Section 2: Sins Against the Honor and Good Name of Others

The sins against the honor we owe our fellowmen are partly internal and partly external. They differ in degree according to the nature of the attack and the relation existing between the offender and the offended.

The legal axiom that every man must be considered honorable until the contrary has been proved, embodies a truly Christian principle, for the essence of Christianity is charity, which “thinketh no evil.”¹ Whoever disregards this maxim, has either lost charity, or is about to lose it. Merely to entertain unfounded suspicion internally is an injustice to others and an act of infidelity to God.²

¹ 1 Cor. XIII, 5.

² Matth. VII, 1; Luke VI, 37; John VII, 24; 1 Cor. IV, 5; Jas. IV, 13.—St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 4: “By the very fact that someone holds a bad opinion of another without sufficient cause, he injures and despises him. But no one ought to despise another or inflict any harm whatever without compelling cause. And therefore, where manifest indications of someone’s malice do not appear, we ought to regard him as good by interpreting what is doubtful in the better part.”—Ibid., ad 2: “It is one thing to judge things and another to judge men. For in a judgment in which we judge things, . . . each person ought to strive to judge things according as they are. But in the judg- ment in which we judge men, . . . we ought rather to tend toward judging a man good, unless a manifest reason to the contrary appears.”—Hence the moral and legal axiom: “Nemo praesumitur malus, nisi probetur.”

1. The internal acts by which we violate the duty of honoring our neighbor, in so far as they influence our conduct towards him and thus cause him injury, are: groundless suspicion and rash judgment.

a) We are guilty of groundless suspicion against our fellowman if we doubt his virtue for altogether insufficient reasons (levia indicia). This sin usually begins with an unfounded doubt (dubitatio temeraria), which, if it is not promptly suppressed, engenders rash suspicion (suspicio temeraria).³

³ St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 3: “There are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a man begins to doubt another’s goodness from slight indications; and this is a venial and slight sin, for it belongs to human temptation, without which this life is not lived. The second degree is when someone holds another’s malice as certain from slight indications; and this, if it concerns some grave matter, is a mortal sin, inasmuch as it is not without contempt of one’s neighbor. The third degree is when a judge proceeds from suspicion to condemn someone; and this pertains directly to injustice, whence it is a mortal sin.”—St. Augustine, Tract. in Ioa., 26, n. 2: “Noli velle iudicare, si non vis errare.” (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 1607).

Unfounded suspicion of others usually comes from corruption in one’s own heart. If we were better men ourselves, says a modern writer, we should not consider others capable of so much evil. “He who is himself wicked,” says St. Ignatius of Loyola, “easily suspects others, just as he who suffers from vertigo, imagines that everything about him is moving round and round.”

b) Rash judgment (iudicium temerarium) consists in thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant. It differs from groundless suspicion only in degree: the former implies hesitation, whereas the latter does not.⁴ Holy Scripture tells us, and experience confirms it, that unfounded suspicion and rash judgment both originate as a rule either in malice, which sees nothing but wickedness in others, or in envy or hatred, which inspire ill will towards others. In some men these vices result from the bitter disappointments of a life-time. When they spring from malice, envy, or hatred, unfounded suspicion and rash judgment are invariably sinful, because they involve a lack of charity. The gravity of this sin may be gauged by the importance of its object and the degree of pleasure which the sinner takes in his uncharitable act.

⁴ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 481: “1. A rash judgment is a true assent, conceived from slight indications, concerning some sin or defect of one’s neighbor; 2. rash suspicion is a weak assent concerning one’s neighbor’s evil, or an assent concerning another’s stain conceived with fear of the opposite; 3. doubt is a suspension of the mind determining itself toward neither side.”

Merely to harbor a momentary and spontaneous (or involuntary) doubt regarding the virtue of another is, of course, no sin at all. Such judgments frequently flash through the mind—we are so quick and prone to judge ill of others without sufficient reason. All this is merely a temptation. But from the temptation we pass on to sin if, knowing the insufficiency of our reasons, we nevertheless deliberately form an unfavorable judgment regarding another’s virtue. “Suspicion,” says the Angelic Doctor, “denotes evil thinking based on slight indications, and this may arise from three causes. First, from a man’s being evil in himself, and from this very fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, a wicked man is prone to think evil of others. . . . Secondly, it is owing to a man’s being ill-disposed towards another; for when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with or envious of him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, it may arise from long experience, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii) that old people are very suspicious, for they have often experienced the faults of others. The first two causes of suspicion evidently connote perversity of the affections, whilst the third diminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads to certainty, which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently, suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the more vicious it is.”⁵

