Chapter II: On Mortal Sin, or on Sin Properly So Called

Order of speaking. First we shall treat of actual sin, then of habitual sin, then briefly of the guilt of fault and punishment.

In order we shall hand down its notion and demonstration; its psychological explanation; its definition and conditions. Then we shall complete the doctrine with various considerations concerning sin of omission, concerning the unequal gravity of sins, even mortal ones, and concerning the physical order to which sin pertains.

— I. Notion and demonstration of mortal sin. Sin is called mortal insofar as it closes the way to eternal life for the sinner.

That there are sins of this sort is made clear splendidly from Sacred Scripture itself. The goats who, in the solemn judgment, will be placed on the left of the Judge, who as cursed will depart into eternal fire, are certainly guilty of mortal sin ¹. Judas committed mortal sin, concerning whom the Lord says: "Woe to that man by whom the Son of Man shall be betrayed" (2). When pagan iniquities have been enumerated, St. Paul directly pronounces worthy of death those who do such things: "and not only those who do them, but also those who consent to those doing them" (3). "Neither fornicators, nor servants of idols, nor adulterers, etc. shall possess the kingdom of God" (4). "Sin," says St. James (5), "when it is consummated, generates death."

The testimonies of tradition are also most open, so that there is no need to linger in alleging the Fathers. Innocent III (6) says without hesitation: "The actual punishment of sin is the perpetual torment of Gehenna." Two ecumenical councils, Lyons II and Florence, have these words: "The souls of those who depart in actual mortal sin, or with original sin alone, immediately descend into hell, yet to be punished with unequal punishments (7)." Between each council, Benedict XII, Constitution of January 29, 1336: "We define that according to the common ordination of God, the souls of those departing in actual mortal sin, immediately after their death descend to hell, where they are tormented by infernal punishments" (Denz. 531).

St. Thomas elegantly proposes the reason in this way: "Wherever there is some due order to an end, it is necessary that that order lead to the end; but departure from the order excludes the end; for those things which are from the end receive necessity from the end, namely that they must be, if the end ought to follow, and with those things existing without impediment, the end follows. But God has imposed on the acts of men some order in respect to the end of good, as is clear from the things said above. Therefore it is necessary that, if that order has been rightly placed, those proceeding through that order obtain the end of good, which is to be rewarded; but those departing from that order through sin be excluded from the end of good, which is to be punished" (C. Gent. III, c. 140). Since the Holy Doctor treats in that place of punishment in general, it must be completed by the following, where, treating of the punishment due to mortal and venial sin, he has these words: "Man through works of virtues, in which chiefly there is the intention of the due end, attains his ultimate end, which is happiness. If therefore he acts in something against virtue, turned away from the intention of the ultimate end, it is fitting that he be deprived of the ultimate end" (C. G. III, c. 143).

¹ St. Matt. 25, 31-46. - (2) St. Matt. 26, 21; and St. Mark 14, 21. - (3) Rom. 1, 32. - (4) 1 Cor. 6, 9-10. And he repeats the same, to Gal. 5, 19-21. - (5) Jas. 1, 15. - (6) Denz. n. 410. - (7) Denz. 464 and 603.

— II. Psychological explanation. If we contemplated God in himself and the rest in God, we should see, by clear intuition, that our happiness cannot be separated from the observed moral order or law of God; and that by one and the same way one arrives at God, at Good, at Beatitude. But now that immediate evidence is lacking to us; and mediate evidence is not so strong or stable that it prevents every deception. Therefore it happens that a certain enjoyment contrary to that order or to that law seems to be appetible, an element of beatitude, and can be proposed to us as to be chosen here and now, as better for us than the preserved order itself. Yet at the same time we are conscious of the permanent necessity or obligation, whatever detriment must be borne, of remaining in the moral order, of choosing nothing which is contrary to honorable good. Therefore the opposite election is demonstrated to contain rejection of honorable good, and, as much as lies on the part of the one choosing, renunciation of the ultimate end or God, to whom the preserved order is related as a necessary means.

