Irritation (Annulment) of Vows

228. Declarations. 1. Irritation is defined as the annulment or suspension of a vow made by him who has power either over the will of the one vowing or over the matter of the vow. The power of irritating is exercised immediately either upon the act of vowing or upon the matter of the vow.

He who is subject to the power of another cannot make a firm vow. His vow is indeed valid, yet it always includes this tacit condition: unless the superior contradicts; therefore his vow is called infirm or irritatable. But if the superior afterward actually irritates the vow, its obligation ceases by that very fact.

2. A twofold irritation is distinguished, direct and indirect. Direct and properly so called is the annulment of a vow made by him who has power over the will of the one vowing; this irritation touches the act itself and dissolves it in such a way that it never revives. Indirect and improperly so called is the suspension of a vow made by him who has power only over the matter of the vow; this irritation touches the thing promised, whose offering is impeded; therefore it only suspends the obligation of the vow, which revives again as soon as the matter promised is withdrawn from the power of the one irritating.

For the irritation of a vow, the power of jurisdiction is not required, but dominative power. Now dominative power is twofold: one over the person of the one vowing, by which the will of the one vowing is so subordinated to another that without his consent he cannot undertake any firm obligation; the other over the things and actions of the one vowing, by which it happens that the thing promised can be withdrawn from the power of the one vowing, and in this way not indeed the vow can be annulled, but the execution of the vow can be impeded.¹

3. For validly irritating vows, whether directly or indirectly, no cause is required: for the vows of subjects always involve this condition: unless the superior contradicts. Nor for licitly irritating vows is a cause required of itself: for anyone can use his own right; nevertheless, in the concrete, irritation which is made without any cause will be a venial sin, as an idle and irrational action. But any reasonable cause is sufficient so that the superior can licitly irritate vows and the subject can seek irritation.

¹ Cf. De principiis^9, n. 105.

229. Who can directly irritate vows. He who has dominative power over the will of another can directly irritate all this person's vows.

Not just any dominative power suffices for directly irritating vows, but only that from which the will of the subject, even in spiritual matters, is so dependent that he cannot firmly and absolutely obligate himself (to God).

1. A regular prelate (from the immediate superior: prior, guardian, rector, up to the supreme superior) can directly irritate all private vows of religious made after profession; the same is true of superioresses of nuns with respect to their subjects: for through the vow of obedience a religious fully subjects his will to his superior.

a. The power which a regular prelate enjoys is had also by the supreme pontiff, not insofar as he possesses supreme jurisdiction in the Church, but insofar as he is the supreme prelate of all religious orders.

b. They ask whether this power is of natural law or of ecclesiastical law, and they answer in diverse ways. It seems it must be said that religious profession with the promise of obedience is of ecclesiastical law; but once subjection toward the superior has been made through the vow of obedience, the power of irritating vows arises by natural law.

c. A regular prelate can irritate all private vows of religious made after profession, whether solemn or simple, even merely internal vows, indeed even concerning a thing otherwise commanded; but the substantial vows of religion and those which in some orders are annexed to them cannot be irritated. From private vows only the vow of passing to a stricter religion is excepted,¹ which not even the supreme pontiff can irritate. But not only the pope, but also the regular prelate, can dispense in this vow.

d. There are those who deny that a regular prelate can irritate the vows of those who have made only simple profession. There are two kinds of simply professed: some belong to an order in which solemn profession is made, but before profession a three-year period of simple vows is premised; others belong to an institute in which only simple vows (whether perpetual or temporary) are made. Those who think that the vows of those who have nothing except simple profession cannot be irritated seem to be of this opinion, that there is an internal essential distinction between solemn and simple vows; but since the offering made to God and to the prelate is essentially the same both of him who makes simple profession and of him who makes solemn profession, and the irritability of vows depends upon this offering, there is no reason why the power of irritating the vows of those who have made simple profession should be denied to the regular superior.

e. The power of irritating the vows of their subjects must also be conceded to superioresses of nuns: for on the one hand nuns promise obedience also to their superioresses, on which the power of irritating depends; on the other hand, no jurisdiction is required for irritation.²

f. The vows of novices can be irritated by a regular prelate only indirectly, because the power of directly irritating is founded upon religious profession. Wherefore those vows of novices cannot be irritated whose execution does not impede the exercises of probation. Vows made by regulars before profession are extinguished by religious profession, or rather are commuted into it.

¹ C. Licet 18, De regularibus (III. 31).

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 674.

230. 2. A father can directly irritate all vows of children made before puberty.

a. This power is derived from the law of nature: for natural reason demands that the impubescent, because of immaturity of judgment and inconstancy of will, be ruled by the will of another, even if they have already arrived at the use of reason. Now this power is perfected by positive law as to the determination of time, namely up to puberty, which is established by ecclesiastical law alone.¹

b. This power belongs to the father and to all to whom paternal power belongs by law, namely to the tutor and, when he is lacking, to the paternal grandfather. There are those who, when the father or tutor is absent or does not contradict, rightly attribute the same power also to the mother.

c. All vows of children made before puberty can be irritated; also vows otherwise reserved and promised in favor of a third party, likewise vows of impubescent persons concerning things to be furnished only after puberty; finally, even vows confirmed after puberty, unless afterward they were confirmed by a new vow independent of the former vow. But vows of children made after puberty can be irritated only indirectly.

¹ Cf. Puella 2, c. 20, q. 2.

231. 3. Whether a husband can directly irritate vows of his wife made after marriage is very controversial; the opinion of those who hold that the husband cannot directly irritate the vows of his wife, whether made before or after marriage, seems to be preferred.

Those who hold the affirmative opinion use: a. a positive argument from Num. 30:2-17, where the law concerning irritation of vows is had, and Eph. 5:24; b. an internal argument: it greatly contributes to the peace of the family, to restraining the impulse of women, and to succoring the weakness of their judgment, if the will of wives depends fully and in all things upon the man.¹

But those who follow the negative opinion say: a. This power does not arise from the law of nature: for the things which the adversaries exaggerate concerning weakness of judgment and levity of feminine character do not show that so perfect a subjection of the wife is necessary, since it is not necessary in a pubescent daughter. b. It does not arise from positive law: for the cited texts of sacred Scripture have another explanation; namely, the texts of the Old Testament are to be understood of a special law long since abrogated; but the text of the New Testament of subjection in all things which pertain to the right governance of the household.² c. The subjection of the wife toward the husband arises from the matrimonial contract, wherefore it does not extend beyond the rights of marriage, by which the woman is subject to the man in the use of marriage, in the society of life, in the education of offspring, and in the governance of the family.

¹ Summa, II-II, q. 88, a. 8, ad 3.

² Cf. Kirchberg, l. c., n. 123 ff.

232. Who can indirectly irritate vows. Every superior who has power over the matter of a vow can indirectly irritate those vows of his subjects which injure his rights: for by the law of nature a promise cannot be made which yields to the damage and prejudice of another. And vows indeed can be irritated by a superior even when he himself gave license of vowing or approved the vow, provided he did not expressly intend to yield his own right. Therefore:

1. A husband can irritate those vows of his wife, even if made before marriage, which injure his rights over the body of his wife, over cohabitation, over the governance of the family, over the administration of goods, for example a vow of continence, whether perpetual or temporal, a vow of large alms, etc.; but not vows which do not turn to his prejudice, such as a vow of moderate prayer.

A wife can irritate those vows of her husband which injure her rights, such as a vow of continence, a vow of sleeping separately, etc.

2. A master (mistress) can irritate both real and personal vows of servants which turn to his prejudice, such as a vow of a longer pilgrimage or fast, by which servants are rendered unfit for furnishing due services to their masters.

3. A father can irritate those vows of pubescent children not yet emancipated which impede the free administration of the family or the obedience owed to the father, such as a vow of a distant pilgrimage.

4. A regular prelate can irritate vows of novices which impede the exercises of probation or injure the rights of the order. The same must be said of the superior of a college, who can irritate vows of his students which stand in the way of the right of exacting obedience from them.¹

5. The supreme pontiff can irritate the vows of all the faithful, and a bishop the vows of his subjects, which prejudice their rights.

¹ Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 686.

I. Notion. Irritation is the annulment of a vow, validly emitted, made by one who has dominative power over the will of the one vowing. Irritation is customarily distinguished as twofold, direct and indirect; but indirect irritation is rather called suspension, which is also more conformable to the Code of Canon Law (cf. can. 1312, § 2).

II. The existence of the power of irritating vows is clear both from the tradition and practice of the Church, and from can. 1312, § 1.

III. The source of the power. The power of irritating vows seems to be founded either in dominative power alone, or in dominative power completed or perfected by positive law.¹ According to the former opinion, dominative power of itself imports the power of irritating vows; according to the other, the power of irritating vows is indeed suggested, as to the power of parents, by the weakness of children; as to the power of religious superiors, by the fact that the subjection of the religious is most especially ordered to the direction of those things which can contribute to perfection, such as vows. From the things said, I say, the power of irritating is indeed suggested, but nevertheless it is not present in dominative power unless in some way it is completed or perfected by positive law (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 227). Whatever the case, in fact dominative power certainly has annexed to it the power of irritating, as will be clear from what must now be said.

¹ Some derive the power of irritating vows from positive law alone; others judge that, at least in some cases, it must be strengthened and more accurately circumscribed by positive law (cf. Damen, cited work, pp. 11-12).

IV. The subject of the power of irritating vows is all those who enjoy dominative power over the will of the one vowing (can. 1312, § 1). If the power of the superior, for example of the father with respect to a pubescent child, has not wholly ceased, the faculty of irritating vows emitted in the time of subjection persists, provided the one vowing, after the time of subjection, has not confirmed the vow with knowledge of the infirmity of the vow. Otherwise one must speak if the power of the superior, for example of a regular Prelate, has been wholly extinguished, or some religious is now no longer subject to him (St. Alphonsus, III, 238).

To whom specifically the power of irritating vows belongs, see in the corollary.

V. The extent of the power. The power of irritating extends to all vows of subjects emitted in the time of subjection, even to those which are reserved as to dispensation; likewise to those which are to be executed after the time of subjection has passed; likewise to those which the lord himself has approved. Indeed, he cannot even abdicate the faculty annexed to dominative power, namely that of irritating vows. It was disputed whether the power extended to vows concerning internal acts; but much more commonly it was affirmed, and can. 1312, § 1 does not except them (St. Alphonsus, III, 227).

VI. The use of the power. Irritation made without cause is valid; however, it is lightly illicit, insofar as the progress of the subject is irrationally impeded. Moreover, any just or reasonable cause suffices (can. 1312, § 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 228).

VII. The effect of irritation is that the vow is entirely extinguished, so that in no case does the obligation afterward revive (can. 1312, § 1).

Corollary. The following can irritate vows:

1. A father can irritate vows emitted by prepubescent children, provided that when they become pubescent they have not confirmed them while aware of the infirmity of the prior vow. If, unaware of the infirmity, they confirm them, strictly speaking they only renew the vow as it was; but it was infirm or irritatable. The aforesaid power also belongs to him who, either by law (as a tutor), or by the father's disposition, is substituted in his place. The reason is that, because of the weakness of prepubescents, power over their will, that is, dominative power, must be judged to belong to the father and to the others enumerated. But dominative power, by can. 1312, § 1, has annexed to it the power of irritating vows (St. Alphonsus, III, 229, 238; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 9).

