Question — Merkelbach, Pastoral Questions

Question II: Concerning Sins Against Reverence for God

¶4599.

I. Matter to be treated. - Sins committed against reverence for God are prohibited in a general way by the second precept of the Decalogue. They are very many; among them blasphemies, imprecations, and illicit oaths come more often to be attended to and healed by the confessor.1

1 Concerning these matters see all moralists. Especially to be seen are: Aertnijs, Th. M., I, l. II, concerning the second precept, n. 64 sq., Th. P., nn. 80-83; Reuter, Neo-conf., nn. 118, 185-186; Marc, Th. M., I, nn. 596-613; Haine, Th. M., I, concerning the second precept, nn. 39-59; Genicot, Th. M., I, nn. 292-303; Prummer, Th. M., II, n. 437 sq. and 529 sq.

¶4600.

II. Notions concerning blasphemy.2 - Blasphemy is insulting speech against God, whether it immediately touches God Himself, or mediately through the saints or other creatures, insofar as their dishonoring redounds upon God.

2 We are content with a brief and simple exposition and recollection of notions; for a more profound and accurate notion we refer to our work: Summa Theologiae Moralis, II, n. 781 sq.

¶4601.

It can be committed chiefly in five ways:

¶4602.
  1. to attribute to God what is repugnant to Him, for example that He is cruel, a tyrant, unfaithful, lying;
¶4603.
  1. to deny what belongs to Him, for example that He does not provide concerning human things; such is the expression: Whether God wills or not! or: Malgre Dieu;
¶4604.
  1. to say true things but in an insulting or mocking manner, or with indignation or anger against God, for example: Bah! the goodness of God; or: blood of Christ; Bah! Thou who destroyest the temple of God; Thou hast suffered!; Thou hast conquered, Galilean;
¶4605.
  1. to attribute to a creature what is proper to God alone, for example to say: I would do this as well as God; or to call the devil omnipotent, more faithful;
¶4606.
  1. to utter abusive words against the saints or other creatures with a special relation to God, for example: Blessed Mary is not a virgin, she is a mother like the rest.
¶4607.

By reason of the sense of the words, blasphemy:

¶4608.

a) is sometimes heretical, which states a heresy or falsity against faith, for example: God does not wish or is not able to help me;

¶4609.

b) sometimes imprecatory, by which evil is wished to God immediately or mediately, for example: cursed be God! - may God perish!

¶4610.

c) sometimes dishonoring or simple, which contains only insult and is customarily uttered in the manner of despising or indignation, for example to say in this manner: the name of God!; Hail, king of the Jews; the blood or death of Christ; or also to spit into heaven, to trample on a cross.

¶4611.

On the part of intention, one kind is directly intended or diabolical, which is done from the explicit intention of dishonoring God and inflicting insult upon Him; another is indirectly intended, when it is done with sufficient deliberation without the express purpose of dishonoring God.

¶4612.

III. Principles for judging the malice of blasphemy. - The following points especially come to be attended to:

¶4613.
  1. Blasphemy against God is a most grave mortal sin from its whole genus, because it inflicts the highest injury upon the supreme Majesty, even if it is mediated through the saints or creatures. If nevertheless the saints were not regarded as saints, but as men, without considering their relation to God, there would not be blasphemy properly so called against religion, but a sin against dulia alone, mortal from its genus, which admits smallness of matter, for example if it were done in jest and without contempt or indignation against the saints.
¶4614.
  1. Those expressions are blasphemous which, either from their proper signification, or from the common acceptation of the words, or from the mind of the one uttering them, inflict injury upon divine honor.
¶4615.
  1. For the sin of blasphemy a direct intention of dishonoring God is not required, but the assertive utterance of a blasphemous word suffices; consequently he blasphemes who deliberately utters a word which turns to the reproach of God, even if he speaks it from anger against neighbor alone.
¶4616.
  1. To utter corrupted or halved words is not blasphemous by force of their proper signification, because for this it is necessary that the expression have a complete sense insulting against God: thus, for example, sacre nom, santo di, saterment, sangi de Dio, jarnidie, potverdomme, sangbleu. In these cases the conscience of the one uttering them and the mode of uttering them are to be attended to.
¶4617.
  1. Equivocal expressions are not blasphemous, at least of themselves, for example: sacred name of God; it is as true as God; but the sense depends upon the intention of the one uttering it and the circumstances. Thus in the expression: true as God, the created and uncreated truth are not necessarily equated, but only a likeness mixed with some hyperbole is indicated.
¶4618.
  1. To utter sacred words nakedly from anger or indignation, not against God but against men or creatures, is not blasphemous: the name of God, sainte croix.
¶4619.
  1. In our regions there are formulas which of themselves are not blasphemous, though by their proper signification they can be insulting against God, because generally they are not held by men as blasphemous, for example: mort Dieu, mille Dieu, mille nom de Dieu, sacre milliard de Dieu, tausend Herr Gott, tausend sakrament!
¶4620.