Therefore in him who follows the practical judgment of choosing in favor of an enjoyment contrary to the order of honesty, there appears error and imprudence of judgment, malice of the will which embraces it, practical desertion of the way which leads to eternal life, offense of God, who guards the moral order; so that the man sinning at the same time errs, sins, dies spiritually, and turns himself away from God.

Nevertheless, in the present order, since a good relation to God is preserved in habitual grace, which is formally our supernatural life, the spiritual death of the soul says the removal of grace, which God alone can infuse and withdraw. But from the man abusing his liberty and turning himself badly to creatures, God in very truth removes grace, and man spiritually dies.

— III. Definition. By this very explanation, this twofold definition of sin is proved true: one of which is taken from the side of voluntariness or conversion to commutable good, that is, changeable because finite; the other from the side of incommutable good (God):

"Something done or said or desired against the eternal law" ¹.

A turning away from God, the ultimate end, through voluntary conversion to commutable good.

By the former reason, that which is voluntary of itself is considered directly; by the latter, that which is evil of itself. And because it concerns an act of the will, the use of the former definition is more important ².

In this former definition, the words "against the law of God" imply that aversion from God from which the other definition takes its beginning.

Nor can it be objected against the definitions that they suppose an act, whereas sin is also committed by omission. For we conceive omission after the manner of a being, and the omission thus conceived is proposed to the will as an object which can agree with the law or plainly repugn the law. "Just as acting is imputed to a man unto sin because it is opposed to a negative precept of law, so also not acting itself, because it is opposed to an affirmative precept" (St. Thomas, De malo, q. 2, art. 1 c. Cf. the things already said concerning human acts).

¹ St. Augustine, Contra Faustum, l. 22, c. 27 (P. L. 42, 413).

² Cf. Summa, 1, 2, q. 72, art. 6.

— IV. Conditions of mortal sin. In order that mortal sin be committed, it is required and suffices that with advertence to malice, to malice which at least confusedly is apprehended as grave, there be joined consent perfectly free, with that intrinsic perfection which leaves the unencumbered use of the higher faculties. Cf. things said above, n. 41.

But the malice which is apprehended as grave can be either that of the transgression itself, which is known in itself to be grave, or that of imprudence, omitting due inquiry in a grave matter.

A doubt concerning grave sin committed will generally have to be solved from presumptions. This presumption is drawn from the habitual disposition of the agent and from the object, which at first sight appears light or notable.

Concerning each element, that is, concerning the object of the act, which is as it were the matter, and concerning consent, by which the sin is informed, and which depends, in a sane and wakeful man, on advertence, it seems that one must speak separately.

— On grave matter. 1. With respect to gravity, they distinguish matter grave from its whole genus, where none can be judged small, because the notion of grave disorder is found in the whole genus: blasphemy, venereal delight; and matter grave from its genus, in whose genus, grave of itself, grave malice can be absent because of the slightness of the matter. Finally there is matter light from its genus: this does not become grave unless a circumstance is added which changes the species.

2. Whence will grave matter be recognized? Let us distinguish internal criteria from external:

a) Concerning internal criteria. That by which matter is ultimately or formally constituted grave is the will of God commanding or prohibiting under grave obligation. But because the most wise God bears a will adapted to the essences of things, thence it is permitted to us to attempt a more intimate exploration. And the precepts of natural law are to be discerned from positive precepts. With respect to natural law (which we take as its precepts are now the object of supernatural observance), the criterion is offered to us by the very order of things. For if the observance of the essential order is a connatural condition of eternal life, every substantial violation of that order will be grave matter. But there is a threefold essential order to be observed by us: order toward God, order toward neighbor, order in ourselves.

