The three conditions of mortal sin

Conditions of Mortal Sin.

313. What they are. Three things are required so that sin considered subjectively may be mortal: a. grave matter; b. full advertence; c. perfect consent. For since mortal sin produces such disastrous effects, it must be a perfectly human act concerning a grave obligation; and therefore for committing mortal sin, grave matter is required with advertence and perfect consent.

1. Grave matter, i.e. an obligation which is apprehended by the agent as grave, whether it is grave in itself or is held as grave by the agent from invincible ignorance.

Grave matter, which is altogether required for formal sin, must not be considered as it is in itself, but as it is perceived by the agent: for conscience is the proximate norm of actions. Therefore grave sin is committed when the agent apprehends the matter of his act to be grave, whether in itself it is prohibited gravely, lightly, or in no way.

314. 2. Full advertence to the grave malice of the act or to the law obliging under grave obligation. This knowledge must be full; half-full knowledge does not suffice. Yet it is not required that it be clear and distinct, but confused knowledge suffices (n. 46, 287).

From those things which were said in the treatise on the voluntary and its imputability (n. 70 ff.), it is established that, for committing sin, it suffices that the malice of the act be apprehended in the cause of the evil act: for an evil effect which is foreseen as going to follow from a voluntarily placed cause is voluntary in that cause and is imputed to the agent, even if afterward it is placed without actual advertence. Moreover, it can happen in three ways that an evil act is apprehended not in itself but only in the cause.

a. From voluntary negligence, whether in learning those things which someone is bound to know, or in applying the consideration which the matter to be done deserves: for all the defects which he commits are imputed rightly and deservedly to him who, adverting to the obligation of learning or of acting more considerately, nevertheless neglects his obligation.

b. From voluntary sin: for the evil effects which the agent foresees as going to follow from his sinful action, e.g. from drunkenness, are deservedly imputed to him.

c. From a voluntary depraved habit: for evil acts which are foreseen as going to arise from a depraved habit, e.g. of blaspheming, are deservedly imputed to him who does not try to correct the depraved habit (n. 86).

Signs of half-full advertence are:

a. If someone, occupied and distracted by another thing, only passingly and slightly apprehends the thing to be evil, or if he attends little to the sin.

b. If someone is half asleep, or half drunk, or half delirious, or not yet perfectly in possession of reason.

c. If someone is disturbed by vehement passion or by some mania.

d. If someone immediately after the deed scarcely remembers what he did.

e. If someone after the deed, weighing the matter, i.e. the habitual disposition of his soul, judges that he would not have done it if he had fully adverted.

He who indeed knows that he acts badly, but thinks nothing at all about whether the matter is grave or light, sins only venially: for a. he does not sin gravely, because he apprehends a grave obligation in no way; b. by the very fact that he does not apprehend the matter as grave, he is judged to stop at light matter, unless the matter is so certainly grave that its grave malice cannot be hidden from him.

He who doubts whether something is grave or light and, with the doubt not yet laid aside, acts, sins gravely, because he deliberately exposes himself to the danger of gravely offending God: for he knows that his action perhaps gravely offends God and nevertheless does not abstain from it.

315. 3. Full consent, which is always had whenever the will, after full advertence, adheres to a matter prohibited by law.

Consent follows advertence, so that it is full when advertence is full, and half-full when advertence is half-full. Wherefore diverse passions, especially grave fear, impede full consent and therefore mortal sin only when they impede the perfect use of reason.

Signs of half-full consent:

a. He who habitually abhors grave sin, indeed has a firm purpose rather to die than to sin mortally, is to be presumed not to have consented fully.

b. He who could easily have executed the sin exteriorly and nevertheless abstained from the sin is to be judged not to have fully consented interiorly.

c. He who, reflecting on what he did, is immediately distressed and saddened and turns himself away from depraved thoughts and desires, likewise did not give full consent.

d. He who doubts whether he consented is to be presumed not to have consented, if he is of a timorous conscience.

What sort of sin does he commit who deliberates about committing a sin, and nevertheless does not consent?

a. If the deliberation is only a certain hesitation or omission of resistance against temptation from negligence or torpor, the sin is venial. b. If the deliberation is true and full, i.e. if one, with the grave malice of the action known, seriously weighs whether he wishes to perpetrate the gravely evil matter or not, he sins gravely. For hesitating whether to prefer God or the creature, he compares God with the creature. The sin is of the same gravity and species as that about which he deliberates.¹

Note. From the signs of full and half-full consent it is gathered what the confessor ought to ask in order to know whether, in a doubt concerning consent, grave sin was committed. Not rarely the confessor will not be able to form a certain judgment concerning the gravity of the sin committed by the penitent, so that the matter must be left to the judgment of God.

¹ Croix, l. 5, n. 229.

316. A sin grave from its genus can in the individual become light. A sin grave from its genus is ordinarily also mortal in the individual; but sometimes, from defect of a required condition, a sin mortal from its genus becomes light in the individual accidentally:

1. From imperfection of the act: for since full advertence and full consent are required for mortal sin, if one of these is lacking and only imperfect advertence or imperfect consent is had, the sin will be venial.

2. From smallness of matter: namely, where a precept grave of itself is violated only in a light matter, the sin cannot be grave, because grave sin of itself necessarily also demands grave matter.

3. From an excusing cause: namely, if the excusing cause indeed does not suffice to exempt altogether from sin, nevertheless it is such as at least excuses from mortal sin. Thus grave inconvenience altogether excuses from hearing Mass or from fasting, but inconvenience not so grave can at least excuse from mortal sin and makes the transgression venial.

4. From erroneous conscience, which invincibly judges something to be venial sin which in reality is mortal: for just as an invincibly erroneous conscience excuses from every sin, so also it excuses from grave sin.

Conditions of Venial Sin.

317. What they are. Also for venial sin considered subjectively three things are required:

1. Light matter, i.e. an obligation which is apprehended by the agent as light, whether it is light in itself or is held as light from invincible ignorance.

2. At least half-full advertence to the malice of the action.

3. At least half-full consent to the evil thing.

a. But if the matter is light in itself, advertence and consent can be a perfectly human act, yet the sin is nothing except venial. If advertence is half-full, whatever the matter may be, the sin will be venial.

b. Sins which are committed with half-full advertence and half-full consent are customarily called half-deliberate sins, which therefore even in grave matter are venial from imperfection of the act.

c. Indeliberate sins, if this word is taken strictly, cannot be true sins. But if nevertheless the nature of sin is attributed to them, they must be conceived in such a way "that the action itself, which is denominated sin, was done in itself with no advertence, as distraction in prayer, but proceeded from some preceding negligence," so that the action is a sin not in itself but in the cause.¹

¹ Lehmkuhl I, n. 221.

318. A sin light from its genus can in the individual become grave:

1. By reason of an erroneous conscience, by which someone holds a light sin for grave: for then he freely consents to a thing which he apprehends as gravely evil. Therefore children who hold every lie or theft, even of a light thing, as a grave sin not rarely sin gravely from an erroneous conscience.

2. By reason of a gravely evil end. Thus theft of a light thing perpetrated for committing homicide is a grave sin, not indeed on account of an injury in goods of fortune, but on account of the intention of committing homicide: for the means participates in the malice of the end; but the end is gravely evil.

He who, from the intention of gradually arriving at a grave quantity, in repeated instances steals some small amount, or who, from the intention of violating the fast, often eats some small amount, sins gravely in the individual acts: for the intended end is gravely evil; but the means which are applied to the end participate in the malice of the end; therefore the individual acts have grave malice. Nevertheless the individual acts, by reason of the intention from which they proceed and by which they are informed, are gathered into moral unity and morally constitute one sin, unless they are acts plainly independent of one another.

3. By reason of grave scandal which is foreseen as going to arise from a venial sin. Thus the venial levities of a priest before seculars, and the venially evil words of parents before children, can become grave sin on account of scandal.

4. By reason of formal contempt, whether of law or of the legislator: for he who transgresses a law from formal contempt contemns the legislative power itself; but he who contemns this, although in only a light matter, inflicts grave injury upon God and his ordination.

A twofold contempt of law or of the legislator must be distinguished: formal, by which the law or legislator as such, namely his authority, is contemned; and material, by which the matter of the law, e.g. as of light moment, as inept for the end, as unjust, or the legislator as man, e.g. as imprudent or wicked, is contemned. Therefore he sins from formal contempt who transgresses the law because he does not wish to be subject to the law or to the legislator, or precisely because it is commanded. To violate the law from material contempt of the precept or of the human one prescribing is ordinarily a light sin; but to violate the law from material contempt of divine law or of the divine legislator is a grave sin.

5. By reason of proximate danger of falling into grave sin, if by sinning lightly someone exposes himself to such danger: for by the same obligation by which we are held to avoid sin, we are also held to avoid its proximate danger. Thus he who seeks lightly prohibited conversation with companions, in which for the most part he sins gravely, by exposing himself to the danger of grave sin sins gravely.

6. By reason of excessive affection toward some thing, as if someone is so affected toward a game that he is actually prepared rather to offend God gravely, e.g. to omit Mass on a feast day, than to abstain from the game. Not the vehemence of the passion by which he adheres to the game is a grave sin, but the evil disposition by which he is prepared to prefer the creature to God, if indeed that disposition has passed into act.

7. By reason of matter coalescing with the matter of other venial sins, concerning which matter there is the following question.

Note. From the objective gravity of sin must be distinguished the subjective gravity of sin. For judging this gravity, namely, not only objective elements but also subjective ones must be considered, such as ignorance, infirmity, fear, contempt, etc., which in a determined subject can increase or diminish the malice of sin. It not rarely happens that the subjective gravity of sin is far distant from its objective gravity. In the practice of confession, attention must especially be paid to those circumstances which make a sin grave in itself light. Ordinarily, indeed, sins grave in themselves are also grave subjectively; but sometimes those which are grave in themselves and objectively become light subjectively, or at least do not have the same degree of malice in the subject which they have in themselves, because they are committed from ignorance, from infirmity, from fear, from shame, etc., all of which diminish moral malice.

319. Whether several venial sins constitute mortal sin.

1. Venial sins by multiplication alone, however great, never constitute mortal sin unless their matter coalesces: for number alone does not change the essence of sin; but between mortal and venial sin there is an essential difference.

a. Therefore a priest who in recitation of the office daily omits one psalm, even if in the course of the year the omissions are many, sins only venially; and if at the beginning of the year he proposes daily to omit a psalm, this purpose does not exceed venial sin: for the purpose does not have greater malice than the acts intended through the purpose, which individually are venial and are not united with one another.

b. Therefore a master who on a feast day enjoins thirty servants to the labor of one hour sins only venially: for the acts of the individuals do not morally coalesce.

c. Therefore he who proposes to avoid only mortal sins, not caring about venial sins, indeed he who proposes to commit all venial sins which occur, by this will of itself does not exceed venial fault: for the malice of this purpose of itself is taken from the object; but its object is constituted by venial sins alone. It is said of itself because accidentally there can be joined with this purpose of the will a danger of sinning gravely; but to will this danger, known as such, would be a grave sin.

2. Venial sins multiplied by reason of coalescing matter or by reason of an effect caused can constitute mortal sin, with advertence nevertheless supposed to grave matter or to an effect prohibited under grave obligation.

