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Absolution of an accomplice
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Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Vol. III, Book Fifth. On Penance., Ch. III, Q. II, Article Three. Concerning Absolution of One's Own Accomplice.
1 Famous is the constitution of Benedict XIV, Sacramentum poenitentiae (June 1, 1741), for the declaration of which the same pontiff afterward issued the constitution Apostolici muneris (February 8, 1745) and, on March 17, 1749, issued the third constitution Inter praeteritos. That constitution chiefly contains three things: concerning solicitation in confession, concerning calumnious denunciation of the confessor as if soliciting, and concerning absolution of an accomplice. And since in these constitutions it is chiefly provided, not only that delinquents be punished, but especially that worthy administration of the sacrament of penance be procured: the highest indecency is found in this, that a priest hears the confession of a person with whom he committed shameful sin and so acts as judge in a crime of which he himself is a participant; and the highest indecency likewise is contained in this, that further confessions are heard by a priest soliciting in confession, since he who rushes headlong into spiritual ruin ought to absolve and preserve another from sin. Finally, the supreme pontiff also intended to remove the dangers of sinning: for a new temptation and likewise a repeated delict must always be feared in a confessor who solicits or absolves an accomplice.
1 Aertnys, De sollicitatione et absolutione complicis (Faenza, Novelli, 1897). Ian. Bucceroni, Commentarius in constitutionem Benedicti XIV Sacramentum poenitentiae (Rome: Typogr. prop. fid., 1888).
369. Declarations. 1. An accomplice is said to be one who commits the same sin (a shameful sin) with another, whether both act, as in mutual touches and conversations, or only one acts, e.g., one touches the other and this one consents and manifests consent externally. But he who externally does not resist is already considered to manifest consent externally.
a. Hence complicity properly so called is not had if a priest sins with one sleeping, drunk, insane, or unwilling; for the law speaks of formal complicity, for which the consent of both parties in the same sin is required.
b. To incur the case of complicity, immediate complicity in the shameful action itself is required; cooperation, however proximate, toward the shameful sin of another does not suffice.
By the person who is an accomplice is understood anyone with whom the priest committed a shameful sin, whether female or male or a boy, even not yet pubescent, indeed even a person with whom the priest sinned before receiving priesthood;1 for the bull says: whatever person is the accomplice.
Under the name of shameful sin is comprehended any sin against the sixth precept, even if it was not consummated by copula, indeed even if it is only a shameful touch or glance or an immodest conversation.2 But it is required that the sin be, on both sides, certain, external, and grave, both by reason of the internal act and by reason of the external act.
Hence that complicity of which the pontifical constitution speaks is not had if the sins are only internal, or only venial either internally or externally, or only doubtful, whether with doubt of law or doubt of fact.
1 Holy Penitentiary, January 22, 1879.
2 Holy Office, May 18, 1873.
370. Concerning the Forbidden Absolution of One's Own Accomplice. 1. Absolution of an accomplice in a shameful sin is not only gravely illicit but also invalid, except in danger of death.1
a. The cited canon does not change those things which are contained on this matter in the bull Sacramentum poenitentiae. Therefore the confessor is deprived of jurisdiction over the shameful sin of complicity, but not also over the other sins of the same penitent. Therefore if the penitent confesses other sins before the confessor-accomplice directly, the sins of complicity are remitted indirectly, provided the penitent is rightly disposed.
b. Whether the priest-accomplice lacks jurisdiction over his accomplice as regards the sin of complicity perpetually, or only until this sin has been directly remitted, is not established. I would say that a confessor-accomplice can absolve the penitent-accomplice not only from other sins but also from the sin of complicity after this has already once been directly remitted. In this sense most authors have explained the bull Sacramentum poenitentiae.
c. If the priest-accomplice absolves his own accomplice in good faith, either because he is ignorant that he lacks jurisdiction, or because he does not advert that the penitent is his own accomplice, the absolution is invalid, because no ignorance of invalidating or incapacitating laws excuses from those laws.2
d. If the penitent-accomplice who is absolved by the priest-accomplice is in good faith, and likewise if he does not declare the sin of complicity, the other sins are remitted directly and the sins of complicity indirectly.
- A confessor-accomplice:
a. who absolves, or pretends to absolve, an accomplice in a shameful sin incurs by that very fact an excommunication reserved to the apostolic see in a most special manner;
b. incurs the same also when absolving, or pretending to absolve, an accomplice in the article of death, if another priest, even one not approved, can hear the confession of the dying person without grave infamy and scandal, excepting the case in which the dying person refuses to confess to another;
c. finally incurs the same when absolving, or pretending to absolve, an accomplice who does not confess the sin of complicity from which he has not yet been absolved, but so conducts himself because he has been induced to this by the confessor-accomplice, whether directly or indirectly.3
Note. The confessor-accomplice must be warned never to hear the confession of his accomplice outside necessity; if, however, the latter confesses to him after having already been absolved by another from the sin of complicity, he is absolved validly, indeed even licitly, unless this has been prohibited to him by the particular law of the diocese or by the Sacred Penitentiary.
1 Cn. 884.
2 Cn. 16, 1.
3 Cn. 2367, 1, 2. The excommunication is explained in the booklet De Poenis ecclesiasticis. But the penitent-accomplice incurs no penalty, nor is his sin reserved by common law.
371. When a Priest Can Validly and Licitly Absolve His Own Accomplice:
a. In the article or danger of death: a. if no other priest is present or can be called, not even a simple one; b. if another refuses to hear the confession of the dying person; g. if the dying person refuses to confess to another, so that a sacrilegious confession is to be feared; d. if another priest cannot be called without grave scandal or infamy of the priest-accomplice.1
This is clear from the bull of the holy pontiff, who confers jurisdiction on the priest-accomplice lest the dying person perish. Nevertheless, in this case the priest-accomplice is bound to forestall the danger of scandal or infamy, if he can, e.g., by withdrawing under some pretext; but if he omits to do this, though he can, or if he invents a danger of scandal or infamy where there is none, he indeed absolves validly, lest the dying person perish, but he acts illicitly and incurs the censure.
b. In gravest necessity. Although the supreme pontiff by the law itself excepts only extreme necessity, nevertheless by epikeia the priest can absolve his own accomplice also in gravest necessity. For it is scarcely credible that the supreme pontiff wished that this law, although prohibiting and invalidating, should also oblige in circumstances of this kind; wherefore in cases of gravest necessity the law is rightly said to suffer an exception.2
a. The authors imagine this case of gravest necessity: a woman has fallen into a shameful sin with a priest and has no other priest there with whom she may confess, and the circumstances of persons, place, etc., are such that she cannot turn elsewhere to seek a confessor, nor does any hope shine forth that another priest will ever come there (which can happen in mission places);3 or the precept of annual confession and communion urges this woman-accomplice; she cannot omit the reception of the sacraments without grave scandal and infamy, but no other confessor is present, nor can the woman move to another place to seek a confessor.
b. This exception will be granted all the more easily because the human law, although invalidating, collides not only with the natural law of avoiding scandal and with the natural right of avoiding infamy, but also with the divine law commanding holy communion to be received at times; further, because otherwise the woman would have to lack the benefit of absolution for a very long time, indeed perhaps through her whole life until death, which is altogether foreign to the mind of the Church.
1 Cn. 2367.
2 Cf. Gury-Ballerini at n. 587.
3 Moreover, in a case of gravest necessity the confessor can seek the faculty of absolving an accomplice, and it is not necessary that he reveal himself; for he can seek the faculty under a covered name and use the faculty once obtained. Bucceroni n. 49.
Slater, Manual of Moral Theology
Vol. II, Bk. VI, Chapter XI. De Abusu Sacramenti Poenitentiae
Ex eadem Constitutione Benedicti XIV, Sacramentum Poenitentiae, confessarius poenitentem quocum peccatum grave contra castitatem commiserit a peccato complicem absolvere nequit; (By the same Constitution of Benedict XIV, Sacramentum Poenitentiae, a confessor cannot absolve from the sin an accomplice with whom he has committed a grave sin against chastity;) qui autem talem complicem absolvere attentat in casum incidit specialissimo modo reservatum Romano Pontifici. Eandem poenam incurrit qui se absolvere fingit vel, sive directe sive indirecte, complicem inducit ad peccatum complicitatis tacendum quum ad confessionem venit. Si vero poenitens bona fide vel inadvertenter peccatum complicitatis omiserit dum complici confitetur valide ab eo absolvitur. Idem videtur dicendum si complex ab alio sacerdote directe a peccato complicitatis jam absolutus idem peccatum postea tamquam materiam liberam sacerdoti complici confitetur. Praestat autem ut sacerdos complex nunquam confessionem complicis excipiat nisi in casu necessitatis (Can. (The same penalty is incurred by one who pretends to absolve, or who, either directly or indirectly, induces the accomplice to keep silent about the sin of complicity when coming to confession. But if the penitent in good faith or inadvertently has omitted the sin of complicity while confessing to the accomplice, he is validly absolved by him. The same seems to be said if the accomplice, already directly absolved from the sin of complicity by another priest, afterwards confesses that same sin as free matter to the accomplice priest. It is better, however, that an accomplice priest should never hear the confession of his accomplice except in a case of necessity.) 884, 2367).
Complex vero in peccato turpi hic intelligitur qui interne et externe grave peccatum contra castitatem sive verbis sive aspectu sive facto cum sacerdote etiam ante sacerdotium susceptum commiserit. Ut incurratur censura absolutio debet esse formalis ita ut sacerdos sciat se absolvere poenitentem complicem, vel saltem ut ejus ignorantia sit crassa et supina. Requiritur etiam ut poenitens cognoverit se peccasse cum hoc sacerdote sive in actu peccati sive saltem ante absolutionem acceptam, quamvis non sit necessarium ut poenitens confessarium in actu confessionis agnoscat. Sacerdos igitur qui larvatus et incognitus cum muliere peccavit eam adhuc ignorantem suum complicem absolvere valide potest, nam aliter sese proderet poenitenti ac alii confessario ad quem poenitens absolutionis causa accederet. (By an accomplice in a sin of impurity is here understood one who, internally and externally, has committed a grave sin against chastity with the priest — whether by words, by looks, or by deed — even before the priesthood was received. For the censure to be incurred the absolution must be formal, so that the priest knows that he is absolving a penitent who is his accomplice, or at least so that his ignorance is crass and supine. It is also required that the penitent should have known that she sinned with this priest, either in the act of the sin or at least before absolution was received, although it is not necessary that the penitent should recognise the confessor in the act of confession. A priest, therefore, who sinned with a woman while masked and unrecognised can validly absolve her while she is still unaware that he is her accomplice; for otherwise he would betray himself to the penitent and to another confessor to whom the penitent might go for absolution.)
In articulo seu periculo mortis absolutio complicis data a complice sacerdote semper est valida ne anima pereat, ait Benedictus XIV. Praeterea complex moribundus qui nequit aut non vult alteri sacerdoti confiteri licite etiam a complice sacerdote absolvitur. Si vero alius sacerdos etiam non approbatus adsit, vel sine infamia et scandalo advocari possit ad confessionem accipiendam, sacerdos qui complicem in periculo mortis constitutum absolvat excommunicationem non evitat. (Moreover a dying accomplice who cannot, or will not, confess to another priest may lawfully be absolved even by the accomplice priest. But if another priest, even one not approved, is at hand, or can be called without infamy and scandal to receive the confession, a priest who absolves an accomplice placed in danger of death does not escape the excommunication.)
In locis remotis ubi complex alium confessarium habere nequit, et in periculo est ne sine absolutione discedat e vita, potest probabiliter a complice absolvi ne anima pereat. Poterit etiam sacerdos facultatem obtinere ut complicem in tanta necessitate absolvat. (A priest will also be able to obtain the faculty of absolving an accomplice in so great a necessity.)
THE confessor does not satisfy his obligations merely by absolving the penitents who come to him, and refusing absolution to those who are not properly disposed. In the confessional he holds the place of Christ for the reconciliation of sinners with God; he is also the minister of the sacrament, and as such he is bound to see that it is validly and lawfully received by the penitent. In other words, as theologians say, the confessor is the spiritual father, doctor, counsellor, and judge of his penitents. Something must be said on each of these heads (Can. 888, sec. 1).
Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. I, Ch. II, Art. I, § VI. On the Office of Rendering Sentence · Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. I, Ch. II, Art. II, § I. On Inquiry into the Name of an Accomplice · Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. I, Ch. II, Art. II, § II. On Absolution of an Accomplice
Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. I, Ch. II, Art. I, § VI. On the Office of Rendering Sentence
II. For those doubtfully disposed, absolution of itself must be deferred (n. 398); but for a grave reason it can or even must be granted, but only under condition.
Those are understood as doubtfully disposed who, after paternal admonition, are not indeed held as certainly indisposed, but nevertheless do not bring those signs of penance which found broad moral certitude about due disposition.
A grave reason is had: 1. if someone is in danger of death; 2. if the penitent judges that he is disposed and it is prudently feared that, if absolution is delayed, he will become alienated from the sacraments and waste away in sins, or, for example by communicating or entering marriage, will commit another sacrilege (St. Alphonsus, VI, 432, 4).
Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. I, Ch. II, Art. II, § I. On Inquiry into the Name of an Accomplice
Canon 888, § 2 establishes: "Let the confessor take care altogether not to inquire into the name of an accomplice." This canon takes the place of the ecclesiastical documents1 which before the Code governed this matter. Therefore, of itself it is forbidden to induce the penitent to reveal the name of an accomplice, and indeed under grave sin or, as commonly happens, under light sin, according as, considering the rules on defamation of neighbor (vol. I, n. 1069), it is grave or light to reveal the sin of a third person to one upright man. Scandal can be added, and the danger that the penitent may be somewhat alienated from the sacrament. Moreover, of itself it is always a grave sin to inquire into the name of an accomplice under denial of absolution.
And so the matter stands of itself, since, when a proportionate cause is added, inquiry into the name becomes licit.
Corollary I. It is lawful for the confessor to inquire into the name of an accomplice if the penitent is bound from another source to denounce the accomplice, and either the confessor is the superior to whom the accomplice must be denounced, or the denunciation cannot conveniently be made except through the mediation of the confessor, who has been made certain of the accomplice's name. But commonly, even in these cases, it is better that the name be revealed outside confession. If it is done through the mediation of the confessor, it can commonly be done without the name of the accomplice being manifested to the confessor, namely by handing to him a closed note on which the name of the accomplice is written, or even by handing to the confessor a closed note which contains both the facts to be manifested and the name of the accomplice, and which is handed over by the confessor to the one to whom it belongs by law.
Corollary II. The confessor can and must question the penitent insofar as the integrity of confession and the prudent ministration of the sacrament require it, even if from this he comes to knowledge of the accomplice, as was explained in n. 328 (St. Alphonsus, VI, 491, 492).
1 The documents were: the Constitutions Suprema of Benedict XIV, July 7, 1745; Ubi primum, June 2, 1746; Ad eradicandum, September 28, 1746; and the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis of Pius IX, October 12, 1869. The law, however, not only prohibited inquiry into the name of an accomplice, but also, when the conditions were posited, established penalties; these have now been removed.
Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. II, Pt. II, Sect. I, Ch. II, Art. II, § II. On Absolution of an Accomplice
The principal documents pertaining here are: canon 884, which refers to the Apostolic Constitutions; the Constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae of Benedict XIV;1 the Brief Apostoli muneris of Benedict XIV;2 the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis of Pius IX;3 canon 2367.
Moreover, considering the documents cited, two things must be distinguished here, namely a certain subtraction of jurisdiction and an excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See in the most special manner. The former is established against the confessor accomplice who absolves the other accomplice party.
1 June 1, 1741.
2 February 8, 1745.
3 October 12, 1869.
1. Subtraction of jurisdiction. Canon 884 establishes: "Absolution of an accomplice in a shameful sin is invalid except in danger of death; and even in danger of death, outside the case of necessity, it is illicit on the part of the confessor according to the norm of the Apostolic Constitutions and especially the Constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae of Benedict XIV, June 1, 1741." We shall speak first of the requisites for subtraction of jurisdiction to have place; then of the way in which subtraction of jurisdiction must be understood; finally we shall assign exceptions to the general rule.
- Requisites for subtraction of jurisdiction to have place. A sin is required:
a) Against chastity. It does not matter whether it is a sin of deed, of sight, or of speech2 (St. Alphonsus, VI, 554).
b) Committed with another, whether with a male or with a female, whether with one mature or one immature, and, as the Sacred Penitentiary3 responded, whether before or after the priesthood was received. Nor does it stand in the way that in the latter case the danger of relapse has almost vanished; for a law which is founded on the presumption of common danger persists, even if in a particular case the danger has ceased. There is added the fact that, besides the danger of relapse to be avoided, other ends of the law are also assigned, such as the indecency of a confession of this kind.
c) Grave, and indeed subjectively and externally. It is nevertheless sufficiently externally grave if it shows grave internal malice (St. Alphonsus, VI, 554).
d) As grave and known to the other party, and indeed at the time when the sin is committed. Otherwise there is not complicity, or participation in the same grave external sin. Moreover, this condition is presumed to be present if the case concerns a mutual act of itself gravely influencing venereal commotion. But if the discussion is of an act not gravely influencing of itself, but posited with lustful intention or with venereal commotion, that intention or commotion must become known from the circumstances; otherwise the act is indeed common, but it is not common insofar as it involves grave sin.
e) Such in both parties as has been described. Hence the case is not present if the other party did not consent, or was ignorant of the malice, even if he or she was led into that error by the accomplice; nor is it present if the sin was committed with one sleeping, with one drunk, or with one not yet possessing the use of reason (St. Alphonsus, VI, 554).
f) That the confessor and the penitent know themselves as accomplices, whether previously, for example at the time of the sin, or now. This is required with sufficient probability, because otherwise it can happen that the confessor would have to defame himself before the penitent. Suppose some person presents herself to the confessor, ignorant that she has sinned with that priest, while the confessor notices that the person is present with whom he perpetrated lust. Otherwise one must speak if the confessor and penitent previously knew themselves as accomplices, and only the penitent did not notice that he or she was confessing to the confessor with whom he or she had sinned.
g) That the aforesaid things are at least morally certain. Doubt sometimes concerns the gravity of a touch, and so forth.
Corollary. When the conditions have been fulfilled, subtraction of jurisdiction has place:
a) Even if the confessor is ignorant of the law which establishes the subtraction of jurisdiction; for "ignorance of invalidating or inhabilitating laws does not excuse from them unless something else is expressly said" (can. 16, § 1), or unless the incapacity is established only by way of penalty, which does not have place in the case, since the law was principally issued so that relapses might be guarded against.
b) Even if the confessor does not recognize the penitent; for if ignorance of an inhabilitating law does not excuse from it, still less does ignorance of the fact on which the application of the law depends. Nor should you object that Benedict XIV takes jurisdiction away from the confessor who "dares to receive the sacramental confession of the accomplice person," but that in our hypothesis rash daring is lacking. For the Supreme Pontiff subtracts jurisdiction from the confessor "lest he dare to receive the confession."
c) Even if the penitent does not notice that he or she is confessing to the confessor with whom he or she sinned, provided nevertheless that the confessor and penitent previously knew themselves as accomplices. For when this latter hypothesis has been fulfilled, the confessor admonishing the penitent does not defame himself.
1 Cf. De Smet, De absolutione complicis et sollicitatione, 2nd ed.
2 Holy Office, May 28, 1873.
3 January 22, 1879.
2. The way in which subtraction of jurisdiction must be understood. a) The confessor certainly cannot directly absolve the accomplice from the sin of complicity as long as another confessor has not yet directly absolved him or her from it. After the sin has been directly remitted, even the confessor accomplice validly absolves directly from it (St. Alphonsus, VI, 555). I said validly, because commonly he acts illicitly; for the Holy See is accustomed to enjoin on one who, when the sin of complicity has not yet been directly remitted, absolves or feigns to absolve an accomplice, that he abstain in the future from hearing the confessions of the accomplice.
b) It is disputed whether jurisdiction has also been taken away with respect to other sins, or whether it persists with respect to them, so that the confessor can absolve directly from the others, and thus indirectly from the sin of complicity. Some affirm simply. Others affirm if the penitent declares the sin of complicity, otherwise they deny. Others simply deny, or judge that jurisdiction persists with respect to other sins. This opinion is sufficiently probable, both because the Constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae declares that jurisdiction has been taken away "for absolving any person whatever from a fault of this kind; so indeed that absolution, if he shall have imparted any, is altogether null and void," namely absolution from that sin, since as not direct it is null as such, so that the sin must be confessed anew and remitted directly; and because the Sacred Penitentiary responded1 that "privation of jurisdiction ... is in order to the shameful sin itself in which the same confessor was an accomplice." This opinion is at least probable, so that the Church supplies for caution.
1 May 16, 1877.
3. Exceptions. a) The confessor validly absolves even from the sin of complicity in danger of death; likewise in the same danger he licitly absolves if necessity urges (the cited documents). It is said:
In danger of death; who are said to be in danger of death, see n. 370.
In danger of death he also absolves licitly if necessity urges, that is: 1. if another, even one not approved, cannot be used without danger of infamy or scandal (can. 2367, § 1).1 Nevertheless, fear of infamy to be incurred before that one confessor, in the confession itself, does not excuse. Moreover, the priest accomplice is bound under grave obligation, if it can be done, to remove or anticipate the danger of infamy or scandal, for example by pretending illness or by going away for some time. Nevertheless, danger of infamy or scandal will easily be present if only one not approved can be called; still more, if only one suspended or excommunicated, known as such, remains. There are even those who judge that the obligation of calling the latter persons is simply absent. Necessity urges: 2. if another refuses to receive the confession; 3. if the penitent refuses to confess to another, for example to a blood-relative, or manifests grave repugnance to doing so, in which case there is danger of sacrilege (can. 2367, § 1). The reason for 2 and 3 is that then another priest is morally absent.
Corollary. One who has begun a confession licitly continues and directly absolves the accomplice from the sin of complicity, even if now another priest can receive the confession: 1. if he began licitly, that is, when another could not conveniently be present, even perhaps because of preceding culpable negligence by the one beginning; 2. with sufficient probability, if he began illicitly, that is, when another could be present. As regards excommunication, however, in the case one must speak thus: if he began licitly, he does not incur excommunication, and this is probable even if he culpably neglected to anticipate the danger which, when he began the confession, could no longer be anticipated. If he began illicitly, that is, when another could conveniently be present, he escapes or does not escape excommunication according as before absolution he repents or does not repent of the sin committed.
b) It is disputed whether the confessor ever validly absolves from the sin of complicity even outside danger of death, for example if the accomplice would for a long time, or at least for a very long time, lack the occasion of confessing to another. Now it seems this must be denied. For the law expressly and repeatedly declares that only danger of death is excepted. So also canon 884. Likewise the Holy Office declared2 that jurisdiction is taken away "unless the most extreme necessity entirely urges, namely if in the very article of death another priest is lacking." Finally, the end of the law, which is that priests be turned away from sin and relapse, advises that the law be urged, even if the penitent sometimes suffers some harm from it. For the rest, that harm scarcely deserves notice, since the penitent in the cases here supposed can be absolved directly from other sins, and thus indirectly from the sin of complicity, as we shall now note.
c) As we said, the confessor enjoys jurisdiction over the other sins of the accomplice (n. 410). Moreover, if a truly grave reason is present and another cannot be approached without grave inconvenience, it is lawful to absolve the accomplice directly from other sins, indirectly from the sin of complicity. A truly grave reason, considering the most severe law which forbids absolution of an accomplice, is, for example, an annual confession to be made, Easter Communion, or another Communion which cannot be omitted without danger of infamy or scandal. Nevertheless, in the case the penitent can also be content with perfect contrition; indeed, this of itself is to be preferred. A grave cause on the part of the confessor is had if the penitent knows the confessor accomplice only by face, not by name, and denial of absolution perhaps brings danger that the name of the confessor will afterward be inquired into.
1 Constitution Apostolici muneris, § 3.
2 February 20, 1867.
II. Excommunication. Canon 2367 establishes: one absolving or feigning to absolve an accomplice in a shameful sin incurs by the very fact an excommunication reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See. And this also in the article of death, if another priest, even one not approved for confessions, can receive the confession of the dying person without some grave infamy and scandal going to arise, except the case in which the dying person refuses to confess to another (§ 1). The one absolving or feigning to absolve an accomplice who indeed does not confess the sin of complicity, from which he or she has not yet been absolved, does not escape the same excommunication if he or she conducts himself or herself in this way because he or she was induced to this either directly or indirectly by the accomplice confessor (§ 2). We shall speak of the requisites for excommunication to be incurred, and of absolution from it, with some things to be noted added.
