Chapter VI: On Absolution of an Accomplice

— "Absolution of an accomplice in a shameful sin is invalid, except in danger of death; and even in danger of death, outside the case of necessity, it is illicit on the part of the confessor according to the norm of the apostolic constitutions, and namely the constitution of Benedict XIV, Sacramentum Paenitentiae, June 1, 1741."

C. 884 remits to the Apostolic Constitutions by which this matter is governed. They are the above-praised Bull Sacramentum Paenitentiae, §§4 and 5, and the declaratory Brief Apostolici muneris, February 8, 1745, to which certain declarations of the Holy Office and of the Sacred Penitentiary are added.

The sum of the matter is handed down to us by c. 884 itself, whose words found certain or probable explanations.

Absolution of an accomplice. Looking at the end of the law, which is indicated at the beginning of the constitution Sacramentum Paenitentiae itself, that is, lest a confession of this kind should be an occasion of spiritual ruin for penitents, etc., Ballerini, Op. theol., V, 410, did not wish a complicity preceding the reception of the priesthood to be comprehended by the severe law. "If you imagine, for example, two accomplices in sin in boyhood or adolescence, of whom afterward one, for example, having assumed the habit of the Capuchins, after twenty years hears the confession of his companion, by force of which he must absolve also from that sin, because, for example, he confessed invalidly, surely it is not credible that the faculty of absolving has been denied to this confessor."

Yet the Sacred Penitentiary, January 22, 1879, responded: that the confessor cannot absolve the accomplice with whom before the priesthood in a youthful age he acted shamefully, unless he is morally certain that the accomplice has already been directly and validly absolved from the sin of complicity by another confessor. And today morally all writers reject the distinction of complicity before or after the priesthood.

Of an accomplice in a shameful sin. On May 28, 1873, the Holy Office declared that not only touches are comprehended, "but all grave sins externally committed against chastity, even those which consist in mere conversations and looks which import complicity." Therefore a shameful sin can be either of action, or, what was formerly disputed, of words, or of sight, yet grave as external. And on account of the words of the Bull Sacramentum, repeated in the Brief Apostolici: "in a shameful and dishonorable sin," there is probably required a sin which is libidinous in itself, or, as Noldin, III, 369, says, "immediate complicity in the shameful action itself." Such complicity is not that of a pander to whom money is paid, but of the woman with whom, for example, fornication is committed.

True complicity is required besides, which can be absent in looks and even in touches, for example of a sleeping, drunken, or unwilling person. For complicity supposes the consent of two or more, expressed or tacitly signified, in the same sin. Complicity properly so called is not the connivance of one not impeding a sin which by office he was not bound to impede, or approval of speech already heard which does not excite other shameful speeches.

But any accomplice-person is understood, whether female, or male, or child, yet possessing the use of reason.

Absolution is invalid, at least as regards the sin of complicity in a shameful matter not yet directly absolved. After that sin has been remitted by another priest, contrary to what Ball., op. c., V, 415, and Pighi, Cursus theol. mor., IV, 374, 2°, wrote, with the more common opinion we adhere to the sentence of Card. d'Ann. (III, 324, 37): "it is truer that, reservation having been consumed, the absolution is valid."

As regards the other sins of the same accomplice-person, jurisdiction does not seem to be taken away.

Noldin indeed, III, 370, now thinks a more severe response must be given, since the Canon declares invalid the absolution of the accomplice himself, and not only of the sin; but the Canon can be understood according to the preceding constitutions to which it remits. With us stand Pighi, IV, 374; Gen., II, 352; Arregui, n. 646.

Wherefore, as often as the penitent confesses in good faith, he is directly and validly absolved from the other sins, so that in a new confession he must accuse only the sin of complicity.

And the matter stands similarly if the confessor gave absolution while distracted, or did not recognize the penitent.

For which reason also, although, when the necessity of communicating or celebrating is urgent, it is much better that the accomplice dispose himself by perfect contrition rather than by making confession to the accomplice, nevertheless if he wishes to obtain security of received absolution, another confessor being lacking, he could be absolved from the other sins by the accomplice. If the latter warns the penitent concerning the confession of the sin of complicity to be repeated, he seems to escape the penalty of excommunication, concerning which immediately below. Gen., II, 352. Ball., Op. Th., V, 415, who at the same time warns that this is not to be committed outside gravest necessity. And it is plain that it is by no means becoming that one, at least who has sinned while already a priest, act as confessor of his accomplice outside necessity.

But the case of can. 884 is not had if neither knew the other before the confession. Otherwise, you would easily oblige the priest to defame himself.