He who, without the intention of gathering a grave quantity, in repeated instances steals some small amount, sins gravely when, with advertence to the grave effect, he steals the quantity which completes grave matter: for although the matter of that theft, considered in itself and absolutely, is light, nevertheless together with the preceding things with which it coalesces it completes and constitutes grave matter. But the thief, before the last theft, adverting as supposed to grave matter and grave damage, by that small theft consents to grave sin. By equal reason a priest who in different hours of the same office omits some small amount sins mortally by that omission which completes grave matter, if he adverts to the gravity of the matter.

With reference to the gravity of its malice, sin is divided into mortal and venial. Holy Scripture teaches us that there are certain sins which exclude from the kingdom of God,¹ and, on the other hand, that the just, even while they remain just, frequently fall into slight faults.² The same truth is taught by the Church. There are, then, mortal and venial sins.

The essence of mortal sin consists in turning aside from God, our last end, and virtually placing our supreme happiness in some created good. But our last end is the vital and guiding principle of moral conduct, and to throw that aside is to make complete shipwreck of the moral life. It is not merely to wander out of the direct path, as is done by committing venial sin; however much this is done, if the ship be kept moving toward the port, it will come to harbour at last; but if the ship be steered altogether away from the port, it will never get there. By committing mortal sin, then, we turn away from God, our last end; we rob our souls of the sanctifying grace of God which is their life, and we incur liability to eternal separation from God and punishment in hell. Venial sin is indeed an offence against God, but it does not turn the soul away from him, nor rob it of his sanctifying grace; and it is more easily pardoned than mortal sin.

¹ Prov. xxiv 16; Jas. iii 2.

² Trent, sess. 14, C. 5.

Mortal sin is sin in the fullest and most complete sense; it is an act of consummate wickedness. A bad act must have three conditions in order to be mortally sinful:

(a) There must be full advertence to the grave malice of the act. A child that has not yet attained the full use of reason, a person half asleep, or half drunk, or half-witted, cannot know and appreciate sufficiently the malice of mortal sin, and so cannot commit it. , It is not, however, necessary to reflect explicitly on God; or on the grave wickedness contained in the act in order to sin mortally. It will be sufficient if one who has the full use of reason consciously does what 1 x Cor. vi 9. he knows to be seriously wrong, although there is no actual weighing of motives for doing or avoiding the act, no actual thought of God, no explicit calling to mind of the terrible consequences of mortal sin. Men who never think of God from morning till night, men who do not believe in hell, certainly commit mortal sins when they do what their consciences tell them is seriously wrong. Their conscience, as we saw above, is the voice of God.

(b) Besides advertence of the mind to the malice of the act, there must be full and free consent of the will to do it. If a man does not give full consent, but only dallies with the temptation, there is venial but not mortal sin; if, through being only half conscious or partially deranged, he has not full control over his will, he cannot be guilty of mortal sin.

After a temptation to sin is over, the conscience is sometimes uncertain and troubled as to whether full consent was given to sin. Often one may form one’s conscience on the point by reflecting whether he was fully awake or conscious of what he was doing, whether the sinful act to which temptation impelled him was executed if there was the opportunity of doing so. If doubt remains, it should be settled by presumptions drawn from what usually happens. If he usually yields to such temptations, the presumption is that he did so on this doubtful occasion; the presumption is in his favour if he does not usually yield consent.

(c) The object or the matter to which consent is given must be seriously against the moral law in order that a sin may be mortal.

The matter is serious as a rule when the sin committed is directly against our duty to God, as blasphemy, heresy, hatred of God, idolatry, despair of God’s mercy.

The matter is also serious when the sin causes great harm to our neighbour, as do sins against justice, charity, and obedience.

When sins cause great harm to the sinner himself the matter will also be serious and the sins mortal. This is the case with sins of intemperance and lust.

There are two opinions about the estimation of the property loss.

(a) Thus, an older opinion held that the standard should be an absolute one, that is, that the loss should be determined independently of the wealth or poverty of the person injured, since the financial situation of this person is a purely extrinsic circumstance of the theft. The rich man has just as much right to his $10 as the poor man has to his $10, and it is therefore just as injurious to deprive the former of the sum as it is to deprive the latter. What is a mortal theft in one case is a mortal theft in every case.

(b) A later opinion, which seems to be the common one today, distinguishes two standards: an absolute one, which fixes one highest amount that is always grave matter on account of its magnitude, however wealthy the loser may be, and a relative one, which proposes a scale of lower amounts that are grave matter on account of the economic condition of the persons stolen from. It is argued that a relative standard should be set up, since the injury of theft is certainly felt more by those who have less means to fall back on; and that an absolute standard is also necessary, since without it the property of the rich would not be sufficiently safeguarded and the peace and order of society would be endangered.

Opinions on the Amounts that Are Grave Matter.—(a) The older opinion, according to which there is only one invariable standard for all classes and conditions, regards as grave matter the amount necessary to support for a day, according to his state and obligations, a man whose financial condition is midway between wealth and poverty; for the loss of a day’s support is usually looked on as a serious loss, and a standard for all should be taken from the average. This daily support amount may be reckoned from the amount of daily wages or income. In the United States in 1955 the average daily wage was between $14 and $15, but, if only skilled laborers or those who are in moderately prosperous circumstances are considered, the average would be considerable higher. Perhaps it would range between $25 and $30. Or if we strike a medium between the highest and the lowest figures given by the advocates of two standards, we should arrive at approximately $30 or $35.

(b) The common opinion today fixes the absolute amount, which is grave matter even when theft is from the wealthiest person or society as the equivalent of a week’s wages for the head of a family living in fairly good circumstances but dependent upon his work for its support. As to the actual amount, authors differ. Thus, Father Francis Connell, C.SS.R., wrote in 1945 in American Ecclesiastical Review (p. 69): “To lay down a general norm in view of actual conditions and value of money, it would seem that the actual sum for grave theft would be about $40.” In 1946, writing in the Homiletic and Pastoral Review (p. 694), Father Joseph Donovan, C.M., stated: “It is hard to see how less than $100 could be absolutely grave with the chances of a higher amount being probably so.”[*] This sum was criticized as being excessive and did not meet with ready acceptance by all moral theologians. On page 127 of the third printing of his Outlines of Moral Theology (1955), Father Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., suggested $75 as a reasonable absolute sum considering the value of money at the time, and, as a practical norm, the sum has been acceptable to most confessors and authors. Relatively grave matter corresponds with the amount needed to support a worker and his family for a day or, according to some, the amount required for the support of the worker alone. Relatively grave matter would range from about $5 from a poor person on relief, through $20-$35 from skilled laborers and persons in comfortable circumstances, to $75 from the wealthy. The latter sum constitutes the absolute standard. For a general norm to establish relatively grave matter, then, an acceptable procedure is to take the daily earning power or expenses of those who do not belong to the wealthiest classes, but who just barely make a living by reason of their work or charity.

[*] This is not to suggest that the authors cited hold to the “week’s pay norm” as the standard. Father Connell, for example, defines the absolute as “a sum which is so large that society would suffer much if it could be stolen without grave sin even from the richest or from a wealthy corporation” (op. cit., pp. 127-128). The interest in citing the authors is to show the precise sums suggested by them at various times regardless of the norm used in arriving at the particular amount suggested.

472. 1. Grave matter: but this can be such by reason of the object or circumstances, from what was said above, n. 144-146 and 158-161. - But what matter is grave can be defined both by authority and by reason.

(A) By authority. (a) We have already said that from Scripture it can be discerned that certain sins are mortal, namely those which are said to exclude from the kingdom of heaven, to be worthy of death or eternal damnation, execrable, abominable, etc. (b) The same can be gathered from the decrees of Councils, Pontiffs, or Congregations, or from the common doctrine of the Fathers and theologians, or from the common sense of the faithful. In this matter it must be noted that there has been some progress, so that the catalogue of sins today is longer than in the first times of the Church; this indeed happened not so much from an authentic declaration of the Pontiffs, who have very rarely pronounced concerning the gravity of sin, as from the common sense of doctors or of the faithful, and from the progressive education of Christian conscience.

473. (B) By reason: for this, since it is a certain participation in divine reason, judges concerning the morality of human acts, and therefore concerning the gravity of sins. The general principle is that that sin is to be held as mortal which imports a grave disorder with regard to God, society, oneself, or neighbor. Thus mortal of themselves are:

(a) Sins which inflict grave injury upon God or His divine attributes, such as infidelity, apostasy, despair, hatred of God, blasphemy, irreligion. (b) Sins which induce grave harm to the human race or to society, for example, fornication, rebellion against legitimate authority, all those things which foster discords among the various orders of citizens. (c) Sins which are so opposed to charity or justice toward oneself or neighbor that they bring notable detriment; thus, for example, suicide, homicide, theft of some moment, hatred of neighbor, detractions and calumnies which greatly injure reputation, etc.

Certain sins are called grave from their whole genus, when namely they admit no smallness of matter, for example, apostasy, hatred of God, blasphemy; these are always mortal of themselves, nor can they become light except by defect of full deliberation or full consent. But others are grave from their genus, insofar as of themselves they have it that they can be grave, yet in such a way that they are venial not only from defect of full deliberation or consent, but also from smallness of matter; for example, theft, detraction, etc.

474. 2. Full advertence, namely that which a man fully master of himself is accustomed to apply to a business of great moment; for when the matter concerns the loss of eternal salvation, or turning away from the ultimate end, semiplene advertence does not suffice, such as exists in one half-asleep or in him who is distracted by another matter. Therefore it is required that the action be clearly apprehended or clearly suspected as illicit, and indeed gravely so: for if this appears only confusedly and obscurely, it cannot be said that the sinner wills, explicitly or implicitly, to turn himself away from God.¹ Yet it is not necessary that someone again and again, for a long time, maturely and reflexively consider the matter as prohibited by God under grave penalty; but it suffices to perceive the act clearly and directly, even for a brief time, as gravely illicit.

¹ Vieux Moraliste, Peche precis et peche vague, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XX, 1898, p. 1025-1030.

Hence they lack full advertence, and therefore do not sin gravely: (a) the half-asleep, the half-drunk, or all those who are not truly masters of themselves; (b) those who, occupied and distracted by another matter, give only slight attention to the action which they perform; (c) those who, by vehement passion, or agitation of the nerves, or another physical disease or pathological state (above, n. 128-135), are so disturbed that they attend to the matter only imperfectly; (d) those who immediately or a little after the fact, weighing its malice more attentively, judge that they would not have acted so if they had seriously thought beforehand; and a fortiori if they scarcely remember what they did.

475. 3. Full consent, that is, that which follows full advertence, and at the same time is offered with that liberty which a matter of great moment requires. For this liberty it is not necessary that the agent be immune from passion or fear, but it suffices that, notwithstanding vehement passion or fear, he is able to deliberate and choose maturely: thus he is not excused from grave sin who, from fear of death, externally denies the faith, or, in order to preserve a public office, deliberately, although reluctantly, commits injustice.

But in doubt whether someone has fully consented, these can be held as signs of imperfect consent: (a) he who habitually abhors mortal sin, and therefore is of a fearful conscience, so that he is prepared rather to die than to sin gravely, is to be presumed not to have fully consented. (b) He who experienced some desire of doing evil, and abstained from external sin, while an easy occasion of sinning externally presented itself, is generally to be judged not to have offered full consent. (c) The same can be said of him who, as soon as he fully adverted to the temptation, repelled it; or is anguished or saddened concerning depraved thoughts or desires which invade his mind, even if they have remained for a long time.

