Section 2. On the Irritation of Vow

228. Declarations. 1. Irritation is defined as the annulment or suspension of a vow made by him who has power either over the will of the one vowing or over the matter of the vow. The power of irritating is exercised immediately either upon the act of vowing or upon the matter of the vow.

He who is subject to the power of another cannot make a firm vow. His vow is indeed valid, yet it always includes this tacit condition: unless the superior contradicts; therefore his vow is called infirm or irritatable. But if the superior afterward actually irritates the vow, its obligation ceases by that very fact.

2. A twofold irritation is distinguished, direct and indirect. Direct and properly so called is the annulment of a vow made by him who has power over the will of the one vowing; this irritation touches the act itself and dissolves it in such a way that it never revives. Indirect and improperly so called is the suspension of a vow made by him who has power only over the matter of the vow; this irritation touches the thing promised, whose offering is impeded; therefore it only suspends the obligation of the vow, which revives again as soon as the matter promised is withdrawn from the power of the one irritating.

For the irritation of a vow, the power of jurisdiction is not required, but dominative power. Now dominative power is twofold: one over the person of the one vowing, by which the will of the one vowing is so subordinated to another that without his consent he cannot undertake any firm obligation; the other over the things and actions of the one vowing, by which it happens that the thing promised can be withdrawn from the power of the one vowing, and in this way not indeed the vow can be annulled, but the execution of the vow can be impeded.¹

3. For validly irritating vows, whether directly or indirectly, no cause is required: for the vows of subjects always involve this condition: unless the superior contradicts. Nor for licitly irritating vows is a cause required of itself: for anyone can use his own right; nevertheless, in the concrete, irritation which is made without any cause will be a venial sin, as an idle and irrational action. But any reasonable cause is sufficient so that the superior can licitly irritate vows and the subject can seek irritation.

¹ Cf. De principiis^9, n. 105.

229. Who can directly irritate vows. He who has dominative power over the will of another can directly irritate all this person's vows.

Not just any dominative power suffices for directly irritating vows, but only that from which the will of the subject, even in spiritual matters, is so dependent that he cannot firmly and absolutely obligate himself (to God).

1. A regular prelate (from the immediate superior: prior, guardian, rector, up to the supreme superior) can directly irritate all private vows of religious made after profession; the same is true of superioresses of nuns with respect to their subjects: for through the vow of obedience a religious fully subjects his will to his superior.

a. The power which a regular prelate enjoys is had also by the supreme pontiff, not insofar as he possesses supreme jurisdiction in the Church, but insofar as he is the supreme prelate of all religious orders.

b. They ask whether this power is of natural law or of ecclesiastical law, and they answer in diverse ways. It seems it must be said that religious profession with the promise of obedience is of ecclesiastical law; but once subjection toward the superior has been made through the vow of obedience, the power of irritating vows arises by natural law.

c. A regular prelate can irritate all private vows of religious made after profession, whether solemn or simple, even merely internal vows, indeed even concerning a thing otherwise commanded; but the substantial vows of religion and those which in some orders are annexed to them cannot be irritated. From private vows only the vow of passing to a stricter religion is excepted,¹ which not even the supreme pontiff can irritate. But not only the pope, but also the regular prelate, can dispense in this vow.

d. There are those who deny that a regular prelate can irritate the vows of those who have made only simple profession. There are two kinds of simply professed: some belong to an order in which solemn profession is made, but before profession a three-year period of simple vows is premised; others belong to an institute in which only simple vows (whether perpetual or temporary) are made. Those who think that the vows of those who have nothing except simple profession cannot be irritated seem to be of this opinion, that there is an internal essential distinction between solemn and simple vows; but since the offering made to God and to the prelate is essentially the same both of him who makes simple profession and of him who makes solemn profession, and the irritability of vows depends upon this offering, there is no reason why the power of irritating the vows of those who have made simple profession should be denied to the regular superior.

e. The power of irritating the vows of their subjects must also be conceded to superioresses of nuns: for on the one hand nuns promise obedience also to their superioresses, on which the power of irritating depends; on the other hand, no jurisdiction is required for irritation.²

f. The vows of novices can be irritated by a regular prelate only indirectly, because the power of directly irritating is founded upon religious profession. Wherefore those vows of novices cannot be irritated whose execution does not impede the exercises of probation. Vows made by regulars before profession are extinguished by religious profession, or rather are commuted into it.