It is disputed whether a father can irritate vows emitted by pubescent minors. Now the matter seems wholly doubtful, because the father's dominative power over pubescent minors is not proved. Nor is can. 89, which declares: "A minor person remains subject to the power of parents or guardians in the exercise of his rights, except in those things in which the law holds minors exempt from power"; nor is the cited canon, I say, judged to settle the question or theoretical controversy whether or not the father enjoys dominative power over pubescent minors.

Corollary. In doubt whether a vow was emitted before or after puberty, the power of irritating is doubtful, because it is doubtful whether the vow was emitted at a time when it was certainly subject to irritation.

2. The mother seems able to do the same as the father, provided he does not contradict, or with dependence on the father. The reason is that dominative power seems to belong to the mother as much as to the father, because she is the principle of the child no less than the father. Once dominative power is admitted, the power of irritating vows also must be admitted (St. Thomas, opusc. 17, cap. 13, vers. Decimo; St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 5, n. 36).

3. The husband seems to have the power of irritating the vows of the wife, because he seems to enjoy dominative power over her; for such power of itself is very expedient for the good of conjugal society, that is, for fostering dependence and intense love, for restraining the wife's impulses of mind, and for favoring the peace of the family. But dominative power carries with it the power of irritating vows (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 8, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 324).¹

4. Superiors of religious, both exempt and non-exempt, both solemnly and simply professed, and likewise Superioresses, can directly irritate vows emitted by subjects during the time in which they were subject to themselves or to other Superiors, for example to a predecessor (can. 501, § 1). The power does not extend: 1. to substantial religious vows, for since these are constitutive of subjection, they are emitted independently of this subjection, and therefore cannot be called infirm or irritatable; 2. to vows annexed to the substantial vows, because since they are emitted together with the substantial vows, they likewise are judged to have been made independently of subjection. They also except the vow of passing to a stricter Religion² (St. Alphonsus, III, 233; IV, 53, 54).

What has been said about Superiors of religious should also be applied: 1. to the Pope with respect to professed male and female religious (cf. can. 499, § 1); 2. to Chapters of religious according to the norm of the constitutions and common law (cf. can. 501, § 1); 3. to the Bishop, if it is a question of a religion of diocesan right.

A Superior cannot irritate the vows of novices unless, according to the things said under I, he truly supplies the place of a parent, and it is a question of a vow which a parent could irritate (St. Alphonsus, IV, 55). Nor does the faculty of irritating the vows of novices or other faithful belong to the Supreme Pontiff, because he lacks dominative power over them.

Question. Whether the Church supplies probable power of irritating vows.

Response. We judge that it must be denied. For the power of irritating vows supposes dominative power; if this is present, the Church certainly completes it; if it is not present, it cannot be completed.

Corollary. Those who enjoy the power of irritating vows can also in advance render subjects incapable of vowing, either in some matter or universally, so that vows from that time are null from the beginning (St. Alphonsus, III, 228).

¹ Cf. Num. 30:7-13; Eph. 5:24.

² Cap. 18, de Reg.

Twofold Dependence on the Will of Another.—Those who are not masters of their own acts are unable to vow on account of their subjection to or dependence on the will of another. There is a twofold dependence of this kind.

(a) There is a dependence of the will of the subject, as in the case of religious who have vowed obedience to their rule and superiors, and in the case of those who have not attained the age of puberty and who must be guided and ruled by their father or guardian. This dependence means, not that the subject must have the positive consent of the superior for every act, but that he must not will or do anything contrary to the just will of the superior.

(b) There is a dependence of the matter of the vow, when it is subject to the wishes of another person, as happens in the case of those who have obligations to others. Thus, a wife cannot make a vow of chastity without the consent of her husband, otherwise she infringes upon conjugal rights; a servant cannot make a vow to spend in visiting churches time for which he is paid; a son who lives with his parents and is not emancipated cannot vow to give his earnings in alms, for he owes them to his family.

The Validity of Vows Made by Subjects.—(a) If the vow is against the rights of another person, it is invalid without his consent. Thus, if a wife makes a vow of chastity without her husband’s consent, the vow obliges her to ask his consent, but it has no force if he refuses his consent.

(b) If the vow is against the subjection due another, it is invalid if he denies his consent. Thus, if a religious vows an act for which according to his rule permission must be sought, the vow has no actual force until the permission is obtained; if he vows an act that is good in itself, but absolutely forbidden in his rule (e.g., if a novice bound to remain in the cloister vowed to go on a pilgrimage), the vow is null, since it is better to keep the rule.

(c) If the vow is neither against the right of another nor against the subjection due, it seems that the vow is valid without the knowledge and consent of the superior. Thus, if a religious privately vows to do what is commanded in a particular law or rule, or what is counselled by his superiors, or what is good and not forbidden, the vow is valid until annulled by the superior; for, as was said in the previous paragraph, the subject is not bound to have the positive consent of his superior for all acts, and it is supposed now that the thing vowed is not detrimental to the rights of the superior or others.

Annulment of Vows.—The annulment of a vow is made in two ways, directly and indirectly. A full treatment of this subject will be found in commentaries on Canons 1312, 499, 88, 89, 675, 501.

(a) Direct annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the vower which, by affecting immediately the vower’s act, recalls the vow and makes it of no force. Hence, this kind of annulment may be exercised by all those who have such private authority over the will of the vower as to be able either to confirm or to cancel his acts. Private authority over the will of another is contained in the paternal power of the father over his children, in the domestic power of the husband over his wife, and in the governing power of a religious superior over his subjects. The paternal power may be exercised to annul the vows of children (at least, of those who have not reached puberty), since these children are incompetent to decide for themselves. The governing power also may annul directly the private vows of professed subjects made after profession, since these subjects have made a quasi-contract of submission in this matter. The domestic power of the husband, according to some, cannot directly annul the post-matrimonial vows of the wife, since the wife is competent to direct herself in these affairs, and has made no engagement of subjection in their regard; but others argue that at least positive law (Num., xxx. 2-17; Eph., v. 24) gives the husband this authority. The paternal power in this matter is had, not only by the father, but also by those who take his place (such as the guardian or the mother); the governing power is had by religious superioresses, by immediate and other regular superiors, by bishops in reference to their non-exempt communities, and by the Pope in reference to all communities.

(b) Indirect annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the vower which, by affecting the matter or object of the vow, suspends the obligation produced by the vow. Hence, this kind of annulment may be exercised by all those who have a right over the matter of the vow, when and as long as the vow is prejudicial to their right. Thus, the Pope may annul a vow of any of the faithful that is detrimental to his rights or the rights of the Church; parents may annul the vows even of their children who have attained puberty, when these vows interfere with family order; religious superiors may annul the vows of novices that are harmful to religious discipline; husbands and wives may annul each other’s vows that trespass on conjugal rights; a master may annul a vow of his servant that keeps the servant from performing work due the master.

Reason Necessary for Annulment of a Vow.—Is a just reason necessary for annulment of a vow? (a) For validity it is not necessary that there be a just reason, since there is always the implicit condition in a vow: “unless the superior or other person whose consent is necessary refuses.” (b) For lawfulness it is necessary that there be a just reason, for it is not lawful to deprive God of honor promised Him, unless one has a good reason to do so (see Canon 1312). But the sin committed by one who annuls or who asks for annulment without sufficient reason does not regularly exceed a venial sin.

Differences between Direct and Indirect Annulment.—(a) Direct annulment extinguishes a vow, since it affects the act of vowing itself, and hence, if a father annuls the vow of his son who has not reached the age of fourteen, the vow ceases entirely. Indirect annulment, on the contrary, only suspends a vow, since it affects only the matter of the vow and this matter may be withdrawn from the power of him who annuls. Thus, if a master annulled the vow of his cook to hear Mass daily, the vow would revive when the cook took service elsewhere.

(b) He who has power to annul directly may exercise the power even though he granted permission for the vow, or promised not to annul it, or gave his approval to it; for he retains his power over his subject and may change his own decision. But he who has only indirect power of annulment more probably may not annul once he has given his permission or ratification to a vow; for his power is only over the matter of the vow, and this, after he has consented to its dedication to God, is no longer under his control.

331. Questions. Q. 1. Whether a husband can irritate all the vows of his wife?

Resp. It is disputed. Some deny it, and say that the husband can only indirectly irritate those vows which stand in the way of his rights. For as to other matters the wife is not subject. - Thus Voit, n. 600; Laymann, etc. - Better, however, others with St. Thomas ⁵ and St. Alphonsus, n. 234, attribute to the husband the right of irritating also directly the vows emitted while the marriage stands.

⁵ St. Thomas (2. 2, q. 88, art. 8 ad 3): "No vow of a religious is firm except by consent of the prelate, just as neither is the vow of a girl existing in the house, unless it is by consent of the father, nor of a wife, unless it is by consent of the husband."

Q. 2. Whether a father can directly irritate the vows of pubescent children emitted before puberty?

Resp. It is affirmed, provided the children, after reaching puberty, have not confirmed them; indeed probably even if they have ratified them, not knowing that they were irritatable. - St. Alphonsus, n. 238, with others ⁶.

⁶ This question must be extended more broadly to any vows emitted at the time of subjection, whatever finally may be the reason of the subjection. To solve it, a twofold general rule proposed by Sanchez is useful (In Decal., lib. 4, c. 30, n. 7-8). The former is: When the power of the superior during whose time the vow was emitted is not wholly extinguished or wholly suspended, but remains with respect to some things, he can irritate a vow emitted during the time of his subjection, even if that time has now passed, provided that, when it had passed, it was not again confirmed; understand, confirmed with knowledge of the infirmity of the vow emitted during the time of subjection, as the author also indicates. The latter rule is: When that power of the superior is wholly extinguished or wholly suspended, he cannot irritate those vows. Many questions solved by the help of both rules can be seen in the same Sanchez, both in the cited chapter and in De Matrimonio, lib. 9, disp. 41, n. 3.

Q. 3. Whether irritation can be made without cause?

Resp. It is affirmed as to validity, because a master validly disposes of his own thing; but denied as to lawfulness, because the spiritual progress of the subject is irrationally impeded, etc. Yet this commonly ⁷ does not exceed venial sin. - St. Alphonsus and others commonly.

⁷ It is said commonly: 1. because he would sin gravely who irritated vows either from an evil intention or with grave harm to the subject, as Suarez notes (De Relig., tr. 6, lib. 6, c. 1, n. 10); thus, for example, if a father did this from hatred or envy of the spiritual progress of his children, or from contempt of religion; 2. because, as St. Alphonsus says (lib. 3, n. 228), speaking of itself, it is truer that there is no sin, "because the vows of subjects are emitted under the condition of the consent of superiors; whence obedience suffices as a cause... I said, speaking of itself; because from elsewhere it will be difficult to excuse from venial sin, either because one performs an idle act, or because he irrationally impedes the progress of another... Any reasonable cause suffices to excuse from venial sin."

On this matter Suarez says well (l.c.): "It must be considered whether the power of irritating has been given for the good of the one vowing, as to a religious prelate; or for the convenience of the one irritating, as to a master with respect to a servant; or with a view to both, as to a father with respect to a son. If the first, for the irritation to be made lawfully, it is necessary that it be judged useful either to the one vowing, or to religion, or that, with all things weighed, greater service of God be judged... If the second, there will be no sin in doing it with a view to one's own convenience, because the master uses a thing wholly his own... and it is only necessary that an honorable end be present, and moreover that it not be done against charity, which is owed even to a servant... If the third, say the same as in the second, except that by a greater obligation the father is bound to consult the good of the children, or the husband that of the wife, so that he uses his power well."