⁵ St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 3: “Suspicion denotes an opinion of evil when it proceeds from slight indications, and this happens in three ways: first, from the fact that someone is evil in himself and, from this very fact, as though conscious of his own malice, readily thinks evil of others. Secondly, it arises from the fact that someone is ill-disposed toward another; for when someone despises or hates another, or is angry with or envious of him, he thinks evil of him from slight signs, because everyone readily believes what he desires. Thirdly, it arises from long experience. The first two causes of suspicion manifestly pertain to perversity of affection; but the third cause diminishes the nature of suspicion, inasmuch as experience advances toward certainty, which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. And therefore suspicion denotes a certain vice, and the farther suspicion proceeds, the more vicious it is.” (Vide supra, n. 3).—Gury, Comp. Theol. Moral., I, n. 482: “A rash judgment concerning a neighbor’s fault is by its kind a mortal sin against justice; for each person has a right to his good reputation in the judgment of individuals. . . . Often, however, it is venial because of the slightness of the matter or the imperfection of the act. Rash suspicion and doubt concerning a neighbor’s stain are only venial by their kind. The reason is that, because of their weak and readily changeable adherence, they ordinarily inflict only slight harm on one’s neighbor, since they do not destroy his reputation but only diminish it and render it doubtful.”

To entertain a sort of general distrust towards strangers or to reserve one’s judgment regarding their honesty or disinterestedness, in consequence of having had one’s goodness repeatedly imposed upon, is no sin, because there is some reason for such a general distrust. Still, we must always remember that Christian charity commands us to think good rather than evil of our neighbor.⁶ The Talmud lays down a prudent rule of conduct when it says: “Judge no one unless you have been in his place.”

⁶ Cfr. Is. XI, 3; Luke VI, 37; John VIII, 15 sq.; 1 Cor. IV, 5.—St. Augustine, De Agone Christ., c. 27, n. 29: “In that passage [Mt. vii, 1], where [the Lord] forbids judging, He admonishes us not to condemn anyone whose thought is not open to us, or of whom we do not know what sort of person he may afterwards become.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 395).

“Frequently there is a greater sin involved in judging rashly of another than in the act that is so judged. The wise men of the world (sapientes mundi) warn us not to outdo the sins of others by passing rash judgment upon them; how much more carefully ought we to consider our own conduct, lest we condemn petty faults in others and at the same time incur grievous sins ourselves.”⁷

⁷ Pseudo-Ambrose, Apol. II David, c. 2, n. 5 (Migne, P. L., XIV, 889).

“To have a low opinion of oneself and always to think well and commendably of others,” says Thomas à Kempis, “is great wisdom and perfection. If thou shouldst see another openly sin, or commit heinous crimes, yet thou oughtest not to esteem thyself better, because thou knowest not how long thou mayest remain in a good state. We are all frail; but do thou think no one more frail than thyself.”⁸

⁸ De Imitatione Christi, l. I, c. 2 (ed. Pohl, II, 8).

2. The chief external sins against the honor of our fellowman are contumely, calumny, and slander.

a) Contumely (contumelia) means casting a man's faults in his face to detract from his dignity. This may be done either in his physical or in his moral presence. Moral presence is assumed when the insult is uttered before those who know the victim and to whose respect he attaches weight.⁹ This includes publication in the press.

⁹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 478: "A person can be present either personally or physically, or morally through an image or through something else in which he is represented to some extent."

Contumely implies insult. An insult is any remark or expression by which another is denied the dignity of a human being, or accused of a moral defect, or charged with a crime or an offense. It is not necessary that the utterance in question actually contain an expression of contempt or disrespect, but the intention of injuring the other (animus iniuriandi) suffices.

The seriousness of the sin of contumely is measured by the intention of the offender, the importance of the matter involved, and the dignity of the person injured. No contumely is committed by parents and superiors when they censure the sins and faults of their children or subjects, even if this is done in a humiliating way, though they should, of course, always remember that even just reproaches must be kept within proper limits and that brutality and unnecessary harshness often produce a contrary effect.