¹ C. Licet 18, De regularibus (III. 31).

² Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 674.

230. 2. A father can directly irritate all vows of children made before puberty.

a. This power is derived from the law of nature: for natural reason demands that the impubescent, because of immaturity of judgment and inconstancy of will, be ruled by the will of another, even if they have already arrived at the use of reason. Now this power is perfected by positive law as to the determination of time, namely up to puberty, which is established by ecclesiastical law alone.¹

b. This power belongs to the father and to all to whom paternal power belongs by law, namely to the tutor and, when he is lacking, to the paternal grandfather. There are those who, when the father or tutor is absent or does not contradict, rightly attribute the same power also to the mother.

c. All vows of children made before puberty can be irritated; also vows otherwise reserved and promised in favor of a third party, likewise vows of impubescent persons concerning things to be furnished only after puberty; finally, even vows confirmed after puberty, unless afterward they were confirmed by a new vow independent of the former vow. But vows of children made after puberty can be irritated only indirectly.

¹ Cf. Puella 2, c. 20, q. 2.

231. 3. Whether a husband can directly irritate vows of his wife made after marriage is very controversial; the opinion of those who hold that the husband cannot directly irritate the vows of his wife, whether made before or after marriage, seems to be preferred.

Those who hold the affirmative opinion use: a. a positive argument from Num. 30:2-17, where the law concerning irritation of vows is had, and Eph. 5:24; b. an internal argument: it greatly contributes to the peace of the family, to restraining the impulse of women, and to succoring the weakness of their judgment, if the will of wives depends fully and in all things upon the man.¹

But those who follow the negative opinion say: a. This power does not arise from the law of nature: for the things which the adversaries exaggerate concerning weakness of judgment and levity of feminine character do not show that so perfect a subjection of the wife is necessary, since it is not necessary in a pubescent daughter. b. It does not arise from positive law: for the cited texts of sacred Scripture have another explanation; namely, the texts of the Old Testament are to be understood of a special law long since abrogated; but the text of the New Testament of subjection in all things which pertain to the right governance of the household.² c. The subjection of the wife toward the husband arises from the matrimonial contract, wherefore it does not extend beyond the rights of marriage, by which the woman is subject to the man in the use of marriage, in the society of life, in the education of offspring, and in the governance of the family.

¹ Summa, II-II, q. 88, a. 8, ad 3.

² Cf. Kirchberg, l. c., n. 123 ff.

232. Who can indirectly irritate vows. Every superior who has power over the matter of a vow can indirectly irritate those vows of his subjects which injure his rights: for by the law of nature a promise cannot be made which yields to the damage and prejudice of another. And vows indeed can be irritated by a superior even when he himself gave license of vowing or approved the vow, provided he did not expressly intend to yield his own right. Therefore:

1. A husband can irritate those vows of his wife, even if made before marriage, which injure his rights over the body of his wife, over cohabitation, over the governance of the family, over the administration of goods, for example a vow of continence, whether perpetual or temporal, a vow of large alms, etc.; but not vows which do not turn to his prejudice, such as a vow of moderate prayer.

A wife can irritate those vows of her husband which injure her rights, such as a vow of continence, a vow of sleeping separately, etc.

2. A master (mistress) can irritate both real and personal vows of servants which turn to his prejudice, such as a vow of a longer pilgrimage or fast, by which servants are rendered unfit for furnishing due services to their masters.

3. A father can irritate those vows of pubescent children not yet emancipated which impede the free administration of the family or the obedience owed to the father, such as a vow of a distant pilgrimage.

4. A regular prelate can irritate vows of novices which impede the exercises of probation or injure the rights of the order. The same must be said of the superior of a college, who can irritate vows of his students which stand in the way of the right of exacting obedience from them.¹

5. The supreme pontiff can irritate the vows of all the faithful, and a bishop the vows of his subjects, which prejudice their rights.

¹ Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 686.