§ 1. On Injuries Which Touch Immaterial Goods

1. He who has induced another to sin by mere persuasion or example, when the other has freely consented, is held only by the office of charity to call him back to a better state; but if he used fraud or fear, he must remove these, must besides indicate suitable remedies, unless the other has sufficiently known these, and must repair other damages, if any have proceeded thence.

II. He who has turned someone away from entrance into the novitiate, or a novice from profession, has not violated justice unless he used force or fraud. If either has intervened, the obligation toward the novice or candidate will return, of which we were just speaking in the preceding case.

Must the emoluments connected per se with that entrance be restored to the monastery? Some hold this and estimate the damages according to the present hope. But because an action of this kind does not tend of itself to inflicting temporal damage upon an Institute, to which no acquired right in a novice belongs, the obligation can probably be denied. - He who by force or fraud has abducted a professed religious is held concerning temporal damages toward the Religion. Force and fraud being excluded, since the religious himself does not certainly sin against justice, the obligation of restitution, with Lessius, Iust., c. 8, n. 16-20, against many, seems able to be denied.

I. He is per se guilty of grave injury who has made an unwilling person drunk, or by the injection of morphine or the use of a similar substance has artificially deprived him of the use of reason, or has filled him with various dreams or phantasms. Cf. what was said I, 478. The damages thence following are to be repaired as far as can be done.

II. He who has taught practical errors must unteach them, and must repair the damages which thence per se have followed for the erring person and for others. But if they were speculative, that is held as venial, unless the error concerns the principal and fundamental dogmas of faith, or the student is defrauded of a great part of the discipline which he wished to learn.

I. A private man is injurious who has prohibited another, by physical force, from free steps or actions; or, morally, by unjust threats has forced him to do or omit certain things; or by fraud has impeded his free choices.

Clerics are protected from these injuries by canonical sanction, that is, by the privilege of the canon. Cf. III, 10.

2. He also is injurious who subjects a non-consenting person, for example by abuse of hypnotism, to his commands. He must from justice restore that person, by suitable means, to his own right.

— Everyone has the right that, according to his goodness, whether innate or acquired, he be esteemed and treated. That right is violated by contumely, detraction or calumny, and rash judgment. Concerning each of these we must speak briefly.

I. On Contumely. 1. Notions. Contumely is the dishonoring of one's neighbor, or an illicit lesion of the honor of one's neighbor. Honor, however, is a testimony concerning another's excellence or goodness. Some goodness belongs to each one, and there is a right that he not be contemned.

Contumely is negative, by which signs of honor which observance and piety would demand are merely denied; positive, when a lesion of honor is contained either by word (through insults, reproaches, curses), or by writing (through an infamous libel), or by deed (through signs, insulting representations).

Specification and Gravity. The mere omission of signs which are not owed from justice is opposed to piety, observance, charity, but not to justice; but a positive denial which is a virtual dishonoring is opposed to it; and much more an act contrary to the honor of another. And it is mortal by its genus, because it is opposed to a good which is worth more than riches themselves. And it will be mortal in reality when it proceeds from an affection mortally evil, whether of contempt or of hatred, or if a grave dishonoring follows; here the quality both of the sinner and of the person dishonored has very great force. The place of St. Matthew, "If anyone shall say to his brother, Fool, he will be guilty of hell fire," is explained insofar as an insulting word manifests mortal hatred.

Although the quality of the person harmed, as for instance of a parent, can add a new species, contumely, as such, is the lowest species, since it contains this one formal malice of prejudice done to the honor of neighbor. Thus most hold, although St. Alphonsus, De Peccatis, n. 48, judges it more probable that contumelies are to be distinguished from their objects, because a proper honor is to be attributed to individual excellences.

With the mind of correcting, humbling, or for another just reason, a Superior can cast some word, otherwise insulting, at a subject; but let him beware of excess.

For the sake of jest to cast light defects, provided the other is not saddened or moved to anger, pertains to urbanity, according to St. Th. 2, 2, q. 72, art. 2. The insults with which women, children, and men of the lowest lot burden one another are not judged gravely to wound honor, so that they are excused from mortal sin, because faith is not given to them. The same often must be said of insults uttered by an angry man.

Cf. also what was said concerning piety, n. 290.

