Damage to reputation

When one has injured another’s reputation by slander or detraction, he is under a grave obligation in serious matters to restore his neighbour’s good name as far as he is able, and to make reparation for all other damage which the injured party has suffered in consequence of the slander or detraction. If he has lost his position or money, restitution of these must be made as far as possible, We saw above that more probably the detractor is not bound to pay money precisely in compensation for the injured reputation, unless condemned to do so by competent authority. The mode of restoring the injured reputation of another will vary according to circumstances. If no other way presents itself, the slanderer must say that he spoke falsely, for the reputation of the innocent is of more consequence than that of the guilty. A detractor who has injured the good name of another by making known his secret sin, cannot, of course, say that he spoke falsely, but he must do what he can in some other way towards the desired end. There will be no obligation to do anything if the calumny or detraction has been forgotten, or if the injured party has lost his reputation in some other way, or if the injured party prefers that the matter should not be reopened, or if it is physically or morally impossible now to do anything towards restoring his good name.

Cf. Part VIII, on the eighth precept, where the injury of reputation is treated, and, because of the connection of the matter, also the injury of the other goods enumerated is discussed.

Duty of a Lawyer When the Justice of a Cause Is Doubtful.—(a) In a civil cause, the lawyer may act, whether for the plaintiff or for the defendant. He may even take a case whose justice seems less probable, for the purpose of the trial is to settle the doubt, and not infrequently the cause that seemed doubtful or less probable at the outset is vindicated by the examination. Some moralists distinguish for cases in which the doubt is one of fact between the defendant and the plaintiff: if the former’s case is less or equally probable, they say, one may take it, but not so if this is true of the latter’s case.

(b) In a criminal case, when life, reputation or other grave issue is involved, the common opinion is that a lawyer may not prosecute if the case of the people is doubtful or less probable, but he may defend, as was just said, even though he is certain that the accused is guilty. The office of the prosecutor is not necessarily to secure a conviction, but to see that justice is upheld, while the office of the defender is to take care that an accused person is deprived of no right or protection that he should have under the law.

Defamation.—Defamation (backbiting) is the unjust blackening of the reputation of another person by secret words.

(a) It is unjust, that is, it has no reasonable motive to justify it. Defamation differs from just revelation of secret faults.

(b) It is a blackening or besmirching, that is, a taking away or lessening of fame. Defamation casts a shadow over or totally obscures the brilliance of a good reputation.

(c) It is against reputation, that is, against the favorable opinion and report of the public on the virtue and character or other good qualities of a person, Thus, it is defamation to say that an individual is a drunkard, or that a professional man is incompetent, if these persons are not known to have such defects. If a person has no reputation here and now, except a bad one (e.g., a criminal who has just been convicted and sentenced to prison, a loafer who is often seen intoxicated on the streets, a woman who is often heard peddling scandals), it is not defamation to speak about the true and public faults of this person; nor is it sinful to speak thus if there is some suitable reason (e.g., to discuss a murder trial that is being reported in the papers, or to tell a humorous incident that will do no harm). But those who uselessly or harmfully discuss the known weaknesses of their neighbors are sinners called gossipers or fault-finders.

(d) It is against the reputation of a person, that is, of an individual possessed of right. The party offended by defamation can be a natural person (i.e., a rational being, whether infant or adult, high or low, rich or poor) or an artificial person (i.e., a society, group or collection of individuals endowed with reason); he can be either a living or a deceased person, for death does not destroy the soul nor take away the right to reputation.

(e) It is against the reputation of another, that is, defamation as now used is a sin of injustice, and one cannot be strictly unjust to oneself; but “self-defamation” may be used in a wider sense to designate a sin opposed to charity (see 1575 sqq.).

(f) It is accomplished by means of words, that is, by oral communication or its equivalent. One can defame, therefore, by word of mouth, by deaf and dumb language, by writing, by a gesture, by silence, or by a look.

(g) It is done by words or signs that are secret, that is, by words or signs expressed before others but in the absence of the person who is defamed, or at least when he is thought to be absent (backbiting). The defamer is like the thief who wishes to do harm but does not wish the victim to know the author of the harm.

The Differences between Defamation and Contumely.—(a) They differ in their purposes, for the defamer intends to hurt another in his reputation before the public, while the contumelious man intends to hurt another in his honor, either in his own eyes or in those of others. (b) They differ in their manner of procedure, for defamation is behind the back, contumely before the face, of the party who is injured. The defamer has some respect for his enemy, for he fears to face him and resorts to undermining, but the contumelious sinner despises his enemy and shows it by insulting him to his face.

Various Forms of Injury to Good Name.—(a) By reason of the intention, the injury is either defamatory (as when derogatory things are said about another behind his back) or contumelious (as when derogatory things are insultingly said to him in his presence). Hence, there can be injury to reputation that is not contumelious (e.g., the secret spreading of a rumor that Balbus is a drunkard); there can be contumely that is not injurious to fame (e.g., the addressing of Balbus as a drunkard when no else is by, or when those present know already that he is a drunkard), and contumely that is injurious to reputation (e.g., when one calls Balbus a drunkard before others who thought he was a sober man).

(b) By reason of the purpose, defamation is willed either explicitly or implicitly. In the former case the defamer expressly intends the blackening of his neighbor’s reputation; in the latter case he intends something unnecessary, such as mere indulgence of levity or talkativeness, though the blackening of his neighbor is foreseen. Explicit defamation is regularly a mortal offense, implicit defamation a venial one; but the degrees of sinfulness may be changed, if the former sin causes slight, or the latter sin serious damage.

(c) By reason of the injury done defamation is either detraction or calumny. Detraction blackens a reputation by revealing faults or defects that are real; calumny (slander) injures reputation by stories that are untrue. A common form of calumny is a mixture of truth and falsehood (e.g., when a historian ascribes to a villain, in addition to real crimes, faults of which the latter was innocent), or of half-truths that convey the impression of what is untrue (e.g., when a historian narrates that a certain character killed a man and does not give the background or causes of the killing, such as provocation, challenge, mistake; or when a biographer tells of the crimes of his subject and glosses over the virtues, or makes no mention of his amendment).

(d) By reason of the means used defamation is either direct or indirect. Direct defamation is more open and positive; indirect defamation is rather concealed or negative. There is also the distinction of slander (which is oral) and libel (which is written or printed). Libel is more grievous, since it has a permanence that is not found in spoken words.

Examples of Indirect Defamation.—(a) Faint praise is a subtle mode of defamation, as when one says of an absent person that he has not committed murder yet, or that like everyone he has some good points, for to the listeners this indicates that the speaker does no hold a high opinion of the person discussed.

(b) Silence is also at times a hidden form of defamation, as when Titus says to Balbus that the absent Caius is good and Balbus out of malice answers: “Let’s talk about something else; we must be charitable”, or when Sempronius falsely declares in company that the absent Claudius is to the knowledge of Julius a depraved character and Julius, who is present, makes no protest against the misrepresentation.

(c) Depreciation is defamatory, as when one says that a person who is being discussed is not as pious or reliable as is commonly believed, or that there is great room for improvement, or that he is much better now than in times past, or that there is another side to the picture, or that he is good, but....

(d) Denial of good qualities is defamatory, when it lessens the esteem in which a person is held. The good qualities here referred to are those that render a person distinguished or commendable among his fellows: chiefly these are moral qualities (viz., virtuous habits, dispositions and acts); secondarily, natural and internal qualities (such as learning, quickness of mind, experience, strength and health of body, and in women, beauty); finally, natural and external goods (such as wealth, famous ancestry, able assistants in business, or the excellent merchandise supplied, etc.).

Examples of Direct Defamation.—The following are examples of direct defamation:

(a) sinister interpretation, as when one states that words or acts of a neighbor that were good or at least open to a good interpretation, were dictated by greed, ambition, pride, etc.;

(b) unjust revelation (detraction), as when one reveals secret faults or crimes;

(c) exaggeration, as when one magnifies a venial into a mortal sin, an exceptional or indeliberate fault into an habitual or deliberate sin; or when one distorts a sin of one species into a sin of another and far more heinous species, or accuses a whole class or body of men because one of their number has fallen. Those who add their own little detail or circumstance to a defamatory tale as they pass it along are proverbial examples of exaggeration: “Fama crescit eundo”;

(d) false accusation (calumny) is the worst kind of defamation. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that one may probably use calumny without serious sin as a defense of one’s own justice and honor (see Denzinger, n. 1194).

Direct defamation is committed either by plain words or by insinuation. (a) Examples of defamation by innuendo are those ambiguous expressions or half-veiled accusations that arouse suspicion and often do more injury than plain accusations. Thus, to say with a laugh or in an ironical tone that a certain person is human, or broadminded, or prudent may be equal to volumes of abuse, since the words can have a bad meaning as well as a good one. Similarly, such expressions as, “What I know about him is not to be told,” “I know what no one would believe,” etc., may be taken for slurs on character.

(b) Examples of defamation by plain speech are all those innumerable statements which, either in general terms (e.g., that another person is a scoundrel, a villain, a reprobate) or in specific ones (e.g., that another person is a blasphemer, a thief, a liar), tend to blacken the good name of a neighbor.

Sinfulness of Detraction.—The civil law does not generally punish slander if the slanderer can prove that his statements are true, but this does not make veracious defamation morally lawful. God detests and punishes crimes (e.g., fornication) of which human law sometimes takes no account. The harmfulness of veracious defamation is both public and private.

(a) Defamation Does Public Harm.—The peace and order of the community would be seriously disturbed, if it were lawful to attack reputations simply because one was persuaded that they were unfounded: the person detracted would be hampered in his official business and social relations, innocent persons would be blackened as well as the guilty, and the friends and relatives would suffer with the person detracted.

(b) Defamation Does Private Harm.—The peace and security of the individual would be uselessly assailed. Reputation is profitable both in spiritual and temporal ways, and it is therefore a ruthless act to rob a person of it, when he has done nothing in public to forfeit it and its possession by him is harmful to no one.

Right to True and False Reputation. There is, nevertheless, a difference between the right to a true and the right to a false reputation.

(a) Thus, the right to a true reputation is an absolute and universal right, one which does not cease in any case, for truth and justice demand that one should not represent as evil a person who is really good. This right applies to an extraordinary, as well as to an ordinary reputation.

(b) The right to a false reputation is a relative and limited right, one which ceases when the common good on which it rests no longer supports it (e.g., when it cannot be maintained without injustice). Moreover, there is no right to an extraordinary reputation, if it is based on false premises, for the common good does not require such a right, and hence it is not detraction to show that the renown of an individual for superior skill or success is built up on advertising alone or merely on uninformed rumor.

Sinfulness of Gossip or Criticism about Real and Known Defects.—(a) It is not unjust, per se, since it does not take away fame, that being non-existent. (b) It is sinful, if there is no sufficient reason for it, but not mortally sinful per se, since grave harm is not done to the reputation of one whose reputation is already bad. The sin committed is usually that of idle talk or of uncharitableness, by reason of the disedification offered the listeners, or the malice that prompts the speaker, or the sadness that is caused to the person gossiped about. Gossip is dangerous, since it prepares the way for detraction, as detraction prepares the way for calumny.

Moral Species of Defamation.—(a) Moralists agree that wrongful defamation is a sin against justice and charity. It violates justice, since it infringes a right which is not less strict than that of proprietorship over goods of fortune; it violates charity, since it is opposed to friendship and love of neighbor. They also agree that other species of sin can be added to defamation (e.g., infidelity, as when one denies that Christ was sinless, or blasphemy, as when one defames a Saint).

(b) Moralists disagree on the question whether certain forms of defamation are distinct sub-species or only degrees of one lowest species. Some hold that detraction and calumny are distinct species, because calumny adds mendacity to defamation; others say that detractions about specifically different sins are distinct kinds of detraction (e.g., that it is one species of sin to say that a neighbor is a drunkard, and another species to say that he is a thief, and the reason is that the reputation for temperance is a different thing from the reputation for honesty, etc.); still others hold that defamation of parents and other immediate relations is a special form of defamation, as being contrary to piety. There are, on the contrary, theologians who reject all these distinctions and hold that the difference between defamations is only one of more or less, since all of them have the characteristic note of attack on reputation, which is one right. Hence, just as the stealing of a cow and the stealing of a cat are only greater and lesser forms of the sin of theft, so likewise calumny and detraction, etc., are only major and minor degrees of the sin of defamation (see 2012, 2013, 2115).

Species of Sins of Defamation.—Since the species of sins must be particularized in confessions, the question of the distinction between defamations has practical importance. The common opinion on the line of action to be observed seems to be as follows:

(a) the penitent is obliged as a rule in serious matters to tell whether his defamation was simple detraction or calumny. The reason for this, according to some, is the specific difference between these two sins; according to others, the reason is that otherwise the confessor cannot know whether the sin was mortal or venial, or what restitution is to be imposed. As to detraction of parents or superiors, it seems that the quality of the person detracted should be mentioned, if there was any incitement to disrespect or disobedience;

(b) the penitent is not obliged to mention the sins or defects he ascribed to the person he defamed. Nor should the confessor inquire about this unless it is necessary in order to know what was the gravity of the sin or what kind of reparation should be enjoined (cfr. 2013). Moreover, questions about what was said might easily lead to a disclosure of the name of the person defamed, and thus the confessional would be turned into a place of defamation.

The Numerical Multiplication of Defamations.—(a) They are multiplied when there are many sinful acts about distinct objects; for example, when Balbus calumniates Caius today as a thief and Claudius tomorrow as another thief, there are two calumnies (see 209).

(b) Defamations are multiplied when there are many sinful acts about the same object; for example, when Balbus calumniates Caius today as a thief and repeats the same calumny tomorrow, there are two calumnies. But if Balbus begins his story today and does not finish it till tomorrow, there is one calumny (see 214, 215).

(c) Defamations are multiplied when there is one sinful act about many distinct objects; for example, when Balbus calumniates by saying that the two worst thieves he knows are Caius and Claudius, there are two sins. But if Caius and Claudius are regarded as a unit (e.g., if they are the firm of Caius and Claudius), there is one sin. A like calumny would be that Caius came from a dishonest family (see 216-219). If Balbus calumniates Caius before ten persons, he does not commit ten defamations, it seems, but ten scandals, since the ten form a body in the matter of fame, but are individuals in the matter of example. If Balbus calumniates by saying that Caius has broken all of the ten commandments, there may be ten calumnies or but one calumny, according to the intention and the effect (see 217, 218).

The Theological Species of Defamation.—(a) From its nature defamation is a mortal sin, and hence the Apostle declares (Rom, i. 29, 30) that detractors are hateful to God. In the first place, it inflicts an atrocious injury on the public welfare, sowing everywhere hatreds, dissensions and disorders—so much so that detractors are rightly called an abomination to mankind (Prov., xxiv. 9).