Our order toward God is one of subjection; toward neighbor, it is one of equality, by which we are forbidden to violate his person either in himself or in his things, and of proximity, by which he must be loved by us as "another I." In ourselves order demands that, content with useful dominion of our person and of our faculties, we make no act of perfect dominion over them, but that in ourselves we venerate God, parents, and fatherland as our authors. Hence we cannot pervert the subordination of our faculties. Whatever, therefore, cannot be composed with that order thus explained, but either simply denies it or is opposed to it by so great a relation of contrariety, will be the object of grave sin.

Hence, in the order toward God, the violation will be substantial which is not only about the mode of honoring, of worshiping God (as voluntary distraction in prayer), but denies God, or his attribute, or worship itself, at least by a transient act. Wherefore there is no slightness of matter in sins directly against God or a divine attribute, for example, in those which are directly opposed to the theological virtues: heresy, despair, hatred of God; nor in blasphemy, in an assertory oath, superstition, simony of natural right.

In the order toward neighbor, substantial will be every violation which is notably harmful to the neighbor in a matter of which he is not master, or which induces a just and grave offense of him.

In the order toward the agent himself, substantial will be every direct disposal of himself or of his faculty, since these are opposed to the divine dominion of our person. This usurpation can be committed by physical destruction of oneself (suicide) or of a faculty (mutilation), or by moral abuse through acts which are against the order of the whole faculty. Since this abuse is present in every venereal delight directly sought outside marriage, therefore in that luxury there is not given light matter.

N.B. The customary words "grave matter" suggest a quantitative estimation, which, when natural law is being treated, is never formal, nor can it always be applied. For even in commutative justice itself, where, when external things are treated, quantity is truly considered, theft nevertheless is not grave precisely because it is of such a quantity, but because, on account of such a quantity, the neighbor is judged reasonably and gravely unwilling, so that the order toward him is substantially violated. But in the matter of chastity, that quantitative consideration has caused many to experience such difficulty in admitting the gravity of every lustful lewdness outside marriage, indeed of every fornication; it was also the cause why they fled to extrinsic reasons of danger of hallucination and abuse. But then the malice does not seem now intrinsic, which nevertheless is demanded by reason of the violation of nature. And that extrinsic reason is laboriously demonstrated to be universal.

Because the end of every law is charity, this other form also is proved: "Mortal from its genus is that which of itself harms the charity of God, or of neighbor with respect to persons, things, or rights, or gravely corrupts ourselves" ¹.

When positive law is being treated, this imposes an order not essential of itself, whose observance therefore is less immediately joined with the end of man. Wherefore here the consideration of the moment of the end and of the relation of the thing to that end becomes more formal. This is especially true of human law. In order that this law can obligate gravely, it is required that the law contribute notably to the common good, and that its violation notably harm that end, at least if it were multiplied. For a law can impede that multiplication by a grave prohibition.

The things thus far explained will be illustrated and completed by notions concerning venial sin.

b) Concerning external criteria. Although the principle of distinguishing mortal sin from venial, taken from contrariety to the orders of charity ², is not hidden from man, nevertheless it surpasses human art, as if from the intrinsic nature, to define concerning individual sins whether they are mortal or venial, so that St. Augustine confesses that he had labored in vain to discern all grave sins from light ones ³. And St. Thomas: "Every question in which mortal sin is being asked about, unless expressed truth is had, is determined dangerously" ⁴. Therefore St. Augustine advised this: "Let us not bring deceitful scales, on which we weigh what we will and how we will, saying according to our own judgment: this is grave, this is light; but let us bring the divine scale from the holy Scriptures, as from the treasuries of the Lord, and on it weigh what is graver; indeed let us not weigh it, but recognize things weighed by the Lord" (De baptismo, l. 2, c. 6, n. 9. P. L. 43, 132).

Furthermore, the positive will of God must be viewed, which certainly in many matters, through a precept made for a grave end, can as it were complete the gravity of the matter. Hence also Augustine: "There are some things which would be thought very light, unless they were shown in the Scriptures to be grave beyond opinion" (Enchir. c. 79. P. L. 40, 270).

