On the Constitution *Sacramentum Poenitentiae*

What about solicitation in Confession? As regards solicitation, three things concerning it are established in the cited Constitution of Benedict XIV, June 1, 1741. The first is that Inquisitors and Ordinaries of places "severely punish by condign penalties," § 1, confessors soliciting in Confession, who are to be denounced to the same Inquisitors or Ordinaries. The second is that confessors "warn their penitents, whom they know to have been solicited by others, concerning the obligation of denouncing," § 2. The third is that "those falsely accusing innocent priests before ecclesiastical judges of solicitation" are deprived of the benefit of absolution, which is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, § 3. E.M.

Benedict XIV, Constitution Etsi Pastoralis, May 26, 1742, § 9, n. 5, has these things: "Then subjection to all and singular Constitutions of the Roman Pontiffs, especially those issued against persons soliciting in Confession, which extend their force universally into individual Nations, and comprehend Latins as well as Greeks by their breadth."

Who are to be denounced? Indeed "all and singular priests, both secular and regular, exempt in any way... of whatever dignity and preeminence, or fortified by any privilege and indult," §§ 1 and 2, soliciting to shameful things in Confession, are to be denounced. All and singular priests, "even if they are priests who lack jurisdiction for validly imparting absolution," § 2; Holy Office, February 11, 1661. "But interpreters and messengers of solicitation, or those commanding it, or giving counsel, are not comprehended under these Constitutions, even if they are priests. For these are not properly those soliciting or having dishonest treatment in sacred Confession, nor are those actions priestly actions, nor as such do they come under the name of priests... Thus also is comprehended a priest or another who solicits a penitent while he is confessing not to himself, but to another." Pignatelli, Consult. Canon. Noviss., chap. 117, par. Non vero. Nor indeed is the penitent who in Confession solicits the priest to be denounced. L. 689. E.M.

What is the crime of solicitation, on account of which confessors are to be denounced? It is that by which confessors of this sort shall have attempted to solicit or provoke some penitent, whatever person that may be, either in the act of sacramental confession, or before or immediately after confession, or on the occasion or pretext of confession, or even outside the occasion of confession in the confessional, or in another place destined or chosen for hearing confessions, with simulation of hearing confession there, to dishonest and shameful things, whether by words, or signs, or nods, or touch, or through writing to be read either then or afterwards; or shall with rash daring have had illicit and dishonest conversations or dealings with them, § 1. Whatever person that may be, "whether males or females, whoever they may be." Instruction of the Universal Inquisition to all Bishops, February 20, 1867.

In the act of sacramental confession, not of other sacraments. The act of sacramental confession is verified between the beginning of confession and absolution given. Solicitation has place in the act of sacramental confession either when the confessor then simply has illicit and dishonest conversations or dealings, or when he then only applies means by which he afterwards solicits. And this distinction of formal solicitation, or only causal solicitation, or of solicitation in itself or in the means then placed, is to be understood as regards all the other clauses: immediately before, immediately after, etc. L. 676. Nor indeed is it required that absolution be given. Gregory XV, Constitution Universi Dominici gregis, August 30, 1622, § 4, says that one soliciting on the occasion of confession is to be denounced, even when confession itself did not follow.

Or before, or immediately after confession. "That phrase immediately before they more commonly think must be understood strictly, so that no interval intervenes." L. 677. Thus one who solicits a woman kneeling before his feet to confess, even if she has not yet fortified herself with the sign of the cross, is said to solicit immediately before. "That phrase immediately after is commonly understood by the doctors when after confession neither the confessor nor the penitent turns aside to other things, so that the solicitation occurs before any other action has intervened." Nevertheless, if some action intervenes, "it must be judged from the circumstances whether solicitation was principally intended and the business as a means, or whether the business was principal and the solicitation accidental." L. 677.

On the occasion or pretext of confession. Occasion and pretext here signify two distinct things. To solicit on the occasion of confession is to take the opportunity or motive of provoking from a true confession. But he solicits under pretext of confession who puts forward confession as a pretext, or fictitiously incites to confession, so that he may provoke more freely. A pretext is a false cause, and to pretext is to bring forward some cause which is not true. Therefore a confessor of this sort is to be denounced, even when confession did not follow. Under pretext, that is, if the priest uses confession as a pretext so that he may solicit the penitent; not if the penitent uses it as a pretext so that he may solicit the confessor; nor if each does so by agreement to deceive others. L. 679. On the occasion of confession someone seems able to solicit in three ways: 1. when from an express or tacit petition for confession he takes the motive of soliciting. L. 677. 2. From confession itself, i.e., when, understanding, for example, in the very confession the penitent's inclination to venery, he obtains an occasion to provoke him then to dishonest things; or by interrupting the penitent lest he begin confession, or lest he continue it, meanwhile soliciting the same, the opportunity of confession having been taken. 3. When he uses knowledge which he had from confession for afterwards soliciting the penitent. But this use of knowledge of confession must be sufficiently established from circumstances in order to impose the obligation of denunciation. L. 678. But there is difficulty concerning the first way, since then the confessor seems to solicit rather on the occasion of the petition for confession than on the occasion of confession, if nevertheless confession at present neither immediately follows nor ought to follow. Pignatelli, Cons. 104, n. 14. The same must be said of the promise of confession. Pignatelli, Cons. 117, par. Ratio autem. Likewise there is difficulty concerning the third way. For he does not seem to solicit on the occasion of confession who, having learned in confession the frailty of the penitent, approaches him at home and urges him, since he takes knowledge from confession and from knowledge the handle of soliciting. Pignatelli, Cons. 117, par. Unde multo et ratio autem.

Or even outside the occasion of confession in the confessional. "Whether a confessor is to be denounced who, sitting in the confessional, solicits a woman standing before the confessional, without simulating confession? The Qualifiers judged that the negative opinion does not lack probability." Holy Office, February 11, 1661, to the fifteenth. This resolution is certainly to be compared with the resolution of the same Sacred Congregation on the same day, to the fourth: "Whether a confessor who solicits a woman saying in the confessional that she wishes to confess tomorrow, and dissuades confession, is to be denounced? If the solicitation is made outside the place of confession, and without pretext of confession, the Qualifiers judged that the negative opinion is probable; otherwise in the confessional or in the place of confession."

