Chapter — Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Chapter II. On the Gravity of Sin

127.

The gravity of sin is the quantity or measure of malice by which sin is more or less offensive to God: it is called mortal if, because of the violation of a law gravely obliging, it dissolves divine friendship and renders man guilty of eternal damnation; otherwise it will be venial. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 88, art. 1.

It must be noted here that some sins are said to be mortal from their whole genus, and others simply mortal from their genus (not whole). The former are those whose matter, of itself, setting aside erroneous conscience, semi-full advertence, or imperfect consent, always contains grave disorder within its whole genus, as happens in lust, blasphemy, heresy, etc. But the others are those whose matter, within its genus, is now grave, now slight, of which sort are sins against justice. - But sins are said to be venial from their genus which, considered according to the matter or nature of the object, do not admit grave guilt within their genus, and therefore, until they are transferred into another genus by a new mortal deformity accruing from elsewhere, they cannot be mortal. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 51. - Lacroix, n. 199.

I say 1st. Not all sins are equal, but some are graver than others. Proof 1st. from Sacred Scripture: Jerem. vii, 26: "And they have done worse than their fathers." St. John xix, 11: "He who handed me over to you has the greater sin." Proof 2nd. from reason. What is said, with due proportion, of the injuries of men against God must be said of the injuries of sons against parents, or of subjects against Princes; but these certainly differ among themselves by reason of gravity: therefore those also. Besides, sins are opposition to virtues and precepts; but some virtues are more excellent than others, and some precepts are graver than others; therefore opposition to these will be graver or less grave. From another side also the evil intention of the delinquent can admit various degrees of malice, as is clear. Therefore.

I say 2nd. There are mortal sins. Proof 1st. from Sacred Scripture. I Cor. vi, 9, 10: "Do not err: neither fornicators, nor those serving idols, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor those who lie with males, nor thieves, nor the avaricious, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor the rapacious will possess the kingdom of God." Rom. i, 32: "Those who do such things are worthy of death." I St. John iii, 14: "He who does not love remains in death." Add innumerable other testimonies of Sacred Scripture, from which it is very clearly established that many men, because of their sins, are to be rejected by God and tormented with eternal penalties. Proof 2nd. from the authority of the Church: for the Church teaches that there are mortal sins. Thus Trent, sess. 6, can. 27: If anyone shall have said that there is no mortal sin except that of infidelity, or that grace once received is lost by no other sin, however grave and enormous, except the sin of infidelity, let him be anathema. Likewise sess. 14, c. 5 says: It is necessary that all mortal sins be recounted by penitents in confession.

I say 3rd. There are merely venial sins. Proof 1st. from Sacred Scripture: Prov. xxiv, 16: "The just man will fall seven times." Therefore he who falls or sins while he is just does not sin mortally, since he is not deprived of justice: therefore only venially. Therefore. Likewise St. James iii, 2: In many things we all offend; but we do not all sin mortally, since many are just before God, as is clear from many places of the Old and New Testament, for example, as is said of Zachariah and Elizabeth, Luke i, 6; of St. Joseph, Matt. i, 19, etc. Therefore there are just persons not immune from sin; therefore there are venial sins. Proof 2nd. from the definition of the Church; in Trent, in the place cited above, it is said: "Venial sins, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God, and into which we fall more frequently, can be expiated by many other remedies (besides the Sacrament of Penance)." It is clear also from proposition 20 of Baius, condemned by Pius V and other Supreme Pontiffs, which sounds thus: "There is no sin venial by its own nature, but every sin merits eternal penalty." Proof 3rd. from reason: for among friends there are slight offenses which do not dissolve friendship; therefore similarly such offenses ought to be given toward God. Therefore.

Cited by 1 passage

128.

Questions

Question 1. What things are required for mortal sin?

Response. Three things are necessarily required, namely grave matter either in itself or because of circumstances; full advertence to the grave malice of the act; full consent of the will into the transgression. Therefore:

There is required 1st. grave matter, otherwise a law obliging under grave sin could not be had.

There is required 2nd. full advertence of mind, otherwise there will not be full deliberation.