Q. 4. Whether a superior can irritate vows ratified by himself?

Resp. It is affirmed, because he cannot take away from himself the power which he has over subjects. - St. Alphonsus, n. 239 ⁸. - See Cases, n. 326 and following to 334.

⁸ Therefore he irritates vows of this sort not only validly, but also lawfully, if some reasonable cause is present. On this matter Suarez warns (De Relig., tr. 6, lib. 6, c. 7, n. 16) that a lesser cause suffices for irritating than for dispensing. Hence from the opinion of all he infers that a subject who asks from his prelate the irritation of a vow, when he does not have a cause which suffices for a just dispensation, does not sin, because, he says, he uses his own right. Likewise, because the vow was not absolute but conditioned, and by it he did not obligate himself to take care that the condition not be impeded, or not to take precaution so that it would not be placed, as is clear from the common mode of vowing... Likewise it is not a sin to show oneself inclined to irritation, because this is neither against the vow nor against another precept... Finally, he who feels the burdens of religion can without sin enjoy its advantages. Therefore he who has subjected himself to the power of the superior, so that he may receive burdens from him, does not sin by procuring, through lawful means, some relief through the same power. Therefore just as the prelate does not sin by irritating, so neither does the subject by asking.

But if no reasonable cause is present, it is the common opinion that the subject is not without sin. But more probably the fault must be held light (see St. Alphonsus, lib. 5, n. 239), and inspect the reasons in Suarez, l.c., c. 4, n. 22, where he treats of a husband irritating the vows of his wife.

But from the principles laid down beforehand, namely: 1. concerning the power of the husband directly to irritate the vows of the wife; 2. concerning the power of the wife indirectly to irritate the vows of the husband; 3. concerning the power of irritating vows even approved or ratified by oneself, it is easily concluded that spouses can mutually irritate even a vow of continence emitted by mutual consent. For 1. nothing forbids the wife from asking from the husband the irritation of the vow emitted by herself, and the husband furnishing this; 2. likewise nothing prohibits the wife, once released from the vow, from indirectly irritating the vow of the husband; 3. finally nothing prevents both, released from the vow, from mutually restoring to themselves again the right to the other's body which they had mutually yielded by agreement. And from this it is clear why St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 239) said that he did not find a certain reason why he should condemn this opinion, although he adhered to the opposite as more common. But since most of these authors came into that opinion led by principles which not even St. Alphonsus admits, it is clear that this external authority cannot stand in the way of someone's safely following the preceding opinion.

On the contrary, as Busembaum rightly has, he who once irritated a vow, if afterward he is unwilling, the vow is not for that reason revalidated. See Sa (v. Irritatio voti) ⁹. - But the reason is that by irritation the vow is extinguished. But for the extinguished vow to revive, the repentance of the superior who irritated it contributes nothing; rather, there is required the will of the subject, who again obliges himself by vow.

⁹ ** In the text of Busembaum in St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 236), it is not read, "See Sa," but, "as Sa wills"; this insinuates that Emmanuel Sa thought with those few whom the Salamancans, alleged by St. Alphonsus, say stand against the doctrine set forth in the text. But the matter does not stand thus. For Sa (l.c., n. 4) teaches thus: "One irritating a vow, if afterward he consents, does not thereby revalidate it." And again (n. 3): "The vow of one before puberty about doing something in the time of liberty, once irritated, does not revive."

St. Alphonsus subjoins to the words of Busembaum (l.c.): "Thus the Salamancans, c. 3, n. 70, with Soto, etc., against some." But the Salamancans have something entirely singular in this place. "We establish this assertion," they say, "against some who, with respect to this, place a distinction between vows which are irritated by a father or prelate, and those which are irritated by a husband with respect to a wife, or by a master with respect to a servant." Now the doctrine concerning the power of a master with respect to a servant, as the Salamancans hand it down (ibid., n. 62), as though he can directly irritate the vows of a pubescent servant, no one has admitted up to now. Wherefore they wrongly (ibid., n. 70) allege for themselves Sanchez and others, who teach this not concerning the vows of a servant, but certainly of a wife.

992. 1. Notion. The invalidation of a vow is its annulment or suspension made by him who has dominative power¹ over the will of the one vowing, or over the matter of the vow. Therefore a twofold invalidation is customarily distinguished: (a) direct, or properly so called, which is the annulment of a vow made by him who has power over the will of the one vowing: this dissolves the obligation in perpetuity, so that it never revives. This can be declared thus: he who is subject to the power of another cannot emit an absolute vow, but only a conditioned one, namely with the tacit condition added: unless the superior contradicts; wherefore, if in reality the superior has contradicted, by that very fact the vow does not oblige, because the annexed condition was not fulfilled. (b) Indirect, or less properly so called, is the suspension of a vow made by him who has power not directly over the very will of the one vowing, but over the thing promised: this does not thoroughly remove the obligation of the vow, but only suspends it, namely as long as the matter remains subject to the will of the superior; therefore the obligation revives as soon as this matter is withdrawn from his power.

¹ Dominative power, which belongs to private masters as regards subjects, differs from the power of jurisdiction: for the latter arises from a public office, while the former arises from a private office. Dominative power sometimes flows from the law of nature, as paternal authority; sometimes also from ecclesiastical law, as the authority of religious superiors over subjects.

993. 2. Who are able to invalidate vows? (A) Directly, those can do this who have dominative power over the will of others:

(a) A father can directly invalidate all vows emitted by children before puberty, and probably those of non-emancipated minors (Codex, 88, 89). This power indeed rests on natural law, by force of which children depend on the father as long as they are immature in judgment, but it was determined by ecclesiastical law alone within these precise limits. This faculty extends to all vows emitted before puberty, even reserved vows and vows made in favor of a third party; indeed even to vows confirmed after puberty, unless these are made firm by a new vow altogether independent from the former. The same privilege belongs to all those in whom paternal power is present by law, namely to a tutor, and, this lacking, to the paternal grandfather; indeed probably, according to some, to the mother, if, the father or tutor being present and not contradicting, she exercises this authority.

(b) It is controverted whether a husband can directly invalidate all the vows of his wife emitted after marriage. Those who affirm with St. Thomas² argue from the fact that the man is the head of the woman, and therefore has power over her will. Yet many deny this, because the subjection of the wife, arising from marriage, does not extend beyond matrimonial duties; therefore the husband can invalidate only indirectly those vows which are opposed to his rights. We embrace this opinion as the more probable.

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 8, ad 3. - Num. 30:7-9 is also alleged for confirming this opinion; but this text pertains to the ceremonial Mosaic law, which has been abrogated.

(c) A regular Superior can directly invalidate all private vows of subjects emitted after profession: for by the vow of obedience they have subjected their will to the superior in all licit things. Nevertheless, the vow of passing to a stricter religion is excepted; this, from ecclesiastical law,³ no one can invalidate, since it is always free to each one to tend to better things. - The vows of novices can be invalidated only indirectly, since they have not yet vowed obedience.

³ Decretals, l. III, tit. 21, c. 18.

This same power belongs to superioresses of nuns as regards the vows of their subjects. - The Sovereign Pontiff, insofar as he is the supreme prelate of all religious, can invalidate their vows; Bishops enjoy the same authority only as regards religious who depend on the Ordinary.

994. (B) From the Code, all superiors who have power over the matter of a vow can suspend the vows of subjects which wound their rights. The reason is that, even by natural law, promises which wound the rights of another cannot be made. Wherefore:

(a) A husband can invalidate all vows of his wife, even those emitted before marriage, which are opposed to his matrimonial rights, for example, a vow of continence, of a long pilgrimage, etc.; the wife enjoys the same right, and therefore can invalidate a vow of living for a long time far from the conjugal home.

(b) A father can invalidate the vows of children, even of those who have reached puberty, which are opposed to his rights or the rights of the family, for example, a vow of a distant pilgrimage.

(c) Masters, or lords, can invalidate the vows of servants which render them unfit to furnish the services owed, such as vows of fasting daily or of spending a long time in churches.

(d) Regular prelates can invalidate the vows of novices which are incompatible with the observance of the rule; the same must be said of all superiors of colleges as regards the vows of pupils which bring an impediment to due obedience.

(e) The Sovereign Pontiff and Bishops can a fortiori invalidate the vows of subjects incompatible with their just prescriptions.

995. Note. For the validity of invalidation, in these or similar cases, no reason is required, because the superior who invalidates a vow subject to himself uses his own right. But for the licit exercise of this right, a just cause is required; for one who without reason invalidated the vows of subjects would irrationally impede their spiritual good. Thus from the Code, can. 1312: "... he can render his vows invalid validly and, from a just cause, also licitly."

From the Code, c. 1315, vows emitted before religious profession are suspended as long as the one vowing remains in religion.

2. Cessatio per irritationem or annulment is a declaration of nullity or suspension made by some one who has authority over the will of the vovens or the object of the vow.

An annulment is direct if the person who has made the vow is subject to the annulling authority, as a child to his parents, a religious to his superior, etc. “Those who are placed in such a state of dependency on their superiors cannot undertake any absolute obligation; they can only bind themselves conditionally, supposing that their superior consents. If he does not consent, the obligation falls to the ground.”³

³ IDEM, ibid., I, 251; cfr. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., II, pp. 241 sqq.

By indirect annulment the obligation can be suspended by any one who has authority over the matter of the vow; for, as the same author says, “it is not just that an obligation should be undertaken which interferes with the rights of some one else.”⁴

⁴ Slater, ibid., I, 252.

The vows of minor children, therefore, and those of religious, can be directly annulled, i. e., declared to be perpetually null and void, by their parents or superiors. The only exception is the vow whereby a religious has promised to enter a stricter order.

The vows of children who have attained majority but remain under the tutelage of their parents; the vows of spouses with regard to their marital rights and duties; the vows of ecclesiastical subjects in so far as they affect the personal or “real” rights of their superiors,—all these can be annulled indirectly, i. e., temporarily suspended.⁵ As soon as the person who has made a vow is able to dispose freely of the matter of the promise, the obligation takes effect.⁶

⁵ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, 324: “The obligation of a vow can cease: 1. From intrinsic causes, namely, by the cessation of the motivating cause, by a substantial change of the matter, and by physical or moral impossibility; 2. From extrinsic causes, namely, by annulment, dispensation, and commutation. . . . Annulment of a vow is its cancellation or suspension made by the one to whose power the will of the vower or the matter of the vow is subject. It is: 1. direct, if it falls directly upon the person of the vower; 2. indirect, if it falls only upon the matter of the vow.” Cfr. n. 325–327; also Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 243.

⁶ H. Busembaum, S.J., Medulla Theol. Mor., l. III, tr. 2, c. 3, dub. 6, a. 2, n. 8: “Vows annulled only indirectly revive and oblige when they cease to prejudice another.”

To annul a vow arbitrarily, without sufficient reason, is valid but illicit.⁷

⁷ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 328: “Question: Can annulment be made without a cause? Answer: Yes as regards validity, because a master validly disposes of his own thing; but no as regards liceity, because spiritual progress is thus unreasonably impeded, etc.”

