Question Four: On the Restitution of Reputation and Honor

443. State of the question. - Just as external goods of fortune unjustly taken away are to be restored, and unjust damage caused in them is to be repaired, so a fortiori it must be held for reputation and honor, which are goods of greater moment. Nevertheless their restitution is not always convenient, but rather often presents special difficulties. Wherefore it must be carefully examined who is bound to restore them; what, when, to whom, how, and before whom he ought to restore; and what are the causes excusing from restoring them.

444. Principle I. He who unjustly injures another's reputation in any way whatsoever is bound from justice to restore it as soon as possible, and to repair all material damages, at least confusedly foreseen, which have effectively and culpably followed from the defamation. - It is said:

a) he who unjustly injures reputation: for where there is no violation of right, there can be no place for reparation; whence if someone has revealed another's crime from necessity or a just cause, he is not bound to restitution;

b) in any way whatsoever, whether internally before himself, by his own judgment of mind, or externally before others, whether by simple detraction or by calumny, whether he himself detracted or unjustly cooperated with one detracting, whether positively he did this by commanding, counseling, consenting, etc., or negatively, by not impeding when he could and from justice ought to impede;

c) he is bound to restore reputation: for what was unjustly taken away must be returned. This obligation of itself is personal and therefore regards only the defamer, but not the heirs, except by accident if the owner promised pecuniary recompense;

d) as soon as possible; otherwise the burden of the defamed person is continued, and there is danger lest the detraction be propagated farther or produce other evil effects;

e) and to repair all material damages which have effectively and culpably followed, namely, real damages which he truly caused, as if the detractor impeded another from profit, office, benefice, or from a fitting marriage, or was the cause why another is dismissed from office or compelled to labor at a lesser wage; but not those things which justly befall the other, or only on occasion of the detraction, as if from it it happens that he is justly sent to prison by a judge, or if the defamed man from sadness kills himself or brings another evil upon himself or his own, because these are related by accident to defamation. This obligation is real, and consequently passes to the heirs, both of the one injuring, though not beyond the forces of the inheritance, and of the one injured.

It is proved: Everyone who knowingly and willingly violates the strict right of another is bound to repair it. But 1) man has a strict right to reputation, which nevertheless can be injured unjustly; therefore he who injures the reputation of another unjustly is bound to repair it; - 2) man also has a strict right that damage not be unjustly brought upon goods of fortune, which nevertheless often comes from injury of reputation; therefore the unjust defamer is also bound to repair these damages.

Both obligations are grave, if the defamation was gravely culpable.

Hence 1° he who sinned gravely by defaming another is bound to repair reputation even with grave inconvenience to himself, for a grave obligation binds with proportionate inconvenience.

2° He who from light fault or from inadvertence or imprudence injured the reputation of another is bound to repair, but without grave inconvenience: for he is bound as far as he can to impede his saying from producing further effects, otherwise the infamy which follows further would also be imputed to him under grave obligation.

3° If the whole fault is not from the speaker but from the hearers, because they interpreted the words of the speaker sinisterly, the speaker is bound not from justice but from charity alone to correct the error.

4° If light infamy has induced grave damage in goods of fortune, as if someone lost the office of secretary because he was presented as talkative, there is a grave obligation of repairing that damage, if it was foreseen, because then the defamation is grave, not by reason of infamy, but by reason of damage.

5° He who injured another's reputation by rash judgment or suspicion is bound to put those away and to conceive a good estimation.

445. The manner of repairing reputation. - Generally reputation is to be repaired in that manner by which the infamy brought upon one's neighbor is truly removed, and therefore the unjust damager must choose the mode which does not seem easier to himself, but which, with the circumstances considered, is truly efficacious. Therefore in practice it will have to be distinguished whether the infamy arose from calumny or detraction, whether it remained secret or became public.

