Section 3: Distinctive Characteristics of Mortal and Venial Sin

1. THE LEADING CRITERIA. —As mortal sins are necessary matter for confession (materia necessaria), the penitent who enters the sacred tribunal must be able to distinguish them with comparative certainty from venial sins. For this purpose Catholic moralists have established the following criteria: a) KNOWLEDGE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRECEPT TRANSGRESSED. —If the precept is of great importance for the moral and social order (materia gravis), and its transgression is likely to entail serious consequences, the sin is grievous (peccatum grave). If, on the other hand, the precept is unimportant (materia parva), and the matter divisible, the sin is light. Note, however, (1) that this objective distinction between serious and light sin is not identical with the distinction between mortal and venial sin, 29 for subjectively or individually a grievous sin may be venial and a venial sin mortal, whereas a grievous sin per se can never be light nor a mortal sin venial. (2) Some precepts and some sins, e. g., simony, blasphemy, murder, fornication, violation of the seal of confession, are essentially indivisible and therefore do not admit of parvitas materiae. (3) The decision regarding the cessation of parvitas materiae or the beginning of a grievous sin is always more or less arbitrary. (4) When a sin is materially grievous, the presumption is that it is a mortal sin, and vice versa.

b) THE DEGREE OF ADVERTENCE REQUIRED FOR A MORTAL SIN. —No one who is unconscious can sin, and one who is half asleep, or partly intoxicated, or feeble-minded, cannot sufficiently appreciate the malice of mortal sin to be guilty of it.¹

¹ Cfr. Matth. XXV, 26; Jas. IV, 17; cfr. Gen. XIX, 33-35; XX, 4-6.

However, to be guilty of mortal sin, a man need not reflect explicitly on the malice of the contemplated act or be fully aware of the importance of the law transgressed. It is sufficient for him to know that the act is sinful. Culpable ignorance, therefore, when it results in the commission of a grievous sin, does not excuse from guilt. Still less is it necessary to commit the sinful act with the full consciousness of offending God. Some writers have construed a distinction between philosophical and theological sin. They define the former as an act contrary to rea- son and the natural law, but involving no conscious violation of a divine precept, and hold that it may be grievous, but never mortal. This theory has been formally condemned by the Church.²

² Prop. Damnat. ab Alexandra VIII. (Aug. 24, 1690), n. 2 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1290).

c) THE FREE CONSENT OF THE WILL. —To make an act mortally sinful, the will must give its full and free consent. This consent need not, however, involve the actual and direct intention of transgressing the moral law. All that is required is that it be full and free.³

³ Cfr. Gury, Compendium Theol. Moralis, Vol. I, n. 150: "For mortal sin three things are necessarily required: (1) matter grave in itself or because of circumstances; (2) full advertence to the malice of the act; (3) full consent of the will to the transgression." —Ibid., n. 153: "For venial sin some advertence, however slight, to the malice and some consent, however imperfect, of the will are required and suffice: they are required because, if they are removed, there can be no knowledge and willing of evil and therefore no sin; but they suffice because, when they are present, the knowledge and willing of evil necessary to constitute sin are present in some manner."

Mortal sin, as we have seen, is a complete turning away from God to the creature. No act is mortally sinful unless the agent clearly perceives its true character and gives full consent. By committing a mortal sin man renders himself guilty of eternal damnation. Now it would be contrary to the goodness and mercy of God to condemn a man to eternal punishment on account of a slight transgression or for an act which was not entirely free or wilful.⁴

⁴ Op. cit.r n. 150: "Full advertence and full consent are required because, since through mortal sin man totally withdraws from God so as to adhere wholly to creatures, this cannot occur unless the sinner deliberately prefers the object of sin to God and absolutely wills to establish his ultimate end in it. Moreover, it is wholly foreign to divine goodness to condemn a man to eternal damnation either for a slight transgression or for an act that is not perfectly free and voluntary."

Some sins are mortal by their very nature or species (peccata mortalia ex genere suo). They are those whose object is important in itself, regardless of conditions or circumstances, e. g., the theft of a large sum of money. Others (peccata mortalia per accidens) are rendered mortal by the attending circumstances, e. g., grave scandal.

Those sins which are mortal by their nature or species are subdivided into peccata mortalia ex toto genere suo and peccata mortalia ex genere suo non toto. Sins of the former class embody some grievous disorder, such as unbelief, despair, etc. Those of the latter class have an object that, though binding under pain of grievous sin, admits of degrees because of the smallness of the matter involved (parvitas materiae), e. g., theft, slander.

There is an analogous distinction between venial sins ex genere suo and per accidens. The former involve an unimportant object, whereas the latter have an important object, but are rendered venial by circumstances.⁵

⁵ Ibid.: "Mortal sins are of these kinds: (1) mortal in their whole genus, when their object or matter, whatever it may be, contains a grave disorder, as in lust, blasphemy, perjury, heresy, etc.; (2) mortal in their genus, but not in the whole genus, or simply mortal in their genus, when their matter, while remaining in the same species, is generally grave, although it can also be light, as are sins against justice; (3) mortal accidentally, that is, when they are mortal not from their object but from some circumstance, for example, from an erroneous conscience, etc." —Cfr. Gopfert, Moraltheologie. Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 224-230.