2. On Restitution for Wounded Honor. It is asked whether, from charity alone or also from justice, some reparation must be made, at least if reputation has remained intact. And Molina, Iust., tr. 4, d. 46, judges that new signs of honor are owed from charity alone. But the contrary sentence is to be preferred, because dishonoring, as such, is damnose. For in the very man who is affected by contumely, courage and confidence in acting are diminished; this is not lightly harmful to him. Besides, in the opinion of others, dignity or the title of honor decreases from contumely, and thus the dishonored man is also damaged in his social life.

Reparation is made through an honorific and friendly greeting, or an invitation to table, or a petition for pardon (sometimes even on bended knees and before witnesses; which can also be done through a mandatary), according as the lesion was grave. If material damages have followed, there is no doubt that these must be repaired. But from the common sense of men, pardon no longer must be sought if the offended man has taken vengeance, by himself or by the judge.

II. On Detraction and Calumny. 1. Notions. a) Detraction, in broader use, is any unjust violation of another's reputation. And, from what was said in n. 580, any direct violation committed by a private person is unjust. Detraction strictly so called is distinguished from calumny. For calumny is committed when a false crime is imputed to someone; detraction, when a true but occult crime is revealed.

In the civil forum of Belgium and France, since public officials cannot act except concerning calumny, while proof of sin or delict against private persons is not admitted, they sometimes distinguish defamation, which is a lesion of the reputation of a private man, and calumny, by which the reputation of an official is harmed.

By the intention of wounding reputation, formal detraction is separated from material detraction.

b) Reputation, however, is opinion or estimation concerning another's excellence. Therefore it is a good which we have among others.

Reputation is distinguished: a) of the moral order, which, founded in the use of free will, freely perishes and can be freely restored. This reputation of honesty, of probity, is reputation simply so called, and is had either as connatural or negative and common, insofar as he who is not proved evil is not reprehended; or as positive, special, acquired by the exercise of virtue; b) of the physical or intellectual order, which, being removed from free will, honors capacity, genius, talent.

Reputation is useful, indeed necessary, so that we may foster easy, dignified, and pleasant intercourse with other men, and so that according to our capacity we may render ourselves useful to others and to society, or may discharge our social function.

It is also very useful to enjoy a good reputation for capacity and talent.

2. The Right of Having Reputation. a) A good which serves so greatly the end of human life is manifestly the object of right. And common utility itself demands that it not perish because of an accidental vice; therefore to take away reputation is at the same time to take away the stimulus of conversion and the occasion of repairing the things committed. Moreover, it is to snatch from someone a good which he still has.

But even in a moral matter no one can lay claim to a positive reputation which is greater than his merits.

Finally, this good is not ended by death; for posthumous reputation also is held in great price, and by the hope of such reputation many are stirred to illustrious deeds.

b) Because reputation is a good distinct from the person, it is in the perfect dominion of man, so that one can validly renounce his own reputation. And for the same cause it is situated in the high dominion of the State, so that social authority can, on account of true but occult delicts, mark and punish someone with infamy. Although it is rather repugnant to the mind of the legislator of today that he affect even a guilty man with perpetual infamy.

3. Moral Estimation of Wounded Reputation. a) Malice. Directly to detract from the reputation of someone unwilling is, in a private man, a sin of injustice which participates in the nature of theft, and by its genus is grave, although contumely is judged graver.

But the gravity of detraction is to be estimated less from the defect narrated than from the detriment which is inflicted upon someone's estimation. Wherefore it will often be graver rashly to accuse a secretary of garrulity than of mortal sin.

Nor is it right to detract from the dead.

b) Specification. Although calumny is graver than detraction, nevertheless in species the two do not differ, except insofar as calumny is at the same time opposed to truth; but this malice is not mortal. Nor do various detractions seem to differ among themselves in species, because they are opposed to the same reputation. St. Alphonsus, however, L. V (De Peccato), n. 48, more probably thinks that the species vary because reputations are distinct according to the object or matter.

c) Excuse. He is not unjust who, according to truth, casts someone down from a special reputation of virtue to a common one, or who supplies just notice of the skill or lack of skill of others. For neither had truly acquired or possessed the greater reputation.

Nor is he unjust who, on account of proportionate utility, communicates notice which at the same time harms another's reputation. For often an action which wounds reputation possesses some other utility of this kind. The defamation of another, as the other effect of the notice given, is merely actively permitted. - And more easily a proportionate cause is present for historians, so that concerning facts, especially not recent ones, and concerning men whose reputation now matters less to other living persons, they may speak fully according to the truth, with every consideration of personal reputation removed: both because historical knowledge commonly matters; and because the condemnation of a harmful man very often prepares the restitution of good reputation to an innocent man.