476. Corollaries. (A) Therefore it can happen that an action objectively gravely sinful is not mortal sin:

(a) From defect of full advertence or full consent from the things said above; (b) from invincibly erroneous conscience, when namely someone in good faith thinks that the action is only lightly evil; (c) from an excusing cause, when the matter concerns some law, from whose fulfillment sufficient reason can excuse; for example, grave inconvenience excuses altogether from hearing Mass on a feast day, and an inconvenience not so grave can excuse from mortal sin, if not from venial.

477. (B) On the contrary, a sin light from its genus can become grave:

(a) From erroneous conscience, when the agent holds a venial sin as grave, for example, a minute theft; (b) from a gravely evil end, if someone, for example, steals a thing of slight price for committing homicide: for the means which is ordered to a gravely evil end participates in the grave malice of the end itself; for the same reason, he sins mortally who adheres to a thing prohibited only under light sin, yet in such a way that he is prepared rather to offend God gravely than to bid farewell to the thing; (c) by reason of scandal, when it is morally certain that grave scandal will arise from a sin otherwise venial, for example, if a priest acts so lightly that he offers grave scandal to laymen; (d) by reason of danger, if someone, by sinning venially (for example, by idle conversation), foresees that he is going to fall into grave temptation; (e) by reason of contempt, when someone violates the law in light matter, but with the intention of manifesting contempt toward the law or the legislator: which nevertheless occurs very rarely; (f) by reason of matter coalescing, when matters, small of themselves, are so ordered to making some one moral whole that they effect a notable transgression of the same precept; thus sometimes minute thefts coalesce into one and constitute mortal sin, as is declared in the Treatise on Justice, n. 440-444.

478. (C) Since it is very difficult in practice to define whether some sin is mortal, all circumstances having been attended to, and especially the psychological dispositions of the agent, let the confessor not be prone to judging easily that such or such an action is gravely evil, unless this is sufficiently evident.¹ Often he will prudently recognize that the matter is doubtful, and leave it to divine judgment; but he will be solicitous about exciting contrition in the heart of the penitent, and will urgently exhort him to strive to abstain from every deliberate sin.

¹ Cf. Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XX, 1898, p. 1029.

1. THE LEADING CRITERIA. —As mortal sins are necessary matter for confession (materia necessaria), the penitent who enters the sacred tribunal must be able to distinguish them with comparative certainty from venial sins. For this purpose Catholic moralists have established the following criteria: a) KNOWLEDGE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRECEPT TRANSGRESSED. —If the precept is of great importance for the moral and social order (materia gravis), and its transgression is likely to entail serious consequences, the sin is grievous (peccatum grave). If, on the other hand, the precept is unimportant (materia parva), and the matter divisible, the sin is light. Note, however, (1) that this objective distinction between serious and light sin is not identical with the distinction between mortal and venial sin, 29 for subjectively or individually a grievous sin may be venial and a venial sin mortal, whereas a grievous sin per se can never be light nor a mortal sin venial. (2) Some precepts and some sins, e. g., simony, blasphemy, murder, fornication, violation of the seal of confession, are essentially indivisible and therefore do not admit of parvitas materiae. (3) The decision regarding the cessation of parvitas materiae or the beginning of a grievous sin is always more or less arbitrary. (4) When a sin is materially grievous, the presumption is that it is a mortal sin, and vice versa.

b) THE DEGREE OF ADVERTENCE REQUIRED FOR A MORTAL SIN. —No one who is unconscious can sin, and one who is half asleep, or partly intoxicated, or feeble-minded, cannot sufficiently appreciate the malice of mortal sin to be guilty of it.¹

¹ Cfr. Matth. XXV, 26; Jas. IV, 17; cfr. Gen. XIX, 33-35; XX, 4-6.

However, to be guilty of mortal sin, a man need not reflect explicitly on the malice of the contemplated act or be fully aware of the importance of the law transgressed. It is sufficient for him to know that the act is sinful. Culpable ignorance, therefore, when it results in the commission of a grievous sin, does not excuse from guilt. Still less is it necessary to commit the sinful act with the full consciousness of offending God. Some writers have construed a distinction between philosophical and theological sin. They define the former as an act contrary to rea- son and the natural law, but involving no conscious violation of a divine precept, and hold that it may be grievous, but never mortal. This theory has been formally condemned by the Church.²

² Prop. Damnat. ab Alexandra VIII. (Aug. 24, 1690), n. 2 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1290).

c) THE FREE CONSENT OF THE WILL. —To make an act mortally sinful, the will must give its full and free consent. This consent need not, however, involve the actual and direct intention of transgressing the moral law. All that is required is that it be full and free.³

³ Cfr. Gury, Compendium Theol. Moralis, Vol. I, n. 150: "For mortal sin three things are necessarily required: (1) matter grave in itself or because of circumstances; (2) full advertence to the malice of the act; (3) full consent of the will to the transgression." —Ibid., n. 153: "For venial sin some advertence, however slight, to the malice and some consent, however imperfect, of the will are required and suffice: they are required because, if they are removed, there can be no knowledge and willing of evil and therefore no sin; but they suffice because, when they are present, the knowledge and willing of evil necessary to constitute sin are present in some manner."

Mortal sin, as we have seen, is a complete turning away from God to the creature. No act is mortally sinful unless the agent clearly perceives its true character and gives full consent. By committing a mortal sin man renders himself guilty of eternal damnation. Now it would be contrary to the goodness and mercy of God to condemn a man to eternal punishment on account of a slight transgression or for an act which was not entirely free or wilful.⁴

⁴ Op. cit.r n. 150: "Full advertence and full consent are required because, since through mortal sin man totally withdraws from God so as to adhere wholly to creatures, this cannot occur unless the sinner deliberately prefers the object of sin to God and absolutely wills to establish his ultimate end in it. Moreover, it is wholly foreign to divine goodness to condemn a man to eternal damnation either for a slight transgression or for an act that is not perfectly free and voluntary."

Order of speaking. First we shall treat of actual sin, then of habitual sin, then briefly of the guilt of fault and punishment.

In order we shall hand down its notion and demonstration; its psychological explanation; its definition and conditions. Then we shall complete the doctrine with various considerations concerning sin of omission, concerning the unequal gravity of sins, even mortal ones, and concerning the physical order to which sin pertains.

— I. Notion and demonstration of mortal sin. Sin is called mortal insofar as it closes the way to eternal life for the sinner.

That there are sins of this sort is made clear splendidly from Sacred Scripture itself. The goats who, in the solemn judgment, will be placed on the left of the Judge, who as cursed will depart into eternal fire, are certainly guilty of mortal sin ¹. Judas committed mortal sin, concerning whom the Lord says: "Woe to that man by whom the Son of Man shall be betrayed" (2). When pagan iniquities have been enumerated, St. Paul directly pronounces worthy of death those who do such things: "and not only those who do them, but also those who consent to those doing them" (3). "Neither fornicators, nor servants of idols, nor adulterers, etc. shall possess the kingdom of God" (4). "Sin," says St. James (5), "when it is consummated, generates death."

The testimonies of tradition are also most open, so that there is no need to linger in alleging the Fathers. Innocent III (6) says without hesitation: "The actual punishment of sin is the perpetual torment of Gehenna." Two ecumenical councils, Lyons II and Florence, have these words: "The souls of those who depart in actual mortal sin, or with original sin alone, immediately descend into hell, yet to be punished with unequal punishments (7)." Between each council, Benedict XII, Constitution of January 29, 1336: "We define that according to the common ordination of God, the souls of those departing in actual mortal sin, immediately after their death descend to hell, where they are tormented by infernal punishments" (Denz. 531).

St. Thomas elegantly proposes the reason in this way: "Wherever there is some due order to an end, it is necessary that that order lead to the end; but departure from the order excludes the end; for those things which are from the end receive necessity from the end, namely that they must be, if the end ought to follow, and with those things existing without impediment, the end follows. But God has imposed on the acts of men some order in respect to the end of good, as is clear from the things said above. Therefore it is necessary that, if that order has been rightly placed, those proceeding through that order obtain the end of good, which is to be rewarded; but those departing from that order through sin be excluded from the end of good, which is to be punished" (C. Gent. III, c. 140). Since the Holy Doctor treats in that place of punishment in general, it must be completed by the following, where, treating of the punishment due to mortal and venial sin, he has these words: "Man through works of virtues, in which chiefly there is the intention of the due end, attains his ultimate end, which is happiness. If therefore he acts in something against virtue, turned away from the intention of the ultimate end, it is fitting that he be deprived of the ultimate end" (C. G. III, c. 143).

¹ St. Matt. 25, 31-46. - (2) St. Matt. 26, 21; and St. Mark 14, 21. - (3) Rom. 1, 32. - (4) 1 Cor. 6, 9-10. And he repeats the same, to Gal. 5, 19-21. - (5) Jas. 1, 15. - (6) Denz. n. 410. - (7) Denz. 464 and 603.

— II. Psychological explanation. If we contemplated God in himself and the rest in God, we should see, by clear intuition, that our happiness cannot be separated from the observed moral order or law of God; and that by one and the same way one arrives at God, at Good, at Beatitude. But now that immediate evidence is lacking to us; and mediate evidence is not so strong or stable that it prevents every deception. Therefore it happens that a certain enjoyment contrary to that order or to that law seems to be appetible, an element of beatitude, and can be proposed to us as to be chosen here and now, as better for us than the preserved order itself. Yet at the same time we are conscious of the permanent necessity or obligation, whatever detriment must be borne, of remaining in the moral order, of choosing nothing which is contrary to honorable good. Therefore the opposite election is demonstrated to contain rejection of honorable good, and, as much as lies on the part of the one choosing, renunciation of the ultimate end or God, to whom the preserved order is related as a necessary means.

Therefore in him who follows the practical judgment of choosing in favor of an enjoyment contrary to the order of honesty, there appears error and imprudence of judgment, malice of the will which embraces it, practical desertion of the way which leads to eternal life, offense of God, who guards the moral order; so that the man sinning at the same time errs, sins, dies spiritually, and turns himself away from God.

Nevertheless, in the present order, since a good relation to God is preserved in habitual grace, which is formally our supernatural life, the spiritual death of the soul says the removal of grace, which God alone can infuse and withdraw. But from the man abusing his liberty and turning himself badly to creatures, God in very truth removes grace, and man spiritually dies.

— III. Definition. By this very explanation, this twofold definition of sin is proved true: one of which is taken from the side of voluntariness or conversion to commutable good, that is, changeable because finite; the other from the side of incommutable good (God):

"Something done or said or desired against the eternal law" ¹.

A turning away from God, the ultimate end, through voluntary conversion to commutable good.

By the former reason, that which is voluntary of itself is considered directly; by the latter, that which is evil of itself. And because it concerns an act of the will, the use of the former definition is more important ².

In this former definition, the words "against the law of God" imply that aversion from God from which the other definition takes its beginning.

Nor can it be objected against the definitions that they suppose an act, whereas sin is also committed by omission. For we conceive omission after the manner of a being, and the omission thus conceived is proposed to the will as an object which can agree with the law or plainly repugn the law. "Just as acting is imputed to a man unto sin because it is opposed to a negative precept of law, so also not acting itself, because it is opposed to an affirmative precept" (St. Thomas, De malo, q. 2, art. 1 c. Cf. the things already said concerning human acts).