Or in another place destined or chosen for hearing confessions, with simulation of hearing confession there. Therefore a threefold place for hearing confessions is distinguished. The first is the ordinary confessional. The second is any other place distinct from the confessional where confessions are heard, e.g., a kneeler which is in the sacristy, where confessions are received.

The third is any place chosen for hearing confessions. That clause, with simulation of hearing confession there, placed in the last place, is referred to all the antecedents, and therefore also to that first member, whether outside the occasion of confession in the confessional, according to the common rule that a clause placed in the last place is referred to all connected antecedents. The whole difference seems to be in this: that as regards the first and second place, it is indeed required that both the confessor and the penitent be in the confessional, or in another place in which confessions are heard, but by this very fact then, regularly speaking, there is simulation of confession, and the obligation of denunciation presses, as is clear from the cited Response of the Holy Office to the fourth. But as regards the third place, it is not sufficient that the confessor and penitent be in the same place or converse together; rather it is necessary that they positively simulate confession. Pignatelli, Cons. Can. Noviss., chap. 117, par. Tertio ff.; E.M.

To dishonest and shameful things, i.e., obscene things, namely touches, looks, etc. Gregory XV adds in the cited Constitution, § 4: "whether to be perpetrated among themselves, or with others in any way." Hence a confessor is to be denounced who solicits a penitent so that he may induce some person to sin with him. L. 691. Likewise from Benedict XIV, denunciation presses even if the solicitation has been performed by the confessor not for himself but for another person, § 2. "Whether a confessor who solicits a penitent to illicit acts outside venereal acts is to be denounced? The Qualifiers judged that the negative opinion is probable." Holy Office, May 11, 1661, to the eleventh; L. 684; Benedict XIV, de Syn., chap. 11, n. 14.

Whether a confessor soliciting to acts only venially dishonest is to be denounced? "The more probable opinion denies." L. 683. This is clear from the whole tenor of the Constitution of Benedict XIV. Venially dishonest, namely outside the venereal matter. Hence the Holy Office, February 11, 1661, to the third: "Whether a confessor, when soliciting because of smallness of matter, is to be denounced. Since in venereal matters there is no smallness of matter, and if there were, it would not be present in the present matter, the Qualifiers judged that he is to be denounced, and that the contrary opinion is not probable." But it must be diligently observed here that it is one thing to solicit to light acts, another to solicit to graver things through light acts; in which case, without any doubt, denunciation must be made, provided the interior intention appears. Castro-Palao, tract. 4, disp. 9, part 3, n. 4.

Shall have attempted to solicit or provoke, etc., or shall with rash daring have had illicit and dishonest conversations or dealings with them. Solicitation generally is a crafty inducement and movement of another's will to doing or suffering something. Solicitation or provocation here is any invitation and incitement to venereal things made by a priest as confessor, or as quasi-confessor, even if he immediately repented of the solicitation, or desisted in the very solicitation. Holy Office, May 11, 1661, to the second; hence it is said: shall have attempted to solicit or provoke; namely priests abusing confession in any way to the aforesaid effect. To have dishonest conversations or dealings. This is an explanation of the previous clause, and it is declared that solicitation or provocation to be denounced is had through any dishonest conversations or dealings whatsoever between confessor and penitent, whether the confessor begins first or the penitent begins, so that each in fact has those dishonest conversations and dealings, and rests in them, without proceeding further; for then mutual solicitation is had. Hence confessors are commanded that "they warn penitents whom they know to have been solicited by others, as above, cf. 1253, concerning the obligation of denouncing the solicitors," § 2. But although the Supreme Pontiff openly adds in the same place the case of mutual solicitation, nevertheless he adds nothing concerning the case of a confessor who bears himself merely passively with respect to solicitation on the part of the penitent, although consenting to it.

"Whether a confessor is to be denounced who gives the penitent a letter in confession, to be read afterwards at home, in which he solicited to venery? The Qualifiers judged that he is to be denounced, and that the negative opinion is not probable." Holy Office, May 11, 1661, to the first. This is also clear from proposition 6 condemned by Alexander VII, confirmed by Benedict XIV, § 1, together with proposition 7 concerning this same matter. The same is had in so many words in the Constitution of Benedict XIV, § 1: "whether through writing to be read either then or afterwards." Cf. 1253.

"Whether a confessor is to be denounced who, while hearing confession, gives a gift to a woman, so that he is said to have solicited her? The Qualifiers answered the same as to the twelfth." Holy Office, February 11, 1661, to the sixteenth. Speaking in itself, to give something is not dishonest, nor does it tend to dishonest things, but to conciliating benevolence, or to satisfying gratitude for some received benefit. Now these things are to the twelfth: "Whether a confessor, if he praises a penitent for beauty and attractiveness, is said to solicit her, and therefore is to be denounced? The Qualifiers judged that, if that praise is serious and gives no odor of depraved intention, the negative is probable. But if otherwise, it is not probable." To praise the beauty of a woman, even in confession, is not of itself by its object a mortal sin, nor is it an act of itself directed to solicitation to shameful things.

Whether a confessor is to be denounced if his solicitation is doubtful? "If it is doubted whether his deed or word was true solicitation, then with the more common and truer opinion it must be said that there is no obligation of denouncing... The reason is both because doubtful things are to be taken in the better part, and in ambiguous words the more benign interpretation must be made; ... and because in doubt no one is to be deprived of the reputation which he possesses; and because the Bulls command solicitors to be denounced, but he cannot be called a solicitor concerning whom it is doubted whether he truly solicited; for a doubtful crime is not a crime." L. 702.

