Doubt III: Whether, and how, restitution of fame, and honor, is to be made

That reputation is a good having marketable value, the taking away of which obliges in justice to restitution, is certain. For reputation is good estimation among others, of which Proverb. 22: Melius est nomen bonum, quam divitiae multae. From this S. Bonaventure p. p. Centil. sect. 13 deduces that the detractor is held under greater obligation to Restitution than the thief, which Valentia thereupon noted disp. 5. quaest. 6. puncto 5.

Therefore the detractor is held to restore reputation, three conditions concurring. The first is that the reputation have been taken away — for sometimes reputation is not removed by a saying, either because it is not believed, or because that sin does not blacken a person of that rank, as if you say of a knight: He wounded another man. The second condition is that the reputation have been taken away unjustly. The third, that the defamed man have not redeemed his stolen reputation. Thus they report from the common teaching: Soto Lib. 4. de Iustitia, quaest. 6. art. 3, Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 6. puncto 5, Turrianus disp. 53. dub. 3, Caspensis disp. 10. sect. 5.

I assert, therefore, first, that the unjust detractor is held to restore reputation, even with the loss of his own reputation, though not of his life, even by saying (if need be) that he lied. Thus D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. ad 2, Caietanus ibi, Sotus Lib. 4. de Iustitia, quaest. 6. art. 3, Petrus Navar. Lib. 2. de restit. cap. 4. disput. 5. num. 375, Michael Salonius 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. controu. 13, Navar. in manuali Latino, cap. 18. num. 45, Rodriquez 2. part. summae, cap. 45, Lopez prima parte, instruct. cap. 16, Sayrus Lib. 11. cap. 3. num. 21, Filliucius Tom. 2. tract. 32. cap. 9. num. 145, Malder. de Iust. tract. 7. cap. 2. dub. 9. fol. 554, et all the Doctors commonly, as in Valentia loco cit. Fagundez in octavum praeceptum Decal. cap. 15, Tannerum disp. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 4, Bassaeum V. Detractio, 2. num. 4.

Some add a little exception: unless there be great inequality — as if the defamed man be of low condition, but the defamer of great dignity, and he suffer greater detriment by saying he lied. Thus Sotus and Valentia, although Nauarrus doubts of this: for one is not held to make greater restitution than what he took away. Whence it comes about that he is not held to restore reputation with the loss of his own life; for although reputation is a kind of civil death, as Anselmo teaches Lib. de simil. cap. 147 as cited by D. Bonaventure in Pharetra Lib. 3. cap. 3. §. De Detractione, still it is not the proper taking away of life, but of a good inferior to life itself, namely reputation, which outweighs riches, according to Proverb. 22; and accordingly it binds more to restitution than the taking away of an eye, as the Saintly Doctor again enjoins in speculo animae, cap. 1. Most follow this doctrine, as in Fagundez cap. 15 et Dianam part. 2. Tract. 5. resol. 29 et 30.

There is, moreover, a question there in Diana: whether one who falsely defamed someone is held, if need be, to swear that he spoke falsely. They answer affirmatively: Caietanus and Aragon 2. 2. quaest. 62. artic. 2, where also Sylvius quaestione 22. tractat. 32. cap. 20. num. 245, Turrianus disp. 52. dub. 1, Salon de Iust. tom. 1. quaest. 62. art. 2. controv. 3, Carbo de restit. quaest. 18, Villalob. in summa, Tom. 2. tract. 11. diff. 37, Tanner. 2. 2. disp. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 6. num. 141, Diana ibi, Fagundez Lib. 8. cap. 15, Navar. cap. 18. num. 45, Pet. Navar. Lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 137, Sotos de Iust. Lib. 4. quaest. 6. art. 3, Faustus in speculo, disp. 21. quaest. 21, Bassaeus num. 9. Nay, they add — Molina tom. 5. disp. 41, Ioan. de la Cruz in Direct. pract. 1. punct. 7. art. 2. dub. 5, Soto, Aragon, and Salon — that he must, if need be, even bring witnesses.

I WONDER, however, that the Doctors so crowd headlong into binding consciences; for, as Faventinus observes in 4. dist. 15. quaest. 3. disp. 53. cap. 1. num. 32, the ancient Theologians — such as S. Bonaventure in the places adduced and elsewhere, Alensis part. 2. quaest. 129. memb. 6, D. Thom. quaest. 62. art. 2. ad 2, Scotus loco cit. — require only a simple retraction. But the modern Zealots superadd a most heavy burden, which perhaps they themselves do not touch with a finger.