(b) From the smallness of the matter or the imperfection of the act defamation may be only a venial sin. Criticism of others is a vice so widespread that almost all mankind (even pious persons) would be involved in continual mortal sins, were it not for the fact that sins of speech are frequently the result of ignorance, thoughtlessness, or sudden passion (James, iii. 2 sqq.), and that the things said are frequently of no great harm to the person criticized.

The gravity of the harm done by defamation is well expressed by St. Bernard when he says that defamation at one blow inflicts a mortal Wound on the person defamed, on the defamer himself, and on the listener.

(a) Thus, the person defamed is robbed and often irreparably of a good name, one of the most esteemed of possessions; he is deprived of many spiritual and temporal opportunities, and is frequently dragged down to social and moral ruin, and even to suicide. Scripture says that the tongue of the detractor has the sharpness of a razor, and it compares him to an arrow dipped in poison, and to a biting serpent.

(b) The defamer destroys his own good name, at least in the sight of God, for he defiles his own soul with guilt; he disgraces himself before others, since it is well known that defamation is the vice of those who feel themselves inferior or guilty. And, worst of all, his sin is seldom repented of or repaired by satisfaction, since the defamer is generally too proud, hateful, jealous or revengeful to acknowledge his error, or is so blind that the thought of the harm he has done and of the grave obligation of satisfaction never crosses his mind.

(c) The listener is scandalized and contaminated by what he hears, his ideals are shattered, his respect for virtue or religion is destroyed, and he is encouraged to continue the work of the defamer.

Comparison of Defamation with Other Injuries against the Neighbor.—(a) Defamation is less sinful than injuries to internal goods, and hence homicide and adultery, which are opposed to the good of the body and of life itself, are graver sins than defamation.

(b) Defamation is less sinful than injury to higher external goods perpetrated in a contemptuous manner, for defamation being secret does not add insult to injury. Hence, just as robbery is more offensive than theft, so is contumely more sinful than defamation.

(c) Defamation is more sinful than injury to lower external goods, such as lands and money, for fame along with honor approaches spiritual things on account of their relation to virtue, whereas wealth is of the order of corporeal things. Hence, the Scriptures teach that a good name is more important than great riches (Prov., xxii. 1), more enduring than thousands of vast and precious treasures (Ecclus., xli, 15).

Rule for Determining the Seriousness of Defamation.—The rule for determining whether the matter of defamation is serious or not is the amount of harm done by the defamation, and hence not one but several factors have to be considered.

(a) Thus, the defect ascribed to the neighbor has to be considered, for some kinds of defects (e.g., littleness of body or prodigality) are less disgraceful than others (e.g., dwarfishness of mind or soul or niggardliness), and it is more harmful to reveal one mortal sin than to reveal a hundred venial sins.

(b) The person defamed is to be considered, for imputed defects that are not harmful to one person may be harmful to another (e.g., the charge of being a toper might be considered praise among persons of gay or rough habits, but it would be regarded as disgraceful among serious and refined persons).

(c) The person who defames is also to be considered, for little attention is paid to the talk of some, but much weight is given to the slightest words of others. Indeed, some persons’ condemnation is equivalent to praise.

(d) Finally, the persons before whom the defamation is spoken are to be considered, for everyone knows that it is much more harmful and dangerous to speak ill of others before certain ones than before others (cfr. 1461, 1462).

The Harm Done by Reason of the Defects Revealed.—(a) If the defects are natural imperfections of soul or body that do not connote moral stain or turpitude, and if no great detriment is caused by revelation (e.g., to say that another person is deaf, hunchbacked, a beggar, or dense), disclosure is not in itself serious, or even sinful; for little or no harm is done, and the defects are of such a character that they can be readily discovered by observation. But if the defects are very ignominious or harmful, defamation is a grave sin (e.g., to say that a very distinguished person is illegitimate, or of a mixed race, or that his immediate relative was a criminal).

(b) If the defects are related to moral stain, but do not imply it, revelation of them is not a grave sin, provided no great loss is caused by it (e.g., to say that a person is scrupulous about himself, or has certain peccadillos or human imperfections). If a shortcoming is usually understood as a propensity rather than as a fault (e.g., quick temper, high-strung disposition, pride, closeness with money), there is little if any harm done by speaking of it. But if the defects mentioned are such as imply or insinuate actual moral lapses (e.g., to say that a person has a venereal disease and the cause is unknown, or that he has delirium tremens or morphinism, or is of a very passionate nature), the revelation is defamatory and more or less sinful.

(c) If the defects are moral, he who reveals them is guilty of sinful defamation. But the harm done by the imputation of moral guilt is greater in some cases and less in others. Some sins are more disgraceful from their degradation (e.g., carnal sins, see 224), and from this point of view it is worse to accuse a neighbor of gluttony or sexual irregularity than of pride. Some sins (e.g., solicitation, sodomy) are especially heinous in the eyes of the law and produce legal infamy, because they are more harmful to the public or more subject to public contempt (see Canons 2320, 2328, 2343, 2351, 2356, 2357). There are also some defamations that are less harmful to reputation, but more damaging to material prosperity (e.g., it is usually more hurtful to the prospects of a person in business to be charged with incompetency, dishonesty, or carelessness than to be charged with religious indifference or impurity). Finally, there are gradations in the malice of the same kinds of sin (see 197), as in the angry thought, the angry word, the angry deed, in tipsiness and drunkenness, in occasional and habitual lying, etc.

Is it sinful to narrate the secret faults of another, if at the same time one tells of his repentance and amendment?

(a) If the infamy remains in spite of the remarks about a change of life for the better (as is generally the case), the narrator is guilty of sinful detraction. Thus, it is very harmful to one in an exalted position if it is given out that he was at one time bibacious, but succeeded in thoroughly curing his appetite. The same principle applies to those who praise in one matter and detract in another (e.g., by stating that a person is very learned, but also very dishonest).

(b) If the infamy does not remain, because the atonement is so extraordinary as to make the hearers think little or nothing about the fault, the narrator is not guilty of sinful detraction. Thus, it is not detraction to narrate that a saint was so grieved over a lie he told that he did lifelong penance for it, or that a person who was once lukewarm—a thing that is quite common—has in later years become fervent in an uncommon degree. But the stigma that attaches to uncommon sins or carnal sins is hardly overcome by the mention of repentance, unless the person spoken of is already long dead or is one from whom very little is expected.

The Harm Done by Reason of the Person Defamed.—(a) Serious faults are sometimes attributed to certain persons without serious sin, because, on account of the life led by these persons or the notoriety they have already achieved, they suffer no serious detriment when defects like to those already known are charged against them. Thus, if it is well known that a person keeps company with a fast set or consorts with a tough gang, he suffers little if one reveals that he uses profanity, gambles, drinks to excess, etc.; and if it is known that a person has these vices, he is not harmed much by mention of a particular instance or by the additional report that he has been arrested for cheating and disorderly conduct. But the case is different if defects unlike those already known are charged (e.g., if one says of a person known as a liar that he is also a thief), unless the person spoken of has so black a name as an all-around cheat that no new crime charged to his account can give a deeper dye to his reputation.

(b) Light faults or acts that are not sinful in themselves are sometimes matter of grave defamation when spoken of certain persons, namely, when so much is expected from these persons that even minor defects are serious blots on their fame. Thus, to say that a layman is a confirmed liar or loves the opposite sex might be only a venial sin or no sin at all, but the same statements about a grave cleric would be seriously defamatory.

Meaning of the Expression “Infamous in a Certain Place.”—(a) The place referred to is either a closed community (e.g., a monastery, a college, a family) or an open community (e.g., a village, a neighborhood, a parish, a town, a city); (b) the notoriety referred to is either universal (i.e. known to all the community), or general (i.e., known to the greater part of the community), or sufficient (i.e., known to so many and such talkative persons that the whole community will shortly be made to share in it). A crime known only to one or two, or to a small circle of Christian-living persons, is not notorious.

Revelation about a Person Who Is Juridically in Disrepute Elsewhere.—(a) This exposure is not contrary to commutative justice, according to the common opinion, for the condemnation deprives the criminal of his right to fame (as regards the matter in which he is found guilty) in all places, and it is often to the interest of the public to know who has been convicted of crime elsewhere. Exception should be made for the case in which a trial is conducted secretly in order to spare the reputation of the condemned, as when a corporation expels one of its members after a hearing and an unfavorable vote (see 2057).

(b) This revelation is contrary to charity when it deprives a person without reason of the good fame which he possesses and which he would not otherwise have lost; for we should love our neighbor as ourselves. Example: Balbus served a term in jail in the town of A, on account of drunkenness. He then moved to the distant town of B and by his good conduct built up an excellent reputation. Claudius from A arrives and maliciously spreads around the news that Balbus had been once in jail for drunkenness. Claudius sins gravely against charity.

Revelation about a Person Who Is Actually in Disrepute Elsewhere.—If the person in question will in all likelihood soon lose the reputation he has here, the following cases must be considered:

(a) if the disrepute is based on the publicity of a misdeed, the revelation is not opposed to commutative justice; for he who sins publicly thereby resigns his right to reputation as regards all those persons and places to which knowledge of his delinquency is likely to arrive. The revelation is against charity, however, if there is no sufficient reason for it; but since the news would be soon brought hither from other sources, no great harm is done and no serious sin committed by the revelation;

(b) if the disrepute is based on public rumor and the rumor is unjust, revelation, according to some, is opposed to commutative justice, since it is nothing but a continuation and extension of the original injury. Others hold that, unless one knows the rumor to be false, revelation is not unjust in this case, since, as is supposed, the revealer was not the author of the rumor, and those to whom he spoke would have learned it shortly even without him. Of course, if the person about whom the revelation is made suffers some considerable damage by reason of the early loss of his good name, the person who makes the revelation unnecessarily is guilty of serious sin. And rumor should never be represented as an established fact.

Notoriety in a Closed Community.—Notoriety in a closed community is not absolute publicity, and hence the conclusions just given on absolute publicity do not apply to closed communities.

(a) Thus, if a fault is actually notorious in a closed community, the members may speak about it to one another, if there is any sufficient reason for this. Hence, if the majority of the members of a religious house know about a fault that has been committed there, it may be divulged to one who is in ignorance about it for his instruction or warning. Similarly, servants in a house may tell other domestics about faults which are commonly known in the house.

(b) If a fault is notorious in a closed community but not outside, the members as a rule may not speak or write about it to outsiders without injustice, for generally speaking there is no reason arising from necessity or utility for such a revelation. Moreover, the community itself suffers in repute from such disclosures, since outsiders will be impressed with the thought that the community has wicked members or is lax, and that there is a lack of unity among them. To carry stories from one monastery or house to another (even of the same Order) is a form of detraction to outsiders, according to St. Alphonsus.

Revelation about a Person Formerly in Disrepute.—When the revelation concerns one who was in disrepute formerly, but who has a good name now, either because his crime has been forgotten or because he has lived it down, a distinction must be made between juridical and actual notoriety.

(a) If the former disrepute was juridical notoriety, the revelation of it is not unjust, since condemnation pronounced in a court of law gives the right to others to make the sentence known in any place or at any time; but more probably it is mortally uncharitable, if made without necessity, since it harms the other person or his family in the reputation which he has honestly recovered, thus depriving him of a good most useful to him and hurtful to no one else.

(b) If the former disrepute was actual notoriety only, the revelation is uncharitable, according to all, since it does not observe the golden rule of doing to others as we would be done by. Many hold that it is also unjust, since an obliterated crime is the same as an occult crime, which cannot be divulged without injustice (see 2067). Moreover, the person who has built up for himself a new reputation has a right to it, and by the revelation of the old reputation this right is infringed, inasmuch as his present good name is also lost or made useless. It should be noted that the common good sometimes makes exceptions, and thus it is not forbidden to historians to make revelations about happenings that throw a new and unfavorable light on the youth or earlier years of persons no longer living (see 2072 Sqq.).

Case in Which the Name of the Person Defamed Is Not Given.—(a) If there is nothing to indicate the individual and no reflection is cast on a body to which he belongs, per se no sin is committed. Hence, if one says, “A certain person whom we shall call Balbus stole a sheep,” there is no defamation in the narrative, even though a real happening is described. Similarly, if one says that in the city where he is speaking there are many criminals, or that even among his numerous auditors there are doubtless some who are living in mortal sin, there is no defamation.

(b) If there is something to indicate the individual meant, or if reflection is cast on a body to which the individual belongs, sin is committed by the remarks. Hence, if the narrative about Balbus and the stolen sheep went on to describe incidents so that the hearers could easily perceive that Balbus was a person known to them, this person would be injured in his fame. Again, if one states that in a certain city which one names 90% of the married people are addicted to drunkenness, or that the party who was guilty of some scandalous act was a member of a Religious Institute, harm is brought directly upon individuals or damage is done to societies. It is true that an organization is not really discredited by the misdeeds of one of its members, but in popular opinion very often the disgrace of one is the disgrace of all.

Defamation of Deceased and Legal Persons.—(a) Defamation of the dead, whether they be long or only recently dead, is sinful per se, since the departed are capable of a glorious or inglorious memory, and it is reasonable that one should wish one’s good name to be respected after one’s death, both for one’s own sake and for the sake of others. Hence the saying, “De mortuis nil nisi bonum.” But per accidens it is not sinful to make revelations about the dead when this is necessary for historical truth (see 2072 sqq.). Defamation of the dead in itself is less sinful than defamation of the living, since the dead have less need of a good reputation; but circumstances may be such that one who defames a dead person does serious harm and commits a mortal sin.

(b) Defamation of legal persons is also sinful per se, since these bodies possess along with other rights of natural persons the right to a good name. Public esteem is very necessary for them, and they are protected in their enjoyment of it by the laws. Thus, it is injurious to state that a certain Religious Order or monastery or diocese is relaxed, or that a certain business corporation is not well managed. But per accidens it is not sinful to make revelations about organizations, when there is a sufficient reason for the revelation (see 2067). For example, if a political party is preying on the citizens, or if a mercantile house is practising frauds, the common good would require one to make these facts known. Neither is it sinful to mention faults or defects that are notorious, for example, that a certain government is warlike, that a certain people is backward, that a certain group is devoted to erroneous principles or practices (Tit., i. 12).

The Harm Done by Reason of the Person of the Defamer.—(a) The person of the defamer increases the harm when his authority is greater. A person who is supposed to be better informed (e.g., one who reports that he was an eyewitness of the event he narrates), or who enjoys a better reputation for truth (e.g., one who is in an official position, or who is thought to be honest and disinterested), does more harm by defamation than another whose authority is weak.

(b) The person of the defamer decreases the harm when his authority is less. Hence, those who give out unfavorable reports about others with reservations (such as “perhaps,” “it is not impossible,” “it seems so, but I would not swear to it,” etc.), and also those whose weight as authorities is light (such as talkative, lightminded, envious, gossipy, or untruthful persons), do less harm than persons who are held in higher repute. The confessor should not let these defamers off easily, however, since many of them act on the principle that if enough mud is thrown, no matter how foolish the charges, some of the mud will stick.