¹ St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, l. 22, c. 27 (P. L. 42, 413).

² Cf. Summa, 1, 2, q. 72, art. 6.

— IV. Conditions of mortal sin. In order that mortal sin be committed, it is required and suffices that with advertence to malice, to malice which at least confusedly is apprehended as grave, there be joined consent perfectly free, with that intrinsic perfection which leaves the unencumbered use of the higher faculties. Cf. things said above, n. 41.

But the malice which is apprehended as grave can be either that of the transgression itself, which is known in itself to be grave, or that of imprudence, omitting due inquiry in a grave matter.

A doubt concerning grave sin committed will generally have to be solved from presumptions. This presumption is drawn from the habitual disposition of the agent and from the object, which at first sight appears light or notable.

Concerning each element, that is, concerning the object of the act, which is as it were the matter, and concerning consent, by which the sin is informed, and which depends, in a sane and wakeful man, on advertence, it seems that one must speak separately.

— On grave matter. 1. With respect to gravity, they distinguish matter grave from its whole genus, where none can be judged small, because the notion of grave disorder is found in the whole genus: blasphemy, venereal delight; and matter grave from its genus, in whose genus, grave of itself, grave malice can be absent because of the slightness of the matter. Finally there is matter light from its genus: this does not become grave unless a circumstance is added which changes the species.

2. Whence will grave matter be recognized? Let us distinguish internal criteria from external:

a) Concerning internal criteria. That by which matter is ultimately or formally constituted grave is the will of God commanding or prohibiting under grave obligation. But because the most wise God bears a will adapted to the essences of things, thence it is permitted to us to attempt a more intimate exploration. And the precepts of natural law are to be discerned from positive precepts. With respect to natural law (which we take as its precepts are now the object of supernatural observance), the criterion is offered to us by the very order of things. For if the observance of the essential order is a connatural condition of eternal life, every substantial violation of that order will be grave matter. But there is a threefold essential order to be observed by us: order toward God, order toward neighbor, order in ourselves.

Our order toward God is one of subjection; toward neighbor, it is one of equality, by which we are forbidden to violate his person either in himself or in his things, and of proximity, by which he must be loved by us as "another I." In ourselves order demands that, content with useful dominion of our person and of our faculties, we make no act of perfect dominion over them, but that in ourselves we venerate God, parents, and fatherland as our authors. Hence we cannot pervert the subordination of our faculties. Whatever, therefore, cannot be composed with that order thus explained, but either simply denies it or is opposed to it by so great a relation of contrariety, will be the object of grave sin.

Hence, in the order toward God, the violation will be substantial which is not only about the mode of honoring, of worshiping God (as voluntary distraction in prayer), but denies God, or his attribute, or worship itself, at least by a transient act. Wherefore there is no slightness of matter in sins directly against God or a divine attribute, for example, in those which are directly opposed to the theological virtues: heresy, despair, hatred of God; nor in blasphemy, in an assertory oath, superstition, simony of natural right.

In the order toward neighbor, substantial will be every violation which is notably harmful to the neighbor in a matter of which he is not master, or which induces a just and grave offense of him.

In the order toward the agent himself, substantial will be every direct disposal of himself or of his faculty, since these are opposed to the divine dominion of our person. This usurpation can be committed by physical destruction of oneself (suicide) or of a faculty (mutilation), or by moral abuse through acts which are against the order of the whole faculty. Since this abuse is present in every venereal delight directly sought outside marriage, therefore in that luxury there is not given light matter.

N.B. The customary words "grave matter" suggest a quantitative estimation, which, when natural law is being treated, is never formal, nor can it always be applied. For even in commutative justice itself, where, when external things are treated, quantity is truly considered, theft nevertheless is not grave precisely because it is of such a quantity, but because, on account of such a quantity, the neighbor is judged reasonably and gravely unwilling, so that the order toward him is substantially violated. But in the matter of chastity, that quantitative consideration has caused many to experience such difficulty in admitting the gravity of every lustful lewdness outside marriage, indeed of every fornication; it was also the cause why they fled to extrinsic reasons of danger of hallucination and abuse. But then the malice does not seem now intrinsic, which nevertheless is demanded by reason of the violation of nature. And that extrinsic reason is laboriously demonstrated to be universal.

Because the end of every law is charity, this other form also is proved: "Mortal from its genus is that which of itself harms the charity of God, or of neighbor with respect to persons, things, or rights, or gravely corrupts ourselves" ¹.

When positive law is being treated, this imposes an order not essential of itself, whose observance therefore is less immediately joined with the end of man. Wherefore here the consideration of the moment of the end and of the relation of the thing to that end becomes more formal. This is especially true of human law. In order that this law can obligate gravely, it is required that the law contribute notably to the common good, and that its violation notably harm that end, at least if it were multiplied. For a law can impede that multiplication by a grave prohibition.

The things thus far explained will be illustrated and completed by notions concerning venial sin.

b) Concerning external criteria. Although the principle of distinguishing mortal sin from venial, taken from contrariety to the orders of charity ², is not hidden from man, nevertheless it surpasses human art, as if from the intrinsic nature, to define concerning individual sins whether they are mortal or venial, so that St. Augustine confesses that he had labored in vain to discern all grave sins from light ones ³. And St. Thomas: "Every question in which mortal sin is being asked about, unless expressed truth is had, is determined dangerously" ⁴. Therefore St. Augustine advised this: "Let us not bring deceitful scales, on which we weigh what we will and how we will, saying according to our own judgment: this is grave, this is light; but let us bring the divine scale from the holy Scriptures, as from the treasuries of the Lord, and on it weigh what is graver; indeed let us not weigh it, but recognize things weighed by the Lord" (De baptismo, l. 2, c. 6, n. 9. P. L. 43, 132).

Furthermore, the positive will of God must be viewed, which certainly in many matters, through a precept made for a grave end, can as it were complete the gravity of the matter. Hence also Augustine: "There are some things which would be thought very light, unless they were shown in the Scriptures to be grave beyond opinion" (Enchir. c. 79. P. L. 40, 270).

Wherefore a threefold criterion of distinction is customarily handed down: Sacred Scripture, which is judged to condemn an action as mortal when it declares it "to be worthy of death," or "to exclude from the kingdom," or "to be execrable and abominable," or marks it with similar words. (Cf. Suarez, ad 1, 2, Tr. 5, Disp. 2, s. 5, n. 19.) - The accepted opinion of the Fathers and Doctors, for in a moral matter authority is of very great value. - The judgment of reason, according to the things which we have just said.

But in the absence of certain proof, matter is not to be pronounced grave. St. Raymond had already warned: "One thing I counsel, that you not be too prone to judge mortal sins, where it is not established for you by certain Scripture... otherwise men could be induced into despair ¹."

But St. Alphonsus confirms by authorities and reasons the danger of rash condemnation: for those men whom you easily condemn of mortal sin in actions in which grave malice does not appear to evident reason, those same men you make exposed to the danger of eternal damnation.

¹ Busembaum from Azor, p. 1, l. 1, c. 9; and Sanchez, Decal., L. 1, c. 1, n. 4. And cf. St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 88, art. 2.

² Cf. the Summa, 1, 2, q. 88, art. 2 c.

³ "What are those very sins which so impede arrival at the kingdom of God that nevertheless they obtain indulgence by the merits of the saints, is most difficult to find, most dangerous to define. I certainly, up to this time, although I have labored about this matter, have not been able to arrive at the investigation of them." (Civ. Dei, L. 21, c. 27, n. 5. P. L. 41, 750. Cf. also Enchiridion, c. 73.)

⁴ Quodlibet 9, art. 16.

¹ Summa, L. 3, De Poenitentia et remissione, § 21.

— On advertence. Actual advertence to malice is required. It does not suffice that a man could and ought to have adverted. But he who, conscious, has omitted the obligation of adverting, then, in the cause, becomes guilty of the evil effects which he foresaw at least confusedly.

It is not required, however, that advertence endure as long as the sinful action endures, but it is enough that it was present at the beginning of the action, indeed before it was begun, when the sinner willed to begin and complete it: as one who proposes to drink until drunkenness, or to take that quantity from which he knows drunkenness will follow. Nor is distinct advertence to malice demanded, but consciousness of a gravely evil thing in the confused sense suffices. Nor must there be explicit attention to God's offense, since philosophical sin is not given. And reflex attention is not required; direct cognition which is drawn from habitual knowledge suffices. Nevertheless perfect apprehension of substantial malice is necessary; but concerning a special circumstance habitually known it is said to be enough that it be present to the intellect in a subconscious or confused way.

Here there is need of a certain discretion. Of itself (with a special reason set aside) it will not be admitted that one sinning lustfully did not advert to a vow of chastity, the memory of which so many occasions renew; but forgetfulness of a vow of abstinence will be admitted in him who, among companions, takes a drink offered. A talkative woman can, without advertence, gravely detract from her neighbor; yet if she has been taught by experience itself or by the command of a confessor concerning the necessity of greater attention, she will be excused with more difficulty.

— Various Complements. 1. Concerning sin of omission. The will can be borne to omission in two ways. For the omission itself can please the sinner as flight from a distasteful thing: as if assistance at Mass generates weariness for him; and it can happen that nothing in the omission as such pleases him: as if he quite gladly hears Mass; and then the will is directly borne to that by which the due act is impeded, for example, to a game on account of which he omits Mass ¹. That positive act, which is the impulsive cause of the sin of omission, nevertheless stands outside its essence. Wherefore it does not specify the sin, which consists in the very cessation from the due act. Nevertheless there is had an inordinate affection on account of which one wills to omit the sacred service. Wherefore, if one neglects the sacred service in order to study, he sins gravely by omission against religion; and besides he is infected by the venial vice of curiosity. Cf. Suarez, Rel., Tr. 5, d. 2, c. 13, n. 4. Therefore the species of the grave sin has not on that account been changed.

¹ St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 71, art. 5.

— II. The unequal gravity of sins, even mortal ones. That unequal gravity is demonstrated by Scripture itself, and indeed from the mouth of the Lord, where he indicated that the sin of the betrayer was greater than the sin of Pilate.

And it is proved by reason. For mortal sin also is specified by the object; and the object can be opposed to the moral order or law of God in various degree.

The gravest of all is hatred of God, which directly repugns charity; sin which is committed immediately against God, such as infidelity and blasphemy, is graver than sin of the same notion committed against man; sin concerning the substance of man, such as homicide, is graver than sin concerning external things, such as theft. (Cf. 1, 2, q. 73, art. 1 and 2.)

— Sin is in the natural order. III. When good was being treated, we distinguished natural and supernatural goodness at least by reason. An act in which natural goodness is present does not thereby yet participate supernatural perfection. But concerning actual sin the same distinction does not hold. For God is offended, not precisely insofar as he is author of supernatural life, but insofar as, author and lord of nature, he has bound us by his precepts, among which surely this greatest is found, that we intend the supernatural end. Nor can we turn ourselves away from the supernatural end without at the same time turning ourselves away from the natural end, which is as it were absorbed by the former. Nor can a distinction be taken from the elicitive principle (natural or supernatural), since to sin is in our power and we always complete sin by our own powers alone.

That we may repeat the same in a few words: every mortal sin is ascribed to natural disorders, both because man sins by natural powers, and because, by sinning mortally, man turns himself away simply from God the ultimate end, and not only from God the author of beatitude.

