Question XIII: What the power of annulling vows is, and what kind

Having treated of the obligation of votes, we must now treat of their dissolution.

IN THREE ways votes are dissolved extrinsically: by Irritation, Dispensation, and Commutation; for when the obligation ceases from a change of the matter, or from the cessation of the cause, or of the condition, it of itself fails and perishes, as can sufficiently be gathered from what has been said.

They DIFFER, however, because by dispensation and by irritation the obligation of a vote is extinguished; but by commutation it is not extinguished, but transferred to another matter substituted in place of the former, which, if it be an alms, is called the redemption of the vote, which they enumerate as an essential species of commutation.

IRRITATION, moreover, is twofold: one, direct and proper, by which a vote is extinguished outright; the other improper, which is called the suspension of a vote by the prohibition of the matter, the bond of the vote remaining unimpaired.

This IRRITATION differs from the other, in that proper irritation belongs to dominative power alone, such as the Priors of Religious orders have over their religious; a father over his sons; a husband over his wife; a master over his slaves, as D. Bonav. teaches in corpore, and after him commonly, as Sanchez has it l. 4. cap. 24. But the improper and indirect belongs by reason of any subjection whatever, whether temporal or spiritual, as Suarez has it Tom. 2. de relig. Tract. de Voto, lib. 6. cap. 1. num. 6.

The QUESTION, however, is: whether this power is so absolute as to require no cause for annulling.

The FIRST opinion is, that no cause is required. So the twenty-seven Doctors in Sanchez, lib. 4. cap. 24. Tannetus subscribes, disp. 5. quaest. 4. 20. et 21.

The SECOND opinion is, that a cause is required when they have the power of annulling ordered to the good of the one vowing, which the Priors of religious orders possess; but not when it is granted for the good of the one annulling alone. So Suarez Tom. 2. de relig. tract. de Voto, lib. 6. cap. 1.

The THIRD opinion is, that to annul without cause is always a venial sin. So Sanchez l. 4. cap. 24. num. 15. adducing nine Doctors of the same sense.

There are Soto lib. 7. de iustitia, quaest. 3. art. 1. Medina l. 1. summa, cap. 14. §. 7. Aragonii 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 8. Sayri lib. 6. cap. 10. Leonard. l. 1. de Iust. cap. 40. dub. 10. num. 70. Mantelis on the Bull of the Crusade, §. 9. num. 104. Conrad. in resp. p. 1. quaest. 298. Valentiz 2. 2. disp. 6. quaest. 6. p. 6. Abul. cap. 30. Numer. quaest. 43. Sanchez loco citato.

I ASSERT with this opinion that votes are not annulled without cause without venial sin.

It is PROVED by the reason of D. Bonav. dist. 19. dub. 6. in 4. as regards dispensations, as I said in prima secunda Tract. 4. who is on the Laws disp. 5. quaest. 14. — because to remove anyone from the worship of God without cause is insolent, and an abuse of power. Sanchez uses this reason num. 15. who says it is a venial sin, which very many think even of the one requesting an annulment without cause. See Sanchez num. 4. But if leave to vow was previously given, and the vote is annulled without cause, Suarez l. 6. de voto, cap. 4. near the end says it is rarely mortal, unless contempt or scandal intervene: Soto approves, l. 7. quaest. 3. art. 1. Rosella verbo votum, num. 2. Yet Sanchez l. 4. cap. 32. says it is mortal, of which at quaest. 13.

The PRINCIPAL question, however, is: whether it ought to be dominative; and whether spiritual Jurisdiction suffices for directly annulling votes; for if this sufficed, the Pope could then annul everywhere the votes of all.

I SUPPOSE, moreover, from what was said in prima secunda, Tract. 4. which is on the laws disp. 6. quaest. 1. that the Pope has no civil dominative power over all Christians.

SOME assert that the Pope can annul the votes of all absolutely, because they say all votes contain impliedly this condition: if it please the Pope, who is the supreme Pastor, to whom our spiritual governance belongs, under which votes are included. The same concerning Bishops in their Diocese is gathered ex cap. quemadmodum, v. Conditio de iureiurando. Moreover, he to whom the greater is licit is licit also for the lesser, Regula, cui licet 53. de regulis iuris, in 6. — and the Pope can dispense, which is greater than to annul, since that is of spiritual power, which excels dominative power: Therefore. This Medina maintains, de sacrorum hominum continentia, lib. 5. cap. 44. Lilius methodo curationis, 3. part. cap. 44. §. 51. and Lessius grants some probability to this opinion lib. 2. de Iust. cap. 40. dub. 10. num. 86. S. Bonavent. reports it, in 4. dist. 38. art. 2. quaest. 3.

The OPPOSITE opinion, however, is common after D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 12. and of nineteen other Doctors whom Sanchez reports and follows, lib. 4. cap. 24. num. 18. And from these many bring the same argument concerning the votes of secular clerics, which do not pertain to Ecclesiastical matters. Add Bassaeus 5. To this the Sainted Doctor seems to incline art. 1. quaest. 3.