The Doctors bring forward a certain SMOOTH manner of restoring reputation. For since to say one lied is an arduous act, they teach that the reputation is to be restored by praising the defamed man before those who had heard the detraction. Thus Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Soto de Iustitia, lib. 4. quaest. 9. art. 3. ad 4, Villalob. in summa, Tom. 2. tract. 11. diff. 37. num. 4, Tannerus 2. 2. disp. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 4. num. 143, Valentia quaest. 4. puncto 5 and quaest. 17. puncto 2, Fagundez in octavum praeceptum, Lib. 8. cap. 15. num. 3, Lessius Lib. 2. cap. 11. dub. 10, Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Faustus in speculo confess. disp. 21. quaest. 74. num. 6, Diana loco cit. Whatever they may bring to the contrary: Layman Lib. 3. sect. 5. tract. 3. part. 2. cap. 7, Navar. lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 370, Faber n. 46, Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. quaeritur 22, Fillucius Tom. 2. tract. 31. cap. 10. num. 246.

IT IS ASKED second: whether the defamer, not being able to restore the reputation, can, and ought, to make satisfaction with money.

They AFFIRM that he is held: Layman Lib. 3. sect. 5. tract. 3. part. 2. cap. 7, Filliuc. Tom. 2. tract. 32. cap. 10. n. 239, Turrianus 1. 2. tomo 2. disp. 53. dub. 7, Faber in 4. disp. 53. cap. 4. num. 122, Malderus 2. 2. tract. 7. cap. 7. dub. 8, Navarrus cap. 17. num. 19, Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Sylvest. verbo Detractio, quaest. 4, Navar. lib. 2. cap 4. num. 416, Lessius Lib. 2. cap. 11. disp. 11, and others as in Bassaeum num. 7.

OTHERS, however, as in Diana resol. 50 citata, propose with probability that it can be done. Thus Villalob. Tom. 2. tract. 11. diffic. 39, Sotos de Iust. Lib. 4. quaest. 6. art. 2, Aragon 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 6. puncto 5, Couar. lib. 1. variar. cap. 2. num. 8, Molina tract. 4. disput. 25, Sà V. Infamia, num. 7, Sylvius 1. 2. quaestio 62. art. 2. Quaeritur 22, post Rebell. — Sotum, Richardum, Adrianum, Caietanum, and others as in Fagundez Lib 8. cap. 14. num. 11, asserting also Couar. reg. peccatum, p. p. num. 6 et Lib. 1. var. resol. cap. 2. num. 8, Cordubam quaest. 33. art. 2, Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 116, Salonium 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. controv. 13, Rodriquez 2. part. summa, cap. 45, Rebell. Lib. 2. quaest. 10, the Gloss on cap. Ecclesia sanctae Mariae extra, ut lite pendente nihil innovetur, Malderum de Iust. tract. 7. cap. 2. de restit. famae, dub. 8, Tannerum disp. cit. num. 150, and others adduced above. Add Bassaeum num. 7, who says it can be done in equity if the defamer is poor.

The OPINION of the Seraphic Doctor, in my judgment, is that this compensation cannot be made. Thus the authorities cited, to whom add Caspensem disp. 10. sect. 5. num. 37, and Tanner judges it probable.

The rationale of D. Bonaventure, in nearly all the places cited and ad cap. 10. Ecclesiast., is this: Restitution is an act of Justice, reducing to equality according to commutation through compensation of what was taken away; but money, or other goods of fortune, are not proportionate to compensating reputation: Therefore. The minor is proved by Proverb. 22, Melius est nomen bonum, quam divitiae multae, and Ecclesiasticus 41, Curam habe de bono nomine: hoc enim tibi magis permanebit, quam mille thesauri pretiosi. The authors of our opinion use this rationale, from which it also follows that, conversely, one is not held to restore with goods of a higher order of life. Thus it is laid down in cap. offi. II., de poenit. et remiss, and the Doctors commonly cite it as in Fagundez in octavum Praeceptum Lib. 8. cap. 13 and Diana part. 2. Tract. 3. resol. 30 — even if the defamed man is a noble defamed by a VILE man. The reason has already been given. IT WILL BE ASKED third: whether one who, without just cause, makes known the hidden crime of someone to one or two prudent men whom he knows will not spread it about, sins mortally.