Wherefore a threefold criterion of distinction is customarily handed down: Sacred Scripture, which is judged to condemn an action as mortal when it declares it "to be worthy of death," or "to exclude from the kingdom," or "to be execrable and abominable," or marks it with similar words. (Cf. Suarez, ad 1, 2, Tr. 5, Disp. 2, s. 5, n. 19.) - The accepted opinion of the Fathers and Doctors, for in a moral matter authority is of very great value. - The judgment of reason, according to the things which we have just said.

But in the absence of certain proof, matter is not to be pronounced grave. St. Raymond had already warned: "One thing I counsel, that you not be too prone to judge mortal sins, where it is not established for you by certain Scripture... otherwise men could be induced into despair ¹."

But St. Alphonsus confirms by authorities and reasons the danger of rash condemnation: for those men whom you easily condemn of mortal sin in actions in which grave malice does not appear to evident reason, those same men you make exposed to the danger of eternal damnation.

¹ Busembaum from Azor, p. 1, l. 1, c. 9; and Sanchez, Decal., L. 1, c. 1, n. 4. And cf. St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 88, art. 2.

² Cf. the Summa, 1, 2, q. 88, art. 2 c.

³ "What are those very sins which so impede arrival at the kingdom of God that nevertheless they obtain indulgence by the merits of the saints, is most difficult to find, most dangerous to define. I certainly, up to this time, although I have labored about this matter, have not been able to arrive at the investigation of them." (Civ. Dei, L. 21, c. 27, n. 5. P. L. 41, 750. Cf. also Enchiridion, c. 73.)

⁴ Quodlibet 9, art. 16.

¹ Summa, L. 3, De Poenitentia et remissione, § 21.

— On advertence. Actual advertence to malice is required. It does not suffice that a man could and ought to have adverted. But he who, conscious, has omitted the obligation of adverting, then, in the cause, becomes guilty of the evil effects which he foresaw at least confusedly.

It is not required, however, that advertence endure as long as the sinful action endures, but it is enough that it was present at the beginning of the action, indeed before it was begun, when the sinner willed to begin and complete it: as one who proposes to drink until drunkenness, or to take that quantity from which he knows drunkenness will follow. Nor is distinct advertence to malice demanded, but consciousness of a gravely evil thing in the confused sense suffices. Nor must there be explicit attention to God's offense, since philosophical sin is not given. And reflex attention is not required; direct cognition which is drawn from habitual knowledge suffices. Nevertheless perfect apprehension of substantial malice is necessary; but concerning a special circumstance habitually known it is said to be enough that it be present to the intellect in a subconscious or confused way.

Here there is need of a certain discretion. Of itself (with a special reason set aside) it will not be admitted that one sinning lustfully did not advert to a vow of chastity, the memory of which so many occasions renew; but forgetfulness of a vow of abstinence will be admitted in him who, among companions, takes a drink offered. A talkative woman can, without advertence, gravely detract from her neighbor; yet if she has been taught by experience itself or by the command of a confessor concerning the necessity of greater attention, she will be excused with more difficulty.

— Various Complements. 1. Concerning sin of omission. The will can be borne to omission in two ways. For the omission itself can please the sinner as flight from a distasteful thing: as if assistance at Mass generates weariness for him; and it can happen that nothing in the omission as such pleases him: as if he quite gladly hears Mass; and then the will is directly borne to that by which the due act is impeded, for example, to a game on account of which he omits Mass ¹. That positive act, which is the impulsive cause of the sin of omission, nevertheless stands outside its essence. Wherefore it does not specify the sin, which consists in the very cessation from the due act. Nevertheless there is had an inordinate affection on account of which one wills to omit the sacred service. Wherefore, if one neglects the sacred service in order to study, he sins gravely by omission against religion; and besides he is infected by the venial vice of curiosity. Cf. Suarez, Rel., Tr. 5, d. 2, c. 13, n. 4. Therefore the species of the grave sin has not on that account been changed.