411. Definition. Invalidation of a vow is its annulment or suspension made by one who has dominative power⁴⁰⁷ over the will of the person vowing or at least over the matter of the vow. Invalidation, therefore, is an act of dominative power and not of jurisdiction. According as this dominative power is exercised either over the will of the person vowing or over the matter of the vow, a twofold invalidation is distinguished: the one direct, or properly so called, which is the annulment of a vow made by one who has dominative power over the will of the person vowing, e.g., by a father with respect to all the vows of his children before puberty; the other indirect, or improper, which is not the direct annulment of the vow but its suspension made by one who has dominative power over the matter of the vow. Thus a master can indirectly invalidate vows of servants which impede the service owed.

⁴⁰⁷ I.e., dominion (Verfügungsrecht).

734. Irritation of a vow is its annulment or suspension by him to whose power the very will of the one vowing, or the matter of the vow, is subject: "for no one can firmly oblige himself by a promise to that which is in the power of another, but only to that which is in his own power; but he who is subject to someone, as to this, is not of his own power to do what he wills, but depends upon the will of another; therefore he cannot firmly oblige himself by vow in those things in which he is subject to another, without the consent of his superior"; whence in every vow there is implicitly contained the condition: unless the superior resists (a. 8).

Hence irritation is twofold: direct and indirect; between which there is a manifold difference. Direct irritation, and that properly so called, is the annulment of a vow (verbreking) made by him who has dominative power over the will of the one vowing, whence it touches the act itself and so dissolves it that it never revives: it is valid for vows emitted at the time of subjection, while one is under the power of a superior, even if they are to be fulfilled afterward (can. 1312, § 1). Indirect irritation, and that improperly so called, is the suspension of a vow (opschorsing) made by him who has power only over the matter of the vow; it touches the thing promised, whose obligation is impeded, and therefore it only suspends the obligation of the vow, which of itself revives as soon as the promised matter is withdrawn from the power of the one irritating it (can. 1312, § 2). Hence it is valid even for vows emitted previously, but not for vows to be fulfilled afterward (cf., for example, can. 1315).

735. They can directly irritate or annul a vow who have dominative power over the person or will of subjects (can. 1312, § 1):

1. The father (if he is lacking or far absent, the tutor, or the mother as tutrix) can annul the vows of minor children, at least those of the non-pubescent; whether also those of pubescent children not emancipated is disputed, some affirming it because of the general manner of speaking of the new law without restriction in canons 1312 and 89, others denying it because there is no reason for thinking that the legislator wished in this matter to introduce some change.

2. Religious superiors: the Supreme Pontiff, the bishop for non-exempt religious, legitimately constituted superiors, even abbesses and female superiors, can annul the vows of professed religious, except the vows of the profession itself.

3. The husband, probably, can annul the vows of his wife, because he is the head of the woman.

The Church cannot directly irritate the vows of subjects over whom it has only the power of jurisdiction; yet it can require conditions for their validity. Thus it has declared null a temporary religious profession before the completed sixteenth year; but perpetual profession if it is made before twenty-one years, or if a profession of three years has not preceded (can. 573-574).

736. They can indirectly irritate or suspend a vow* who have power, whether dominative or of jurisdiction, over the matter of the vow (can. 1312, § 2):

1. The father can suspend the vows of minor children, as long as they remain under his power, concerning things or actions which are subject to his administration and governance.

2. Spouses mutually: namely, the husband can suspend vows of the wife prejudicial to marital right, to the education of offspring, or to domestic government; and the wife, vows of the husband adverse to her rights.

3. Religious superiors can suspend the vows of the professed and even of novices, prejudicial to their exercises and probation; whence canon 1315: "Vows emitted before religious profession are suspended, as long as the one vowing remains in religion."

4. Ecclesiastical and civil superiors can suspend vows of subjects prejudicial to their rights.

5. A master can suspend the vows of servants when they do not accord with due duties: such often are vows of making a pilgrimage, fasting, hearing Mass daily.

The superior who permitted or confirmed vows nevertheless validly irritates them directly or indirectly, because he did not abdicate his power of irritating. Likewise a vow confirmed by some superior can always be irritated by a higher superior in the same order; but a vow confirmed by a higher superior cannot be irritated by an inferior of the same order.

Irritation of a vow is its annulment or suspension made by him to whose power the will of the one vowing or the matter of the vow is subject. But it is called direct, if it falls directly upon the person or upon the will of the one vowing; indirect, if it falls only upon the matter of the vow. In the former case the vow is altogether annulled; but in the latter only its obligation is suspended.

I Say 1st. § 1. He who legitimately exercises dominative power over the will of the one vowing can validly, and from a just cause also licitly, render his vows invalid, so that in no case does the obligation afterward revive (Can. 1312). The reason is taken from the right which the superior then has of directing their will, and consequently of preventing them from taking up a new obligation. Hence particular vows of Regulars and Nuns can be irritated: 1st, by the Supreme Pontiff as supreme Prelate of all Regulars; 2nd, by superiors, even women, of the Order or house; 3rd, by the proper Bishop, if the Orders are not exempt from his jurisdiction. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 227.

I Say 2nd. § 2. He who has power not indeed over the will of the one vowing, but over the matter of the vow, can suspend the obligation of the vow as long as fulfillment of the vow brings prejudice to him (Can. 1312); because each one has a right not to be injured in things subject to his dominion. Hence:

1st. A husband can irritate the vows of a wife which prejudice conjugal right, the education of children, or the governance of the house.

2nd. A wife can irritate the vows of a husband which injure the rights of marriage, such as a vow of chastity, of a long pilgrimage, of putting on the habit of a hermit, etc.

3rd. A master can irritate or suspend the vows of servants which impede or lessen the service owed, such as a vow of hearing Mass daily. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 241 and following.

Vows emitted before religious profession are suspended as long as the one vowing has remained in religion (Can. 1315).

Question 1. Can a father directly irritate all the vows of children?

Response. Affirmatively, if the children are impubescent, as is clear from canon law, C. Puella, causa 20, q. 2, c. 2, determining natural law. Indeed not only can the vows of the impubescent be directly irritated by the father, but also, in default of the father, by the paternal grandfather, by a tutor, and, these being lacking, by the mother; indeed also, at least probably, by the mother when the father or tutor is present and yet does not contradict. - But if the children are pubescent, it will also be answered affirmatively if it is a question of vows emitted before puberty, and they still remain under paternal power. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 229, 230 and 238.

Question 2. Can a husband irritate all the vows of his wife?

Response. It is controverted; for some deny it, and say that a husband can only indirectly irritate those vows which stand in the way of his rights; but others with St. Alphonsus attribute to the husband the right also of irritating directly vows emitted during matrimony, because, as the Apostle says, Ephes. v, 22 and 23: "let women be subject to their husbands ... because the man is the head of the woman." - From this it follows that spouses who by mutual consent have emitted a vow of continence can again use matrimony, if the husband first directly irritates the vow of the wife, and she afterward, having recovered the right of petitioning what is due, indirectly irritates the vow of the husband. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 234. - Baller., note (b), p. 326.

Question 3. Can irritation be made without cause?

Response. Affirmatively, as regards validity, because an owner validly disposes of his own thing even without cause. Indeed also as regards liceity, speaking of itself, or by reason of the irritation itself; for the vows of subjects are emitted under the condition of the consent of the superior, which the superior of himself is not held to give. But by accident, or by reason of circumstances, some fault will rarely be absent, either because the act is imprudent or because the spiritual progress of the subject is irrationally impeded, etc. Yet this of itself, with an evil affection or grave harm of the subject excluded, scarcely exceeds venial sin. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 228. - Baller., note (a), p. 328.

Question 4. Can a superior irritate vows ratified by himself?

Response. Affirmatively, because he cannot take away from himself the power which he has over subjects. But on the other hand, if the superior who once irritated the vow of a subject later repents, the vow is not for that reason revalidated. The reason is that by direct irritation a vow is extinguished; but that something extinguished may revive, the repentance of the superior who irritated does not avail, but the will of the subject who again obliges himself by a vow is required. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 239. - Baller., note (b), p. 326, and note (a), p. 327.

I. Invalidation of a vow is a certain annulment of the same, made by one who possesses dominating power. For "to invalidate" ["irritare"] means the same as to dissolve, to loosen, to render void, or to reduce to nothing. Invalidation is recognized as twofold: one they call direct, the other indirect, or improper. Direct, or proper, invalidation is an act of one possessing the power by which the bond of the vow is dissolved, or the vow is rendered entirely null. It is called an act of one possessing power, because it must proceed from one who has dominion over the person of the one vowing, or over that same one vowing's will — as a father over his children, and superiors over Religious. Indirect, or improper, invalidation looks to the promised matter, which impedes its execution; and it is called a suspension of the vow, rather than its invalidation. Hence the Pontiff can invalidate, or suspend, the vows of all the faithful — since he can prohibit the matter promised by vow; and then the vow remains suspended, so long as the forbidden matter persists. The prohibition of the matter removed, however, the vow revives, and presses the one vowing to its execution. It happens otherwise in the direct invalidation of a vow, which, once made void, never revives.

II. Since our discussion concerns the invalidation of vows, or of oaths (for the same reasoning applies to both), vows must immediately be distinguished, as must oaths. For some cease only in honor of God; others also for the utility of men. Again, a like distinction must be made among the latter. For there are some vows and oaths made to men, who acquire a right to the things promised, since such vows have been accepted by those in whose favor they were made; there are others — oaths, and vows made, indeed, for the utility and advantage of others, yet in such a way that those in whose favor they were made acquire no right in those same vows: either because they were not entirely freely made, but extorted by deceit, fraud, and unjustly instilled fear, and consequently remain in the power of the one vowing or swearing, for their revocation, if justice is considered — or because, though intimated, they were in no way accepted. Concerning the validity of a promissory oath we shall dispute elsewhere. Concerning vows, then, we shall now discuss only those which are made either to God alone, or to men, without conferring any right by such vows or oaths, on those acquiring the right.

III. Question I. Is some cause required for the licit invalidation of vows? Response: It is agreed among all that no cause is required for the valid invalidation of vows. They dispute, however, whether vows can be invalidated not only validly, but also licitly, with no cause occurring. Sotus denies this (on justice and law, Bk. VII, q. 3, art. 1, near the end), Medina (Bk. I, Summa, ch. 14, §7), Aragón (II-II, q. 88, art. 8), Sayr (in Clavis Regia, Bk. VI, ch. 10, punct. 16), Corrado (Part I, q. 298), Valentia (disp. 6, q. 6), Lessius (Bk. II, on justice, ch. 40, dub. 10, n. 70), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 7, n. 18), Villalobos (Part II, tract. 34, diff. 17). As for its use, Sánchez (on the Decalogue, Bk. IV, ch. 24, n. 15), Corradus, Layman, and Villalobos. The reasons for this opinion seem sound enough. Invalidation is an act of jurisdiction; an examination, then, must precede, so that this act be judged fitting or not. For although the will of a subject is subject to the will of a superior, so that the superior may exercise dominion over it at his own whim, the subject is nonetheless not so subject that the superior may lawfully impede the good of subjects for whatever cause, and without reason. For no reason presents itself why superiors should be permitted to impede this, whenever that good is opposed neither to the best governance, nor to the common good, of the subjects. Finally, whether this power is conferred for the benefit of the one vowing, as in Prelates and parents with respect to Religious and sons; or for the advantage of the one invalidating, as in masters with respect to servants; the vow of both the one vowing and the one invalidating is deemed to redound to the benefit of both — as in a husband with respect to a wife: always, then, according to reason, the vow must be judged such that it be invalidated for no cause whatsoever.

