Article III: On the Conditions Required for Mortal Sin

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 2 and 6; De Malo q. 7, a. 1 and 3.

538. Conditions required for mortal sin. - In perfect or mortal sin there is a twofold element: a) objective, namely grave malice; b) subjective, or an act perfectly deliberate and voluntary. Hence for it a threefold condition is required:

1. gravity of malice in the object, otherwise it would not be gravely evil; moreover, gravity in the object suffices, that is, in the thing or action as apprehended, nor is grave malice necessarily required in the thing or action as it is in itself: for this suffices, that man really wills a grave evil. Therefore there must be grave transgression of law in itself, or at least from a false estimation;

2. advertence to the grave malice, for if the gravity is not adverted to, man cannot will it, and the offense will be light; and indeed full advertence or perfect deliberation, for otherwise the malice would not be perfectly willed and the condition would be lacking;

3. perfect consent of the will: for no one is judged to convert himself to something as to the ultimate end and to love it above all things and to separate himself altogether from God except by an act perfectly human and voluntary. Then something is sin insofar as it is voluntary; therefore if it is imperfectly voluntary, it is an imperfect sin. Finally, it is repugnant to divine goodness to punish a man with eternal punishments without full consideration and consent on his part.

539. The malice of the object, whose gravity we must advert to, is understood as either grave in itself, that is, from the object, or from circumstances, as from the end, scandal, an adjoined danger, etc., as will be said in article 5. In order to discern easily the gravity (or lightness) of malice, the following rules are usually handed down by theologians:

1. It is taken from Scripture: when Scripture marks some sin with grave appellations, it is to be judged mortal, for example, if it calls it a crime, wickedness, iniquity, abomination, or says that it is worthy of death, hateful to God, brings death, excludes from the kingdom of heaven, cries to heaven, or if a curse is attached to it, for example, woe (Lev. XXIV, 14, 16, 17, 23; Prov. VI, 16; Is. V, 20; Rom. I, 18 sq.; I Cor. VI, 8-VII; Gal. V, 19; Eph. V, 3); - on the contrary, sin is reckoned only venial when Scripture uses milder words, such as the name of mote, stubble, hay, etc. (I Cor. III, 12; Matt. XXIII, 24; Luke VI, 41), or strikes it with a lighter correction (Prov. X, 19; Matt. XII, 36).

2. It is taken from Tradition: mortal sins are those which are held as such in the decisions of Pontiffs and Councils, or from the morally unanimous consent of the holy Fathers or Doctors, or even from the practice of God-fearing men. Nevertheless, concerning the ancient Fathers one must carefully attend to what their mode of speaking was (for example, whether perhaps exaggerated in the manner of an orator), and what the discipline of those times was (for example, whether there was a grave punishment for a lesser fault or vice versa).

3. It is taken from reason: sins are mortal which take away order to the ultimate end, or dissolve charity toward God or oneself or neighbor; such are those by which the subjection and reverence of man toward God is taken away (for example, blasphemy, superstition of a false divinity); - or by which grave harm to one's own bodily or spiritual salvation is incurred, which is a necessary condition for the ultimate end, the love and glory of God; - or by which those things are taken away without which human society cannot be preserved, which is a means necessary for man in order that he may arrive at the ultimate end, such as rebellion, homicide, adultery, theft, disobedience in a matter of great moment: for men could not live together with one another where these things were perpetrated everywhere and indifferently, as we said when distinguishing the primary and secondary precepts of the natural law (n. 251, C).

Or also: mortal sins are those which are directly opposed to the primary precepts of the natural law, or which violate the moral order primarily intended by nature. For the observance of the primary order is a necessary condition for attaining the ultimate end. Therefore a substantial violation of the primary order is mortal sin. Hence mortal are: a) those which violate the order itself to God or take away subjection to him (blasphemy, perjury), but not those things which are only against the mode of subjection; - b) those which violate the order of man to himself, and are a direct disposition of himself or of his faculties against the very ordination of rational nature, or without due subordination to the human species and the common good (suicide, drunkenness, pollution), but not those things which are only against the mode of disposing; - c) those which violate the order to neighbor, while they bring notable harm or an offense to which he is gravely unwilling (homicide, adultery, theft), but not those things which only do not preserve the due mode or by which neighbor is not much unwilling (n. 251, A, b).