If "the deed or word is true solicitation, and it is only doubted whether that confessor or another did or said it, then it is to be denounced, because while the crime is certain, judges can duly proceed to inquiring into the person concerning whom there is doubt. Nevertheless I judge that this must be said only in the case in which the judges can easily, by their diligence, become certain concerning the soliciting person; because otherwise that priest, since he can be innocent, would remain in some way defamed, and in doubt the reputation of one's neighbor, who possesses it, must be preserved uninjured." L. 702. As regards the various cases of doubtful solicitation, and others in which the doctors more commonly judge that the confessor is to be denounced, cf. L. 704.

Must confessors warn penitents concerning the denunciation to be made? Confessors are altogether obliged "diligently to warn their penitents whom they know to have been solicited by others, as above, according to the circumstances of occurring cases, concerning the obligation of denouncing to Inquisitors or Ordinaries of places the person who has committed solicitation... Let them moreover diligently take care that they not impart sacramental absolution to penitents whom they know already to have been solicited by another, unless first, bringing the aforesaid denunciation to effect, they have indicated the delinquent to the competent Judge, or at least pledge and promise that they will report him as soon as they can." § 2.

Their own solicited penitents: not others, not solicited; these they are not bound by a positive precept to warn, but by force of the natural precept, insofar as this precept obliges in a particular case. Nor does their good faith excuse from warning them. But the confessor is not bound to ask penitents whether they have been solicited and to warn them concerning the obligation of denouncing, unless he prudently judges from the confession heard that they have been solicited.

By others, not by himself. Hence the confessor who solicited is not himself bound to warn the solicited person concerning the obligation of denouncing, in the supposed case that this penitent afterwards confesses to him, because by natural law no one is bound to procure that his own shamefulness be revealed. To warn: but although the confessor ceases to warn the penitent concerning the obligation of denouncing, nevertheless the obligation in the penitent does not yet cease of denouncing him or another soliciting confessor, if from elsewhere he knows that he is obliged to this by pontifical law, just as the burden of restitution does not cease in a penitent because the confessor ceases to warn him of such an obligation, if from elsewhere he knows it and is not invincibly ignorant of it. Proposition 7 condemned by Alexander VII.

If the confessor certainly foresees that the penitent, existing in good faith, will not denounce, must he nevertheless warn him of his obligation and dismiss him if he is unwilling to denounce? In the case of death, namely when the death of the penitent is imminent, negatively. For no one is bound to do a useless and harmful thing. Now according to the hypothesis, that warning is useless for procuring the common good, and harmful to the private good of the penitent, since then it casts him into bad faith and into eternal damnation. Besides, if the clause appended by the same Benedict XIV has any force, namely of warning penitents according to the circumstances of occurring cases, cf. 1265, 1278, there is not always and in every case an absolute obligation of warning. Therefore at least in the stated case, truly extreme. Outside danger of death, affirmatively. The reason first is that it can always rightly and deservedly be hoped that a penitent of this kind, with the confessor insisting and the grace of God helping, will at least later do what today perhaps, frightened by difficulty, he refuses to do. Hence also nothing then prevents the confessor, if the penitent is certainly going to return to him, opportunely deferring absolution, or even granting it in a case of necessity, from awaiting a favorable occasion when he will be more disposed and foreseen to be going to do what today would be demanded from him in vain. But if the penitent is not going to return to the same confessor, it is enough that he be warned of the obligation of speaking about such a matter with his Ordinary or another confessor because of the difficulty of the matter still to be untangled, and meanwhile that he be prepared in soul to fulfill the obligation, if perhaps there is one and it is made manifest to him by the same confessor. Besides, to this case also is extended the aforesaid clause of Benedict XIV concerning penitents to be warned according to the circumstances of occurring cases, which is not to be restricted to the single extreme case of death. Cf. Benedict XIV, encyclical letter Apostolica Constitutio, n. 20. Moreover the difficulty which can frighten the penitent in making denunciation is surely not such that it has no remedy, since the Sacred Congregation itself indicates various ways by which the fulfillment of this most grave obligation can become much easier. Cf. 1270, 1278.

Is not only the solicited person bound to denunciation, but also one who from elsewhere knows the solicitation certainly? R. Affirmatively, "if he knows the crime from persons worthy of faith; otherwise, if he knew it from persons unworthy of faith, or from frivolous women. But this must be said, not now from the Bull of Gregory, but from the Edict of the Holy Inquisition, March 10, 1677, where it is said that one who has known or heard that he solicited is bound to denounce the confessor." L. 695. These things from the Holy Office, May 11, 1661, to the fourteenth: "Whether someone is bound to denounce a soliciting confessor if he heard this not from persons worthy of faith, but only from frivolous persons? The Qualifiers judged that the negative opinion does not lack probability." Nevertheless it must be noted here that the affirmative resolution is inferred rather from the proposed Question than from the Response of the Sacred Congregation.

Is one who knows of solicitation under a natural secret bound to denunciation? R. Affirmatively, "because no one is bound to a secret, even promised by oath, when the secret turns to common harm. But otherwise, if the solicitation has been manifested for seeking counsel; for the disclosure of the secret would then be against human intercourse, and also against the public good, which certainly intervenes in seeking counsels." L. 698. And this last point is founded besides on the Decree of Alexander VII, July 8, 1660, which obliges Regulars from whom counsel is sought concerning the obligation of denouncing only to this, that they warn and oblige to denounce.

Is absolution to be denied to a penitent who refuses to denounce a soliciting priest? R. Affirmatively. "Penitents who have been warned and altogether refuse cannot be absolved; but those who because of a just cause must defer denunciation, and who pledge and seriously promise that it is to be made as quickly as they can, can be absolved... If necessity presses, the solicited person is to conduct himself according to the counsels and warnings of his confessor," namely when there is grave difficulty standing in the way of making denunciation. Cited Instruction, nn. 5 and 7; L. 693.