One of the commonest forms of defamation is the narration of some crime or defect at second hand, as when the defamer introduces his remarks as follows: “They say,” or, “It is reported,” or, “I hear,” etc.

(a) The mode of defamation here lessens the sin when it weakens the effect of the story upon the hearers. Hence, if one says that the talk of the town is that Claudius is a heavy drinker, and the listeners gather from this only that there is a vague rumor which cannot be traced to any source or be confirmed by any fact and which is therefore unreliable, the harm is less.

(b) The mode of defamation here does not lessen the sin when it does not weaken the impression of the story; on the contrary, it increases the sin when it adds strength to the story. Hence, if one says that Claudius is said to be an excessive drinker, and if from the phrasing the listeners will understand that the report originated with very good authorities, or that it is based on general knowledge of the public, the harm is greater. Justice is violated if the narrative itself inclines the hearers to sinister thoughts or suspicions, for then the narrator causes the harm; charity alone may be violated if it is only the character of the listeners (e.g., their suspicious or frivolous minds or their own guilt) that engenders in them evil opinion, for then the narrator only occasions the harm (cfr. 1447, 1464).

The Harm Done by Reason of the Listeners.—(a) The quality of the listeners makes a difference, since it may cause the person defamed to suffer more or less readily in their eyes (e.g., if they are suspicious, or prejudiced, or credulous, or guilty themselves, they will more easily believe evil about others) or in the eyes of others (e.g., if the listeners are newsmongers or enemies of the person defamed, the spread of the defamatory story is more certain). The loss itself may be greater or less on account of the character or position of the listener (e.g., loss of reputation with a friend or a virtuous person is felt more, loss of reputation with customers or employers is more damaging, etc.).

(b) The quantity of the listeners also makes a difference, since it is more harmful, other things being equal, to be defamed before several than before one. Hence, the fact that many persons are present when the defamation is uttered is an aggravating circumstance of the sin. Whether it multiplies the sin numerically, so that one commits as many sins of defamation as there are persons who hear and are impressed, is a disputed point. Those who hold for multiplication argue that the defamed person has a distinct right to his reputation with each person present; those who deny multiplication contend that the right to reputation is a single object, since reputation is the opinion of others, whether they be many or few. This latter view seems to be more common, and its practical bearing is that a penitent need not mention the number of persons before whom he defamed his neighbor (see 217).

Detraction to One Discreet Person.—Is detraction a mortal sin, if the revelation of a serious sin is made without sufficient reason but to only one prudent and discreet person, who will neither divulge the information, nor be influenced by it to the harm of the party spoken against?

(a) If the purpose of the speaker is to inflict serious injury on his neighbor, mortal sin is committed, since the gravity of the sin is measured by the malevolence of the will.

(b) If the purpose of the speaker is not to inflict serious injury, but only to indulge his love of talk, levity of mind, etc., the gravity of the sin depends on the actual harm that is done; for one wills indirectly the harm connected with one’s acts, even when one does not desire it directly (see 102). Hence, if the harm is in fact serious, mortal sin is incurred by the detractor, unless he is excused from it by the imperfection of his deliberation or consent. How much harm, then, is done in this case? Most moralists, it seems, think grave harm is done, since the loss of good name with one prudent man is generally more distasteful than its loss with many light-minded persons. Some moralists, however, dissent from this view, and hold that the harm done is small. They argue that the loss of good name with one prudent person (exception being made for the cases when he is the one person whose esteem is prized above that of all others, or when the crime revealed is an enormous or very degrading one) is not a great blow to reputation, since reputation consists in the opinion of many persons, and since a prudent man will be inclined to help rather than harm one who has been defamed in his presence. The advocates of the first opinion appeal also to the analogy of contumely and rash judgment, for these two sins are grave, even when the loss of honor or good opinion is in respect to one person only. But their adversaries deny the assumed parity: for, while contumely includes the purpose to injure and rash judgment includes the imputation to another of a defect of which he is not guilty or not known to be guilty, the detraction now considered is innocent both of design to injure and of calumny. Both opinions are probable, but the former seems to be more common and more likely.

Belittling a Person to Himself.—It is not impossible to belittle a person to himself, for example, to make him believe that lie is illegitimate, that he is regarded with contempt by others, that his ability is mediocre or his character defective, etc. Is this defamation, or is it sinful?

(a) To lower a person in his own estimation is not defamation in the strict sense of the word, since defamation is properly an injury to the reputation that one has with one’s neighbors or with the public, not to the opinion one has of oneself. This sin belongs rather to derision (see 2106).

(b) To lower a person in his own eyes is sinful or not sinful according to the purpose intended or the means employed. Thus, if a parent, wishing to correct the pride or presumption of his son, gives the latter a true picture of his failings or limitations, the act is one of virtuous correction. But if an envious person, wishing to produce a sense of inferiority in another, deprives the latter of rightful peace of mind and of reasonable confidence in self, charity and justice are violated and there is a duty of restitution.

Disclosing Matters Detrimental to Third Party.—In what cases is it lawful to disclose to others matters that will be detrimental to the reputation of a third party?

(a) If the communication is false, it is never lawful, no matter how important the reason; for the end does not justify the means. It is sinful, therefore, to resort to calumny as a defense of one’s own reputation or dignity (see 2035, 2036).

(b) If the communication is truthful and the matter is already well known to the persons addressed, there is no defamation, unless the communication makes these persons strongly convinced, whereas they had been rather uncertain before, or reveals to them some important detail about which they had been in ignorance.

(c) If the communication is truthful, but the defects are secret and unknown to the parties addressed, there is defamation, unless the person whose defects are revealed has lost his right to good name on account of the right of another person which has precedence and cannot otherwise be upheld (cfr. 2035). In this latter case there is no obligation to maintain silence, neither from justice (since the lesser right must yield to the greater right) nor from charity (since this virtue does not oblige at the cost of great inconvenience). Thus, Our Lord made known to the Apostles that the Pharisees were hypocrites (Luke, xii, 1; Matt., xvi. 6), and St. Paul told Timothy that Alexander and Hymeneus had neither faith nor a good conscience (I Tim., i. 20).

Rights that Have Precedence over a False Reputation.—(a) The public good is to be preferred to a false reputation, for the public welfare is the ground for the right to such reputation, the subject himself being unworthy of the good name he bears (see 2037). It is right, therefore, to denounce criminals or conspirators to the proper authorities, or to testify against them. Employers have the duty to discuss together the failings or imperfections of their employees that interfere with the business; subjects should manifest abuses about which they are asked in a canonical visitation; students in a college should give information about companions who are depraving the morals of the student body or exercising an evil influence on the other residents, etc.

(b) The private good of innocent parties may be preferred to the fame of one who enjoys a false reputation. One may reveal secret defects for one’s own defense; for example, a person whose life, honor or property is being unjustly attacked may reveal sins of the guilty in order to deter them or weaken their authority; a person who has been injured by his superior or another party may speak of this to a friend for the sake of obtaining consolation, or to a confessor, a lawyer or other adviser for the sake of obtaining counsel or assistance. One may also reveal secret defects for the protection of others; for example, one should put unsuspecting persons on their guard against seducers, impostors, quacks; one should reveal impediments that stand in the way of a marriage, or should warn a young woman that the man to whom she is engaged is a criminal or diseased; one should make known the true author of a crime for which an innocent person is about to suffer; one should tell the truth to inquirers about the incompetency of servants or other persons whom one has employed.

(c) The higher good of the person whose faults are revealed may also be preferred to the lower good of his false reputation; for it is to his interest that his higher good be promoted, even at the expense of an inferior good. It is lawful to tell parents about the misdeeds of their children (e.g., that a daughter is involved in a scandalous liaison), in order that the latter may be corrected; or to speak to the friends of wayward persons about the misconduct of the latter in order that prayers may be said for their conversion.

Unlawful Attack on Another’s False Reputation.—If the false reputation of another is not the unjust cause of a loss that is feared, it is not right to deprive him of his good name. Examples: (a) It is not lawful to accuse a person who is about to be promoted to some office or dignity of which he is worthy, if the motive of the accusation is to secure the honor for oneself or one’s friend; otherwise ambitious persons would be encouraged to practise spying, manufacturing of evidence, etc., and the public peace would be greatly disturbed. (b) It is not lawful to accuse a person who is giving one no offense, if the motive of the accusation is to distract attention from oneself or to make oneself shine by the comparison.

Conditions that Justify Revelation of Another’s Defects.—In revealing defects on account of some necessary good, one must observe the conditions for an act of double result (see 103).

(a) Thus, the action itself must not be evil, and hence one may not break the seal of secrecy to which one is bound (as will be said in the next Article in discussing violations of secrets), nor make use of knowledge unjustly acquired, nor reveal more or to more persons than the case demands, nor reveal anything, if a warning to the offender will suffice (see 1286).

(b) The good result must be intended, and the evil result of detriment to fame must be only permitted. Those who assign pious motives (pity, zeal, sincerity) for talk against a neighbor, but who are really actuated by hatred, revenge, ambition to defeat a rival, or other like passion, sin on account of their wrong intention. A hypocritical form of defamation is practised by some persons exteriorly devout, who under the pretext of asking prayers for their neighbor’s conversion spread stories about those whom they dislike.

(c) The reason for permitting the evil must be sufficiently weighty. Hence, the good result intended must be one that is likely to follow on the revelation, and it must be of some importance; for it would be cruel to throw away a neighbor’s good name on the mere possibility that a considerable good would be secured, or on the certainty that only a slight benefit would be obtained. It does seem, however, that the good which is hoped for must be of an equal dignity with the good of fame, since the innocent and the guilty party are not on the same footing, and furthermore all admit, for example, that the fame of an employee who is stealing from his employer is not to be preferred to the goods of the employer. In doubt about the seriousness of the evil following on revelation, the innocent party is to be favored.

Revelations about Public Officials or Candidates for Public Office.—(a) These are lawful when the public good calls for them (e.g., when a man has used corrupt practices in order to be elected, or when he is incompetent, or when he has been guilty of malfeasance in office), and the conditions of the previous paragraph are observed.

(b) These revelations are unlawful when the public good suffers from them (e.g., when the safety or dignity of society itself would be injured by attacks on the head of government), or when the due conditions are not observed (e.g., when one resorts to personalities about a deserving public official, or practises muckraking because of mere prejudice or partisanship). The law permits fair comment on public persons or works, but it also grants an action for criticism that contains unfair aspersions of personal character or unjust accusations about public conduct.

Revelations about Historical Personages.—(a) These revelations are not lawful unless there is a proportionate reason that justifies them. For historians there are sufficient reasons to narrate impartially the crimes as well as the virtues of those who appear in their pages. These reasons are: the nature of history as a record of facts and causes (“the first law of history is that it dare not tell any untruth, that it fear not to tell any truth,” Leo XIII); the rights of the persons who are treated in the annals (e.g., it is often impossible to understand the deeds of one character in history or to do him justice unless the secret crime of another character is revealed); the rights of the readers (e.g., the reader has the right to know that the persecutors of religion have been wicked in their personal lives). The historian, therefore, may search for material bearing on the lives and deeds of historical personages of the past, he may collect similar material relating to current events, he may narrate defects or delinquencies of the past that were unknown or forgotten. But matters of a purely private character that have no bearing on public events do not belong, according to some moralists, to the legitimate province of the historian; for otherwise there would be an end to the rights of the dead over their fame. Moreover, there is the risk of calumny and of violation of elementary justice, since the historian is a self-appointed judge and the person condemned is not able to defend himself.

(b) These historical revelations are not lawful unless the conditions mentioned in 2070 are observed. Thus, a historian should not write down details that were told him in confidence by a person long since dead; he should not be swayed either by unreasonable likes or unreasonable dislikes in the expression of his views; he should not publish what will cause harm rather than good, such as circumstances in the lives of persons recently deceased which, if revealed, will be detrimental to living persons.

Revelations about Persons Who Figure in the News of the Day.—(a) If the matters revealed are of a public nature, the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the revelation will depend on the reasons for it and the manner in which it is given. In discussing political affairs, a newspaper has the right to call attention to mistakes and faults of public men, since the freedom of the press in this respect is a protection to liberty and to progress, and those who enter public life implicitly consent to criticism of their conduct; in reporting the news, a newspaper has the right to speak of murders, robberies and other public crimes that have been committed, since the common good requires that the authors of public offenses be known as such. But if this kind of news is disserviceable in any instance to the order, peace or dignity of the community, or if the news is obtained in unjust or dishonorable ways, or if the motive is merely to gratify curiosity, to indulge prejudice, or to make money, the newspaper management is morally guilty, even though it may be legally within its right. Yellow journalism and “tabloidism” are reprehensible because they are injurious to the minds and morals of their readers on account of the undue prominence given to crime, even of the most disgusting sort, and the appeal made to sense and emotion rather than to thought.

(b) It the matters revealed are of a private nature, the morality of the revelation has to be judged by the principles given in 2067 sqq. It would be wrong to make a practice of spying into the private life and affairs even of public persons merely to add interest to one’s columns; but if there is some really important advantage to the public or to a private person that will be served, and if the other conditions are observed (see 2070), one may publish even private defects that are real and certain.

Injustice in Professional Critics.—(a) Injustice is done by professional critics (such as book reviewers, dramatic and art critics, and the like) to the persons who rely upon their opinion, if there is a compact with them to give a competent and unbiased judgment and the compact is not lived up to by the critic with resultant damage to the client (see 1793). If there is no compact, the critic is nevertheless guilty of deception and uncharitableness, if he performs his office carelessly (e.g., by eulogizing a worthless book or play or picture).

(b) Injustice is done the person criticized, if his work is undervalued purposely (e.g., because the critic is jealous, or in an ill humor or is hired by others to dispraise), or if uncalled-for personalities are indulged in at the expense of the person’s fame. A carping critic may by the stroke of the pen spoil the work of years, and hence ignorance does not excuse those censors who practise wholesale and unfair denunciations (see 905).

The sins against the honor we owe our fellowmen are partly internal and partly external. They differ in degree according to the nature of the attack and the relation existing between the offender and the offended.

The legal axiom that every man must be considered honorable until the contrary has been proved, embodies a truly Christian principle, for the essence of Christianity is charity, which “thinketh no evil.”¹ Whoever disregards this maxim, has either lost charity, or is about to lose it. Merely to entertain unfounded suspicion internally is an injustice to others and an act of infidelity to God.²

¹ 1 Cor. XIII, 5.

² Matth. VII, 1; Luke VI, 37; John VII, 24; 1 Cor. IV, 5; Jas. IV, 13.—St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 4: “By the very fact that someone holds a bad opinion of another without sufficient cause, he injures and despises him. But no one ought to despise another or inflict any harm whatever without compelling cause. And therefore, where manifest indications of someone’s malice do not appear, we ought to regard him as good by interpreting what is doubtful in the better part.”—Ibid., ad 2: “It is one thing to judge things and another to judge men. For in a judgment in which we judge things, . . . each person ought to strive to judge things according as they are. But in the judg- ment in which we judge men, . . . we ought rather to tend toward judging a man good, unless a manifest reason to the contrary appears.”—Hence the moral and legal axiom: “Nemo praesumitur malus, nisi probetur.”