IV. The other opinion teaches that no cause is required for the licit invalidation of a vow. This is defended by St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §6), Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 4, q. 1), Cajetan (in his Summa, s.v. "Invalidation of vows"), Ledesma (dub. 2, concl. 4), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 3), Ludovico López (Instructions, ch. 48), Navarrus (in the Manual, ch. 12, n. 73), Suárez (Part III, disp. 1, sect. 1, n. 8), Toledo (Bk. IV, ch. 18, n. 9), Azor (Vol. I, Bk. XI, ch. 17, q. 1), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 3, punct. 3, n. 31), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 17, q. 5) and, cited in his work, Paludanus, Angles, Palacios, Ovando, Vega, Vivaldus, Béja, and others. The reason is that the vows of men who are subjects are always made under the tacit condition of the superior's consent; nor is that superior bound, by any right, to grant this consent, but he can, at his own arbitrary will, suspend and consequently invalidate the vows — just as, if someone promised alms from another's goods, under this condition, that the owner should be willing to consent, the owner can, freely, without any inquiry into a cause, deny his consent.

V. Each opinion is true in its own sense. For if it is considered thus, so to speak, that universal law itself, in nature, by which everyone is bound, the second opinion is true: for civil power alone, and not a fixed, particular action, is by nature indifferent — for whatever individual action is elicited must proceed from a rational and honorable cause. If, however, it is considered individually, by reason of some end which each one sets before himself, or an evil action, the first opinion is true: since no individual action is found indifferent. Invalidating vows, then, according to the quality of the end, becomes good or bad; some end, or a good reason, must move the superior to invalidate his subjects' vows. Therefore in practice a superior can never lawfully invalidate vows without a reasonable cause.

VI. Question II. Is the faculty of invalidating vows a matter of positive or of natural law? Response: The first opinion stands for positive law. Since the solemn vows of Regulars, which constitute the religious state, are said to be indissoluble by law alone, positive law; therefore they are called indissoluble only by ecclesiastical law. This is confirmed from the fact that certain vows made by Prelates of Regulars cannot be invalidated — as is the vow of transferring to a stricter religious order: chapter "Licet," on Regulars. Therefore, that this or that vow can be invalidated, derives its origin from positive law. Finally, parents can invalidate the real and personal vows of their sons, before... they can no longer do so once the son has reached majority: since positive law so establishes. This opinion is defended by Vázquez (I-II, q. 96, disp. 165, ch. 4, n. 19), Lessius (Bk. II, on justice, ch. 40, dub. 1, n. 79), Sánchez (on the Decalogue... , ch. 24, n. 32), Castropalao (tract. 14, disp. 2, punct. 4), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 7, §2, n. 15), Lezana (s.v. Votum). Leander and the theologians of Salamanca judge it probable — namely, that parents can invalidate the real and personal vows of their children before they reach puberty; but once they have reached puberty, their personal vows can no longer be invalidated.

VII. The contrary opinion is more probable, and, to me, true. St. Thomas teaches this (II-II, q. 88, art. 8, dub. 3, ad 1), where this is said. Sotus (on justice and law, Bk. VII, q. 3, art. 1), Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 5), the theologian called Torre (II-II, q. 88, art. 8, dub. 3, §4, n. 4), Raphael de la Torre (disp. 4, n. 5), Prado (ch. 31, q. 13, n. 15), Suárez (Bk. VI, on vows, ch. 6, n. 1, and ch. 6, n. 4), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 19, n. 1), Pontius (on marriage, Bk. VII, ch. 5, n. 19), Ledesma (Vol. II, tract. 10, ch. 7, dub. 2, concl. 3), Garzias (Vol. II, tract. 10, diff. 6, dub. 7, punct. 2, n. 15), Pellizzari (tract. 3, ch. 4, n. 65), Leander (tract. 2, disp. 3, q. 21), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 3, punct. 3, n. 16). The reason on which this opinion chiefly rests is what St. Thomas gives (II-II, q. 88, art. 8, in the body): "Whoever is subject to another, in that in which he is subject, does not have the power to do what he wills, but depends on the will of another. And therefore he cannot firmly bind himself by a vow in those matters which pertain to the power of another, unless he to whose power he pertains does not object." He repeats and impresses this same doctrine in reply to the first objection: "And therefore he cannot in all things bind himself without the consent of his superior, since the notion of a vow cannot otherwise be preserved by the response, unless one who is placed under the power of another contradicts, so that, avoiding a disposition of his own, he might."

VIII. Sons naturally are in the power of their father, as regards the disposition of their status; therefore the father can revoke their vows, by force of the natural law of paternal power. Finally, in the place cited — namely, II-II, q. 189, art. 5 — he has this concerning Religious subject to the power of a Superior: "The vow is under this condition, if he to whose power he pertains does not object." Sons, then, are subject in power... to their father, as regards the disposition of their state; and superiors are subject to that of natural and divine right, in that they hold power over Religious sons — that is, over the vow of obedience. In virtue of this dominion, then, superiors of natural, divine, and ecclesiastical right can invalidate the vows of their subjects, and Religious, and parents those of their children; the reason being the fruit of the same natural and divine right. Add to this that, once such a law is posited, natural and divine right arises. The institution of this or that superior derives from human and ecclesiastical law; the natural and divine right, nonetheless, is less prescribed by the form of the law, but is acquired once made — just as the consecration of a chalice is prescribed by ecclesiastical law, but once the chalice is consecrated, reverence and homage are owed it by natural and divine right. Although, then, the solemnity of vows arises from ecclesiastical law, once the solemnity of vows has been celebrated, the Religious is subject by natural law to the will of his superior — just as, by natural law, a wife is subject to the rule of her husband, although the solemnities of matrimony proceed from ecclesiastical law. From all this, the solution to the arguments alleged in favor of the contrary opinion is established. Nor does it stand in the way that ecclesiastical law forbids superiors to exercise power over certain vows of their subjects, as is plain in the examples adduced — since, as regards such vows, subjects are not subject to the dominion of superiors: the Church, so as to remove disagreements, declares that superiors cannot invalidate such vows.

IX. Question III. To whom does the power of invalidating vows belong? Response: Superiors are of various kinds, to whom the invalidation of vows pertains. So that the question may be clearly resolved, a distinction is needed. Some superiors possess dominating power over their subjects, as parents over children, masters over servants. Others have only the power of jurisdiction, or of direction, which is also called indirect. These points established, the resolution is easy.

X. First, it is false, what Jerónimo Lamas writes — namely, that the Supreme Pontiff can, with a reasonable cause, invalidate whatever a father, a guardian, a Prelate, and a master can invalidate. This opinion is false, and is commonly rejected by all, both theologians and canonists. Since it is agreed that the Supreme Pontiff, although all the faithful, of whatever voice they may be, are subject to him as to the supreme Pastor and Head, does not have dominating power over all the faithful — that is, that they are subject to him as to a master; otherwise it would have to be said that no secular person could vow entrance into religious life, contract marriage, celebrate contracts, without the Pontiff's consent — just as servants cannot do these things without their masters' consent, nor sons without their parents' consent — which plainly departs from the truth. The Supreme Pontiffs, then, cannot directly invalidate the vows of the laity; but, a just cause occurring, they can only dispense them from their vows. The Pontiff, however, can invalidate the vows of Regulars and Nuns by a stronger and more immediate right — since he himself is the supreme and principal Prelate of all Religious. Likewise all the vows of Ecclesiastics which pertain to ecclesiastical benefices can be invalidated by the Pontiff. The vows, however, either of secular Clerics, or of laymen, he cannot directly invalidate, but only indirectly, by forbidding the matter.

XI. Bishops can invalidate the vows of Nuns subject to them — for over these they have dominating power. It must be judged otherwise concerning Nuns... indeed they cannot invalidate the vows even of their own Clerics, still less of laymen. For over these they do not exercise dominion, but only possess jurisdiction, or the power of direction.

XII. Only those, then, can directly invalidate vows who have the power called dominative over persons subject to themselves. For whoever are subject to another's dominion, either by reason of the person, or by reason of the goods which are subject to their promises, can establish nothing firm without their superiors being consulted; but a condition of the superiors' consent being obtained is included in all their promises. Wherefore the superiors of Regulars are not subject to the jurisdiction of the vows of Religious, nor can they invalidate the vows of exempt Regulars. Likewise, parents can invalidate the vows of their children, guardians the vows of their wards, curators the vows of minors, masters the vows of servants, husbands the vows of wives — since all these hold dominion over their subjects, by that power which is called dominative. From this it follows that no one can invalidate his own vows, since no one has dominion over himself.

XIII. Question IV. Is a superior bound to have specific knowledge of the vows he is to invalidate? Response: No one denies that a superior can, absolutely, invalidate the vows of his subjects, even without having a distinct knowledge of the vows. For it has been said above that no cause is required for validly invalidating vows. A fairly common opinion also maintains that a superior can invalidate not only validly, but also licitly — see what has been said above, n. 5. But although a superior can, absolutely and validly, do this, he is nonetheless always bound to act for some particular end, and prudently. In order, then, for a superior to invalidate his subjects' vows for a reason, and licitly, he ought to have knowledge of those vows. In this matter, however, scruple is to be avoided. For whatever cause is enough, in the opinion of all, for a valid and licit invalidation. We say, then, that knowledge of the vows to be invalidated is required, so that the superior may escape the mark of imprudence.

XIV. Question V. Can a superior invalidate vows, the subjects resisting? Response: The common opinion affirms this, and rightly. Since a vow made under the condition of the superior's future consent ought not to depend on the subject's will, so that the superior be bound to approve the vow according to the will of the subject. Whenever, then, it seems expedient to him, the subject dissenting, he can nonetheless invalidate the vows. Indeed, the superior can forbid subjects from making vows in the future.

I. The common notion of invalidation having been dispensed with, I approach the declaration of particular invalidations. I will dispatch everything in a few words. From what has been said, it is established that regular Prelates can invalidate the vows of their subjects. Theologians dispute, however, whether all the vows of subjects, both internal and external, are subject to the power of Prelates; and who those Prelates are who possess the faculty of invalidating vows. I therefore propose the following little questions for resolution.

II. Question I. Can internal vows of Regulars, which disturb neither the government, nor the observance of religious life, be invalidated by their Prelates? Response: Several authors deny this. Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 3, and q. 104, art. 5), Prado (ch. 31, q. 13, n. 31), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 23, n. 6), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 40, dub. 13, n. 39), Castropalao (disp. 2, punct. 5, n. 1), Armilla (s.v. Votum), Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 3, q. 3, at the end), and others. They seek to prove this opinion by the authority of St. Thomas — for he has this (II-II, q. 104, art. 5, in the body): "In those things which pertain to the interior movement of the will, man is not bound to obey man, but God alone." He impresses this same doctrine more forcefully in his reply to the second objection: "Man is subject to God simply, as regards all things, both interior and exterior; and therefore he is bound to obey him in all things. Subjects, however, are not subject to their superiors as regards all things, but only as regards certain determinate matters." From this teaching, the reason is evident which shows this opinion to be true. Since regular Prelates possess dominating power over their subjects only insofar as they regard the observance of the Rule, and the governance of the order; and if they do not fully hold dominion over them, in things to which subjects are not subject to their Prelates, they lack this power of invalidating the internal vows of Religious. It seems plain, then, that Prelates can invalidate vows in those matters which fall under their governance, but not in those which touch neither the observance of the Rule, nor the government of the religious order.