The ancients took cognizance of real contumely, but not of verbal, and the Roman law did not punish the latter, probably for the reason that in former times men were less sensitive in regard to verbal insults than they are now, but especially because the spoken word did not then enjoy the publicity now given to it through the press.¹⁰ St. John the Baptist and Jesus Christ Himself severely censured the Scribes, Pharisees, and Sadducees.¹¹ St. Polycarp, when asked by the heretic Marcion whether he knew him, answered: "Certainly I know the first-born of Satan!"¹²

¹⁰ Homer (Ilias, I, 210 sqq.) describes Athene as intervening between Achilles and Agamemnon with the words: "Do not engage in combat nor draw the sword, for you can insult him in words as much as you please."—Linsenmann, Moraltheol., p. 457; W. S. Lilly, On Right and Wrong, London, 1892, Ch. VII, "The Ethics of Journalism," pp. 150–173.

¹¹ Matth. III, 7; XII, 34, 39; XVI, 4; XXIII, 13–33; Mark VIII, 38; Luke III, 7; XI, 42–45; cfr. Matth. XV, 26; XVI, 23; Mark VII, 27; Luke XIII, 32; Acts XIII, 10; XXIII, 3; Gal. III, 1, 3; Phil. III, 2; Tit. I, 12 sq.

¹² Irenaeus, Adv. Haer., III, 3–4; cfr. Polycarp, Epist. ad Philipp., c. 7; Funk, Patres Apost., Vol. I, 2nd ed., p. 304; Kirsopp Lake, The Apostolic Fathers (Loeb Classical Library), Vol. I, p. 293.

Contumely, says Fr. Slater,¹³ is of itself a grave sin against justice and charity, for it injures a man in what he values more than wealth, and as a rule an insult wounds the reputation as well as the feelings of him who is insulted. Christ shows how grievous a sin is committed by contumely when He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council. And whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire."¹⁴ Like most sins against justice and charity, contumely may be a venial sin only, if the matter involved is slight. Chaff or banter, which is not intended to wound or irritate others is, of course, harmless, so long as it keeps within due bounds.¹⁵

¹³ Slater, Mor. Theol., I, 462.

¹⁴ Matth. V, 22.

¹⁵ Slater, ibid.

We insult a neighbor not only in words, but also by sending him abusive, immoral, or frivolous cards, a custom which exists in some countries and constitutes a serious abuse of the practice, in itself unobjectionable, of sending tokens of congratulation or remembrance at certain seasons of the year. The exhibition and circulation of offensive cards seriously menaces the morals of the young and promotes the world-wide movement against sound ethics.

b) Calumny (calumnia) or slander is committed by falsely imputing to another something which injures or destroys his reputation. This usually consists in accusing him falsely or exaggerating his faults or denying his good qualities or wilfully misinterpreting his intentions,¹⁶ and may be done in speech or in writing; in the latter case is called libel or pasquil.

¹⁶ Deut. I, 27; Mark VII, 22. On Matth. XII, 36 ῥῆμα ἀργόν, verbum otiosum, cfr. E. Nestle, Philologica Sacra, Berlin, 1896, pp. 58 sq.

Calumny involves three distinct acts; namely, first, a wilful lie, which is aggravated by the fact that it is told in secret and the injured person cannot defend himself against it; secondly, a sin against charity, and thirdly, a violation of justice (iustitia commutativa), because the injured person frequently suffers damage in his social position or good name.

If calumny is committed in general terms, i. e., if we declare our neighbor to be entirely bad without a redeeming trait, it is a mortal sin. If we impute to him only one fault, or several faults, the gravity of the sin committed varies according to the seriousness of the faults imputed, the consequences of the imputation, and the malice with which the calumniator strives to effect the moral or social ruin of his victim. The lighter the unjust accusation and the less intentional the imputation of evil, the smaller will be the guilt incurred.

In its worst form calumny is little less than spiritual murder and must be reckoned among the sins that cry to Heaven for vengeance.¹⁷