But disobedience in a grave matter is also had in positive law; hence mortal are those things which are done against a law commanding under grave obligation: for then by that very fact man acts against those things without which human society cannot be preserved, for the violation of a precept which is of great moment for the common good is apt notably to harm society. But law obliges under grave obligation when the matter is grave, that is, conduces much to an end of great moment, and at the same time the legislator wills to command under grave obligation; concerning which judgment must be made according to the rules handed down in the treatise on Laws, n. 343.

In practice, that whose grave malice does not appear certainly should not be called mortal.

540. Advertence of the intellect is present 1. to grave malice, if man understands that something is so evil or prohibited by God that it cannot stand together with his love, or friendship, or grace, or conjunction with him as end; or at least he understands this implicitly, for example, by knowing that something is very base, rigorously prohibited, notably disturbing the moral order, very opposed to the divine will, inducing enmity with God, worthy of grave punishment, etc., or perceives in some way whatever else is distinctive of grave sin.1

Hence St. Thomas, q. 88, a. 2, ad 1: "from the very fact that someone has chosen that which is repugnant to divine charity, he is convicted of preferring that to divine charity; and consequently of loving it more than God. And therefore some sins from their genus, which of themselves are repugnant to charity, have it that something is loved above God; and thus they are mortal from their genus."

But 2. full advertence or perfect deliberation is required, which nevertheless is not the greatest possible, but that by which man, fully master of himself, is accustomed to attend to a business of sufficiently great moment. And indeed:

a) Subjectively, obscure and imperfect advertence does not suffice, but full and perfect advertence is required, by which a man awake, with mind free, and not impeded by any notable distraction or carried away by disturbance, adverts to the gravity of malice, whether immediately, at the moment when the evil action is placed, or mediately, when the cause is placed from which an evil effect is foreseen to follow at least confusedly.

b) Objectively, however, distinct advertence is not required but confused advertence suffices: for it is not required that grave malice be apprehended distinctly, but it suffices that it appear confusedly, by doubting concerning it or suspecting it, or by adverting that there is danger of this, or that there is an obligation to attend to it or to attend more, and this whether at the moment in which the evil is done or at the moment in which the cause is placed from which it is foreseen that it will follow: for then, if someone nevertheless chooses it, he already fully wills it even if it is a grave evil (n. 214), and therefore he really wills a grave evil, and thus spurns the love of God and the ultimate end and loves it more, and implicitly and virtually chooses even aversion from God and leaves the ultimate end (a. 2, ad 1). Hence confused advertence is not for that reason obscure, but can be full and perfect.2

c) Reflex advertence by which man knows that he adverts is not required, but direct advertence to the malice itself suffices, such as is also drawn from habitual knowledge and can scarcely be absent in those things which are habitually known and are frequently recalled in memory: thus if a sacred person sins against chastity, even if he does not explicitly think about sacrilege, nevertheless he adverts to it implicitly or in act exercised, since he knows that it is he and not another who perpetrates such things; likewise one who willingly lingers in base thoughts which for the most part induce pollution, or one who is accustomed to act familiarly with women. Likewise, for full advertence a long duration of time is not required, nor is this a sign of it.

The conjectural signs of imperfect advertence handed down by theologians are the following: a) if, occupied and distracted by another thing, you have incidentally and slightly apprehended that the thing is evil; b) if half-asleep or half-delirious you were not yet perfectly master of yourself; c) if, forgetful after the fact, you scarcely remember what you did; d) if when you consider better, you judge, according to your habitual disposition, that you would not have done it if you had apprehended it thus; e) if you were so carried away by distraction or passion that you were occupied by cognition only of the utility, harm, convenience, or inconvenience to be perceived from the work, not of the malice; f) or if you labored or were disturbed by a most vehement passion (of anger, fear, sadness), apprehension, agitation of nerves or mania, or a pathological state, so that you scarcely knew what you were doing (which often happens in depraved thoughts, detractions, sins from which harms or dangers follow for others).