I ASSERT that the Pope cannot annul the votes of all the faithful.

It is PROVED by D. Bonavent. art. 1. quaest. 3. For this there is necessary a dominative power, such as that of a master over slaves, of a spouse over a spouse, of a father over sons, of a prior of religious over subjects, which the Pope has not with respect to all, as the Sainted Doctor there supposes; therefore he omitted it.

This is the common reason which Sanchez uses, num. 18. That civil dominative power is not universal I showed in the Tract. de legibus.

From this reason many infer that the Pope can annul the votes of religious, because he has dominative power over them. So D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 186. art. 5. ad 2. — which is truer of the Order of Friars Minor, because St. Francis cap. 1. Regulae promises filial obedience in a special manner with his sons to the Apostolic See, as D. Bonavent. notes in expositione illius capituli. See the Doctors in Sanchez num. 20. Suarez lib. 6. cap. 2. Bassaeo V. Votum 5. num. 2.

To the opposite D. Bonavent. answers that the things which are for the service of God are not so bound to the will of the Pontiff that they cannot be rendered without him.

To the other it is answered that it is understood of oaths, not of votes; because the reason is not the same, since for these dominative power is required; hence he can dispense, not annul, nor does that proposition, He who can do the greater, etc., hold in things of different kinds, as D. Bonavent. says, whose sign is this (he says) that man can generate man, not an ass.

There is, however, a controversy: Whether this dominative power, insofar as it is extended to the annulling of votes, is of natural law, or of human law.

The FIRST opinion is that it is of Ecclesiastical law. So Lessius lib. 2. de Iust. cap. 40. dub. 10. num. 74. Vasquez prima secundae, disp. 165. cap. 4. num. 29.

The SECOND SECOND opinion is that it is of Ecclesiastical law together with natural law. So Sanchez in the place cited, num 32.

The THIRD opinion is that it is of natural law. It seems to be that of D. Bonau. art. 1. quaest. 3. cited in 4. dist. 38. There follow Sotus l. 7. de iustitia, quaest. 3. art. 1. Aragon. 2. 1. quaest. 88. art. 8. Ouandus 4. dist. 38. disp. unica, prop. 22. Sayrus in Claui regia, l. 6. cap. 10. Azor. T. 1. l. 11. cap. 17. Petrus Ledesma 2. Tomo, Tract. 10. cap. 7. dub. 2. Suarez Tom. 2. de relig. Tract. de voto, l. 6. cap. 6. speaking of those under age, and of religious l. 6. cap. 7. The same Salas holds p. 2. quaest. 21. tract. 8. disp. unica, sect. 25. num. 262. speaking of parental power.

Thus, speaking of the Priors of religious orders, they bring forward Vega 2. Tomo summae, cap. 120. casu 88. Conradus in suis resp. 1. p. quaest. 297. Manuel 2. Tomo summae, cap. 89 et 99. regul. tom. 1. quaest. 25. art. 5. Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 88. art. 8. dub. 5. — yet Suarez and Ledesma confess that human law also concurs, prescribing a time for boys.

I ASSERT with this opinion that the dominative power of annulling votes is of natural law.

It is PROVED by D. Bonau., first foundation, as regards the wife from cap. 30. Numer. where it is said that the votes of a wife depend on the will of the husband; but this is not merely positive: Therefore. The minor is proved first, because it would have ceased with the other merely positive precepts of the Mosaic law: therefore it is an explication of the natural law. And so all the Fathers gather from that passage this subjection of the woman toward the husband with respect to votes. The same S. August. l. 4. in qq. Numer. quaest. 59. gathers; by which he proved his own opinion, S. Bonav. dist. 32. dubio 3. littera.

It is PROVED secondly by a most valid argument of S. Bonau. loc. cit. in corpore, which the others use. That which compels when every positive law is set aside is from natural Divine law: But the dominative power of annulling the votes of a wife compels when any human positive law whatsoever is set aside: Therefore. The minor is proved, because the wife subjects herself by natural law, and is subjected, that she may be governed by her very husband. For she has not power of her own body, as the Apostle says, first Corinthians 7. and Genesis 2.

HENCE falls the refuge of Sanchez, that this subjection induces only the improper irritation, insofar as it impedes: For marriage is a perpetual bond.

It is PROVED thirdly as regards those under age by D. Bonau., foundation 1. and in corpore, from the nature of a child, who on account of the weakness of his judgment is under the power of parents and under tutors, as a part of them, indeed even as nothing different from a slave, as we have in Galatians 4. and this nature itself teaches.

