Article II. On Mortal Sin

361. Essence. Already above in n. 358 the essence of mortal sin was described in some way in the definition of sin in general. For this definition, given by St. Augustine, principally belongs to mortal sin. Yet for a fuller explanation it is necessary to observe the following: the disorder which is found in mortal sin consists:

1. In aversion from God. From what was said above in n. 20, it is clear that man ought in all his acts, explicitly or at least implicitly, to tend toward his last end, which is God or intimate union with God. But if man does not do this, he sins, and indeed gravely, if he perfectly turns himself away from God, the last end. Therefore mortal or grave sin is essentially aversion from God; and the Angelic Doctor⁴³ says excellently: "When the soul is disordered by sin all the way to aversion from the last end, namely God, to whom it is united through charity, then there is mortal sin"; and elsewhere:⁴⁴ "In any mortal sin the principal reason of evil and gravity is from this, that it turns away from God; for if there could be conversion toward a changeable good without aversion from God, although it would be disordered, it would not be mortal sin."

2. In a gravely disordered conversion toward creatures. For the sinner so vehemently desires a temporal good that he prefers to be turned away from God rather than not to enjoy this good. Therefore aversion from God is necessarily joined with disordered conversion toward creatures,⁴⁵ and each element constitutes a grave injury and therefore an offense against God. By the voluntary aversion of the sinner from God the bond of charity between God and man is broken, and consequently habitual grace is destroyed. But since sanctifying or habitual grace is, as it were, the life of the soul, hence grave sin is deservedly called mortal, namely because it causes the death of the soul. But a dead soul cannot enter into eternal life. Therefore mortal sin, which frivolously breaks on this earth the bond of charity with God, in the other world will justly be punished by violent separation from God in gehenna. This punishment indeed is called the "punishment of loss."

3. In a grave wounding of rational nature. For every sin is true foolishness committed against right reason,⁴⁶ since it is most foolish to lose an infinite good for enjoying a finite good.

4. In a grave wounding of the social order. In some sins this wounding is very open, for example, in homicide, adultery, etc., but in reality it is found in any sin, since, by gravely wounding the sinner, a member of society, it also wounds human society itself.

⁴³ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 72, a. 5.

⁴⁴ 2, 2, q. 20, a. 3 (Leonine ed.).

⁴⁵ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 20, a. 1 ad 1.

⁴⁶ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 71, a. 2.

362. Existence of mortal sin is manifestly drawn from Sacred Scripture. For Christ says concerning certain sins against neighbor: "But I say to you that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be guilty of judgment; ... but he who says, Thou fool, [to his brother] shall be guilty of the gehenna of fire."⁴⁷ - St. Paul affirms: "The wages of sin is death."⁴⁸ Moreover: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall die."⁴⁹ - Therefore mortal sins exist. Nor are only sins perpetrated from fixed malice or against the Holy Spirit⁵⁰ mortal sins - as some theologians wished - but also sins done from grave disordered passion, as for example adultery, fornication, etc.

⁴⁷ Matth. 5, 22.

⁴⁸ Rom. 6, 23.

⁴⁹ Rom. 8, 13; cf. also 1 Cor. 6, 9 and Iac. 1, 15.

⁵⁰ These sins are called sins with the raised hand.

363. Inequality of mortal sins. The ancient Stoics, Jovinian, Novatian, and several Protestants taught that all sins are equal. But this is manifestly false, as appears both from Sacred Scripture and from theological reason. - Christ, speaking to Pilate, said: "He who handed me over to thee has the greater sin."⁵¹ Concerning the Jews Jeremiah says: "They have acted worse than their fathers."⁵² - But the intrinsic reason why one sin is graver than another is chiefly taken from the object disorderedly desired. For sin, as a human act, is specified from its object. But the object of sin admits degrees of disorder. Thus, for example, in adultery there is greater disorder than in fornication. - Against this doctrine it is customary to object: mortal sin is the death of the soul. But death does not admit more and less. Therefore neither does mortal sin. But it is easily responded: sin is not the death of the soul formally, but effectively, that is, sin indeed produces death, but it is not death itself, just as a sword which produces death is not death. But just as diverse causes producing the death of the body can be greater and lesser, for example, the ball of a gun and the ball of a ballista, so also diverse sins causing the death of the soul.⁵³

