Section — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)
§ I. On the Irritation of Vows
Definition. Irritation of a vow is its annulment or suspension made by him to whose power the will of the one vowing, or the matter of the vow, is subject.
Division. It is 1. direct, if it falls directly upon the person or upon the will of the one vowing; 2. indirect, if it falls only upon the matter of the vow 1.
1 In this latter case you have a mere suspension of the vow, but in the former an annihilation of the vow.
- Principles. I. Every superior endowed with dominative power over the will of another, such as a religious superior by force of the vow of obedience, can directly irritate all the vows of subjects; and once irritated, they never revive. Therefore the vows of inferiors whose will, by force of their state, is perfectly subject to the superior, always involve this tacit condition: unless the superior has resisted.
Hence the particular vows of religious men and nuns can be irritated: 1. by the Supreme Pontiff as supreme prelate of all religious; 2. by the superiors of the order or house 2; 3. by the proper bishop, if the orders are not exempt from his jurisdiction. - St. Alphonsus, n. 227.
2 Suarez proves (De Relig., tr. 6, lib. 6, c. 7, n. 10) that abbesses too are included in this reckoning, namely by force of the obedience by which nuns are subjected to them from vow.
Besides, all the doctors here except the vow of passing to a stricter religion, which they deny can be irritated by a religious prelate, from c. Licet 18, De Regularibus. Indeed St. Alphonsus judges (lib. 3, n. 233) that such a vow cannot be irritated even by the Supreme Pontiff himself, insofar as he is supreme prelate of a religious order, although not only the Pope, but also the regular prelate, can dispense from it.
** Here the doctors ask whether the superior can irritate vows if it is doubtful whether the subject emitted them before profession or after. St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 237) embraces the negative opinion against Suarez, Sanchez, Bonacina, etc., who hold the affirmative. And indeed the question can seem useless, since by force of profession prior vows are extinguished by the fact itself, as is said in c. Scripturae 4, De Voto: "He is not held guilty of a broken vow who is known to commute temporary service into the perpetual observance of religion." But the question is in reality not useless, because someone can fall away from the religious state, and therefore prior vows can revive. And certainly in the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus it is provided that if a scholastic is dismissed, and therefore by authority of the General Provost the simple vows by which he had bound himself in religion are removed, it is at the same time declared to him that thence the obligations of vows revive, if he had any when he entered religion or emitted the vows of religion. What, then, to the proposed question? Resp. Since Suarez, Sanchez, and others anticipated the reason alleged by St. Alphonsus for the opposite opinion and sufficiently solved it, their opinion seems able to be safely held.
II. Every superior or master can indirectly irritate all vows of subjects in those things in which his power is harmed; because each one has the right not to be harmed in matters subject to his dominion. But these vows revive when they can be fulfilled without prejudice to another. - See Cases, n. 328.
Hence 1. A husband can irritate the vows of his wife which prejudice conjugal right, the education of children, or the governance of the house.
- A wife can irritate the vows of her husband which harm the rights of marriage, such as a vow of chastity, of a long pilgrimage, of putting on the habit of a hermit, etc.
- A master can irritate or suspend the vows of servants which impede or lessen the service owed, such as a vow of hearing Mass daily. - St. Alphonsus, n. 241 and following.
III. All the vows of those before puberty, even of chastity and religion, can be directly irritated by paternal power. This is clear from canon law, c. Puella, caus. 20, qu. 2, c. 2 3.
3 Nevertheless the faculty of directly irritating the vows of those over whose will someone has dominative power is to be derived not from positive law alone, but also from natural law, as St. Alphonsus observes (lib. 3, n. 227). See on these matters Suarez (De Relig., tr. 6, lib. 6, c. 6-7), where with regard to the vows of children he observes that it is owed to positive law that this paternal power extends itself to all and only the vows emitted before puberty.
Hence the vows of those before puberty can be directly irritated by the father, and in defect of the father, by the paternal grandfather, by the tutor, and, when these are lacking, by the mother, and probably even when the father 4 or tutor is present. - St. Alphonsus, n. 229, 230. - See Cases, n. 330.