III. The other opinion maintains that Prelates of Regulars can directly invalidate all the vows of their subjects, both internal and external. This is defended by Sotus (on justice and law, Bk. VII, q. 3, art. 4, dub. 2), Suárez (Bk. VI, ch. 24, n. 40; Vol. V, on Part III, disp. 4, sect. 2, n. 8; likewise Vol. V, on Religion, Bk. III, on vows, ch. 7, n. 5 and 9; also on the religious state, Bk. VII, ch. 7, n. 8), Prado (ch. 31, q. 13, §2), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 7, §1, n. 26), Valentia (disp. 7, punct. 6, q. 5), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 17, q. 16, and n. 17), Vázquez (I-II, disp. 160, ch. 4, n. 17), Tamburini (on law, Vol. III, disp. 18, q. 4, n. 6 and 12), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 7, n. 6, concl. 1), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 24), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 4, n. 37), and many others. St. Thomas too seems to concede this same opinion (II-II, q. 88, art. 8, ad 1): "No vow of a Religious is firm, unless it is by the consent of the Prelate." This is indeed true, in this sense: that Prelates cannot either increase or diminish the vows of their subjects, nor prescribe anything beyond, or against, the Rule; nor can they in any way impose new burdens on themselves, since a subject is bound to the observance of the Rule by his solemn vow. Yet more easily can they render a subject unfit to fulfill these new burdens, which are dedicated to God, if these render him unfit to fulfill what the Rule prescribes. A Religious can elicit very many internal vows — of eliciting so many acts of divine love each day, so many of faith, and as many of hope, of reciting lengthy prayers, of genuflecting, and the like — all of which can, on account of the harm to his health, and the toll such vows may take, impede a Religious from properly discharging his Rule. Since, then, a Religious, by virtue of his profession, is subject to the power of his Prelates, being wholly dedicated to God, he is subject to them even in this — that he cannot make firm vows, unless the consent to be obtained from the Prelates is taken into account.

IV. This opinion is more probable, indeed true. From this, what the first opinion alleges for itself is resolved. For it is true, what St. Thomas teaches, that a Religious is not subject to his Prelates as regards all things. It does not follow from this, however, that he is not subject as regards the making of vows. Subjects are subject to their superiors as regards certain determinate matters, says the Angelic Doctor — that is, as regards those things which are prescribed in the Rule and the Constitutions, and which are annexed to them. The sense of all this is that a Prelate cannot compel a subject to obey him in those things which are neither prescribed in the Rule, nor conduce in any way to the observance of the Rule. Not to belabor the point: a Prelate cannot, at his own whim and pleasure, oblige subjects to carry out things that exceed the bounds of the profession made. Similarly, it is said that the Church does not have direct power over internal acts, insofar as it prescribes or forbids something purely internal. Nonetheless, it by no means follows from this that she does not have the faculty of freeing subjects from some obligation, even an internal one. This invalidation of vows is not a burden, but a liberation, which the Prelate can grant, since... it looks to the good and benefit of that same subject. And although vows may be internal, the execution of vows, even internal ones, nonetheless can bring prejudice to the exterior discipline of the subject. This is established from what we have said. Our own opinion, then, is that a Prelate can invalidate any vows whatsoever of his subjects. Before, however, they are invalidated, the subject ought to observe them, since they are valid, according to what we have taught above, ch. 1, q. 1; and only when the cause is known can the Prelate invalidate the vows.

V. Certain vows, however, are excepted, which cannot be invalidated by Prelates — such as those which constitute a state, whether simple or solemn. For this reason, vows which are made in certain Orders — such as the vow of the Minims to abstain from meat, the vow of the Mercedarians to redeem captives, the four or five vows of the Jesuits beyond the three solemn ones — are in no way subject to the invalidation of Prelates. The vow, too, of transferring to a stricter religious order is not subject to the power of superiors; indeed, not even the Supreme Pontiff can invalidate such a vow of transferring to a stricter one, as theologians commonly teach — since, as Pontiff, he has no power at all of invalidating, but only as the supreme Prelate of all Religious. But as Prelate he cannot invalidate these vows, just as other Prelates cannot. If you wish more, read Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 33, n. 13).

VI. Question II. Which Prelates of Regulars have this faculty? Response: All superiors who possess ordinary power have the power of invalidating the vows of subjects — such as Generals in the whole Order, Provincials in the whole province, and Superiors, or Priors, of particular Convents or houses, who can invalidate the vows of all subjects, even guests remaining beyond a day there.

VII. Question III. Can Legates a latere, and the Congregation of Cardinals, invalidate the vows of Religious? Response: Concerning Legates a latere, Prado affirms this (ch. 31, q. 13, §1, n. 51). Concerning the Congregation of Cardinals on the discipline of Regulars, several teach the same. But it is more probable that neither Legates a latere, nor the Congregation of Cardinals, possess this power. Since they have only the power of jurisdiction over Religious, not dominative power. And although the Supreme Pontiff could delegate this power to them, it is by no means established that it has really been delegated to them. For the rest, in these matters practice must be followed. For if the aforesaid Legates and Congregations did invalidate vows, it would have to be said that the Pontiff had delegated such power to them. It is agreed among almost all, however, that Cardinal Protectors do not have this power.

VIII. Question IV. Do Prelates, or secondary Superiors, whom they are accustomed to call Sub-priors, Vicars, Proctors, and, among Monks, Priors, possess this power of invalidating vows? Response: The common opinion teaches that, when the primary Prelates are present, these secondary Prelates enjoy no power of invalidating vows — since they are then mere coadjutors of the Prelates, and hold no dominion over the subjects. On the contrary, in the absence of the major Prelates, they succeed to their office, and become true Superiors of the subjects, who are bound, by virtue of their vow, to obey them as subjects, and to carry out their precepts. In order, however, for these secondary Superiors to enjoy this power, it is required that the primary Prelates be truly absent. For if they leave the house, to return the same day, or if they are absent for a short time within the same day, this, in common understanding, is not a true absence. Commonly, when they are absent from the Convents for one or another entire natural day, they are understood to be truly absent; and then the secondary Superiors truly possess the power dominant over the subjects, and can invalidate their vows, and impose precepts by right. All this is common ground among authors.

IX. Question V. Can Abbesses, or Prioresses of Nuns, invalidate the vows of their Nuns? Response: Some contend that they can invalidate only those vows which interfere with governance — since they possess only political and domestic power in relation to the household government; not so other vows which do not oppose the exterior government directly. The common opinion, however, defends the opposite — namely, that Abbesses and Prioresses can invalidate all those vows of their Nuns which Abbots and Priors, or Prelates in their Convents, can invalidate — because holy Nuns, no less than Religious men, vow obedience, and are bound to render it to their Abbesses and Prioresses, not only in domestic and political matters, but also, indeed chiefly, in those which concern the spiritual profession of souls. Prado (ch. 31, q. 13, §2, n. 44), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 7, n. 26), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 3), Lezana (Vol. II, s.v. Votum), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 33, n. 19), Lessius (on justice, Bk. II, ch. 40, dub. 13, n. 105), Suárez (Bk. VI, ch. 7), Candido (disp. 25, art. 3, dub. 4), Raphael de la Torre (II-II, q. 88, art. 9, disp. 1, n. 6), Ascanio Tamburini (on law, Bk. III, disp. 32, q. 6), Pellizzari (Vol. II, tract. 10, ch. 7), Garzias (Vol. II, tract. 10, diff. 6, dub. 3, punct. 1, n. 10), Tamburini (on the Decalogue, Bk. III, ch. 16, §3, n. 31), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 3, n. 12), and others.

X. Question VI. Can Prelates of Regulars invalidate the vows of Novices? Response: All commonly deny this. Novices, before they make profession, are their own masters, and neither the Prelates, nor their Masters who most directly bear their charge, hold any dominating power over them. They can, however, impede personal vows which interfere with the exercises and governance of the Novitiate; nor are Novices bound to fulfill such vows. Prelates, or Masters, can also suspend, by right, those vows which excessively burden Novices, for the time of the Novitiate. If, however, Novices, having left religious life, return to the world, the vows revive, and they are bound to fulfill them. Real vows which neither impede the administration, or governance, of the religious order, nor greatly burden the Novices — such as vows to disburse alms, and to dispose of their own goods — Prelates have no faculty either to invalidate or to suspend, or to impede.

[continuing] These vows, however, whether real or personal, can be commuted by the Prelates into other pious burdens. And this commutation would cease, if the Novice should leave the religious order — since the commutation made is deemed to be only for the time of the Novitiate. All this is common ground. As for dispensation, however, it is agreed among theologians that the faculty of dispensing from such vows of Novices belongs to the Prelates, since they possess ecclesiastical jurisdiction over them.

I. Authors commonly dispute at what time the infancy of children begins. Some contend that it takes its beginning from the very animation of the fetus, and lasts until the seventh year — which they prove by the authority of Luke 1: "For behold, as soon as the voice of thy salutation sounded in my ears, the infant in my womb leaped for joy." And in this the physicians seem to agree — Hippocrates, Galen, Celsus, and Zacchia, whom Narbona reports (Vol. VII, q. 1, n. 1). Others commonly maintain that the beginnings of infancy, taken in its proper sense, is birth. This disagreement is of no importance. That a fetus, animated by a soul, existing in the womb, can be called an infant, just as the Evangelist Luke himself calls it such, there is no room to doubt. For the rest, according to common usage, infancy takes its beginning from birth, and ends at the completed seventh year — for the seventh year does not include the preceding birth-day. The age of wardship, or non-puberty, begins at the seventh year, and ends, in females, at the completion of the twelfth year, and in males, likewise, at the completion of the fourteenth. Puberty of females begins at the twelfth year, and of males at the fourteenth, and, according to common law, ends both for men and for women at the completed twenty-fifth year. Within this interval, from the twelfth and fourteenth years up to the twenty-fifth, both women and men are called pubescent, and minors — just as, from birth to the seventh year, they are infants, and from the seventh year to the fourteenth, they are wards, or non-pubescent. Wherefore the office of a guardian, who is assigned to a ward, or non-pubescent, on account of the father's absence, ceases with the age of wardship, or non-puberty; just as the ministry of a curator, who is likewise appointed for a minor on account of the father's absence, ceases, the age of puberty, or minority, having elapsed, at the twenty-fifth year — although it not infrequently happens that, as has already been said, pubescent persons, or minors, are withdrawn from the power of a curator before the space prefixed by common law, by the Prince's favor. Much else would need to be said here concerning paternal power, and its effects; but you will find all this discussed in its proper place. I have wished only to touch upon those points here whose knowledge is necessary for grasping what we are about to say.