2. PRACTICAL HINTS. —a) A venial sin can become mortal, ( I ) by the action of an erroneous conscience that wrongly judges a venial sin to be mortal; (2) through a gravely sinful intention (finis pravus), as when a lie is told in order to enable one to commit adultery; (3) on account of the proximate danger of mortal sin; (4) because of formal contempt of the law or the lawgiver, and (5) by reason of grave scandal entailed.

In a similar way, an objectively mortal sin may become subjectively venial, (i) on account of the smallness of the matter involved (parvitas materia); (2) through imperfect advertence or consent to an act in itself gravely sinful (excusable ignorance, extreme haste, weakness); (3) because of failure to consummate an intended sinful action, though it would have been easy to do so. b) When positive doubt exists as to whether an act was mortally sinful or not, this doubt may be resolved in favor of the person concerned if he was so disposed that he would not have committed a mortal sin even though it was easy for him to do so, but would have preferred to die rather than grievously offend God; or if, without his own fault, he was not entirely master of his actions; or if he is uncertain whether he consented to the sinful act or remembers that he proceeded timidly or in doubt.

Though, strictly speaking, no mortal sin can become venial, and no venial sin mortal, because of the essential difference existing between the two, a person who constantly commits venial sins with full deliberation thereby forms evil habits, which will sooner or later precipitate him into mortal sin and rob his soul of sanctifying grace. It is in this sense that the Scholastics say that venial sin disposes the soul to mortal sin.⁶

⁶ Cfr. Ecclus. XIX, 1; Luke XVI, 10. —St. Augustine, Tract, in loa., 12, n. 14: "Many small sins, if neglected, kill. Drops are small, yet they fill rivers; grains of sand are small, yet if much sand is piled on, it presses and crushes. A neglected bilge does what an onrushing wave does: it enters gradually through the bilge, but by entering for a long time and not being pumped out, it sinks the ship. What is pumping out except acting by good works so that sins do not overwhelm us—by groaning, fasting, giving, and forgiving?" (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 1492).—IDEM, Serm., 56, c. 9, n. 12: "If all these things are gathered against us, do they therefore not weigh us down because they are small? What difference does it make whether lead or sand presses you? Lead is one mass; sand is small grains, but by their multitude they press you. Sins are small. Do you not see rivers filled from tiny drops and foundations swept away? They are small, but they are many." (P. L., XXXVIII, 383)-—IDEM, Serm., 58, c. 9, n. 10: "Let sins be forgiven; let past sins be forgiven; let future sins cease. But you cannot live here without them, whether they are lesser, small, or light. Yet let those light and small sins not be despised. Rivers are filled from tiny drops. Let not even lesser things be despised. Through narrow cracks water seeps into the ship, the bilge is filled, and if the bilge is neglected the ship sinks." (P. L., XXXVIII, 398).—Pseudo-Augustine, Append. Serm., 292 (a/. 244 de tempore), n. 6: "Do not despise your sins because they are small, but fear because they are many. For drops of rain too are small, but they fill rivers, carry off great masses, and uproot trees with their roots." (P. L., XXXIX, 2999).—St. Gregory the Great, Moral., |. 10, c. 11, n. 21: "From vanity we are led to iniquity." (P. L., LXXV, 933).— St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, q. 88, art. 3: "Venial sin can by a certain consequence dispose toward a sin that is mortal on the part of the agent. For when the disposition or habit is increased by acts of venial sins, the desire of sinning can grow to such a degree that the sinner will place his end in a venial sin. For to everyone who has a habit, insofar as he has it, the end is operation according to the habit; and thus by sinning venially many times he will be disposed toward mortal sin." —IDEM, ibid., art. 4: "Not all the venial sins in the world can have as much guilt as one mortal sin. But if it is understood that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, this is true according to the two modes of disposition by which venial sin disposes toward mortal sin." —IDEM, ibid., 2a 2ae, q. 186, art. 9: “Venial sin is a disposition toward mortal sin insofar as it hinders those things by which one is disposed to observe the principal precepts of the law of Christ, which are the precepts of charity.” —Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. i, n. *53: "Venial sins, however much multiplied, can never of themselves and by reason of multiplication coalesce into a mortal sin, because each remains in the inferior species. Sometimes, however, by reason of matter accumulating they attain to mortal sin, as happens especially in matters of justice."

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. 88.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 161 sqq.—Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 136 sqq—H. Gerigk, Wesen und Voraussetzungen der Todsünde, Untersuchung der Frage nach dem Wesensunterschiede zwischen dem Peccatum Mortale und Veniale, Breslau 1903, especially pp. 96 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 328 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 193 sqq.—Sabetti-Barrett, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., 22nd ed., pp. 113 sqq. —A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Pastor., Vol. II, pp. 253 sqq.—L. Billot, S.J., Disquisitio de Natura et Ratione Peccati, Rome 1900, th. I sqq. —H. E. Manning, Sin and its Consequences, Ch. I, sqq. (French tr. by Maillet, Le Peché et ses Consequences, Avignon 1894, Ch. I sqq.)- —B. V. Miller, "Mortal and Venial Sin in the Early Church," Irish Eccl. Record, March 1921, No. 639, pp. 236-256. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 355 sqq., 368 sqq. —A. Landgraf, Das Wesen der lässlichen Sünde in der Scholastik bis Thomas von Aquin, Bamberg 1923.