4 Nevertheless St. Alphonsus limits this, that the father can irritate the vows of children when the mother contradicts; but the mother cannot do so in the same way when the father contradicts.
The same faculty, where others are lacking, is customarily attributed to a master with a disciple, and to a master with a small servant. See Suarez, De Relig., tr. 6, lib. 6, c. 6, n. 23.
- Questions. Q. 1. Whether a husband can irritate all the vows of his wife?
Resp. It is disputed. Some deny it, and say that the husband can only indirectly irritate those vows which stand in the way of his rights. For as to other matters the wife is not subject. - Thus Voit, n. 600; Laymann, etc. - Better, however, others with St. Thomas 5 and St. Alphonsus, n. 234, attribute to the husband the right of irritating also directly the vows emitted while the marriage stands.
5 St. Thomas (2. 2, q. 88, art. 8 ad 3): "No vow of a religious is firm except by consent of the prelate, just as neither is the vow of a girl existing in the house, unless it is by consent of the father, nor of a wife, unless it is by consent of the husband."
Q. 2. Whether a father can directly irritate the vows of pubescent children emitted before puberty?
Resp. It is affirmed, provided the children, after reaching puberty, have not confirmed them; indeed probably even if they have ratified them, not knowing that they were irritatable. - St. Alphonsus, n. 238, with others 6.
6 This question must be extended more broadly to any vows emitted at the time of subjection, whatever finally may be the reason of the subjection. To solve it, a twofold general rule proposed by Sanchez is useful (In Decal., lib. 4, c. 30, n. 7-8). The former is: When the power of the superior during whose time the vow was emitted is not wholly extinguished or wholly suspended, but remains with respect to some things, he can irritate a vow emitted during the time of his subjection, even if that time has now passed, provided that, when it had passed, it was not again confirmed; understand, confirmed with knowledge of the infirmity of the vow emitted during the time of subjection, as the author also indicates. The latter rule is: When that power of the superior is wholly extinguished or wholly suspended, he cannot irritate those vows. Many questions solved by the help of both rules can be seen in the same Sanchez, both in the cited chapter and in De Matrimonio, lib. 9, disp. 41, n. 3.
Q. 3. Whether irritation can be made without cause?
Resp. It is affirmed as to validity, because a master validly disposes of his own thing; but denied as to lawfulness, because the spiritual progress of the subject is irrationally impeded, etc. Yet this commonly 7 does not exceed venial sin. - St. Alphonsus and others commonly.
7 It is said commonly: 1. because he would sin gravely who irritated vows either from an evil intention or with grave harm to the subject, as Suarez notes (De Relig., tr. 6, lib. 6, c. 1, n. 10); thus, for example, if a father did this from hatred or envy of the spiritual progress of his children, or from contempt of religion; 2. because, as St. Alphonsus says (lib. 3, n. 228), speaking of itself, it is truer that there is no sin, "because the vows of subjects are emitted under the condition of the consent of superiors; whence obedience suffices as a cause... I said, speaking of itself; because from elsewhere it will be difficult to excuse from venial sin, either because one performs an idle act, or because he irrationally impedes the progress of another... Any reasonable cause suffices to excuse from venial sin."
On this matter Suarez says well (l.c.): "It must be considered whether the power of irritating has been given for the good of the one vowing, as to a religious prelate; or for the convenience of the one irritating, as to a master with respect to a servant; or with a view to both, as to a father with respect to a son. If the first, for the irritation to be made lawfully, it is necessary that it be judged useful either to the one vowing, or to religion, or that, with all things weighed, greater service of God be judged... If the second, there will be no sin in doing it with a view to one's own convenience, because the master uses a thing wholly his own... and it is only necessary that an honorable end be present, and moreover that it not be done against charity, which is owed even to a servant... If the third, say the same as in the second, except that by a greater obligation the father is bound to consult the good of the children, or the husband that of the wife, so that he uses his power well."