¹⁷ Cfr. Ps. C, 5; Jas. IV, 11; 1 Pet. II, 1.—St. Jerome, Epist. 54 (al. 10), n. 13: "It is impossible for anyone to pass through the course of this life without being bitten by men, and it is the consolation of the wicked to carp at the good, while they think the guilt of sins is diminished by the multitude of sinners. Yet the fire of stubble soon subsides, and the overflowing flame gradually dies when nourishment fails."—Epist., 108 (al. 27), n. 19: "A slanderous tongue is accustomed to carp at saints as a consolation for the offender."—Epist., 148 (al. 14), n. 16: "Never detract from anyone at all, nor wish to appear praiseworthy by censuring others; learn rather to adorn your own life than to carp at another's. There are very few who renounce this vice, and rarely will you find those who wish to present their own life as blameless without willingly censuring another's. So great a lust for this evil has invaded men's minds that even those who have withdrawn far from other vices nevertheless fall into this one as though into the devil's final snare. But do you so flee this evil that not only do you yourself not detract, but you do not even at any time believe another who detracts. Nor by agreeing give authority to detractors, lest by nodding assent you nourish their vice. . . . Indeed, this vice is such that it should be extinguished among the first, and should be wholly excluded by those who wish to train themselves in holiness. For nothing so disturbs the mind; there is nothing that makes the mind so changeable and frivolous as readily to believe everything and to follow the words of detractors with the mind's rash assent. Hence frequent dissensions arise, hence unjust hatreds. This it is that often makes enemies even of the closest friends, when a malicious tongue separates souls that are indeed harmonious but credulous. On the other hand, it is great tranquility of mind and great steadiness of character not rashly to hear anything adverse about anyone. Blessed is he who has so armed himself against this vice that no one dares detract in his presence. But if there were in us this diligence not to believe detractors indiscriminately, everyone would now fear to detract, lest in detracting they make not others so much as themselves contemptible. But this evil is notorious for this reason, and this vice flourishes in many for this reason: because it is willingly heard by almost everyone." (Migne, P. L., XXII, 557, 896, 1211).

The varieties of this sin are described in the old memorial verse:

"Imponens, augens, manifestans, in mala vertens, Qui negat aut minuit, reticet laudatque remisse."

If one is calumniated, he should recall that it is not the worst fruit that is attacked by the wasps, as the German poet Bürger says, or, as an Arabian proverb puts it: "People do not throw stones at a tree unless it bears fruit."

Some men resemble bees, not by their diligence, but by their sting.

c) Detraction, or backbiting (diffamatio, detractio)¹⁸ is committed when one unjustly deprives another of his good name by revealing his real but secret faults in his absence. This is a sin against justice as well as charity, because every man has a strict right to his good name. The more uncharitable the disposition of the detractor or slanderer, the more unfavorable the light in which he places his neighbor, the more widely the detraction circulates, the more the victim's position or activity depends on his good name, and the worse the results of the detraction, the more serious is the sin committed. Another factor to be taken into consideration here, as in all sins of defamation, are the consequences resulting from detraction in the case of those who hear of it.

¹⁸ The older Scholastics designated both calumny and detraction with one word: detractio.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 73, art. 1.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 459, says: "Detraction is a secret and unjust violation of another's reputation, or the unjust blackening of the reputation of an absent neighbor. Reputation is the good estimation that others have of someone's life and morals. Detraction is called simply such if the neighbor's reputation is violated by reporting a true crime; it is called calumny if the violation follows from imputing a false crime."

Unsophisticated persons are apt to lose their good opinion of others generally (odium generis humani) and their reverence for virtue. Hence a sin of this kind, aside from the malice it involves, is more grievous when committed by persons in whose veracity and judgment one has great confidence.¹⁹

¹⁹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 460: "The gravity of detraction is to be taken chiefly from the gravity of the harm that one's neighbor is foreseen to suffer from it, and not precisely from the gravity of the defect or crime related about him. Hence, to determine the gravity of detraction in a particular case, attention must be paid to the character: 1. of the detractor—whether he is serious and discreet, or talkative and frivolous; 2. of the injured person—whether he enjoys a good or bad reputation, etc. The reason is that greater or lesser credence will be given according as the speaker is worthy of greater or lesser trust; likewise, greater or lesser injury to reputation will follow in proportion to the greater or lesser esteem enjoyed by the injured person."

Like calumny, detraction can be committed against an entire community or class, and not only by word of mouth, but also in writing. To defame others in writing is a more grievous sin than to do so by word of mouth. Writings enjoy a certain permanency and therefore are able to exercise their influence not merely in the present, but likewise in the future.²⁰

²⁰ Cfr. St. Paul's judgment of the Cretans (Tit. I, 12), and the sayings: "Litera scripta manet" and "Literae non erubescunt"; i. e., one writes more boldly than one speaks.