1. Requisites for excommunication to be incurred. It is required:
a) That, as regards the sin, the things set forth above in n. 409, under I, 1 be present.
b) That the sin of complicity has not yet been directly remitted by another confessor (cf. can. 2367, § 2).
c) That the confessor either has directly absolved or feigned to absolve the accomplice from the sin of complicity, or has absolved or feigned to absolve the accomplice who keeps back the sin of complicity, but does so because he or she has been induced to this by the confessor, either directly or indirectly. It is said:
a) Either has absolved or feigned to absolve; hence it does not suffice that he only received the confession. The fiction, moreover, is required with respect to the penitent, in other words, it is required that with respect to the penitent he acted in such a way that the latter ought to judge that he or she was being absolved. It is not required, nor does it suffice, that only others ought to think that the penitent was being absolved. But it does not matter whether the confessor simulates absolution, that is, pronounces the form without the intention of absolving, or dissembles the denial of absolution by reciting some prayer, or by pronouncing other words, or even by keeping silence, yet in such a way that because of signs or gestures of the hands he seems truly to loose the penitent from sins.
b) Or has directly absolved or feigned to absolve the accomplice from the sin of complicity. Hence he does not incur excommunication who, after the sin of complicity has been declared by the penitent, signifies to the penitent that he can absolve only from other sins, but not from that sin. Nor does one incur excommunication who absolves or feigns to absolve an accomplice who keeps back the sin of complicity, except in the case now to be assigned.
c) Or has absolved or feigned to absolve an accomplice who keeps back the sin of complicity, but does so because he or she has been induced to this by the confessor, either directly or indirectly;1 although in the case the confessor neither directly absolves nor feigns to absolve directly from the sin of complicity, nevertheless excommunication is contracted.
d) That the confessor, if he absolved the accomplice, has acted objectively illicitly. Moreover, it was set forth above when the confessor licitly absolves the accomplice.
e) That the confessor has both sinned subjectively gravely and known the censure and adverted to it. Defect of grave subjective fault can arise, for example, from ignorance of the law forbidding absolution, from the fact that he is ignorant that an unconsummated sin suffices, or does not know that the person confessing is an accomplice. Ignorance of the censure excuses, even if it is vincible, provided it is not affected, crass, or supine (can. 2229).
1 "The confessor directly induces the penitent when he positively and explicitly forewarns him or her about keeping silent concerning the sin of complicity, because, for example, he already knows it and its declaration would be useless. But he induces indirectly when the confessor tries to persuade the penitent either that the shameful action committed with him is not a sin, or at least is not so grave that he or she ought to be disturbed about it; whence the penitent concludes that it is lawful for him or her not to declare such a sin, and really abstains from declaring it" (Sacred Penitentiary, February 19, 1896).
2. Absolution from the excommunication can be granted as follows:
a) In more urgent cases any confessor can absolve from this excommunication in the sacramental forum, with the burden enjoined of having recourse, under penalty of reincidence, within a month, at least by letter and through the confessor, if this can be done without grave inconvenience, the name being kept back, to the Sacred Penitentiary and of standing by its mandates (can. 2254, §§ 1 and 3). It is said:
a) Confessor, that is, every priest approved for hearing confessions.
b) In more urgent cases; a more urgent case is had if the censure cannot be observed externally without danger of grave scandal or infamy, or if it is hard for the penitent to remain in the state of grave sin for the time necessary for the competent Superior to provide (can. 2254, § 1).
c) The confessor must, under penalty of reincidence, impose the burden of having recourse to the Sacred Penitentiary within a month from the absolution received. Recourse is always necessary, so that the disposition of canon 2254, § 3, by force of which sometimes the penitent can be absolved without the burden of having recourse, cannot, as the cited canon adds, be applied to this excommunication. Therefore the obligation of having recourse urges until it has been fulfilled. The recourse is made with the name kept back, and can be made either through the confessor or by the penitent himself. If the penitent can conveniently approach the same confessor, it is better that the recourse be made through the confessor; otherwise let the penitent have recourse, unless he wishes to approach another confessor who is willing to have recourse. If the confessor refuses, the penitent is bound, unless however he is impeded by sickness or by inability to write; in that case he is excused until the impediment has ceased.
b) In danger of death any priest, even one not approved, can absolve from this excommunication, while there remains, however, for the sick person, under penalty of reincidence, the obligation of having recourse, after he has recovered, unless he has been absolved by one endowed with a special faculty, to the Sacred Penitentiary and of obeying its mandates (can. 882 compared with can. 2252). The obligation of having recourse urges from the time health has been recovered, so that recourse must be instituted as soon as possible. If it is delayed longer, the penitent falls back into the censure. For the rest, as regards recourse, the things said above under a) hold.
3. Things to be noted regard both the petition to be directed to the Sacred Penitentiary, and the execution of the rescript to be received, and the clauses contained in the rescript. To these we shall add a formula for having recourse to the Sacred Penitentiary.
a) In the petition, with the assumed name of the penitent used, let there be set forth: 1. that the penitent has fallen into excommunication; 2. how many accomplice persons and how many times he absolved them; 3. whether and how many times he has been absolved from the same delict and excommunication; 4. whether he has contracted one or more irregularities from violation of the censure. This, however, can be omitted if he has already been dispensed from the irregularity by the confessor; 5. that the penitent has been absolved in danger of death, or in an urgent case, but now has recourse to the Sacred Penitentiary; 6. according to the circumstances it is laudably added that the sin of complicity was less grave, that the occasion of relapse has been removed, that a long time intervened between the grace obtained and the relapse, and that through the interval he conducted himself well.
b) If the rescript is granted in gracious form, it suffices that the penitent read it and fulfill the obligations imposed. If the confessor wrote, it is enough that the received rescript be communicated to the penitent, whether in confession or outside it. If the rescript is granted in commissory form, the execution is committed to the confessor chosen or to be chosen by the penitent, so that it can be carried out by any confessor whom the penitent has chosen. The execution must be done in sacramental confession, and indeed so that first absolution from the censure is given, then absolution from sins, finally dispensation is granted in the irregularity.
If the penitent can return to the confessor only with difficulty, it is better that the rescript be sought in gracious form.
c) Several clauses are commonly inserted into the rescript of the Sacred Penitentiary, for example:
The guilty person, if the penitent again approaches him, should admonish the penitent concerning the nullity of the past confessions.
Let him abstain, insofar as this can be done without grave scandal, from hearing the confessions of the accomplice person. This clause obliges under grave obligation.
Let the guilty person be warned that, if he commits another crime of absolution and obtains a similar favor from the Sacred Penitentiary, this favor will in no way profit him unless he has made mention of the present favor.
As regards the clause of giving up the office of confessor, if it is added, note these things:
This clause is imposed either absolutely, or with mitigation, namely insofar as, before the term fixed for giving up the office, a new recourse to the Sacred Penitentiary is permitted, if it is judged that grave causes stand in the way of resigning the office.
If it is imposed with mitigation, recourse can be had to the Sacred Penitentiary for the purpose of obtaining relaxation of the clause, after the reasons have been set forth and, according to the circumstances, also the good disposition of the penitent and the amendment of his morals have been invoked.
If it is imposed absolutely, nothing prevents the confessor from having recourse again and obtaining either relaxation of the clause or at least prorogation of the term.1
d) Formula for having recourse to the Sacred Penitentiary.
Most Eminent Prince,
Titius, a priest, has incurred the excommunication reserved to the Supreme Pontiff in the most special manner, because once, or twice, or three times, he absolved an accomplice, or feigned to absolve an accomplice. Since he could not be dismissed without absolution, he received it. Now, however, through me he has recourse to the Holy See, prepared to execute the mandates which it may please Your Eminence to impose, in gracious form. Titius continued to celebrate before absolution. The office which he holds cannot be given up without grave inconvenience.
May Your Eminence deign to direct the response to me, the undersigned.
Reverently kissing the sacred purple, I subscribe with the greatest reverence which is fitting.
Your Eminence's most humble servant.
Notes. The name and domicile of the confessor should be clearly noted. The letter, however, should be addressed thus: A sua Eminenza Reverendissima - Il Cardinale Penitenziere-Maggiore - Palazzo del S. Uffizio, Roma.
1 De Smet, De absolutione complicis et sollicitatione, 2nd edition, n. 40.
Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology
Vol. IV, On the Constitution *Sacramentum Poenitentiae*
What about solicitation in Confession? As regards solicitation, three things concerning it are established in the cited Constitution of Benedict XIV, June 1, 1741. The first is that Inquisitors and Ordinaries of places "severely punish by condign penalties," § 1, confessors soliciting in Confession, who are to be denounced to the same Inquisitors or Ordinaries. The second is that confessors "warn their penitents, whom they know to have been solicited by others, concerning the obligation of denouncing," § 2. The third is that "those falsely accusing innocent priests before ecclesiastical judges of solicitation" are deprived of the benefit of absolution, which is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, § 3. E.M.
Benedict XIV, Constitution Etsi Pastoralis, May 26, 1742, § 9, n. 5, has these things: "Then subjection to all and singular Constitutions of the Roman Pontiffs, especially those issued against persons soliciting in Confession, which extend their force universally into individual Nations, and comprehend Latins as well as Greeks by their breadth."
Who are to be denounced? Indeed "all and singular priests, both secular and regular, exempt in any way... of whatever dignity and preeminence, or fortified by any privilege and indult," §§ 1 and 2, soliciting to shameful things in Confession, are to be denounced. All and singular priests, "even if they are priests who lack jurisdiction for validly imparting absolution," § 2; Holy Office, February 11, 1661. "But interpreters and messengers of solicitation, or those commanding it, or giving counsel, are not comprehended under these Constitutions, even if they are priests. For these are not properly those soliciting or having dishonest treatment in sacred Confession, nor are those actions priestly actions, nor as such do they come under the name of priests... Thus also is comprehended a priest or another who solicits a penitent while he is confessing not to himself, but to another." Pignatelli, Consult. Canon. Noviss., chap. 117, par. Non vero. Nor indeed is the penitent who in Confession solicits the priest to be denounced. L. 689. E.M.
What is the crime of solicitation, on account of which confessors are to be denounced? It is that by which confessors of this sort shall have attempted to solicit or provoke some penitent, whatever person that may be, either in the act of sacramental confession, or before or immediately after confession, or on the occasion or pretext of confession, or even outside the occasion of confession in the confessional, or in another place destined or chosen for hearing confessions, with simulation of hearing confession there, to dishonest and shameful things, whether by words, or signs, or nods, or touch, or through writing to be read either then or afterwards; or shall with rash daring have had illicit and dishonest conversations or dealings with them, § 1. Whatever person that may be, "whether males or females, whoever they may be." Instruction of the Universal Inquisition to all Bishops, February 20, 1867.
In the act of sacramental confession, not of other sacraments. The act of sacramental confession is verified between the beginning of confession and absolution given. Solicitation has place in the act of sacramental confession either when the confessor then simply has illicit and dishonest conversations or dealings, or when he then only applies means by which he afterwards solicits. And this distinction of formal solicitation, or only causal solicitation, or of solicitation in itself or in the means then placed, is to be understood as regards all the other clauses: immediately before, immediately after, etc. L. 676. Nor indeed is it required that absolution be given. Gregory XV, Constitution Universi Dominici gregis, August 30, 1622, § 4, says that one soliciting on the occasion of confession is to be denounced, even when confession itself did not follow.
Or before, or immediately after confession. "That phrase immediately before they more commonly think must be understood strictly, so that no interval intervenes." L. 677. Thus one who solicits a woman kneeling before his feet to confess, even if she has not yet fortified herself with the sign of the cross, is said to solicit immediately before. "That phrase immediately after is commonly understood by the doctors when after confession neither the confessor nor the penitent turns aside to other things, so that the solicitation occurs before any other action has intervened." Nevertheless, if some action intervenes, "it must be judged from the circumstances whether solicitation was principally intended and the business as a means, or whether the business was principal and the solicitation accidental." L. 677.
On the occasion or pretext of confession. Occasion and pretext here signify two distinct things. To solicit on the occasion of confession is to take the opportunity or motive of provoking from a true confession. But he solicits under pretext of confession who puts forward confession as a pretext, or fictitiously incites to confession, so that he may provoke more freely. A pretext is a false cause, and to pretext is to bring forward some cause which is not true. Therefore a confessor of this sort is to be denounced, even when confession did not follow. Under pretext, that is, if the priest uses confession as a pretext so that he may solicit the penitent; not if the penitent uses it as a pretext so that he may solicit the confessor; nor if each does so by agreement to deceive others. L. 679. On the occasion of confession someone seems able to solicit in three ways: 1. when from an express or tacit petition for confession he takes the motive of soliciting. L. 677. 2. From confession itself, i.e., when, understanding, for example, in the very confession the penitent's inclination to venery, he obtains an occasion to provoke him then to dishonest things; or by interrupting the penitent lest he begin confession, or lest he continue it, meanwhile soliciting the same, the opportunity of confession having been taken. 3. When he uses knowledge which he had from confession for afterwards soliciting the penitent. But this use of knowledge of confession must be sufficiently established from circumstances in order to impose the obligation of denunciation. L. 678. But there is difficulty concerning the first way, since then the confessor seems to solicit rather on the occasion of the petition for confession than on the occasion of confession, if nevertheless confession at present neither immediately follows nor ought to follow. Pignatelli, Cons. 104, n. 14. The same must be said of the promise of confession. Pignatelli, Cons. 117, par. Ratio autem. Likewise there is difficulty concerning the third way. For he does not seem to solicit on the occasion of confession who, having learned in confession the frailty of the penitent, approaches him at home and urges him, since he takes knowledge from confession and from knowledge the handle of soliciting. Pignatelli, Cons. 117, par. Unde multo et ratio autem.
Or even outside the occasion of confession in the confessional. "Whether a confessor is to be denounced who, sitting in the confessional, solicits a woman standing before the confessional, without simulating confession? The Qualifiers judged that the negative opinion does not lack probability." Holy Office, February 11, 1661, to the fifteenth. This resolution is certainly to be compared with the resolution of the same Sacred Congregation on the same day, to the fourth: "Whether a confessor who solicits a woman saying in the confessional that she wishes to confess tomorrow, and dissuades confession, is to be denounced? If the solicitation is made outside the place of confession, and without pretext of confession, the Qualifiers judged that the negative opinion is probable; otherwise in the confessional or in the place of confession."
Or in another place destined or chosen for hearing confessions, with simulation of hearing confession there. Therefore a threefold place for hearing confessions is distinguished. The first is the ordinary confessional. The second is any other place distinct from the confessional where confessions are heard, e.g., a kneeler which is in the sacristy, where confessions are received.
The third is any place chosen for hearing confessions. That clause, with simulation of hearing confession there, placed in the last place, is referred to all the antecedents, and therefore also to that first member, whether outside the occasion of confession in the confessional, according to the common rule that a clause placed in the last place is referred to all connected antecedents. The whole difference seems to be in this: that as regards the first and second place, it is indeed required that both the confessor and the penitent be in the confessional, or in another place in which confessions are heard, but by this very fact then, regularly speaking, there is simulation of confession, and the obligation of denunciation presses, as is clear from the cited Response of the Holy Office to the fourth. But as regards the third place, it is not sufficient that the confessor and penitent be in the same place or converse together; rather it is necessary that they positively simulate confession. Pignatelli, Cons. Can. Noviss., chap. 117, par. Tertio ff.; E.M.
To dishonest and shameful things, i.e., obscene things, namely touches, looks, etc. Gregory XV adds in the cited Constitution, § 4: "whether to be perpetrated among themselves, or with others in any way." Hence a confessor is to be denounced who solicits a penitent so that he may induce some person to sin with him. L. 691. Likewise from Benedict XIV, denunciation presses even if the solicitation has been performed by the confessor not for himself but for another person, § 2. "Whether a confessor who solicits a penitent to illicit acts outside venereal acts is to be denounced? The Qualifiers judged that the negative opinion is probable." Holy Office, May 11, 1661, to the eleventh; L. 684; Benedict XIV, de Syn., chap. 11, n. 14.
Whether a confessor soliciting to acts only venially dishonest is to be denounced? "The more probable opinion denies." L. 683. This is clear from the whole tenor of the Constitution of Benedict XIV. Venially dishonest, namely outside the venereal matter. Hence the Holy Office, February 11, 1661, to the third: "Whether a confessor, when soliciting because of smallness of matter, is to be denounced. Since in venereal matters there is no smallness of matter, and if there were, it would not be present in the present matter, the Qualifiers judged that he is to be denounced, and that the contrary opinion is not probable." But it must be diligently observed here that it is one thing to solicit to light acts, another to solicit to graver things through light acts; in which case, without any doubt, denunciation must be made, provided the interior intention appears. Castro-Palao, tract. 4, disp. 9, part 3, n. 4.
Shall have attempted to solicit or provoke, etc., or shall with rash daring have had illicit and dishonest conversations or dealings with them. Solicitation generally is a crafty inducement and movement of another's will to doing or suffering something. Solicitation or provocation here is any invitation and incitement to venereal things made by a priest as confessor, or as quasi-confessor, even if he immediately repented of the solicitation, or desisted in the very solicitation. Holy Office, May 11, 1661, to the second; hence it is said: shall have attempted to solicit or provoke; namely priests abusing confession in any way to the aforesaid effect. To have dishonest conversations or dealings. This is an explanation of the previous clause, and it is declared that solicitation or provocation to be denounced is had through any dishonest conversations or dealings whatsoever between confessor and penitent, whether the confessor begins first or the penitent begins, so that each in fact has those dishonest conversations and dealings, and rests in them, without proceeding further; for then mutual solicitation is had. Hence confessors are commanded that "they warn penitents whom they know to have been solicited by others, as above, cf. 1253, concerning the obligation of denouncing the solicitors," § 2. But although the Supreme Pontiff openly adds in the same place the case of mutual solicitation, nevertheless he adds nothing concerning the case of a confessor who bears himself merely passively with respect to solicitation on the part of the penitent, although consenting to it.
"Whether a confessor is to be denounced who gives the penitent a letter in confession, to be read afterwards at home, in which he solicited to venery? The Qualifiers judged that he is to be denounced, and that the negative opinion is not probable." Holy Office, May 11, 1661, to the first. This is also clear from proposition 6 condemned by Alexander VII, confirmed by Benedict XIV, § 1, together with proposition 7 concerning this same matter. The same is had in so many words in the Constitution of Benedict XIV, § 1: "whether through writing to be read either then or afterwards." Cf. 1253.
"Whether a confessor is to be denounced who, while hearing confession, gives a gift to a woman, so that he is said to have solicited her? The Qualifiers answered the same as to the twelfth." Holy Office, February 11, 1661, to the sixteenth. Speaking in itself, to give something is not dishonest, nor does it tend to dishonest things, but to conciliating benevolence, or to satisfying gratitude for some received benefit. Now these things are to the twelfth: "Whether a confessor, if he praises a penitent for beauty and attractiveness, is said to solicit her, and therefore is to be denounced? The Qualifiers judged that, if that praise is serious and gives no odor of depraved intention, the negative is probable. But if otherwise, it is not probable." To praise the beauty of a woman, even in confession, is not of itself by its object a mortal sin, nor is it an act of itself directed to solicitation to shameful things.
Whether a confessor is to be denounced if his solicitation is doubtful? "If it is doubted whether his deed or word was true solicitation, then with the more common and truer opinion it must be said that there is no obligation of denouncing... The reason is both because doubtful things are to be taken in the better part, and in ambiguous words the more benign interpretation must be made; ... and because in doubt no one is to be deprived of the reputation which he possesses; and because the Bulls command solicitors to be denounced, but he cannot be called a solicitor concerning whom it is doubted whether he truly solicited; for a doubtful crime is not a crime." L. 702.
If "the deed or word is true solicitation, and it is only doubted whether that confessor or another did or said it, then it is to be denounced, because while the crime is certain, judges can duly proceed to inquiring into the person concerning whom there is doubt. Nevertheless I judge that this must be said only in the case in which the judges can easily, by their diligence, become certain concerning the soliciting person; because otherwise that priest, since he can be innocent, would remain in some way defamed, and in doubt the reputation of one's neighbor, who possesses it, must be preserved uninjured." L. 702. As regards the various cases of doubtful solicitation, and others in which the doctors more commonly judge that the confessor is to be denounced, cf. L. 704.
Must confessors warn penitents concerning the denunciation to be made? Confessors are altogether obliged "diligently to warn their penitents whom they know to have been solicited by others, as above, according to the circumstances of occurring cases, concerning the obligation of denouncing to Inquisitors or Ordinaries of places the person who has committed solicitation... Let them moreover diligently take care that they not impart sacramental absolution to penitents whom they know already to have been solicited by another, unless first, bringing the aforesaid denunciation to effect, they have indicated the delinquent to the competent Judge, or at least pledge and promise that they will report him as soon as they can." § 2.
Their own solicited penitents: not others, not solicited; these they are not bound by a positive precept to warn, but by force of the natural precept, insofar as this precept obliges in a particular case. Nor does their good faith excuse from warning them. But the confessor is not bound to ask penitents whether they have been solicited and to warn them concerning the obligation of denouncing, unless he prudently judges from the confession heard that they have been solicited.
By others, not by himself. Hence the confessor who solicited is not himself bound to warn the solicited person concerning the obligation of denouncing, in the supposed case that this penitent afterwards confesses to him, because by natural law no one is bound to procure that his own shamefulness be revealed. To warn: but although the confessor ceases to warn the penitent concerning the obligation of denouncing, nevertheless the obligation in the penitent does not yet cease of denouncing him or another soliciting confessor, if from elsewhere he knows that he is obliged to this by pontifical law, just as the burden of restitution does not cease in a penitent because the confessor ceases to warn him of such an obligation, if from elsewhere he knows it and is not invincibly ignorant of it. Proposition 7 condemned by Alexander VII.
If the confessor certainly foresees that the penitent, existing in good faith, will not denounce, must he nevertheless warn him of his obligation and dismiss him if he is unwilling to denounce? In the case of death, namely when the death of the penitent is imminent, negatively. For no one is bound to do a useless and harmful thing. Now according to the hypothesis, that warning is useless for procuring the common good, and harmful to the private good of the penitent, since then it casts him into bad faith and into eternal damnation. Besides, if the clause appended by the same Benedict XIV has any force, namely of warning penitents according to the circumstances of occurring cases, cf. 1265, 1278, there is not always and in every case an absolute obligation of warning. Therefore at least in the stated case, truly extreme. Outside danger of death, affirmatively. The reason first is that it can always rightly and deservedly be hoped that a penitent of this kind, with the confessor insisting and the grace of God helping, will at least later do what today perhaps, frightened by difficulty, he refuses to do. Hence also nothing then prevents the confessor, if the penitent is certainly going to return to him, opportunely deferring absolution, or even granting it in a case of necessity, from awaiting a favorable occasion when he will be more disposed and foreseen to be going to do what today would be demanded from him in vain. But if the penitent is not going to return to the same confessor, it is enough that he be warned of the obligation of speaking about such a matter with his Ordinary or another confessor because of the difficulty of the matter still to be untangled, and meanwhile that he be prepared in soul to fulfill the obligation, if perhaps there is one and it is made manifest to him by the same confessor. Besides, to this case also is extended the aforesaid clause of Benedict XIV concerning penitents to be warned according to the circumstances of occurring cases, which is not to be restricted to the single extreme case of death. Cf. Benedict XIV, encyclical letter Apostolica Constitutio, n. 20. Moreover the difficulty which can frighten the penitent in making denunciation is surely not such that it has no remedy, since the Sacred Congregation itself indicates various ways by which the fulfillment of this most grave obligation can become much easier. Cf. 1270, 1278.
Is not only the solicited person bound to denunciation, but also one who from elsewhere knows the solicitation certainly? R. Affirmatively, "if he knows the crime from persons worthy of faith; otherwise, if he knew it from persons unworthy of faith, or from frivolous women. But this must be said, not now from the Bull of Gregory, but from the Edict of the Holy Inquisition, March 10, 1677, where it is said that one who has known or heard that he solicited is bound to denounce the confessor." L. 695. These things from the Holy Office, May 11, 1661, to the fourteenth: "Whether someone is bound to denounce a soliciting confessor if he heard this not from persons worthy of faith, but only from frivolous persons? The Qualifiers judged that the negative opinion does not lack probability." Nevertheless it must be noted here that the affirmative resolution is inferred rather from the proposed Question than from the Response of the Sacred Congregation.
Is one who knows of solicitation under a natural secret bound to denunciation? R. Affirmatively, "because no one is bound to a secret, even promised by oath, when the secret turns to common harm. But otherwise, if the solicitation has been manifested for seeking counsel; for the disclosure of the secret would then be against human intercourse, and also against the public good, which certainly intervenes in seeking counsels." L. 698. And this last point is founded besides on the Decree of Alexander VII, July 8, 1660, which obliges Regulars from whom counsel is sought concerning the obligation of denouncing only to this, that they warn and oblige to denounce.