¹ St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 71, art. 5.

— II. The unequal gravity of sins, even mortal ones. That unequal gravity is demonstrated by Scripture itself, and indeed from the mouth of the Lord, where he indicated that the sin of the betrayer was greater than the sin of Pilate.

And it is proved by reason. For mortal sin also is specified by the object; and the object can be opposed to the moral order or law of God in various degree.

The gravest of all is hatred of God, which directly repugns charity; sin which is committed immediately against God, such as infidelity and blasphemy, is graver than sin of the same notion committed against man; sin concerning the substance of man, such as homicide, is graver than sin concerning external things, such as theft. (Cf. 1, 2, q. 73, art. 1 and 2.)

— Sin is in the natural order. III. When good was being treated, we distinguished natural and supernatural goodness at least by reason. An act in which natural goodness is present does not thereby yet participate supernatural perfection. But concerning actual sin the same distinction does not hold. For God is offended, not precisely insofar as he is author of supernatural life, but insofar as, author and lord of nature, he has bound us by his precepts, among which surely this greatest is found, that we intend the supernatural end. Nor can we turn ourselves away from the supernatural end without at the same time turning ourselves away from the natural end, which is as it were absorbed by the former. Nor can a distinction be taken from the elicitive principle (natural or supernatural), since to sin is in our power and we always complete sin by our own powers alone.

That we may repeat the same in a few words: every mortal sin is ascribed to natural disorders, both because man sins by natural powers, and because, by sinning mortally, man turns himself away simply from God the ultimate end, and not only from God the author of beatitude.

— 1. From the school of dogma we assume, as demonstrated by Scripture and tradition, that beyond actual sin there is habitual sin; faith itself hands down an example of this in original sin.

Besides, even among equal men, after a grave offense there endures a certain state of mutual enmity, in which, not only the offended one, which is clear of itself, but, what seems wonderful at first sight, the offender himself remains turned away from the person toward whom he was injurious. And in a similar way, committed sin morally perseveres until reconciliation, or at least until penance. That perseverance of sin formally constitutes the state of sin, or habitual sin, the guilt of fault ¹. It would have existed in every order of the world, even a natural one. But in the present order, after mortal sin, it materially consists in the privation of sanctifying grace (insofar as it connotes the will by which one voluntarily turns himself away from God), nor does it cease except through the restitution of that same grace.

2. But because that grace is at the same time the beauty of the soul, its privation infects the soul with a stain. Wherefore Scripture itself exhibits sinners as polluted, unclean, befouled with filth to be washed away ². Therefore the stain is distinguished from habitual sin only by reason.

¹ Guilt here is taken for the state of imputation.

² Cf. Job 33, 9; Prov. 21, 8; Gospel of St. John 13, 10; Is. 4, 4; Zach. 13, 1; Acts 22, 16; 1 Cor. 6, 11.

— I. That permanent guilt of fault is the proximate title of punishment to be undergone. Therefore this is owed as long as that guilt remains.

From the dogmatic exploration of mortal sin we know that mortal sin is of itself irreparable: for no principle of reparation, by which he may restore charity and grace to himself, remains in the man who has sinned mortally.

II. Furthermore, to aversion from God, infinite good, there remains for the sinner the infinite and perpetual punishment of loss, or of privation of the beatific vision. The punishment of sense is owed properly because of the disorder of conversion to creatures. On this side, sin is finite, and could, considered in itself, be expiated by a finite and temporal punishment of sense. But because of the eternal guilt of fault, it happens that the punishment of sense itself will endure eternally. This human explanation is attempted concerning a thing which has been revealed to us by God.

But, according to the positions of St. Thomas, for the same reason, because the remission of venial fault or the payment of debt is not conceived in a permanent state of enmity, eternal punishment is inflicted on the damned also for venial sins and for mortal sins whose fault indeed had been removed but whose expiation had remained imperfect. Several other theologians do not admit this.