4. Corollaries or Applications. In a place where someone is so unknown that even when present he cannot be designated by anyone by his own name, the person has no reputation. Wherefore calumny uttered against him will have the nature of a lie, but not of unjust detraction.

They do not sin by detraction who, with a view to correction, report the occult defects of children and subjects to parents and Superiors (cf. above, n. 116); - who, for the sake of taking counsel and help, reveal things which necessarily must be communicated; - who by their revelation propose to impede proportionate damage of another: whence, when there is question of conferring an office, of contracting marriage, of undertaking religion, of assuming a physician, preceptor, or servant, it is lawful, indeed sometimes necessary, to manifest the occult impediments, inability, and crimes of another, from which some notable inconvenience is deservedly feared, provided that no other more suitable manner of impeding is at hand, and that the damage feared for the neighbor is not too far below the damage which will follow from the revelation; - who by revelation consult their own reputation unjustly wounded by another; - who, for the sake of solace, communicate to one friend, not to many, an injury done to them by another, especially if care is taken that the person is not named more openly than is necessary for solace; - who manifest a crime public by notoriety of law, that is, concerning which there is certainty by a definitive sentence of a judge, even in other places where reputation was not easily going to arrive. This is done without injustice, because the divulging of the sentence has the nature of a useful penalty, and it is expedient for the public good that criminals be known. Nor is it repugnant to charity, unless you act with a bad intention, or, because of the amendment of the person, the reason of public good has ceased. Indeed, if the matter has only notoriety of fact, the public good seems to demand that men be able to converse about public matters of this kind, and thus avoid errors which would easily flow from false estimation. Thus Lugo, d. 11, n. 61, against others who speak more severely, when the matter is divulged in a place to which reputation was not going to arrive except after a long time. But can the memory of an ancient condemnation be stirred up, with justice preserved? Formerly they admitted this; the matter depends on the mind of the legislator, which we judge to be contrary.

Detraction is only light per se in him who reveals the natural defects of others or general propensities to anger, etc. (lust excepted); or even mortal sins which, because of the condition of the person, wound his reputation only a little, as if you should say of a secular and not very pious youth that he is prodigal, given to loves, etc.; - of him who reveals someone's occult crime to some one prudent and taciturn man, unless the person be one by whom someone specially wishes to be approved. Nor is it an obstacle that the loss of reputation with one person is held grave through rash judgment; because by that judgment a crime is imposed on someone as if falsely, which, in a grave matter, is always grave; - of him who manifests a crime which shortly will be public, because it harms little, unless, however, grave damages follow from that anticipation; - of him who makes one infamous in one crime, for example adultery, infamous concerning another very related one, as for instance fornication; - of him who speaks of the vice of a people in general, or says of some city that many there are wicked, even determining the crime, insofar as either it is notorious or it harms no determinate person. Indeed, often no sin will be committed by this narration.

But it will be grave, against justice, by narrating even light defects to do grave harm, as if you should say that a Prelate of the best name is accustomed to lies, or is illegitimately born; - or to say of someone that you know something about him by which he is to be affected with great shame; - to reveal to those who do not belong to that community grave matters which are contained within the ambit of a restricted community, such as a chapter, monastery, or religion, especially since the infamation of the religion, order, etc., not rarely follows thence; - to detract from an order or religious state in common, or from a monastery, by saying, for example, that life is lived badly in it, that regular observance is not kept (unless that was notorious), or, while the person is passed over in silence, to indicate the monastery where an occult grave sin was committed; - to detract from some place if infamy redounds, as it were, to individuals: yet today, because all kinds of persons are mixed, this will happen more rarely.

5. Material Detraction Arising from Loquacity. is mortal if it brings grave lesion of neighbor, and this is adverted to. But it can be objectively venial, if it is not received or believed seriously. Likewise they judge it venial to report things heard as heard only, affirming nothing concerning the truth of the matter, but rather signifying one's doubt concerning it, unless, however, grave damage is foreseen as going to follow from the manner of narrating or from the levity of the hearers, who are going to believe and spread it rashly. But when not from the manner of narrating, but from their own levity, the hearers are going to believe, it will be grave against charity alone. Justice itself, however, will be gravely harmed if you report the matter as narrated by a man worthy of faith; for others will then reasonably believe. Cf. Lugo, d. 14, n. 56, 57; St. Alph., l. 3, n. 977.