Is absolution to be denied to a penitent who refuses to denounce a soliciting priest? R. Affirmatively. "Penitents who have been warned and altogether refuse cannot be absolved; but those who because of a just cause must defer denunciation, and who pledge and seriously promise that it is to be made as quickly as they can, can be absolved... If necessity presses, the solicited person is to conduct himself according to the counsels and warnings of his confessor," namely when there is grave difficulty standing in the way of making denunciation. Cited Instruction, nn. 5 and 7; L. 693.
Do those omitting denunciation incur excommunication? From the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis of Pius IX, October 15, 1869, those incur an excommunication latae sententiae reserved to no one: "Those neglecting or culpably omitting to denounce within a month confessors or priests by whom they have been solicited to shameful things, in any of the cases expressed by Our predecessors Gregory XV, Constitution Universi, August 20, 1622, and Benedict XIV, Constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae, June 1, 1741." Neglecting or culpably omitting to denounce, and therefore when they could and ought to have done this. Within a month: to be computed from this obligation having become known; therefore after the month has elapsed they fall into excommunication. Moreover, if they have promised that they will denounce, and faith can be had in them, they will be able to be absolved, and not only from sins before the month has elapsed, which is expressly provided in the Constitution of Benedict XIV, cf. 1265, 1270, but also from excommunication after the month has elapsed. For the present excommunication is not reserved. Nor indeed does a penitent of this kind seem to relapse into the same excommunication if afterwards he has deceived the faith placed in him, since absolution here is granted absolutely; and when the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis willed otherwise, it openly expressed it. By whom they have been solicited: therefore only solicited penitents are subject to this excommunication, by no means all whatsoever who learned of the solicitation. Pignatelli, Cons. Can. Noviss., chap. 117, par. Terminus autem.
What causes excuse from making denunciation? If truly and reasonably, from denunciation, grave harm is feared in life, reputation, and temporal goods, the penitent could be excused from denouncing. The reason is that a natural right is given for preventing these harms, against which the positive law of the Church does not prevail; for the Church is not accustomed to oblige further with grave inconvenience for the observance of her laws. It is added that laws imposing denunciation of their nature do not oblige with grave inconvenience, because they do not have that annexed to them of their nature, as, for example, precepts given to a soldier concerning not leaving his station, or to a pastor concerning assisting the sick laboring under plague.
But when a law of its nature does not demand to be fulfilled with grave inconvenience, it ceases to oblige if that grave inconvenience supervenes, as is clear concerning a law imposing fasting, hearing Mass, etc. But denunciation is to be made even with any harm whatsoever as often as from that crime contempt of this sacrament and destruction of souls would arise. But although this could be absent when it was certainly known that someone solicited once, not from contempt of the sacrament but from mere momentary lust, nevertheless it would indeed happen when solicitation arose from making light of the sacrament, or if the solicitor were a powerful man and solicited frequently. Therefore in these cases the reason of the common good and of preventing harm to Religion outweighs any private harm whatsoever, and therefore denunciation should never be omitted. L. 699; Pignatelli, Cons. Can. Noviss., chap. 117, par. Denique ff.; E.M.
Note: Those who cannot denounce because of the aforesaid causes are still bound when these cease. Holy Office, February 21, 1630; Giraldi, p. 640, note qui, p. 641. E.M.
Is a woman bound to denounce a soliciting confessor to whom she herself consented? R. Affirmatively. For Benedict XIV commanded denunciation to be made "whether the penitent consented to the solicitation, or by no means gave consent." The reason is that denunciation can be made without any danger to one's own reputation, since one cannot be questioned about this by the Bishop, and therefore even if someone is questioned he can deny his own consent. L. 700. In the cited Instruction, n. 6, it is said: "Care must also be taken that those denouncing are not asked whether they consented to the solicitation; and it would be most fitting if concerning consent of this kind, however spontaneously manifested, nothing at all were noted in the records. From the Declaration of Urban VIII, Thursday, April 17, 1624."
Must a woman constituted in good faith and simplicity, who did not understand the solicitation, be warned concerning denunciation, and must she denounce? R. Negatively, by reason of scandal. Nevertheless "the Sacred Congregation on May 11, 1707 declared that a girl solicited while constituted in simplicity and without knowledge of dishonesty is bound to denounce the soliciting confessor after she has become capable and has acquired knowledge of the past solicitation." Giraldi, p. 641.
Is the solicited person bound to denounce solicitation had a long time ago, or occult solicitation, or one which cannot be juridically proved? R. To the first, affirmatively, from the open Declaration of Benedict XIV, Constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae, § 2. L. 697. To the second, it must altogether be affirmed; otherwise this most grave law would be completely useless, since this crime of itself is occult. L. 696. To the third, "it must altogether be affirmed." L. 695. The reason is that juridical proof is not necessary here.
Is a soliciting confessor to be denounced if he has already been amended, or judged and punished, or is dead? R. To the first: affirmatively. And St. Alphonsus judges this absolutely more probable, and it seems practically and regularly to be held. For the primary and principal reason of the law of denunciation is not the amendment of a particular person, but the public security of the sacrament and of souls, by the certain chastisement of so abominable a crime, and by unavoidable fear of penalty, even for one act, or for one repeated only once; indeed also the indemnity of the Church, namely lest plagues of this sort creep into public offices, than which nothing is more harmful to the common good of the Church. Benedict XIV, de Synod., book 6, chap. 11, n. 10.
To the second: it is certain that, if he himself offends again after he has been punished for the first crime, he must again be denounced. And the same must be said if he was not fully convicted of solicitation, because then he would not have been punished. If concerning the same solicitation he has already been sufficiently convicted and punished, it must far more probably be affirmed, L. 637, from the Holy Office, May 11, 1661, to the thirteenth: "Whether a confessor who abjured on account of the solicitation of another is to be denounced? The Qualifiers judged that the negative opinion is not probable, and therefore that he is to be denounced, which was also resolved on July 26, 1628." Abjured, that is, one who on account of another preceding solicitation appeared before the Inquisitor and abjured, namely detested heresy; for since abjuration is detestation of heresy, someone was bound to abjure insofar as he was a heretic or suspected of heresy; and such a solicitor was held to be, who therefore had to abjure at least for caution; and if the suspicion of heresy was slight, he was said to abjure de levi; if vehement, to abjure de vehementi. Nevertheless it must be observed that in the preceding Response there is question of the solicitation of another penitent, on account of which the confessor abjured, not of that same penitent on account of whose solicitation he spontaneously appeared. But in another Decree, July 26, 1628, cited in the aforesaid Response, as that Decree is had in Albitius, de Inconst. in Fid., chap. 35, n. 50, it is established generally that "the solicited person is bound to denounce the solicitor, although he knows that the same appeared in the Holy Office." In the same general sense the same Decree is reported by Giraldi, p. 641.
To the third: negatively, because then the whole end of the law ceases, namely both the punishment and the amendment of the guilty party. Holy Office, March 6, 1839; Sacred Penitentiary, April 24, 1884; L. 692. E.M.
When, to whom, and how is denunciation to be made? Denunciation must be made within a month from the time when its obligation became known. Holy Office, March 10, 1677; L. 693. Cf. 1271.
It is to be made "to Inquisitors or Ordinaries of places," § 2. Of places, i.e., of the place in which the penitent is present, even if the penitent and the soliciting confessor pertain to another diocese. It pertains to the Ordinary or Inquisitor of the place to receive the sworn denunciation and to transmit it to the Bishop of the guilty priest. In the cited Instruction, n. 1, it is said: "they must report the matter to the Holy See or to the Ordinary of the place." He satisfies the obligation who denounces delinquents of this kind to the Supreme Tribunal of the Sacred Roman and Universal Inquisition. Pignatelli, Cons. Can. Noviss., chap. 117, Ex parte vero. Vicars Apostolic can also receive denunciation, but they must remit "to the Holy Office through the medium of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide in a closed letter the names of the solicitors."
Holy Office, June 20, 1882. As regards Regulars, Regular Superiors cannot receive this denunciation, nor take cognizance of this cause. Decree of Alexander VII Licet alias, July 3, 1660. Cardinals, Bishops, and the Inquisitors themselves, who are truly delegates of the Apostolic See, in the case of solicitation, if it is to be denounced, are to be denounced not to the Inquisitor or Ordinary of the place, but either to the Holy See or to the Sacred Congregation of the Holy and Universal Inquisition. "If they cannot, or do not wish immediately, to denounce them to the Supreme Tribunal, they are bound to denounce them to the Inquisitors or Ordinaries of places, so that the delict may become known to the Holy Office; because the obligation of denouncing requires in the judge only the faculty of receiving juridical denunciations. For this suffices so that the delict may become known to the Sacred Tribunal, so that afterwards according to its laws proceeding may be made against the delinquent." Pignatelli, Cons. Can. Noviss., chap. 117, par. Ideoque.
As regards the manner of making denunciation, the cited Instruction, nn. 6-8, has these things: "6. Anonymous denunciations against those soliciting to shameful things have no force; for denunciations must be made in judgment, namely before the Bishop or his delegate with the intervention of an ecclesiastical man who holds the parts of notary, and with oath, and with expression and subscription of one's own name. Nor is it sufficient if it is made by notes, or by letters without the name and surname of the author. Moreover it is prohibited that, in receiving denunciations, besides the judge and the notary, each an ecclesiastical man, furnished with the special and written deputation of the Bishop, witnesses be present." "7. The burden of denunciation is personal, and to be fulfilled by the solicited person himself. But if he is impeded by most grave difficulties from being able to perform this himself, then either by himself, or by letter, or through another person well disposed to him, let him approach his Ordinary, or the Holy See through the Sacred Penitentiary, or even through this Supreme Inquisition, all the circumstances having been set forth, and then let him conduct himself according to the counsels and warnings of his confessor. But if, detained by no impediment, he altogether refuses denunciation, in this case and in the other mentioned cases the confessor is to be praised who has not denied his labor to the penitent, and has consulted either the Ordinary or the Holy See for opportune provisions, the name of the penitent nevertheless being suppressed. But approved authors hand down the formulas to be used in these cases, among whom are Pignatelli, Cons. Can. Noviss., t. I, chap. 104; Carena, Albitius, etc." "8. It not infrequently occurs that a confessor or another ecclesiastic is deputed by Bishops, whose power this indeed is, to receive denunciations in a matter pertaining to the crime of solicitation, without the intervention of a notary. Men especially suitable are to be destined to this most grave function; they must be instructed concerning the act of denunciation to be assumed in a judicial manner, and warned that immediately after the denunciation has been received they are at once to transmit it cautiously to the Bishop himself by whom they were deputed, and that they are to retain for themselves no copy or any trace of the act drawn up. And in about this manner the function of denouncing is fulfilled without great difficulty. Certainly it must be brought about by Ordinaries of places that it not be necessary to apply to places subject to their jurisdiction what was declared for the missions of Pernambuco in America, on June 22, 1627: namely that solicited women are not bound to denunciation if the ministers of the Inquisition and the Vicars of the Bishop dwelling in distant regions cannot be approached without grave inconvenience."
Therefore, if a woman cannot even be induced to make the denunciation in writing and with oath to a confessor deputed for this, recourse must be had to the Holy See for an opportune remedy, and meanwhile such a penitent is not to be absolved, as being indisposed.
All Ordinaries of places are deputed judges for inquiring and proceeding against solicitors. Therefore they can delegate to others the faculty of admitting juridical denunciations, not only for an act but also habitually. L. 695; E.M.
What about the crime of false denunciation? "Since certain wicked persons are found who, moved either by hatred, or anger, or another unworthy cause, or incited by the impious persuasions, or promises, or flatteries, or threats of others, or in any other way, the dread judgment of God being set aside and the authority of the Church contemned, falsely accuse innocent priests of solicitation before ecclesiastical judges: Therefore, that so wicked an audacity and so detestable a crime may be restrained by fear of the greatness of the penalty, whatever person has stained himself with an execrable crime of this sort, either by himself impiously calumniating innocent confessors, or by wickedly procuring that this be done by others, is forever deprived, by any priest whatsoever, fortified by whatever privilege, authority, and dignity, except by Us and Our successors, unless at the end of life and except in the article of death, of the hope of obtaining absolution, which We reserve to Us and to the aforesaid successors." § 3.
The present case is a papal reserved case, but without censure. The reservation is penal. But that procuring must be efficacious of the unjust denunciation which followed. There is question, however, not of any false denunciation, but of a juridical denunciation, i.e., made before ecclesiastical judges, namely before the Ordinary of the place or the Inquisitor. L. 693.
What about absolution of an accomplice? In the same Constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum Poenitentiae, there is also treatment of absolution of an accomplice, of its unlawfulness and invalidity, and of the excommunication imposed on the absolver.
What about the unlawfulness and invalidity of absolution? Benedict XIV has these things in the cited Constitution, §§ 4 and 2: "To all and singular priests, both secular and regular, of whatever order and dignity, although otherwise approved for receiving confessions, and supported by any privilege and indult, even one worthy of special expression and of most special note and mention, by Apostolic authority and the plenitude of Our power, We interdict and prohibit, lest any of them, outside the case of extreme necessity, namely in the very article of death, and then when any other priest who can discharge the office of confessor is lacking, dare to receive the sacramental confession of a person who is an accomplice in a shameful and dishonest sin committed against the sixth precept of the Decalogue, any authority and jurisdiction whatsoever for absolving any person from guilt of this kind being for this reason removed from him by the law itself; indeed so that the absolution, if he shall impart any, is altogether null and void, as imparted by a priest who exists deprived of the jurisdiction and faculty necessary for validly absolving, which We intend to remove from him by these Our present letters.
And nevertheless, if any confessor shall have dared to do otherwise, he incurs also by that very fact the penalty of major excommunication, the power of absolving from which We reserve to Us alone and only to Our Successors. Declaring also and decreeing that not even by force of any Jubilee whatsoever, or even of the Bull which is called of the Holy Crusade, or of any other Indult, can anyone receive the confession of the said accomplice of this kind and bestow sacramental absolution upon him: since for this effect, and in this case, no confessor, as one who in this kind of sin and penitent lacks jurisdiction, as was said above, and exists deprived by Us of the faculty of absolving, is to be held as a legitimate and approved confessor.
Notwithstanding Apostolic Constitutions and Ordinances, especially those which are called of the Holy Crusade, or of Universal and plenary Jubilee, and also any Statutes and Customs whatsoever, Privileges also, Indults, and Apostolic Letters... To all of which... for this time only We specially and expressly derogate, and to other things whatsoever to the contrary."
Is absolution of an accomplice always unlawful, always invalid? Absolution of an accomplice will always be unlawful outside the case of extreme necessity, namely in the very article of death, and then when any other confessor who can discharge the office of confessor is lacking. But it will always be invalid outside the article of death. In the article of death it will always be valid, even short of necessity.
For thus Benedict XIV, in the Constitution Apostolici, declared his mind concerning a case of necessity of this kind. 1. Thus an accomplice is interdicted and prohibited from hearing and absolving an accomplice in the aforesaid article of death "so that if some other priest is not lacking, even if perhaps this other was only a simple priest, or otherwise not approved for hearing confessions, nevertheless that simple priest can receive the Confession and impart absolution." 2. "If the quality of an urgent case and the concurring circumstances, which cannot be avoided, are such that another priest cannot be called or approach to hear the confession of a person constituted in the said article without some grave infamy or scandal likely to arise; then another priest can be held and considered just as if he were really absent and lacking; and therefore in that state of things, the priest who is partner of the crime is not prohibited from imparting absolution to the penitent also from that crime. But let an accomplice priest of this kind know and seriously observe that he will in fact be guilty before God, who cannot be mocked, of grave disobedience against Our aforesaid Constitution and liable to the penalties imposed in it, if he voluntarily invents for himself the aforesaid dangers of infamy or scandal where they do not exist. Indeed let him understand that he is gravely bound to forestall or remove dangers of this kind, insofar as it is in him, suitable means being employed, whence it may happen that a way lies open for any other priest to hear that confession without anyone's infamy or scandal." 3. "But if the same priest either in any way thrusts himself in, compelled by no grave necessity, or, where danger of infamy or scandal is feared if the labor of another priest must be required, he himself has deliberately neglected to employ suitable means to avert that danger, and thus has presumed to receive the sacramental Confession of the person who is an accomplice in the said crime and constituted in that article, as was said above, and to bestow absolution from that crime, no necessary cause compelling as is premised; although absolution of this kind will be valid, provided that on the part of the penitent the dispositions required by Christ the Lord for the validity of the sacrament of penance have not been lacking, for We do not intend in the fearful article of death to take away from the same priest, however unworthy, the necessary jurisdiction, lest by this very occasion someone perish; nevertheless that priest will by no means escape the penalties of the law violated by such rash daring; and therefore he incurs the major excommunication imposed in the said Constitution and reserved to Us and to this Holy See in exactly the same way as is decreed there."
If an accomplice priest, necessity standing, begins to hear the confession of an accomplice in the article of death, and another priest arrives, can he complete the confession begun? R. Affirmatively. "The reason is that when he began to hear, this was lawful through the Pontiff giving him jurisdiction; but this jurisdiction does not expire by the arrival of another, because the confession for which jurisdiction was conferred, since it is only begun, is not yet whole or perfect." Ithur., Case 49, n. 17.
If an accomplice priest begins to hear the confession of an accomplice in the article of death, necessity standing, can he then, after the danger of death has passed, complete the confession and absolve? R. Affirmatively. The reason is the same as in the preceding case. For jurisdiction valid at the time of the confession begun is judged to remain so long as the confession begun has not been completed by absolution. For confession is ordered to this, and has its completion in this. Ithur., Case 49, nn. 21, 22, 23.
After the accomplice has been absolved by the accomplice priest in the article of death, necessity pressing, can the priest then, when that danger has passed, complete his confession by reason of integrity? Either the penitent sufficiently expressed by nods all the sins of complicity, or not. If the former, the accomplice priest can complete the confession by reason of integrity; otherwise he cannot. The reason of the first is that by valid absolution the sins of complicity were directly remitted, and therefore the complicity itself has been directly destroyed, and the accomplice priest, like any other, can absolve from other sins. For those sins are no longer necessary matter of confession, but only free matter, like venial sins or mortal sins already disclosed. The reason of the second is that then the bond of complicity still endures; for the remaining sins were remitted only indirectly, as omitted in confession. Therefore those sins remain necessary matter of confession. Ithur., Case 49, nn. 19, 20.
Can an accomplice absolve an accomplice not only in the article, but also in the danger of death? The article of death is distinguished in this from the danger of death: the article of death denotes certain nearness, the danger denotes probable impending death. R. Affirmatively. The extrinsic reason is that the article of death and danger of death, by canon law, by the most common opinion of theologians, and by the practice of confessors, are altogether equated in order to receiving the sacraments of penance, Eucharist, and extreme unction. But the intrinsic reason is that, morally speaking, the necessity of the sick person is nearly the same.
Therefore, lest he perish, the Church confers jurisdiction on all priests for the article of death, even if there is question of an accomplice priest absolving an accomplice, as is openly clear from the Constitution of Benedict XIV Apostolici muneris. Ithur., Case 49, nn. 4-10.
Note: The same must be said even if the danger of death was prudently indeed, but falsely, judged to be present. Ithur., Case 49, nn. 11-15. For since it is sometimes difficult to distinguish a true and real danger from a danger only judged and apparent, jurisdiction is given absolutely to all for the article or danger of death prudently judged to be present, lest someone perish.
What if a dying person is unwilling to confess to anyone other than the priest who is his partner in sin? In that case he can be absolved by the accomplice priest, if he is otherwise disposed, namely lest he perish or be endangered. Gousset, Theol. Mor., vol. 2, n. 489. The same must be said if another priest who has been called is unwilling to come, or, though already present, is unwilling to hear the confession. The reason is that then it is the same as if there were no supply of another confessor.
When is complicity had here? Complicity is had here when there is an externally, reciprocally or mutually declared consent, agreement, or conspiracy of two or more persons into a shameful and dishonest sin, indeed a mortal one, against the sixth precept of the Decalogue, although not consummated by copula. Externally: certainly complicity cannot be had without an external act. Mortal: for the Supreme Pontiff speaks of a sin which must necessarily be destroyed by sacramental absolution. But mortal is understood both by reason of the internal act and by reason of the exterior work. Therefore the aforesaid law does not have place where there is question of sins only grave but doubtful, whether the doubt be of law or of fact; or where there is question of simply venial sins, or of sins venial only as regards the external act, although either one or each has internally sinned gravely. But how great an imprudence and rashness it is, because of the danger of scandal, to approach an accomplice confessor, even if there is question only of venial sins in this matter to be manifested to the same accomplice confessor, there is no one who does not see. Reciprocally or mutually. Therefore "1. if a priest, having taken an occasion from sleep or drunkenness, were to use some woman to satisfy lust, he would not for this reason lose jurisdiction for absolving her, because since both the drunken woman and the sleeping woman are unequal to sinning, neither would be held formally as an accomplice, although each could be called materially a partner of the crime in the sin against the sixth precept perpetrated by the priest... 2. If some priest by the greatest crime were to induce a woman to believe that it was altogether free from sin if she allowed herself to be shamefully touched by him, and she, deceived by him, in good faith suffered herself to be shamefully touched by him, without admitting formal sin in herself, she would not be an accomplice, and could subject herself to the sacramental judgment of the same priest for obtaining absolution not from a venereal sin, from which we posit her to be immune, but from other sins." Ithur., Case 41, nn. 25, 26. Likewise the complicity of which there is question in this law is not present if the woman with whom the priest sins, although she consents interiorly, nevertheless externally resists. But under the name of shameful sin comes every grave external sin against the sixth precept, even if it is only touch or conversation. The reason is that the words of the Bull, "in a shameful and dishonest sin against the sixth precept," without doubt comprehend any shameful sins whatsoever. Holy Office, May 28, 1873; L. 554.
Does the aforesaid complicity comprehend the shameful sin of the confessor with the partner of the crime, committed even before he had been initiated in sacred orders? R. Affirmatively. The reason is that the Supreme Pontiff speaks altogether indefinitely of sin committed with an accomplice, and does not restrict it to sin committed by the confessor himself when already having the faculty of hearing confessions, or already constituted in sacred orders. Sacred Penitentiary, January 22, 1879; Ithur., Case 47, nn. 2-6.
…and 10 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.
Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience
162. On the Absolution of an Accomplice
- Fabia approaches Caius, with whom she recently sinned, for the sake of making sacramental confession before him. Caius does not dare to repel her from the Sacred Tribunal, nor does he dare to absolve. "I cannot," he says, "absolve you from this sin; I do not have jurisdiction; it is necessary that you go to another." Nevertheless, greatly disturbed, he absolves her from the other sins. Caius, sincerely penitent, manifests this to his confessor, who, anxious, doubts whether Caius has incurred excommunication; and suspending resolution, before he absolves Caius or does anything else, he determines to seek counsel concerning this matter from a pious and learned friend.
It is asked: What to the Case?
R. Here first one must note what Cardinal De Lugo has, de Poenit., d. 20, n. 77. Concerning sacramental absolution it must be said that "it cannot be divided or halved, just as neither can confession itself without necessity and urgent cause, since the integrity of confession is of divine law. Whence Suarez adds that even if the superior wished, after the whole confession had been heard, to absolve directly from only the reserved sins, he could not validly do this; but either he must absolve from all sins heard, or from none, because Christ did not give such a power. Yet this does not lack difficulty, nor will it easily be proved that a priest cannot validly, although not licitly, will to absolve from these and not apply the absolution directly to the others, but to hold himself as if he had not heard them." But whatever may be of this, there is no doubt that in the Case Caius could not absolve from the sins of complicity, since in that whole matter he lacked jurisdiction. As regards the other sins, Caius did not lack jurisdiction, but it does not seem that, in the Case, Fabia was truly absolved from the other sins. For since Caius told her that he did not have jurisdiction for absolving her, Fabia in fact received absolution in bad faith, and therefore sacrilegiously. But as regards excommunication, there is no doubt that Caius incurred it in the Case. For first, although he was greatly disturbed, nevertheless since he absolved, and absolved from other sins, therefore he well adverted to what he was doing, and so well that by acting thus he surely wished to avoid excommunication. But he did not avoid excommunication, for he truly absolved an accomplice. And if that man incurs excommunication who even feigns and simulates absolving, how much more he who simply absolves an accomplice.
- "Titianus, a priest, a slippery occasion having been given, by an unhappy fall lapsed with Anna into grave sin against the sixth precept of the Decalogue. Soon each accomplice repented of this shameful fault. Since no other priest was present there, Titianus immediately went to another place for the sake of confessing. But Anna, detained by some infirmity, could not go to another confessor. Therefore, sad and sorrowful, she earnestly begs Titianus that he hear her confession. He, doubtful and uncertain, first hesitates; on the one side he is restrained by the law of the Church prohibiting the absolving of an accomplice; but on the other side he would like to help the miserable woman, who otherwise will be without a confessor for a long time. Finally, moved by mercy, he hears Anna in confession and absolves her, thinking that the prohibition of the Church does not press in this difficult Case.