A. If calumny is in question, this is openly to be retracted, even with loss of one's own reputation or of another equivalent good; for in an equal cause the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty. Hence, if this is required for an efficacious retraction, the calumniator must confess that he lied; nevertheless sometimes, the circumstances being considered, satisfaction is made to justice by saying that he erred or was deceived; and if the retraction would not be efficacious unless an oath were added or witnesses employed, these means would have to be employed, because they do not appear too difficult.

Only then is the calumniator proportionately excused, if his reputation is necessary for the public good, as if a magistrate calumniated, or if the damage which the defamer would have to suffer by restoring would much exceed the damage of the defamed man: thus defamation is not to be repaired with danger of life, unless death also threatens the defamed man himself from the defamation.

B. If simple defamation is in question, a special difficulty comes from this, that the crime unjustly manifested is true. Therefore the detractor cannot declare that he spoke what was false; for this would be a lie, but a lie is never lawful. Therefore he must repair the injured reputation in another way, either formally and directly, or equivalently and indirectly.

1° Formally and directly, if it thus benefits the defamed man: by saying that he spoke unjustly and badly, that he did injury to the other, indeed, by using amphibology, that he erred, that he did not say the matter as it was to be said; nevertheless let him act cautiously, lest the hearers, understanding the ambiguity, be confirmed more in their sinister opinion.

2° Equivalently and indirectly, if directly he can effect nothing before astute hearers: by speaking honorably concerning the defamed man, by praising him when occasion is given, especially in similar matter, or by excusing him, and in various ways promoting his good reputation. This manner of repairing is often safer and more efficacious than the former, which smells of mental restriction.¹

¹ "Someone can take away someone's reputation in three ways: in one way by saying what is true and justly, for instance when someone discloses another's crime with due order observed, and then he is not bound to restitution of reputation; in another way by saying what is false and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore reputation, by saying that he said what was false; in a third way by saying what is true, but unjustly, for instance when someone discloses another's crime against due order, and then he is bound to restitution of reputation, as much as he can, without lying however, as for instance by saying that he spoke badly, or that he unjustly defamed him; or if he cannot restore reputation, he ought to compensate him otherwise" II-II, q. 62, a. 2, ad 2.

C. If the defamation was public and widely spread, the reparation also ought to be public, so that it may be efficacious insofar as it can be; hence:

1° Defamation published in writing and in print is fittingly repaired in the same way, and ordinarily is to be repaired thus; indeed even defamation made orally is often suitably repaired in that public way, especially if it has already been widely diffused and it is unknown to whom it has come;

2° otherwise, however, first it must be retracted before the immediate hearers themselves, because before them the defamer was the immediate cause of infamy;

3° then also before mediate hearers, insofar as the diffusion must be attributed to the fault of the defamer and reparation is possible: a) thus of itself, if by direct intention he disclosed the crime so that the hearers would divulge it, or moved them to this by command or persuasion; or also if he told light and talkative persons whom he foresaw would easily publish it, at least if he did it without stipulation of secrecy: for then the damage of further defamation was foreseen and voluntary;

b) on the contrary, if he narrated under secrecy, or to such persons whom he prudently judged would not publish the matter further: for then the further infamy is involuntary to him, and must be imputed to the malice of the hearers;

c) in practice, reparation before mediate hearers is often morally impossible; in which case it suffices to retract before the immediate hearers, at the same time exhorting them to do the same, when opportunity is given, before those to whom they manifested the crime.

In the case in which the defamation is at least in part irreparable, some reparation through money can be counseled, especially in the case in which the defamer is rich, but the defamed man poor and willing to accept a compensation of this kind.

446. Several causes excusing from restitution of reputation are listed:

1° Absence of damage, namely, if the defamation was not efficacious, because for example the hearers did not understand, or did not give faith to the detractor, or knew the matter from elsewhere, or another, by correcting the detractor, impeded the evil effect.