— 1. From the school of dogma we assume, as demonstrated by Scripture and tradition, that beyond actual sin there is habitual sin; faith itself hands down an example of this in original sin.

Besides, even among equal men, after a grave offense there endures a certain state of mutual enmity, in which, not only the offended one, which is clear of itself, but, what seems wonderful at first sight, the offender himself remains turned away from the person toward whom he was injurious. And in a similar way, committed sin morally perseveres until reconciliation, or at least until penance. That perseverance of sin formally constitutes the state of sin, or habitual sin, the guilt of fault ¹. It would have existed in every order of the world, even a natural one. But in the present order, after mortal sin, it materially consists in the privation of sanctifying grace (insofar as it connotes the will by which one voluntarily turns himself away from God), nor does it cease except through the restitution of that same grace.

2. But because that grace is at the same time the beauty of the soul, its privation infects the soul with a stain. Wherefore Scripture itself exhibits sinners as polluted, unclean, befouled with filth to be washed away ². Therefore the stain is distinguished from habitual sin only by reason.

¹ Guilt here is taken for the state of imputation.

² Cf. Job 33, 9; Prov. 21, 8; Gospel of St. John 13, 10; Is. 4, 4; Zach. 13, 1; Acts 22, 16; 1 Cor. 6, 11.

— I. That permanent guilt of fault is the proximate title of punishment to be undergone. Therefore this is owed as long as that guilt remains.

From the dogmatic exploration of mortal sin we know that mortal sin is of itself irreparable: for no principle of reparation, by which he may restore charity and grace to himself, remains in the man who has sinned mortally.

II. Furthermore, to aversion from God, infinite good, there remains for the sinner the infinite and perpetual punishment of loss, or of privation of the beatific vision. The punishment of sense is owed properly because of the disorder of conversion to creatures. On this side, sin is finite, and could, considered in itself, be expiated by a finite and temporal punishment of sense. But because of the eternal guilt of fault, it happens that the punishment of sense itself will endure eternally. This human explanation is attempted concerning a thing which has been revealed to us by God.

But, according to the positions of St. Thomas, for the same reason, because the remission of venial fault or the payment of debt is not conceived in a permanent state of enmity, eternal punishment is inflicted on the damned also for venial sins and for mortal sins whose fault indeed had been removed but whose expiation had remained imperfect. Several other theologians do not admit this.

Observe finally that the proximate cause of eternal damnation is not sought by St. Thomas from the infinity of sin (which subjectively is none), but from the necessity, mysterious enough to us, by which the separated soul cannot change counsels without a miracle, but rather perseveres impenitent in its voluntary aversion from God.

— I. Notion and demonstration of mortal sin. From Scripture and Tradition we know that there are mortal sins, that is, sins which close the way of eternal beatitude. This is confirmed by reason. For when the order to the end has been established, once it is substantially vitiated, the attainment of the end ought to become impossible.

II. Mortal sin is explained psychologically by this, that, deprived of immediate vision of the indivisible bond by which our happiness is joined to the moral order observed, a certain enjoyment outside God and against his law is at the same time proposed to us as appetible and nevertheless forbidden to us. Hence man can choose in favor of that enjoyment, but by rejecting honorable good and renouncing the ultimate end or God, so that at the same time he errs, sins, spiritually dies, and turns himself away from God. Yet that aversion, in the present order, is not consummated except through withdrawn sanctifying grace, which God alone can take away.

III. As it is voluntary of itself, sin is defined: something done or said or desired against the eternal law; as it is evil of itself: a turning away from God, the ultimate end, through voluntary conversion to commutable good.

IV. The conditions of mortal sin are: that with advertence to malice apprehended at least confusedly as grave, there be joined intrinsically perfect consent. Doubts will have to be solved from presumption.

1. Matter is distinguished as grave from its whole genus or from its genus: the latter admits excuse of slight matter. An object light from its genus does not become grave unless a circumstance is added which changes the species.

But matter is grave formally insofar as, when natural law is being treated, the order of essences is substantially violated, whether toward God, toward neighbor, or in ourselves; or, when positive law is being treated, insofar as the end of the law is of grave moment, and its violation notably harms that end, at least if it becomes frequent.

In the present order, that also can be called grave which of itself harms the charity of God or of neighbor, or is contrary to right love of ourselves.

Nevertheless, to recognize mortal sins, we need external criteria of Sacred Scripture, Tradition, and even human authority.

2. Actual advertence is demanded, while there remains firm imputation of the evil effects which he at least confusedly foresaw who, conscious, omitted the obligation of adverting. It is not required, however, that advertence endure through the whole action; nor is distinct or explicit attention to God's offense demanded; nevertheless apprehension of substantial malice is demanded; and it must prudently be weighed whether a circumstance habitually known actually could have been unattended or not.

V. Various Complements. 1. Omission can be directly willed, or only indirectly, because of affection for a thing which cannot be composed with the action. Nevertheless the sin of omission is not specified by that affection. Wherefore not rarely, with a grave sin of omission, there is joined a venial sin of inordinate affection for the thing on account of which the omission was voluntary.

2. Because they are specified by the object, which can be opposed to the law of God unequally, mortal sins, as Scripture itself testifies, are of unequal gravity.

3. But all sins are of the physical natural order, because we sin by our own powers, and through every mortal sin we turn ourselves away from God, author of nature.

VI. After mortal sin there remains guilt of an offense of God, by which habitual sin, or guilt of sin, is formally constituted. This same guilt now materially consists in the privation of sanctifying grace.

Since that grace is at the same time the beauty of the soul, its privation stains the soul. That stain is distinct from habitual sin only by reason.

VII. Guilt of fault is the proximate title of punishment to be undergone. To aversion from God is owed punishment of loss; to inordinate conversion to a creature, punishment of sense. This latter of itself would be temporal, unless the persevering state of enmity stood in the way of its extinction. Which, according to St. Thomas, is also applied to the punishments which the damned must undergo because of venial faults and forgiven mortal sins.

The proximate cause of the eternity of the punishments of hell is in the immutable obstinacy of the separated soul in its voluntary aversion from God.

361. Essence. Already above in n. 358 the essence of mortal sin was described in some way in the definition of sin in general. For this definition, given by St. Augustine, principally belongs to mortal sin. Yet for a fuller explanation it is necessary to observe the following: the disorder which is found in mortal sin consists:

1. In aversion from God. From what was said above in n. 20, it is clear that man ought in all his acts, explicitly or at least implicitly, to tend toward his last end, which is God or intimate union with God. But if man does not do this, he sins, and indeed gravely, if he perfectly turns himself away from God, the last end. Therefore mortal or grave sin is essentially aversion from God; and the Angelic Doctor⁴³ says excellently: "When the soul is disordered by sin all the way to aversion from the last end, namely God, to whom it is united through charity, then there is mortal sin"; and elsewhere:⁴⁴ "In any mortal sin the principal reason of evil and gravity is from this, that it turns away from God; for if there could be conversion toward a changeable good without aversion from God, although it would be disordered, it would not be mortal sin."

2. In a gravely disordered conversion toward creatures. For the sinner so vehemently desires a temporal good that he prefers to be turned away from God rather than not to enjoy this good. Therefore aversion from God is necessarily joined with disordered conversion toward creatures,⁴⁵ and each element constitutes a grave injury and therefore an offense against God. By the voluntary aversion of the sinner from God the bond of charity between God and man is broken, and consequently habitual grace is destroyed. But since sanctifying or habitual grace is, as it were, the life of the soul, hence grave sin is deservedly called mortal, namely because it causes the death of the soul. But a dead soul cannot enter into eternal life. Therefore mortal sin, which frivolously breaks on this earth the bond of charity with God, in the other world will justly be punished by violent separation from God in gehenna. This punishment indeed is called the "punishment of loss."

3. In a grave wounding of rational nature. For every sin is true foolishness committed against right reason,⁴⁶ since it is most foolish to lose an infinite good for enjoying a finite good.

4. In a grave wounding of the social order. In some sins this wounding is very open, for example, in homicide, adultery, etc., but in reality it is found in any sin, since, by gravely wounding the sinner, a member of society, it also wounds human society itself.

⁴³ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 72, a. 5.

⁴⁴ 2, 2, q. 20, a. 3 (Leonine ed.).

⁴⁵ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 20, a. 1 ad 1.

⁴⁶ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 71, a. 2.

362. Existence of mortal sin is manifestly drawn from Sacred Scripture. For Christ says concerning certain sins against neighbor: "But I say to you that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be guilty of judgment; ... but he who says, Thou fool, [to his brother] shall be guilty of the gehenna of fire."⁴⁷ - St. Paul affirms: "The wages of sin is death."⁴⁸ Moreover: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall die."⁴⁹ - Therefore mortal sins exist. Nor are only sins perpetrated from fixed malice or against the Holy Spirit⁵⁰ mortal sins - as some theologians wished - but also sins done from grave disordered passion, as for example adultery, fornication, etc.

⁴⁷ Matth. 5, 22.

⁴⁸ Rom. 6, 23.

⁴⁹ Rom. 8, 13; cf. also 1 Cor. 6, 9 and Iac. 1, 15.

⁵⁰ These sins are called sins with the raised hand.

363. Inequality of mortal sins. The ancient Stoics, Jovinian, Novatian, and several Protestants taught that all sins are equal. But this is manifestly false, as appears both from Sacred Scripture and from theological reason. - Christ, speaking to Pilate, said: "He who handed me over to thee has the greater sin."⁵¹ Concerning the Jews Jeremiah says: "They have acted worse than their fathers."⁵² - But the intrinsic reason why one sin is graver than another is chiefly taken from the object disorderedly desired. For sin, as a human act, is specified from its object. But the object of sin admits degrees of disorder. Thus, for example, in adultery there is greater disorder than in fornication. - Against this doctrine it is customary to object: mortal sin is the death of the soul. But death does not admit more and less. Therefore neither does mortal sin. But it is easily responded: sin is not the death of the soul formally, but effectively, that is, sin indeed produces death, but it is not death itself, just as a sword which produces death is not death. But just as diverse causes producing the death of the body can be greater and lesser, for example, the ball of a gun and the ball of a ballista, so also diverse sins causing the death of the soul.⁵³

Rules for discerning the gravity of sins. For judging concerning the gravity of individual sins it is necessary to recall those things which were said above in n. 110 sqq. concerning object, circumstances, and end as sources of morality. Therefore one must consider first of all the nobility of the virtue to which the sin is opposed. The highest and noblest virtue is charity. Hence sins directly opposed to the virtue of charity are the gravest, for example, hatred of God, which is called by St. Thomas simply "the worst sin of man."⁵⁴ Charity toward neighbor is prescribed in an equal manner as charity toward God. Hence sins which wound charity toward neighbor are graver than the rest, and the nobler the good of the neighbor that is wounded, the graver is the sin. Thus homicide, which wounds the highest natural good of the neighbor, namely bodily life, and which sometimes also produces the eternal ruin of the neighbor, is a much graver sin than adultery, by which a lesser good is wounded. Next the circumstances must be considered, because, although the gravity of sins must primarily be taken from the gravity of the object and from the nobility of the virtue to which they are opposed,⁵⁵ nevertheless it also depends on the circumstances of person, place, time, etc. Thus, for example, by blaspheming a priest sins much more gravely than a driver. St. Thomas observes⁵⁶ that carnal sins, for example, sins of lust, are of themselves and all else being equal lesser than spiritual sins, for example, blasphemy, hatred of neighbor, because the aversion is greater and the temptation is customarily lesser in spiritual sins than in carnal sins. But carnal sins are more infamous because they render man like brute beings; and besides, they are customarily more dangerous because temptations to them are more vehement and the habits arising from them are eradicated with greater difficulty. "Let those attend to these things," says Billuart,⁵⁷ "not a few who wish to be held spiritual and look down with pharisaical disdain upon others on account of certain human falls, while they themselves are stained with graver sins of pride, envy, detraction, etc."