Q. 4. Whether a superior can irritate vows ratified by himself?
Resp. It is affirmed, because he cannot take away from himself the power which he has over subjects. - St. Alphonsus, n. 239 8. - See Cases, n. 326 and following to 334.
8 Therefore he irritates vows of this sort not only validly, but also lawfully, if some reasonable cause is present. On this matter Suarez warns (De Relig., tr. 6, lib. 6, c. 7, n. 16) that a lesser cause suffices for irritating than for dispensing. Hence from the opinion of all he infers that a subject who asks from his prelate the irritation of a vow, when he does not have a cause which suffices for a just dispensation, does not sin, because, he says, he uses his own right. Likewise, because the vow was not absolute but conditioned, and by it he did not obligate himself to take care that the condition not be impeded, or not to take precaution so that it would not be placed, as is clear from the common mode of vowing... Likewise it is not a sin to show oneself inclined to irritation, because this is neither against the vow nor against another precept... Finally, he who feels the burdens of religion can without sin enjoy its advantages. Therefore he who has subjected himself to the power of the superior, so that he may receive burdens from him, does not sin by procuring, through lawful means, some relief through the same power. Therefore just as the prelate does not sin by irritating, so neither does the subject by asking.
But if no reasonable cause is present, it is the common opinion that the subject is not without sin. But more probably the fault must be held light (see St. Alphonsus, lib. 5, n. 239), and inspect the reasons in Suarez, l.c., c. 4, n. 22, where he treats of a husband irritating the vows of his wife.
But from the principles laid down beforehand, namely: 1. concerning the power of the husband directly to irritate the vows of the wife; 2. concerning the power of the wife indirectly to irritate the vows of the husband; 3. concerning the power of irritating vows even approved or ratified by oneself, it is easily concluded that spouses can mutually irritate even a vow of continence emitted by mutual consent. For 1. nothing forbids the wife from asking from the husband the irritation of the vow emitted by herself, and the husband furnishing this; 2. likewise nothing prohibits the wife, once released from the vow, from indirectly irritating the vow of the husband; 3. finally nothing prevents both, released from the vow, from mutually restoring to themselves again the right to the other's body which they had mutually yielded by agreement. And from this it is clear why St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 239) said that he did not find a certain reason why he should condemn this opinion, although he adhered to the opposite as more common. But since most of these authors came into that opinion led by principles which not even St. Alphonsus admits, it is clear that this external authority cannot stand in the way of someone's safely following the preceding opinion.
On the contrary, as Busembaum rightly has, he who once irritated a vow, if afterward he is unwilling, the vow is not for that reason revalidated. See Sa (v. Irritatio voti) 9. - But the reason is that by irritation the vow is extinguished. But for the extinguished vow to revive, the repentance of the superior who irritated it contributes nothing; rather, there is required the will of the subject, who again obliges himself by vow.
9 ** In the text of Busembaum in St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 236), it is not read, "See Sa," but, "as Sa wills"; this insinuates that Emmanuel Sa thought with those few whom the Salamancans, alleged by St. Alphonsus, say stand against the doctrine set forth in the text. But the matter does not stand thus. For Sa (l.c., n. 4) teaches thus: "One irritating a vow, if afterward he consents, does not thereby revalidate it." And again (n. 3): "The vow of one before puberty about doing something in the time of liberty, once irritated, does not revive."
St. Alphonsus subjoins to the words of Busembaum (l.c.): "Thus the Salamancans, c. 3, n. 70, with Soto, etc., against some." But the Salamancans have something entirely singular in this place. "We establish this assertion," they say, "against some who, with respect to this, place a distinction between vows which are irritated by a father or prelate, and those which are irritated by a husband with respect to a wife, or by a master with respect to a servant." Now the doctrine concerning the power of a master with respect to a servant, as the Salamancans hand it down (ibid., n. 62), as though he can directly irritate the vows of a pubescent servant, no one has admitted up to now. Wherefore they wrongly (ibid., n. 70) allege for themselves Sanchez and others, who teach this not concerning the vows of a servant, but certainly of a wife.