II. Question I. Can parents invalidate the vows of non-pubescent children? Response: Some contend that vows made before the time of puberty are invalid; for which opinion Sylvester is cited (s.v. Religio, 2, q. 15, and s.v. Baptismus, q. 3), where he indicates only that children can vow near puberty. The common, and true, opinion, however, teaches that vows made around the use of reason, which is commonly held to be the seventh year, are valid — for just as, once the light of reason shines forth, non-pubescent children can sin, so too can they vow. St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 9) teaches that a father can invalidate all the vows of his children, whether real, personal, or mixed, and even the vow of religious life itself, saying this: "It must be said that if a boy or girl, before the years of puberty, does not yet have the use of reason, he can in no way bind himself by a vow to anything. If, however, before the years of puberty, he attains the use of reason, he can indeed (so far as it is in him) bind himself; but his vow can be invalidated by his parents, to whose care he remains subject." Angelicus speaks indiscriminately of all vows. There is no reason, then, why we should draw a distinction; since a stronger reason cannot be assigned for one vow over another. Indeed, it is worth adding... , that it seems fitting that such a feeble age, in all vows of the greatest weight, should be directed by another's will, and be subject to another's power. And although the light of reason may, in some children, shine forth abundantly before the years of puberty, this is nonetheless too rare an occurrence, and for the most part the opposite happens. But those things which commonly occur are to be attended to. St. Thomas's opinion is supported by Cajetan (there, and in his Summa, s.v. Votum), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 18, n. 5), Suárez (Bk. VI, ch. 3, n. 6 and 7), Prado (ch. 31, q. 23, n. 61), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 40, dub. 2, n. 18), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 7, §2, n. 18), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 35, n. 2), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 7, n. 10), Tamburini (on the Decalogue, Bk. III, ch. 16, §3, n. 8), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 16, q. 32), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 5, n. 45), and others commonly.

III. Question II. Can parents invalidate the personal vows of their children who have attained puberty, even though these vows may exist under their father's power? Response: Although both boys and girls, even after reaching puberty, remain under paternal power, the personal vows nonetheless which they make in that state of puberty cannot be invalidated by their parents, as regards those things which pertain to their own person — say, that he binds himself to religious life by a vow, or that he contracts marriage; but they can be invalidated insofar as they concern domestic dispensation, provided they do not disturb domestic governance. So St. Thomas says (II-II, q. 88, art. 8, ad 2): "From the time a man comes to the years of puberty, if he is of free condition, he is master of his own person, as regards those things which pertain to his own person; but he is not master as regards domestic dispensation... Whence, concerning this he cannot do anything ratified, without the father's consent." St. Thomas's opinion is subscribed to by Prado (ch. 31, q. 23, n. 45), Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 2, q. 6), Torre (II-II, q. 88, art. 8, dub. 4, qc. 6), Suárez (disp. 4, q. 6), Raphael de la Torre (n. 3), Valentia (disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 5, §2), Sayr (Bk. VI, ch. 5, n. 6), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 5, n. 4), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 16, q. 81), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 5, n. 46), and others commonly. Both parts of the question are established: namely, that a father cannot invalidate personal vows which do not interfere with domestic governance, but can, at his own will, break those which impede domestic government. This is established from the full and perfect use of reason as regards all those matters which properly look to the direction of the person. Vows, then, are ratified and firm which sons make in this state, when they are elicited by the full and perfect use of reason on the part of these sons. This is the one and only reason which entirely ceases, the state of non-puberty having elapsed, and the state of puberty arriving; for the state of puberty by its own nature constitutes the youth in possession of liberty, insofar as they concern the person only. The vows of non-pubescent children are subject to invalidation, then, precisely for this reason: that they lack full deliberation regarding matters affecting only their own person. This is the first part. The other part is no less manifest. For vows which disturb domestic governance ought to be submitted to paternal power under the condition of the father's future consent; since what is harmful to another (for vows disturbing domestic administration are of this kind) cannot stand without the father consenting, since he suffers damage. A father cannot, then, invalidate vows of chastity, of religious life, and of that state, once entered upon — vows of fasts, of prayers, and other such things which pubescent sons make, provided they are not so immoderate as to be contrary to domestic administration. Vows, however, of pilgrimage, of prayers, and of fasts, which would be contrary to paternal care, can be invalidated by the father.

IV. Vows made by sons in ward-status, or when non-pubescent, if they are confirmed by the sons themselves at puberty, are held ratified and firm, and are subject to no invalidation whatsoever — provided they are personal, and bring no harm to the father's power. In order for a vow to be said to be confirmed, however, it is not enough that the one vowing merely preserve it; but it is necessary that he ratify it with a new and explicit deliberation, so that he vow it anew, and add, as it were, force to the prior vow by a second act of vowing.

V. Question III. Can the vows of non-pubescent children, once confirmed by the father, subsequently be invalidated by the father? Response: Leander affirms this as more probable (tract. 1, disp. 16, q. 78), alleging for this opinion Sánchez, Fagundez, and Tamburini; nor does he produce any other reason, except that it is more probable that the father's confirmation does not stand in the way of his afterward being able to invalidate the confirmed vows — which reason, as is said, begs the question. He does, however, attempt to strengthen it by the parallel of Prelates of Regulars, who can always invalidate the vows of subjects which they have confirmed.

VI. The contrary opinion seems to me more probable, and it is defended by Suárez (Bk. VI, on...), Marcus of the office... (ch. 15 and 16), Sayr (in Clavis Regia, Bk. VI, ch. 5, n. 8), Roderiguez a Sacerdote (Vol. I, Bk. III, ch. 18), Filliucci (tract. 26, ch. 4, n. 133). That this is validly established is proven thus. Conditional vows, once the condition has been fulfilled, are ratified and firm. The vows which non-pubescent children make are conditional — namely, that the father consent. Since, then, once the father's consent has been obtained, the condition is fulfilled, they have full validity. Would not other conditioned promises of children, once the father's consent is added, become ratified? Why not, then, vows made to God as well? Whence is it held that a father can retract his given consent? In no contract, in no promise, does it happen that one who has given his consent freely, and as master, can, at his own pleasure, revoke it. The parallel of Prelates of Regulars does not conclude the matter — both because it is brought into dispute among theologians whether a Prelate, who has once confirmed a subject's vow, can invalidate it; and because the state is entirely different. A regular Prelate cannot confirm the vows of his subjects in perpetuity — since subjects are immediately under the power and dominion of the religious order, whose minister the Prelate is, not perpetually, but for a determined time. Wherefore he cannot deprive himself of the power of directing the subject for the advantage and benefit of the religious order. He can grant all that conduces to the common good of the religious order, but not what in some way harms the dominion of the religious order. Not to belabor the point: a Prelate is not an absolute master; and therefore he cannot give an absolute consent which he cannot retract. A father, by contrast, compared to his son, is an absolute master, and can give absolute consent; and what he has once granted, he cannot rescind. If a sufficient cause presses, the vow can be commuted, or dispensed by one having the authority.

VII. Vows made by illegitimate and bastard children can be invalidated by their father, unless they are placed under a guardian or curator — since, although the father does not have civil power over them, he is nonetheless bound by natural law to look after such feeble-aged children, lest they be burdened beyond what is just by the weight of vows. And in this the Doctors agree.

VIII. Question IV. Are the real vows of pubescent children subject to paternal invalidation? Response: St. Thomas affirms this (II-II, q. 88, art. 8, ad 1): "The notion of a vow cannot altogether be preserved, when one constituted under another's power vows that which is under another's power, unless he to whose power it pertains does not object." So long as sons are not of major age, or within the time of puberty, they are subject to paternal administration, and can dispose of paternal goods by no right. Null, then, are their real vows, by which temporal goods are promised by vow, the parents' consent not being obtained. The same must be said of mixed vows, as regards that part which is real.

IX. Question V. Can a father invalidate the real vows of children which concern goods of a military nature? Response: Military property, or quasi-military property, as will be said in its own place, is under the dominion of the sons. Law "A son of the family," on gifts. Vows, then, concerning these goods can in no way be invalidated by the father, since they are not goods subject to the father's dominion.

X. Question VI. Is the same to be said of vows made concerning acquired goods? Response: When the acquired goods are under the dominion of the children, as they are... constituted, so that they, though pubescent, have not only dominion, but also administration, then the father cannot invalidate the vows of his children concerning such goods — since such vows bring no harm to paternal governance, being concerning goods altogether withdrawn from his dominion and administration. On the contrary, if the father had administration of these goods, then vows made concerning these goods by the son could be invalidated by the father, on account of the impediment to right administration.

XI. If a minor son had made a vow of going to Rome to obtain absolution from excommunication, the father could not invalidate it, unless there existed some privilege granted to Religious, by virtue of which absolution could be obtained without such journeys. The same is said of vows to go in aid of the Holy Land. This, however, must be understood as applying when pubescent sons could fulfill the vows at their own expense; for the father is not bound to contribute his own goods, by which such vows might be fulfilled. As for vows made by children after they have been freed from paternal power, and as to the time at which they are freed from paternal power, nothing needs to be said at present — since it is beyond dispute that vows made by sons withdrawn from paternal power cannot be invalidated by the father. That sons are not subject to their parents after the completed twenty-fifth year, as regards the eliciting of vows and the entering of several other contracts alike, is certain. Difficulties which can arise concerning the time when paternal power is dissolved will be untangled in their proper place.

XII. Question VII. Can guardians and curators invalidate the vows of non-pubescent and minor children directly? Response: Before I answer this little question, I preface that there is a difference between a guardian and a curator. A guardian is first appointed for the governing of the person, and then, secondarily, for the administration of goods; a curator, by contrast, is first put in charge of the administration of goods. A guardian is appointed for wards, or non-pubescent children, up to puberty, upon whose arrival his office ceases; a curator's status is afterward granted to minors up to the twenty-fifth year, at which point, according to common law, the time prefixed for such office elapses — although sometimes, by the Prince's privilege, this time ceases earlier.

XIII. We say, then, that both guardians and curators can invalidate the vows of non-pubescent and minor children, in the same manner that parents can rescind the vows of their children. For a guardian of non-pubescent children, or wards, whether male or female, is reckoned as it were a father, having care not only of their persons but of their goods. He can, therefore, invalidate both the personal and the real vows of the same. A curator can invalidate all vows of minors which interfere with his administration; but those which in no way harm his governance remain firm, and are not subject to invalidation by him. All this is understood even if the vows had been confirmed by an oath. After the completed twenty-fifth year, curators have no power at all over the vows of minors, since minors are no longer such. If there are several curators of pubescent children, or several guardians of non-pubescent ones, each can invalidate the vows of subjects within the defined span of time. All this is common ground.

XIV. Vows made by a ward, or non-pubescent child, not confirmed after puberty is attained, even if they are personal, can a curator invalidate? Response: He can — since, although a curator is deputed primarily for the administration of goods, nonetheless the governance and direction of the person pertains to him secondarily. So think Sánchez, Trullench, Tamburini, Bassaeus, Leander. The opposite is taught by Suárez (Bk. VI, ch. 6, n. 24), on the grounds that a curator does not succeed in the father's place, and is given not for the person, but for goods. There is no need to spend more time in a longer discussion of this matter. To me, however, Suárez's opinion seems more probable.

XV. Question VIII. Can a curator given to a spendthrift on account of his fault invalidate that same man's real vows? Response: The common opinion affirms this — since all administration forbidden to a major is subject to the curator's dominion: therefore, whatever real vows the spendthrift makes, though ratified by vow, can be invalidated by the curator.

XVI. Question IX. Does a mother have the power of invalidating the vows of her sons, or daughters? Response: While the father is living, and present, the mother lacks the power of invalidating the vows of her sons and daughters. This is drawn, first, from Scripture itself; for in Numbers 30, the privilege of invalidating vows is attributed solely to paternal power, or to the father alone, with no mention made of the mother — though in fact there it is a matter of daughters, not sons, that is mentioned. The reason is that the father alone is head of the family. This is the more common opinion, defended by Navarrus (in the Manual, ch. 12, n. 64), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 17, q. 3), Suárez (Bk. VI, ch. 6, n. 19), Sylvester and Paludanus there, Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 40, dub. 10, n. 78), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 35, n. 58), Tamburini (Bk. III, ch. 16, §3, n. 21), Trullench (Bk. II, on the Decalogue, ch. 2, dub. 36, n. 2), Castropalao (disp. 1, on vows, punct. 7, n. 7), Raphael de la Torre (II-II, q. 88, art. 9, disp. 4, n. 8), Sayr (Bk. VI, Clavis Regia, ch. 10), Bassaeus (Vol. II, s.v. Votum, 2, n. 10), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 16, q. 118).