Do those omitting denunciation incur excommunication? From the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis of Pius IX, October 15, 1869, those incur an excommunication latae sententiae reserved to no one: "Those neglecting or culpably omitting to denounce within a month confessors or priests by whom they have been solicited to shameful things, in any of the cases expressed by Our predecessors Gregory XV, Constitution Universi, August 20, 1622, and Benedict XIV, Constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae, June 1, 1741." Neglecting or culpably omitting to denounce, and therefore when they could and ought to have done this. Within a month: to be computed from this obligation having become known; therefore after the month has elapsed they fall into excommunication. Moreover, if they have promised that they will denounce, and faith can be had in them, they will be able to be absolved, and not only from sins before the month has elapsed, which is expressly provided in the Constitution of Benedict XIV, cf. 1265, 1270, but also from excommunication after the month has elapsed. For the present excommunication is not reserved. Nor indeed does a penitent of this kind seem to relapse into the same excommunication if afterwards he has deceived the faith placed in him, since absolution here is granted absolutely; and when the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis willed otherwise, it openly expressed it. By whom they have been solicited: therefore only solicited penitents are subject to this excommunication, by no means all whatsoever who learned of the solicitation. Pignatelli, Cons. Can. Noviss., chap. 117, par. Terminus autem.

What causes excuse from making denunciation? If truly and reasonably, from denunciation, grave harm is feared in life, reputation, and temporal goods, the penitent could be excused from denouncing. The reason is that a natural right is given for preventing these harms, against which the positive law of the Church does not prevail; for the Church is not accustomed to oblige further with grave inconvenience for the observance of her laws. It is added that laws imposing denunciation of their nature do not oblige with grave inconvenience, because they do not have that annexed to them of their nature, as, for example, precepts given to a soldier concerning not leaving his station, or to a pastor concerning assisting the sick laboring under plague.

But when a law of its nature does not demand to be fulfilled with grave inconvenience, it ceases to oblige if that grave inconvenience supervenes, as is clear concerning a law imposing fasting, hearing Mass, etc. But denunciation is to be made even with any harm whatsoever as often as from that crime contempt of this sacrament and destruction of souls would arise. But although this could be absent when it was certainly known that someone solicited once, not from contempt of the sacrament but from mere momentary lust, nevertheless it would indeed happen when solicitation arose from making light of the sacrament, or if the solicitor were a powerful man and solicited frequently. Therefore in these cases the reason of the common good and of preventing harm to Religion outweighs any private harm whatsoever, and therefore denunciation should never be omitted. L. 699; Pignatelli, Cons. Can. Noviss., chap. 117, par. Denique ff.; E.M.

Note: Those who cannot denounce because of the aforesaid causes are still bound when these cease. Holy Office, February 21, 1630; Giraldi, p. 640, note qui, p. 641. E.M.

Is a woman bound to denounce a soliciting confessor to whom she herself consented? R. Affirmatively. For Benedict XIV commanded denunciation to be made "whether the penitent consented to the solicitation, or by no means gave consent." The reason is that denunciation can be made without any danger to one's own reputation, since one cannot be questioned about this by the Bishop, and therefore even if someone is questioned he can deny his own consent. L. 700. In the cited Instruction, n. 6, it is said: "Care must also be taken that those denouncing are not asked whether they consented to the solicitation; and it would be most fitting if concerning consent of this kind, however spontaneously manifested, nothing at all were noted in the records. From the Declaration of Urban VIII, Thursday, April 17, 1624."

Must a woman constituted in good faith and simplicity, who did not understand the solicitation, be warned concerning denunciation, and must she denounce? R. Negatively, by reason of scandal. Nevertheless "the Sacred Congregation on May 11, 1707 declared that a girl solicited while constituted in simplicity and without knowledge of dishonesty is bound to denounce the soliciting confessor after she has become capable and has acquired knowledge of the past solicitation." Giraldi, p. 641.

Is the solicited person bound to denounce solicitation had a long time ago, or occult solicitation, or one which cannot be juridically proved? R. To the first, affirmatively, from the open Declaration of Benedict XIV, Constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae, § 2. L. 697. To the second, it must altogether be affirmed; otherwise this most grave law would be completely useless, since this crime of itself is occult. L. 696. To the third, "it must altogether be affirmed." L. 695. The reason is that juridical proof is not necessary here.

Is a soliciting confessor to be denounced if he has already been amended, or judged and punished, or is dead? R. To the first: affirmatively. And St. Alphonsus judges this absolutely more probable, and it seems practically and regularly to be held. For the primary and principal reason of the law of denunciation is not the amendment of a particular person, but the public security of the sacrament and of souls, by the certain chastisement of so abominable a crime, and by unavoidable fear of penalty, even for one act, or for one repeated only once; indeed also the indemnity of the Church, namely lest plagues of this sort creep into public offices, than which nothing is more harmful to the common good of the Church. Benedict XIV, de Synod., book 6, chap. 11, n. 10.

To the second: it is certain that, if he himself offends again after he has been punished for the first crime, he must again be denounced. And the same must be said if he was not fully convicted of solicitation, because then he would not have been punished. If concerning the same solicitation he has already been sufficiently convicted and punished, it must far more probably be affirmed, L. 637, from the Holy Office, May 11, 1661, to the thirteenth: "Whether a confessor who abjured on account of the solicitation of another is to be denounced? The Qualifiers judged that the negative opinion is not probable, and therefore that he is to be denounced, which was also resolved on July 26, 1628." Abjured, that is, one who on account of another preceding solicitation appeared before the Inquisitor and abjured, namely detested heresy; for since abjuration is detestation of heresy, someone was bound to abjure insofar as he was a heretic or suspected of heresy; and such a solicitor was held to be, who therefore had to abjure at least for caution; and if the suspicion of heresy was slight, he was said to abjure de levi; if vehement, to abjure de vehementi. Nevertheless it must be observed that in the preceding Response there is question of the solicitation of another penitent, on account of which the confessor abjured, not of that same penitent on account of whose solicitation he spontaneously appeared. But in another Decree, July 26, 1628, cited in the aforesaid Response, as that Decree is had in Albitius, de Inconst. in Fid., chap. 35, n. 50, it is established generally that "the solicited person is bound to denounce the solicitor, although he knows that the same appeared in the Holy Office." In the same general sense the same Decree is reported by Giraldi, p. 641.