Sanchez answers, num 31. that this subjection does not impede other promises, graver and irrevocable, unless injury is proved; since yet in votes there is present the remedy of dispensation; but promises made by those under age cannot be annulled by parents, as is clear of betrothals. Secondly, a minor contracting with a man is bound, which obligation cannot be annulled by the father, and a son of a family of age is bound to a man naturally and civilly independently of the father. All which things are done by reason of the disposition of the civil law, so statuting.

MOREOVER because natural subjection grants only the improper irritation of suspension, and this when the execution of the votes impedes that subjection, as num. 28. has it.

FINALLY, whenever human law determines an indefinite obligation of natural law, it is said to bind absolutely by human law, as is clear in the precept of annual confession, and of keeping someone's feast; for that determination is like a form specifying that precept.

But these things are frivolous: And first indeed betrothals are permitted in such a way that they do not pass to the effect of matrimony except after puberty. And then indeed there is a mature judgment for this, nor in these things is he subject to parents, for it is said in Genesis 2. Therefore shall a man leave father, etc. — but subjection impedes in those things which are repugnant to that subjection, or to a part of it, as D. Bonan. and others note.

To that about the minor and the orphan it is answered that the assumption is false, otherwise the laws would be inequitable which protect the orphan, lest he pay that debt.

Sanchez answers, lib. 6. de matrimonio, disp. 38. num. 36. that the laws are not inequitable, but that that law protects him so that it may be lawful for him to elude that natural debt, using against it the privilege of restitution.

BUT I do not see by what reasoning, wrapped in these words, he dissolves the argument; for it is an inequitable privilege that exempts from a restitution naturally owed.

But as to what he adds, that natural subjection grants only the improper irritation, not the proper one: I answer, already at num. 4. I asserted that dominative power is the foundation of the power of annulling votes; but this power in the father is natural toward the son.

But as to what he adds about indeterminate precepts, it is false; and, that we may use the example of confession, if it were determined essentially to human law, we would no longer be bound to confess sins merely internal: therefore when something essential is determined, for instance the matter, or the form, then it is drawn to human being, not when it is determined as to things entirely extrinsic, for instance time, etc. Thus therefore, although liberty is by natural law the natural foundation of such dependence on the father; yet the time is determined by human law, not indeed that some time naturally subjected be eluded, but that it be declared at what time the son is apt of himself to vow naturally. And so the law only declares the natural law, which, since it varies with the stage of a man's age, has much of doubt in it, as Sanchez num. 29. Suarez, and Ledefma well note, cited above. Nor was this to be left to manifest arbitrariness.

It is PROVED fourthly by D. Bonau. loc. cit. and the last foundation, as regards slaves, because that which arises from natural dominion is natural; but this power arises from a dominion which is natural over a slave, as Sanchez himself concedes: Therefore. I know that the law of nations intervened in captivity; but servitude in this state is natural, as I said in Tract. 3. de Legibus, Disput. de Iure gentium, prima secunda.

Sanchez answers before num. 32. that by that subjection only the improper power of irritation in Dominion is induced, for suspending votes, insofar as they do harm. The same he says of wives, and of sons.

BUT concerning wives the answer is surely absurd, because since the bond is perpetual, nothing other than proper irritation is required. It is similar concerning sons; but slaves, as long as they are slaves, have the same perpetual obligation as regards the things of their servitude. For we do not wish that by servitude all spiritual goods are impeded, as S. Bonau. notes loc. cit. but those things which clash with the state of servitude, and are not indispensable to salvation.

AS REGARDS Religious it is proved by D. Bonau., foundation 3. in corpore. By the voluntary promise of obedience they are so subjected to the prior that with respect to the disposition of their own will they are as minors under a tutor. Therefore c. si religiosus, de electione in 6. religious are said not to have a WILL of their own or a NILL, and thus the custom of all religious orders has interpreted this subordination of the religious to the prior.

Sanchez answers that that solemn obligation of one's own will is of Ecclesiastical law, and by that law alone does he render such obedience invalid, which is done; and this appears in simple votes, which by Ecclesiastical determination obtain the power of annulling, as in the Society of Jesus. He urges: because that subjection argues only the power of an imperfect irritation. He adds that religious do not subject their will in all things.

But even grant that the solemnity of the vote, that it may constitute religion as such, requires Ecclesiastical law; yet the obligation of the will, made in the service of God to that man, by natural Divine law binds as regards the promises, except in those things which are repugnant to that subjection; but the promise is in all things which are within religion, as D. Bonavent. notes in corpore, nor therefore does he wish the power of annulling to be extended beyond the dominative power, which is in the prior for governing all things; though it is not to be commanded, ex Sanchez. See the end of quaest. 19. And the valid promise of a religious from the nature of the thing binds naturally by the force of fidelity; otherwise the votes would revive, which Sanchez lib. 4. sap. 26. num. 4. does not concede, and it is against the practice of the whole Church, and cap. 29. num. 29. from the nature of dominion he gathers the power of annulling directly in the rule given cap. 26. num. 4.