1. The internal acts by which we violate the duty of honoring our neighbor, in so far as they influence our conduct towards him and thus cause him injury, are: groundless suspicion and rash judgment.

a) We are guilty of groundless suspicion against our fellowman if we doubt his virtue for altogether insufficient reasons (levia indicia). This sin usually begins with an unfounded doubt (dubitatio temeraria), which, if it is not promptly suppressed, engenders rash suspicion (suspicio temeraria).³

³ St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 3: “There are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a man begins to doubt another’s goodness from slight indications; and this is a venial and slight sin, for it belongs to human temptation, without which this life is not lived. The second degree is when someone holds another’s malice as certain from slight indications; and this, if it concerns some grave matter, is a mortal sin, inasmuch as it is not without contempt of one’s neighbor. The third degree is when a judge proceeds from suspicion to condemn someone; and this pertains directly to injustice, whence it is a mortal sin.”—St. Augustine, Tract. in Ioa., 26, n. 2: “Noli velle iudicare, si non vis errare.” (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 1607).

Unfounded suspicion of others usually comes from corruption in one’s own heart. If we were better men ourselves, says a modern writer, we should not consider others capable of so much evil. “He who is himself wicked,” says St. Ignatius of Loyola, “easily suspects others, just as he who suffers from vertigo, imagines that everything about him is moving round and round.”

b) Rash judgment (iudicium temerarium) consists in thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant. It differs from groundless suspicion only in degree: the former implies hesitation, whereas the latter does not.⁴ Holy Scripture tells us, and experience confirms it, that unfounded suspicion and rash judgment both originate as a rule either in malice, which sees nothing but wickedness in others, or in envy or hatred, which inspire ill will towards others. In some men these vices result from the bitter disappointments of a life-time. When they spring from malice, envy, or hatred, unfounded suspicion and rash judgment are invariably sinful, because they involve a lack of charity. The gravity of this sin may be gauged by the importance of its object and the degree of pleasure which the sinner takes in his uncharitable act.

⁴ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 481: “1. A rash judgment is a true assent, conceived from slight indications, concerning some sin or defect of one’s neighbor; 2. rash suspicion is a weak assent concerning one’s neighbor’s evil, or an assent concerning another’s stain conceived with fear of the opposite; 3. doubt is a suspension of the mind determining itself toward neither side.”

Merely to harbor a momentary and spontaneous (or involuntary) doubt regarding the virtue of another is, of course, no sin at all. Such judgments frequently flash through the mind—we are so quick and prone to judge ill of others without sufficient reason. All this is merely a temptation. But from the temptation we pass on to sin if, knowing the insufficiency of our reasons, we nevertheless deliberately form an unfavorable judgment regarding another’s virtue. “Suspicion,” says the Angelic Doctor, “denotes evil thinking based on slight indications, and this may arise from three causes. First, from a man’s being evil in himself, and from this very fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, a wicked man is prone to think evil of others. . . . Secondly, it is owing to a man’s being ill-disposed towards another; for when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with or envious of him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, it may arise from long experience, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii) that old people are very suspicious, for they have often experienced the faults of others. The first two causes of suspicion evidently connote perversity of the affections, whilst the third diminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads to certainty, which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently, suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the more vicious it is.”⁵

⁵ St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 3: “Suspicion denotes an opinion of evil when it proceeds from slight indications, and this happens in three ways: first, from the fact that someone is evil in himself and, from this very fact, as though conscious of his own malice, readily thinks evil of others. Secondly, it arises from the fact that someone is ill-disposed toward another; for when someone despises or hates another, or is angry with or envious of him, he thinks evil of him from slight signs, because everyone readily believes what he desires. Thirdly, it arises from long experience. The first two causes of suspicion manifestly pertain to perversity of affection; but the third cause diminishes the nature of suspicion, inasmuch as experience advances toward certainty, which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. And therefore suspicion denotes a certain vice, and the farther suspicion proceeds, the more vicious it is.” (Vide supra, n. 3).—Gury, Comp. Theol. Moral., I, n. 482: “A rash judgment concerning a neighbor’s fault is by its kind a mortal sin against justice; for each person has a right to his good reputation in the judgment of individuals. . . . Often, however, it is venial because of the slightness of the matter or the imperfection of the act. Rash suspicion and doubt concerning a neighbor’s stain are only venial by their kind. The reason is that, because of their weak and readily changeable adherence, they ordinarily inflict only slight harm on one’s neighbor, since they do not destroy his reputation but only diminish it and render it doubtful.”

To entertain a sort of general distrust towards strangers or to reserve one’s judgment regarding their honesty or disinterestedness, in consequence of having had one’s goodness repeatedly imposed upon, is no sin, because there is some reason for such a general distrust. Still, we must always remember that Christian charity commands us to think good rather than evil of our neighbor.⁶ The Talmud lays down a prudent rule of conduct when it says: “Judge no one unless you have been in his place.”

⁶ Cfr. Is. XI, 3; Luke VI, 37; John VIII, 15 sq.; 1 Cor. IV, 5.—St. Augustine, De Agone Christ., c. 27, n. 29: “In that passage [Mt. vii, 1], where [the Lord] forbids judging, He admonishes us not to condemn anyone whose thought is not open to us, or of whom we do not know what sort of person he may afterwards become.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 395).

“Frequently there is a greater sin involved in judging rashly of another than in the act that is so judged. The wise men of the world (sapientes mundi) warn us not to outdo the sins of others by passing rash judgment upon them; how much more carefully ought we to consider our own conduct, lest we condemn petty faults in others and at the same time incur grievous sins ourselves.”⁷

⁷ Pseudo-Ambrose, Apol. II David, c. 2, n. 5 (Migne, P. L., XIV, 889).

“To have a low opinion of oneself and always to think well and commendably of others,” says Thomas à Kempis, “is great wisdom and perfection. If thou shouldst see another openly sin, or commit heinous crimes, yet thou oughtest not to esteem thyself better, because thou knowest not how long thou mayest remain in a good state. We are all frail; but do thou think no one more frail than thyself.”⁸

⁸ De Imitatione Christi, l. I, c. 2 (ed. Pohl, II, 8).

2. The chief external sins against the honor of our fellowman are contumely, calumny, and slander.

a) Contumely (contumelia) means casting a man's faults in his face to detract from his dignity. This may be done either in his physical or in his moral presence. Moral presence is assumed when the insult is uttered before those who know the victim and to whose respect he attaches weight.⁹ This includes publication in the press.

⁹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 478: "A person can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image or through something else in which he is represented to some extent."

Contumely implies insult. An insult is any remark or expression by which another is denied the dignity of a human being, or accused of a moral defect, or charged with a crime or an offense. It is not necessary that the utterance in question actually contain an expression of contempt or disrespect, but the intention of injuring the other (animus iniuriandi) suffices.

The seriousness of the sin of contumely is measured by the intention of the offender, the importance of the matter involved, and the dignity of the person injured. No contumely is committed by parents and superiors when they censure the sins and faults of their children or subjects, even if this is done in a humiliating way, though they should, of course, always remember that even just reproaches must be kept within proper limits and that brutality and unnecessary harshness often produce a contrary effect.

The ancients took cognizance of real contumely, but not of verbal, and the Roman law did not punish the latter, probably for the reason that in former times men were less sensitive in regard to verbal insults than they are now, but especially because the spoken word did not then enjoy the publicity now given to it through the press.¹⁰ St. John the Baptist and Jesus Christ Himself severely censured the Scribes, Pharisees, and Sadducees.¹¹ St. Polycarp, when asked by the heretic Marcion whether he knew him, answered: "Certainly I know the first-born of Satan!"¹²

¹⁰ Homer (Ilias, I, 210 sqq.) describes Athene as intervening between Achilles and Agamemnon with the words: "Do not engage in combat nor draw the sword, for you can insult him in words as much as you please."—Linsenmann, Moraltheol., p. 457; W. S. Lilly, On Right and Wrong, London, 1892, Ch. VII, "The Ethics of Journalism," pp. 150–173.

¹¹ Matth. III, 7; XII, 34, 39; XVI, 4; XXIII, 13–33; Mark VIII, 38; Luke III, 7; XI, 42–45; cfr. Matth. XV, 26; XVI, 23; Mark VII, 27; Luke XIII, 32; Acts XIII, 10; XXIII, 3; Gal. III, 1, 3; Phil. III, 2; Tit. I, 12 sq.

¹² Irenaeus, Adv. Haer., III, 3–4; cfr. Polycarp, Epist. ad Philipp., c. 7; Funk, Patres Apost., Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 304; Kirsopp Lake, The Apostolic Fathers (Loeb Classical Library), Vol. I, p. 293.

Contumely, says Fr. Slater,¹³ is of itself a grave sin against justice and charity, for it injures a man in what he values more than wealth, and as a rule an insult wounds the reputation as well as the feelings of him who is insulted. Christ shows how grievous a sin is committed by contumely when He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council. And whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire."¹⁴ Like most sins against justice and charity, contumely may be a venial sin only, if the matter involved is slight. Chaff or banter, which is not intended to wound or irritate others is, of course, harmless, so long as it keeps within due bounds.¹⁵

¹³ Slater, Mor. Theol., I, 462.

¹⁴ Matth. V, 22.

¹⁵ Slater, ibid.

We insult a neighbor not only in words, but also by sending him abusive, immoral, or frivolous cards, a custom which exists in some countries and constitutes a serious abuse of the practice, in itself unobjectionable, of sending tokens of congratulation or remembrance at certain seasons of the year. The exhibition and circulation of offensive cards seriously menaces the morals of the young and promotes the world-wide movement against sound ethics.

b) Calumny (calumnia) or slander is committed by falsely imputing to another something which injures or destroys his reputation. This usually consists in accusing him falsely or exaggerating his faults or denying his good qualities or wilfully misinterpreting his intentions,¹⁶ and may be done in speech or in writing; in the latter case is called libel or pasquil.

¹⁶ Deut. I, 27; Mark VII, 22. On Matth. XII, 36 ῥῆμα ἀργόν, verbum otiosum, cfr. E. Nestle, Philologica Sacra, Berlin, 1896, pp. 58 sq.

Calumny involves three distinct acts; namely, first, a wilful lie, which is aggravated by the fact that it is told in secret and the injured person cannot defend himself against it; secondly, a sin against charity, and thirdly, a violation of justice (iustitia commutativa), because the injured person frequently suffers damage in his social position or good name.

If calumny is committed in general terms, i. e., if we declare our neighbor to be entirely bad without a redeeming trait, it is a mortal sin. If we impute to him only one fault, or several faults, the gravity of the sin committed varies according to the seriousness of the faults imputed, the consequences of the imputation, and the malice with which the calumniator strives to effect the moral or social ruin of his victim. The lighter the unjust accusation and the less intentional the imputation of evil, the smaller will be the guilt incurred.

In its worst form calumny is little less than spiritual murder and must be reckoned among the sins that cry to Heaven for vengeance.¹⁷

¹⁷ Cfr. Ps. C, 5; Jas. IV, 11; 1 Pet. II, 1.—St. Jerome, Epist. 54 (al. 10), n. 13: "It is impossible for anyone to pass through the course of this life without being bitten by men, and it is the consolation of the wicked to carp at the good, while they think the guilt of sins is diminished by the multitude of sinners. Yet the fire of stubble soon subsides, and the overflowing flame gradually dies when nourishment fails."—Epist., 108 (al. 27), n. 19: "A slanderous tongue is accustomed to carp at saints as a consolation for the offender."—Epist., 148 (al. 14), n. 16: "Never detract from anyone at all, nor wish to appear praiseworthy by censuring others; learn rather to adorn your own life than to carp at another's. There are very few who renounce this vice, and rarely will you find those who wish to present their own life as blameless without willingly censuring another's. So great a lust for this evil has invaded men's minds that even those who have withdrawn far from other vices nevertheless fall into this one as though into the devil's final snare. But do you so flee this evil that not only do you yourself not detract, but you do not even at any time believe another who detracts. Nor by agreeing give authority to detractors, lest by nodding assent you nourish their vice. . . . Indeed, this vice is such that it should be extinguished among the first, and should be wholly excluded by those who wish to train themselves in holiness. For nothing so disturbs the mind; there is nothing that makes the mind so changeable and frivolous as readily to believe everything and to follow the words of detractors with the mind's rash assent. Hence frequent dissensions arise, hence unjust hatreds. This it is that often makes enemies even of the closest friends, when a malicious tongue separates souls that are indeed harmonious but credulous. On the other hand, it is great tranquility of mind and great steadiness of character not rashly to hear anything adverse about anyone. Blessed is he who has so armed himself against this vice that no one dares detract in his presence. But if there were in us this diligence not to believe detractors indiscriminately, everyone would now fear to detract, lest in detracting they make not others so much as themselves contemptible. But this evil is notorious for this reason, and this vice flourishes in many for this reason: because it is willingly heard by almost everyone." (Migne, P. L., XXII, 557, 896, 1211).

The varieties of this sin are described in the old memorial verse:

"Imponens, augens, manifestans, in mala vertens, Qui negat aut minuit, reticet laudatque remisse."

If one is calumniated, he should recall that it is not the worst fruit that is attacked by the wasps, as the German poet Bürger says, or, as an Arabian proverb puts it: "People do not throw stones at a tree unless it bears fruit."

Some men resemble bees, not by their diligence, but by their sting.

c) Detraction, or backbiting (diffamatio, detractio)¹⁸ is committed when one unjustly deprives another of his good name by revealing his real but secret faults in his absence. This is a sin against justice as well as charity, because every man has a strict right to his good name. The more uncharitable the disposition of the detractor or slanderer, the more unfavorable the light in which he places his neighbor, the more widely the detraction circulates, the more the victim's position or activity depends on his good name, and the worse the results of the detraction, the more serious is the sin committed. Another factor to be taken into consideration here, as in all sins of defamation, are the consequences resulting from detraction in the case of those who hear of it.

¹⁸ The older Scholastics designated both calumny and detraction with one word: detractio.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 73, art. 1.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 459, says: "Detraction is a secret and unjust violation of another's reputation, or the unjust blackening of the reputation of an absent neighbor. Reputation is the good estimation that others have of someone's life and morals. Detraction is called simply such if the neighbor's reputation is violated by reporting a true crime; it is called calumny if the violation follows from imputing a false crime."