It is asked: What to the Case?
R. Titianus absolved Anna, his accomplice, altogether invalidly, since he wholly lacked jurisdiction over her. Nor did the law cease in that Case, because an invalidating law does not cease on account of any particular inconvenience whatever. From the law itself only the case of extreme necessity is excepted. Therefore Titianus incurs excommunication, unless he was excused from it by good faith. But he must warn Anna that the absolution imparted by him is null and void, so that she may repeat the confession before another." Thus P. Gury 614.
That the absolution of Titianus was altogether void is denied not without merit. For although in the Constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae it is said to be altogether void, nevertheless in the same Constitution jurisdiction is taken away from the confessor as regards a sin of this sort. Wherefore, if the penitent is in good faith, as she seems to be in the Case, it is indeed altogether void as regards the sins of complicity, but by no means as regards the others. S. Poenit., May 16, 1877; I. M. 1291, 1293; Comment. in Const. Sacram. Poenit. n. 71, ed. 5.
But it is most true that an invalidating law, as is the law of Benedict XIV in the Case, does not cease on account of any particular inconvenience whatever. For "it is, as it were, contrary to the nature of an absolute incapacity introduced without restriction, and contrary to the custom of laws simply inducing incapacity, which do not receive interpretation from equity and goodness; because a law invalidating acts does not attend to particular cases and reasons, but precisely to the common reason and uniformity, to the common and necessary good and utility." Suarez, de Leg., l. 5, c. 23, n. 3.
But what is said in the resolution of the Case, namely that Titianus incurred excommunication unless he was excused from it by good faith, is precisely that which must be resolved from the proposed Case, as a matter often occurring in practice. Nor indeed would the Case be conveniently resolved practically if, to the penitent asking in the case set forth whether he incurred excommunication, the confessor were to respond thus conditionally: affirmatively, unless you acted in good faith. Now there seems no doubt that Titianus cannot be excused by good faith. For he seems to labor in this matter under an altogether crass and supine error, which does not excuse from incurring this censure. S. O., Jan. 13, 1892.
- Fulberius and Arcontius, priests, converse among themselves about shameful matters with mutual and scandalous complacency. Wherefore both sin by deed, but without any complicity. After these committed sins, they institute confession to each other and absolve each other. Then they have a doubt whether they have incurred excommunication. For they thought that shameful speech was not certainly comprehended under the prohibition of absolving an accomplice in a sin committed against the sixth precept of the Decalogue. They did indeed doubt, but if they had known certainly that shameful speech also was comprehended, they would have abstained from that mutual confession and absolution. Moreover, they were ignorant of the Decree of the Holy Office of May 28, 1873; when afterward they came to know it by consulting Moral Institutions, they began to be troubled by still graver anxiety.
It is asked: What to the Case?
R. It seems one must say that Fulberius and Arcontius incurred excommunication. For they were not ignorant of the ecclesiastical law and the censure. They also had a doubt in the particular Case, and they acted in bad faith, and indeed in altogether vincible and crass ignorance, by absolving each other. For with such a doubt standing, they ought at least to have asked others beforehand. Nor indeed was there need to have knowledge of that Decree. For it is a question not of a new law, but of a simple Declaration of a pre-existing law, already known to them. Moreover, ignorance in the Case, if there is any, is certainly not ignorance of fact, but of law. But ignorance of law is scarcely admitted in the external forum, and censures are above all penalties of the external forum. Wherefore there is no doubt that, the matter in the Case being brought before a judge, Fulberius and Arcontius would be declared excommunicated. Cf. Commentar. in C. Sacramentum Poenitentiae n. 69, ed. 5; I. M. 1289.
- Titius, hearing the confession of Berta, with whom, amid consolations, he had exercised touches, although not gravely shameful, recognizes that she had sinned lethally because of the interior pleasure of soul in receiving them, and nevertheless absolves her. Similarly he conducts himself with a friend, with whom he had had dishonest conversations, and together with whom, mutual solicitation having been given, he had gone to visit a bad woman. Finally he absolves Caia, his accomplice in a shameful matter, who was laboring under a long-lasting, although not dangerous, sickness; nor, with Easter time approaching and her relatives exhorting her to be refreshed by the sacred banquet, could she omit communion. No other priest was at hand, nor was there hope that another would come shortly. To this was added that therefore Titius also could not abstain from hearing her confession, lest perhaps Caia's husband be confirmed in suspicion concerning his wife's adultery with Titius himself. Indeed another time Titius, earnestly asked, absolved the same Caia, because she seemed seized by an unexpected sickness, although in the middle of confession it was learned that it was a fainting fit, and meanwhile before she was absolved another priest happened to arrive.
It is asked: 1.º What is a shameful sin, and in what sense is complicity in this sin to be understood according to the Constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum poenitentiae? - 2.º Whether absolution given to an accomplice is illicit only, or also invalid; and what penalties the confessor absolving an accomplice incurs? - 3.º Whether and what exception concerning absolution to be furnished to an accomplice is assigned in the same Constitution? - 4.º What is to be judged concerning the manner of acting of Titius as regards each thing, as in the Case?
R. To the 1st. A shameful sin, as regards the absolution of an accomplice, is a sin certainly grave, consummated exteriorly, against the sixth precept of the Decalogue, even if it is only touch, sight, or conversation. This is clear from the Constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum Poenitentiae, and from the Holy Office, May 28, 1873. But complicity is to be taken in the Case thus: that one is to the other a companion of the crime, as is had in the other Constitution of Benedict XIV Apostolici muneris. A companion, and therefore one knowing and willing with another knowing and willing. Of the crime, that is, a companion in the same exterior work gravely dishonest.
To the 2nd. Absolution given to an accomplice is illicit and at the same time invalid, as is established in each Constitution of Benedict XIV just praised. But the confessor absolving an accomplice incurs excommunication reserved in the most special mode to the Supreme Pontiff, as is had in the same Constitutions of Benedict XIV, and in the Constitution of Pius IX Apostolicae Sedis concerning censures, and also from the Declaration of the Holy Office, Apr. 4, 1871.
To the 3rd. An exception is indeed had, and it is altogether the only one, and in the cited Constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum Poenitentiae it is expressed thus: namely, that the accomplice not absolve the accomplice "outside the case of extreme necessity, namely at the very article of death, and then with any other priest who can perform the office of confessor being lacking." But from the other Constitution of Benedict XIV Apostolici muneris, any other priest who can perform the office of confessor is judged lacking if "another priest cannot be called or cannot approach without some grave infamy or scandal that would arise." But by this same Constitution it is declared that, if the priest who is an accomplice nevertheless absolves the accomplice at the article of death without the aforesaid necessity, the absolution is valid, although illicit, and the same priest incurs reserved excommunication.
To the 4th. Titius, absolving Berta, does not incur the aforesaid excommunication. For the sin was not grave in the notion of an external act, as is openly said in the Case. He incurs it by absolving the friend; for with him, as is drawn from the whole tenor of the Case, he had gravely dishonest conversations, whence then together, mutual solicitation having been given, they had gone to visit a bad woman. He also incurs the same excommunication by absolving Caia the first time. For although Caia labored under a long-lasting sickness, nevertheless it was not dangerous. Wherefore Caia was neither at the article nor in the danger of death. Nor indeed did Easter time constitute Caia in the aforesaid article or danger of death. Wherefore the necessity of Easter communion did not excuse Titius. From whatever source the obligation of Easter communion is had, from ecclesiastical Law only or also from divine Law, it is certain that Benedict XIV, who knew this obligation, positively excluded this case, since he excepted only the case of extreme necessity, and that at the article of death. Nor is it valid to insist that, on the one hand, Caia's relatives were exhorting her to communion, whence if she had abstained there would have been infamy for her; and that Titius, on the other hand, was pressed to hear the confession by fear of a suspicion of adultery that would arise in Caia's husband. For this twofold inconvenience of infamy does not constitute Titius and Caia in the aforesaid case of extreme necessity and at the article of death. Concerning the article of death the matter is clear. But infamy can easily be avoided. For Titius, from the Constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum Poenitentiae, has himself as any other priest deprived of jurisdiction. Now any other simple priest, not yet approved, lacking jurisdiction, certainly would not acquire it in the aforesaid case. Therefore neither does Titius. Besides, if another priest lacking jurisdiction were present, then Caia, with a true danger of infamy standing, could, after eliciting an act of contrition, receive Communion. Therefore she can do the same with only Titius present. Moreover, in order that the suspicion of adultery may be avoided, it is not necessary that Titius truly hear Caia's confession and absolve her; but, having been called to hear Caia's confession, if another confessor truly cannot either meanwhile or afterward be called without scandal or infamy, he himself can then, instead of hearing Caia's confession and absolving her, exhort and excite her to elicit an act of perfect contrition, and declare to her that in straits of this sort she can well receive Communion without Confession and Absolution, by the act of perfect contrition alone, lest perhaps she sin from an erroneous conscience. But Titius, absolving Caia a second time, incurs no excommunication. For her confession truly was in danger of death, although only an apparent one. Real and apparent danger of death are the same here, provided nevertheless, as in the Case, that danger was prudently judged; for otherwise there would be danger to the salvation of souls. Besides, no other confessor was present at that moment. Wherefore Titius could then well hear the confession. The confession having been begun, although afterward both that danger vanishes and another confessor is present, he can by right complete it and absolve Caia. The reason is that the jurisdiction which is had at the beginning of the act perseveres until the same act is completed. "Where judgment has once been accepted, there also it ought to receive its end." L. Ubi 30, de Iudiciis, Dig., lib. 5, tit. 1.
Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905)
Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905), On the Constitution *Apostolicae Sedis*
Absolution of an Accomplice
The absolution of an accomplice is reserved in a most special manner to the Holy See, so that it is excepted even in a general and most ample grant of absolving from all cases, even those under a censure reserved in a special manner to the Supreme Pontiff. Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, 4 April 1871.
The absolution of an accomplice which is treated here concerns the first absolution of the accomplice, namely, one who has not yet been absolved by another confessor from the sin of complicity. By a decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, 29 May 1867, it was declared that a confessor is free to absolve an accomplice who has already been absolved by another confessor from the dishonorable sin of complicity; counsel, however, must always be given to the confessor in question that, unless necessity compels him, he abstain from hearing the sacred confessions of the accomplice, even though already absolved from the sin of complicity.
Under the prohibition of absolving an accomplice in a base matter are included not only touches, but all grave and externally committed sins against chastity, even those which consist in mere conversations and looks that involve complicity. Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, 28 May 1873.
"Whether a confessor who pretends to absolve his male or female accomplice in a base sin, according to the mind of the Bull Apostolicae Sedis, no. 10, for example, by reciting some prayer, or by pronouncing other words, or even by remaining silent, in such a way that by signs or gestures of the hands he seems truly to release the penitent from sins, incurs the excommunication reserved in a special manner to the Supreme Pontiff which is treated in the aforesaid Bull.—Response. Confessors pretending to absolve an accomplice in a base sin do not escape the reserved excommunication in the Bull Sacramentum Poenitentiae of Benedict XIV." Sacred Penitentiary, 1 March 1878.—Consequently, neither do those escape excommunication who pretend to absolve and do not absolve. Holy Office, 5 December 1883.
"Whether he incurs the censures enacted against those absolving an accomplice in a base sin, who indeed absolves an accomplice, but an accomplice who did not declare the sin of complicity in confession.—Response. The deprivation of jurisdiction for absolving an accomplice in a base sin, and the excommunication annexed to it, insofar as the confessor has absolved him, are ordered to the base sin itself in which that same confessor was an accomplice." Sacred Penitentiary, 16 May 1877.
"Confessors do not escape the excommunication reserved in the Bull Sacramentum Poenitentiae who absolve, or pretend to absolve, an accomplice who indeed does not confess the sin of complicity from which he has not yet been absolved, but conducts himself thus because the confessor, either directly or indirectly, induced the penitent to do so." Sacred Penitentiary, 19 February 1896.
"Whether those who absolve an accomplice in a base matter with crass and supine ignorance incur this excommunication or not?—Response. In the case proposed, they incur it." Holy Office, 13 January 1892.
Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)
Vol. II, Treatise On the Sacrament …, Pt. III, Ch. I, Art. III, Appendix I. On Absolution of One's Own Accomplice in a Shameful Sin
- I. No confessor can absolve his own accomplice in a shameful sin; but one who presumes to absolve incurs ipso facto an excommunication reserved to the Pope. This is established from the Constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae of Benedict XIV, June 1, 1741, and likewise from another Constitution of the same Pontiff, Apostolici muneris, February 8, 1745.
II. A Confessor lacks all jurisdiction for absolving an accomplice with regard to the sin in which he was a participant. This is inferred from the express words of the Bull, in which it is said: Any authority and jurisdiction for absolving any person whatsoever from a fault of this kind being moreover taken away from him by the law itself.
- Questions. - QUESTION 1. What is comprehended under the name of a shameful sin?
Reply. Every grave sin against the sixth precept of the Decalogue is comprehended, even if it is not consummated by intercourse; indeed, even if it is only a shameful touch. Some also add indecent conversation; but others contradict this, and this opinion, says Amort (On Penance, disp. 10), is more conformable to the words of Benedict XIV, On the Synod, book 7, chapter 14, no. 4, where he describes this crime.
It is required, however, that on each side there be a mortal sin not only internal but also in the character of an external act, and with formal complicity, that is, with mutual consent externally manifested. - St. Ligorius, no. 554, and others.
QUESTION 2. Under the name of accomplice are not only women but also men comprehended?
Reply. Yes. The reason is that the words of the Bull are altogether general; for in it is said: Whoever dares to hear the sacramental confession of a person who is an accomplice in a shameful sin against the sixth precept. Therefore the disposition of the Constitution is not to be restricted to the female sex. - Thus commonly. - Gousset, no. 488.
- QUESTION 3. Can a Priest absolve an accomplice at the moment or in danger of death?
Reply. Yes, validly and lawfully, if another Priest who can discharge the office of Confessor cannot be summoned; but if another Priest is present, even one not approved, who can hear the confession, he will indeed absolve validly but unlawfully, and he will not escape the penalties.
QUESTION 4. Can a Priest absolve an accomplice at death if another cannot be summoned or approach without infamy or scandal?
Reply. Yes, validly and lawfully. Yet the Priest who is the accomplice is bound, if he can, to forestall such dangers of infamy or scandal, for example, by departing under some pretext, etc. Otherwise he will not escape the penalties, although the absolution is valid. This is established from the Constitution of Benedict XIV. - St. Ligorius, no. 553.
QUESTION 5. Can a Priest absolve an accomplice at death if the latter refuses to confess to another?
Reply. It seems that the answer must be affirmative if the penitent is otherwise disposed, lest he perish, or at least lest his eternal salvation be endangered 1.
1 There can be no controversy concerning the validity of the absolution if the penitent is rightly disposed; for Benedict XIV himself affirms that it is valid in the Constitution Apostolici muneris. Therefore the doubt can be only whether lawfully the Priest absolves lawfully. Now Benedict XIV, in the cited Constitution, condemns only one who, with no necessary cause compelling him, presumed to hear the sacramental confession of his accomplice and to bestow absolution from that crime upon him. But when a sick person near death refuses to confess to anyone else, not only does the eternal salvation of the sick person impose upon this Priest the necessity of hearing the confession, but a cause of scandal will also easily be present if he refuses to hear the confession of that sick person.
- QUESTION 6. Can a Priest absolve an accomplice from other sins extraneous to himself after the accomplice has once been rightly absolved by another?
Reply. Yes. The reason is that he lacks jurisdiction over this penitent only with regard to the sin in which he himself was a participant; therefore, once that sin has been blotted out through absolution imparted by another, the prohibition now ceases and jurisdiction is not lacking 2. - St. Ligorius, no. 555, and others commonly.
2 They relate that Benedict XIV, once asked by the Bishop of Brugnato whether a priest could absolve an accomplice after the latter had already been absolved by another confessor, replied that the accomplice could not be absolved by the priest who was his accomplice even if he had been absolved a hundred times by others. Nevertheless, this response in no way conflicts with the doctrine of the Author. For the Pontiff took away from the priest the jurisdiction by which he might absolve his accomplice from the crime in which he himself was an accomplice. And since this priest no longer has any jurisdiction over that crime, while that crime can be matter of absolution even after it has been remitted in another confession, it must certainly be said that the priest who was the accomplice cannot absolve the accomplice from that crime even if he has already been absolved by another; for with regard to that crime he perpetually lacks jurisdiction. But the Author is not speaking of absolving the accomplice from that crime, but of absolving him from other sins after that crime has been rightly expiated by confession made to another priest.
What, then, you will ask, is the Confessor to do if the penitent accuses himself of that sin, although remitted? I reply: If he accuses himself of this alone, the matter returns to the same as if someone confessed only a reserved sin to one not having the faculty over reserved sins; concerning which it was said above (section 575, Reply 2, no. 2) that he cannot be absolved, because thus no suitable matter of the sacrament is present. But if he also confesses other sins, it will be the same as if someone brought forward reserved and non-reserved sins together, namely, when matter partly suitable and partly unsuitable is proposed; but then the penitent can certainly be absolved, as was said in the cited section 575; yet the absolution, both from the nature of the matter and from the mind of the one absolving, falls only upon the suitable matter. Moreover, the present case differs from that preceding case in this: that for absolving one who with other sins also brings forward reserved sins, a cause excusing from the integrity of confession is required, as is noted in the same place; but in the present case no cause of this kind is required, because there is no need for that already remitted sin to be submitted again to the keys, and therefore its accusation occurs as something merely extraneous to the confession.
But if any shame remains in a Priest who through pitiable frailty committed a shameful sin with another, if any honor due to the Sacrament remains, he will never afterward hear the confession of his accomplice. Moreover, danger of a new lapse, or at least of grave temptation, can easily be present in the direction of such a penitent. - Gousset, ibid. - Therefore the faithful are to be warned, insofar as this can be done, never afterward to approach as Confessor the accomplice in their sin, except in a case of necessity.
In certain dioceses it had been provided by particular law that a Priest could never hear the confession of an accomplice, at least when intercourse had been consummated. Yet the Sacred Congregation of the Council more than once disapproved this; and when the Decrees of the Synod of Cosenza were proposed, although the defenders of this Decree brought forward many things in its defense and denied that danger of scandal was present, which others warned would easily arise from such a decree especially in small places, the Sacred Congregation of the Council replied on December 2, 1679: Let such a Decree be deleted 3. - Analecta Juris Pontificii, p. 752.
3 Thus the Sacred Congregation most wisely took care that zeal for restraining the faithful from evil, which sometimes spares no devices or efforts, should not exceed the limits of prudence; from which perhaps it may happen that the power given by Christ (2 Cor. 13:10) tends rather to destruction than to edification, while the difficulty of the remedy drives into the abyss of despair one whom it did not restrain from evil.
And here indeed a much more difficult question presents itself to us. For what is to be done if in some place a woman who has miserably fallen into a sin of this kind with a priest has no other priest there to whom she might sacramentally confess that sin, and the circumstances of the persons, place, etc., are such that she cannot turn elsewhere to seek a confessor, nor is there any hope, as can happen, for example, in mission territories, that another priest will ever come there? Shall we say that the mind of Pope Benedict XIV, when he promulgated those Constitutions, was that a most wretched woman in these circumstances ought to lack the sacraments of the Church throughout the course of her whole life, until in the final moments of life she can at last be absolved by the priest who was her accomplice in the sin, as the Constitution of Benedict XIV provides? Indeed, since death sometimes comes unexpectedly and with no illness as though announcing its arrival beforehand, shall we say that the same woman is constrained also by this dreadful necessity: that after that sin she must undergo the danger, prolonged perhaps for very many years, of departing from this life without sacramental absolution? But then what is she to do when the precept of annual confession and Communion urges? Will you say that she can, and indeed ought, perpetually to approach the sacred table after merely premising contrition? What if scandal of the people and infamy of the woman follow if it becomes public that she does not approach the sacrament of Penance for several years? Someone may perhaps suggest that in this necessity one can act with a penitent of this kind no otherwise than with one having a reserved sin, and thus, passing over the fault over which the priest has no jurisdiction, the remaining sins can be submitted to absolution; and in this way that fault also can be remitted indirectly. But where and when will that fault finally be submitted to the keys of the Church? It must therefore be admitted that most grave difficulties occur, whichever way one may finally turn; nor, it seems, will anyone easily proceed to define anything in so grave a matter by relying upon his own judgment alone.
Yet there are two things which seem sufficiently clear. One is that Benedict XIV, when he took away from a Confessor who was an accomplice in the crime jurisdiction for absolving his accomplice from the same crime, indeed wished to remove the occasion of a most grave scandal, but by no means to close to the penitent the way of reconciliation instituted by Christ the Lord and imposed upon all the faithful; indeed, for this reason he rendered the Confessor who was an accomplice in the crime incapable of the ministry of this reconciliation, so that it might be obtained more fittingly and certainly through the ministry of another priest. He therefore supposed that which generally occurs, and occurred much more in that age, namely, that other priests were not lacking from whom the penitent might obtain, according to the law established by Christ, remission of his sin through confession and sacramental absolution which he sought. Therefore he perhaps will not have strayed very far from the truth who thinks that in the present hypothesis, as altogether extraordinary, a determination is sought in vain in those Constitutions.
The other is that the mind and practice of the Church have never been such that, whenever she restricts or removes jurisdiction for remitting certain sins and reserves their absolution to certain persons, she wished thereby to commit it that, with the law of Christ concerning seeking and obtaining pardon of sins through the sacrament of Penance set aside, the faithful should obtain the grace of justification only through contrition or even only through indirect remission of crimes. For however these means may seem, and in fact may be, sufficient for the grace of reconciliation with God and therefore for obtaining eternal salvation, nevertheless the Church, insofar as it lies in her, does not permit the economy established by Christ to be neglected. Hence that declaration of the Council of Trent (sess. 14, chapter 7): It has always been observed in the Church of God that there is no reservation at the moment of death; and therefore all priests can absolve any penitents from any sins and censures whatsoever. Nor indeed must it be judged that this was provided by the Church only for the moment or danger of death. For according to the sense of the same Church, which most manifestly reveals itself to us in the sacred Canons and the unanimous opinion of the Catholic schools, whenever it happens that someone, on account of a legitimate impediment, cannot have recourse for the benefit of absolution to him by whom otherwise he was by law to be absolved, he can be absolved by another (chapter Eos qui, 22, De Sent. Excomm., in VI). We find the same established in chapter Ea noscitur, 13, De Sent. Excomm., and chapter Quamvis, 58, same title. Moreover, according to the doctrine of the Catholic schools (see above, no. 575), this obtains when the impediment to approaching one who possesses the faculty of absolving persists for a long time, which is computed from six months. Indeed, what of the fact that the Church does not forbid Catholics dwelling in a region of schismatics, if perhaps they feel themselves burdened with sins and do not judge that sufficient provision is made for the peace of conscience through contrition, to seek sacramental absolution from a schismatic priest when a Catholic priest is lacking? Therefore it is most alien to the mind and custom of the Church so to restrict or bind the jurisdiction necessary for administering the sacrament of Penance that it remains restricted or bound even when, for a long time and much more throughout the whole course of life, no access is open to the sinner to those who do not have it bound or restricted.
Nevertheless, it must not be denied that a distinction of no slight moment intervenes between the present question and the general question concerning reserved sins. For although the condition of each case may seem equal when only the lack of another confessor is considered in the necessity of confessing, nevertheless the character of the inconvenience which in the present case can be feared from confession to such a priest is different. To this difficulty perhaps this one thing can be replied: that fear of an inconvenience which can be called voluntary, because it lies in our will freely to admit or remove it, neither can nor ought to bring it about that those things which seem necessary are omitted. Hence Benedict XIV himself did not fear an inconvenience of this kind so far as to think that a Confessor who was an accomplice should be prevented from hearing the confession of his accomplice even when necessity urged. For it belongs to the Church as a pious mother not to fail her children in necessities and therefore not to withdraw the necessary aid of the Sacrament in these circumstances, lest, if anyone perish, his destruction be attributed rather to the negligence or severity of the mother than to the obstinacy of the children.
But it also happens from other causes that sacramental confession inspires in either the priest, because of certain conditions of a penitent, or the penitent, because of conditions of the priest, a fear of some inconvenience which is not empty. Yet who would therefore say that either the priest is to be deterred from furnishing the ministry or the penitent from making confession where reception of the sacrament appears necessary? Namely, when necessity demands the use of the sacrament, the necessary aid must by no means be denied on the one side, nor neglected on the other. If anyone abuses this aid, the fault of the ruin will fall entirely upon the malice of him who was unwilling to use a good well.
- QUESTION 7. Can a Bishop absolve from the excommunication imposed upon a Confessor who absolved his own accomplice, if the case is occult, by the concession of Trent, chapter 6, Liceat, sess. 24?
