Chapter II — What, and of how many kinds, is the probable, the more probable, the safe, and the safer opinion. The genuine sense of the question is proposed

I. The true definition of a probable opinion is this: An assent of the intellect to one part, with fear of the opposite part, on account of a probable motive, as St. Thomas with the other Theologians teaches, I, q. 79, art. 9, ad 4. "Probable" is taken by relation to truth. If this truth lies open to the mind by evident and certain reasons, then the mind elicits a certain and evident assent, and has concerning such truth a certitude free of all fear of the opposite part. If this truth offers itself to the mind by probable reasons only, then the mind forms an opinative assent, that is, a probable opinion. Wherefore probability is the same as verisimilitude.

II. One opinion is called more verisimilar, or more probable, than another, when more solid weights of reason occur for the former than for the latter. Wherefore that is more probable which approaches nearer to the truth. That opinion is named less probable which approaches the truth less, and stands farther from it than the more probable. Before the rise of Probabilism, the more probable opinion alone was held for a probable opinion. For the less probable opinion, in view of the more probable, was not probable to all the ancients — and in very deed is not, as will become plain below. However the matter may stand, our position does not depend upon this distinction.

III. The probable opinion is divided into speculative and practical. This division, taken absolutely, is true. For some sciences are speculative, which halt in speculation and meditation alone; others extend themselves to the work, and are called practical. This distinction many abuse, who call that opinion speculatively probable which regards the action prescinded from its peculiar circumstances, and practically probable that which considers the object, or the action, clothed with its circumstances. Hence they gather that an opinion which was speculatively probable becomes practically improbable on account of the variation of the circumstances. This division, explained in this fashion, Fr. Vasquez rightly impugns, tome I on the I-II, disputation 62, chapter 4, and disputation 65, chapter 1. For when the circumstances are varied in the genus of morals, the opinion does not remain the same, but becomes another. For the same opinion is called speculative inasmuch as it meditates the object with all its circumstances, and halts in speculation alone; but it becomes practical insofar as it directs and commands the execution of the work. For from speculative probability the practical arises; that is, speculative probability itself, by extension, becomes practical, without the variation or diversity of any circumstance.

IV. Again, that opinion is probable from within [ab intrinseco] which rests upon a solid and grave foundation of reason; and it is probable from without [ab extrinseco] when it rests upon the authority of Theologians. This authority must be measured not so much by their number as by their merit, doctrine, and sanctity. Furthermore, one opinion is objectively probable, which is such in itself, inasmuch as it has for itself grave weights of reasons, whether drawn from reason or from authority; and another is called subjectively probable, which so appears to a serious man maturely considering its reasons and foundations. If these reasons be in very truth solid and grave, then the opinion is probable both objectively and subjectively.

V. Finally, one opinion is safe, another safer. The lay and the matrimonial state is safe; the religious state is safer; yet each state is safe. And because Fr. Medina uses this example, on the I-II, question 19, article 6, in explaining the probable and the more probable, he is therefore commonly excused by many from the Probabilism of the Moderns. The use of this distinction, then, has place only when both opinions are certain, but one is more removed from the danger of sinning even materially. Contrition formed by imperfect charity suffices, in the opinion of all, for the Sacrament of penance. This opinion is safe. But if the charity be perfect, the opinion becomes surely safer.

VI. Very many of the unskilled confound the safer opinion with the more probable, and the safe with the less probable. Hence the Probabiliorists are called by the unskilled crowd Tutiorists and Rigorists. But this is a putrid calumny, born of ignorance — and that a supine ignorance. An opinion standing for the law is safer, but not on that account more probable. For that opinion is called safer which more removes a man from the danger of sinning. If, however, it be sometimes asserted that such an opinion binds a man to its execution, it will be false and improbable. More safely, surely, will a man keep chastity if he never look upon or address women; and more safely will he abstain from usury if he enter into no contracts. But if you would absolutely bind men to abstain from converse with all women, and from every contract, the opinion is utterly improbable and false. For the safer opinion and the more probable opinion flow from diverse principles: the latter from a greater approach to the truth, and from graver weights of reasons; the former from a greater withdrawal from the danger of sinning.

VII. Lastly, probability is divided into the probability of conscience and the probability of impunity. The probability of conscience is that of which we have spoken hitherto. The probability of impunity is that which books enjoy that are published with the approbation of the Revisers or Censors — which probability by no means suffices for forming a probable conscience. Wherefore the following opinion was proscribed by Alexander VII: If a Book be that of some more recent and modern author, its opinion ought to be considered probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the apostolic See as improbable. Hence it is plain under how great an ignorance they labor who blurt out: The Book is approved; therefore its opinion enjoys probability. This mere probability of impunity is enjoyed by many constitutions of the Regular Orders, which have been approved in common form, but not in specific form. By this latter approbation, with solemn rite, all the opinions and laws contained in the book are discussed and approved one by one. Whether by this approbation in specific form, as they say, any constitutions of Orders have been approved, I do not know. Commonly they have been approved in common form; and then they enjoy only the probability of impunity. Wherefore, just as in other books approved in common form, so also in these constitutions improbable opinions can occur. And then the pontifical approbations are ineptly alleged, that such improbable opinions may be maintained as probable with the probability of conscience, when they are only probable with the probability of impunity.

VIII. The argument about which the disputation is instituted, and which runs through the whole of Theology, is of this kind. Someone doubts whether some action be morally evil, that is, prohibited by the divine law. He recognizes that grave and pious Theologians fight with one another on both sides, and contradict each other. All things having been maturely weighed, by proofs drawn both from reason and from authority, he finds and judges it more verisimilar that such an action is vicious: he sees that the foundations which prove the malice and prohibition of the action are the graver, and outweigh the foundations of the opposite opinion, which stands for the honesty of that same action. It is asked whether he can, rejecting the more probable, embrace the less probable opinion, and freely execute the aforesaid action.

IX. The Antiprobabilists deny it. The Probabilists on the contrary affirm it, and defend the position that the use of either opinion is licit, so that the Christian can choose whichever he prefers: the more probable, indeed, by the counsel of greater perfection; but the less probable by the liberty of election, since no precept urges to the former.