6. Some Things to Be Noted. a) He who reports a public delict must also, from justice, report the penitence and amendment.

b) According to the condition of the hearers, who may be conscious of similar things or altogether ignorant, revelation of the delict of a community, or of clerics, monastery, or clerical order, can gravely harm or not harm. And the stricter the secret (for example, of confession) by which you are bound, the graver obligation of prudence you are held to. Scandals also are to be avoided.

c) From the grave sadness of another, the narration of a natural defect can become grave against charity. Likewise, charity at least being unharmed, the memory of a deed which has been handed over to oblivion cannot be made, unless the reason of the common good demands it.

They admit that it is right for an accused man, if it contributes to his defense, to reveal the true crimes of witnesses in a criminal trial. And if the witness responds illegitimately, calumny itself will indeed be opposed to truth, but not to justice.

2. Restitution of Reputation. a) Reputation itself must be restored by the detractor, not by his heirs, since a personal obligation follows a personal delict; material damages which have followed become the burden of the patrimony itself.

b) He who narrated a true crime can gradually repair reputation by praise, by honor restored. The use of mental restrictions, which others concede and even command, cannot be approved by us. But the imputation of a false crime must per se be destroyed by open retraction before immediate hearers, and also mediate hearers. Sometimes it will suffice to say that he was wholly deceived and that the matter was otherwise than had been said. Yet generally confessors are content with retraction before the immediate hearers, since another retraction is made most difficult, and the immediate hearers are tacitly invited to correct the error of others. Cf. Lugo, d. 15, n. 15, 16; d'Ann., II, 226; St. Alph., l. 3, n. 991.

He who, led by good faith or probable error, has said something false about another without a formal lie, must correct the error from justice, insofar as he can do this without notable inconvenience to himself. But if the error of the hearers was the cause why the crime said of one person was understood of another, he must at least from charity prevent grave detriment of neighbor without his own damage.

c) The obligation of restitution is excused or ceases: on account of physical or moral impotence; but he who was formally injurious must restore with equal damage to himself; - if the occult crime which was narrated, or another similar one, has become public in another way; - if reputation probably was not harmed, because it is likely that faith was not given by the hearers to one who seemed to speak from anger or passion; - if reputation has been recovered in other ways (yet material damages which have followed must be repaired); - if the matter has been covered by probable oblivion, and it is dangerous to renew the memory of the matter; - if the other has detracted from you and does not wish to restore; - if restitution is condoned. That condonation is licit if the infamy does not redound to others, nor impede the fruits of commonly useful labor.

III. On Rash Judgment. 1. Notions. Judgment is a firm sentence of the mind, or indubitable assent; suspicion is begun assent; doubt is not assent except causally, but is, as it were, a suspension of the mind inclining to neither part.

2. What Things Are Lawful. On account of sufficient indications, no one is prohibited from judging, suspecting, doubting; indeed prudence itself compels this to be done in practical matters. Nor, when we doubt, provided that we abstain from a positive judgment concerning improbity, are we forbidden so to act and dispose matters for greater caution as if the other were unjust. This being excluded, rather we ought in mind to incline toward a good interpretation, and to disregard some falsity if any underlies this favorable judgment, because a contingent particular truth does not pertain to the perfection of the intellect according to itself, and that judgment more regards the good affection of the mind. Cf. 2, 2, q. 60, art. 4, ad 2.

3. The Sin of Rash Judgment. Because reputation is a good which we have among others, rash judgment, with full advertence, concerning a gravely defaming guilt of neighbor, is opposed to justice, and indeed gravely. But that sin will rarely be committed, either because at least probable indications are present, or because the defect of reasons is not adverted to. Almost then it will be committed when, while adverting to the obligation of examining the reasons, one neglects the examination from an evil affection, and delights in the apprehension of another's infamy.

4. What of Suspicion and Doubt. Rash suspicion and doubt seem by their genus to be venial. For since some good estimation of neighbor remains in the mind of the one suspecting, no grave injury is inflicted on him. Yet grave can be the malevolence on account of which one persists in grave suspicion or in doubt concerning a grave matter. He who, being interrogated, responds that he is not morally certain but can be deceived, does not judge but suspects; but he judges who has affirmed the matter as certain or almost certain.