Reply. St. Ligorius, no. 556, replies thus. On the one hand it seems that the answer must be no; for if the Bishop or another delegated by him could absolve this case when it is occult, the reservation of the Pontiff would become useless and illusory, for this case can occur only occultly....
Nevertheless, it seems that it can probably be said that, even while preserving the faculty imparted to Bishops by the Council for absolving this case when it is occult, the reservation of the Pontiff would not become altogether useless and illusory: both because, although the case is ordinarily occult, nevertheless it can sometimes happen that it is public; and because the law of reservation would have place at least in Rome and in other places where Trent has not been received and where Bishops cannot use the aforesaid faculty....
Thus indeed St. Alphonsus according to the laws then in force. But now, since the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis of Our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius IX, in confirming the faculty attributed to Bishops by the Council of Trent, excepted censures reserved in a special manner to the Apostolic See, and since among these, no. 10, is enumerated the excommunication upon those absolving an accomplice in a shameful sin according to the Constitutions of Benedict XIV, it is evident that this controversy no longer has place.
- QUESTION 8. Does a Priest incur excommunication who indeed hears the confession of an accomplice but does not absolve him?
Reply. It seems that the answer must be no with St. Ligorius, no. 556 4. - Ituriaga, vol. V, case 50. - The reason is that this is sufficiently clear from the Constitution Inter praeteritos of Benedict XIV, where it is thus said: No less was the penalty of excommunication imposed by us in the cited Constitutions upon a Priest who is an accomplice, who either outside the moment of death hears the confession of the penitent and absolves him, or who absolves him at the moment of death when another Priest is not lacking.... Therefore, according to the mind of the Pontiff, confession does not suffice, but absolution is also required.
4 ** Thus the holy Doctor says on this matter (book 6, no. 556): The question is raised whether a priest who does not absolve an accomplice but only hears him in confession incurs this excommunication. Concerning this doubt I consulted the Sacred Penitentiary, which on July 9, 1751, replied absolutely: The aforesaid confessor is not held by excommunication through a fictitious absolution. And I had long adhered to this opinion; but afterward, when I had read through the Constitution Inter praeteritos of the same Pontiff Benedict XIV, cited several times, I found the opposite sufficiently declared in section 59.
Tanquerey
Vol. I, Matrimony, and Holy Orders, On Penance (Volume I), Moral Part — Chapter II: On the Confessor
I. On the Absolution of an Accomplice
- Lest confessors be able to abuse their authority for sinning more freely with penitents, Benedict XIV prohibited, under penalty of excommunication, that they sacramentally hear and absolve an accomplice in a shameful sin licitly and validly, outside the case of extreme necessity:
1 Benedict XIV, Bull Sacram. Poenitentiae, June 1, 1741; Apostolici muneris, February 8, 1745; Inter praeteritos, December 3, 1749; Pius IX, Bull Apostolicae Sedis, October 11, 1869; St. Alphonsus, n. 553-556; Lehmk., n. 935-938; Marc, n. 1780-1784; Haine, q. 92; Genicot, n. 351-354; Noldin, n. 377-380; D'Annibale, In Constit. Apost. Sedis, Prati, 1894, n. 83-87; Bucceroni, Comment. de Constit. Bened. Sacram. Poenitentiae, Rome, 1890; Berardi, De Sollicitatione et Absolutione complicis, Faenza, 1897; Rota, Enchiridion confessarii et judicis ecclesiastici, Turin, 1884, n. 122-163; S. Many, De Absol. complicis, ap. Canoniste, June, July 1895.
"To individual priests, secular as well as regular ... we interdict and prohibit that any of them, outside the case of extreme necessity, namely in the article of death itself, and then with any other priest lacking who could perform the office of confessor, should dare to receive the sacramental confession of a person who is an accomplice in a shameful and dishonorable sin committed against the sixth precept of the Decalogue, any authority and jurisdiction for absolving any person whatsoever from a fault of this kind therefore being removed from him by the law itself, so indeed that the absolution, if he imparts any, is entirely null and void."
The Code at once confirms and explains this prohibition (c. 884): "The absolution of an accomplice in a shameful sin is invalid, except in danger of death; and even in danger of death, outside the case of necessity, it is illicit on the part of the confessor." Moreover, from can. 2367, "one absolving or pretending to absolve an accomplice in a shameful sin incurs by the fact itself an excommunication reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See."
For these documents to be rightly understood, it must be explained 1° what complicity in a shameful sin is; 2° what penalties are incurred by those who absolve an accomplice.
1° On Complicity in a Shameful Sin
- That the matter may be better declared, it must be known 1° what here is understood by shameful sin, and 2° by accomplice in this sin.
(A) The shameful sin of which there is question, considering the cited documents and the decrees of the Congregations, is any sin whatsoever against the sixth precept of the Decalogue, which is external, - grave not only as internal, but also insofar as external, - and certainly committed.
- (a) Therefore any sins whatsoever against other precepts of the Decalogue are excluded, and also internal sins of lust, because the Church punishes only external acts.
(b) But there are included not only consummated sins of lust, but also those which are not consummated, provided they are grave, such as touches, embraces, kisses, looks, conversations; for Benedict XIV speaks in a general manner of a shameful sin against the sixth, without any restriction. Certain authors formerly had thought that shameful speech was not included; but the Holy Office declared, May 28, 1873, that under the name of shameful sin are comprehended also those sins "which consist in mere conversations and looks, which import complicity."1
1 Ap. Bucceroni, op. cit., n. 68.
Yet it is required that the sin be grave, because the Church does not punish slight delicts by censure; and indeed grave both internally and externally, as was said concerning a reserved sin (n. 431), because here there is question of a certain reservation or limitation of jurisdiction. Hence an external act lightly shameful does not fall under this law, even if it proceeds from a gravely libidinous affection; the same must be said of an act materially grave, but formally light because of inadvertence or imperfect consent.
It is also required that the sin be certainly grave; hence the penalty is not incurred if there is a doubt either of fact, for example, concerning advertence, consent, or the objective gravity of the sin; or of law, for example, if it is controverted whether such a species of sin falls under this law.
But it is not required that the sin have been committed by the priest after the priesthood had already been received; for the law is wholly general, and includes also those acts which were committed by the confessor while he was still a layman, as is established from the decree of the Sacred Penitentiary, January 22, 1879, where it is declared1: "that a confessor cannot absolve an accomplice with whom before the priesthood, in boyhood, he acted shamefully, unless he is morally certain that the same person has already been directly and validly absolved by another confessor from the sin of complicity."
1 Ap. Lehmk., n. 935, note 1. - Ball. P., n. 649 and Genicot, n. 352, indeed contradict; but their authority, however great it may be, cannot destroy the force of this decree.
- (B) What an accomplice in a shameful sin is must now be declared. Now complicity in this matter imports the consent of two persons in the same shameful, grave, and external sin, whether each cooperates, as in mutual embraces, conversations, etc.; or only one acts, provided the other consents externally and at the same time internally: moreover consent is sufficiently present if this latter in no way resists.
(a) Hence there does not fall under the law an act which is mortal on one side, but only venial on the other; nor an act externally light although internally grave on both sides, because of the libidinous affection of both; nor an act, however grave, to which the other does not consent, indeed to which he has not given external consent, although internally he assents. Hence if someone has sinned with one resisting, or sleeping, or fully drunk, or destitute of the use of reason, there is not complicity.
(b) Complicity must be certain; hence if it is doubted whether either party sinned mortally, the act does not fall under the law. But complicity can be certain, even if that which had been promised is not fulfilled; for example, if two agree concerning copula to be had, although in fact copula is not had; or if a man induces a priest to sin with his own wife, and the priest furnishes assent, although afterwards he does not commit the sin; for in these or similar cases complicity consists in the evil purpose expressed by both in words or signs.
(c) But the accomplice can be either a man or a woman, either pubescent or prepubescent, provided he or she is capable of mortal sin; for Benedict XIV in no way distinguishes.
2° On the Penalties Passed Against Complicity in a Shameful Sin
- Complicity of this kind is struck by a twofold penalty: 1° absolution given to the accomplice is not only illicit, but also invalid, except in the case of necessity; 2° the priest absolving the accomplice incurs by the fact itself an excommunication reserved in a special manner to the Supreme Pontiff.
- (A) General rule, outside the case of necessity. (a) The confessor cannot directly absolve his own accomplice validly from the sin itself of complicity; this is certain from the very text of the law. Therefore in this matter the common error of the faithful is of no profit, nor a fortiori the good faith of the penitent, because here there is not question of a multitude, which the Church may wish to favor, but of two accomplices, whom she deservedly wishes to punish. Hence if the penitent is absolved from the sin of complicity by the accomplice, he is bound to repeat his confession before another priest. - Nor can the priest absolve his own accomplice from the sin of complicity by force of any Jubilee whatsoever or of any privilege whatsoever, whether granted to himself or to the penitent: for this is expressly declared by Benedict XIV.1
1 Bull Sacram. Poenit., § 5.
- (b) According to the more probable opinion, the priest can validly absolve his own accomplice from other sins, that is, from all those which are distinguished from the sin itself of complicity; for, according to the cited Bull (n. 567), the priest is deprived of jurisdiction for absolving from a fault of this kind, but not from others. Yet it is not licit to receive the sacramental confession of an accomplice, even as to other sins, if there is question of sins which are accused in a confession where the sin of complicity is deliberately kept silent. This is confirmed from a response of the Sacred Penitentiary2, May 16, 1877: "Whether he incurs censures ... who indeed absolved an accomplice ... who did not declare the sin of complicity in confession?" ... The response was: "The privation of jurisdiction for absolving an accomplice in a shameful sin, and the attached excommunication, insofar as the confessor shall have absolved him, is in order to the shameful sin in which the same confessor was an accomplice."
2 Ap. Canoniste, 1895, p. 334-335.
- Corollaries. (a) If the penitent has already been directly and validly absolved from the sin of complicity by another confessor, the priest who is an accomplice can validly absolve him from other sins.3 This was formerly disputed, but the matter was made certain from a decree of the Holy Office, May 29, 1867, where it is declared that "it is free to the confessor to absolve the person who is an accomplice, who has already been absolved from the dishonorable sin of complicity by another confessor; nevertheless counsel must always be given to the confessor in question that, unless necessity compels, he abstain from receiving the sacred confessions of the person, although already absolved from the sin of complicity." - It is said "directly absolved"; for if the sin of complicity has been remitted only indirectly, because, for example, it had been inculpably omitted, the priest who is the accomplice cannot remit it, since as to this same sin he lacks jurisdiction.
3 Apud Bucceroni, Comment. in Bull. Apostol. Sedis, n. 37.
Probably also, according to some, if the sin of complicity, already directly absolved, is again accused with others, the priest who is the accomplice is not prohibited from absolving from it; for the reservation of this sin has been taken away by the previous absolution.
But in both cases, on account of the honor of the sacrament and the security of the confessor and of the penitent, it is altogether expedient that the priest not hear the confession of an accomplice where there are other priests.
(b) If the priest in good faith absolves an accomplice not only from other sins, but also from the sin of complicity not yet directly absolved - for example, because he does not recognize his own accomplice, or because the penitent inculpably omits the sin of complicity - probably the absolution is valid, in this sense, that other sins are directly remitted and the sin of complicity indirectly; the reason is that the Supreme Pontiff prohibits and renders void only the direct absolution of this sin granted by him who has known himself to absolve from the sin of complicity. - Yet a sin thus indirectly remitted must be accused before another confessor, that it may be directly absolved.
But if the penitent in bad faith keeps back the sin of complicity, and accuses other sins, no sin is remitted, because of the defect of formal integrity, and therefore the confession must be repeated in its entirety.
- (B) Exceptions. (a) In the case of extreme necessity, i.e., in the article of death, the priest always validly absolves the accomplice; and licitly, if any priest whatsoever is lacking who morally can receive the confession of the dying person.
The article of death is understood of grave danger of death, as above, n. 399.
He acts illicitly and incurs excommunication who even then absolves an accomplice when another priest is present, whether approved or not. - Yet except the case if the other priest is unwilling to hear the confession, or if the person who is the accomplice altogether refuses to confess sins to him1; or if the other priest cannot be called or approach without grave infamy or scandal; for then this other priest cannot morally hear the confession. - Except also, more probably, if the other priest is notoriously suspended, excommunicated, or interdicted, because a priest of this kind could not be called to hear the confession of the dying person without infamy of the priest who is the accomplice, or scandal.2
1 Thus the Code, c. 2367: "even in the article of death, if another priest, although not approved for confessions, can receive the confession of the dying person without any grave infamy and scandal about to arise, except the case in which the dying person refuses to confess to another."
2 Thus Rota, n. 156; Many, ap. Canoniste, p. 340; Lehmk., n. 937.
- (b) In the case of graver necessity - when, for example, the ecclesiastical and divine precept of confession is urgent, and the accomplice in no way has, nor for a long time can have, the supply of another confessor, as sometimes occurs in mission places - more probably the priest can validly and licitly absolve the accomplice, directly indeed from ordinary sins and indirectly from the sin of complicity, provided there is present on neither side any grave danger of relapse.1 - For when divine law and ecclesiastical law concur, the former must prevail; but in this case the divine precept of confession is urgent, and it cannot be fulfilled except by approaching the priest who is the accomplice; therefore it must be preferred to the ecclesiastical law prohibiting absolution of an accomplice. - Yet it is said provided there is not present a grave danger of relapse: for if it were present, natural law, which is preferred to a positive divine precept, prohibits that the confession be instituted.
1 Rota, n. 148; Baller. P., n. 648; Many, l. c., p. 335-337. - Indeed, some say that the priest licitly and validly absolves the accomplice even directly, when there is grave danger that this person during the whole time of his or her life will find no other priest who may absolve him or her directly from the sin of complicity: because this case almost falls back into danger of death. Thus Bucceroni, op. cit., n. 67; D'Annibale, Summula, III, n. 324, note 38; Ball. P., n. 655.
(c) Some also say that the absolution of an accomplice is valid whenever the absolving confessor is excused from excommunication because of one of the causes soon to be explained; for the nullity of absolution is a certain penalty imposed against the penitent; and if the confessor is exempted from penalty, it is equitable that the penitent likewise be exempted.2
2 Thus D'Annibale, n. 87; Scavini, n. 485; Pennacchi, Comment. in Bull. Apost. Sedis, t. I, p. 312.
On the Excommunication Passed Against Those Absolving an Accomplice
- Those absolving an accomplice in a shameful sin incur by the fact itself a major excommunication reserved in a most special manner to the Supreme Pontiff, as is established from can. 2367 of the Code.
For incurring this excommunication certain conditions are required: (A) That the confessor directly absolve or pretend to absolve from the sin of complicity. Hence (a) the hearing of the confession does not suffice, but absolution or the simulation of absolution is required. Nor does absolution from ordinary sins suffice, but direct absolution from the sin of complicity is required, as is clear from what has been said above.
(b) Yet the simulation of direct absolution suffices, by which the confessor so acts externally that he seems to grant absolution, for example, if he utters the words of absolution without the intention of absolving, or pronounces the form while omitting an essential word, or recites a prayer over the penitent, so that the latter thinks himself to be absolved. This indeed was formerly denied by many, notwithstanding contrary decisions of the Sacred Penitentiary; but the controversy was ended by an authentic decree of the Holy Office, approved by the Supreme Pontiff, December 10, 1883: "All commentators on the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis teach that that confessor is not subject to excommunication who pretends to absolve an accomplice in a shameful sin, but in reality does not absolve. Yet the Sacred Penitentiary declared the contrary, March 1, 1878. Can the petitioner permit that in his Seminary the aforesaid opinion of the Commentators, opposed to the response of the Sacred Penitentiary, be taught? - Indeed the Eminent Fathers responded: In the negative, communication having been made with the Most Holy."1 - This is confirmed from can. 2367 of the Code already cited.
1 Ap. Canoniste, l. c., p. 404.
- (B) That the confessor have recognized the accomplice and knowingly and willingly absolved; otherwise the absolution of an accomplice will not be formal. Indeed invincible ignorance excuses from this excommunication, or vincible ignorance which is not crass and supine. Hence, - (a) if one in no way recognizes the accomplice, he does not sin by absolving, nor does he incur the censure. (b) Likewise, if the confessor, when he sinned, was in no way known by the accomplice (for example, because he was dressed in secular garb), he is not bound to betray himself to the penitent by declaring that he cannot absolve him; and therefore, more probably, he does not incur excommunication by absolving. But if previously both knew each other mutually as accomplices, it is not necessary that they recognize each other mutually in the sacred tribunal, but it suffices that the confessor notice that the penitent is his accomplice.
(c) Nor does a priest absolving an accomplice incur excommunication, when the accomplice did not declare the sin of complicity in confession, unless directly or indirectly he induced the penitent not to manifest such a sin: directly indeed, by expressly suggesting that such a sin must be kept silent in confession; indirectly, by persuading that such an act is not a sin, or is not so grave that he or she should be troubled about it. For the Sacred Penitentiary declared, February 19, 1896, that "the excommunication ... is not escaped by confessors absolving or pretending to absolve that accomplice who indeed does not confess the sin of complicity, from which he has not yet been absolved, but conducts himself thus for this reason, that the confessor induced the penitent to this, whether directly or indirectly."2 The same is established by the Code, c. 2367, § 2.
2 Acta S. Sedis, XXVIII, p. 444-445.
(d) But if the confessor doubts whether the penitent is an accomplice or not, he must prudently question him, so that he may be able to uncover the matter; but if the doubt perseveres, he can absolve, without incurring the censure, from what has been said, n. 573. - But if he does nothing to resolve the doubt, he does not escape excommunication, because his ignorance is crass and supine; moreover, this does not excuse from censure in this case, as the Holy Office declared3, January 13, 1892.
3 Acta S. Sedis, XXIV, 625: "Whether those absolving an accomplice in a shameful matter with crass and supine ignorance incur this excommunication or not? - In the case, they incur it."
- (C) When a priest absolves an accomplice in the article of death, he does not incur excommunication, unless there is present another priest who, without grave infamy and scandal, morally could receive the confession of the dying person, as was said above, n. 578.
Concerning absolution from this censure, reserved in a special, indeed in a most special, manner to the Supreme Pontiff, see what we said above, n. 446-447. - When a priest has absolved his accomplice three times, the Sacred Penitentiary is accustomed to command him to lay aside the office of confessor; but since this is often morally impossible in regions where there are few priests, petition must be made that this clause not be inserted or that dispensation from it be granted.
Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis
Vol. III, Bk. II, Tr. V, Chapter VI: On Absolution of an Accomplice
— "Absolution of an accomplice in a shameful sin is invalid, except in danger of death; and even in danger of death, outside the case of necessity, it is illicit on the part of the confessor according to the norm of the apostolic constitutions, and namely the constitution of Benedict XIV, Sacramentum Paenitentiae, June 1, 1741."
C. 884 remits to the Apostolic Constitutions by which this matter is governed. They are the above-praised Bull Sacramentum Paenitentiae, §§4 and 5, and the declaratory Brief Apostolici muneris, February 8, 1745, to which certain declarations of the Holy Office and of the Sacred Penitentiary are added.
The sum of the matter is handed down to us by c. 884 itself, whose words found certain or probable explanations.
Absolution of an accomplice. Looking at the end of the law, which is indicated at the beginning of the constitution Sacramentum Paenitentiae itself, that is, lest a confession of this kind should be an occasion of spiritual ruin for penitents, etc., Ballerini, Op. theol., V, 410, did not wish a complicity preceding the reception of the priesthood to be comprehended by the severe law. "If you imagine, for example, two accomplices in sin in boyhood or adolescence, of whom afterward one, for example, having assumed the habit of the Capuchins, after twenty years hears the confession of his companion, by force of which he must absolve also from that sin, because, for example, he confessed invalidly, surely it is not credible that the faculty of absolving has been denied to this confessor."
Yet the Sacred Penitentiary, January 22, 1879, responded: that the confessor cannot absolve the accomplice with whom before the priesthood in a youthful age he acted shamefully, unless he is morally certain that the accomplice has already been directly and validly absolved from the sin of complicity by another confessor. And today morally all writers reject the distinction of complicity before or after the priesthood.
Of an accomplice in a shameful sin. On May 28, 1873, the Holy Office declared that not only touches are comprehended, "but all grave sins externally committed against chastity, even those which consist in mere conversations and looks which import complicity." Therefore a shameful sin can be either of action, or, what was formerly disputed, of words, or of sight, yet grave as external. And on account of the words of the Bull Sacramentum, repeated in the Brief Apostolici: "in a shameful and dishonorable sin," there is probably required a sin which is libidinous in itself, or, as Noldin, III, 369, says, "immediate complicity in the shameful action itself." Such complicity is not that of a pander to whom money is paid, but of the woman with whom, for example, fornication is committed.
True complicity is required besides, which can be absent in looks and even in touches, for example of a sleeping, drunken, or unwilling person. For complicity supposes the consent of two or more, expressed or tacitly signified, in the same sin. Complicity properly so called is not the connivance of one not impeding a sin which by office he was not bound to impede, or approval of speech already heard which does not excite other shameful speeches.
But any accomplice-person is understood, whether female, or male, or child, yet possessing the use of reason.
Absolution is invalid, at least as regards the sin of complicity in a shameful matter not yet directly absolved. After that sin has been remitted by another priest, contrary to what Ball., op. c., V, 415, and Pighi, Cursus theol. mor., IV, 374, 2°, wrote, with the more common opinion we adhere to the sentence of Card. d'Ann. (III, 324, 37): "it is truer that, reservation having been consumed, the absolution is valid."
As regards the other sins of the same accomplice-person, jurisdiction does not seem to be taken away.
Noldin indeed, III, 370, now thinks a more severe response must be given, since the Canon declares invalid the absolution of the accomplice himself, and not only of the sin; but the Canon can be understood according to the preceding constitutions to which it remits. With us stand Pighi, IV, 374; Gen., II, 352; Arregui, n. 646.
Wherefore, as often as the penitent confesses in good faith, he is directly and validly absolved from the other sins, so that in a new confession he must accuse only the sin of complicity.
And the matter stands similarly if the confessor gave absolution while distracted, or did not recognize the penitent.
For which reason also, although, when the necessity of communicating or celebrating is urgent, it is much better that the accomplice dispose himself by perfect contrition rather than by making confession to the accomplice, nevertheless if he wishes to obtain security of received absolution, another confessor being lacking, he could be absolved from the other sins by the accomplice. If the latter warns the penitent concerning the confession of the sin of complicity to be repeated, he seems to escape the penalty of excommunication, concerning which immediately below. Gen., II, 352. Ball., Op. Th., V, 415, who at the same time warns that this is not to be committed outside gravest necessity. And it is plain that it is by no means becoming that one, at least who has sinned while already a priest, act as confessor of his accomplice outside necessity.
But the case of can. 884 is not had if neither knew the other before the confession. Otherwise, you would easily oblige the priest to defame himself.
Here distinguish accurately the confessor who has known the accomplice and him who has not recognized the accomplice. He who knew the accomplice outside confession, but at the beginning of confession did not recognize him, must well warn concerning the defect of his jurisdiction: for by this he falls into no infamy.
By the use of that direct absolution as to other sins, provision is made for the necessity in which the penitent can be, in mission places or even in Europe, when, for example, while the paschal precept is pressing, reception of the sacraments cannot be omitted without infamy and scandal, and he is impeded from seeking a confessor in another place. Those who, like Noldin, think jurisdiction is taken away in a universal manner, are compelled, in the same circumstances, to recur to epikeia, by which then they also permit direct absolution from the sin of complicity. Cf. Noldin, III, 371 b. This, contrary to what Ballerini insinuates, l.c., n. 424, 425, in our opinion is not to be admitted outside danger of death.
What if the penitent knows the priest-accomplice by face, but not by name, and approaches the confessional of the accomplice as of an unknown priest? The confessor ought not reveal his name. Therefore he will be able to absolve the penitent, if the latter brings other matter to be absolved, but the sin of complicity will not yet be directly absolved.
But absolution can be formal and true, although ineffective; it can be feigned or equivalently given.
— In danger of death itself, absolution of an accomplice is illicit outside the case of necessity. A case of necessity is had: if no other priest, even a simple one or one not approved for hearing confessions, either is present or can be called without grave scandal or infamy, whether certain or probable (and Ballerini, V, 422, notes that the probable suspicion itself of complicity is already gravely defaming and scandalous); if another who is present is unwilling to receive the confession of the dying or sick person, or the sick person refuses to make confession to another, so that there is danger of sacrilegious confession.
And because the question concerns a person who is endangered as to eternal salvation, that refusal of another confessor is not to be taken scrupulously; but a sick woman is already judged to refuse another confessor when, not ignorant that other confessors are available, nevertheless of her own accord she declares that she wishes such a priest (of whom she was the accomplice).