Unsophisticated persons are apt to lose their good opinion of others generally (odium generis humani) and their reverence for virtue. Hence a sin of this kind, aside from the malice it involves, is more grievous when committed by persons in whose veracity and judgment one has great confidence.¹⁹

¹⁹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 460: "The gravity of detraction is to be taken chiefly from the gravity of the harm that one's neighbor is foreseen to suffer from it, and not precisely from the gravity of the defect or crime related about him. Hence, to determine the gravity of detraction in a particular case, attention must be paid to the character: 1. of the detractor—whether he is serious and discreet, or talkative and frivolous; 2. of the injured person—whether he enjoys a good or bad reputation, etc. The reason is that greater or lesser credence will be given according as the speaker is worthy of greater or lesser trust; likewise, greater or lesser injury to reputation will follow in proportion to the greater or lesser esteem enjoyed by the injured person."

Like calumny, detraction can be committed against an entire community or class, and not only by word of mouth, but also in writing. To defame others in writing is a more grievous sin than to do so by word of mouth. Writings enjoy a certain permanency and therefore are able to exercise their influence not merely in the present, but likewise in the future.²⁰

²⁰ Cfr. St. Paul's judgment of the Cretans (Tit. I, 12), and the sayings: "Litera scripta manet" and "Literae non erubescunt"; i. e., one writes more boldly than one speaks.

Mendacity and detraction are the primary vices of the modern newspaper press. "Journalism is conducted under conditions which tend to nourish this vice. The newspaper is, by its very nature, an ephemeral production, read for an hour and then cast aside, and probably never looked at again. Its assertions have done their work before an opportunity of correcting them is presented. Besides, it rests with editors whether contradictions of false and misleading allegations, which their journals may contain, shall appear in them or not. And it is manifest to all men that the considerations by which this question is determined are, in a vast majority of instances, wholly unethical. Again, the conditions under which the newspaper publicist works are extremely unfavorable to the cultivation of the virtue of veracity. He is called upon suddenly to expound views which shall strike his readers as profound, well-considered, or original, about subjects of which, very likely, he knows nothing truly or exactly. Or he is summoned to essay the defense of 'principles' to which he is wholly indifferent. Or he is bidden to attack some institution, some interest, some work, which whatever there may be of good left to him confesses to be worthy of respect and support. A very few years' practice in a calling of this kind is apt to render him as indifferent to the goal whither his pen conducts him, as is a cab-horse to the destination whither the driver's 'fare' is conveyed. And the worst of it is that, in time, he comes to glory in his shame. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, distinguishes between two kinds of liars; there is 'the liar who loves a lie for its own sake,' and 'the liar who lies to win reputation or to make money.' But many a journalist who, at first, belongs to the latter of these classes, and is perhaps a little ashamed, for a while, at finding himself there, passes pretty swiftly into the former. Thus does he anticipate in this life, the doom which Dante ascribed to the damned; he is in the miserable estate of those 'genti dolorose' who have lost 'il ben del intelletto.' And then, by a fatal and necessary law, his chief object, next to the provision of the means of 'agreeable feeling' for himself, is to bring down as many as possible to his own level. Nor does he find any surer way of effecting this, than by the persistent denial of those moral excellences which he has ceased to strive after, or even to venerate. Is a man the object of reverence and admiration, for patriotism, philanthropy, piety? Your newspaper censors, with due protestations of hatred of hypocrisy, will strip off the veneer which imposes on the unsuspicious; will show their readers that these pretended virtues are a mere cloak for some base or sordid end; will demonstrate conclusively that 'old Cato is as great a rogue as you.' And their efforts are only too successful. I think I may truly say that the newspaper press, during the last quarter of a century, has done more than anything else to de-ethicize public life; to lay the axe to the root of duty, self-devotion, self-sacrifice, the elements of the moral greatness of a nation, which is its true greatness."²¹

²¹ W. S. Lilly, On Right and Wrong, pp. 171 sqq.

Formal detraction differs from material in that it is intentional. Formal detraction, or, a fortiori, slander, be- ing contrary to justice and charity, which bind under a grave obligation, is of itself a grievous sin, though frequently only venial on account of the smallness of the matter involved. Material detraction usually proceeds from carelessness, lack of caution, love of gossip, or a desire to be entertaining and, therefore, as a rule, is a venial sin only, unless indeed it seriously injures the good name of others.²²

²² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 73, art. 2: "Verbal sins are to be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Detraction by its nature is ordered to blackening someone's reputation. Hence, strictly speaking, he detracts who speaks ill of someone in his absence for the purpose of blackening his reputation. Now, to take away someone's reputation is very serious, because among temporal goods reputation seems to be more precious, through the loss of which a man is hindered from doing many good things (Eccli. 41, 15). And therefore detraction, strictly speaking, is a mortal sin. Yet it sometimes happens that someone says certain words by which another's reputation is diminished, intending not this but something else. This, however, is not detraction strictly and formally speaking, but only materially and, as it were, accidentally. And if someone utters words by which another's reputation is diminished for the sake of some necessary good, with the due circumstances observed, it is not a sin and cannot be called detraction. But if he utters them from levity of mind or for some unnecessary cause, it is not a mortal sin, unless perhaps the word spoken is so grave that it notably injures someone's reputation, especially in matters pertaining to uprightness of life, because from the very kind of words it has the character of a mortal sin."

Note that the guilt of detraction, aside from the underlying intention, is measured by the amount of injury done (gravitas damni), and that, consequently, attacks upon the good name of others are grievously sinful in proportion to the dignity or social position of the persons attacked. To attack the good name of a priest or superior, therefore, is more grievous than to attack the reputation of an ordinary citizen.

While it is never permissible falsely to impute a crime to another,²³ it may be licit, nay a strict duty, to reveal his true faults for a higher purpose. This is the case, for instance, when it becomes necessary to inform legitimate superiors, to warn inferiors, children, etc., or to protect oneself or others against serious injury, or if the faults revealed are already known in consequence of a public trial or the culprit's own admission (notorietate iuris) through the confession of confederates (notorietate facti) or through rumor (notorietate famae). Whenever the revelation of the sins or faults of another seems necessary as a means of reforming him or of averting a greater evil, it is morally licit, nay a duty, for the reason that the sinner has lost the right to his good name because he can not preserve it except to the detriment of others and to his own injury.²⁴ But even though his faults and crimes are notorious, charity commands us not to reveal them to persons to whom they would otherwise probably remain unknown. Besides rumors must never be represented as facts.

²³ Prop. damn. sub Innoc. XI, n. 44: "It is probable that one who imputes a false crime to someone in order to defend his own justice and honor does not sin mortally. And if this is not probable, scarcely any opinion in theology will be probable." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1194).

²⁴ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 461: "It is never permissible to impute a false crime to another. . . . It is permissible, however, for a just cause to reveal a hidden crime even with the loss of his reputation, because sometimes the public or a private good requires this, and then the neighbor's right to the preservation of his reputation ceases. The causes for which another's crime may lawfully be revealed are the following: 1. A notable advantage to the revealer himself, e. g., to seek advice or assistance in a grave matter, provided, however, that every disposition to detraction is excluded; 2. The advantage of the offender, namely, for his instruction or correction, etc.; 3. The public advantage, as for preventing evils threatening the state, religion, or some community; 4. A grave private advantage, either of the hearers or of others, e. g., that they may guard against evils, losses, or inconveniences that otherwise will certainly or probably befall them. The reason for these cases is that one who then reveals another's sin injures neither justice nor charity. 1. He does not injure justice, because the neighbor does not have so strict a right to his reputation that others are bound to conceal the truth when its disclosure is necessary to avoid grave harm, whether to oneself or to others. 2. He does not injure charity, because charity does not bind at so great a loss. For if you are not bound to prevent harm to your neighbor, even greater harm, at grave loss to yourself, neither are you bound in that case to conceal your neighbor's hidden crime." Cfr. ibid., n. 465–466.

Detraction comprises all evil speaking and criticizing of others through the spreading of tales to the disadvantage of their good name. This applies especially to suspicions cast upon the internal motives of our fellowmen.

A special kind of detraction is known as tale-bearing (susurratio), and consists in mischief-making between friends by telling tales to the disadvantage of one of them, with the object of sowing or promoting discord.²⁵ This sin is particularly detestable if it is directed to the destruction of mutual confidence between husband and wife.

²⁵ Prov. VI, 16 sqq.; XXVI, 20, 22; Ecclus. V, 16 sq.; XXVIII, 15.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 74, art. 2: "A sin against one's neighbor is graver in proportion as greater harm is inflicted on the neighbor through it. Harm, however, is greater in proportion as the good taken away is greater. Among the remaining external goods, however, a friend is preeminent (Ecclus. vi, 15). Reputation itself, which is taken away by detraction, is especially necessary for this, that a man be held fit for friendship. Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than detraction and even than contumely, because a friend is better than honor and to be loved than to be honored."

By listening wilfully or with pleasure to a detractor, or encouraging him by asking questions or applauding his tales, or not hindering them if we are able, we formally coöperate in his sin.²⁶

²⁶ Prov. XXV, 23.—Cfr. St. Bernard, De Consid., l. II, c. 13: "Whether to detract or to listen to a detractor—which of these is more damnable I would not easily say." (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 756).

Mockery or derision (derisio, irrisio, illusio, subsannatio) makes sport of another's honor. It sometimes runs counter to charity also by employing the faults or infirmities of others in order to make them a butt of laughter or contempt. The most grievous sin of this kind is the mockery of God and sacred things; next in order come mockery of parents, superiors, and virtuous persons.²⁷

²⁷ Is. XXXVII, 23; Prov. XXX, 17; Job XII, 4.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 75, art. 2.—Possidius, Vita Sti. Augustini, c. 22 (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 52): "Whoever loves to gnaw at the life of the absent with words, let him know that this table is unworthy of him."

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 3–4; qu. 73 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, II, 18 sqq., 82 sqq.).—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 962–977 (ed. Gaudé, II, 355 sqq.).—Jocham, Moraltheologie, Vol. III, pp. 400 sqq.—Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 77 sqq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 110 sqq.—A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Pastor., Vol. III, pp. 156 sqq.—J. E. Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 259 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 659 sqq., 678 sq.

Detraction, calumny, and other like sins violate justice, and therefore involve the duty of making restitution, as far as possible, for the damage inflicted, and of seeking reconciliation with the person injured.

1. An insult or contumely wilfully committed against a fellowman calls for an apology (deprecatio). However, a formal apology is, as a rule, demanded only of subjects; among equals an act of extraordinary benevolence will serve the same purpose; on the part of superiors in their relation to inferiors, a special sign of good will or amiability will suffice.¹

¹ St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 986–987 (ed. Gaudé, II, 373).—St. Augustine, Epist., 211 (al. 109), n. 14: "Whichever nun has injured another by abuse or cursing or even by charging her with a crime, let her remember to take care as quickly as possible, by making satisfaction, of what she has done, and let the one who was injured forgive without dispute. But if they have injured each other, they ought mutually to forgive the debts owed to each other, on account of your prayers, which you certainly ought to have holier in proportion as you have them more frequently. Better is she who, although often tempted by anger, nevertheless hastens to obtain forgiveness from the one whom she acknowledges that she has wronged, than she who is slower to become angry and is more reluctantly inclined to ask forgiveness. She who does not wish to forgive her sister should not hope to receive the effect of prayer; but she who never wishes to ask forgiveness, or does not ask it from the heart, is in the monastery without cause, even if she is not cast out from it. Therefore, for your part, refrain from harsher words; but if they have issued from your mouth, do not be ashamed to bring forth remedies from the same mouth from which the wounds were made. When, however, the necessity of discipline compels you to speak harsh words in restraining those younger than you, even if you feel that in those very words you have exceeded due measure, it is not required of you that you ask forgiveness from them, lest, while excessive humility is observed toward those who ought to be subject, the authority to govern be broken; nevertheless, forgiveness must be sought from the Lord of all, who knows with how much benevolence you love even those whom perhaps you rebuke more than is just." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 964).

If the insult was committed in actions, it should not merely be apologized for, but restitution must be made for the material damage inflicted.

1. He who has induced another to sin by mere persuasion or example, when the other has freely consented, is held only by the office of charity to call him back to a better state; but if he used fraud or fear, he must remove these, must besides indicate suitable remedies, unless the other has sufficiently known these, and must repair other damages, if any have proceeded thence.

II. He who has turned someone away from entrance into the novitiate, or a novice from profession, has not violated justice unless he used force or fraud. If either has intervened, the obligation toward the novice or candidate will return, of which we were just speaking in the preceding case.

Must the emoluments connected per se with that entrance be restored to the monastery? Some hold this and estimate the damages according to the present hope. But because an action of this kind does not tend of itself to inflicting temporal damage upon an Institute, to which no acquired right in a novice belongs, the obligation can probably be denied. - He who by force or fraud has abducted a professed religious is held concerning temporal damages toward the Religion. Force and fraud being excluded, since the religious himself does not certainly sin against justice, the obligation of restitution, with Lessius, Iust., c. 8, n. 16-20, against many, seems able to be denied.

I. He is per se guilty of grave injury who has made an unwilling person drunk, or by the injection of morphine or the use of a similar substance has artificially deprived him of the use of reason, or has filled him with various dreams or phantasms. Cf. what was said I, 478. The damages thence following are to be repaired as far as can be done.

II. He who has taught practical errors must unteach them, and must repair the damages which thence per se have followed for the erring person and for others. But if they were speculative, that is held as venial, unless the error concerns the principal and fundamental dogmas of faith, or the student is defrauded of a great part of the discipline which he wished to learn.

I. A private man is injurious who has prohibited another, by physical force, from free steps or actions; or, morally, by unjust threats has forced him to do or omit certain things; or by fraud has impeded his free choices.

Clerics are protected from these injuries by canonical sanction, that is, by the privilege of the canon. Cf. III, 10.

2. He also is injurious who subjects a non-consenting person, for example by abuse of hypnotism, to his commands. He must from justice restore that person, by suitable means, to his own right.

— Everyone has the right that, according to his goodness, whether innate or acquired, he be esteemed and treated. That right is violated by contumely, detraction or calumny, and rash judgment. Concerning each of these we must speak briefly.

I. On Contumely. 1. Notions. Contumely is the dishonoring of one's neighbor, or an illicit lesion of the honor of one's neighbor. Honor, however, is a testimony concerning another's excellence or goodness. Some goodness belongs to each one, and there is a right that he not be contemned.

Contumely is negative, by which signs of honor which observance and piety would demand are merely denied; positive, when a lesion of honor is contained either by word (through insults, reproaches, curses), or by writing (through an infamous libel), or by deed (through signs, insulting representations).

Specification and Gravity. The mere omission of signs which are not owed from justice is opposed to piety, observance, charity, but not to justice; but a positive denial which is a virtual dishonoring is opposed to it; and much more an act contrary to the honor of another. And it is mortal by its genus, because it is opposed to a good which is worth more than riches themselves. And it will be mortal in reality when it proceeds from an affection mortally evil, whether of contempt or of hatred, or if a grave dishonoring follows; here the quality both of the sinner and of the person dishonored has very great force. The place of St. Matthew, "If anyone shall say to his brother, Fool, he will be guilty of hell fire," is explained insofar as an insulting word manifests mortal hatred.