To the third: negatively, because then the whole end of the law ceases, namely both the punishment and the amendment of the guilty party. Holy Office, March 6, 1839; Sacred Penitentiary, April 24, 1884; L. 692. E.M.

When, to whom, and how is denunciation to be made? Denunciation must be made within a month from the time when its obligation became known. Holy Office, March 10, 1677; L. 693. Cf. 1271.

It is to be made "to Inquisitors or Ordinaries of places," § 2. Of places, i.e., of the place in which the penitent is present, even if the penitent and the soliciting confessor pertain to another diocese. It pertains to the Ordinary or Inquisitor of the place to receive the sworn denunciation and to transmit it to the Bishop of the guilty priest. In the cited Instruction, n. 1, it is said: "they must report the matter to the Holy See or to the Ordinary of the place." He satisfies the obligation who denounces delinquents of this kind to the Supreme Tribunal of the Sacred Roman and Universal Inquisition. Pignatelli, Cons. Can. Noviss., chap. 117, Ex parte vero. Vicars Apostolic can also receive denunciation, but they must remit "to the Holy Office through the medium of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide in a closed letter the names of the solicitors."

Holy Office, June 20, 1882. As regards Regulars, Regular Superiors cannot receive this denunciation, nor take cognizance of this cause. Decree of Alexander VII Licet alias, July 3, 1660. Cardinals, Bishops, and the Inquisitors themselves, who are truly delegates of the Apostolic See, in the case of solicitation, if it is to be denounced, are to be denounced not to the Inquisitor or Ordinary of the place, but either to the Holy See or to the Sacred Congregation of the Holy and Universal Inquisition. "If they cannot, or do not wish immediately, to denounce them to the Supreme Tribunal, they are bound to denounce them to the Inquisitors or Ordinaries of places, so that the delict may become known to the Holy Office; because the obligation of denouncing requires in the judge only the faculty of receiving juridical denunciations. For this suffices so that the delict may become known to the Sacred Tribunal, so that afterwards according to its laws proceeding may be made against the delinquent." Pignatelli, Cons. Can. Noviss., chap. 117, par. Ideoque.

As regards the manner of making denunciation, the cited Instruction, nn. 6-8, has these things: "6. Anonymous denunciations against those soliciting to shameful things have no force; for denunciations must be made in judgment, namely before the Bishop or his delegate with the intervention of an ecclesiastical man who holds the parts of notary, and with oath, and with expression and subscription of one's own name. Nor is it sufficient if it is made by notes, or by letters without the name and surname of the author. Moreover it is prohibited that, in receiving denunciations, besides the judge and the notary, each an ecclesiastical man, furnished with the special and written deputation of the Bishop, witnesses be present." "7. The burden of denunciation is personal, and to be fulfilled by the solicited person himself. But if he is impeded by most grave difficulties from being able to perform this himself, then either by himself, or by letter, or through another person well disposed to him, let him approach his Ordinary, or the Holy See through the Sacred Penitentiary, or even through this Supreme Inquisition, all the circumstances having been set forth, and then let him conduct himself according to the counsels and warnings of his confessor. But if, detained by no impediment, he altogether refuses denunciation, in this case and in the other mentioned cases the confessor is to be praised who has not denied his labor to the penitent, and has consulted either the Ordinary or the Holy See for opportune provisions, the name of the penitent nevertheless being suppressed. But approved authors hand down the formulas to be used in these cases, among whom are Pignatelli, Cons. Can. Noviss., t. I, chap. 104; Carena, Albitius, etc." "8. It not infrequently occurs that a confessor or another ecclesiastic is deputed by Bishops, whose power this indeed is, to receive denunciations in a matter pertaining to the crime of solicitation, without the intervention of a notary. Men especially suitable are to be destined to this most grave function; they must be instructed concerning the act of denunciation to be assumed in a judicial manner, and warned that immediately after the denunciation has been received they are at once to transmit it cautiously to the Bishop himself by whom they were deputed, and that they are to retain for themselves no copy or any trace of the act drawn up. And in about this manner the function of denouncing is fulfilled without great difficulty. Certainly it must be brought about by Ordinaries of places that it not be necessary to apply to places subject to their jurisdiction what was declared for the missions of Pernambuco in America, on June 22, 1627: namely that solicited women are not bound to denunciation if the ministers of the Inquisition and the Vicars of the Bishop dwelling in distant regions cannot be approached without grave inconvenience."

Therefore, if a woman cannot even be induced to make the denunciation in writing and with oath to a confessor deputed for this, recourse must be had to the Holy See for an opportune remedy, and meanwhile such a penitent is not to be absolved, as being indisposed.

All Ordinaries of places are deputed judges for inquiring and proceeding against solicitors. Therefore they can delegate to others the faculty of admitting juridical denunciations, not only for an act but also habitually. L. 695; E.M.

What about the crime of false denunciation? "Since certain wicked persons are found who, moved either by hatred, or anger, or another unworthy cause, or incited by the impious persuasions, or promises, or flatteries, or threats of others, or in any other way, the dread judgment of God being set aside and the authority of the Church contemned, falsely accuse innocent priests of solicitation before ecclesiastical judges: Therefore, that so wicked an audacity and so detestable a crime may be restrained by fear of the greatness of the penalty, whatever person has stained himself with an execrable crime of this sort, either by himself impiously calumniating innocent confessors, or by wickedly procuring that this be done by others, is forever deprived, by any priest whatsoever, fortified by whatever privilege, authority, and dignity, except by Us and Our successors, unless at the end of life and except in the article of death, of the hope of obtaining absolution, which We reserve to Us and to the aforesaid successors." § 3.