⁵¹ Io. 19, 11.

⁵² Ier. 7, 26; cf. also Thren. 4, 6.

⁵³ Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 3, a. 2.

⁵⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 34, a. 2. Blessed Albert the Great says: "Infidelity is the greatest sin simply" (in 4, dist. 39, a. 2 ad 4). But nevertheless there does not seem to be anything except an apparent contradiction between Blessed Albert and St. Thomas; for Blessed Albert considers the gravity of infidelity by reason of the harm which it brings in, which indeed can be graver than simple hatred of God; indeed it can include hatred of God.

⁵⁵ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 73, a. 4.

⁵⁶ Ib. a. 5.

⁵⁷ De pecc. diss. 3, a. 3.

364. Conditions required for mortal sin. For mortal sin three things are necessary: 1. grave matter, 2. full advertence, 3. perfect consent of the will. The reason is that mortal sin produces such deadly effects - it destroys the friendship of God and sanctifying grace, thrusts down into gehenna, etc.; cf. below n. 392 - that no human act is to be judged so evil unless a) it is perfectly voluntary, that is, has been performed with perfect advertence and full consent, and b) it is concerned with grave matter.

1. Grave matter necessary for mortal sin can be defined and discerned both from authority and from reason. Authority is threefold, namely that of Sacred Scripture, of the Church, and of the Doctors.

If in Scripture certain sins are said to exclude from the kingdom of heaven, to be worthy of death or eternal fire, execrable, abominable, etc., they are judged grave and their matter grave, for example fornication, adultery, etc.

If decrees of Supreme Pontiffs or of Councils have declared some sin to be grave, its matter is grave. Thus we know that there is grave matter if someone omits an act of charity for five years,⁵⁸ if someone transgresses the precept of observing feasts.⁵⁹

By the authority of Doctors and theologians we know what matter is grave in theft, in violation of fasting, etc.

By reason the gravity of sin must be weighed from the object and circumstances of the act. But that sin is judged grave from the object and circumstances which brings in a grave disorder against the eternal law of God, that is, against God, or human society, or neighbor, or ourselves. But the gravity of the disorder must be weighed according to prudent judgment, with account taken of the precept and of its end, which is impeded. Thus to omit the infusion of drops of water into the wine to be consecrated is judged a grave sin and grave matter, because the signification of that infusion is most grave, namely the blood and water flowing from the side of Christ are signified. But to destroy such a signification seems to be grave matter in the sacrifice of the Mass, by which the sacrifice of the cross is recalled.

Therefore grave matter is required for mortal sin. But light matter cannot constitute anything except a light sin. Nevertheless there are certain sins which are not excused from grave fault on account of lightness of matter, or rather, in which any matter whatever freely willed is always grave. They are called mortal sins ex toto genere suo, from their whole genus. Whenever in these there are full advertence and full consent, mortal sin also exists. Such sins are, for example, blasphemy, hatred of God, lust, violation of the natural or eucharistic fast, etc. But the intrinsic reason is that even the least fully voluntary act of sins of this kind includes grave disorder. Hence the common manner of speaking, "Sins mortal ex toto genere suo do not admit smallness of matter," must be understood thus: any fully voluntary matter whatever of these sins is a grave disorder and therefore a grave sin. Yet these sins become venial from imperfection of the act, namely when full advertence or full consent is lacking. Thus, for example, semi-deliberate lascivious thoughts are venial sins, as also second-first acts of blasphemy are. - Other sins, mortal from the object, which nevertheless admit smallness of matter even when full advertence and full consent exist, are called mortal ex genere suo, from their genus, for example theft, causing damage, etc. Therefore the following expressions must be noted:

venial sin ex genere suo (lying);

mortal sin ex genere suo (theft);

mortal sin ex toto genere suo (lust).

⁵⁸ Prop. 6, condemned by Innocent XI; apud Denz. n. 1156.

⁵⁹ Prop. 52 condemned, Denz. n. 1202.

365. 2. Full advertence. Advertence can be concerned with a twofold object, namely with the physical act and with the malice of that physical act. The first advertence can be present without the other, for example someone knowingly eats meats, but does not know or has forgotten that today this eating is illicit because of Friday. If the first advertence is lacking, the act is no longer human, but an act of man, and therefore cannot be a mortal sin. As to the other advertence, authors do not agree on what kind is necessary for mortal sin. All indeed teach that advertence must be full, and that half-full advertence does not suffice, but they dispute among themselves whether actual advertence is required or virtual advertence suffices. That actual advertence is required is taught by several authors cited by St. Alphonsus;⁶⁰ that virtual advertence suffices is judged by Cajetan, Billuart,⁶¹ and others. It seems to be a dispute over a word. Certainly false and savoring of Jansenism is the opinion of a few who say that all transgressions of law are to be imputed, even if no actual advertence ever intervened, neither direct nor indirect, neither clear nor confused advertence of the malice of the act, and that interpretative advertence suffices, which consists solely in this, that a man has had the physical and remote power of adverting to the malice. St. Alphonsus deservedly says⁶² of this opinion: "It would follow that very many men would find themselves burdened with many mortal faults, though they had never had any cognition whatever concerning them." On the contrary, for mortal sin it is by no means required that one here and now actually advert to the malice of the act; crass and supine inadvertence suffices. For if actual ignorance or inadvertence is voluntary and culpable in the cause, for example because of negligence,⁶³ because of passion which one deliberately wishes to follow,⁶⁴ because of a bad habit which one knowingly retains,⁶⁵ without any doubt it does not excuse from mortal sin. Thus, for example, prostitutes are sometimes so carried away by their own most evil life and vices that they no longer actually attend to the malice of individual shameful acts. Nevertheless those shameful acts, notwithstanding actual inadvertence to the malice, are mortal sins.

Clear advertence is not required, but confused advertence to the malice of the act suffices. Therefore it is by no means necessary that one clearly and explicitly advert to the whole malice of the act. Thus, for example, he who kills his enemy commits homicide with all the circumstances which he could and ought to have foreseen, even if he does not actually think that this enemy is, for example, the father of a family, is perhaps in mortal sin, that God has forbidden homicide, etc.; or a priest who sins against chastity also commits sacrilege, although here and now he thinks nothing of the vow of chastity being violated.

Note. In practice it is not rarely rather difficult for the confessor to discern whether full advertence was present or not. If the penitent is of a timorous conscience, for the most part it is licit to judge that full advertence was not present, if some doubt arises about it; but if the penitent is of a lax conscience and a freer life, the presumption stands for sufficient advertence having been had.

Signs of half-full advertence are:

a) If someone committed the act half-asleep or half-drunk or almost not master of himself. Note this concerning pollution which occurs in sleep or in drowsiness!

b) If someone, carried away by a most vehement passion, did not retain the full use of reason, for example in anger.

c) If someone labors under pathological states or affections, for example hysteria, mania, phobia, etc.

d) If after the deed someone scarcely remembers what gravely evil thing he did, or if he says firmly to himself that he would never have done it if beforehand he had seriously thought.

⁶⁰ Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 4.

⁶¹ De pecc. diss. 5, a. 6.

⁶² L. c.

⁶³ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 76, a. 3. De malo q. 3, a. 7 ad 7 et 8.

⁶⁴ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 6, a. 8. De malo q. 3, a. 10.

⁶⁵ S. theol. l. c.

366. 3. Perfect consent. Whenever full advertence has been present together with freedom from coercion or violence, perfect consent exists. Therefore fear and passion indeed lessen consent, but they do not take it away, unless, however, they disturb reason. Thus, for example, a woman who is violated, violence having been inflicted, does not sin; on the contrary, she sins if, from grave fear of infamy or of another evil, she permits violation or other lustful acts. Likewise a young man sins who, as grave temptation grows hot, procures pollution, provided however that the use of reason is not utterly disturbed by passion or fear.

Signs of half-perfect consent in doubt about consent given:

a) If someone is of a timorous conscience and habitually abhors committing grave sin.

b) If someone has experienced the desire of doing something evil and nevertheless has abstained from the external act, even if he could easily have sinned externally.

c) If someone, perceiving temptations, is immediately troubled and saddened.

Moreover, in practice the same thing holds concerning consent as was said above concerning advertence: in doubt one must stand for that for which the presumption stands. A man of a timorous conscience, in doubt about sufficient consent, is not judged to have consented fully; it is otherwise if the man has a lax conscience. If the matter remains doubtful, let the confessor leave it to divine judgment.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 2 and 6; De Malo q. 7, a. 1 and 3.

538. Conditions required for mortal sin. - In perfect or mortal sin there is a twofold element: a) objective, namely grave malice; b) subjective, or an act perfectly deliberate and voluntary. Hence for it a threefold condition is required:

1. gravity of malice in the object, otherwise it would not be gravely evil; moreover, gravity in the object suffices, that is, in the thing or action as apprehended, nor is grave malice necessarily required in the thing or action as it is in itself: for this suffices, that man really wills a grave evil. Therefore there must be grave transgression of law in itself, or at least from a false estimation;

2. advertence to the grave malice, for if the gravity is not adverted to, man cannot will it, and the offense will be light; and indeed full advertence or perfect deliberation, for otherwise the malice would not be perfectly willed and the condition would be lacking;

3. perfect consent of the will: for no one is judged to convert himself to something as to the ultimate end and to love it above all things and to separate himself altogether from God except by an act perfectly human and voluntary. Then something is sin insofar as it is voluntary; therefore if it is imperfectly voluntary, it is an imperfect sin. Finally, it is repugnant to divine goodness to punish a man with eternal punishments without full consideration and consent on his part.

539. The malice of the object, whose gravity we must advert to, is understood as either grave in itself, that is, from the object, or from circumstances, as from the end, scandal, an adjoined danger, etc., as will be said in article 5. In order to discern easily the gravity (or lightness) of malice, the following rules are usually handed down by theologians:

1. It is taken from Scripture: when Scripture marks some sin with grave appellations, it is to be judged mortal, for example, if it calls it a crime, wickedness, iniquity, abomination, or says that it is worthy of death, hateful to God, brings death, excludes from the kingdom of heaven, cries to heaven, or if a curse is attached to it, for example, woe (Lev. XXIV, 14, 16, 17, 23; Prov. VI, 16; Is. V, 20; Rom. I, 18 sq.; I Cor. VI, 8-VII; Gal. V, 19; Eph. V, 3); - on the contrary, sin is reckoned only venial when Scripture uses milder words, such as the name of mote, stubble, hay, etc. (I Cor. III, 12; Matt. XXIII, 24; Luke VI, 41), or strikes it with a lighter correction (Prov. X, 19; Matt. XII, 36).