YOU WILL ASK third: whether one who, without just cause, makes known the hidden crime of someone to one or two prudent men whom he knows will not spread it about, sins mortally.

They answer AFFIRMATIVELY: Turrianus 2. 2. Tom. 2. disp. 53. dub. 8, Sotus de Iust. Lib. 7. quaest. 10. art. 2, Molina de Iust. tract. 4. disp. 29, Lessius Lib. 2. cap. 11. dub. 11. num. 70, Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Azor. Tom. 1. Lib. 6. cap. 9, Fillincius Tom. 2. tract. 40. cap. 4. num. 91, Suarez tom. 4. disp. 34. sect. 1, Villalob. Tom. 2. tract. 11. diffic. 36, Valentia tomo 3. disp. 5. quaest. 17. puncto 2, Malderus 2. 2. tract. 7. cap. 1. dub. 4, Layman Lib. 3. sect. 5. tract. 3. part. 2. cap. 3, Ioan. de la Cruz part. 8. quaest. 2. art. 2. dub. 3, Salonius 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, who state this opinion to be common among the more recent Thomists; Fagundez also defends it in octavum praeceptum, Lib. 8. cap. 2. num. 7, and Bassaeus V. Detractio 1. num. 11.

Caietanus teaches the CONTRARY opinion, 1. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2, Navar. de restit. Lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 234, Graffius lib. 2. cap 137, and others; and many of the adversaries hold this opinion probable, as Tanner. 2. 2. disput. 4. quaest. 8 dub. 7. num. 138, Ioan. de la Cruz, and others, with whom Diana subscribes, part. 2. Tract. 5. resol. 23.

The OPINION of D. Bonaventure is that this man sins mortally. His rationale, which the Moderns use as in Diana and Fagundez, is that reputation is blackened even before one or two. Wherefore Jesus Christ in Matth. 18 grants that one or two be called to correct someone when the obstinate man refuses solitary correction; otherwise he commands it to be done inter te, et ipsum solum. For one man could be harming, even if prudent, and of the sort Christ desires to help in reproving the fallen. For he wills that suitable men be chosen to raise up the fallen; and indeed reputation is often more harmed if it is said to one weighty person than if to many of the common people; but especially if the defamed man depended upon him. Thus the Saintly Doctor defines this question at those words of Ecclesiasticus 10, Si mordeat serpens in silentio, nihil eo minus habet, qui occulte detrahit, from which he elicits a new argument; for the striking is deadly even when secret before one whom he defames, for he compares this to the striking of a venomous serpent.

They OBJECT that the prudent man would not reveal it. It is answered, as I said, that it makes no difference. Next, who made you the guarantor of this?

ANOTHER doubt arises: whether the detractor is held to restitution of damages in the goods of the man's household, and in other things, lost on account of his ruined reputation.

A DISTINCTION must be made. For if he defamed him falsely, he is held to full restitution of all damages. Thus commonly with Lessio Tom. 1. Lib. 2. cap. 12. de detract. dub. 19. numero 101.

Sayro lib. 11. cap. 3. de restit. bon. exter. num. 17, Soto lib. 4. de Iust. quaest. 6. art. 3. ad 4, Pet. Navar. lib. 2. de restit. cap. 4. disp. 4. num. 375, Navar. summa Lat. cap. 18. num. 47, Salon 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. controv. 20; and it is clear from cap. si culpa, de iniur. et damn. as Fagundez notes in octavum Praeceptum, lib. 8. cap. 24. num. 5, who observes that this opinion is to be understood of goods already existing in possession; but as regards goods in hope — say, if on account of the defamation he was impeded from some dignity — he says the matter must be judged by a prudent man.

HE ADDS, moreover, that even one who defamed of a true crime is not held to restore goods in hope in full, but well those already acquired. Thus also Navar. summa, cap. 18. num. 45, Sayrus lib. 11. cap. 3. de restit. bon. exter. num. 20, Lessius Tomo 1. lib. 2. cap. 12. de detract. et contum. n. 19 et num. 109, Petrus Navar. de restit. cap. 4. dub. 6. num. 384, and Salon. supra.

The rationale of the latter is that the debt of restitution arises not from the quantity of the sin, but from the quantity of the damage inflicted; whence, although one who speaks the truth sins less, yet he inflicted the same damage unjustly. Nor say that he gave the occasion by his own sin. For it is answered that the crime would inflict no damage except through the mediation of knowledge, and the detractor has no right to set this cause in motion. But he who is the cause of an unjust damaging is immediately constituted guilty of restitution, as the Saintly Doctor argues in Speculo animae, cap. 1, and with him Bassaeus, v. Detractio 2. num. 2.