Rules for discerning the gravity of sins. For judging concerning the gravity of individual sins it is necessary to recall those things which were said above in n. 110 sqq. concerning object, circumstances, and end as sources of morality. Therefore one must consider first of all the nobility of the virtue to which the sin is opposed. The highest and noblest virtue is charity. Hence sins directly opposed to the virtue of charity are the gravest, for example, hatred of God, which is called by St. Thomas simply "the worst sin of man."⁵⁴ Charity toward neighbor is prescribed in an equal manner as charity toward God. Hence sins which wound charity toward neighbor are graver than the rest, and the nobler the good of the neighbor that is wounded, the graver is the sin. Thus homicide, which wounds the highest natural good of the neighbor, namely bodily life, and which sometimes also produces the eternal ruin of the neighbor, is a much graver sin than adultery, by which a lesser good is wounded. Next the circumstances must be considered, because, although the gravity of sins must primarily be taken from the gravity of the object and from the nobility of the virtue to which they are opposed,⁵⁵ nevertheless it also depends on the circumstances of person, place, time, etc. Thus, for example, by blaspheming a priest sins much more gravely than a driver. St. Thomas observes⁵⁶ that carnal sins, for example, sins of lust, are of themselves and all else being equal lesser than spiritual sins, for example, blasphemy, hatred of neighbor, because the aversion is greater and the temptation is customarily lesser in spiritual sins than in carnal sins. But carnal sins are more infamous because they render man like brute beings; and besides, they are customarily more dangerous because temptations to them are more vehement and the habits arising from them are eradicated with greater difficulty. "Let those attend to these things," says Billuart,⁵⁷ "not a few who wish to be held spiritual and look down with pharisaical disdain upon others on account of certain human falls, while they themselves are stained with graver sins of pride, envy, detraction, etc."

⁵¹ Io. 19, 11.

⁵² Ier. 7, 26; cf. also Thren. 4, 6.

⁵³ Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 3, a. 2.

⁵⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 34, a. 2. Blessed Albert the Great says: "Infidelity is the greatest sin simply" (in 4, dist. 39, a. 2 ad 4). But nevertheless there does not seem to be anything except an apparent contradiction between Blessed Albert and St. Thomas; for Blessed Albert considers the gravity of infidelity by reason of the harm which it brings in, which indeed can be graver than simple hatred of God; indeed it can include hatred of God.

⁵⁵ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 73, a. 4.

⁵⁶ Ib. a. 5.

⁵⁷ De pecc. diss. 3, a. 3.

364. Conditions required for mortal sin. For mortal sin three things are necessary: 1. grave matter, 2. full advertence, 3. perfect consent of the will. The reason is that mortal sin produces such deadly effects - it destroys the friendship of God and sanctifying grace, thrusts down into gehenna, etc.; cf. below n. 392 - that no human act is to be judged so evil unless a) it is perfectly voluntary, that is, has been performed with perfect advertence and full consent, and b) it is concerned with grave matter.

1. Grave matter necessary for mortal sin can be defined and discerned both from authority and from reason. Authority is threefold, namely that of Sacred Scripture, of the Church, and of the Doctors.

If in Scripture certain sins are said to exclude from the kingdom of heaven, to be worthy of death or eternal fire, execrable, abominable, etc., they are judged grave and their matter grave, for example fornication, adultery, etc.

If decrees of Supreme Pontiffs or of Councils have declared some sin to be grave, its matter is grave. Thus we know that there is grave matter if someone omits an act of charity for five years,⁵⁸ if someone transgresses the precept of observing feasts.⁵⁹

By the authority of Doctors and theologians we know what matter is grave in theft, in violation of fasting, etc.

By reason the gravity of sin must be weighed from the object and circumstances of the act. But that sin is judged grave from the object and circumstances which brings in a grave disorder against the eternal law of God, that is, against God, or human society, or neighbor, or ourselves. But the gravity of the disorder must be weighed according to prudent judgment, with account taken of the precept and of its end, which is impeded. Thus to omit the infusion of drops of water into the wine to be consecrated is judged a grave sin and grave matter, because the signification of that infusion is most grave, namely the blood and water flowing from the side of Christ are signified. But to destroy such a signification seems to be grave matter in the sacrifice of the Mass, by which the sacrifice of the cross is recalled.

Therefore grave matter is required for mortal sin. But light matter cannot constitute anything except a light sin. Nevertheless there are certain sins which are not excused from grave fault on account of lightness of matter, or rather, in which any matter whatever freely willed is always grave. They are called mortal sins ex toto genere suo, from their whole genus. Whenever in these there are full advertence and full consent, mortal sin also exists. Such sins are, for example, blasphemy, hatred of God, lust, violation of the natural or eucharistic fast, etc. But the intrinsic reason is that even the least fully voluntary act of sins of this kind includes grave disorder. Hence the common manner of speaking, "Sins mortal ex toto genere suo do not admit smallness of matter," must be understood thus: any fully voluntary matter whatever of these sins is a grave disorder and therefore a grave sin. Yet these sins become venial from imperfection of the act, namely when full advertence or full consent is lacking. Thus, for example, semi-deliberate lascivious thoughts are venial sins, as also second-first acts of blasphemy are. - Other sins, mortal from the object, which nevertheless admit smallness of matter even when full advertence and full consent exist, are called mortal ex genere suo, from their genus, for example theft, causing damage, etc. Therefore the following expressions must be noted:

venial sin ex genere suo (lying);

mortal sin ex genere suo (theft);

mortal sin ex toto genere suo (lust).