From Benedict XIV, the accomplice-confessor must under grave obligation procure that place be open to another confessor, for example by departing under some pretext, if nevertheless he can do this without his own infamy or without danger of sacrilegious confession.
If no one else is available except one notoriously suspended or excommunicated, it is not certain that this one must be preferred to the accomplice, since to employ one notoriously excommunicated is of itself very little becoming.
A well-begun confession can also be brought through to the end, whether another has arrived or the danger of death has ceased. But he who, on account of the impediment of illness, has been absolved after only an incomplete confession, will not afterward be able to complete it before the accomplice, unless the sin of complicity has already been accused with sufficient distinctness so that it was directly remitted in its species.
What if the danger of death, in which the accomplice was absolved by the priest, was merely apparent? Provided the estimation of danger was prudent, the absolution will be valid: for jurisdiction is reasonably understood to have been given for a prudently estimated danger of death.
Prudently also the Code declares the absolution illicit only on the part of the confessor, lest the penitent ever be troubled by a scruple of illicit petition.
— Penalty of Excommunication. From c. 2367, "One absolving or feigning to absolve an accomplice in a shameful sin incurs by the fact itself an excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See in a most special manner, and this even in the article of death, if another priest, though not approved for confessions, can receive the confession of the dying person without grave infamy and scandal about to arise, except the case in which the dying person refuses to confess to another."
Therefore, he is punished by excommunication who absolves, seriously, although ineffectively; who feigns to absolve, that is, not indeed he who by some gesture or some utterance of words hides from others, but not from the penitent, the absolution denied; but he who so acts that the penitent reasonably ought to think himself absolved. Whether he absolves a healthy penitent or one lying dangerously ill, he is excommunicated as often as, from what was said above, absolution then remains illicit. Yet if the priest-accomplice, by abstaining from every action, merely did not cause another priest to be able to be physically present, with attention to the words of Benedict XIV, he does not seem affected by the excommunication. Or, to use other words, there does not seem to be prescribed for the accomplice under excommunication the positive action of physically calling another priest; but only that he avoid the infamy to be feared from another priest called, and take care that place be open to him.
Nor, from §2 of c. 2367, does he escape excommunication who absolves an accomplice not accusing the sin of complicity for this reason, "because he was induced to this by the accomplice-confessor either directly or indirectly." The indirect mode will be if the priest, after the deed, persuaded the other that the sin was not grave, or that the accusation was useless because the matter was already known to him. After the deed, I say; for, with attention to the common opinion, the case is not had if, deceived by the priest, the other truly, on account of his error, does not sin gravely.
But he escapes excommunication who absolves an accomplice spontaneously concealing that sin of complicity; indeed who, to one accusing that sin with others, declared that he absolved him only from the other sins, the burden remaining of accusing that sin to another confessor (Ball., V, 415).
Much more does he escape excommunication who, in the gravest difficulty of which above, licitly confers absolution. Finally he escapes who in good faith and not doubting judged that the case was not present although in reality it was present. For excommunication supposes grave fault.
But he does not escape excommunication who sins by crass or supine ignorance, since no temerarious audacity is required; and he also will be guilty of excommunication who, by his manner of acting, for example by spontaneous and undue visitation, is to be judged to have offered himself spontaneously to the dangerously sick woman as confessor of an accomplice.
What if the priest has sacrilegiously begun to hear the confession of a sick person in danger of death, but before absolution repents of the deed? The case is objectively controverted. If he can, it seems that even then he is held by the obligation of seeing that another be summoned, and that he is excused only by the danger of graver infamy, since he himself exposed himself to the danger. Subjectively, if he thought the judgment had to be completed by himself, he will avoid guilt and excommunication.
— That excommunication is most specially reserved. Yet the penitent priest will be able to be absolved by another in the circumstances indicated above, n. 473, with the burden of recurring at least through the confessor to the Sacred Penitentiary. This burden remains, from c. 2252, after convalescence, even if he was absolved in danger of death. Indeed, from c. 2254, §3, even if in an extraordinary case recourse is impossible at present, when opportunity is given recourse will have to be made, contrary to what is disposed concerning other censures even most specially reserved. Whence this case is treated with peculiar severity.
N.B. In the letters which the confessor has given to the Sacred Penitentiary, it is necessary that you distinguish the quality of pastor or of one having care of souls from the office of mere confessor (such as even a cooperating vicar is); that you indicate whether he absolved the accomplice only once, or twice, or several times. For according to these things the mandates of the Sacred Penitentiary are accustomed to vary. Besides, it is also useful that from the beginning the confessor enjoin what afterward will be prescribed, that is, that the delinquent no longer hear the accomplice-person sacramentally, neither before the sin of complicity has been directly remitted by another confessor, as is clear of itself, nor even afterward, if nevertheless this can be done without scandal or danger of infamy; and that, if that person returns to him, he warn her concerning the nullity of the absolutions.
He who doubts whether the one confessing is his accomplice or not possesses doubtful jurisdiction. But lest he have to betray himself, he seems able to use it, and licitly impart absolution.
Summary
— I. Absolution of an accomplice in a shameful sin is forbidden.
Absolution is understood both formal and true, by a serious pronunciation of the form, and feigned, without intention or pronunciation of the form; also equivalently given, when, deceiving the penitent concerning the gravity of the sin committed or the necessity of accusing it, the priest directly or indirectly induces him to be silent about the sin.
An accomplice, according to the opinion common today, to which the Sacred Penitentiary adhered on January 22, 1879, is also the accomplice of one who afterward became a priest.
If neither of the two knew the other before confession, the case is not contained in canon 884.
Complicity says formal consent with the priest in the same sin.
In a shameful sin: whether of action, or words, or sight, which is grave as external, and, as is probable, libidinous in itself, or immediately shameful.
II. Sanction. 1. Direct absolution, given outside danger of death concerning this sin not yet sacramentally absolved, is invalid. It is illicit on the part of the priest, even when given to an accomplice in danger of death, outside necessity.
A case of necessity is had: a) if no other priest (even not approved, yet except one notoriously suspended or excommunicated) is present or willing; b) if another cannot be called without grave scandal or infamy, whether certain or probable; c) if the sick accomplice refuses to confess to another. This refusal does not seem capable of being understood rigorously, because, in that danger of death, the just severity of the Church must be reconciled with her solicitude concerning eternal salvation, which demands a confession wholly sincere and complete. But the accomplice-confessor must procure that place be open to another priest, and therefore must strive that the excuse of feared infamy be removed. Yet he does not seem compelled by any law to call another priest himself. The use of epikeia in gravest necessity is not altogether excluded by authors, for example in mission places, or when, without grave scandal, the reception of the sacraments cannot be omitted; but, in our opinion, outside danger of death, the first absolution from that sin will not be direct if it has been given by the accomplice.
- The priest guilty of the delict is punished by excommunication latae sententiae most specially reserved to the Holy See, by which one absolving an accomplice even in danger of death is punished, if he is not excused by necessity, and therefore if he is morally to be judged to have inserted himself spontaneously into hearing that confession of the accomplice. Nor is excommunication avoided by crass or supine ignorance. One doubting whether the one confessing is an accomplice has doubtful jurisdiction, which nevertheless, lest he have to betray himself, he seems able to use.
Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Vol. III, Pt. II, Tr. V, Ch. III, Art. IV, § 1. On the Absolution of an Accomplice
454. The law now in force. The Code of Canon Law, c. 2367, establishes: "One who absolves or pretends to absolve an accomplice in a shameful sin incurs ipso facto an excommunication reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See; and this even in the article of death, if another priest, although not approved for confessions, can receive the confession of the dying person without some grave infamy and scandal that would arise, except the case in which the dying person refuses to confess to another. Nor does one who absolves or pretends to absolve an accomplice escape the same excommunication when the accomplice indeed does not confess the sin of complicity, from which he has not yet been absolved, but conducts himself thus because he was induced to it by the accomplice confessor, either directly or indirectly."
Canon 884 establishes: "The absolution of an accomplice in a shameful sin is invalid except in danger of death; and even in danger of death, outside a case of necessity, it is illicit on the part of the confessor according to the norm of the apostolic constitutions, and by name the constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum Poenitentiae, June 1, 1741." These are the words of the constitution: "We forbid and prohibit each and every priest, both secular and regular, ... lest any one of them, outside a case of extreme necessity, namely, in the very article of death and with another priest then also lacking who can discharge the office of confessor, dare to receive the sacramental confession of a person who is an accomplice in a shameful and dishonorable sin committed against the sixth precept of the Decalogue, any authority and jurisdiction to absolve any person whatsoever from fault of this kind having therefore been removed from him by the law itself, and this indeed to such a degree that the absolution, if he should impart any, is altogether null and void.... And nevertheless, if any confessor should dare to act otherwise, let him also incur ipso facto the penalty of major excommunication...." - Afterward the same Pontiff, through the constitution Apostolici muneris of February 28, 1745, explained this law still more. - For explaining these ecclesiastical statutes it is necessary to declare how the following are understood here: 1. a shameful sin; 2. an accomplice; 3. to absolve.
455. 1. A shameful sin is any sin of lust, provided that it is a) grave (objectively and subjectively); b) external; c) certain; d) not yet directly remitted.422 Therefore the following are excluded:
a) Sins against other virtues, for example, theft, homicide, and so forth. Hence a confessor could absolve his accomplice in homicide. But everyone sees how unbecoming even such an absolution would be.
b) Internal sins against chastity, such as morose delectations and desires.
c) Light sins of lust, whether from the imperfection of the act or from an erroneous conscience. Hence if some boy, from an erroneous conscience, should certainly think that impure touches perpetrated by a priest were not a grave sin, he could be absolved by this priest, who would not incur excommunication. Likewise, kisses, although they are often mortal sins in a particular case, nevertheless in this matter are not held to be certainly mortal from the external object, and therefore it must be judged from the attendant circumstances whether a kiss was lustful and consequently a mortal sin or not. While doubt remains, the censure is not incurred.
d) Sins already directly remitted beforehand. Hence, for example, if someone in his youth sinned shamefully with a priest and has already rightly confessed this sin to another confessor and received valid absolution, but now confesses the same sin as free matter to the accomplice priest, he is validly absolved, nor does the priest incur any penalty. But in practice it is greatly to be counseled that a confessor should never hear the confession of his accomplice, because of the danger of temptations and of irreverence toward the sacrament.423
Note. It is not required that the shameful sin have been committed after the priesthood had already been received. Hence the Sacred Penitentiary taught on January 22, 1879: "A confessor cannot absolve an accomplice with whom he acted shamefully in boyhood before the priesthood, unless he is morally certain that the accomplice has already been directly and validly absolved from the sin of complicity by another confessor."
422 Cf. Holy Office, May 18, 1873.
423 Hence the Holy Office declared on May 29, 1867: "A confessor is free to absolve an accomplice who has already been absolved from the dishonorable sin of complicity by another confessor; nevertheless counsel must always be given to the confessor in question that, unless necessity compels, he abstain from receiving the sacred confessions of a person, although already absolved from the sin of complicity" (in Bucceroni, Comm. in Bull. Ap. Sedis, n. 37).
456. 2. An accomplice (or a partner in crime, that is, one as though entangled in the same crime) can be either a man or a woman, either pubescent or prepubescent, provided that the person is capable of mortal sin. Nor is it required that this sin have been perpetrated by a lustful act between the priest and the accomplice, but it suffices that both have inwardly and outwardly committed the same grave sin against chastity. Hence, for example, the sin of complicity seems to be present if a husband agrees with a priest concerning committing adultery with his wife, although the adultery does not in fact occur because of the resistance of the wife. In that case the priest cannot absolve the husband, since he is his accomplice.424 It is altogether required that the complicity be formal, and indeed both at the time of the sin and at the time of absolution. Hence, if a priest sins with a woman who resists, who is totally drunk, or who is insane, formal complicity is not present; or if the confessor during absolution does not recognize his accomplice, or even in the case in which he seriously doubts whether the penitent is his accomplice, he validly and licitly absolves. For he ought indeed cautiously to attempt to dispel that doubt, but he is not bound to ask the penitent: Did you commit that sin with me? Likewise, formal complicity is not present if the priest was known as a priest neither in the act of sin nor afterward. Thus, for example, if a masked priest sinned with a woman who never recognized him and afterward absolves this woman from that sin of lust, he does not incur excommunication. For he is not bound to say to this woman in confession: I am that man with whom you sinned. But the intrinsic reason is that the abuse of the sacrament which ecclesiastical law wishes to prohibit is then not present. Thus commonly the modern authors, for example, Hollweck,425 Lehmkuhl.426 Without sufficient reason Gury427 taught the contrary.
424 Thus the truer opinion (cf. Bucceroni, Comm. in Const. "Sacramentum Poenitentiae", n. 69); Noldin-Schmitt (De sacr.17, n. 370) teaches the contrary, saying: "For incurring the case of complicity, immediate complicity in the shameful action itself is required; cooperation, however proximate, in the shameful sin of another does not suffice."
425 Die kirchlichen Strafgesetze, § 274.
426 Theol. mor. II, n. 1202.
427 Cas. consc. II, n. 617.
457. 3. True or at least pretended absolution is required in order that the excommunication be incurred. Hence this penalty is not inflicted: a) if the confessor only heard the confession of the accomplice, provided, however, that he does not simulate absolution. A confessor simulates or pretends absolution if he leads the penitent himself into error, so that he thinks himself truly absolved; b) if the penitent of his own accord concealed the sin of complicity in confession. But if the confessor directly or indirectly induced the accomplice penitent not to confess the sin of complicity, one who absolves or pretends to absolve his accomplice does not escape excommunication. A confessor would induce directly if he said to the penitent: Take care not to confess that sin; but a confessor would induce indirectly if he persuaded the penitent that such a lustful act previously committed with him and thought to be a grave sin was in fact not gravely evil, or was not necessarily to be accused in confession, because the confessor himself already knew that fact from elsewhere.428
Gross or supine ignorance does not excuse the confessor from this excommunication.429 Therefore in practice, as often as a confessor absolves his accomplice, so often does he incur this censure.
428 Cf. Sacred Penitentiary, February 19, 1896 (Collect. de Prop. Fide, n. 1916).
429 Holy Office, January 13, 1892, ad 3 (ibid., n. 1777).
458. Exceptions from the censure (and the validity of absolution) are had only in a case of extreme necessity. Such extreme necessity never exists if another priest is present, even one not approved, who can morally receive the confession of the penitent. But if another priest is indeed physically present but cannot be called to hear the confession without grave infamy and public scandal, or if he refuses to hear the confession, it is then the same as if no priest were present. A case of extreme necessity is:
a) The article or grave danger of death.
Since in the article or danger of death every reservation ceases, the confessor indeed validly absolves his accomplice; but if any other priest (even one not approved) can hear this confession without grave infamy to the dying person and the accomplice priest and without public scandal, the confessor acts illicitly and incurs excommunication, unless, notwithstanding serious persuasion, the accomplice altogether refuses to confess to another confessor. - Although Benedict XIV and the Code of Canon Law, c. 884, granted the absolution of an accomplice only in the article or danger of death, nevertheless through epikeia this faculty is extended to another case of gravest necessity, namely, if there is present:
b) Gravest necessity, when the ecclesiastical and divine precepts both of confession and of Communion press, and the accomplice cannot find another confessor for a long time.
Thus several modern authors rightly teach as probable, for example, Lehmkuhl,430 Tanquerey,431 Bucceroni,432 D'Annibale,433 Noldin-Schönegger,434 Joseph Alberti,435 Ballerini-Palmieri.436 But the reason is that the positive ecclesiastical law which invalidates the absolution of an accomplice seems in gravest necessity to have to yield both to the divine law of receiving Communion and to the natural law of avoiding scandal. This case can occur in a remote place of the missions to which another priest scarcely ever comes and from which the penitent cannot undertake a long journey to find another confessor. But the absolution granted in this case does not seem to be other than indirect, and consequently the penitent is bound afterward, when it will be possible, to confess the sin of complicity to another confessor.437
If the confessor in good faith, that is, without advertence to the sin of complicity, absolves a penitent who is his accomplice, more probably the absolution is valid. For other sins are directly absolved, but the sin of complicity is indirectly remitted. The reason is that the jurisdiction of the priest seems to be restricted only with regard to the sin of complicity, but not with regard to other sins. Nevertheless, there are some authors who teach that the confessor altogether lacks every jurisdiction over his accomplice who has not yet been directly absolved from the sin of complicity.
c) A confessor indeed does not incur excommunication, but acts gravely illicitly, if he attempts to absolve his accomplice: alpha) when the latter is entirely silent concerning the sin of complicity, provided the confessor did not induce him to be silent (either directly or indirectly), as has already been said; beta) when the latter, because of the danger of grave scandal, is unable to confess elsewhere, provided the confessor expressly admonishes him that he does not will to absolve him from the sin of complicity (which must afterward be declared to another confessor), and that he absolves him directly from the other sins.
Authors do not agree whether the absolution given indirectly in this case from the sin of complicity is valid or invalid,438 but it is probably valid, provided that the other requisites are present.439 For the Sacred Penitentiary gave this response on May 16, 1877: "The privation of jurisdiction for absolving an accomplice in a shameful sin, and the annexed excommunication insofar as the confessor should absolve him, are in relation to the shameful sin itself in which the same confessor was an accomplice." - From these words the following case is resolved: Peter, a priest, committed a grave sin of lust with Tullia. Tullia, accompanied by her mother, presents herself at Peter's confessional. Peter plainly says that he neither can nor wills to absolve her from the sin of lust, which must be declared to another confessor. Tullia insists greatly upon having absolution because, if she were not to go immediately after confession with her mother to Holy Communion, a most grave scandal would arise. Peter then gives absolution from the other sins, admonishing Tullia concerning eliciting an act of perfect contrition and concerning the obligation of declaring the sin of lust to another confessor. Peter does not incur excommunication, because he does not absolve from the shameful sin. But D'Annibale says:440 "No one has ever doubted or doubts that it is forbidden to absolve a penitent from the other sins and to send him to another confessor for this one to be absolved." Therefore it seems that Peter ought to have elicited an act of perfect contrition with Tullia, who then could have approached Communion without absolution.
430 Theol. mor. II, n. 1205.
431 De poenit., n. 579.
432 Comm. in Bull. Ap. Sedis, n. 87.
433 Summula Theol. mor. III, n. 324 and n. 38.
434 De poenis eccl.12, n. 55.
435 Theol. pastor. III, n. 28.
436 Opus theol. V (de sacr. poenit.), n. 655.
437 Cappello, De censuris, n. 182, teaches that this absolution is direct.
438 Cf. Noldin, De poenis eccl., n. 63; Marc-Raus, Instit. mor. II, n. 1783; Van der Velden, Principia Theol. mor. III, 673.
439 Thus also Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor.11 II, 1203 note; Ojetti, Synopsis rer. mor. I8, n. 1369.
440 Comm. in Const. Ap. Sedis, n. 86.
459. Absolution from the excommunication incurred. A confessor who (apart from the cases indicated above) absolves his own accomplice incurs an excommunication reserved in a most special manner to the Supreme Pontiff, as has been said.
This excommunication is said to be reserved in a most special manner because it is always judged to be excluded from all delegated faculties, even the most ample, unless it is expressly named,441 as, for example, on the occasion of the Jubilee granted by Pius XI. Gross and supine ignorance does not excuse from this excommunication,442 as has already been said. In more urgent cases a simple confessor can indeed absolve from this censure, but then the person absolved must within a month (if this is not altogether impossible) have recourse443 to the Sacred Penitentiary, which is accustomed to impose rather severe penances. Indeed, if a priest has three or more times since the last absolution already obtained443a absolved his accomplice, he is commanded to lay aside the office of confessor in perpetuity. But since this is often morally impossible, both because of the very great scandal that would otherwise arise and because of the scarcity of priests, it is expedient that in the letters to be sent to the Sacred Penitentiary a supplication be made that the confessor may remain in his office. This supplication is accustomed to be heard if the confessor has proved serious amendment within six or twelve months.
441 Holy Office, June 27, 1866.
442 Holy Office, January 13, 1892, ad 3.
443 Cf. the specimen of this recourse above, n. 426.
443a Sacred Penitentiary, March 5, 1925.
Marc, Institutiones Morales
Vol. II, Part Third: On the Sacrame…, Tr. V, Diss. III, Ch. I, Art. IV, § 2. On The Forbidden Absolution Of An Accomplice
- Principles. I. It is forbidden to every priest, outside the case of extreme necessity, to dare to receive the sacramental confession OF A PERSON WHO IS AN ACCOMPLICE in a base sin against the sixth precept. Thus from the Constitutions of Benedict XIV, Sacramentum (June 1, 1741), and Apostolici muneris (February 8, 1745), namely for guarding the sanctity of the sacred Tribunal and removing dangers of souls.1
It is said 1. outside the case of extreme necessity, that is, outside the article or danger of death; because then it is permitted to absolve an accomplice, provided another priest is lacking, even a simple one, who is able to absolve; or provided that priest cannot receive the confession of the infirm person without grave scandal, or infamy of the approved priest. Yet the priest accomplice is bound to forestall such dangers of scandal or infamy, if he can, for example by departing under some pretext, etc.; otherwise he will not escape the guilt and penalties of a grave offense, although the absolution is valid "lest on this very occasion," says the Pontiff, "someone perish."2
It is said 2. of a person who is an accomplice: by which name, from the common interpretation, come not only women, but also men, nor are even the prepubescent themselves excepted. - Indeed, persons with whom the confessor already sinned before the priesthood was received are not excluded; as is established from the Response of the S. PENITENTIARY of January 22, 1879.3
It is said 3. in a base sin...: in which appellation is comprehended every sin, certain on each side, grave, external and mutual, against the sixth precept, even if it was not consummated by copulation; indeed, although it is only a base touch, or gaze, or indecent conversation, as is more commonly taught, and as is established from the Response of the S. OFFICE, May 28, 1873 (cf. n. 1324).4 - But venial faults are not comprehended, whether they are such because of smallness of matter, or because of defect of advertence or consent; nor merely internal sins, or sins not fully manifested externally; nor doubtful sins, by doubt of fact or of law; nor finally when doubt turns on whether the penitent himself also sinned gravely; because the Bull is to be understood of a formal accomplice, in mortal sin against the Sixth.5
- II. The confessor, outside danger of death, LACKS all JURISDICTION for absolving an accomplice as regards the sin of which he was participant. - This is established from the words of the Bull saying: "Any authority and jurisdiction therefore being taken away from him by the law itself for absolving any person whatever from a fault of this sort." - Therefore, as long as the sin of complicity has not been directly remitted through absolution duly imparted by another priest, the confessor absolves his accomplice neither licitly nor validly. Indeed, it is probable that that sin, even after it has been directly remitted by another, can never and in no way be declared and subjected to the confessor-accomplice as sufficient matter of absolution, since he seems perpetually to lack jurisdiction over it.6
- III. EXCOMMUNICATION, reserved to the Roman Pontiff in a most special way, IS INCURRED by a priest who, outside extreme necessity, absolves an accomplice in a base sin. - This is established both from the Bull Sacramentum of Benedict XIV, and from the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis issued by Pius IX (cf. n. 1324).
Yet here it must be adverted that the following are not bound by the censure: 1. he who only hears the accomplice in confession, but does not absolve; otherwise, if he simulates absolution, as is established from the Response of the S. Penitentiary given on March 1, 1878, and confirmed from another Response of the Congregation of the Holy Office made to the Bishop of Périgueux on December 10, 18837 (cf. n. 1324); 2. he who indeed absolves, but with ignorance, even crass, of the censure; or without advertence to the complicity of the penitent; for the Constitution of Benedict XIV, from which the censure was taken, requires daring, so that excommunication may be incurred.
- Questions. Q. 1. Whether the censure and privation of jurisdiction have place if the sin of complicity is not subjected to the keys?
Resp. Negative. For it was asked: "Whether he incurs the censures imposed on those absolving an accomplice in a base sin, who indeed absolves an accomplice, but an accomplice who did not declare the sin of complicity in confession? The reason for doubting seems to be because such a priest, even if the accomplice sacrilegiously omitted the confession of this sin, and he culpably abstained from questioning, nevertheless does not absolve from the fault of complicity of this sort, as not declared, nor subjected to the keys."
And the S. PENITENTIARY, on May 16, 1877, responded: "The privation of jurisdiction of absolving an accomplice in a base sin, and the annexed excommunication, insofar as the confessor shall have absolved him, are in order to the base sin itself in which the same confessor was the accomplice. Nevertheless the confessor is bound with all zeal to place before the eyes of the priest who in this way absolves the accomplice, yet not from the sin of complicity, the enormity of his offense and the abominable abuse of the Sacrament of Penance; nor otherwise to impart to him the benefit of absolution than after a most grave exhortation has been premised, that he strive to lay down the office of confessor, and also with the obligation imposed that in the future he wholly abstain from hearing confessions of the accomplice; the same person who was the accomplice being admonished, if he appears again, that he accuse himself before another confessor of the sin of complicity and of the others invalidly confessed."8
Q. 2. Whether he avoids EXCOMMUNICATION who, when the precept of CONFESSION is urgent, INDIRECTLY only absolves an accomplice unable to confess to another without danger of grave infamy or scandal?