IV. Applications. - 1. To curse creatures (saints, priests, creatures considered in themselves, the devil) is not blasphemous, unless it is done insofar as they have a special relation to God. "Hence," says Marc, Th. M., I, n. 598, 3: "a) it is blasphemy to curse the saints, sacraments, sacred days or things, the Catholic faith, the Church of God, or even priests insofar as they are ministers of God; b) but to curse creatures insofar as they are creatures is not blasphemy, unless the word God is added, for example, cursed be the rain of God; or unless divine power shines forth in them in a peculiar way, as the soul, heaven, the whole world, etc.; in which case in them He would be indirectly contemned; c) to curse a man, living or dead, without uttering the word soul, is not blasphemy, unless the intention of the speaker refers the curse to souls; wherefore to say: may God damn me, may God damn you, is not of itself blasphemy, but a dire imprecation; d) to curse the devil, as author of evils, is not blasphemy; e) in anger to imprecate against oneself or others the devil, thunderbolts, etc., is likewise a dire imprecation, which for the most part, because of defect of serious will, is only venial fault. Nevertheless it is grave irreverence if subjects thus curse superiors, children parents, even if only materially, especially to the face."

¶4621.
  1. The French expression Sacre Nom de Dieu from its proper and absolute signification can be taken in a good or bad sense, either as: blessed..., or as: execrable or cursed be the name of God. The sense depends upon the intention of the one uttering it. Nevertheless commonly it is not blasphemous, because those uttering it abstract from any sense whatever of the word, and ordinarily are indignant not against God but against men or creatures.
¶4622.
  1. The Flemish expression God verdomme of itself is not blasphemy, but an imprecation which signifies: May God damn, or may God damn me; hence of itself it is venial, but mortal if someone seriously imprecated eternal damnation against himself.3

3 This also holds concerning the English expression: God damn me; but something altogether different must be said concerning the formula: God be damned, which signifies: let God be damned.

¶4623.
  1. The vain usurpation of the name of God in the manner of an oath, for example per Deum, par Dieu, bij God, or in the manner of an interjection, for example, the name of God!, without indignation against God, is venial.
¶4624.

V. Practical rules for confessors. - 1. Those who accuse themselves in confession of blasphemies are often excused from mortal sin: a) because the expressions do not have a complete sense but are corrupted, and those uttering them do not have the intention of blaspheming or dishonoring God; or b) because they are equivocal expressions or rather non-serious imprecations; or c) because they are uttered without sufficient advertence and perfect consent, for example from a sudden movement of anger, or sudden pain; or d) because on account of their ignorance they do not understand the expressions and for the most part do not judge themselves to sin mortally.

