Chapter III — On the invalidation of vows, and on those who possess the faculty of invalidating them

I. Invalidation of a vow is a certain annulment of the same, made by one who possesses dominating power. For "to invalidate" ["irritare"] means the same as to dissolve, to loosen, to render void, or to reduce to nothing. Invalidation is recognized as twofold: one they call direct, the other indirect, or improper. Direct, or proper, invalidation is an act of one possessing the power by which the bond of the vow is dissolved, or the vow is rendered entirely null. It is called an act of one possessing power, because it must proceed from one who has dominion over the person of the one vowing, or over that same one vowing's will — as a father over his children, and superiors over Religious. Indirect, or improper, invalidation looks to the promised matter, which impedes its execution; and it is called a suspension of the vow, rather than its invalidation. Hence the Pontiff can invalidate, or suspend, the vows of all the faithful — since he can prohibit the matter promised by vow; and then the vow remains suspended, so long as the forbidden matter persists. The prohibition of the matter removed, however, the vow revives, and presses the one vowing to its execution. It happens otherwise in the direct invalidation of a vow, which, once made void, never revives.

II. Since our discussion concerns the invalidation of vows, or of oaths (for the same reasoning applies to both), vows must immediately be distinguished, as must oaths. For some cease only in honor of God; others also for the utility of men. Again, a like distinction must be made among the latter. For there are some vows and oaths made to men, who acquire a right to the things promised, since such vows have been accepted by those in whose favor they were made; there are others — oaths, and vows made, indeed, for the utility and advantage of others, yet in such a way that those in whose favor they were made acquire no right in those same vows: either because they were not entirely freely made, but extorted by deceit, fraud, and unjustly instilled fear, and consequently remain in the power of the one vowing or swearing, for their revocation, if justice is considered — or because, though intimated, they were in no way accepted. Concerning the validity of a promissory oath we shall dispute elsewhere. Concerning vows, then, we shall now discuss only those which are made either to God alone, or to men, without conferring any right by such vows or oaths, on those acquiring the right.

III. Question I. Is some cause required for the licit invalidation of vows? Response: It is agreed among all that no cause is required for the valid invalidation of vows. They dispute, however, whether vows can be invalidated not only validly, but also licitly, with no cause occurring. Sotus denies this (on justice and law, Bk. VII, q. 3, art. 1, near the end), Medina (Bk. I, Summa, ch. 14, §7), Aragón (II-II, q. 88, art. 8), Sayr (in Clavis Regia, Bk. VI, ch. 10, punct. 16), Corrado (Part I, q. 298), Valentia (disp. 6, q. 6), Lessius (Bk. II, on justice, ch. 40, dub. 10, n. 70), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 7, n. 18), Villalobos (Part II, tract. 34, diff. 17). As for its use, Sánchez (on the Decalogue, Bk. IV, ch. 24, n. 15), Corradus, Layman, and Villalobos. The reasons for this opinion seem sound enough. Invalidation is an act of jurisdiction; an examination, then, must precede, so that this act be judged fitting or not. For although the will of a subject is subject to the will of a superior, so that the superior may exercise dominion over it at his own whim, the subject is nonetheless not so subject that the superior may lawfully impede the good of subjects for whatever cause, and without reason. For no reason presents itself why superiors should be permitted to impede this, whenever that good is opposed neither to the best governance, nor to the common good, of the subjects. Finally, whether this power is conferred for the benefit of the one vowing, as in Prelates and parents with respect to Religious and sons; or for the advantage of the one invalidating, as in masters with respect to servants; the vow of both the one vowing and the one invalidating is deemed to redound to the benefit of both — as in a husband with respect to a wife: always, then, according to reason, the vow must be judged such that it be invalidated for no cause whatsoever.

IV. The other opinion teaches that no cause is required for the licit invalidation of a vow. This is defended by St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §6), Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 4, q. 1), Cajetan (in his Summa, s.v. "Invalidation of vows"), Ledesma (dub. 2, concl. 4), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 3), Ludovico López (Instructions, ch. 48), Navarrus (in the Manual, ch. 12, n. 73), Suárez (Part III, disp. 1, sect. 1, n. 8), Toledo (Bk. IV, ch. 18, n. 9), Azor (Vol. I, Bk. XI, ch. 17, q. 1), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 3, punct. 3, n. 31), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 17, q. 5) and, cited in his work, Paludanus, Angles, Palacios, Ovando, Vega, Vivaldus, Béja, and others. The reason is that the vows of men who are subjects are always made under the tacit condition of the superior's consent; nor is that superior bound, by any right, to grant this consent, but he can, at his own arbitrary will, suspend and consequently invalidate the vows — just as, if someone promised alms from another's goods, under this condition, that the owner should be willing to consent, the owner can, freely, without any inquiry into a cause, deny his consent.