The present case is a papal reserved case, but without censure. The reservation is penal. But that procuring must be efficacious of the unjust denunciation which followed. There is question, however, not of any false denunciation, but of a juridical denunciation, i.e., made before ecclesiastical judges, namely before the Ordinary of the place or the Inquisitor. L. 693.

What about absolution of an accomplice? In the same Constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum Poenitentiae, there is also treatment of absolution of an accomplice, of its unlawfulness and invalidity, and of the excommunication imposed on the absolver.

What about the unlawfulness and invalidity of absolution? Benedict XIV has these things in the cited Constitution, §§ 4 and 2: "To all and singular priests, both secular and regular, of whatever order and dignity, although otherwise approved for receiving confessions, and supported by any privilege and indult, even one worthy of special expression and of most special note and mention, by Apostolic authority and the plenitude of Our power, We interdict and prohibit, lest any of them, outside the case of extreme necessity, namely in the very article of death, and then when any other priest who can discharge the office of confessor is lacking, dare to receive the sacramental confession of a person who is an accomplice in a shameful and dishonest sin committed against the sixth precept of the Decalogue, any authority and jurisdiction whatsoever for absolving any person from guilt of this kind being for this reason removed from him by the law itself; indeed so that the absolution, if he shall impart any, is altogether null and void, as imparted by a priest who exists deprived of the jurisdiction and faculty necessary for validly absolving, which We intend to remove from him by these Our present letters.

And nevertheless, if any confessor shall have dared to do otherwise, he incurs also by that very fact the penalty of major excommunication, the power of absolving from which We reserve to Us alone and only to Our Successors. Declaring also and decreeing that not even by force of any Jubilee whatsoever, or even of the Bull which is called of the Holy Crusade, or of any other Indult, can anyone receive the confession of the said accomplice of this kind and bestow sacramental absolution upon him: since for this effect, and in this case, no confessor, as one who in this kind of sin and penitent lacks jurisdiction, as was said above, and exists deprived by Us of the faculty of absolving, is to be held as a legitimate and approved confessor.

Notwithstanding Apostolic Constitutions and Ordinances, especially those which are called of the Holy Crusade, or of Universal and plenary Jubilee, and also any Statutes and Customs whatsoever, Privileges also, Indults, and Apostolic Letters... To all of which... for this time only We specially and expressly derogate, and to other things whatsoever to the contrary."

Is absolution of an accomplice always unlawful, always invalid? Absolution of an accomplice will always be unlawful outside the case of extreme necessity, namely in the very article of death, and then when any other confessor who can discharge the office of confessor is lacking. But it will always be invalid outside the article of death. In the article of death it will always be valid, even short of necessity.

For thus Benedict XIV, in the Constitution Apostolici, declared his mind concerning a case of necessity of this kind. 1. Thus an accomplice is interdicted and prohibited from hearing and absolving an accomplice in the aforesaid article of death "so that if some other priest is not lacking, even if perhaps this other was only a simple priest, or otherwise not approved for hearing confessions, nevertheless that simple priest can receive the Confession and impart absolution." 2. "If the quality of an urgent case and the concurring circumstances, which cannot be avoided, are such that another priest cannot be called or approach to hear the confession of a person constituted in the said article without some grave infamy or scandal likely to arise; then another priest can be held and considered just as if he were really absent and lacking; and therefore in that state of things, the priest who is partner of the crime is not prohibited from imparting absolution to the penitent also from that crime. But let an accomplice priest of this kind know and seriously observe that he will in fact be guilty before God, who cannot be mocked, of grave disobedience against Our aforesaid Constitution and liable to the penalties imposed in it, if he voluntarily invents for himself the aforesaid dangers of infamy or scandal where they do not exist. Indeed let him understand that he is gravely bound to forestall or remove dangers of this kind, insofar as it is in him, suitable means being employed, whence it may happen that a way lies open for any other priest to hear that confession without anyone's infamy or scandal." 3. "But if the same priest either in any way thrusts himself in, compelled by no grave necessity, or, where danger of infamy or scandal is feared if the labor of another priest must be required, he himself has deliberately neglected to employ suitable means to avert that danger, and thus has presumed to receive the sacramental Confession of the person who is an accomplice in the said crime and constituted in that article, as was said above, and to bestow absolution from that crime, no necessary cause compelling as is premised; although absolution of this kind will be valid, provided that on the part of the penitent the dispositions required by Christ the Lord for the validity of the sacrament of penance have not been lacking, for We do not intend in the fearful article of death to take away from the same priest, however unworthy, the necessary jurisdiction, lest by this very occasion someone perish; nevertheless that priest will by no means escape the penalties of the law violated by such rash daring; and therefore he incurs the major excommunication imposed in the said Constitution and reserved to Us and to this Holy See in exactly the same way as is decreed there."

If an accomplice priest, necessity standing, begins to hear the confession of an accomplice in the article of death, and another priest arrives, can he complete the confession begun? R. Affirmatively. "The reason is that when he began to hear, this was lawful through the Pontiff giving him jurisdiction; but this jurisdiction does not expire by the arrival of another, because the confession for which jurisdiction was conferred, since it is only begun, is not yet whole or perfect." Ithur., Case 49, n. 17.

If an accomplice priest begins to hear the confession of an accomplice in the article of death, necessity standing, can he then, after the danger of death has passed, complete the confession and absolve? R. Affirmatively. The reason is the same as in the preceding case. For jurisdiction valid at the time of the confession begun is judged to remain so long as the confession begun has not been completed by absolution. For confession is ordered to this, and has its completion in this. Ithur., Case 49, nn. 21, 22, 23.

After the accomplice has been absolved by the accomplice priest in the article of death, necessity pressing, can the priest then, when that danger has passed, complete his confession by reason of integrity? Either the penitent sufficiently expressed by nods all the sins of complicity, or not. If the former, the accomplice priest can complete the confession by reason of integrity; otherwise he cannot. The reason of the first is that by valid absolution the sins of complicity were directly remitted, and therefore the complicity itself has been directly destroyed, and the accomplice priest, like any other, can absolve from other sins. For those sins are no longer necessary matter of confession, but only free matter, like venial sins or mortal sins already disclosed. The reason of the second is that then the bond of complicity still endures; for the remaining sins were remitted only indirectly, as omitted in confession. Therefore those sins remain necessary matter of confession. Ithur., Case 49, nn. 19, 20.