Observe finally that the proximate cause of eternal damnation is not sought by St. Thomas from the infinity of sin (which subjectively is none), but from the necessity, mysterious enough to us, by which the separated soul cannot change counsels without a miracle, but rather perseveres impenitent in its voluntary aversion from God.

— I. Notion and demonstration of mortal sin. From Scripture and Tradition we know that there are mortal sins, that is, sins which close the way of eternal beatitude. This is confirmed by reason. For when the order to the end has been established, once it is substantially vitiated, the attainment of the end ought to become impossible.

II. Mortal sin is explained psychologically by this, that, deprived of immediate vision of the indivisible bond by which our happiness is joined to the moral order observed, a certain enjoyment outside God and against his law is at the same time proposed to us as appetible and nevertheless forbidden to us. Hence man can choose in favor of that enjoyment, but by rejecting honorable good and renouncing the ultimate end or God, so that at the same time he errs, sins, spiritually dies, and turns himself away from God. Yet that aversion, in the present order, is not consummated except through withdrawn sanctifying grace, which God alone can take away.

III. As it is voluntary of itself, sin is defined: something done or said or desired against the eternal law; as it is evil of itself: a turning away from God, the ultimate end, through voluntary conversion to commutable good.

IV. The conditions of mortal sin are: that with advertence to malice apprehended at least confusedly as grave, there be joined intrinsically perfect consent. Doubts will have to be solved from presumption.

1. Matter is distinguished as grave from its whole genus or from its genus: the latter admits excuse of slight matter. An object light from its genus does not become grave unless a circumstance is added which changes the species.

But matter is grave formally insofar as, when natural law is being treated, the order of essences is substantially violated, whether toward God, toward neighbor, or in ourselves; or, when positive law is being treated, insofar as the end of the law is of grave moment, and its violation notably harms that end, at least if it becomes frequent.

In the present order, that also can be called grave which of itself harms the charity of God or of neighbor, or is contrary to right love of ourselves.

Nevertheless, to recognize mortal sins, we need external criteria of Sacred Scripture, Tradition, and even human authority.

2. Actual advertence is demanded, while there remains firm imputation of the evil effects which he at least confusedly foresaw who, conscious, omitted the obligation of adverting. It is not required, however, that advertence endure through the whole action; nor is distinct or explicit attention to God's offense demanded; nevertheless apprehension of substantial malice is demanded; and it must prudently be weighed whether a circumstance habitually known actually could have been unattended or not.

V. Various Complements. 1. Omission can be directly willed, or only indirectly, because of affection for a thing which cannot be composed with the action. Nevertheless the sin of omission is not specified by that affection. Wherefore not rarely, with a grave sin of omission, there is joined a venial sin of inordinate affection for the thing on account of which the omission was voluntary.

2. Because they are specified by the object, which can be opposed to the law of God unequally, mortal sins, as Scripture itself testifies, are of unequal gravity.

3. But all sins are of the physical natural order, because we sin by our own powers, and through every mortal sin we turn ourselves away from God, author of nature.

VI. After mortal sin there remains guilt of an offense of God, by which habitual sin, or guilt of sin, is formally constituted. This same guilt now materially consists in the privation of sanctifying grace.

Since that grace is at the same time the beauty of the soul, its privation stains the soul. That stain is distinct from habitual sin only by reason.

VII. Guilt of fault is the proximate title of punishment to be undergone. To aversion from God is owed punishment of loss; to inordinate conversion to a creature, punishment of sense. This latter of itself would be temporal, unless the persevering state of enmity stood in the way of its extinction. Which, according to St. Thomas, is also applied to the punishments which the damned must undergo because of venial faults and forgiven mortal sins.

The proximate cause of the eternity of the punishments of hell is in the immutable obstinacy of the separated soul in its voluntary aversion from God.