A doubt, however, OCCURS here at once: whether he is held to restore the reputation before all those to whose notice the sin came through those to whom he himself told it.

Faber answers NEGATIVELY, disp. 35. allegata, cap. 1. num. 35, adducing Alensem. See Dianam loc. cit. resol. 34, Tannerum disput. 4. quaest. 6. dub. 6. num. 146, and others as in him and in Villalob. Tom. 2. tract. 11. diffic. 37. num. 11.

I JUDGE with Villalobos loc. cit. and Caspensi Tract. 18. de Restit. disp. 10. sect. 5. num. 33, and Diana, that such a man is excused if he believed those to whom he told it would not defame him to others; but if he believed they would defame him, he is held; for what is the cause of a cause is also the cause of what is caused. But the cause of the damaging is guilty of restitution, as the Saintly Doctor says loco citato.

I SUBMIT ANOTHER doubt: whether, if someone tells another of an injury secretly inflicted upon himself by someone, in order to lessen his grief, he sins mortally. Diana answers negatively loc. cit. resol. 32, with Sylvio 2. 2. quaestion. 62. art. 2. quaerit. 15, Lessio lib. 2. cap. 11. dub. 12. num. 31, Navar. lib. 1. cap. 4. num. 345, Molina tract. 4. disp. 29. num. 5, Layman lib. 3. sect. 5. tract. 3. p. 2. cap. 3. num. 6, Tannero 2. 2. disp. 4. quaest. 8. dub. 7. num. 145, and others commonly. But Ioan. de la Cruz in Direct. p. 8. quaest. 2. art. 2. dub. 3 adds more. If a person gravely injured in secret, unable to restrain himself from grief, breaks out into public complaints, he is not immediately condemned of mortal guilt if the injurer is defamed; for it seems hard to restrain so afflicted a mind from breaking into complaints, since this is most natural. He adduces for this opinion also Ludovicum Lopes.

I judge S. Bonaventure assents to these, who at those words Eccles. 10. Si mordeat serpens in silentio reduces the causes of detracting someone's reputation to three heads.

The FIRST is from necessity, when he is compelled by some legitimate precept, human or divine. Human, when he who can commands him to speak; Divine, when conscience dictates to a man that he is bound to look after his neighbor, that he may be corrected, according to that precept of the Lord concerning fraternal correction.

The SECOND head is from usefulness, when he tells the evil of someone to one who can help and not harm, as when he tells it to a man who loves and sympathizes and has the will to correct him.

The THIRD is from the lust of detracting. When, therefore, neither necessity is considered nor usefulness, even if it be the truth, he is not excused from the lust of detracting; indeed he sins the sin of detraction. Thus the Saintly Doctor.

THEREFORE he replies further, that if some usefulness intervenes, it is not a sin.

He adds in speculo animae, cap. 1. what Cruz says. Yet it matters greatly whether this vice proceeds from envy, or from an indiscreet Zeal of justice; for it sometimes happens that the evils of others, done out of a certain indignation or lightness of speech, are recited, or even aggravated, without the intention of defaming anyone as evil — which it would be hard to judge mortal. Thus the Saintly Doctor.

FINALLY many admit compensation, if the other also took away the other's reputation and is unwilling to restore it. Thus Toletus lib. 5. cap. 7, Lessius disput. 25, Molina disp. 49, Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. quaeritur 10, Malder. 2. 2. tract. 7. cap. 2. n. 14, Diana p. 2. Tract. 5. resol. 30. ante controv. 13 et 24, Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. ad 2, Petro de Navar. lib. 2. de restit. cap. 4. num. 6, Sayro lib. 11. cap. 8, and others, after D. Bonau. in 3. dist. 9. quaest. 4 et 5. Moreover honor is harmed by words, as by insults which impose faults to one's face; by insults which also oppose penal charges, such as being a bastard, etc.; by reproaches, casting up the miseries from which he has been relieved. So also by deeds one is harmed, by blows, scourges, etc., as the Doctors commonly teach with D. Bonau. in speculo animae, cap. 1; and accordingly they are held, as inflictors of damage, to restitution, as all concede. And indeed that it is a mortal sin, if they are grave.