Mendacity and detraction are the primary vices of the modern newspaper press. "Journalism is conducted under conditions which tend to nourish this vice. The newspaper is, by its very nature, an ephemeral production, read for an hour and then cast aside, and probably never looked at again. Its assertions have done their work before an opportunity of correcting them is presented. Besides, it rests with editors whether contradictions of false and misleading allegations, which their journals may contain, shall appear in them or not. And it is manifest to all men that the considerations by which this question is determined are, in a vast majority of instances, wholly unethical. Again, the conditions under which the newspaper publicist works are extremely unfavorable to the cultivation of the virtue of veracity. He is called upon suddenly to expound views which shall strike his readers as profound, well-considered, or original, about subjects of which, very likely, he knows nothing truly or exactly. Or he is summoned to essay the defense of 'principles' to which he is wholly indifferent. Or he is bidden to attack some institution, some interest, some work, which whatever there may be of good left to him confesses to be worthy of respect and support. A very few years' practice in a calling of this kind is apt to render him as indifferent to the goal whither his pen conducts him, as is a cab-horse to the destination whither the driver's 'fare' is conveyed. And the worst of it is that, in time, he comes to glory in his shame. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, distinguishes between two kinds of liars; there is 'the liar who loves a lie for its own sake,' and 'the liar who lies to win reputation or to make money.' But many a journalist who, at first, belongs to the latter of these classes, and is perhaps a little ashamed, for a while, at finding himself there, passes pretty swiftly into the former. Thus does he anticipate in this life, the doom which Dante ascribed to the damned; he is in the miserable estate of those 'genti dolorose' who have lost 'il ben del intelletto.' And then, by a fatal and necessary law, his chief object, next to the provision of the means of 'agreeable feeling' for himself, is to bring down as many as possible to his own level. Nor does he find any surer way of effecting this, than by the persistent denial of those moral excellences which he has ceased to strive after, or even to venerate. Is a man the object of reverence and admiration, for patriotism, philanthropy, piety? Your newspaper censors, with due protestations of hatred of hypocrisy, will strip off the veneer which imposes on the unsuspicious; will show their readers that these pretended virtues are a mere cloak for some base or sordid end; will demonstrate conclusively that 'old Cato is as great a rogue as you.' And their efforts are only too successful. I think I may truly say that the newspaper press, during the last quarter of a century, has done more than anything else to de-ethicize public life; to lay the axe to the root of duty, self-devotion, self-sacrifice, the elements of the moral greatness of a nation, which is its true greatness."²¹

²¹ W. S. Lilly, On Right and Wrong, pp. 171 sqq.

Formal detraction differs from material in that it is intentional. Formal detraction, or, a fortiori, slander, be- ing contrary to justice and charity, which bind under a grave obligation, is of itself a grievous sin, though frequently only venial on account of the smallness of the matter involved. Material detraction usually proceeds from carelessness, lack of caution, love of gossip, or a desire to be entertaining and, therefore, as a rule, is a venial sin only, unless indeed it seriously injures the good name of others.²²

²² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 73, art. 2: "Verbal sins are to be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Detraction by its nature is ordered to blackening someone's reputation. Hence, strictly speaking, he detracts who speaks ill of someone in his absence for the purpose of blackening his reputation. Now, to take away someone's reputation is very serious, because among temporal goods reputation seems to be more precious, through the loss of which a man is hindered from doing many good things (Eccli. 41, 15). And therefore detraction, strictly speaking, is a mortal sin. Yet it sometimes happens that someone says certain words by which another's reputation is diminished, intending not this but something else. This, however, is not detraction strictly and formally speaking, but only materially and, as it were, accidentally. And if someone utters words by which another's reputation is diminished for the sake of some necessary good, with the due circumstances observed, it is not a sin and cannot be called detraction. But if he utters them from levity of mind or for some unnecessary cause, it is not a mortal sin, unless perhaps the word spoken is so grave that it notably injures someone's reputation, especially in matters pertaining to uprightness of life, because from the very kind of words it has the character of a mortal sin."

Note that the guilt of detraction, aside from the underlying intention, is measured by the amount of injury done (gravitas damni), and that, consequently, attacks upon the good name of others are grievously sinful in proportion to the dignity or social position of the persons attacked. To attack the good name of a priest or superior, therefore, is more grievous than to attack the reputation of an ordinary citizen.