¶4625.
  1. As regards blasphemies uttered from custom, a distinction must be made: those who have not yet retracted the custom are easily to be blamed for blasphemies which they seem to utter inadvertently, if the formulas are truly blasphemous, because they are voluntary in their cause, and often in themselves on account of sufficient advertence; on the contrary, those who have retracted the custom and have seriously proposed to amend themselves, and have applied themselves to this by using means for this purpose, are not in the cause with respect to blasphemies which they utter inadvertently. See n. IX.
¶4626.
  1. Let confessors beware lest they hear the fictitious excuses of blasphemers as legitimate: I do not utter the words with the mind of dishonoring God but from custom or anger. For the custom must be taken away and anger expressed otherwise.
¶4627.
  1. Penitents are to be questioned a) concerning the words uttered: for often they confuse imprecations, curses, oaths, and blasphemies; and moreover it must be established whether the blasphemies proceeded from infidelity, desperation, or anger against God or the saints; b) concerning the times and occasion, so that they may thus know whether they are recidivists or in an occasion; c) concerning circumstances: whether they did this before children, servants, or others, because then scandal is present.
¶4628.
  1. The confessor must take great care not to condemn as certainly sinful what in itself is doubtful; likewise lest those who sin gravely because of erroneous conscience be left in their error. Hence those who accuse themselves of equivocal expressions, such as: sacred name of God, or of imprecations which by many are held as blasphemies, such as: may God damn me, are to be questioned concerning what sense they attributed to them; and if they did not pronounce them from an explicit intention of dishonoring God, it is to be said that those formulas are not blasphemous, but are to be left as venial things.
¶4629.
  1. For amendment the cause of the evil is to be considered. Blasphemies arise from irreverence toward God, from anger, from custom; these therefore are to be removed: irreverence, by considering the rights of God to our reverence, and the enormity, temerity, and uselessness of blasphemy; anger, by removing the causes which excite it and disposing oneself as far as possible to tolerate any injuries whatever; custom, by frequently renewing the purpose not to blaspheme (for example every morning) and by praying to this end, by imposing upon oneself some penance each time (for example a small alms, an act of contrition, striking the breast, asking pardon, an ejaculatory prayer, etc.), by not mixing the name of God into expressions, by substituting innocent expressions, etc. The confessor will opportunely be able to impose a penance to be recited for 7 or 14 days.
¶4630.

VI. Notions and principles concerning imprecations. - An imprecation or curse is an act by which someone calls down evil upon another under the aspect of evil. This sin is not always opposed to divine reverence, religion, and the second precept of the Decalogue, but only when it imports a dishonoring of God; otherwise it will be against charity or also justice, and thus against the precepts of the second table, for example against the fifth or eighth. Hence in particular:

¶4631.

A. Against religion and the second precept of the Decalogue are, and are grave sin:

¶4632.
  1. imprecations directed immediately against God, because they are great imprecatory blasphemy;
¶4633.
  1. likewise imprecations against creatures, but considered in relation to God, because then the curse redounds upon God: this easily happens concerning wind, rain, heaven, thunder, the whole world, etc., for example, cursed be the rain of God; and almost always concerning sacred things or persons; if nevertheless holy persons are considered in themselves, the sin will not be against religion but against dulia;
¶4634.
  1. likewise curses against creatures considered in themselves, but by something divine or holy which exists not for cursing but for blessing, for example: may God's blood, death, head, wounds, passion, etc., destroy you.
¶4635.

B. They are not against religion, but against charity of neighbor and justice:

¶4636.
  1. to curse rational creatures or any neighbors whatever considered without relation to God, which is mortal sin from its genus, if it is done from the heart; otherwise it will be venial, as for the most part happens: thus, for example, may the devil carry you off, may God damn you;
¶4637.
  1. likewise to curse irrational creatures insofar as they serve the utility of men, for example cattle, because in fact this is to curse men;
¶4638.
  1. much more to curse parents, which is not only mortal if a grave evil is wished seriously, but sometimes if a light evil is wished, because it is also great irreverence against piety; likewise to curse children or before children, which in parents is also a sin against piety, because they easily provide scandal and are the cause that children thereafter have no reverence and obedience toward them; likewise to curse superiors, especially when present, which also easily is grave and against observance.
¶4639.

C. To imprecate evil upon oneself is against charity toward oneself, which is mortal from its genus if it is done seriously; otherwise it is venial: thus, for example, may God damn me.

¶4640.

D. It is not a sin of itself, on account of an honorable end:

¶4641.
  1. to curse the devil as author of evils, unless sometimes by reason of immoderate anger or scandal;
¶4642.
  1. to curse irrational creatures insofar as they are the cause of evil, unless by reason of impatience or anger.
¶4643.

E. Of itself it is vain and idle, and by this reason venial: to curse irrational creatures considered according to themselves.

¶4644.

Observation. - The custom of imprecating is to be extirpated: under mortal sin if the imprecations are against God; under venial sin if imprecations against men are pronounced without intention.

¶4645.

VII. Notions and principles concerning the morality of an oath. - An oath is the invocation of the divine name in testimony of truth, whether this is done directly, by immediately invoking God, or indirectly by means of creatures considered in relation to God (for example by faith, the cross, the Gospel, etc.); whether God is invoked as witness for manifesting truth (a contestatory or invocatory oath), or also as judge for punishing falsity (an execratory oath), as in the very well-known oath: so I swear, so may God help me.

¶4646.

On the part of matter, an oath can be merely assertory if only an affirmation is stated, or also promissory if a promise is also affirmed.