Resp. Some deny it; but the Salmanticenses affirm it; and this opinion (if the penitent knows or is admonished that he must afterward approach another confessor) seems more probable and safe in practice, from the fact that in a case of this sort there is not present the rash daring which the Constitution of Benedict XIV requires.9 It also seems more conformable to the Response of the S. Penitentiary just reported.
- From what has been said you resolve:10 1. The confessor INVALIDLY absolves: 1. A penitent with whom he agreed about seducing a woman, although afterward he did not seduce her; because it is verified that this penitent is a partner of an iniquitous agreement against chastity. - 2. A penitent from whom he only heard base conversations, if he showed that they pleased him; because by being outwardly pleased with them, he participated in them, and therefore is an accomplice of the base sin. 3. A penitent accomplice who makes a general confession, if it is certain or probable that the past confessions were invalid.
- He VALIDLY absolves: 1. A woman whom, while sleeping or resisting, he immodestly touched, or by whom he himself, sleeping or resisting, was touched; because he does not absolve from the sin of complicity. 2. A woman with whom there intervened a kiss given in passing, or a momentary touch of hands or of honorable parts, from jest or levity. And the same would have to be said if the priest had taken the woman by the hand, although he himself, but he alone, had experienced venereal delight. For in these cases either there is not a certainly mortal sin, or it is not present on each side. 3. Resolve the same if delight, however carnal and arising on both sides, is personal to each, without any external sign and mutually unknown. - 4. Nor is the absolution invalid over other sins directly imparted to an accomplice if he inculpably omitted the sin of complicity in confession; for from the aforesaid Response of the S. Penitentiary of May 16, 1877, it is established that the priest is not deprived of his jurisdiction.
Note. The penitent accomplice himself incurs no censure or other penalty, nor is his sin subject to reservation (unless perhaps episcopal reservation, from diocesan Statutes). - Therefore let a person of this sort be benignly received by a legitimate confessor, so that he may not blush to confess his own misery; and, the confessions invalidly made before the accomplice having been repeated, and the occasion of sinning having been removed, let him be dismissed absolved. But let him be turned away, as much as can be done, from further return to the confessor-accomplice, even if the law concerning fleeing a proximate occasion does not seem absolutely to require it (cf. Response of the S. PENITENTIARY at the end).
But if besides this, on the occasion of confession, he had been solicited to sin, see n. 1795.
Konings, Theologia Moralis
Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART THIRD: ON THE MINISTE…, APPENDIX I: ON THE ABSOLUTION OF ONE'S OWN ACCOMPLICE IN A SHAMEFUL SIN · Vol. II, Treatise on Censures, Appendix III: On Censures …, § I. On Excommunications Latae Sententiae Reserved to the Roman Pontiff in a Special Manner
Vol. II, TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENT …, PART THIRD: ON THE MINISTE…, APPENDIX I: ON THE ABSOLUTION OF ONE'S OWN ACCOMPLICE IN A SHAMEFUL SIN
1404. - I. No confessor can absolve his own accomplice, i.e. an associate and participant in a shameful sin. This is clear from the Constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae of Benedict XIV, June 1, 1741. - Likewise from another Constitution of the same Pontiff: Apostolici muneris, February 8, 1745.
II. A Confessor lacks all jurisdiction for absolving an accomplice as regards the sin of which he was a participant. This is inferred from the express words of the Bull, in which it is said: "Moreover there is removed from him by the law itself any authority and jurisdiction whatsoever for absolving any person whatsoever from a fault of this kind."
1405. Questions. - Query 1° What comes under the name of shameful sin?
Resp. Every grave sin against the Sixth Precept of the Decalogue, even if it has not been consummated by copula; indeed even if it is only a shameful touch or look, or speech, as today is certain.
But it is required that on each side there be a certainly mortal sin, not only internal, but also external, insofar as mutual, or externally manifested at the same time on each side.
Query 2° Under the name of accomplice do not only women, but also men, come?
Resp. Affirm. The reason is that the words of the Bull are altogether general; for in it it is said: "Who shall dare to hear the Sacramental Confession of a person who is an accomplice in a shameful sin against the Sixth Precept." Therefore the disposition of the Constitution is not to be restricted to the female sex. - Thus commonly.
Query 3° Can a priest absolve an accomplice in the article or danger of death?
Resp. Affirm., if another priest cannot be called who can perform the function of confessor; but otherwise if another priest is present, even one not approved, who can hear the Confession.
Query 4° Can a priest absolve an accomplice in death, if another cannot be called or approach without infamy or scandal?
Resp. Affirm. Nevertheless the priest-accomplice is held to prevent such dangers of infamy or scandal, if he can, e.g. by departing under some pretext, etc. Otherwise he will not evade the penalties, although the absolution is valid. This is clear from the Constitution of Benedict XIV.
Query 5° Can a priest absolve an accomplice in death, if the latter refuses to confess to another?
Resp. Affirm., if otherwise he is disposed, namely lest he perish, or at least lest his eternal salvation be endangered. Cf. n. 1402. IV.
Query 6° Can a priest absolve an accomplice from other sins foreign to himself, after that one has once been absolved by another from his own sin?
Resp. Affirm. The reason is that he lacks jurisdiction over this penitent only as regards the sin of which he himself was a participant; therefore, when that sin has been blotted out through absolution imparted by another, the prohibition now ceases, nor is jurisdiction lacking. - Except: I. if the penitent was absolved from this sin by another confessor, either 1) only indirectly, e.g. on account of inculpable forgetfulness of the said shameful sin, or 2) invalidly. II. If that priest has been absolved from the censures and penalties which he incurred on account of the attempted absolution of an accomplice by force of the faculty reported at p. LXXI. Note 2, under the burden, namely, of altogether abstaining from hearing the Confessions of the accomplice. - Nevertheless the absolution which the confessor, absolved with this burden, had given would not by the law itself be invalid; for from precisely this, that the law or precept of a Superior prohibits some act from being done, unless it expresses that by that very fact it also wishes it to be done voidly and nullly, the act must not be considered null in conscience. III. According to some, if the penitent again confesses to the accomplice that very sin itself from which complicity arises, as sufficient matter, without adding another matter; for the words, they say, of the Constitution are altogether peremptory. Thus Pruner and Acta. Yet this exception, although it is usefully alleged here, does not pertain to the question. St. Alphonsus does not treat this precise question.
But truly, if any shame remains in a priest who through pitiable frailty has perpetrated a shameful sin with another, if any honor due to the Sacrament, he will never afterward hear the Confession of the accomplice. Moreover, the danger of a new fall, or at least of grave temptation in the direction of such a penitent, can easily be present. Therefore the faithful are to be turned away, as far as can be done, so that afterward, with the case of necessity set aside, they never approach a confessor who is an accomplice of sin. See the same warning given in n. 1365. q. 4°.
1406. - Resolves: 1° A Confessor invalidly absolves a penitent:
a) With whom he agreed about seducing a woman, although afterward he did not seduce her; because it is verified that this penitent is an associate of an iniquitous agreement against chastity.
b) From whom he heard only shameful conversations, if he showed that they pleased him; because by exteriorly taking complacence in them he participated in them, and therefore is an accomplice of shameful sin.
c) With whom he sinned against chastity before he was a priest or cleric; because it is always true that he is an accomplice, and therefore all jurisdiction is removed from him. Sacred Penitentiary apud Haringer.
d) An impubes accomplice; because the prohibition made to a confessor of absolving an accomplice does not have the character of reservation, since the power of absolving is removed from him, not from other confessors; nor is it certain that impuberty exempts from reservation.
2° A Confessor validly absolves:
a) A girl whom he shamefully touches while sleeping or resisting, or by whom he is touched while sleeping or resisting, although he altogether ought not hear her, lest he cast himself into the danger of sinning more gravely or formally; because he does not absolve from a sin of complicity.
b) A woman with whom there intervened a kiss given in passing, or a momentary touch of the hands or respectable parts from play or levity. - The same holds if the confessor takes hold of a girl by the hand, arm, or neck, and he indeed undergoes venereal delight on his own part, even externally declared, if he excites none in the penitent. The same, if a priest were to induce a woman to believe that there is no sin if she allowed herself to be shamefully touched by him; and she, deceived by him, in good faith allowed herself to be shamefully touched, without sinning formally. For in these cases either a certainly mortal sin is not present, or it is not present on each side.
c) Resolve the same if the motion, however carnal, and arising on each side, is personal to each and respectively unknown. The reason is that, in order that there be a sin of an accomplice, unity of time in which each sins does not suffice, but moral unity of action is required, or communication in one action morally.
d) Resolve the same if there is question of a mortal sin internally or externally doubtful, and this whether it is thus doubtful on the part of each or on the part of one of the two.
Note. - Saving a better judgment, we altogether dissent from some who opine that an accomplice is validly absolved if he were absolved inadvertently; for Benedict XIV, requiring presumption (see n. 1401. q. 1°. R. 1°), requires it not so that the absolution be null, but so that excommunication be incurred. - Nor do we agree with those who think that an accomplice forgetting the sin of complicity inculpably, or placed in any necessity whatsoever other than that which arises from danger of death, can be validly, although only indirectly, absolved; for the case of an accomplice is not properly a reserved case, but a case in which all jurisdiction over the accomplice is taken away from the confessor, with only the danger of death excepted; but an exception confirms the rule.
Concerning the excommunication which one absolving an accomplice incurs, see in the Treatise on Censures, n. 1715.
Vol. II, Treatise on Censures, Appendix III: On Censures …, § I. On Excommunications Latae Sententiae Reserved to the Roman Pontiff in a Special Manner
1715. - X. "Those absolving an accomplice in a base sin, even in the article of death, if another priest, although not approved for Confessions, can receive the Confession of the dying person without any grave infamy and scandal about to arise." Benedict XIV, c. Sacramentum Poenitentiae, § IV. Cf. c. Apostolici muneris, §§ III, IV.
Explanation.
1° "Those absolving": but not merely those hearing the Confession of an accomplice,2 nor those absolving with ignorance, even gross ignorance, of the censure; for the Constitution of Benedict XIV, from which the censure is taken, requires daring (cf. n. 1406, 2°, Note, and n. 1664, q. 3°). Those feignedly absolving are held by the censure. (47) p. 428.
2° "An accomplice" (see n. 1404, I, 1405, q. 2°), "in a base sin" (see n. 1405, q. 1°).
3° "Even in the article of death, if," etc. (see n. 1405, q. 3°, q. 4°, q. 5°).
Note. - Concerning absolution from this censure, see p. LXXI, n. 16, note 2, b).
Merkelbach, Pastoral Questions
Ch. V, Question First: Concerning the Absolution of an Accomplice in a Base Sin
I. To avoid lest confessors be able to abuse their power for sinning more freely, Benedict XIV established that every confessor outside danger of death lacks the faculty of absolving his own accomplice in a base sin, and prohibited absolution of this person, outside a case of extreme necessity, under pain of excommunication.
"We interdict and prohibit each and every priest, secular as well as regular... lest any of them outside a case of extreme necessity, namely in the very article of death and then also with another priest lacking who could undertake the function of confessor, dare to receive the sacramental confession of a person who is an accomplice in a base and dishonorable sin committed against the sixth precept of the Decalogue, for that reason any authority and jurisdiction whatsoever over any person whatever for absolving from a fault of this kind having been taken away from him; so indeed that the absolution, if he imparts any, is altogether null and void, as imparted by a priest who exists deprived of the jurisdiction and faculty necessary for absolving validly, which by these our presents we intend to take away from him. And nevertheless, if any confessor has dared to act otherwise, by that very fact let him incur also the penalty of major excommunication, the power of absolving from which we reserve only to Ourselves and to our successors."
Thus in the Bull Sacramentum Poenitentiae, 1 June 1741; which he confirmed and explained more in the Constitutions Apostolici Muneris, 28 February 1745, and Inter praeteritos, 28 November 1749.1 Moreover the Code of Law ratified this, can. 884:
1 These documents, as also other responses of the Holy See to be attended to in the present and following question, can be read in De Smet: On the Absolution of an Accomplice and Solicitation.
"The absolution of an accomplice in a base sin is invalid, except in danger of death; and even in danger of death, outside the case of necessity, it is illicit on the part of the confessor according to the norm of the apostolic constitutions and by name of the constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum Poenitentiae, 1 June 1741"; - and can. 2367:
"1) One absolving or feigning to absolve an accomplice in a base sin incurs by that very fact an excommunication reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See; and this even in the article of death, if another priest, although not approved for confessions, without some grave infamy and scandal about to arise, can receive the confession of the dying person, except the case in which the dying person refuses to confess to another.
"2) He does not escape the same excommunication who absolves or feigns to absolve an accomplice who indeed does not confess the sin of complicity, from which he has not yet been absolved, but conducts himself thus because he has been induced to this by the accomplice confessor either directly or indirectly."
That discipline was established for a twofold end: namely both for protecting the sanctity of the sacred tribunal, or for removing from the sacrament every occasion of baseness and indecency and contempt; - and for meeting dangers to souls, namely for avoiding danger of seduction and relapse into the same sin, and for guarding against detriment of the penitent to be obtained from lesser shame or from defect of serious detestation or purpose.
Moreover, for explaining what has been established, it is necessary to declare what is 1) a base sin, 2) an accomplice, 3) to absolve.
II. A base sin is to be understood without restriction: any sin of lust, that is, against chastity and the sixth precept, not only perfect and consummated, but also imperfect and begun, such as touchings, kisses, embraces, indeed base speech and looks, as the Holy Office declared on 28 May 1873, provided that they are strictly lustful and import complicity; - not however sins against other virtues and precepts. Hence to absolve an accomplice in a sin of injustice, for example, in homicide or theft, is not specially prohibited; although even such absolution is indecent.
But the sin of lust must be a) grave, b) external, c) not yet directly remitted:
a) Grave, both objectively and subjectively, namely materially and formally.
Therefore light sins are excluded, whether from imperfection of the act, or from erroneous conscience, or from lightness of matter, while it concerns lust voluntary only in its cause. Hence if a boy from erroneous conscience certainly judges that touches shamefully perpetrated by a priest are not a grave sin, he could be absolved by this priest.
b) External, so that the sin is grave both internally and externally, and also so that it, as such, namely in the account of an external act, is gravely sinful.
For this reason merely internal sins of lingering delight and desire are excluded, and external sins venial under every respect, and also grave sins whose grave malice is not fully manifested outwardly. Hence if kisses or touches had from an internal lustful affection, as external acts, are not gravely evil in themselves, and the libidinous affection from which they are done is not fully manifested outwardly, they can be absolved.
c) Not directly remitted; whence if the sin has already been duly accused and validly remitted by direct absolution, so that now it is free matter of confession, the priest can absolve from it (Holy Office, 29 May 1867).
Nevertheless it must altogether be advised that he never hear the confession of his accomplice except when necessity compels, on account of the danger of temptation or irreverence toward the sacrament.
III. An accomplice is a companion and as if one implicated in a base sin. This must be understood without restriction, of whatever sex, age, and condition: anyone, whether male or female, whether pubescent or impubescent, provided he is capable of grave sin; indeed also a person with whom before receiving the priesthood the priest had sinned, as the Holy Office declared on 22 January 1879. And therefore here he invalidly absolves an accomplice who institutes a general confession of sins, if the prior confessions certainly were sacrilegious, or even simply invalid.
But for complicity there is required:
- A mutual sin, namely, that each internally and externally committed the same grave sin against chastity; or the consent of two in the same grave and external base sin, whether each cooperates, as in mutual conversations and embraces, or only one acts, for example, by touch, provided that the other consents both externally and internally: which consent is presumed sufficiently to be present if he in no way resists.
Hence the following do not fall under the law: a) an act which is mortal on one side, only venial on the other; b) nor an act externally light although internally grave on each side; c) nor an act, however grave, to which the other does not consent, indeed to which he has not furnished external consent, although he consents internally.
- Formal complicity: a) at the same time of the sin; for in the case of sin with one sleeping, unwilling, totally drunk, insane, or ignorant of the baseness of the sin from erroneous conscience, or in good faith not attending to it, even if he had been led into error by the confessor, complicity is not present;
b) at the time of absolution; for 1. if during absolution the confessor does not recognize his accomplice, or 2. if he doubts and, by prudently questioning insofar as he could do this without danger of his own infamy or scandal of the penitent, he cannot remove the doubt, or 3. if the priest is in no way (neither in the act of sin, nor afterwards) known as a priest, but the penitent altogether does not know that his accomplice is a priest, the absolution is valid and licit. Then namely the abuse of power which the Church prohibits is not present.
Yet it does not matter if the confessor as accomplice is not known in confession by the penitent, provided that it is verified that he truly is an accomplice, and the confessor knows him, and nevertheless absolves: in this case the absolution is invalid.
IV. The aforesaid conditions having been posited, absolution, indeed confession, is invalid on account of privation of jurisdiction; but the absolution itself is required, true or fictive, not confession alone, that excommunication be incurred. Hence
- this penalty is not incurred a) if the priest only heard the confession of the accomplice, provided that he does not absolve nor feign to absolve; b) if the penitent kept back the sin of complicity in confession of his own accord or by inculpable forgetfulness, although this does not escape the one absolving. For the privation of jurisdiction and the attached excommunication is in order to the base sin in which the confessor was an accomplice (Sacred Penitentiary, 16 May 1877);
- but excommunication is incurred: a) if the priest simulates and feigns that he absolves before the penitent himself, as is now certain from the Sacred Penitentiary, 9 July 1751, 1 March 1878, and 19 February 1896, and the Holy Office, 10 December 1883, and ratified by the Code, can. 2367 § 1: thus, for example, if he absolves without intention or substantially corrupts the form, or by pronouncing a certain prayer and other words, or by being silent, seems to the penitent by sign or gesture to absolve; not however if he dismisses a forewarned penitent with only a blessing, dissimulating before those standing by; b) if the confessor induced the penitent accomplice not to confess the sin of complicity, whether directly by admonishing him to be silent, or indirectly by persuading him that the act was not gravely evil, or is not necessarily to be accused, as for example already known to him.
Indeed, from the recent declaration of the Holy Office, 16 November 1934, he is also to be judged as inducing indirectly "a confessor who, either within or outside sacramental confession, has persuaded someone that in base things to be perpetrated between themselves either no sin or certainly not a grave sin is present, and consequently sacramentally absolves or feigns to absolve him when afterwards he confesses to himself concerning other things only." By which excommunication is now extended beyond the case of complicity in grave sin.
V. Observation. - That the established discipline have force, it is necessary that the case be certain and exclude every founded doubt of law and of fact; otherwise the rule is to be applied: in doubt odious things are to be restricted. Therefore it is required that the base sin be certain, certainly grave, and as such certainly external, certainly mutual, and that complicity in it be certain.
Hence the case of complicity in a base sin probably is not present, nor therefore to be attended to in practice:
- if there is doubt whether the penitent sinned gravely;
- if there was simple connivance, from the fact that the other did not impede a sin which by office he does not have to impede, or approval of base speech heard, which did not excite other base speech;
- if the accomplice is not a companion immediately in the base act itself or in sin according to itself libidinous, but only in the sole base agreement concerning seducing a woman, who in reality is not seduced, or in the sole base permission or invitation of sinning with a spouse or offspring, which nevertheless is not corrupted: namely, cooperation alone in the base sin of another does not suffice;
- if the accomplices are in an external act venial from its object (such as a pressure of the hand, a light kiss, a momentary touch, or an embrace on an honorable part), even if on each side internally it is done from a base affection or intention, provided that it has no joined external immodest circumstance, or manifestation by which the affection or intention of immodesty becomes sufficiently known outwardly.
VI. Absolution of an accomplice is not, as some have thought, a reserved sin, because not only is there a restriction, but the removal of power: for the incapacitating law brings it about that the confessor lacks all jurisdiction toward the accomplice accusing a base sin (or culpably keeping it silent), and that the very absolution of the accomplice as such, and not only of the sin of complicity, is void, so that no valid absolution is given, neither direct absolution of other sins nor therefore indirect absolution of the sin of complicity.
Thus not only according to the tenor of can. 884, but also according to the preceding Constitutions.
This is altogether clear from the words cited above of the Benedictine Constitution, which removes "any jurisdiction whatever over any person whatever for absolving from a fault of this kind, so that the absolution... is altogether null and void, as imparted by a priest who exists altogether deprived of jurisdiction... for validly absolving," indeed who "is not able to receive the confession of the said accomplice of this kind nor to bestow sacramental absolution on him, since for this effect and in this case no confessor, as one who exists deprived of jurisdiction and the faculty of absolving (not only) in the genus of this sin (but in this genus) and of penitent, is to be held for a legitimate and approved confessor."
Still more clearly in the Constitution Inter praeteritos: "We have deprived any confessor whatsoever of all authority and jurisdiction of absolving a person who is an accomplice in a base and dishonorable sin against the sixth precept of the Decalogue, so that absolution given by the same is null and invalid, as given by one who by Us has been deprived in that case of the jurisdiction necessary for absolving."
And in the Instruction of the Holy Office, 20 February 1867: "Every faculty and jurisdiction for receiving the sacramental confessions of a person who is an accomplice... is taken away from any priest."
Whence also in the instructions given by the Sacred Penitentiary, for priests to be absolved from censure on account of absolution of an accomplice, there occurs the clause that the accomplice priest admonish the penitent "concerning the nullity of past absolutions," and indeed without that restriction or distinction between the case of good or bad faith on the part of the penitent; indeed from the fact that the penitent is said to be admonished, good faith is rather supposed.
And these things also remain true after the promulgated Code, which repeats in the same sense, can. 884: "The absolution of an accomplice in a base sin is invalid, except in danger of death."
…and 40 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.
Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Vol. III, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On Penance, Fourth Part: On the Minist…, Question Four: On the Abus…, Article I: On the Absolution of an Accomplice in a Shameful Sin
631. Dispositions of canon law concerning the absolution of an accomplice. - According to can. 884: "The absolution of an accomplice in a shameful sin is invalid, except in danger of death; and even in danger of death, outside the case of necessity, it is illicit on the part of the confessor, according to the norm of the apostolic constitutions and especially of the Constitution of Benedict XIV, Sacramentum Poenitentiae, June 1, 1741."
"§ 1. One absolving or pretending to absolve an accomplice in a shameful sin incurs by that very fact an excommunication reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See; and this even in the article of death, if another priest, although not approved for confessions, can hear the confession of the dying person without some grave infamy and scandal about to arise, except in the case in which the dying person refuses to confess to another.
"§ 2. He who absolves or pretends to absolve an accomplice who indeed does not confess the sin of complicity from which he has not yet been absolved, but conducts himself thus because he has been induced to this by the accomplice-confessor either directly or indirectly, does not escape the same excommunication."
632. An accomplice is a partner and one as it were entangled in sin. This is to be understood without restriction, of whatever sex, age, and condition: anyone, whether male or female, whether pubescent or impubescent, provided he is capable of grave sin; indeed even the person with whom the priest had sinned before receiving the priesthood, as the Holy Office declared, January 22, 1879. And therefore he invalidly absolves here the accomplice who makes a general confession of sins, if the previous confessions were certainly sacrilegious, or even simply invalid.
But for complicity there is required:
- Mutual sin, namely, that each one internally and externally committed the same grave sin; or the consent of two persons in the same grave and external shameful sin, whether each cooperates, as in mutual conversations and embraces, or one only acts, e.g., by touch, provided the other consents externally and internally at the same time; which consent is sufficiently presumed to be present if he resists in no way. Hence there does not fall under the law: a) an act which is mortal on one side, only venial on the other; b) nor an externally light act, although internally grave on both sides; c) nor an act, however grave, to which the other does not consent, indeed to which he has not furnished external consent, although he consents internally.
- Formal complicity: a) at the same time of the sin; for in the case of sin with one sleeping, unwilling, totally drunk, insane, or ignorant of the shamefulness of the sin from erroneous conscience, or not attending to it in good faith, even if he was induced into error by the confessor, complicity is not present; - b) at the time of absolution; for 1. if the confessor during absolution inculpably does not recognize his accomplice, or 2. if he doubts and, by prudently questioning as much as he can without danger of his own infamy or scandal to the penitent, cannot remove the doubt, or 3. if the priest in no way (neither in the act of sin nor afterward) is known as a priest, but the penitent is altogether ignorant that his accomplice is a priest, the absolution is valid and licit. Namely, then the abuse of power which the Church prohibits is not present.
Yet it makes no difference if the confessor, as accomplice, was not known by the penitent in confession, provided it is verified that he truly is an accomplice, and the confessor knows him as such, and nevertheless absolves him: in this case the absolution is invalid.