Can an accomplice absolve an accomplice not only in the article, but also in the danger of death? The article of death is distinguished in this from the danger of death: the article of death denotes certain nearness, the danger denotes probable impending death. R. Affirmatively. The extrinsic reason is that the article of death and danger of death, by canon law, by the most common opinion of theologians, and by the practice of confessors, are altogether equated in order to receiving the sacraments of penance, Eucharist, and extreme unction. But the intrinsic reason is that, morally speaking, the necessity of the sick person is nearly the same.

Therefore, lest he perish, the Church confers jurisdiction on all priests for the article of death, even if there is question of an accomplice priest absolving an accomplice, as is openly clear from the Constitution of Benedict XIV Apostolici muneris. Ithur., Case 49, nn. 4-10.

Note: The same must be said even if the danger of death was prudently indeed, but falsely, judged to be present. Ithur., Case 49, nn. 11-15. For since it is sometimes difficult to distinguish a true and real danger from a danger only judged and apparent, jurisdiction is given absolutely to all for the article or danger of death prudently judged to be present, lest someone perish.

What if a dying person is unwilling to confess to anyone other than the priest who is his partner in sin? In that case he can be absolved by the accomplice priest, if he is otherwise disposed, namely lest he perish or be endangered. Gousset, Theol. Mor., vol. 2, n. 489. The same must be said if another priest who has been called is unwilling to come, or, though already present, is unwilling to hear the confession. The reason is that then it is the same as if there were no supply of another confessor.

When is complicity had here? Complicity is had here when there is an externally, reciprocally or mutually declared consent, agreement, or conspiracy of two or more persons into a shameful and dishonest sin, indeed a mortal one, against the sixth precept of the Decalogue, although not consummated by copula. Externally: certainly complicity cannot be had without an external act. Mortal: for the Supreme Pontiff speaks of a sin which must necessarily be destroyed by sacramental absolution. But mortal is understood both by reason of the internal act and by reason of the exterior work. Therefore the aforesaid law does not have place where there is question of sins only grave but doubtful, whether the doubt be of law or of fact; or where there is question of simply venial sins, or of sins venial only as regards the external act, although either one or each has internally sinned gravely. But how great an imprudence and rashness it is, because of the danger of scandal, to approach an accomplice confessor, even if there is question only of venial sins in this matter to be manifested to the same accomplice confessor, there is no one who does not see. Reciprocally or mutually. Therefore "1. if a priest, having taken an occasion from sleep or drunkenness, were to use some woman to satisfy lust, he would not for this reason lose jurisdiction for absolving her, because since both the drunken woman and the sleeping woman are unequal to sinning, neither would be held formally as an accomplice, although each could be called materially a partner of the crime in the sin against the sixth precept perpetrated by the priest... 2. If some priest by the greatest crime were to induce a woman to believe that it was altogether free from sin if she allowed herself to be shamefully touched by him, and she, deceived by him, in good faith suffered herself to be shamefully touched by him, without admitting formal sin in herself, she would not be an accomplice, and could subject herself to the sacramental judgment of the same priest for obtaining absolution not from a venereal sin, from which we posit her to be immune, but from other sins." Ithur., Case 41, nn. 25, 26. Likewise the complicity of which there is question in this law is not present if the woman with whom the priest sins, although she consents interiorly, nevertheless externally resists. But under the name of shameful sin comes every grave external sin against the sixth precept, even if it is only touch or conversation. The reason is that the words of the Bull, "in a shameful and dishonest sin against the sixth precept," without doubt comprehend any shameful sins whatsoever. Holy Office, May 28, 1873; L. 554.

Does the aforesaid complicity comprehend the shameful sin of the confessor with the partner of the crime, committed even before he had been initiated in sacred orders? R. Affirmatively. The reason is that the Supreme Pontiff speaks altogether indefinitely of sin committed with an accomplice, and does not restrict it to sin committed by the confessor himself when already having the faculty of hearing confessions, or already constituted in sacred orders. Sacred Penitentiary, January 22, 1879; Ithur., Case 47, nn. 2-6.

Is the absolution valid at least of other sins, if the penitent was in good faith, as happens whenever there is question of reserved sins? R. Affirmatively. The reason is that in the Bull jurisdiction is indeed removed from the confessor, but from the accomplice confessor, as regards the accomplice penitent, and, what is especially important, from guilt of this kind, in this kind of sin. Therefore not from other sins, not in other matters. Sacred Penitentiary, May 16, 1877.

Does the error of the penitent supply jurisdiction when absolution is unduly imparted to an accomplice? R. Negatively. The reason is that the Church, supplying jurisdiction in the case of error, intends to provide not only for certain persons who, deceived, thought that jurisdiction was present in this priest, but for the multitude of men falsely thinking that very thing by a common persuasion. Hence error supplying jurisdiction regards the multitude, whom the Church intends to favor; it does not regard a few. But where there is question of absolving an accomplice, only two are present, namely the confessor and the accomplice, whom the Benedictine Constitution wishes to punish. Therefore error can contribute nothing at all to the validity of absolution imparted by an accomplice. Ithur., Case 51, n. 26; Case 47, nn. 10, 11.

What if a confessor absolved an accomplice inadvertently? Many affirm that the absolution is valid. The reason is that the Constitutions of Benedict XIV require rash daring and presumption. Many on the other hand deny that the absolution is valid. For two things must be distinguished in the Constitution of Benedict XIV: the removal of jurisdiction and the penalty of excommunication. This indeed, both in the Constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae and in the Constitution Apostolici regiminis, is imposed against those daring and presuming; but the former is simply removed from the accomplice confessor, as is clear from the very tenor of the Bull. Hence it is clear that the removal of jurisdiction is not constituted properly as a penalty, but as an invalidating law for averting danger, lest an accomplice priest dare to absolve an accomplice, and for removing from the sanctity of the sacred tribunal every occasion of shamefulness and contempt of the sacraments, as is said there at the beginning of § 4. Hence the absolution will be invalid as regards the very sin of complicity, but valid as regards other sins, if the penitent is in good faith. Cf. 1291.

