Chapter IV. On Rash Judgment, Suspicion, and Rash Doubt

465. • 1. Rash judgment is a firm assent conceived from slight indications concerning some sin or defect of the neighbor: it must be distinguished from opinion, which is a less firm assent and with fear of the opposite.

2. Rash suspicion is a certain inclination to assent concerning the evil of the neighbor from insufficient reason.

3. Doubt is a suspension of the mind determining itself to neither part.

466. Principles. - I. Rash judgment concerning the fault of the neighbor is a mortal sin from its genus against justice; for each one has a right to a good estimation of himself among individuals, nor must anyone be presumed evil until he is proved such: therefore he inflicts grave injury on the neighbor who rashly judges against him in a grave matter. Yet rather often it is venial on account of the smallness of the matter or the imperfection of the act.

II. For the gravity of rash judgment there is required, 1. that it be firm, or without doubt; 2. that it be fully deliberate and voluntary; 3. that it be in a grave matter concerning a determinate and known person; 4. that it be based on indications which are known to be slight and inept for judging. The reason for these things is that otherwise it would not be a true judgment, nor truly rash, nor gravely injurious to the neighbor. But often it is light on account of the defect of one of the conditions mentioned. - St. Lig., n. 962.

III. Rash suspicion and doubt about the stain of the neighbor are only venial from their genus. The reason is that, on account of the weak and easily movable adhesion, ordinarily they bring only light damage to the neighbor, since they do not take away reputation, but only diminish it and render it doubtful. - St. Lig., n. 963. - But if someone without reason, but from malevolence, persists in suspicion or doubt about a very grave matter, he will scarcely escape mortal sin. - St. Lig., n. 963.

467. Resolves. - 1. He does not sin gravely who judges sinisterly about the neighbor, if the judgment rests upon indications sufficient for prudent probability, because moral certitude and true probability do not differ so much that it should be considered a grave injury to hold as almost certain what is very probable. - St. Lig., n. 962.

2. He does not sin gravely who, in judging, does not attend fully to the insufficiency of the motives, although he notices that he judges less prudently; or if he admits only slight negligence in repelling the judgment. - St. Lig., ibid.; Hom. apost., n. 1.

3. He does not sin gravely who judges rashly about someone indeterminate among many, for example, of some group or community, or even about someone determinate indeed, but unknown to himself. - St. Lig., ibid.

4. You would not judge rashly if, hearing something from an upright and trustworthy man against the neighbor, you believed it. Much less if you only suspected or doubted, since much less is required for prudent suspicion or doubt than for prudent judgment; but otherwise if you heard something from a perverse man or one badly disposed toward another.

5. Suspicion or even doubt that is plainly rash, namely based on no reason, can be a mortal sin if it is occupied with sins very extraordinary and grave by reason of the condition of the persons whom it regards; because a suspicion or doubt of this sort is a greater injury than even a firm judgment concerning less grave sins. - St. Lig., n. 964.

6. It is lawful to forestall damages from fear that is not altogether imprudent; and thus, for example, you can keep your things under guard lest they be stolen by a stranger staying in your house; because although you cannot positively judge that this or that man is a thief, nevertheless you can most excellently consult for yourself, since you know certainly that there are sometimes thieves among men, although they are considered alien from theft.