633. Shameful sin is to be understood without restriction: any sin whatever of lust, i.e., against chastity and the sixth precept, not only perfect and consummated, but also imperfect and begun, such as touches, kisses, embraces, indeed shameful speech and looks, as the Holy Office declared, May 28, 1873, provided they are strictly lustful and import complicity; - not, however, sins against other virtues and precepts. Hence to absolve an accomplice in a sin of injustice, e.g., in homicide or in theft, is not specially prohibited; although even such an absolution is unbecoming.
But it is necessary that the sin of lust be grave, - external, - mutual, - not directly remitted, - and certain.
- Grave, both objectively and subjectively, namely materially and formally. Therefore light sins are excluded, whether from imperfection of the act, or from erroneous conscience, or from lightness of matter, when there is question of lust voluntary only in its cause. Hence if a boy from erroneous conscience certainly judges that touches immodestly perpetrated by a priest are not a grave sin, he could be absolved by this priest.
- External, so that both the internal and the external sin is grave, and also so that it as such, namely in the notion of an external act, is gravely sinful. For this reason sins merely internal, of morose delectation and desire, are excluded, as are external sins under every respect venial, and also grave sins whose grave malice is not fully manifested exteriorly. Hence if kisses or touches had from an internal lustful affection, as external acts, are not in themselves gravely evil, and the libidinous affection from which they are done is not fully manifested exteriorly, they can be absolved.
- Mutual, so that each accomplice internally and externally committed the same grave sin against chastity, or consented in the same grave and external shameful sin, as was explained in the preceding number.
- Not directly remitted. Hence if the sin has already been duly accused and validly remitted by direct absolution, so that it is now free matter of confession, the priest can absolve from it (Holy Office, May 29, 1867), although nevertheless it is altogether to be advised that he never hear the confession of his accomplice unless necessity compels, on account of the danger of temptation or irreverence toward the sacrament.
- Certain, so that every founded doubt of law and of fact is excluded; otherwise the rule must be applied: in doubt, odious things are to be restricted. Therefore it is required that the shameful sin be certain, certainly grave, as such certainly external, certainly mutual, and that the complicity in it be certain.
Hence the case of complicity in a shameful sin probably is not present:
a) If it is doubtful whether the penitent sinned gravely.
b) If there was simple connivance from the fact that the other did not impede a sin which from office he ought not to impede, or approval of a heard shameful conversation which did not stir up other shameful conversations.
c) If the accomplice is not a partner immediately in the shameful act itself or in a sin libidinous according to itself, but only in a shameful agreement about seducing a woman who in reality is not seduced, or only in a shameful permission or invitation to sin with a spouse or offspring who nevertheless is not corrupted. Namely, mere cooperation in the shameful sin of another does not suffice.
d) If the accomplices are in an external act venial from its object (such as pressure of the hand, a light kiss, a momentary touch, or an embrace in an honorable part), although on both sides internally it is done from a shameful affection or intention, provided it has no externally immodest adjunct circumstance, or manifestation by which the affection or intention of immodesty sufficiently becomes known externally.
634. The absolution of an accomplice is radically invalid because of the privation of all jurisdiction. Therefore it is not, as some thought, a case of reserved sin, because there is not restriction but removal of power; for the incapacitating law makes the confessor lack all jurisdiction toward an accomplice accusing a shameful sin (or culpably concealing it), and the very absolution of the accomplice as such, and not only of the sin of complicity, is void, so that there is not given a valid absolution either direct of the other sins, nor consequently indirect of the sin of complicity.
Thus not only according to the tenor of can. 884, but also expressly according to the Benedictine Constitutions and the instruction of the Holy Office, February 20, 1867.1 Hence also in the instructions given by the Sacred Penitentiary for priests to be absolved from censure because of absolution of an accomplice, there occurs the clause that the accomplice-confessor should admonish the penitent "about the nullity of past confessions," and indeed without any restriction or distinction between the case of good or bad faith on the part of the penitent; indeed, from the fact that the penitent is said to be admonished, good faith is rather supposed.
Against this do not stand the words of the Sacred Penitentiary, May 16, 1877, affirming that the privation of jurisdiction "is in order to the shameful sin itself in which the confessor was an accomplice." For there the privation of jurisdiction is not denied but affirmed; it is not said that the privation of jurisdiction affects only the sin of complicity, but the absolution of the accomplice in order to the sin of complicity, so that the confessor is deprived of all jurisdiction and toward every sin, but uniquely in view of and by reason of complicity, i.e., when that sin is accused. Moreover the Sacred Penitentiary could not temper by its own authority and without special intervention of the Supreme Pontiff the law of the Holy Office or of the Benedictine Constitution, concerning which in the case nothing is reported.
Hence, if in urgent necessity an accomplice-penitent could not omit holy communion without grave scandal or infamy, nor could approach another confessor, content with a simple act of perfect contrition, he would have to approach holy communion, nor could he be absolved by the accomplice-priest.
635. An exception is given in the case of extreme necessity, i.e., in the article of death, - and also in a grave danger of proximate death prudently judged, which in law is equated with the article,2 - if another priest is lacking, even one not approved, who can be called or can approach without some grave infamy or scandal about to arise, and to whom the penitent wishes to confess: for then it is the same as if another priest were truly lacking, says Benedict XIV in the constitution Apostolici muneris, February 28, 1745.
A. Therefore in this danger absolution is always valid lest someone perish on this occasion; - but on the part of the confessor it is not licit, nor is the penalty of excommunication avoided, unless another priest is lacking who can be called without great inconvenience, and who does not refuse to hear the confession of the dying person (e.g., because of excessive familiarity with the penitent who is his blood-relative or maidservant), and to whom the penitent does not refuse to confess.
There will be a cause of excuse:
- if the sick person publicly asks the confessor, while he is bringing Viaticum to him, that he would hear his confession, because the confessor, without scandal and danger of infamy, especially if he were pastor, could not refuse this;
- if the dying person, without any fault of the accomplice-confessor, altogether refuses to confess before another priest;
- if without danger of infamy or scandal, or of a sacrilegious confession, the accomplice-priest could not depart, or another could not be called or approach;
- also probably, if there is present only a priest notoriously suspended or excommunicated: for such a one does not seem to be one who can discharge the office of confessor; and moreover he would not easily be called without infamy or scandal.
On the contrary, absolution is illicit, and excommunication is incurred:
- if, while another priest is present who is not impeded or can easily be called, the accomplice-priest absolves;
- if another priest can be called, but the accomplice-priest invents a danger of infamy or scandal where there is none;
- if the accomplice-priest, as much as is in him, does not employ opportune means so that danger of infamy or scandal does not follow and so that room for confession lies open to another priest, e.g., by not coming under some pretext, or by departing from the house, feigning illness, forewarning the penitent, sending another priest to the sick person, etc.;
- if there is present a priest who would not himself be exposed to his own infamy, but before whom the accomplice-priest would be defamed: with respect to one person, either there is no infamy, or the accomplice ought to bear it to some extent on account of the fault committed; otherwise it could scarcely happen that, when a priest is present, the accomplice-confessor could not absolve.
B. Danger of death is any gravely dangerous case, whether from within, from illness or childbirth, or from without, from very dangerous sailing, imminent battle, or an inflicted blow. To those in danger can be equated, by a quasi-privilege conceded by extensive interpretation, soldiers who are constituted in a state of military calling-up or mobilization (Sacred Penitentiary, May 29, 1915); likewise from the nature of the thing, those who are in danger of perpetual insanity.
But now many, having gone farther, from epikeia wish to equate with danger of death the case of a penitent who in a remote region, e.g., of the Missions, would greatly fear that he could never, or only after a very long time, have a confessor, unless he confessed to the accomplice. But in the Constitutions of Benedict XIV and in the Code of Law only the case of danger of death is excepted; although nevertheless occurrences in mission regions could not have been unknown to them: "absolution is invalid except in danger of death," says the code; what is clearer?
Therefore the exception does not seem to be extended to other cases, except those which are commonly judged equivalent to death. Interpretation, even if it were of many theologians or canonists, does not suffice to restrict or extend the sense of the law, but only authentic interpretation can do this; especially because a place is not usually given to epikeia in invalidating laws on account of the common good. Therefore no foundation is present for the more indulgent opinion, which consequently is not solidly probable. Indeed, it is altogether important for the common good that missionaries who, because of special circumstances, are exposed to greater danger, should not know for themselves an excessive facility of absolving an accomplice and escaping the consequences of their sin.1
…and 20 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.
Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology
Vol. II, Tr. XV, Pt. III, Ch. I, Art. III, § II. On Absolution of Reserved Cases
On Absolution of One's Own Accomplice in a Sin Against Chastity
I say. The absolution of an accomplice in a sin against chastity is invalid, except in danger of death; and even in danger of death, outside a case of necessity, it is illicit on the part of the confessor according to the norm of the apostolic constitutions, and by name of the constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum Paenitentiae, 1 June 1741 (Can. 884).
§ 1. One absolving or pretending to absolve an accomplice in a sin against chastity incurs ipso facto excommunication reserved in the most special way to the Apostolic See; and this even in the article of death, if another priest, although not approved for confessions, can receive the confession of the dying person without some grave infamy and scandal about to arise, except the case in which the dying person refuses to confess to another.
§ 2. The one absolving or pretending to absolve an accomplice does not escape the same excommunication when the accomplice indeed does not confess the sin of complicity, from which he has not yet been absolved, but acts thus because he has been induced to this by the accomplice-confessor, whether directly or indirectly (Can. 2367).
Question 5. Whether a priest can absolve an accomplice in the article or danger of death?
Resp. Affirmatively, validly and licitly, if another priest cannot be called who can perform the office of confessor; or if he can indeed be called, but not without scandal. But if another priest is present, even not approved, who can receive the confession, then the accomplice priest will indeed absolve validly, but illicitly, and will not escape the penalties. This is established from the cited Constitutions of Benedict XIV and Can. 884, 2367. - Bucceroni, nn. 62 and seq.
Question 6. Whether outside the case of death the accomplice priest can ever absolve his accomplice, suppose if the woman accomplice has no other priest to whom she may have recourse, and because of the circumstances of the place, as can happen in some missions, there is no hope that she will have one for several years, especially if danger of scandal and infamy is added, because the said woman had previously been accustomed to approach confession and communion frequently?
Resp. Negatively, according to the more common opinion of theologians; and the reason is, both because it is unlawful to place diverse exceptions where the legislator explicitly placed only one, namely the case of death, and because that law is not only prohibiting but also invalidating, the nature of which requires that it not cease on account of some particular inconvenience. Besides, the infamy, scandal, and other inconveniences which are supposed are not necessarily nor always verified; nor can the obligation of confessing once in the year, or rather sometime in life, as being of divine law, be urged, since divine law supposes that a suitable confessor is present. - Nevertheless these reasons do not seem altogether convincing; for it is true that Benedict XIV made one exception, but it is also true that he supposed, in enacting that law, that other priests were present or could easily be found, and did not have our case before his eyes. Besides, that law, although invalidating, is nevertheless a human law, and consequently in the extreme necessity of some extraordinary case can admit epikeia. But when it is said that the divine law of confession does not urge because a suitable confessor is not present, a mere begging of the question is made: namely, it is supposed that the accomplice confessor, placed in the aforesaid most grave necessity, has already lost jurisdiction; and this is precisely that about which the question is made. Wherefore the affirmative opinion seems probable. Cf. Baller. note (a) p. 540. - Bucceroni, n. 67. - Lehmkuhl, n. 937.
Question 7. Whether a priest can absolve his accomplice after the latter has already been duly absolved by another confessor?
Resp. A distinction must be made, and it must be denied if the penitent accuses only the sin of complicity, because, since that sin is altogether withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the accomplice-confessor, in no case would there be matter for absolution. Nevertheless others say that he does not lack jurisdiction over this sin already directly remitted, because it is no longer necessary matter of confession, and it seems that judgment must be made about this sin as about reserved sins directly remitted: thus Bucceroni, n. 1296. - D'Annibale, n. 324, note 37. - Genicot, n. 352. But affirmatively one must respond if the penitent confesses other sins extraneous to shameful complicity, because, with that shameful sin destroyed by absolution duly imparted by another confessor, the prohibition now ceases and jurisdiction returns. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 555. - Baller. note (a) p. 539. The S. Inquisition on 29 May 1867 resolved the case: "It is free for the confessor to absolve the accomplice person who has already been absolved from the sin of dishonest complicity through another confessor: nevertheless counsel must always be given to the confessor of whom there is question, that, unless necessity compels, he abstain from receiving the sacred confessions of the accomplice person, although already absolved from the sin of complicity." But if, after direct absolution from the sin of complicity accepted from a non-accomplice priest, compelled by some necessity he confesses before his accomplice, practically the penitent "should altogether abstain from any mention, even indirect, of sins of complicity, nor is there need that in a general confession he intend to subject them to the keys." But the confessor "who absolves, insofar as he can, should not intend to absolve from those sins, and there will be no remaining difficulty." Thus the S. Penitentiary, on 29 Feb. 1904, responded to the question: "Whether a priest can absolve his accomplice already absolved by another non-accomplice confessor, and returning to him, if he accuses himself after sins committed since the last confession with these words (as pious penitents are accustomed to do), 'I include besides all the sins of my past life, especially against the angelic virtue,' or whether he is always bound to say 'excepting sins of complicity?'" Theolog. Prak. Quart., v. 58, p. 382.
Question 11. Whether a confessor doubting whether the penitent is his accomplice can absolve him?
Resp. Affirmatively. The confessor, after carefully weighing the matter and still doubting whether this penitent is his accomplice, can absolve him, because the legislator scarcely seems in this case to urge the law because of infamy and scandal. This is admitted by some if he himself remained altogether unknown to the penitent, because, for example, masked or for another reason, he approached her; the reason is that he is not bound to betray himself. But in no way can he absolve him when the penitent knows the priest with whom he committed the crime, but here and now while he confesses does not recognize him. - Ball.-Palm., n. 650. - Genicot, n. 353.
You Will Resolve.
1°. Benedict XIV forbids that anyone dare to receive the sacramental confession of an accomplice person in a sin against chastity committed against the sixth precept of the Decalogue: "Therefore any authority and jurisdiction for absolving any person whatsoever from a fault of this sort having been taken away from him by the law itself." The Sacred Penitentiary responded in the same way (16 May 1877): "The privation of jurisdiction of absolving an accomplice in a sin against chastity, and the attached excommunication, insofar as the confessor has absolved him, is in order to the very sin against chastity, in which the same confessor was an accomplice." But if the penitent acts in good faith, the absolution of other sins is not to be held invalid; for jurisdiction is removed not from these, but from the sin of complicity. - Bucceroni, n. 1291. - Lehmkuhl, n. 1203, affirms "not improbably" that this was said. - Nouvelle Revue Theolog., v. 13, p. 573; v. 31, p. 151. - D'Annibale, n. 324. ... The same would have to be said if the penitent by inculpable forgetfulness does not confess the sin of complicity but other sins, for the same reason.
2°. If a priest inadvertently absolved his accomplice confessing all his sins before him in good faith, the priest himself certainly does not incur the censure; the absolution of other sins must be said to be valid. - Bucceroni, n. 1293. Bulot, n. 574. This must be admitted, if suppose the penitent does not advert that this is his accomplice, and is absolved by the priest himself not adverting. Indeed some in the case of inadvertence of the priest and good faith of the penitent hold that the absolution is simply valid. For Benedict XIV wished to restrict presumptuous and rash daring: the Supreme Pontiff renders null the absolution of one knowing and willing. "The nullity of absolution," as D'Annibale once said, "burdens the penitent; therefore it is also quasi-punishment of him; if the confessor is exempted from punishment, it is equitable that the penitent also be exempted." - Cf. Pennacchi, Comment. in Cons. Apos. Sedis, p. 312. - Ball.-Palm. 650 and others; whether truly, let the wiser judge.
3°. If in the article of death the confessor, any other priest being absent, has begun to hear his accomplice, when another priest arrives he can complete the confession; the power of the judge, duly brought into use at the beginning, does not expire as long as the cause has not been completed. The same must be admitted by equal reason if the confessor in the article of death, necessity urging, began to hear the accomplice and meanwhile the article of death passed.
4°. Two confessors enter into a horrible pact among themselves of absolving their accomplices. Titius absolves Caia, the accomplice of Titus, and Titus absolves Bertha, the accomplice of Titius. Titius and Titus by this pact become accomplices to each other. If the accomplice persons themselves are conscious of this wicked pact, then it seems altogether to be said that the confessor and penitent alike become accomplices: for a mind is added to the penitent, so that he may sin more securely, in the hope of more easily obtaining remission. But if these persons are unaware of this pact, the confessors certainly act sacrilegiously, but they do not absolve their own accomplices; and therefore those confessors absolving each other or the accomplices conscious of the pact incur excommunication, but not if they absolve accomplices unaware of the pact. - Cf. Diction. de Theol. Cath., v. 3, c. 617, Dolhagaray. - Bulot, n. 575.
Slater, Cases II
Slater, Cases II, Penance, Case 20. On the Absolution of an Accomplice · Slater, Cases II, Penance, Case 21. Feigned Absolution of an Accomplice · Slater, Cases II, Penance, Case 24. Asking the Name of an Accomplice
Slater, Cases II, Penance, Case 20. On the Absolution of an Accomplice
Titius, a priest, while making spiritual exercises, moved by divine mercy, disclosed to his confessor a certain pact with Paul, a priest. For since Titius and Paul mutually knew that they sinned rather frequently with women, they agreed between themselves to confess to each other and to give absolution mutually to the accomplice. Having heard these things, Titius’s confessor doubted whether he could now absolve him. Hence it is asked:
- What does ecclesiastical law establish concerning the absolution of an accomplice?
- How is the word “accomplice” to be understood?
- What is to be done by the confessor of a priest who has absolved an accomplice?
- What is to be said of the case?
A priest who with another person has gravely sinned against chastity is forbidden to absolve that person from the sin of complicity, is deprived of jurisdiction for absolving that sin, and, if he attempts the absolution of that sin, incurs an excommunication reserved in a most special manner to the Roman Pontiff.1
1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 213.
- How is the word accomplice to be understood?
DE ABSOLUTIONE COMPLICIS
An accomplice in a shameful sin is here understood as one who, internally and externally, has committed a grave sin against chastity, whether by words, by a look, or by deed, with a priest, even before the priesthood was received.¹
- What must be done by the confessor of a priest who has absolved an accomplice?
If a priest confesses that he has attempted to absolve an accomplice, the confessor must admonish him to ask from the Sacred Penitentiary a faculty by which he can be absolved by his confessor. If he wishes, the confessor himself can ask for this faculty. The name of the penitent is not disclosed to the Sacred Penitentiary. If it is necessary for avoiding scandal, or for another just cause, that the penitent be absolved immediately, the confessor can absolve him directly, but under the burden of presenting himself within a month by letter, as above, to the Sacred Penitentiary.2
2 Ibid., 204.
- To the case. Titius and Paulus, priests, mutually agreed upon the absolution of mutual complices in a sin against chastity and upon the absolution of themselves from their own sins. This pact is itself against chastity, inasmuch as it is a means by which they more easily indulge in impurity; they are therefore accomplices in a shameful sin and cannot absolve each other; if they attempt it, they incur the said excommunication.3
3 Bulot, Compend. Theol. Moral., vol. ii, n. 575.
1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 214.
Slater, Cases II, Penance, Case 21. Feigned Absolution of an Accomplice
Titius, a priest, goes to a certain house of Regulars to devote himself to spiritual exercises. After some days there he makes his confession to Father Caius, who was giving him the exercises. Among other sins he confesses that he had indecent conversations with Philip, a friend who belonged to the flock committed to him, and afterwards absolved him; furthermore, that he sinned shamefully once and again with Mary, Philip’s daughter, and once pretended to absolve her after she confessed to him. On another occasion in the confessional, when he suspected from the sound of her voice that she was present, but refrained from questioning her lest he become more certain, he then actually absolved her; afterwards, however, when she sought Holy Communion, it became certain that she had been present in the confessional. Titius adds that he is exceedingly sorry for the past, most firmly resolves amendment of life, and asks for absolution. Hence it is asked:
- What does Benedict XIV establish in the Constitution The Sacrament of Penance?
- What is to be said of the faculty of absolving from the cases contained there?
- What is to be said of the case?
Benedict XIV in the said Constitution treats of the crime of solicitation and of the attempted absolution of an accomplice. Concerning
Regarding solicitation, it is decreed that Ordinaries are to be held to inquire and proceed against priests who are involved in the matter of solicitation in the sacred tribunal; all confessors who know their penitents to have been solicited by others in the sacred tribunal are to be held to admonish them regarding the obligation of denouncing the solicitors; the power of absolving those who falsely accuse priests of solicitation is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. Concerning the attempted absolution of an accomplice, he establishes that a priest guilty of this crime incurs an excommunication likewise reserved to the Supreme Pontiff.1
1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 210 ff.
- What is to be said of the faculty of absolving from the cases contained there?
Absolution from the censures contained in the Constitution The Sacrament of Penance is reserved to the Holy See in a most special manner, so that the faculty of absolving from them is not included even in a faculty of absolving from all cases specially reserved to the Holy See.2
2 Ibid., 206.
- To the case. Titius had indecent conversations with Philip and afterwards absolved him. If the speeches were so indecent that they constituted a grave sin against chastity, the absolution was null and void, and Titius incurs the case of reservation (the Sacred Office, 28 May 1873). By feigning the absolution of Mary, Titius did not avoid excommunication, according to what was often declared by the Sacred Penitentiary and the Sacred Office.3
3 Génicot, vol. ii, n. 353.
By abstaining from questioning so that he would not recognize the accomplice, and afterwards absolving her, Titius seems to have acted with gross and supine ignorance, and consequently to have incurred the censure again, according to the response of the Sacred Office of January 13, 1892.
Hence Titius incurred several times the excommunication reserved in a most special manner, and cannot be absolved without a faculty specially obtained from the Sacred Penitentiary, to which it must be declared how many times Titius absolved accomplices.
Slater, Cases II, Penance, Case 24. Asking the Name of an Accomplice
Albert, a boy fourteen years of age residing in a certain Catholic college, accuses himself in confession of a shameful sin committed with another boy. Questioned by the confessor, he spontaneously admits that he had committed the same sin several times before after being solicited by the same accomplice. Since the confessor prudently fears that the same thing will happen again, he asks whether Albert is prepared to employ every means to prevent a relapse, even to denounce the accomplice. The boy says that he will willingly disclose the accomplice’s name to the confessor himself, but in no way to the superiors, although he willingly grants the confessor the faculty to disclose the matter to the superiors. From the circumstances the confessor judges it altogether necessary for preventing a relapse, and also for the common good of the college, that the accomplice in the case be denounced to the superiors; hence he thinks that the boy cannot be absolved when he refuses this burden, yet thinks that it is not lawful for him to inquire into the accomplice’s name. Hence it is asked:
- What is to be said of the necessity of confessing a sin if thereby the accomplice in the sin is disclosed to the confessor?
- What is to be said of a confessor who inquires into the accomplice’s name?
What must be done by the confessor in the case?
Solution
- Is it necessary to confess a sin if in so doing an accomplice in the sin is made known to the confessor?
If possible the penitent should go to a confessor who would not know the accomplice in the sin. If he can not conveniently do this, it is a controverted point as to whether he should mention the sin, which can not be confessed without also betraying an accomplice, or not. Some authorities hold that he may not mention the sin because the natural law of secrecy about another’s sin is stricter than the positive law about the integrity of confession. Others hold the contrary opinion, because for good reason we may make known the secret sin of another. Both opinions are probable, so that the penitent may follow either.1
1 Bucceroni, vol. ii, n. 720.
- May a confessor ask the name of an accomplice?
In the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis the first of the excommunications reserved to the Holy See is incurred by those who teach or defend as lawful the practice of inquiring from penitents the name of an accomplice in sin as the practice was condemned by Benedict XIV. The practice then is in general unlawful. However, as Benedict XIV himself supposes, there are certain cases in which the penitent is bound to denounce an accomplice, and sometimes this can. only be done to or through a confessor, who may then ask the name of an accomplice.2
2 Ibid., 1178 ff.
- The case. The good of the college requires that the boy who corrupts his school fellows should be denounced to the authorities when this is necessary to prevent future grave sins. This could only be done in the circumstances of the case by Albert himself. He was therefore under a grave obligation of doing this, and could not be absolved if he refused to do it. As he absolutely refused to denounce his accomplice personally to the authorities, but was not unwilling to tell the confessor, to whom he also gave leave to mention the matter to the authorities, the confessor may ask him to write the boy’s name on a slip of paper and put it in an envelope and give it to him, and that he will see that it goes to the authorities. In doing this the confessor would do nothing wrong, but only help the boy to do his duty.