Can a priest doubting whether the penitent is his accomplice absolve him? R. Affirmatively. Gury, Case 619. The reason is that it is not to be presumed that the legislator prudently wished to proceed against the confessor with so great a doubt concerning the matter on the one hand, and with so great a detriment to reputation and perhaps a new scandal on the other. Therefore the present case seems to fall back into the question of probable or doubtful jurisdiction, in which, when a grave cause stands, it is more probably lawful to absolve. Cf. 770.

Does an accomplice priest have jurisdiction over a sin of complicity destroyed by perfect contrition, or remitted only indirectly by the keys? R. Negatively. The reason is that from Benedict XIV the confessor is simply deprived of the jurisdiction necessary for the remission of the sin of complicity, necessarily to be obtained through the keys. Ithur., Case 48, nn. 2, 7, 8, 11-16.

Does an accomplice priest lack jurisdiction over a sin of complicity even already directly remitted? R. Negatively. The reason is that that sin is no longer necessary matter of confession, but free matter. Holy Office, May 29, 1867.

Can an accomplice confessor absolve an accomplice by force at least of some privilege or Jubilee? R. Negatively. This is clear from the Constitution of Benedict XIV, § 5. But it must be noted here that one invalidly absolves a penitent who by force of privilege could be absolved from any sin reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, because this sin is not reserved, since any non-accomplice confessor can absolve from it. From this it follows that a confessor having the power of absolving from cases reserved to the Supreme Pontiff cannot absolve an accomplice.

Can a priest seeking the faculty that some priest absolve an accomplice absolve his own accomplice himself? Can a Bishop grant this faculty of absolving his own accomplice? R. To the first: affirmatively. The reason is that the faculty of absolving an accomplice was requested in general for some priest. Therefore it ought to be valid as much for the petitioner himself as for another. R. To the second: negatively. The reason is that the law prohibiting a priest from absolving an accomplice is a general law of the Church and of most grave moment. But Bishops cannot dispense by their own authority in general laws of the Church except in cases of lesser moment and frequently occurring in practice. This is also clear both from the practice of the Church, which is accustomed to grant to Bishops seeking the faculty of absolution of an accomplice, by particular Indult, that faculty for certain cases of necessity few in number; and especially from the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, by which that case is reserved to the Pope in a special manner, indeed according to the Decree of the Holy Office, January 17, 1866, in a most special manner.

What about excommunication? The excommunication constituted by Benedict XIV, cf. 1281, is retained in the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis and enlarged. For excommunication is not imposed on those daring to absolve, but simply on "those absolving an accomplice in a shameful sin, even in the article of death, if another priest, although not approved for confessions, can receive the confession of the dying person without any grave infamy and scandal likely to arise." Those absolving: therefore it is not enough merely to hear the confession without absolving. Nevertheless confessors pretending and simulating absolution of an accomplice in a shameful sin do not escape excommunication. Sacred Penitentiary, March 1, 1878; Holy Office, December 5, 1883. Those absolving, even with crass or supine ignorance. Holy Office, January 13, 1892.

An accomplice, namely formal, and therefore by mutual consent externally manifested on each side. In a shameful sin, namely 1. against the sixth precept of the Decalogue; 2. formal, for if either one sinned only materially, he cannot be called an accomplice; 3. external; 4. grave on each side, not only in the nature of the internal act, but also in the nature of the external act; 5. not already directly absolved by another confessor. In a shameful sin: nevertheless the confessor would still incur excommunication if he directly or indirectly induced the penitent to keep silent about that sin. Directly, by persuading him that that sin is to be omitted. Indirectly, by persuading him that the shamefulness committed with the priest was not a sin, etc. Even in the article of death, a fortiori outside it.

If another priest, although not approved, i.e., when "any other priest who can discharge the office of confessor is not then lacking." Cf. 1281. Hence one suspended, or even excommunicated, is to be preferred to the accomplice, speaking in itself; otherwise, if infamy and scandal would follow. In the article or danger of death. Cf. 1286.

This case is so held as reserved that even in the general and very broad concession of faculties, which is granted by the Holy See for various places for absolving from all cases even under censure reserved in a special manner, it is expressly excepted. Holy Office, April 4, 1871. Cf. 1298. Its absolution belongs privatively, and only in the internal forum, to the Sacred Penitentiary, to which recourse must be had.

Does an accomplice priest evade censure who, short of necessity, hears the confession of an accomplice in the article of death, if before he absolves he repents of the deed, but afterwards absolves because of the circumstance of the confession begun? The author of Cas. Consc. Bonon., year 1759, month of May, Case 2, and others deny. The reason is that there was no jurisdiction of the confessor at the beginning of the confession, since it was not juridically begun, and none remains in its prosecution. Nor indeed is there another necessity of imparting absolution than the article of death, another confessor being lacking, or danger of scandal and infamy pressing. But others affirm. For "1. he does not incur the penalty for the confession begun alone, because that penalty is not incurred unless the confession is completed by absolution. 2. Nor would he incur it by absolving after a will changed for the better, and contrition elicited concerning that sin; for no one incurs excommunication by an act which on the one hand can no longer be omitted, and on the other hand lacks all fault, indeed has become obligatory. For excommunication is incurred then when absolution is imparted by an accomplice without any necessity (of avoiding scandal and infamy). But the confessor, after hearing the penitent's confession, is compelled to absolve him; therefore he does not incur excommunication." Gury, Case 628; Ithur., Case 50, nn. 25, 26. As regards the reason of the first opinion, cf. 1282.