IT IS PROVED by the Saintly Doctor loc. cit. from that of Matth. 5: Qui dixerit fratri suo, Racha: reus erit iudicio. Qui dixerit fratri suo, fatue: reus erit gehennae ignis. The Saintly Doctor expounds what Racha is in serm. 1. in Dominica 5. post Pentec.; and Racha is an interjection of one indignant, expressing a Hebrew word which signifies empty or vain; but it is worse to call one a fool, and he calls these the insulting and the revilers, and there calls strikers those who damage and are condemned. Hence the Saintly Doctor proves, in serm. 4. in Dominica 5. post Pentec., that these insulting revilers are held to satisfaction. For the Lord adds: Si ergo offers munus tuum ad altare, et ibi recordatus fueris, quia frater tuus habet aliquid adversum te, etc. vade prius reconciliari fratri tuo. On this testimony rest Fagundez in octavum praeceptum Decal. lib. 8. cap. 18. num. 9 and others.

IN MANY ways, however, this restitution of honor can be made. First, by honorable nomination; and Fagundez says this manner is enough for superiors, Lessius Tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 11. de contum. dub. 27, Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 72, adducing D August. de regulis superior.

SECONDLY, by asking pardon. And they say that this inferiors owe to superiors: Fagundez num. 10, Lessius loc. cit. num. 145. Nay, if the injury is atrocious, Fagundez says, it can be juridically decreed that the suppliant ask pardon with a rope about his neck; and he says that when this was done, it was decreed in the most flourishing kingdom of the Gauls, in the time of Louis XIII, who governed that most flourishing Empire most justly and most prudently, as this Spaniard exclaims.

THIRDLY, by inviting to dinner and giving a place of honor. Thus Fagundez num. 13 and Petrus Nauar. lib. 2. cap. 4. num. 63. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 11. de contum. dub. 27. Filliuc. Tom. 2. tract. 32. cap. 9.

COMMONLY, however, they assert that pardon must be asked if the injury is grave. Thus Sotus lib. 4. de Iustitia, quaest. 6. art. 3. ad 5, Mastrius, Ledesma 2. 4. quaest. 18. art. 2. dub. 8, Sylvest. verb. Contumel. quaest. 4, after Nicolao de Lyra and Abul. in id Matth. 5. Si offers munus tuum, etc., Barthol. Medina lib. 1. Instruct. Confessar. cap. 14. §. 35, Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. ad 3, Salon. ibidem, controv. 24, Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 16. punct. 1, Clauis regia lib. 11. cap. 8.

OTHERS, however, assign a milder reason. Thus Caietanus 2. 2. quaest. 72. art. 3, Couar. lib. 2. variarum, cap. 10, Corduba de detract. quaest. 3. concl. 11, Angles in floribus 4. quaest. de restit. art. 1, Petr. Nauar. lib. 2. de restit. cap. 4. p. 1. dub. 6. This, I think, is the opinion of D. Bonaventure; for in the places cited he only says one is held to restitution, but he does not lay down the manner as a precept, on which account the rest rely. They subscribe with others: Turrianus disp. 53. dub. 11, Caspens. disp. 10. sect. 5, Tanner. num. 158, adducing others.

But what turns my stomach is that some of the authorities cited compel subjects to ask pardon, but never superiors. I argue against it, thus: Restitution establishes equality and mediocrity, which consists in the thing, not in reason, as Aristot. 3. Eth. cap. 6 says — although it establishes it in reason also, as I taught in prima secundae Tract. de actibus humanis, disp. quaest. — yet it depends upon the thing; but this is not a restitution of honor, when you defamed the man by calling him by the name of Honor: Therefore. I do not see what restitution of honor this is. The natural law cannot be undermined, and so easily dispensed. Nor did D. Augustine speak in a grave matter, but in light ordinary ones. For when a superior, out of an indiscreet Zeal of justice or love, so exceeds that he thus acts inordinately, such that he would incur such contumelious defamation, then the Zeal of justice would by no means excuse him from sinning mortally. But who shall exempt such a one from restitution of the honor taken away? Truly it ought to be compensated to the Commutative according to an Arithmetic proportion: if you cried out against a man as a thief or infamous, you must bring forward that he is not infamous, and render the counterpass of the contumely received to the man offended — even if you were the Duke of Macqueda.

From these things they conclude, with D. Bonaventure in Confessionali, cap. 1, that absolution must be denied to one who is unwilling to restore the honor he took away. Thus Caspensis disp. 10. sect. 5 admonishes at the end.