2. It is taken from Tradition: mortal sins are those which are held as such in the decisions of Pontiffs and Councils, or from the morally unanimous consent of the holy Fathers or Doctors, or even from the practice of God-fearing men. Nevertheless, concerning the ancient Fathers one must carefully attend to what their mode of speaking was (for example, whether perhaps exaggerated in the manner of an orator), and what the discipline of those times was (for example, whether there was a grave punishment for a lesser fault or vice versa).

3. It is taken from reason: sins are mortal which take away order to the ultimate end, or dissolve charity toward God or oneself or neighbor; such are those by which the subjection and reverence of man toward God is taken away (for example, blasphemy, superstition of a false divinity); - or by which grave harm to one's own bodily or spiritual salvation is incurred, which is a necessary condition for the ultimate end, the love and glory of God; - or by which those things are taken away without which human society cannot be preserved, which is a means necessary for man in order that he may arrive at the ultimate end, such as rebellion, homicide, adultery, theft, disobedience in a matter of great moment: for men could not live together with one another where these things were perpetrated everywhere and indifferently, as we said when distinguishing the primary and secondary precepts of the natural law (n. 251, C).

Or also: mortal sins are those which are directly opposed to the primary precepts of the natural law, or which violate the moral order primarily intended by nature. For the observance of the primary order is a necessary condition for attaining the ultimate end. Therefore a substantial violation of the primary order is mortal sin. Hence mortal are: a) those which violate the order itself to God or take away subjection to him (blasphemy, perjury), but not those things which are only against the mode of subjection; - b) those which violate the order of man to himself, and are a direct disposition of himself or of his faculties against the very ordination of rational nature, or without due subordination to the human species and the common good (suicide, drunkenness, pollution), but not those things which are only against the mode of disposing; - c) those which violate the order to neighbor, while they bring notable harm or an offense to which he is gravely unwilling (homicide, adultery, theft), but not those things which only do not preserve the due mode or by which neighbor is not much unwilling (n. 251, A, b).

But disobedience in a grave matter is also had in positive law; hence mortal are those things which are done against a law commanding under grave obligation: for then by that very fact man acts against those things without which human society cannot be preserved, for the violation of a precept which is of great moment for the common good is apt notably to harm society. But law obliges under grave obligation when the matter is grave, that is, conduces much to an end of great moment, and at the same time the legislator wills to command under grave obligation; concerning which judgment must be made according to the rules handed down in the treatise on Laws, n. 343.

In practice, that whose grave malice does not appear certainly should not be called mortal.

540. Advertence of the intellect is present 1. to grave malice, if man understands that something is so evil or prohibited by God that it cannot stand together with his love, or friendship, or grace, or conjunction with him as end; or at least he understands this implicitly, for example, by knowing that something is very base, rigorously prohibited, notably disturbing the moral order, very opposed to the divine will, inducing enmity with God, worthy of grave punishment, etc., or perceives in some way whatever else is distinctive of grave sin.1

Hence St. Thomas, q. 88, a. 2, ad 1: "from the very fact that someone has chosen that which is repugnant to divine charity, he is convicted of preferring that to divine charity; and consequently of loving it more than God. And therefore some sins from their genus, which of themselves are repugnant to charity, have it that something is loved above God; and thus they are mortal from their genus."

But 2. full advertence or perfect deliberation is required, which nevertheless is not the greatest possible, but that by which man, fully master of himself, is accustomed to attend to a business of sufficiently great moment. And indeed:

a) Subjectively, obscure and imperfect advertence does not suffice, but full and perfect advertence is required, by which a man awake, with mind free, and not impeded by any notable distraction or carried away by disturbance, adverts to the gravity of malice, whether immediately, at the moment when the evil action is placed, or mediately, when the cause is placed from which an evil effect is foreseen to follow at least confusedly.

b) Objectively, however, distinct advertence is not required but confused advertence suffices: for it is not required that grave malice be apprehended distinctly, but it suffices that it appear confusedly, by doubting concerning it or suspecting it, or by adverting that there is danger of this, or that there is an obligation to attend to it or to attend more, and this whether at the moment in which the evil is done or at the moment in which the cause is placed from which it is foreseen that it will follow: for then, if someone nevertheless chooses it, he already fully wills it even if it is a grave evil (n. 214), and therefore he really wills a grave evil, and thus spurns the love of God and the ultimate end and loves it more, and implicitly and virtually chooses even aversion from God and leaves the ultimate end (a. 2, ad 1). Hence confused advertence is not for that reason obscure, but can be full and perfect.2

c) Reflex advertence by which man knows that he adverts is not required, but direct advertence to the malice itself suffices, such as is also drawn from habitual knowledge and can scarcely be absent in those things which are habitually known and are frequently recalled in memory: thus if a sacred person sins against chastity, even if he does not explicitly think about sacrilege, nevertheless he adverts to it implicitly or in act exercised, since he knows that it is he and not another who perpetrates such things; likewise one who willingly lingers in base thoughts which for the most part induce pollution, or one who is accustomed to act familiarly with women. Likewise, for full advertence a long duration of time is not required, nor is this a sign of it.

The conjectural signs of imperfect advertence handed down by theologians are the following: a) if, occupied and distracted by another thing, you have incidentally and slightly apprehended that the thing is evil; b) if half-asleep or half-delirious you were not yet perfectly master of yourself; c) if, forgetful after the fact, you scarcely remember what you did; d) if when you consider better, you judge, according to your habitual disposition, that you would not have done it if you had apprehended it thus; e) if you were so carried away by distraction or passion that you were occupied by cognition only of the utility, harm, convenience, or inconvenience to be perceived from the work, not of the malice; f) or if you labored or were disturbed by a most vehement passion (of anger, fear, sadness), apprehension, agitation of nerves or mania, or a pathological state, so that you scarcely knew what you were doing (which often happens in depraved thoughts, detractions, sins from which harms or dangers follow for others).

Imperfect advertence is ordinarily present and therefore is presumed in those half-asleep, first waking, suddenly consternated, half-mad, half-drunk, younger children (before the seventh year), old people becoming childish again, and the very scrupulous; - on the contrary, advertence at least confused but sufficient is supposed among habitual sinners and hardened sinners.

1. Therefore it is not required that this be done formally. Equivalently this happens when the sinner, although he does not will for the creature the notion of ultimate end, nevertheless in fact adheres to it just as if it were the highest good, perceiving, namely, that renunciation of the creature is a necessary means to God as end and nevertheless choosing the creature, God thus being postponed and contumeliously treated.

2. Aertnijs notes, Th. M. I, n. 230, De Peccatis: "Advertence is called a) full, when one discerns with mind free; imperfect, when with mind not fully free, as being half-asleep, half-drunk, or half-distracted; b) confused, when one doubts or suspects concerning the gravity or species of the sin in the act to be done; distinct, when one discerns the quality or quantity of the sin. Hence it is clear that confused advertence can at the same time be full, since someone by an act of intellect fully conscious to himself can suspect grave malice of an action."

541. Consent of the will is full, when from full deliberation or advertence of mind, it chooses an act either directly and immediately, when the transgression is placed here and now, or mediately or indirectly, when a positive cause or omission is placed from which a transgression is foreseen to follow, at least confusedly. - On the contrary, consent is half-full if the will follows a half-full advertence of the intellect, or if it negligently, with some torpor, repels the suggestion of evil less than it ought, as if a passion of the sensitive appetite is moved but the will resists tepidly.

The conjectural signs of imperfect consent handed down by theologians are the following: a) if someone, fully adverting to a temptation, immediately repels it; b) if more fully adverting, he is immediately distressed or saddened; c) if, as soon as he is distressed, he still finds himself habitually so constituted that he would rather die than sin mortally; d) if he could easily have executed the sin and did not execute it; e) if a God-fearing man (or one who is accustomed to be so affected that he would rather die than expressly sin mortally) doubts whether he consented; f) if he remembers that he proceeded very timidly and hesitantly; g) if he was half-asleep, not fully master of himself, and judges that he would not have done it if he had been fully awake; h) if he doubts whether he was master of himself, awake, not drunk.

In doubt: imperfect consent is presumed among God-fearing men and those who are accustomed to be so disposed that they would rather die than sin mortally, because if they had consented perfectly, ordinarily they would not doubt; - on the contrary, perfect consent is presumed among those who are of a laxer conscience and easily fall into some sin: if these had resisted temptation better than they usually do, they would certainly know it.

542. Corollaries. - 1. He who knows that he is acting badly, but does not know whether the evil is grave or light: a) if he adverts to the danger of grave sin at least confusedly and doubts concerning this, sins gravely because he deliberately exposes himself to the danger of gravely offending God: for he knows that his action perhaps gravely offends God and nevertheless does not abstain from it (cf. treatise on Conscience, n. 214);

b) but if he thinks nothing at all concerning gravity or lightness, he does not sin gravely, because he in no way apprehends grave malice.

2. He who deliberates about committing a grave sin, namely, whether he ought to consent to the sin, yet in such a way that he does not consent: a) if the deliberation is true and full, so that with the gravity of malice proposed, he asks whether he wills a gravely evil thing or not, he sins gravely, because he compares God with a creature, wavering whether he should prefer God or the creature, judging that it can happen that a created good be placed before divine friendship; which is injurious to God;

b) if the deliberation is imperfect, or only some hesitation or omission of resistance against temptation from negligence or torpor, it does not exceed venial sin.¹

¹ Thus Haine, Th. M. I, De Peccatis, q. 7; and Noldin, Th. M. I, n. 318.

Question 1. What things are required for mortal sin?

Response. Three things are necessarily required, namely grave matter either in itself or because of circumstances; full advertence to the grave malice of the act; full consent of the will into the transgression. Therefore:

There is required 1st. grave matter, otherwise a law obliging under grave sin could not be had.

There is required 2nd. full advertence of mind, otherwise there will not be full deliberation.

There is required 3rd. full consent of the will, because unless the sinner, with full consent and full deliberation, prefers the object of sin to God, and thus establishes his ultimate end in the creature, he cannot be said to withdraw totally from God. Besides, it is altogether alien to the divine goodness to consign man to eternal damnation either because of a slight transgression or because of an act not perfectly free and voluntary. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 5, 6, and 53.

Question 2. What things are required for venial sin?

Response. For venial sin there are required and suffice some advertence, however slight, to the malice of the act, and some consent of the will, however imperfect: they are required indeed because, when these have been removed, there can be no cognition and volition of evil, and therefore no sin; but they suffice because, when these have been posited, cognition and volition of evil, which are necessary for constituting sin, are had in some way.

Question 3. In what way can sins be recognized as mortal by reason of matter?

Response. A threefold rule is assigned.

Rule I. Recourse must be had to Sacred Scripture, and those sins must be judged mortal which in Sacred Scripture are declared worthy of death, or exclude from the kingdom of heaven, or which are expressed with the particle woe, which indeed denotes truly grave deformity. Thus the Apostle says concerning the works of the flesh, Galat. v, 19: "Which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury ... I foretell to you, as I have foretold, that those who do such things will not possess the kingdom of God." - Recall also the long series of mortal sins which the Apostle enumerates, I Cor. vi, 9 and 10.

Rule II. Recourse must be had to the Church, or to the definitions of the Supreme Pontiffs, to the Decrees of general Councils, etc., in which many things are declared mortal, or only venial. For the Church is the pillar of truth, and therefore from her doctrine the rule and measure of morals is to be taken.