2° Cessation of damage, namely, if the infamy has already been removed, whether because reputation was recovered through a good life, or because the falsity of the calumny was publicly acknowledged, or the defamation was destroyed by oblivion in the course of time: for then one must altogether beware lest by an inopportune retraction the defamation come back to life.

3° Impotence, by which namely reparation is physically or morally impossible, as if the hearers of the detraction are unknown, or cannot be approached; if the delict has become public by another way; or another's reputation cannot be repaired without one's own far graver damage: then the defamed man is judged to renounce his right.

4° Remission or condonation by the injured person, whether express or tacit, provided he has the power of perfectly condoning, and the public good does not stand in the way from elsewhere; for if infamy redounds to others, or scandalizes others, or stands in the way of an office being duly performed, as of a magistrate or priest, who needs a good name for exercising his office, perfect condonation cannot be made: for then the defamation also injures the state.

5° Mutual compensation, provided the injuries on both sides are equal, and a third party does not suffer from it. Compensation is not to be understood in the sense that the defamed man can defame his defamer: for this would be mere vengeance; but because, if the defamed man himself has injured the reputation of the detractor and does not wish to repair the injury, reparation can be delayed until the other is prepared to repair reputation.

Thus plebeians are judged tacitly to remit injuries to one another, since they know that very often others detract from them and nevertheless do not restore; whence neither are they presumed to demand restitution, or certainly to wish to use mutual compensation in not restoring.

447. Principle II. He who unjustly injures honor owed to someone is bound from justice to restore honor, and to repair all material damages which effectively and culpably followed from this.

For man has a strict right to honor just as to reputation, and therefore the violation of this right must be repaired, whether the contumely was public, or merely hidden. Cf. Mt. V, 23-24.

The manner of repairing honor which is required and sufficient is that which, with the gravity of the injury, the condition of the persons, all the circumstances, and the customs of the place considered, is apt for signifying an equitable estimation of the offended person and thus for repairing the damage inflicted, so that reasonably more cannot be demanded. Whence public contumely is repaired in one way, private in another; satisfaction is shown to a superior in one way, to an equal or subject in another.

Hence: 1. Honor taken away publicly is to be repaired by public reparation, i.e., offered before those who were witnesses of the contumely, or at least in that manner by which the satisfaction becomes known to them.

2. Hidden contumely is sufficiently compensated by hidden reparation, for example, by privately showing signs of sorrow to the offended person.

3. If a superior offended a subject, for the most part a friendly greeting or showing of benevolence suffices, which from the very quality of the one showing it has a greater value and greater signification; rarely will the asking of pardon be necessary, "lest," as Augustine says, "while too much humility is preserved, the authority of ruling be broken," although sometimes it is also useful for edification.

4. To an offended equal, signs of honor greater than usual should be shown: by yielding to him an honorable place, by inviting him to table, by drinking to his health, by procuring favor, etc.; or, if the injury is graver, pardon should be sought. Nevertheless in certain regions, or among persons of a certain condition, it is not the custom to seek pardon.

5. If an inferior offended a superior, often a humble direct or indirect entreaty for pardon will be necessary.

Nevertheless sometimes, if the offended person has taken vengeance, by inflicting a reciprocal injury, for example, by striking, wounding, etc., the other is not bound to further satisfaction: for then the one taking vengeance seems to accept the vengeance which he takes for the satisfaction owed to him, as the common persuasion of men judges. Thus also plebeians are exempted from restitution of honor, if equal abusive speeches have been made among them; because compensation was immediately present.

Let it be noted: a) through the seeking of pardon every injury of itself is sufficiently repaired, even one brought upon a most noble man; if he is not content with this satisfaction, he can be referred to a judge;

b) nevertheless the judge is not to be approached for obtaining greater satisfaction, unless honor and reputation, which someone needs for the common good or the good of a family, cannot be sufficiently preserved by another way;

c) honor itself is not repaired by the payment of money; nevertheless sometimes a fine to be paid can be imposed, for example, for the poor or for pious causes.