There is required 3rd. full consent of the will, because unless the sinner, with full consent and full deliberation, prefers the object of sin to God, and thus establishes his ultimate end in the creature, he cannot be said to withdraw totally from God. Besides, it is altogether alien to the divine goodness to consign man to eternal damnation either because of a slight transgression or because of an act not perfectly free and voluntary. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 5, 6, and 53.

128, Q. 2.

Question 2. What things are required for venial sin?

Response. For venial sin there are required and suffice some advertence, however slight, to the malice of the act, and some consent of the will, however imperfect: they are required indeed because, when these have been removed, there can be no cognition and volition of evil, and therefore no sin; but they suffice because, when these have been posited, cognition and volition of evil, which are necessary for constituting sin, are had in some way.

128, Q. 3.

Question 3. In what way can sins be recognized as mortal by reason of matter?

Response. A threefold rule is assigned.

Rule I. Recourse must be had to Sacred Scripture, and those sins must be judged mortal which in Sacred Scripture are declared worthy of death, or exclude from the kingdom of heaven, or which are expressed with the particle woe, which indeed denotes truly grave deformity. Thus the Apostle says concerning the works of the flesh, Galat. v, 19: "Which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury ... I foretell to you, as I have foretold, that those who do such things will not possess the kingdom of God." - Recall also the long series of mortal sins which the Apostle enumerates, I Cor. vi, 9 and 10.

Rule II. Recourse must be had to the Church, or to the definitions of the Supreme Pontiffs, to the Decrees of general Councils, etc., in which many things are declared mortal, or only venial. For the Church is the pillar of truth, and therefore from her doctrine the rule and measure of morals is to be taken.

Rule III. Recourse must be had to the Holy Fathers, to the Doctors of the Church, and also to the common doctrine of theologians. For the Holy Fathers and Doctors were placed by God in the midst of the Church as burning lamps for driving away the darkness of error, and for illuminating the faithful in the way of truth. But theologians know better than others how to interpret the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers, and the Decrees of the Church, and how to compare cases not defined with defined ones, cases not declared with declared ones, and from parity or similitude to draw opportune conclusions. Therefore those things which by them unanimously or almost unanimously are held as mortal are to be judged as such; for the consent of Doctors is an indication of truth.

But when the preceding rules are lacking, it is very difficult to determine when a sin is grave or slight. Generally there are judged grave 1st. all sins which are directly against God or some perfection of his: likewise all sins which tend to the grave prejudice of the human race, as are the species of lust; 2nd. all sins which gravely repugn the end of great moment intended by the law, such as the omission of fast, Mass, annual confession, paschal communion, etc.; 3rd. all sins by which the neighbor is gravely injured in the goods of life, fortune, reputation, etc., such as homicide, detraction very harmful to the neighbor, notable theft, etc.

For the rest, the limits between mortal and venial sin very often can in no way be determined, as is clear from the innumerable controversies of the Doctors concerning this matter. But a mortal sin is not to be asserted unless it is certainly established concerning it, as St. Alphonsus rightly notes. Cf. Systema Mor.; and de Sacram. Poenit., nn. 604 and 605.

128, Q. 4.

128. Question 4. In what way does a sin mortal from its genus become venial, and vice versa?

Response. A sin mortal from its genus can become venial in a fourfold way, namely by reason of: 1st. smallness of matter; 2nd. imperfect advertence; 3rd. imperfect consent; 4th. erroneous conscience. But a sin venial from its genus can become mortal: 1st. by reason of erroneous conscience; 2nd. by reason of scandal; 3rd. by reason of an end gravely evil; 4th. by reason of formal contempt of the law, or of the authority commanding; 5th. by reason of an evil affection toward a thing otherwise slightly evil, so that one is prepared to transgress even a precept obliging gravely; 6th. by reason of danger or of a proximate occasion of falling into mortal sin; 7th. finally by reason of any circumstance which contains mortal malice in itself and accedes to the act, as St. Thomas well observes, in such a way that it changes its species. - Cf. St. Thom. 1-2, q. 88, art. 1, 2, and 5. - St. Alphonsus, n. 54.

128, Q. 5.

Question 5. Would he sin gravely who wished to avoid only mortal sins, and cared not at all about committing venial sins?

