Question Six: Concerning Artificial Premature Delivery

I. Acceleration of delivery is the artificial expulsion from the mother's uterus of a fetus not fully mature but already viable, so that he can live outside the uterus.

It is not illicit if it is done for just causes and at that time and in those ways by which, according to things ordinarily happening, provision is made for the lives of the mother and fetus (S. Off., 4 May 1898). The reason is that, on the one hand, it is not the killing of the infant, since he can live, but only some danger for mother and offspring is present, and yet not so imminent; on the other hand, the fetus is compelled to undergo a small danger to life on account of grave compensating reasons.

Nevertheless it is illicit if it is done without sufficient reason, since it is not licit rashly to break off the course of nature and to incur some danger except in order to preserve the mother or offspring from a greater danger; but the extracted infant is weak, and therefore delivery is not without some danger for his life. Hence the less grave the danger of the mother is, the greater probability, or as it were moral certainty, is required that the infant will continue to live. And the graver the danger for the fetus from prolongation of gestation is, the more easily delivery can be accelerated or another operation instituted, e.g., Caesarean section.

II. In practice, artificial delivery is licit in a threefold case:

1. whenever it is foreseen that the offspring, if he arrives at the normal term, cannot be born naturally because of the narrowness of the mother, because then he will be in greater danger;

2. whenever grave danger to the life of the mother or offspring is pressing, unless the fetus be brought forth by accelerated delivery, because then the danger of the mother to be turned away is greater than the danger to which the infant is exposed from accelerated delivery;

3. whenever the fetus is foreseen otherwise to be going to die without Baptism, because the good of the soul prevails.

Nevertheless one must wait, as far as can be done, the danger and circumstances having been considered, so that provision may be made for the life of the infant, as much as possible. Hence:¹

¹ Cf. Antonelli, o. c., t. I, n. 448.

a) in narrownesses of the pelvis, in time of grave disease, when the fetus is hydrocephalic, the procuring of premature delivery around the seventh or eighth month is licit, because only in this way can provision be made for the life of the mother and infant, and a longer gestation would expose both to greater danger;

b) likewise in the case of tuberculosis or very grave phthisis of the lungs, if grave danger of death is present for both; for delivery tends to lessen the mother's pains and to preserve the fetus;²

² Thus according to the doctrine generally admitted up to now. Now, however, certain physicians, in the case of tuberculosis, say that pregnancy is not harmful.

c) if it is uncertain whether the fetus can live, one must wait, unless the gravely sick mother cannot wait because of imminent danger to life; for then acceleration will be licit, provided there is true probability that the fetus can live, because there is no other means of providing for the life of each, and, for turning away the certain harm of the mother, the fetus can be exposed to probable danger.

III. The mother is also obliged, if there is no other way of providing for mother and offspring. Nevertheless, there is no obligation 1) if Baptism can be conferred in the mother's uterus; 2) if the mother is robust and wishes to undergo the Caesarean operation.