¶4648.
  1. Three conditions are required for the liceity of an oath:
¶4649.

a) Truth, which excludes not material error but lying, so that the assertion is conformed to the actual mind of the one swearing, and the promise is also made with the present intention of fulfilling it.

¶4650.

b) Justice or honesty, so that the assertion made under oath is lawful, or also the thing promised itself.

¶4651.

c) Judgment or discretion, so that the oath is not made vainly and lightly but on account of a grave motive, and moreover the thing promised is in the power of the one swearing.

¶4652.
  1. A fictitious oath without the intention of swearing, the first two conditions being verified, is reduced to an oath without judgment, as the expression usual among us: by God.
¶4653.
  1. If some condition is lacking, to swear is a sin; and indeed:
¶4654.

a) A false oath, without truth, is mortal sin from its whole genus, because it is grave direct irreverence against God, who is supposed either not to know something or to be able to testify to falsity; this is perjury strictly so called.

¶4655.

b) An iniquitous oath, without justice, if it is promissory, is mortal sin, because it makes God the patron of sin; if it is merely assertory, it is of itself venial, unless it is directly used as a means of sinning, for example to affirm impure love in order to seduce a girl, because this is to make God a cooperator in sin.

¶4656.

c) An incautious oath, without judgment, is of itself venial, and is not mortal except by reason of scandal or danger.

¶4657.

VIII. Observations. - 1. One who accuses himself of oaths is to be questioned concerning what words he used, especially if he is unlearned. For often they say that they have sworn when they have simply affirmed something more firmly without any intention of invoking God as witness, for example by saying: God knows; God sees my conscience; I speak before God; it is as true as I sit, as the sun shines, as God, as the Gospel; I swear; I expose my head, may my ears be cut off if it is not so; indeed by my soul (mijn ziel), because ordinarily they do not regard the special relation between the soul and God. All these things of themselves are not oaths; unless nevertheless someone wished to invoke God as witness or avenger.

¶4658.
  1. In this matter, the formulas and common estimation must be attended to most of all, for there are usual formulas which are not oath-formulas, and, on the contrary, there are truly oath-formulas which by common estimation are not such.
¶4659.
  1. Since the whole matter depends upon the intention of the one swearing, the confessor a) should question him clearly, not indeed: whether he wished to swear (jurer, zweren), but more distinctly: whether he wished to offer an oath (faire serment, zijnen eed doen); b) should teach that for an oath there is required the intention of invoking God as witness; c) should turn him away from using formulas even doubtful and uttered without the intention of swearing, on account of irreverence toward God and the danger of scandal and deception.
¶4660.

IX. The custom or habit of blaspheming, imprecating, and swearing is evil, because it proximately inclines to sinning, namely to blasphemies, imprecations, or false, dishonorable, vain oaths. Hence there is an obligation of removing it (Eccli. XXIII, 9; Mt. V, 34); and he sins who voluntarily acquires such a habit or neglects to eliminate it: internally in affection, as often as, adverting to the obligation of retracting the habit, he does not retract it; externally and in effect, as often as from the habit he utters vicious oaths sufficiently foreseen by morally interrupted acts.

¶4661.

He sins gravely if by the custom he is disposed to blaspheme, to imprecate gravely, or to swear anything whatever indiscriminately, even false and gravely dishonorable things; lightly if he is disposed only to a vain usurpation of the name of God, to lightly evil imprecations, or to vain or lightly dishonorable oaths.

¶4662.

One who swears from custom:

¶4663.

a) either attends to the act of swearing and to its defect, and then the vicious oath is voluntary in itself;

¶4664.

b) or attends only to the act of swearing and not to its defect, and then the oath is gravely or lightly culpable in its cause, namely in the custom, as was said;

¶4665.

c) or attends to nothing, and then properly he does not swear because the intention of swearing is lacking; but nevertheless the expression is voluntary in its cause, or custom, and culpable insofar as externally it sounds like an evil oath or at least a vain usurpation of the name of God;

¶4666.

d) or, if he has efficaciously retracted the custom, the oath is neither voluntary in its cause nor a sin.

¶4667.

The custom is retracted by the will by which someone is sorry for it and proposes to himself to employ efficacious means for removing it, which purpose he usefully renews several times; but if after the purpose he does not employ the means, the custom again becomes indirectly voluntary for him, because he shows that he does not wish to remove it.