V. Each opinion is true in its own sense. For if it is considered thus, so to speak, that universal law itself, in nature, by which everyone is bound, the second opinion is true: for civil power alone, and not a fixed, particular action, is by nature indifferent — for whatever individual action is elicited must proceed from a rational and honorable cause. If, however, it is considered individually, by reason of some end which each one sets before himself, or an evil action, the first opinion is true: since no individual action is found indifferent. Invalidating vows, then, according to the quality of the end, becomes good or bad; some end, or a good reason, must move the superior to invalidate his subjects' vows. Therefore in practice a superior can never lawfully invalidate vows without a reasonable cause.

VI. Question II. Is the faculty of invalidating vows a matter of positive or of natural law? Response: The first opinion stands for positive law. Since the solemn vows of Regulars, which constitute the religious state, are said to be indissoluble by law alone, positive law; therefore they are called indissoluble only by ecclesiastical law. This is confirmed from the fact that certain vows made by Prelates of Regulars cannot be invalidated — as is the vow of transferring to a stricter religious order: chapter "Licet," on Regulars. Therefore, that this or that vow can be invalidated, derives its origin from positive law. Finally, parents can invalidate the real and personal vows of their sons, before... they can no longer do so once the son has reached majority: since positive law so establishes. This opinion is defended by Vázquez (I-II, q. 96, disp. 165, ch. 4, n. 19), Lessius (Bk. II, on justice, ch. 40, dub. 1, n. 79), Sánchez (on the Decalogue... , ch. 24, n. 32), Castropalao (tract. 14, disp. 2, punct. 4), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 7, §2, n. 15), Lezana (s.v. Votum). Leander and the theologians of Salamanca judge it probable — namely, that parents can invalidate the real and personal vows of their children before they reach puberty; but once they have reached puberty, their personal vows can no longer be invalidated.

VII. The contrary opinion is more probable, and, to me, true. St. Thomas teaches this (II-II, q. 88, art. 8, dub. 3, ad 1), where this is said. Sotus (on justice and law, Bk. VII, q. 3, art. 1), Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 5), the theologian called Torre (II-II, q. 88, art. 8, dub. 3, §4, n. 4), Raphael de la Torre (disp. 4, n. 5), Prado (ch. 31, q. 13, n. 15), Suárez (Bk. VI, on vows, ch. 6, n. 1, and ch. 6, n. 4), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 19, n. 1), Pontius (on marriage, Bk. VII, ch. 5, n. 19), Ledesma (Vol. II, tract. 10, ch. 7, dub. 2, concl. 3), Garzias (Vol. II, tract. 10, diff. 6, dub. 7, punct. 2, n. 15), Pellizzari (tract. 3, ch. 4, n. 65), Leander (tract. 2, disp. 3, q. 21), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 3, punct. 3, n. 16). The reason on which this opinion chiefly rests is what St. Thomas gives (II-II, q. 88, art. 8, in the body): "Whoever is subject to another, in that in which he is subject, does not have the power to do what he wills, but depends on the will of another. And therefore he cannot firmly bind himself by a vow in those matters which pertain to the power of another, unless he to whose power he pertains does not object." He repeats and impresses this same doctrine in reply to the first objection: "And therefore he cannot in all things bind himself without the consent of his superior, since the notion of a vow cannot otherwise be preserved by the response, unless one who is placed under the power of another contradicts, so that, avoiding a disposition of his own, he might."

VIII. Sons naturally are in the power of their father, as regards the disposition of their status; therefore the father can revoke their vows, by force of the natural law of paternal power. Finally, in the place cited — namely, II-II, q. 189, art. 5 — he has this concerning Religious subject to the power of a Superior: "The vow is under this condition, if he to whose power he pertains does not object." Sons, then, are subject in power... to their father, as regards the disposition of their state; and superiors are subject to that of natural and divine right, in that they hold power over Religious sons — that is, over the vow of obedience. In virtue of this dominion, then, superiors of natural, divine, and ecclesiastical right can invalidate the vows of their subjects, and Religious, and parents those of their children; the reason being the fruit of the same natural and divine right. Add to this that, once such a law is posited, natural and divine right arises. The institution of this or that superior derives from human and ecclesiastical law; the natural and divine right, nonetheless, is less prescribed by the form of the law, but is acquired once made — just as the consecration of a chalice is prescribed by ecclesiastical law, but once the chalice is consecrated, reverence and homage are owed it by natural and divine right. Although, then, the solemnity of vows arises from ecclesiastical law, once the solemnity of vows has been celebrated, the Religious is subject by natural law to the will of his superior — just as, by natural law, a wife is subject to the rule of her husband, although the solemnities of matrimony proceed from ecclesiastical law. From all this, the solution to the arguments alleged in favor of the contrary opinion is established. Nor does it stand in the way that ecclesiastical law forbids superiors to exercise power over certain vows of their subjects, as is plain in the examples adduced — since, as regards such vows, subjects are not subject to the dominion of superiors: the Church, so as to remove disagreements, declares that superiors cannot invalidate such vows.