Here distinguish accurately the confessor who has known the accomplice and him who has not recognized the accomplice. He who knew the accomplice outside confession, but at the beginning of confession did not recognize him, must well warn concerning the defect of his jurisdiction: for by this he falls into no infamy.

By the use of that direct absolution as to other sins, provision is made for the necessity in which the penitent can be, in mission places or even in Europe, when, for example, while the paschal precept is pressing, reception of the sacraments cannot be omitted without infamy and scandal, and he is impeded from seeking a confessor in another place. Those who, like Noldin, think jurisdiction is taken away in a universal manner, are compelled, in the same circumstances, to recur to epikeia, by which then they also permit direct absolution from the sin of complicity. Cf. Noldin, III, 371 b. This, contrary to what Ballerini insinuates, l.c., n. 424, 425, in our opinion is not to be admitted outside danger of death.

What if the penitent knows the priest-accomplice by face, but not by name, and approaches the confessional of the accomplice as of an unknown priest? The confessor ought not reveal his name. Therefore he will be able to absolve the penitent, if the latter brings other matter to be absolved, but the sin of complicity will not yet be directly absolved.

But absolution can be formal and true, although ineffective; it can be feigned or equivalently given.

— In danger of death itself, absolution of an accomplice is illicit outside the case of necessity. A case of necessity is had: if no other priest, even a simple one or one not approved for hearing confessions, either is present or can be called without grave scandal or infamy, whether certain or probable (and Ballerini, V, 422, notes that the probable suspicion itself of complicity is already gravely defaming and scandalous); if another who is present is unwilling to receive the confession of the dying or sick person, or the sick person refuses to make confession to another, so that there is danger of sacrilegious confession.

And because the question concerns a person who is endangered as to eternal salvation, that refusal of another confessor is not to be taken scrupulously; but a sick woman is already judged to refuse another confessor when, not ignorant that other confessors are available, nevertheless of her own accord she declares that she wishes such a priest (of whom she was the accomplice).

From Benedict XIV, the accomplice-confessor must under grave obligation procure that place be open to another confessor, for example by departing under some pretext, if nevertheless he can do this without his own infamy or without danger of sacrilegious confession.

If no one else is available except one notoriously suspended or excommunicated, it is not certain that this one must be preferred to the accomplice, since to employ one notoriously excommunicated is of itself very little becoming.

A well-begun confession can also be brought through to the end, whether another has arrived or the danger of death has ceased. But he who, on account of the impediment of illness, has been absolved after only an incomplete confession, will not afterward be able to complete it before the accomplice, unless the sin of complicity has already been accused with sufficient distinctness so that it was directly remitted in its species.

What if the danger of death, in which the accomplice was absolved by the priest, was merely apparent? Provided the estimation of danger was prudent, the absolution will be valid: for jurisdiction is reasonably understood to have been given for a prudently estimated danger of death.

Prudently also the Code declares the absolution illicit only on the part of the confessor, lest the penitent ever be troubled by a scruple of illicit petition.

— Penalty of Excommunication. From c. 2367, "One absolving or feigning to absolve an accomplice in a shameful sin incurs by the fact itself an excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See in a most special manner, and this even in the article of death, if another priest, though not approved for confessions, can receive the confession of the dying person without grave infamy and scandal about to arise, except the case in which the dying person refuses to confess to another."

Therefore, he is punished by excommunication who absolves, seriously, although ineffectively; who feigns to absolve, that is, not indeed he who by some gesture or some utterance of words hides from others, but not from the penitent, the absolution denied; but he who so acts that the penitent reasonably ought to think himself absolved. Whether he absolves a healthy penitent or one lying dangerously ill, he is excommunicated as often as, from what was said above, absolution then remains illicit. Yet if the priest-accomplice, by abstaining from every action, merely did not cause another priest to be able to be physically present, with attention to the words of Benedict XIV, he does not seem affected by the excommunication. Or, to use other words, there does not seem to be prescribed for the accomplice under excommunication the positive action of physically calling another priest; but only that he avoid the infamy to be feared from another priest called, and take care that place be open to him.

Nor, from §2 of c. 2367, does he escape excommunication who absolves an accomplice not accusing the sin of complicity for this reason, "because he was induced to this by the accomplice-confessor either directly or indirectly." The indirect mode will be if the priest, after the deed, persuaded the other that the sin was not grave, or that the accusation was useless because the matter was already known to him. After the deed, I say; for, with attention to the common opinion, the case is not had if, deceived by the priest, the other truly, on account of his error, does not sin gravely.

But he escapes excommunication who absolves an accomplice spontaneously concealing that sin of complicity; indeed who, to one accusing that sin with others, declared that he absolved him only from the other sins, the burden remaining of accusing that sin to another confessor (Ball., V, 415).