Response. Negatively, more probably, according to a sufficiently common opinion of theologians, even if this were done from purpose, and not from mere carelessness, provided contempt or peculiar frailty is excluded. The reason is that a soul so disposed does not of itself and necessarily introduce a proximate danger of sinning gravely. But in practice the matter is slippery, since facility in sinning venially is the cause why the soul is gradually weakened, and more easily at length is overcome by grave temptations, according to that saying of Ecclus. xix, 1: "He who despises little things will fall little by little." - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de Praeceptis partic., n. 12.

128, Q. 6.

Question 6. Does he sin gravely who deliberates about furnishing consent to a gravely illicit thing, if at last he does not consent?

Response. The solution of the question depends on the quality of the deliberation; for if this is imperfect, namely if it is nothing but a certain hesitation, or an omission of resistance arising from torpor, sluggishness, or negligence, the sin will not exceed venial. - But if the deliberation is full, the sin will certainly be mortal, because the will then implicitly places some created good before God; for by the very fact that it seriously deliberates, weighing on either side the advantages and temporal evils arising from sin, it shows itself prepared to violate the law if it shall have perceived some utility in this violation. - Cf. Lacroix, nn. 226 and seq. - Sanchez, in Decalog., lib. 1, cap. 1, n. 16.

128, Q. 7.

Question 7. Does he sin gravely who, without sufficient cause, places an action from which he is going to suffer base motions?

Response. 1st. Affirmatively, when a man stirs up these evil motions deliberately. For such a one consents to evil delectation to such a degree that he expressly seeks it.

2nd. Negatively, when, no cause being given on the part of the one suffering, these motions arise naturally and spontaneously, and the danger of consent is absent, as the matter is evident.

3rd. Affirmatively, when he places an action which of itself gravely influences these evil motions, and which itself is a grave sin in the genus of lust. Thus St. Alphonsus, lib. 3, n. 482: "If the cause of pollution gravely influences it and the man does not abstain from placing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed as sin, even if it was not intended, provided that it was foreseen at least in a confused way. Causes of this kind are without doubt all those which of themselves are grave faults in the genus of lust. Therefore all pollutions arising from these causes certainly are mortal. And then (note this) that base act which is the cause of pollution has a special malice against nature." And again in the same place, n. 484: "The common and more probable opinion teaches that it is not mortal unless it arises from a cause mortal of itself in the genus of lust. The reason why the cause ought to be mortal is that, since pollution is not willed in itself but only in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil. The reason why the cause ought, besides, to be evil in the same genus of lust is that, since the cause concurs only slightly toward pollution, there is not a grave obligation of avoiding it on account of pollution, which happens beyond intention."

Therefore if there is present a just reason for placing a licit action, for example, to study, to heal, to hear confessions, no guilt is contracted from these effects: likewise no guilt, if a cause outside the genus of lust in no way influences of itself the evil effects, but these follow only by accident: there will be only slight guilt if a cause outside the genus of lust only slightly influences the effects. If the action is within the genus of lust, an indirectly voluntary gravely evil effect will be imputed only when the action itself gravely and proximately influences this effect and is a mortal sin against the sixth.

You Will Resolve. 1st. Where it is not clear that some sin is grave, the confessor ought not to be hasty in judging that it is actually grave, both objectively and subjectively, because in doubt one must stand for the minimum, or at least the matter is to be left to divine judgment. - St. Alphonsus, n. 52.

2nd. In doubt concerning perfect consent you will judge in favor of the penitent: 1st. if he is of a timorous conscience and habitually prepared rather to die than to offend God; 2nd. if, becoming more fully advertent to the temptation, he was terrified and at once repelled it; 3rd. if he does not know whether, awake or sleeping, whether fully master of himself, he did or willed anything evil. Elbel, n. 578. - St. Alphonsus, lib. 6, n. 476.

3rd. A confessor does not satisfy his office if he applies no care by which he removes the penitent from frequency of venial sins, especially of those which are admitted with full advertence. For one who strives in no way at all to avoid venial sins is accustomed little by little at length to slip into mortal sin. - See Cases, n. 144 and seq. - Roncaglia, c. 1.