Although the quality of the person harmed, as for instance of a parent, can add a new species, contumely, as such, is the lowest species, since it contains this one formal malice of prejudice done to the honor of neighbor. Thus most hold, although St. Alphonsus, De Peccatis, n. 48, judges it more probable that contumelies are to be distinguished from their objects, because a proper honor is to be attributed to individual excellences.

With the mind of correcting, humbling, or for another just reason, a Superior can cast some word, otherwise insulting, at a subject; but let him beware of excess.

For the sake of jest to cast light defects, provided the other is not saddened or moved to anger, pertains to urbanity, according to St. Th. 2, 2, q. 72, art. 2. The insults with which women, children, and men of the lowest lot burden one another are not judged gravely to wound honor, so that they are excused from mortal sin, because faith is not given to them. The same often must be said of insults uttered by an angry man.

Cf. also what was said concerning piety, n. 290.

2. On Restitution for Wounded Honor. It is asked whether, from charity alone or also from justice, some reparation must be made, at least if reputation has remained intact. And Molina, Iust., tr. 4, d. 46, judges that new signs of honor are owed from charity alone. But the contrary sentence is to be preferred, because dishonoring, as such, is damnose. For in the very man who is affected by contumely, courage and confidence in acting are diminished; this is not lightly harmful to him. Besides, in the opinion of others, dignity or the title of honor decreases from contumely, and thus the dishonored man is also damaged in his social life.

Reparation is made through an honorific and friendly greeting, or an invitation to table, or a petition for pardon (sometimes even on bended knees and before witnesses; which can also be done through a mandatary), according as the lesion was grave. If material damages have followed, there is no doubt that these must be repaired. But from the common sense of men, pardon no longer must be sought if the offended man has taken vengeance, by himself or by the judge.

II. On Detraction and Calumny. 1. Notions. a) Detraction, in broader use, is any unjust violation of another's reputation. And, from what was said in n. 580, any direct violation committed by a private person is unjust. Detraction strictly so called is distinguished from calumny. For calumny is committed when a false crime is imputed to someone; detraction, when a true but occult crime is revealed.

In the civil forum of Belgium and France, since public officials cannot act except concerning calumny, while proof of sin or delict against private persons is not admitted, they sometimes distinguish defamation, which is a lesion of the reputation of a private man, and calumny, by which the reputation of an official is harmed.

By the intention of wounding reputation, formal detraction is separated from material detraction.

b) Reputation, however, is opinion or estimation concerning another's excellence. Therefore it is a good which we have among others.

Reputation is distinguished: a) of the moral order, which, founded in the use of free will, freely perishes and can be freely restored. This reputation of honesty, of probity, is reputation simply so called, and is had either as connatural or negative and common, insofar as he who is not proved evil is not reprehended; or as positive, special, acquired by the exercise of virtue; b) of the physical or intellectual order, which, being removed from free will, honors capacity, genius, talent.

Reputation is useful, indeed necessary, so that we may foster easy, dignified, and pleasant intercourse with other men, and so that according to our capacity we may render ourselves useful to others and to society, or may discharge our social function.

It is also very useful to enjoy a good reputation for capacity and talent.

2. The Right of Having Reputation. a) A good which serves so greatly the end of human life is manifestly the object of right. And common utility itself demands that it not perish because of an accidental vice; therefore to take away reputation is at the same time to take away the stimulus of conversion and the occasion of repairing the things committed. Moreover, it is to snatch from someone a good which he still has.

But even in a moral matter no one can lay claim to a positive reputation which is greater than his merits.

Finally, this good is not ended by death; for posthumous reputation also is held in great price, and by the hope of such reputation many are stirred to illustrious deeds.

b) Because reputation is a good distinct from the person, it is in the perfect dominion of man, so that one can validly renounce his own reputation. And for the same cause it is situated in the high dominion of the State, so that social authority can, on account of true but occult delicts, mark and punish someone with infamy. Although it is rather repugnant to the mind of the legislator of today that he affect even a guilty man with perpetual infamy.

3. Moral Estimation of Wounded Reputation. a) Malice. Directly to detract from the reputation of someone unwilling is, in a private man, a sin of injustice which participates in the nature of theft, and by its genus is grave, although contumely is judged graver.

But the gravity of detraction is to be estimated less from the defect narrated than from the detriment which is inflicted upon someone's estimation. Wherefore it will often be graver rashly to accuse a secretary of garrulity than of mortal sin.

Nor is it right to detract from the dead.

b) Specification. Although calumny is graver than detraction, nevertheless in species the two do not differ, except insofar as calumny is at the same time opposed to truth; but this malice is not mortal. Nor do various detractions seem to differ among themselves in species, because they are opposed to the same reputation. St. Alphonsus, however, L. V (De Peccato), n. 48, more probably thinks that the species vary because reputations are distinct according to the object or matter.

c) Excuse. He is not unjust who, according to truth, casts someone down from a special reputation of virtue to a common one, or who supplies just notice of the skill or lack of skill of others. For neither had truly acquired or possessed the greater reputation.

Nor is he unjust who, on account of proportionate utility, communicates notice which at the same time harms another's reputation. For often an action which wounds reputation possesses some other utility of this kind. The defamation of another, as the other effect of the notice given, is merely actively permitted. - And more easily a proportionate cause is present for historians, so that concerning facts, especially not recent ones, and concerning men whose reputation now matters less to other living persons, they may speak fully according to the truth, with every consideration of personal reputation removed: both because historical knowledge commonly matters; and because the condemnation of a harmful man very often prepares the restitution of good reputation to an innocent man.

4. Corollaries or Applications. In a place where someone is so unknown that even when present he cannot be designated by anyone by his own name, the person has no reputation. Wherefore calumny uttered against him will have the nature of a lie, but not of unjust detraction.

They do not sin by detraction who, with a view to correction, report the occult defects of children and subjects to parents and Superiors (cf. above, n. 116); - who, for the sake of taking counsel and help, reveal things which necessarily must be communicated; - who by their revelation propose to impede proportionate damage of another: whence, when there is question of conferring an office, of contracting marriage, of undertaking religion, of assuming a physician, preceptor, or servant, it is lawful, indeed sometimes necessary, to manifest the occult impediments, inability, and crimes of another, from which some notable inconvenience is deservedly feared, provided that no other more suitable manner of impeding is at hand, and that the damage feared for the neighbor is not too far below the damage which will follow from the revelation; - who by revelation consult their own reputation unjustly wounded by another; - who, for the sake of solace, communicate to one friend, not to many, an injury done to them by another, especially if care is taken that the person is not named more openly than is necessary for solace; - who manifest a crime public by notoriety of law, that is, concerning which there is certainty by a definitive sentence of a judge, even in other places where reputation was not easily going to arrive. This is done without injustice, because the divulging of the sentence has the nature of a useful penalty, and it is expedient for the public good that criminals be known. Nor is it repugnant to charity, unless you act with a bad intention, or, because of the amendment of the person, the reason of public good has ceased. Indeed, if the matter has only notoriety of fact, the public good seems to demand that men be able to converse about public matters of this kind, and thus avoid errors which would easily flow from false estimation. Thus Lugo, d. 11, n. 61, against others who speak more severely, when the matter is divulged in a place to which reputation was not going to arrive except after a long time. But can the memory of an ancient condemnation be stirred up, with justice preserved? Formerly they admitted this; the matter depends on the mind of the legislator, which we judge to be contrary.

Detraction is only light per se in him who reveals the natural defects of others or general propensities to anger, etc. (lust excepted); or even mortal sins which, because of the condition of the person, wound his reputation only a little, as if you should say of a secular and not very pious youth that he is prodigal, given to loves, etc.; - of him who reveals someone's occult crime to some one prudent and taciturn man, unless the person be one by whom someone specially wishes to be approved. Nor is it an obstacle that the loss of reputation with one person is held grave through rash judgment; because by that judgment a crime is imposed on someone as if falsely, which, in a grave matter, is always grave; - of him who manifests a crime which shortly will be public, because it harms little, unless, however, grave damages follow from that anticipation; - of him who makes one infamous in one crime, for example adultery, infamous concerning another very related one, as for instance fornication; - of him who speaks of the vice of a people in general, or says of some city that many there are wicked, even determining the crime, insofar as either it is notorious or it harms no determinate person. Indeed, often no sin will be committed by this narration.

But it will be grave, against justice, by narrating even light defects to do grave harm, as if you should say that a Prelate of the best name is accustomed to lies, or is illegitimately born; - or to say of someone that you know something about him by which he is to be affected with great shame; - to reveal to those who do not belong to that community grave matters which are contained within the ambit of a restricted community, such as a chapter, monastery, or religion, especially since the infamation of the religion, order, etc., not rarely follows thence; - to detract from an order or religious state in common, or from a monastery, by saying, for example, that life is lived badly in it, that regular observance is not kept (unless that was notorious), or, while the person is passed over in silence, to indicate the monastery where an occult grave sin was committed; - to detract from some place if infamy redounds, as it were, to individuals: yet today, because all kinds of persons are mixed, this will happen more rarely.

5. Material Detraction Arising from Loquacity. is mortal if it brings grave lesion of neighbor, and this is adverted to. But it can be objectively venial, if it is not received or believed seriously. Likewise they judge it venial to report things heard as heard only, affirming nothing concerning the truth of the matter, but rather signifying one's doubt concerning it, unless, however, grave damage is foreseen as going to follow from the manner of narrating or from the levity of the hearers, who are going to believe and spread it rashly. But when not from the manner of narrating, but from their own levity, the hearers are going to believe, it will be grave against charity alone. Justice itself, however, will be gravely harmed if you report the matter as narrated by a man worthy of faith; for others will then reasonably believe. Cf. Lugo, d. 14, n. 56, 57; St. Alph., l. 3, n. 977.

6. Some Things to Be Noted. a) He who reports a public delict must also, from justice, report the penitence and amendment.

b) According to the condition of the hearers, who may be conscious of similar things or altogether ignorant, revelation of the delict of a community, or of clerics, monastery, or clerical order, can gravely harm or not harm. And the stricter the secret (for example, of confession) by which you are bound, the graver obligation of prudence you are held to. Scandals also are to be avoided.

c) From the grave sadness of another, the narration of a natural defect can become grave against charity. Likewise, charity at least being unharmed, the memory of a deed which has been handed over to oblivion cannot be made, unless the reason of the common good demands it.

They admit that it is right for an accused man, if it contributes to his defense, to reveal the true crimes of witnesses in a criminal trial. And if the witness responds illegitimately, calumny itself will indeed be opposed to truth, but not to justice.

2. Restitution of Reputation. a) Reputation itself must be restored by the detractor, not by his heirs, since a personal obligation follows a personal delict; material damages which have followed become the burden of the patrimony itself.

b) He who narrated a true crime can gradually repair reputation by praise, by honor restored. The use of mental restrictions, which others concede and even command, cannot be approved by us. But the imputation of a false crime must per se be destroyed by open retraction before immediate hearers, and also mediate hearers. Sometimes it will suffice to say that he was wholly deceived and that the matter was otherwise than had been said. Yet generally confessors are content with retraction before the immediate hearers, since another retraction is made most difficult, and the immediate hearers are tacitly invited to correct the error of others. Cf. Lugo, d. 15, n. 15, 16; d'Ann., II, 226; St. Alph., l. 3, n. 991.

He who, led by good faith or probable error, has said something false about another without a formal lie, must correct the error from justice, insofar as he can do this without notable inconvenience to himself. But if the error of the hearers was the cause why the crime said of one person was understood of another, he must at least from charity prevent grave detriment of neighbor without his own damage.

c) The obligation of restitution is excused or ceases: on account of physical or moral impotence; but he who was formally injurious must restore with equal damage to himself; - if the occult crime which was narrated, or another similar one, has become public in another way; - if reputation probably was not harmed, because it is likely that faith was not given by the hearers to one who seemed to speak from anger or passion; - if reputation has been recovered in other ways (yet material damages which have followed must be repaired); - if the matter has been covered by probable oblivion, and it is dangerous to renew the memory of the matter; - if the other has detracted from you and does not wish to restore; - if restitution is condoned. That condonation is licit if the infamy does not redound to others, nor impede the fruits of commonly useful labor.

III. On Rash Judgment. 1. Notions. Judgment is a firm sentence of the mind, or indubitable assent; suspicion is begun assent; doubt is not assent except causally, but is, as it were, a suspension of the mind inclining to neither part.

2. What Things Are Lawful. On account of sufficient indications, no one is prohibited from judging, suspecting, doubting; indeed prudence itself compels this to be done in practical matters. Nor, when we doubt, provided that we abstain from a positive judgment concerning improbity, are we forbidden so to act and dispose matters for greater caution as if the other were unjust. This being excluded, rather we ought in mind to incline toward a good interpretation, and to disregard some falsity if any underlies this favorable judgment, because a contingent particular truth does not pertain to the perfection of the intellect according to itself, and that judgment more regards the good affection of the mind. Cf. 2, 2, q. 60, art. 4, ad 2.

3. The Sin of Rash Judgment. Because reputation is a good which we have among others, rash judgment, with full advertence, concerning a gravely defaming guilt of neighbor, is opposed to justice, and indeed gravely. But that sin will rarely be committed, either because at least probable indications are present, or because the defect of reasons is not adverted to. Almost then it will be committed when, while adverting to the obligation of examining the reasons, one neglects the examination from an evil affection, and delights in the apprehension of another's infamy.

4. What of Suspicion and Doubt. Rash suspicion and doubt seem by their genus to be venial. For since some good estimation of neighbor remains in the mind of the one suspecting, no grave injury is inflicted on him. Yet grave can be the malevolence on account of which one persists in grave suspicion or in doubt concerning a grave matter. He who, being interrogated, responds that he is not morally certain but can be deceived, does not judge but suspects; but he judges who has affirmed the matter as certain or almost certain.

443. State of the question. - Just as external goods of fortune unjustly taken away are to be restored, and unjust damage caused in them is to be repaired, so a fortiori it must be held for reputation and honor, which are goods of greater moment. Nevertheless their restitution is not always convenient, but rather often presents special difficulties. Wherefore it must be carefully examined who is bound to restore them; what, when, to whom, how, and before whom he ought to restore; and what are the causes excusing from restoring them.