Having treated of the obligation of votes, we must now treat of their dissolution.

IN THREE ways votes are dissolved extrinsically: by Irritation, Dispensation, and Commutation; for when the obligation ceases from a change of the matter, or from the cessation of the cause, or of the condition, it of itself fails and perishes, as can sufficiently be gathered from what has been said.

They DIFFER, however, because by dispensation and by irritation the obligation of a vote is extinguished; but by commutation it is not extinguished, but transferred to another matter substituted in place of the former, which, if it be an alms, is called the redemption of the vote, which they enumerate as an essential species of commutation.

IRRITATION, moreover, is twofold: one, direct and proper, by which a vote is extinguished outright; the other improper, which is called the suspension of a vote by the prohibition of the matter, the bond of the vote remaining unimpaired.

This IRRITATION differs from the other, in that proper irritation belongs to dominative power alone, such as the Priors of Religious orders have over their religious; a father over his sons; a husband over his wife; a master over his slaves, as D. Bonav. teaches in corpore, and after him commonly, as Sanchez has it l. 4. cap. 24. But the improper and indirect belongs by reason of any subjection whatever, whether temporal or spiritual, as Suarez has it Tom. 2. de relig. Tract. de Voto, lib. 6. cap. 1. num. 6.

The QUESTION, however, is: whether this power is so absolute as to require no cause for annulling.

The FIRST opinion is, that no cause is required. So the twenty-seven Doctors in Sanchez, lib. 4. cap. 24. Tannetus subscribes, disp. 5. quaest. 4. 20. et 21.

The SECOND opinion is, that a cause is required when they have the power of annulling ordered to the good of the one vowing, which the Priors of religious orders possess; but not when it is granted for the good of the one annulling alone. So Suarez Tom. 2. de relig. tract. de Voto, lib. 6. cap. 1.

The THIRD opinion is, that to annul without cause is always a venial sin. So Sanchez l. 4. cap. 24. num. 15. adducing nine Doctors of the same sense.

There are Soto lib. 7. de iustitia, quaest. 3. art. 1. Medina l. 1. summa, cap. 14. §. 7. Aragonii 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 8. Sayri lib. 6. cap. 10. Leonard. l. 1. de Iust. cap. 40. dub. 10. num. 70. Mantelis on the Bull of the Crusade, §. 9. num. 104. Conrad. in resp. p. 1. quaest. 298. Valentiz 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 6. p. 6. Abul. cap. 30. Numer. quaest. 43. Sanchez loco citato.

I ASSERT with this opinion that votes are not annulled without cause without venial sin.

It is PROVED by the reason of D. Bonav. dist. 19. dub. 6. in 4. as regards dispensations, as I said in prima secunda Tract. 4. who is on the Laws disp. 5. quaest. 14. — because to remove anyone from the worship of God without cause is insolent, and an abuse of power. Sanchez uses this reason num. 15. who says it is a venial sin, which very many think even of the one requesting an annulment without cause. See Sanchez num. 4. But if leave to vow was previously given, and the vote is annulled without cause, Suarez l. 6. de voto, cap. 4. near the end says it is rarely mortal, unless contempt or scandal intervene: Soto approves, l. 7. quaest. 3. art. 1. Rosella verbo votum, num. 2. Yet Sanchez l. 4. cap. 32. says it is mortal, of which at quaest. 13.

The PRINCIPAL question, however, is: whether it ought to be dominative; and whether spiritual Jurisdiction suffices for directly annulling votes; for if this sufficed, the Pope could then annul everywhere the votes of all.

I SUPPOSE, moreover, from what was said in prima secunda, Tract. 4. which is on the laws disp. 6. quaest. 1. that the Pope has no civil dominative power over all Christians.

SOME assert that the Pope can annul the votes of all absolutely, because they say all votes contain impliedly this condition: if it please the Pope, who is the supreme Pastor, to whom our spiritual governance belongs, under which votes are included. The same concerning Bishops in their Diocese is gathered ex cap. quemadmodum, v. Conditio de iureiurando. Moreover, he to whom the greater is licit is licit also for the lesser, Regula, cui licet 53. de regulis iuris, in 6. — and the Pope can dispense, which is greater than to annul, since that is of spiritual power, which excels dominative power: Therefore. This Medina maintains, de sacrorum hominum continentia, lib. 5. cap. 44. Lilius methodo curationis, 3. part. cap. 44. §. 51. and Lessius grants some probability to this opinion lib. 2. de Iust. cap. 40. dub. 10. num. 86. S. Bonavent. reports it, in 4. dist. 38. art. 2. quaest. 3.

The OPPOSITE opinion, however, is common after D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 12. and of nineteen other Doctors whom Sanchez reports and follows, lib. 4. cap. 24. num. 18. And from these many bring the same argument concerning the votes of secular clerics, which do not pertain to Ecclesiastical matters. Add Bassaeus 5. To this the Sainted Doctor seems to incline art. 1. quaest. 3.

I ASSERT that the Pope cannot annul the votes of all the faithful.

It is PROVED by D. Bonavent. art. 1. quaest. 3. For this there is necessary a dominative power, such as that of a master over slaves, of a spouse over a spouse, of a father over sons, of a prior of religious over subjects, which the Pope has not with respect to all, as the Sainted Doctor there supposes; therefore he omitted it.

This is the common reason which Sanchez uses, num. 18. That civil dominative power is not universal I showed in the Tract. de legibus.

From this reason many infer that the Pope can annul the votes of religious, because he has dominative power over them. So D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 186. art. 5. ad 2. — which is truer of the Order of Friars Minor, because St. Francis cap. 1. Regulae promises filial obedience in a special manner with his sons to the Apostolic See, as D. Bonavent. notes in expositione illius capituli. See the Doctors in Sanchez num. 20. Suarez lib. 6. cap. 2. Bassaeo V. Votum 5. num. 2.

To the opposite D. Bonavent. answers that the things which are for the service of God are not so bound to the will of the Pontiff that they cannot be rendered without him.

To the other it is answered that it is understood of oaths, not of votes; because the reason is not the same, since for these dominative power is required; hence he can dispense, not annul, nor does that proposition, He who can do the greater, etc., hold in things of different kinds, as D. Bonavent. says, whose sign is this (he says) that man can generate man, not an ass.

There is, however, a controversy: Whether this dominative power, insofar as it is extended to the annulling of votes, is of natural law, or of human law.

The FIRST opinion is that it is of Ecclesiastical law. So Lessius lib. 2. de Iust. cap. 40. dub. 10. num. 74. Vasquez prima secundae, disp. 165. cap. 4. num. 29.

The SECOND SECOND opinion is that it is of Ecclesiastical law together with natural law. So Sanchez in the place cited, num 32.

The THIRD opinion is that it is of natural law. It seems to be that of D. Bonau. art. 1. quaest. 3. cited in 4. dist. 38. There follow Sotus l. 7. de iustitia, quaest. 3. art. 1. Aragon. 2. 1. quaest. 88. art. 8. Ouandus 4. dist. 38. disp. unica, prop. 22. Sayrus in Claui regia, l. 6. cap. 10. Azor. T. 1. l. 11. cap. 17. Petrus Ledesma 2. Tomo, Tract. 10. cap. 7. dub. 2. Suarez Tom. 2. de relig. Tract. de voto, l. 6. cap. 6. speaking of those under age, and of religious l. 6. cap. 7. The same Salas holds p. 2. quaest. 21. tract. 8. disp. unica, sect. 25. num. 262. speaking of parental power.

Thus, speaking of the Priors of religious orders, they bring forward Vega 2. Tomo summae, cap. 120. casu 88. Conradus in suis resp. 1. p. quaest. 297. Manuel 2. Tomo summae, cap. 89 et 99. regul. tom. 1. quaest. 25. art. 5. Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 8. dub. 5. — yet Suarez and Ledesma confess that human law also concurs, prescribing a time for boys.

I ASSERT with this opinion that the dominative power of annulling votes is of natural law.

It is PROVED by D. Bonau., first foundation, as regards the wife from cap. 30. Numer. where it is said that the votes of a wife depend on the will of the husband; but this is not merely positive: Therefore. The minor is proved first, because it would have ceased with the other merely positive precepts of the Mosaic law: therefore it is an explication of the natural law. And so all the Fathers gather from that passage this subjection of the woman toward the husband with respect to votes. The same S. August. l. 4. in qq. Numer. quaest. 59. gathers; by which he proved his own opinion, S. Bonav. dist. 32. dubio 3. littera.

It is PROVED secondly by a most valid argument of S. Bonau. loc. cit. in corpore, which the others use. That which compels when every positive law is set aside is from natural Divine law: But the dominative power of annulling the votes of a wife compels when any human positive law whatsoever is set aside: Therefore. The minor is proved, because the wife subjects herself by natural law, and is subjected, that she may be governed by her very husband. For she has not power of her own body, as the Apostle says, first Corinthians 7. and Genesis 2.

HENCE falls the refuge of Sanchez, that this subjection induces only the improper irritation, insofar as it impedes: For marriage is a perpetual bond.

It is PROVED thirdly as regards those under age by D. Bonau., foundation 1. and in corpore, from the nature of a child, who on account of the weakness of his judgment is under the power of parents and under tutors, as a part of them, indeed even as nothing different from a slave, as we have in Galatians 4. and this nature itself teaches.

Sanchez answers, num 31. that this subjection does not impede other promises, graver and irrevocable, unless injury is proved; since yet in votes there is present the remedy of dispensation; but promises made by those under age cannot be annulled by parents, as is clear of betrothals. Secondly, a minor contracting with a man is bound, which obligation cannot be annulled by the father, and a son of a family of age is bound to a man naturally and civilly independently of the father. All which things are done by reason of the disposition of the civil law, so statuting.

MOREOVER because natural subjection grants only the improper irritation of suspension, and this when the execution of the votes impedes that subjection, as num. 28. has it.

FINALLY, whenever human law determines an indefinite obligation of natural law, it is said to bind absolutely by human law, as is clear in the precept of annual confession, and of keeping someone's feast; for that determination is like a form specifying that precept.

But these things are frivolous: And first indeed betrothals are permitted in such a way that they do not pass to the effect of matrimony except after puberty. And then indeed there is a mature judgment for this, nor in these things is he subject to parents, for it is said in Genesis 2. Therefore shall a man leave father, etc. — but subjection impedes in those things which are repugnant to that subjection, or to a part of it, as D. Bonan. and others note.

To that about the minor and the orphan it is answered that the assumption is false, otherwise the laws would be inequitable which protect the orphan, lest he pay that debt.

Sanchez answers, lib. 6. de matrimonio, disp. 38. num. 36. that the laws are not inequitable, but that that law protects him so that it may be lawful for him to elude that natural debt, using against it the privilege of restitution.

BUT I do not see by what reasoning, wrapped in these words, he dissolves the argument; for it is an inequitable privilege that exempts from a restitution naturally owed.

But as to what he adds, that natural subjection grants only the improper irritation, not the proper one: I answer, already at num. 4. I asserted that dominative power is the foundation of the power of annulling votes; but this power in the father is natural toward the son.