Rule III. Recourse must be had to the Holy Fathers, to the Doctors of the Church, and also to the common doctrine of theologians. For the Holy Fathers and Doctors were placed by God in the midst of the Church as burning lamps for driving away the darkness of error, and for illuminating the faithful in the way of truth. But theologians know better than others how to interpret the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers, and the Decrees of the Church, and how to compare cases not defined with defined ones, cases not declared with declared ones, and from parity or similitude to draw opportune conclusions. Therefore those things which by them unanimously or almost unanimously are held as mortal are to be judged as such; for the consent of Doctors is an indication of truth.

But when the preceding rules are lacking, it is very difficult to determine when a sin is grave or slight. Generally there are judged grave 1st. all sins which are directly against God or some perfection of his: likewise all sins which tend to the grave prejudice of the human race, as are the species of lust; 2nd. all sins which gravely repugn the end of great moment intended by the law, such as the omission of fast, Mass, annual confession, paschal communion, etc.; 3rd. all sins by which the neighbor is gravely injured in the goods of life, fortune, reputation, etc., such as homicide, detraction very harmful to the neighbor, notable theft, etc.

For the rest, the limits between mortal and venial sin very often can in no way be determined, as is clear from the innumerable controversies of the Doctors concerning this matter. But a mortal sin is not to be asserted unless it is certainly established concerning it, as St. Alphonsus rightly notes. Cf. Systema Mor.; and de Sacram. Poenit., nn. 604 and 605.

128. Question 4. In what way does a sin mortal from its genus become venial, and vice versa?

Response. A sin mortal from its genus can become venial in a fourfold way, namely by reason of: 1st. smallness of matter; 2nd. imperfect advertence; 3rd. imperfect consent; 4th. erroneous conscience. But a sin venial from its genus can become mortal: 1st. by reason of erroneous conscience; 2nd. by reason of scandal; 3rd. by reason of an end gravely evil; 4th. by reason of formal contempt of the law, or of the authority commanding; 5th. by reason of an evil affection toward a thing otherwise slightly evil, so that one is prepared to transgress even a precept obliging gravely; 6th. by reason of danger or of a proximate occasion of falling into mortal sin; 7th. finally by reason of any circumstance which contains mortal malice in itself and accedes to the act, as St. Thomas well observes, in such a way that it changes its species. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 88, art. 1, 2, and 5. - St. Alphonsus, n. 54.

Question 5. Would he sin gravely who wished to avoid only mortal sins, and cared not at all about committing venial sins?

Response. Negatively, more probably, according to a sufficiently common opinion of theologians, even if this were done from purpose, and not from mere carelessness, provided contempt or peculiar frailty is excluded. The reason is that a soul so disposed does not of itself and necessarily introduce a proximate danger of sinning gravely. But in practice the matter is slippery, since facility in sinning venially is the cause why the soul is gradually weakened, and more easily at length is overcome by grave temptations, according to that saying of Ecclus. xix, 1: "He who despises little things will fall little by little." - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de Praeceptis partic., n. 12.

Question 6. Does he sin gravely who deliberates about furnishing consent to a gravely illicit thing, if at last he does not consent?

Response. The solution of the question depends on the quality of the deliberation; for if this is imperfect, namely if it is nothing but a certain hesitation, or an omission of resistance arising from torpor, sluggishness, or negligence, the sin will not exceed venial. - But if the deliberation is full, the sin will certainly be mortal, because the will then implicitly places some created good before God; for by the very fact that it seriously deliberates, weighing on either side the advantages and temporal evils arising from sin, it shows itself prepared to violate the law if it shall have perceived some utility in this violation. - Cf. Lacroix, nn. 226 and seq. - Sanchez, in Decalog., lib. 1, cap. 1, n. 16.

Question 7. Does he sin gravely who, without sufficient cause, places an action from which he is going to suffer base motions?

Response. 1st. Affirmatively, when a man stirs up these evil motions deliberately. For such a one consents to evil delectation to such a degree that he expressly seeks it.

2nd. Negatively, when, no cause being given on the part of the one suffering, these motions arise naturally and spontaneously, and the danger of consent is absent, as the matter is evident.

3rd. Affirmatively, when he places an action which of itself gravely influences these evil motions, and which itself is a grave sin in the genus of lust. Thus St. Alphonsus, lib. 3, n. 482: "If the cause of pollution gravely influences it and the man does not abstain from placing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed as sin, even if it was not intended, provided that it was foreseen at least in a confused way. Causes of this kind are without doubt all those which of themselves are grave faults in the genus of lust. Therefore all pollutions arising from these causes certainly are mortal. And then (note this) that base act which is the cause of pollution has a special malice against nature." And again in the same place, n. 484: "The common and more probable opinion teaches that it is not mortal unless it arises from a cause mortal of itself in the genus of lust. The reason why the cause ought to be mortal is that, since pollution is not willed in itself but only in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil. The reason why the cause ought, besides, to be evil in the same genus of lust is that, since the cause concurs only slightly toward pollution, there is not a grave obligation of avoiding it on account of pollution, which happens beyond intention."

Therefore if there is present a just reason for placing a licit action, for example, to study, to heal, to hear confessions, no guilt is contracted from these effects: likewise no guilt, if a cause outside the genus of lust in no way influences of itself the evil effects, but these follow only by accident: there will be only slight guilt if a cause outside the genus of lust only slightly influences the effects. If the action is within the genus of lust, an indirectly voluntary gravely evil effect will be imputed only when the action itself gravely and proximately influences this effect and is a mortal sin against the sixth.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Where it is not clear that some sin is grave, the confessor ought not to be hasty in judging that it is actually grave, both objectively and subjectively, because in doubt one must stand for the minimum, or at least the matter is to be left to divine judgment. - St. Alphonsus, n. 52.

2nd. In doubt concerning perfect consent you will judge in favor of the penitent: 1st. if he is of a timorous conscience and habitually prepared rather to die than to offend God; 2nd. if, becoming more fully advertent to the temptation, he was terrified and at once repelled it; 3rd. if he does not know whether, awake or sleeping, whether fully master of himself, he did or willed anything evil. Elbel, n. 578. - St. Alphonsus, lib. 6, n. 476.

3rd. A confessor does not satisfy his office if he applies no care by which he removes the penitent from frequency of venial sins, especially of those which are admitted with full advertence. For one who strives in no way at all to avoid venial sins is accustomed little by little at length to slip into mortal sin. - See Cases, n. 144 and seq. - Roncaglia, c. 1.

To Caius, a priest, it seems that theologians, even recent ones, do not sufficiently weigh the circumstances in which the less instructed among the faithful especially live today when they discuss the malice of sins. For very many have from infancy been so accustomed to sins of drunkenness and lust and to the omission of Mass on days of obligation that they regard these and other things as almost nothing. Added to this are bad habits contracted from infancy which blind the conscience and weaken the will. Moreover, such persons scarcely ever think about God except perhaps when they come to church, and therefore, even if they act badly, they do not intend to offend God with the danger of eternal punishment. Led by these reasons, Caius imposes an altogether light penance upon the less instructed who confess such things and readily dismisses them absolved. Hence it is asked:

1. What is mortal sin, and what is required and sufficient for sinning mortally?

2. Is there such a thing as a philosophic sin?

3. Is there invincible ignorance of the natural law and of the obvious obligations of one’s own state?

4. What is to be said about the theory of Caius and his manner of acting?

1. What is mortal sin and what is necessary and sufficient in order to sin mortally ? A mortal sin is a grievous offence against Almighty God, a turning away from God, our last end, and a preferring of some creature to Him. It robs the soul of the grace and friendship of God which constitute its life. It causes the spiritual death of the soul, and on this account it is called mortal. If a man dies while in the state of mortal sin, he can not enter heaven without the wedding garment of God’s grace, and he will be condemned to eternal punishment in hell.

To sin mortally three conditions are necessary and sufficient. The matter must be serious, that is, the act done must be notably inordinate and wrong; it must be a serious disturbance of right order in itself, or because it is contrary to a grave precept imposed by a legitimate authority. At the time when the sin is committed the sinner must clearly know and advert to the malice of his action. This does not mean that he must reflect expressly on the fact that he is doing wrong, or that he is offending God, or that he is doing something that deserves hell. A man who does not expressly think of God or of hell can certainly commit mortal sin. It means that he is fully conscious of what he is doing and that he knows that it is seriously wrong. He may not realize the consequences of his act; what sinner ever did realize the terrible consequences of mortal sin? Moreover, there must be full consent given to the act. A mere hesitation or dallying with the temptation is not sufficient; there must be full and perfect consent to what is known to be seriously wrong.

2. Does philosophic sin exist ?

By a philosophic sin is meant an act against right reason without being an offence against God. Alexander VIII, on Aug. 24, 1690, condemned the following proposition: “A philosophic or moral sin is a human act at variance with a rational nature and right reason; a theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of the divine law. A philosophic sin, however grave, in him who is either ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is a grave sin indeed, but it is not an offence against God, nor a mortal sin depriving the sinner of the friendship of God, nor deserving of eternal punishment." A sin, therefore, which is seriously against a rational nature and right reason is also an offence against God which robs the sinner of God's grace and merits the punishments of hell. Implicitly contained in the judgment of the sinner that an act which he performs is against right reason and wrong, is another judgment that it is against the law of God; for right reason applied to moral action is nothing but a participation of the eternal law of God which commands right order to be observed, and forbids it to be disturbed. Therefore, there is no such thing as a merely philosophic sin.

3. Is there such a thing as invincible ignorance of the natural law and of the ordinary obligations of one’s state of life?

Among people who have the use of reason invincible ignorance of the general principles of morality, such as are contained in the Decalogue, can not be admitted. No human society could long hold together unless those general principles were known and ordinarily acted upon. The same is true of the ordinary obligations of one’s state of life. Invincible ignorance about the application of those general principles in particular circumstances and cases exists not only among the less instructed but among the better instructed also. Hence the variety of opinions among moral theologians.

4. The case. Caius, a priest, thinks that moral theologians do not take sufficient account of the circumstances in which the faithful of the humbler sort live in our days. Very many are so accustomed from childhood to sins of drunkenness, lust, and neglect of Sunday Mass, that they scarcely think anything of them; they contract bad habits in childhood which blind their consciences and weaken their wills; besides, such people scarcely ever think of God except perhaps when they come to Church, and so even if they do wrong, they do not intend to offend God with danger of eternal punishment. For these reasons when such people confess such sins to him Caius imposes a light penance and absolves them without difficulty.

Caius is wrong in acting in this way, and instead of helping his penitents to lead better lives he will probably make them think still less of sin and commit it readily. What he says is unfortunately true of large numbers in our towns. Their antecedents and surroundings have much to do with their sad condition. Still the fact that many in the same circumstances lead very good lives shows that even their wretched surroundings do not deprive them of the power of being good if they choose to be so. We know that unfortunately men may know very well what sin is, and yet drink it in like water. From what was said above it is plain that to commit sin it is not necessary to think expressly of God or of the punishments of hell; it is sufficient if they know that what they do is seriously wrong. They may be partly excusable on account of their surroundings; how far can be known only to God. Caius, however, should change his method of dealing with them; he may be as considerate and kind as he can be; but he should be a more faithful dispenser of the mysteries of God. As the Council of Trent teaches, he should impose penances which are salutary and have some proportion to the number and gravity of the sins confessed, and try to arouse in his penitents a hatred and detestation of sin. Of course he must also be on his guard against frightening such penitents away from the sacraments by imposing penances that are too severe for them.