444. Principle I. He who unjustly injures another's reputation in any way whatsoever is bound from justice to restore it as soon as possible, and to repair all material damages, at least confusedly foreseen, which have effectively and culpably followed from the defamation. - It is said:

a) he who unjustly injures reputation: for where there is no violation of right, there can be no place for reparation; whence if someone has revealed another's crime from necessity or a just cause, he is not bound to restitution;

b) in any way whatsoever, whether internally before himself, by his own judgment of mind, or externally before others, whether by simple detraction or by calumny, whether he himself detracted or unjustly cooperated with one detracting, whether positively he did this by commanding, counseling, consenting, etc., or negatively, by not impeding when he could and from justice ought to impede;

c) he is bound to restore reputation: for what was unjustly taken away must be returned. This obligation of itself is personal and therefore regards only the defamer, but not the heirs, except by accident if the owner promised pecuniary recompense;

d) as soon as possible; otherwise the burden of the defamed person is continued, and there is danger lest the detraction be propagated farther or produce other evil effects;

e) and to repair all material damages which have effectively and culpably followed, namely, real damages which he truly caused, as if the detractor impeded another from profit, office, benefice, or from a fitting marriage, or was the cause why another is dismissed from office or compelled to labor at a lesser wage; but not those things which justly befall the other, or only on occasion of the detraction, as if from it it happens that he is justly sent to prison by a judge, or if the defamed man from sadness kills himself or brings another evil upon himself or his own, because these are related by accident to defamation. This obligation is real, and consequently passes to the heirs, both of the one injuring, though not beyond the forces of the inheritance, and of the one injured.

It is proved: Everyone who knowingly and willingly violates the strict right of another is bound to repair it. But 1) man has a strict right to reputation, which nevertheless can be injured unjustly; therefore he who injures the reputation of another unjustly is bound to repair it; - 2) man also has a strict right that damage not be unjustly brought upon goods of fortune, which nevertheless often comes from injury of reputation; therefore the unjust defamer is also bound to repair these damages.

Both obligations are grave, if the defamation was gravely culpable.

Hence 1° he who sinned gravely by defaming another is bound to repair reputation even with grave inconvenience to himself, for a grave obligation binds with proportionate inconvenience.

2° He who from light fault or from inadvertence or imprudence injured the reputation of another is bound to repair, but without grave inconvenience: for he is bound as far as he can to impede his saying from producing further effects, otherwise the infamy which follows further would also be imputed to him under grave obligation.

3° If the whole fault is not from the speaker but from the hearers, because they interpreted the words of the speaker sinisterly, the speaker is bound not from justice but from charity alone to correct the error.

4° If light infamy has induced grave damage in goods of fortune, as if someone lost the office of secretary because he was presented as talkative, there is a grave obligation of repairing that damage, if it was foreseen, because then the defamation is grave, not by reason of infamy, but by reason of damage.

5° He who injured another's reputation by rash judgment or suspicion is bound to put those away and to conceive a good estimation.

445. The manner of repairing reputation. - Generally reputation is to be repaired in that manner by which the infamy brought upon one's neighbor is truly removed, and therefore the unjust damager must choose the mode which does not seem easier to himself, but which, with the circumstances considered, is truly efficacious. Therefore in practice it will have to be distinguished whether the infamy arose from calumny or detraction, whether it remained secret or became public.

A. If calumny is in question, this is openly to be retracted, even with loss of one's own reputation or of another equivalent good; for in an equal cause the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty. Hence, if this is required for an efficacious retraction, the calumniator must confess that he lied; nevertheless sometimes, the circumstances being considered, satisfaction is made to justice by saying that he erred or was deceived; and if the retraction would not be efficacious unless an oath were added or witnesses employed, these means would have to be employed, because they do not appear too difficult.

Only then is the calumniator proportionately excused, if his reputation is necessary for the public good, as if a magistrate calumniated, or if the damage which the defamer would have to suffer by restoring would much exceed the damage of the defamed man: thus defamation is not to be repaired with danger of life, unless death also threatens the defamed man himself from the defamation.

B. If simple defamation is in question, a special difficulty comes from this, that the crime unjustly manifested is true. Therefore the detractor cannot declare that he spoke what was false; for this would be a lie, but a lie is never lawful. Therefore he must repair the injured reputation in another way, either formally and directly, or equivalently and indirectly.

1° Formally and directly, if it thus benefits the defamed man: by saying that he spoke unjustly and badly, that he did injury to the other, indeed, by using amphibology, that he erred, that he did not say the matter as it was to be said; nevertheless let him act cautiously, lest the hearers, understanding the ambiguity, be confirmed more in their sinister opinion.

2° Equivalently and indirectly, if directly he can effect nothing before astute hearers: by speaking honorably concerning the defamed man, by praising him when occasion is given, especially in similar matter, or by excusing him, and in various ways promoting his good reputation. This manner of repairing is often safer and more efficacious than the former, which smells of mental restriction.¹

¹ "Someone can take away someone's reputation in three ways: in one way by saying what is true and justly, for instance when someone discloses another's crime with due order observed, and then he is not bound to restitution of reputation; in another way by saying what is false and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore reputation, by saying that he said what was false; in a third way by saying what is true, but unjustly, for instance when someone discloses another's crime against due order, and then he is bound to restitution of reputation, as much as he can, without lying however, as for instance by saying that he spoke badly, or that he unjustly defamed him; or if he cannot restore reputation, he ought to compensate him otherwise" II-II, q. 62, a. 2, ad 2.

C. If the defamation was public and widely spread, the reparation also ought to be public, so that it may be efficacious insofar as it can be; hence:

1° Defamation published in writing and in print is fittingly repaired in the same way, and ordinarily is to be repaired thus; indeed even defamation made orally is often suitably repaired in that public way, especially if it has already been widely diffused and it is unknown to whom it has come;

2° otherwise, however, first it must be retracted before the immediate hearers themselves, because before them the defamer was the immediate cause of infamy;

3° then also before mediate hearers, insofar as the diffusion must be attributed to the fault of the defamer and reparation is possible: a) thus of itself, if by direct intention he disclosed the crime so that the hearers would divulge it, or moved them to this by command or persuasion; or also if he told light and talkative persons whom he foresaw would easily publish it, at least if he did it without stipulation of secrecy: for then the damage of further defamation was foreseen and voluntary;

b) on the contrary, if he narrated under secrecy, or to such persons whom he prudently judged would not publish the matter further: for then the further infamy is involuntary to him, and must be imputed to the malice of the hearers;

c) in practice, reparation before mediate hearers is often morally impossible; in which case it suffices to retract before the immediate hearers, at the same time exhorting them to do the same, when opportunity is given, before those to whom they manifested the crime.

In the case in which the defamation is at least in part irreparable, some reparation through money can be counseled, especially in the case in which the defamer is rich, but the defamed man poor and willing to accept a compensation of this kind.

446. Several causes excusing from restitution of reputation are listed:

1° Absence of damage, namely, if the defamation was not efficacious, because for example the hearers did not understand, or did not give faith to the detractor, or knew the matter from elsewhere, or another, by correcting the detractor, impeded the evil effect.

2° Cessation of damage, namely, if the infamy has already been removed, whether because reputation was recovered through a good life, or because the falsity of the calumny was publicly acknowledged, or the defamation was destroyed by oblivion in the course of time: for then one must altogether beware lest by an inopportune retraction the defamation come back to life.

3° Impotence, by which namely reparation is physically or morally impossible, as if the hearers of the detraction are unknown, or cannot be approached; if the delict has become public by another way; or another's reputation cannot be repaired without one's own far graver damage: then the defamed man is judged to renounce his right.

4° Remission or condonation by the injured person, whether express or tacit, provided he has the power of perfectly condoning, and the public good does not stand in the way from elsewhere; for if infamy redounds to others, or scandalizes others, or stands in the way of an office being duly performed, as of a magistrate or priest, who needs a good name for exercising his office, perfect condonation cannot be made: for then the defamation also injures the state.

5° Mutual compensation, provided the injuries on both sides are equal, and a third party does not suffer from it. Compensation is not to be understood in the sense that the defamed man can defame his defamer: for this would be mere vengeance; but because, if the defamed man himself has injured the reputation of the detractor and does not wish to repair the injury, reparation can be delayed until the other is prepared to repair reputation.

Thus plebeians are judged tacitly to remit injuries to one another, since they know that very often others detract from them and nevertheless do not restore; whence neither are they presumed to demand restitution, or certainly to wish to use mutual compensation in not restoring.

XXIX. Fr. Leonard Lessius, Book II, chap. 2, doubt 22, no. 135: “If you have unjustly defamed another who had previously defamed you, you are not bound to restitution towards him, if he is unwilling to make restitution to you; but you may use compensation, equality nevertheless being preserved as far as may be.”

XXXI. Fr. Luis de Molina, On Justice and Right, Vol. IV, disputation 49, no. 5: “When one has unjustly defamed another, and is unwilling, as he was bound, to restore that reputation to him, then the man unjustly defamed, who had not inflicted a loss of reputation upon the other, could compensate in money the loss of reputation in which he stands; and that not only by not paying an old and occult debt, so far as would be judged sufficient in equality for a competent compensation of the reputation in which he stands, but also by secretly taking from what belongs to the other as much as would be enough for the same compensation: provided that no scandal intervene, and that he could not otherwise conveniently obtain the restitution of his reputation; and lastly provided that all the conditions required intervene, that occult compensation of a debt may lawfully be made in the forum of conscience.”

That reputation is a good having marketable value, the taking away of which obliges in justice to restitution, is certain. For reputation is good estimation among others, of which Proverb. 22: Melius est nomen bonum, quam divitiae multae. From this S. Bonaventure p. p. Centil. sect. 13 deduces that the detractor is held under greater obligation to Restitution than the thief, which Valentia thereupon noted disp. 5. quaest. 6. puncto 5.

Therefore the detractor is held to restore reputation, three conditions concurring. The first is that the reputation have been taken away — for sometimes reputation is not removed by a saying, either because it is not believed, or because that sin does not blacken a person of that rank, as if you say of a knight: He wounded another man. The second condition is that the reputation have been taken away unjustly. The third, that the defamed man have not redeemed his stolen reputation. Thus they report from the common teaching: Soto Lib. 4. de Iustitia, quaest. 6. art. 3, Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 6. puncto 5, Turrianus disp. 53. dub. 3, Caspensis disp. 10. sect. 5.

I assert, therefore, first, that the unjust detractor is held to restore reputation, even with the loss of his own reputation, though not of his life, even by saying (if need be) that he lied. Thus D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. ad 2, Caietanus ibi, Sotus Lib. 4. de Iustitia, quaest. 6. art. 3, Petrus Navar. Lib. 2. de restit. cap. 4. disput. 5. num. 375, Michael Salonius 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. controu. 13, Navar. in manuali Latino, cap. 18. num. 45, Rodriquez 2. part. summae, cap. 45, Lopez prima parte, instruct. cap. 16, Sayrus Lib. 11. cap. 3. num. 21, Filliucius Tom. 2. tract. 32. cap. 9. num. 145, Malder. de Iust. tract. 7. cap. 2. dub. 9. fol. 554, et all the Doctors commonly, as in Valentia loco cit. Fagundez in octavum praeceptum Decal. cap. 15, Tannerum disp. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 4, Bassaeum V. Detractio, 2. num. 4.

Some add a little exception: unless there be great inequality — as if the defamed man be of low condition, but the defamer of great dignity, and he suffer greater detriment by saying he lied. Thus Sotus and Valentia, although Nauarrus doubts of this: for one is not held to make greater restitution than what he took away. Whence it comes about that he is not held to restore reputation with the loss of his own life; for although reputation is a kind of civil death, as Anselmo teaches Lib. de simil. cap. 147 as cited by D. Bonaventure in Pharetra Lib. 3. cap. 3. §. De Detractione, still it is not the proper taking away of life, but of a good inferior to life itself, namely reputation, which outweighs riches, according to Proverb. 22; and accordingly it binds more to restitution than the taking away of an eye, as the Saintly Doctor again enjoins in speculo animae, cap. 1. Most follow this doctrine, as in Fagundez cap. 15 et Dianam part. 2. Tract. 5. resol. 29 et 30.

There is, moreover, a question there in Diana: whether one who falsely defamed someone is held, if need be, to swear that he spoke falsely. They answer affirmatively: Caietanus and Aragon 2. 2. quaest. 62. artic. 2, where also Sylvius quaestione 22. tractat. 32. cap. 20. num. 245, Turrianus disp. 52. dub. 1, Salon de Iust. tom. 1. quaest. 62. art. 2. controv. 3, Carbo de restit. quaest. 18, Villalob. in summa, Tom. 2. tract. 11. diff. 37, Tanner. 2. 2. disp. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 6. num. 141, Diana ibi, Fagundez Lib. 8. cap. 15, Navar. cap. 18. num. 45, Pet. Navar. Lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 137, Sotos de Iust. Lib. 4. quaest. 6. art. 3, Faustus in speculo, disp. 21. quaest. 21, Bassaeus num. 9. Nay, they add — Molina tom. 5. disp. 41, Ioan. de la Cruz in Direct. pract. 1. punct. 7. art. 2. dub. 5, Soto, Aragon, and Salon — that he must, if need be, even bring witnesses.

I WONDER, however, that the Doctors so crowd headlong into binding consciences; for, as Faventinus observes in 4. dist. 15. quaest. 3. disp. 53. cap. 1. num. 32, the ancient Theologians — such as S. Bonaventure in the places adduced and elsewhere, Alensis part. 2. quaest. 129. memb. 6, D. Thom. quaest. 62. art. 2. ad 2, Scotus loco cit. — require only a simple retraction. But the modern Zealots superadd a most heavy burden, which perhaps they themselves do not touch with a finger.

The Doctors bring forward a certain SMOOTH manner of restoring reputation. For since to say one lied is an arduous act, they teach that the reputation is to be restored by praising the defamed man before those who had heard the detraction. Thus Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Soto de Iustitia, lib. 4. quaest. 9. art. 3. ad 4, Villalob. in summa, Tom. 2. tract. 11. diff. 37. num. 4, Tannerus 2. 2. disp. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 4. num. 143, Valentia quaest. 4. puncto 5 and quaest. 17. puncto 2, Fagundez in octavum praeceptum, Lib. 8. cap. 15. num. 3, Lessius Lib. 2. cap. 11. dub. 10, Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Faustus in speculo confess. disp. 21. quaest. 74. num. 6, Diana loco cit. Whatever they may bring to the contrary: Layman Lib. 3. sect. 5. tract. 3. part. 2. cap. 7, Navar. lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 370, Faber n. 46, Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. quaeritur 22, Fillucius Tom. 2. tract. 31. cap. 10. num. 246.

IT IS ASKED second: whether the defamer, not being able to restore the reputation, can, and ought, to make satisfaction with money.

They AFFIRM that he is held: Layman Lib. 3. sect. 5. tract. 3. part. 2. cap. 7, Filliuc. Tom. 2. tract. 32. cap. 10. n. 239, Turrianus 1. 2. tomo 2. disp. 53. dub. 7, Faber in 4. disp. 53. cap. 4. num. 122, Malderus 2. 2. tract. 7. cap. 7. dub. 8, Navarrus cap. 17. num. 19, Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Sylvest. verbo Detractio, quaest. 4, Navar. lib. 2. cap 4. num. 416, Lessius Lib. 2. cap. 11. disp. 11, and others as in Bassaeum num. 7.