Much more does he escape excommunication who, in the gravest difficulty of which above, licitly confers absolution. Finally he escapes who in good faith and not doubting judged that the case was not present although in reality it was present. For excommunication supposes grave fault.

But he does not escape excommunication who sins by crass or supine ignorance, since no temerarious audacity is required; and he also will be guilty of excommunication who, by his manner of acting, for example by spontaneous and undue visitation, is to be judged to have offered himself spontaneously to the dangerously sick woman as confessor of an accomplice.

What if the priest has sacrilegiously begun to hear the confession of a sick person in danger of death, but before absolution repents of the deed? The case is objectively controverted. If he can, it seems that even then he is held by the obligation of seeing that another be summoned, and that he is excused only by the danger of graver infamy, since he himself exposed himself to the danger. Subjectively, if he thought the judgment had to be completed by himself, he will avoid guilt and excommunication.

— That excommunication is most specially reserved. Yet the penitent priest will be able to be absolved by another in the circumstances indicated above, n. 473, with the burden of recurring at least through the confessor to the Sacred Penitentiary. This burden remains, from c. 2252, after convalescence, even if he was absolved in danger of death. Indeed, from c. 2254, §3, even if in an extraordinary case recourse is impossible at present, when opportunity is given recourse will have to be made, contrary to what is disposed concerning other censures even most specially reserved. Whence this case is treated with peculiar severity.

N.B. In the letters which the confessor has given to the Sacred Penitentiary, it is necessary that you distinguish the quality of pastor or of one having care of souls from the office of mere confessor (such as even a cooperating vicar is); that you indicate whether he absolved the accomplice only once, or twice, or several times. For according to these things the mandates of the Sacred Penitentiary are accustomed to vary. Besides, it is also useful that from the beginning the confessor enjoin what afterward will be prescribed, that is, that the delinquent no longer hear the accomplice-person sacramentally, neither before the sin of complicity has been directly remitted by another confessor, as is clear of itself, nor even afterward, if nevertheless this can be done without scandal or danger of infamy; and that, if that person returns to him, he warn her concerning the nullity of the absolutions.

He who doubts whether the one confessing is his accomplice or not possesses doubtful jurisdiction. But lest he have to betray himself, he seems able to use it, and licitly impart absolution.

— I. Absolution of an accomplice in a shameful sin is forbidden.

Absolution is understood both formal and true, by a serious pronunciation of the form, and feigned, without intention or pronunciation of the form; also equivalently given, when, deceiving the penitent concerning the gravity of the sin committed or the necessity of accusing it, the priest directly or indirectly induces him to be silent about the sin.

An accomplice, according to the opinion common today, to which the Sacred Penitentiary adhered on January 22, 1879, is also the accomplice of one who afterward became a priest.

If neither of the two knew the other before confession, the case is not contained in canon 884.

Complicity says formal consent with the priest in the same sin.

In a shameful sin: whether of action, or words, or sight, which is grave as external, and, as is probable, libidinous in itself, or immediately shameful.

II. Sanction. 1. Direct absolution, given outside danger of death concerning this sin not yet sacramentally absolved, is invalid. It is illicit on the part of the priest, even when given to an accomplice in danger of death, outside necessity.

A case of necessity is had: a) if no other priest (even not approved, yet except one notoriously suspended or excommunicated) is present or willing; b) if another cannot be called without grave scandal or infamy, whether certain or probable; c) if the sick accomplice refuses to confess to another. This refusal does not seem capable of being understood rigorously, because, in that danger of death, the just severity of the Church must be reconciled with her solicitude concerning eternal salvation, which demands a confession wholly sincere and complete. But the accomplice-confessor must procure that place be open to another priest, and therefore must strive that the excuse of feared infamy be removed. Yet he does not seem compelled by any law to call another priest himself. The use of epikeia in gravest necessity is not altogether excluded by authors, for example in mission places, or when, without grave scandal, the reception of the sacraments cannot be omitted; but, in our opinion, outside danger of death, the first absolution from that sin will not be direct if it has been given by the accomplice.

2. The priest guilty of the delict is punished by excommunication latae sententiae most specially reserved to the Holy See, by which one absolving an accomplice even in danger of death is punished, if he is not excused by necessity, and therefore if he is morally to be judged to have inserted himself spontaneously into hearing that confession of the accomplice. Nor is excommunication avoided by crass or supine ignorance. One doubting whether the one confessing is an accomplice has doubtful jurisdiction, which nevertheless, lest he have to betray himself, he seems able to use.