While it is never permissible falsely to impute a crime to another,²³ it may be licit, nay a strict duty, to reveal his true faults for a higher purpose. This is the case, for instance, when it becomes necessary to inform legitimate superiors, to warn inferiors, children, etc., or to protect oneself or others against serious injury, or if the faults revealed are already known in consequence of a public trial or the culprit's own admission (notorietate iuris) through the confession of confederates (notorietate facti) or through rumor (notorietate famae). Whenever the revelation of the sins or faults of another seems necessary as a means of reforming him or of averting a greater evil, it is morally licit, nay a duty, for the reason that the sinner has lost the right to his good name because he can not preserve it except to the detriment of others and to his own injury.²⁴ But even though his faults and crimes are notorious, charity commands us not to reveal them to persons to whom they would otherwise probably remain unknown. Besides rumors must never be represented as facts.

²³ Prop. damn. sub Innoc. XI, n. 44: "It is probable that one who imputes a false crime to someone in order to defend his own justice and honor does not sin mortally. And if this is not probable, scarcely any opinion in theology will be probable." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1194).

²⁴ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 461: "It is never permissible to impute a false crime to another. . . . It is permissible, however, for a just cause to reveal a hidden crime even with the loss of his reputation, because sometimes the public or a private good requires this, and then the neighbor's right to the preservation of his reputation ceases. The causes for which another's crime may lawfully be revealed are the following: 1. A notable advantage to the revealer himself, e. g., to seek advice or assistance in a grave matter, provided, however, that every disposition to detraction is excluded; 2. The advantage of the offender, namely, for his instruction or correction, etc.; 3. The public advantage, as for preventing evils threatening the state, religion, or some community; 4. A grave private advantage, either of the hearers or of others, e. g., that they may guard against evils, losses, or inconveniences that otherwise will certainly or probably befall them. The reason for these cases is that one who then reveals another's sin injures neither justice nor charity. 1. He does not injure justice, because the neighbor does not have so strict a right to his reputation that others are bound to conceal the truth when its disclosure is necessary to avoid grave harm, whether to oneself or to others. 2. He does not injure charity, because charity does not bind at so great a loss. For if you are not bound to prevent harm to your neighbor, even greater harm, at grave loss to yourself, neither are you bound in that case to conceal your neighbor's hidden crime." Cfr. ibid., n. 465–466.

Detraction comprises all evil speaking and criticizing of others through the spreading of tales to the disadvantage of their good name. This applies especially to suspicions cast upon the internal motives of our fellowmen.

A special kind of detraction is known as tale-bearing (susurratio), and consists in mischief-making between friends by telling tales to the disadvantage of one of them, with the object of sowing or promoting discord.²⁵ This sin is particularly detestable if it is directed to the destruction of mutual confidence between husband and wife.

²⁵ Prov. VI, 16 sqq.; XXVI, 20, 22; Ecclus. V, 16 sq.; XXVIII, 15.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 74, art. 2: "A sin against one's neighbor is graver in proportion as greater harm is inflicted on the neighbor through it. Harm, however, is greater in proportion as the good taken away is greater. Among the remaining external goods, however, a friend is preeminent (Ecclus. vi, 15). Reputation itself, which is taken away by detraction, is especially necessary for this, that a man be held fit for friendship. Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than detraction and even than contumely, because a friend is better than honor and to be loved than to be honored."

By listening wilfully or with pleasure to a detractor, or encouraging him by asking questions or applauding his tales, or not hindering them if we are able, we formally coöperate in his sin.²⁶

²⁶ Prov. XXV, 23.—Cfr. St. Bernard, De Consid., l. II, c. 13: "Whether to detract or to listen to a detractor—which of these is more damnable I would not easily say." (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 756).

Mockery or derision (derisio, irrisio, illusio, subsannatio) makes sport of another's honor. It sometimes runs counter to charity also by employing the faults or infirmities of others in order to make them a butt of laughter or contempt. The most grievous sin of this kind is the mockery of God and sacred things; next in order come mockery of parents, superiors, and virtuous persons.²⁷

²⁷ Is. XXXVII, 23; Prov. XXX, 17; Job XII, 4.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 75, art. 2.—Possidius, Vita Sti. Augustini, c. 22 (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 52): "Whoever loves to gnaw at the life of the absent with words, let him know that this table is unworthy of him."

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 60, art. 3–4; qu. 73 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, II, 18 sqq., 82 sqq.).—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 962–977 (ed. Gaudé, II, 355 sqq.).—Jocham, Moraltheologie, Vol. III, pp. 400 sqq.—Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 77 sqq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 110 sqq.—A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Pastor., Vol. III, pp. 156 sqq.—J. E. Ross, Christian Ethics, pp. 259 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 659 sqq., 678 sq.