OTHERS, however, as in Diana resol. 50 citata, propose with probability that it can be done. Thus Villalob. Tom. 2. tract. 11. diffic. 39, Sotos de Iust. Lib. 4. quaest. 6. art. 2, Aragon 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 6. puncto 5, Couar. lib. 1. variar. cap. 2. num. 8, Molina tract. 4. disput. 25, Sà V. Infamia, num. 7, Sylvius 1. 2. quaestio 62. art. 2. Quaeritur 22, post Rebell. — Sotum, Richardum, Adrianum, Caietanum, and others as in Fagundez Lib 8. cap. 14. num. 11, asserting also Couar. reg. peccatum, p. p. num. 6 et Lib. 1. var. resol. cap. 2. num. 8, Cordubam quaest. 33. art. 2, Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 116, Salonium 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. controv. 13, Rodriquez 2. part. summa, cap. 45, Rebell. Lib. 2. quaest. 10, the Gloss on cap. Ecclesia sanctae Mariae extra, ut lite pendente nihil innovetur, Malderum de Iust. tract. 7. cap. 2. de restit. famae, dub. 8, Tannerum disp. cit. num. 150, and others adduced above. Add Bassaeum num. 7, who says it can be done in equity if the defamer is poor.

The OPINION of the Seraphic Doctor, in my judgment, is that this compensation cannot be made. Thus the authorities cited, to whom add Caspensem disp. 10. sect. 5. num. 37, and Tanner judges it probable.

The rationale of D. Bonaventure, in nearly all the places cited and ad cap. 10. Ecclesiast., is this: Restitution is an act of Justice, reducing to equality according to commutation through compensation of what was taken away; but money, or other goods of fortune, are not proportionate to compensating reputation: Therefore. The minor is proved by Proverb. 22, Melius est nomen bonum, quam divitiae multae, and Ecclesiasticus 41, Curam habe de bono nomine: hoc enim tibi magis permanebit, quam mille thesauri pretiosi. The authors of our opinion use this rationale, from which it also follows that, conversely, one is not held to restore with goods of a higher order of life. Thus it is laid down in cap. offi. II., de poenit. et remiss, and the Doctors commonly cite it as in Fagundez in octavum Praeceptum Lib. 8. cap. 13 and Diana part. 2. Tract. 3. resol. 30 — even if the defamed man is a noble defamed by a VILE man. The reason has already been given. IT WILL BE ASKED third: whether one who, without just cause, makes known the hidden crime of someone to one or two prudent men whom he knows will not spread it about, sins mortally.

YOU WILL ASK third: whether one who, without just cause, makes known the hidden crime of someone to one or two prudent men whom he knows will not spread it about, sins mortally.

They answer AFFIRMATIVELY: Turrianus 2. 2. Tom. 2. disp. 53. dub. 8, Sotus de Iust. Lib. 7. quaest. 10. art. 2, Molina de Iust. tract. 4. disp. 29, Lessius Lib. 2. cap. 11. dub. 11. num. 70, Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Azor. Tom. 1. Lib. 6. cap. 9, Fillincius Tom. 2. tract. 40. cap. 4. num. 91, Suarez tom. 4. disp. 34. sect. 1, Villalob. Tom. 2. tract. 11. diffic. 36, Valentia tomo 3. disp. 5. quaest. 17. puncto 2, Malderus 2. 2. tract. 7. cap. 1. dub. 4, Layman Lib. 3. sect. 5. tract. 3. part. 2. cap. 3, Ioan. de la Cruz part. 8. quaest. 2. art. 2. dub. 3, Salonius 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, who state this opinion to be common among the more recent Thomists; Fagundez also defends it in octavum praeceptum, Lib. 8. cap. 2. num. 7, and Bassaeus V. Detractio 1. num. 11.

Caietanus teaches the CONTRARY opinion, 1. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Navar. de restit. Lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 234, Graffius lib. 2. cap 137, and others; and many of the adversaries hold this opinion probable, as Tanner. 2. 2. disput. 4. quaest. 8 dub. 7. num. 138, Ioan. de la Cruz, and others, with whom Diana subscribes, part. 2. Tract. 5. resol. 23.

The OPINION of D. Bonaventure is that this man sins mortally. His rationale, which the Moderns use as in Diana and Fagundez, is that reputation is blackened even before one or two. Wherefore Jesus Christ in Matth. 18 grants that one or two be called to correct someone when the obstinate man refuses solitary correction; otherwise he commands it to be done inter te, et ipsum solum. For one man could be harming, even if prudent, and of the sort Christ desires to help in reproving the fallen. For he wills that suitable men be chosen to raise up the fallen; and indeed reputation is often more harmed if it is said to one weighty person than if to many of the common people; but especially if the defamed man depended upon him. Thus the Saintly Doctor defines this question at those words of Ecclesiasticus 10, Si mordeat serpens in silentio, nihil eo minus habet, qui occulte detrahit, from which he elicits a new argument; for the striking is deadly even when secret before one whom he defames, for he compares this to the striking of a venomous serpent.

They OBJECT that the prudent man would not reveal it. It is answered, as I said, that it makes no difference. Next, who made you the guarantor of this?

ANOTHER doubt arises: whether the detractor is held to restitution of damages in the goods of the man's household, and in other things, lost on account of his ruined reputation.

A DISTINCTION must be made. For if he defamed him falsely, he is held to full restitution of all damages. Thus commonly with Lessio Tom. 1. Lib. 2. cap. 12. de detract. dub. 19. numero 101.

Sayro lib. 11. cap. 3. de restit. bon. exter. num. 17, Soto lib. 4. de Iust. quaest. 6. art. 3. ad 4, Pet. Navar. lib. 2. de restit. cap. 4. disp. 4. num. 375, Navar. summa Lat. cap. 18. num. 47, Salon 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. controv. 20; and it is clear from cap. si culpa, de iniur. et damn. as Fagundez notes in octavum Praeceptum, lib. 8. cap. 24. num. 5, who observes that this opinion is to be understood of goods already existing in possession; but as regards goods in hope — say, if on account of the defamation he was impeded from some dignity — he says the matter must be judged by a prudent man.

HE ADDS, moreover, that even one who defamed of a true crime is not held to restore goods in hope in full, but well those already acquired. Thus also Navar. summa, cap. 18. num. 45, Sayrus lib. 11. cap. 3. de restit. bon. exter. num. 20, Lessius Tomo 1. lib. 2. cap. 12. de detract. et contum. n. 19 et num. 109, Petrus Navar. de restit. cap. 4. dub. 6. num. 384, and Salon. supra.

The rationale of the latter is that the debt of restitution arises not from the quantity of the sin, but from the quantity of the damage inflicted; whence, although one who speaks the truth sins less, yet he inflicted the same damage unjustly. Nor say that he gave the occasion by his own sin. For it is answered that the crime would inflict no damage except through the mediation of knowledge, and the detractor has no right to set this cause in motion. But he who is the cause of an unjust damaging is immediately constituted guilty of restitution, as the Saintly Doctor argues in Speculo animae, cap. 1, and with him Bassaeus, v. Detractio 2. num. 2.

A doubt, however, OCCURS here at once: whether he is held to restore the reputation before all those to whose notice the sin came through those to whom he himself told it.

Faber answers NEGATIVELY, disp. 35. allegata, cap. 1. num. 35, adducing Alensem. See Dianam loc. cit. resol. 34, Tannerum disput. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 6. num. 146, and others as in him and in Villalob. Tom. 2. tract. 11. diffic. 37. num. 11.

I JUDGE with Villalobos loc. cit. and Caspensi Tract. 18. de Restit. disp. 10. sect. 5. num. 33, and Diana, that such a man is excused if he believed those to whom he told it would not defame him to others; but if he believed they would defame him, he is held; for what is the cause of a cause is also the cause of what is caused. But the cause of the damaging is guilty of restitution, as the Saintly Doctor says loco citato.

I SUBMIT ANOTHER doubt: whether, if someone tells another of an injury secretly inflicted upon himself by someone, in order to lessen his grief, he sins mortally. Diana answers negatively loc. cit. resol. 32, with Sylvio 2. 2. quaestion. 62. art. 2. quaerit. 15, Lessio lib. 2. cap. 11. dub. 12. num. 31, Navar. lib. 1. cap. 4. num. 345, Molina tract. 4. disp. 29. num. 5, Layman lib. 3. sect. 5. tract. 3. p. 2. cap. 3. num. 6, Tannero 2. 2. disp. 4. quaest. 8. dub. 7. num. 145, and others commonly. But Ioan. de la Cruz in Direct. p. 8. quaest. 2. art. 2. dub. 3 adds more. If a person gravely injured in secret, unable to restrain himself from grief, breaks out into public complaints, he is not immediately condemned of mortal guilt if the injurer is defamed; for it seems hard to restrain so afflicted a mind from breaking into complaints, since this is most natural. He adduces for this opinion also Ludovicum Lopes.

I judge S. Bonaventure assents to these, who at those words Eccles. 10. Si mordeat serpens in silentio reduces the causes of detracting someone's reputation to three heads.

The FIRST is from necessity, when he is compelled by some legitimate precept, human or divine. Human, when he who can commands him to speak; Divine, when conscience dictates to a man that he is bound to look after his neighbor, that he may be corrected, according to that precept of the Lord concerning fraternal correction.

The SECOND head is from usefulness, when he tells the evil of someone to one who can help and not harm, as when he tells it to a man who loves and sympathizes and has the will to correct him.

The THIRD is from the lust of detracting. When, therefore, neither necessity is considered nor usefulness, even if it be the truth, he is not excused from the lust of detracting; indeed he sins the sin of detraction. Thus the Saintly Doctor.

THEREFORE he replies further, that if some usefulness intervenes, it is not a sin.

He adds in speculo animae, cap. 1. what Cruz says. Yet it matters greatly whether this vice proceeds from envy, or from an indiscreet Zeal of justice; for it sometimes happens that the evils of others, done out of a certain indignation or lightness of speech, are recited, or even aggravated, without the intention of defaming anyone as evil — which it would be hard to judge mortal. Thus the Saintly Doctor.

FINALLY many admit compensation, if the other also took away the other's reputation and is unwilling to restore it. Thus Toletus lib. 5. cap. 7, Lessius disput. 25, Molina disp. 49, Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. quaeritur 10, Malder. 2. 2. tract. 7. cap. 2. n. 14, Diana p. 2. Tract. 5. resol. 30. ante controv. 13 et 24, Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. ad 2, Petro de Navar. lib. 2. de restit. cap. 4. num. 6, Sayro lib. 11. cap. 8, and others, after D. Bonau. in 3. dist. 9. quaest. 4 et 5. Moreover honor is harmed by words, as by insults which impose faults to one's face; by insults which also oppose penal charges, such as being a bastard, etc.; by reproaches, casting up the miseries from which he has been relieved. So also by deeds one is harmed, by blows, scourges, etc., as the Doctors commonly teach with D. Bonau. in speculo animae, cap. 1; and accordingly they are held, as inflictors of damage, to restitution, as all concede. And indeed that it is a mortal sin, if they are grave.

IT IS PROVED by the Saintly Doctor loc. cit. from that of Matth. 5: Qui dixerit fratri suo, Racha: reus erit iudicio. Qui dixerit fratri suo, fatue: reus erit gehennae ignis. The Saintly Doctor expounds what Racha is in serm. 1. in Dominica 5. post Pentec.; and Racha is an interjection of one indignant, expressing a Hebrew word which signifies empty or vain; but it is worse to call one a fool, and he calls these the insulting and the revilers, and there calls strikers those who damage and are condemned. Hence the Saintly Doctor proves, in serm. 4. in Dominica 5. post Pentec., that these insulting revilers are held to satisfaction. For the Lord adds: Si ergo offers munus tuum ad altare, et ibi recordatus fueris, quia frater tuus habet aliquid adversum te, etc. vade prius reconciliari fratri tuo. On this testimony rest Fagundez in octavum praeceptum Decal. lib. 8. cap. 18. num. 9 and others.

IN MANY ways, however, this restitution of honor can be made. First, by honorable nomination; and Fagundez says this manner is enough for superiors, Lessius Tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 11. de contum. dub. 27, Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 72, adducing D August. de regulis superior.

SECONDLY, by asking pardon. And they say that this inferiors owe to superiors: Fagundez num. 10, Lessius loc. cit. num. 145. Nay, if the injury is atrocious, Fagundez says, it can be juridically decreed that the suppliant ask pardon with a rope about his neck; and he says that when this was done, it was decreed in the most flourishing kingdom of the Gauls, in the time of Louis XIII, who governed that most flourishing Empire most justly and most prudently, as this Spaniard exclaims.

THIRDLY, by inviting to dinner and giving a place of honor. Thus Fagundez num. 13 and Petrus Nauar. lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 63. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 11. de contum. dub. 27. Filliuc. Tom. 2. tract. 32. cap. 9.

COMMONLY, however, they assert that pardon must be asked if the injury is grave. Thus Sotus lib. 4. de Iustitia, quaest. 6. art. 3. ad 5, Mastrius, Ledesma 2. 4. quaest. 18. art. 2. dub. 8, Sylvest. verb. Contumel. quaest. 4, after Nicolao de Lyra and Abul. in id Matth. 5. Si offers munus tuum, etc., Barthol. Medina lib. 1. Instruct. Confessar. cap. 14. §. 35, Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. ad 3, Salon. ibidem, controv. 24, Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 16. punct. 1, Clauis regia lib. 11. cap. 8.

OTHERS, however, assign a milder reason. Thus Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 72. art. 3, Couar. lib. 2. variarum, cap. 10, Corduba de detract. quaest. 3. concl. 11, Angles in floribus 4. quaest. de restit. art. 1, Petr. Nauar. lib. 2. de restit. cap. 4. p. 1. dub. 6. This, I think, is the opinion of D. Bonaventure; for in the places cited he only says one is held to restitution, but he does not lay down the manner as a precept, on which account the rest rely. They subscribe with others: Turrianus disp. 53. dub. 11, Caspens. disp. 10. sect. 5, Tanner. num. 158, adducing others.

But what turns my stomach is that some of the authorities cited compel subjects to ask pardon, but never superiors. I argue against it, thus: Restitution establishes equality and mediocrity, which consists in the thing, not in reason, as Aristot. 3. Eth. cap. 6 says — although it establishes it in reason also, as I taught in prima secundae Tract. de actibus humanis, disp. quaest. — yet it depends upon the thing; but this is not a restitution of honor, when you defamed the man by calling him by the name of Honor: Therefore. I do not see what restitution of honor this is. The natural law cannot be undermined, and so easily dispensed. Nor did D. Augustine speak in a grave matter, but in light ordinary ones. For when a superior, out of an indiscreet Zeal of justice or love, so exceeds that he thus acts inordinately, such that he would incur such contumelious defamation, then the Zeal of justice would by no means excuse him from sinning mortally. But who shall exempt such a one from restitution of the honor taken away? Truly it ought to be compensated to the Commutative according to an Arithmetic proportion: if you cried out against a man as a thief or infamous, you must bring forward that he is not infamous, and render the counterpass of the contumely received to the man offended — even if you were the Duke of Macqueda.