⁵⁸ Prop. 6, condemned by Innocent XI; apud Denz. n. 1156.

⁵⁹ Prop. 52 condemned, Denz. n. 1202.

365. 2. Full advertence. Advertence can be concerned with a twofold object, namely with the physical act and with the malice of that physical act. The first advertence can be present without the other, for example someone knowingly eats meats, but does not know or has forgotten that today this eating is illicit because of Friday. If the first advertence is lacking, the act is no longer human, but an act of man, and therefore cannot be a mortal sin. As to the other advertence, authors do not agree on what kind is necessary for mortal sin. All indeed teach that advertence must be full, and that half-full advertence does not suffice, but they dispute among themselves whether actual advertence is required or virtual advertence suffices. That actual advertence is required is taught by several authors cited by St. Alphonsus;⁶⁰ that virtual advertence suffices is judged by Cajetan, Billuart,⁶¹ and others. It seems to be a dispute over a word. Certainly false and savoring of Jansenism is the opinion of a few who say that all transgressions of law are to be imputed, even if no actual advertence ever intervened, neither direct nor indirect, neither clear nor confused advertence of the malice of the act, and that interpretative advertence suffices, which consists solely in this, that a man has had the physical and remote power of adverting to the malice. St. Alphonsus deservedly says⁶² of this opinion: "It would follow that very many men would find themselves burdened with many mortal faults, though they had never had any cognition whatever concerning them." On the contrary, for mortal sin it is by no means required that one here and now actually advert to the malice of the act; crass and supine inadvertence suffices. For if actual ignorance or inadvertence is voluntary and culpable in the cause, for example because of negligence,⁶³ because of passion which one deliberately wishes to follow,⁶⁴ because of a bad habit which one knowingly retains,⁶⁵ without any doubt it does not excuse from mortal sin. Thus, for example, prostitutes are sometimes so carried away by their own most evil life and vices that they no longer actually attend to the malice of individual shameful acts. Nevertheless those shameful acts, notwithstanding actual inadvertence to the malice, are mortal sins.

Clear advertence is not required, but confused advertence to the malice of the act suffices. Therefore it is by no means necessary that one clearly and explicitly advert to the whole malice of the act. Thus, for example, he who kills his enemy commits homicide with all the circumstances which he could and ought to have foreseen, even if he does not actually think that this enemy is, for example, the father of a family, is perhaps in mortal sin, that God has forbidden homicide, etc.; or a priest who sins against chastity also commits sacrilege, although here and now he thinks nothing of the vow of chastity being violated.

Note. In practice it is not rarely rather difficult for the confessor to discern whether full advertence was present or not. If the penitent is of a timorous conscience, for the most part it is licit to judge that full advertence was not present, if some doubt arises about it; but if the penitent is of a lax conscience and a freer life, the presumption stands for sufficient advertence having been had.

Signs of half-full advertence are:

a) If someone committed the act half-asleep or half-drunk or almost not master of himself. Note this concerning pollution which occurs in sleep or in drowsiness!

b) If someone, carried away by a most vehement passion, did not retain the full use of reason, for example in anger.

c) If someone labors under pathological states or affections, for example hysteria, mania, phobia, etc.

d) If after the deed someone scarcely remembers what gravely evil thing he did, or if he says firmly to himself that he would never have done it if beforehand he had seriously thought.

⁶⁰ Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 4.

⁶¹ De pecc. diss. 5, a. 6.

⁶² L. c.

⁶³ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 76, a. 3. De malo q. 3, a. 7 ad 7 et 8.

⁶⁴ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 6, a. 8. De malo q. 3, a. 10.

⁶⁵ S. theol. l. c.

366. 3. Perfect consent. Whenever full advertence has been present together with freedom from coercion or violence, perfect consent exists. Therefore fear and passion indeed lessen consent, but they do not take it away, unless, however, they disturb reason. Thus, for example, a woman who is violated, violence having been inflicted, does not sin; on the contrary, she sins if, from grave fear of infamy or of another evil, she permits violation or other lustful acts. Likewise a young man sins who, as grave temptation grows hot, procures pollution, provided however that the use of reason is not utterly disturbed by passion or fear.

Signs of half-perfect consent in doubt about consent given:

a) If someone is of a timorous conscience and habitually abhors committing grave sin.

b) If someone has experienced the desire of doing something evil and nevertheless has abstained from the external act, even if he could easily have sinned externally.

c) If someone, perceiving temptations, is immediately troubled and saddened.

Moreover, in practice the same thing holds concerning consent as was said above concerning advertence: in doubt one must stand for that for which the presumption stands. A man of a timorous conscience, in doubt about sufficient consent, is not judged to have consented fully; it is otherwise if the man has a lax conscience. If the matter remains doubtful, let the confessor leave it to divine judgment.