Imperfect advertence is ordinarily present and therefore is presumed in those half-asleep, first waking, suddenly consternated, half-mad, half-drunk, younger children (before the seventh year), old people becoming childish again, and the very scrupulous; - on the contrary, advertence at least confused but sufficient is supposed among habitual sinners and hardened sinners.

1. Therefore it is not required that this be done formally. Equivalently this happens when the sinner, although he does not will for the creature the notion of ultimate end, nevertheless in fact adheres to it just as if it were the highest good, perceiving, namely, that renunciation of the creature is a necessary means to God as end and nevertheless choosing the creature, God thus being postponed and contumeliously treated.

2. Aertnijs notes, Th. M. I, n. 230, De Peccatis: "Advertence is called a) full, when one discerns with mind free; imperfect, when with mind not fully free, as being half-asleep, half-drunk, or half-distracted; b) confused, when one doubts or suspects concerning the gravity or species of the sin in the act to be done; distinct, when one discerns the quality or quantity of the sin. Hence it is clear that confused advertence can at the same time be full, since someone by an act of intellect fully conscious to himself can suspect grave malice of an action."

541. Consent of the will is full, when from full deliberation or advertence of mind, it chooses an act either directly and immediately, when the transgression is placed here and now, or mediately or indirectly, when a positive cause or omission is placed from which a transgression is foreseen to follow, at least confusedly. - On the contrary, consent is half-full if the will follows a half-full advertence of the intellect, or if it negligently, with some torpor, repels the suggestion of evil less than it ought, as if a passion of the sensitive appetite is moved but the will resists tepidly.

The conjectural signs of imperfect consent handed down by theologians are the following: a) if someone, fully adverting to a temptation, immediately repels it; b) if more fully adverting, he is immediately distressed or saddened; c) if, as soon as he is distressed, he still finds himself habitually so constituted that he would rather die than sin mortally; d) if he could easily have executed the sin and did not execute it; e) if a God-fearing man (or one who is accustomed to be so affected that he would rather die than expressly sin mortally) doubts whether he consented; f) if he remembers that he proceeded very timidly and hesitantly; g) if he was half-asleep, not fully master of himself, and judges that he would not have done it if he had been fully awake; h) if he doubts whether he was master of himself, awake, not drunk.

In doubt: imperfect consent is presumed among God-fearing men and those who are accustomed to be so disposed that they would rather die than sin mortally, because if they had consented perfectly, ordinarily they would not doubt; - on the contrary, perfect consent is presumed among those who are of a laxer conscience and easily fall into some sin: if these had resisted temptation better than they usually do, they would certainly know it.

542. Corollaries. - 1. He who knows that he is acting badly, but does not know whether the evil is grave or light: a) if he adverts to the danger of grave sin at least confusedly and doubts concerning this, sins gravely because he deliberately exposes himself to the danger of gravely offending God: for he knows that his action perhaps gravely offends God and nevertheless does not abstain from it (cf. treatise on Conscience, n. 214);

b) but if he thinks nothing at all concerning gravity or lightness, he does not sin gravely, because he in no way apprehends grave malice.

2. He who deliberates about committing a grave sin, namely, whether he ought to consent to the sin, yet in such a way that he does not consent: a) if the deliberation is true and full, so that with the gravity of malice proposed, he asks whether he wills a gravely evil thing or not, he sins gravely, because he compares God with a creature, wavering whether he should prefer God or the creature, judging that it can happen that a created good be placed before divine friendship; which is injurious to God;

b) if the deliberation is imperfect, or only some hesitation or omission of resistance against temptation from negligence or torpor, it does not exceed venial sin.¹

¹ Thus Haine, Th. M. I, De Peccatis, q. 7; and Noldin, Th. M. I, n. 318.