IX. Question III. To whom does the power of invalidating vows belong? Response: Superiors are of various kinds, to whom the invalidation of vows pertains. So that the question may be clearly resolved, a distinction is needed. Some superiors possess dominating power over their subjects, as parents over children, masters over servants. Others have only the power of jurisdiction, or of direction, which is also called indirect. These points established, the resolution is easy.

X. First, it is false, what Jerónimo Lamas writes — namely, that the Supreme Pontiff can, with a reasonable cause, invalidate whatever a father, a guardian, a Prelate, and a master can invalidate. This opinion is false, and is commonly rejected by all, both theologians and canonists. Since it is agreed that the Supreme Pontiff, although all the faithful, of whatever voice they may be, are subject to him as to the supreme Pastor and Head, does not have dominating power over all the faithful — that is, that they are subject to him as to a master; otherwise it would have to be said that no secular person could vow entrance into religious life, contract marriage, celebrate contracts, without the Pontiff's consent — just as servants cannot do these things without their masters' consent, nor sons without their parents' consent — which plainly departs from the truth. The Supreme Pontiffs, then, cannot directly invalidate the vows of the laity; but, a just cause occurring, they can only dispense them from their vows. The Pontiff, however, can invalidate the vows of Regulars and Nuns by a stronger and more immediate right — since he himself is the supreme and principal Prelate of all Religious. Likewise all the vows of Ecclesiastics which pertain to ecclesiastical benefices can be invalidated by the Pontiff. The vows, however, either of secular Clerics, or of laymen, he cannot directly invalidate, but only indirectly, by forbidding the matter.

XI. Bishops can invalidate the vows of Nuns subject to them — for over these they have dominating power. It must be judged otherwise concerning Nuns... indeed they cannot invalidate the vows even of their own Clerics, still less of laymen. For over these they do not exercise dominion, but only possess jurisdiction, or the power of direction.

XII. Only those, then, can directly invalidate vows who have the power called dominative over persons subject to themselves. For whoever are subject to another's dominion, either by reason of the person, or by reason of the goods which are subject to their promises, can establish nothing firm without their superiors being consulted; but a condition of the superiors' consent being obtained is included in all their promises. Wherefore the superiors of Regulars are not subject to the jurisdiction of the vows of Religious, nor can they invalidate the vows of exempt Regulars. Likewise, parents can invalidate the vows of their children, guardians the vows of their wards, curators the vows of minors, masters the vows of servants, husbands the vows of wives — since all these hold dominion over their subjects, by that power which is called dominative. From this it follows that no one can invalidate his own vows, since no one has dominion over himself.

XIII. Question IV. Is a superior bound to have specific knowledge of the vows he is to invalidate? Response: No one denies that a superior can, absolutely, invalidate the vows of his subjects, even without having a distinct knowledge of the vows. For it has been said above that no cause is required for validly invalidating vows. A fairly common opinion also maintains that a superior can invalidate not only validly, but also licitly — see what has been said above, n. 5. But although a superior can, absolutely and validly, do this, he is nonetheless always bound to act for some particular end, and prudently. In order, then, for a superior to invalidate his subjects' vows for a reason, and licitly, he ought to have knowledge of those vows. In this matter, however, scruple is to be avoided. For whatever cause is enough, in the opinion of all, for a valid and licit invalidation. We say, then, that knowledge of the vows to be invalidated is required, so that the superior may escape the mark of imprudence.

XIV. Question V. Can a superior invalidate vows, the subjects resisting? Response: The common opinion affirms this, and rightly. Since a vow made under the condition of the superior's future consent ought not to depend on the subject's will, so that the superior be bound to approve the vow according to the will of the subject. Whenever, then, it seems expedient to him, the subject dissenting, he can nonetheless invalidate the vows. Indeed, the superior can forbid subjects from making vows in the future.