Killing an unjust aggressor in self-defence

332. On the right against an aggressor of life. It is licit for anyone to defend both his own life and the life of others, even with the killing of an unjust aggressor, provided the moderation of blameless defense is observed. This is both because everyone has the right of preferring his own life to the life of an unjust aggressor, and because otherwise criminals, with the greatest damage to human society, would affect others with injuries. Therefore all laws and all positive rights permit force to be repelled by force, even if from defense of oneself the death of the aggressor follows.¹

a. An aggressor is called one who is already actually attacking or actually does certain things from which he is morally judged already to be attacking, for example, he is already preparing weapons; for if physical aggression had to be awaited, defense of oneself would often become impossible. Nevertheless, it is not licit, by preventing the aggression, to kill one who lays snares and will certainly attack later, although it is impossible to escape the danger.² It is not licit after the aggression to kill the aggressor, because that would not be defense but vengeance.

b. Where the required conditions are present, anyone can defend himself against any unjust aggressor, even with the death of the aggressor, whether the aggression is formally or materially unjust. Wherefore even a son can defend himself against a father, a subject against a ruler, unless greater evils such as wars are to be feared, a layman against a cleric, a cleric against a layman, and anyone even against a furious, insane, or drunken person. For although here he commits only material injustice, nevertheless the right to life is not lost through the insanity or drunkenness of the aggressor.

c. It is licit for anyone to defend his own life in this way, but no one is bound to kill an unjust aggressor; wherefore he can licitly permit his own killing, for this means of preserving life is hard and cruel, from which nature recoils. Yet in a twofold case it is not licit to permit one's own killing: alpha. if the life of the one attacked is either necessary or very useful to the common good; beta. if the one attacked is in a state of mortal sin.

d. It is licit to defend in this way not only one's own life, but also the life of others; for what someone licitly does by himself, he can also do through another. Indeed, by reason of charity, piety, or office, this ought sometimes also to be done by those who are hired to protect the life or goods of others. But because such killing ordinarily brings great inconveniences with it, a private person is rarely bound to this, unless a reason of piety or office is added.

Therefore if the one attacked were a person necessary to the public good, or if he were father or son or wife, legal justice or piety would obligate one to defend his life. And those who are hired for the defense of others, such as soldiers and guards, are bound to defend the life of others even with their own grave inconvenience, because office obligates them to this.

e. If the one attacked knows that the aggressor is in a state of mortal sin, ordinarily he can defend himself even by killing the aggressor. For if the aggressor is formally unjust, he freely exposes himself to this danger; therefore since he himself can provide for himself, he is not in extreme spiritual necessity. But if he is materially unjust, as an insane person, in fact he is in extreme spiritual necessity and only the one attacked can assist him. Hence if the one attacked prudently judged himself to be in a state of grace, and moreover knew certainly that the aggressor was in a state of mortal sin which he would afterward amend, charity would demand that he prefer the aggressor's eternal salvation to his own temporal life. But since this twofold knowledge cannot be had, this obligation scarcely ever certainly exists; and an uncertain obligation cannot deprive another of the certain right of defending himself.

¹ C. Si vero 3, De sententia excom. (V, 39).

² Cf. proposition 18 condemned by Alexander VII.

333. On the right against an aggressor of goods. 1. It is licit to defend not only life, but also other goods of greater importance of an inferior order, even with the killing of the unjust aggressor, if they cannot be preserved in another way. For charity does not oblige that one prefer another's goods of a higher order to his own goods of a lower order, unless the other is in extreme necessity. But the unjust aggressor of another's good is not in extreme necessity, since he voluntarily exposes himself to the danger of death.¹

That even goods of fortune can be licitly defended with the killing of an unjust aggressor, theologians have always rightly inferred from sacred Scripture, which permits the killing of a nocturnal thief breaking into a house.²

2. But the goods which it is licit to defend in this way, with the moderation of blameless defense observed, are:

a. Goods of fortune of great importance. These goods must be of great importance, because charity prohibits that on account of a light damage the gravest damage be inflicted upon a neighbor.³

alpha. Goods of great importance are not only those which, if taken away, would leave someone lacking sustenance for himself and his own, but also those whose loss would be a notable damage according to the quality of the person.

beta. It is licit to kill a thief taking away a thing of great importance, if the thing cannot be recovered in another way and if, after warning, he is unwilling to let it go; but if warning is impossible or useless, it also can be omitted.⁴

gamma. It is not licit to kill one who takes away a thing of small importance; but it is licit to protect it against the thief and to recover it once taken away by the thief if it cannot be recovered otherwise with sufficient certainty. But if the thief employs force, where there is need he can even be killed. For in that case he is not killed to protect or recover the thing, but to defend one's own person.⁵

b. Chastity: for if it is licit to kill the aggressor of goods of fortune, a fortiori it is licit to kill the aggressor of chastity, which is a good more excellent than riches. Nevertheless a virgin is not bound to kill the aggressor of chastity, but can passively submit, because chastity is not lost against the will.

c. Integrity of members: for what is licit for preserving life is also licit for defending integrity of body.

¹ St. Alphonsus, n. 383.

² Ex. 22:2; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 7.

³ Proposition 31 condemned by Innocent XI: Regularly I can kill a thief for the preservation of one gold coin.

⁴ St. Alphonsus, n. 382; Bucceroni, Casus consc.^5, n. 59, 3.

⁵ Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 890.

334. On the aggressor of honor. According to the law of perfection handed down to us by Christ, injuries received are to be borne equanimously and forgiven to the enemy without satisfaction; but according to the order of justice and natural equity, these things seem able to be established:¹

a. It is not licit to kill the aggressor of reputation or honor either to impede an imminent injury or to recover honor taken away.

For this is prohibited by the first part of condemned proposition 30,² and rightly indeed, because rarely are the conditions required for bloody defense present, such as that grave damage be inflicted and that there be no other way of repairing the damage. But if the required conditions are present, nevertheless this is not licit because the moderation of blameless defense is not observed; for to recover honor taken away by verbal, indeed even real injury, according to the moral estimation of men, the killing of the aggressor is not required. Rather the retorsion of the injury suffices, even, if there is need, with the striking of the calumniator, where honor cannot be recovered through a judge.

b. It is licit to recover honor taken away by real or verbal injury by immediately inflicting an equal injury, if, as ordinarily happens, it cannot be recovered through a judge without trouble.

Therefore it is licit immediately to strike back at one who ignominiously struck someone, not indeed for the sake of vengeance, but to avoid infamy or to recover honor, where in the moral estimation of men the one struck is judged deprived of honor until he has struck back, but, on the contrary, to have recovered honor if he has struck back. Likewise it is licit to return a similar name to him who called someone by a disgraceful name. Nor should it be said that this opinion has been condemned, since only this is condemned: that one striking can be killed if he flees. Practically, however, this opinion involves a twofold danger: lest the striking back be done for the sake of vengeance, and lest the moderation of blameless defense be violated. Moreover, if the one struck back wishes to strike again, nothing prevents the second striking from being impeded, even with drawn sword, if there is need.

c. It is not licit to recover honor taken away before by real or verbal injury by killing or striking the one who took it away.

For this is prohibited by the second part of condemned proposition 30, because the killing would not be defense but vengeance. Moreover, punishment for a committed offense must be inflicted by a judge.

Note. It must be observed that by positive law he who kills an aggressor of honor, chastity, or goods of fortune is considered as a homicide to be punished; only for impeding rape can a woman by civil law kill the aggressor.

¹ Cf. Elbel-Bierbaum, Theol. mor., I, pr. 4, n. 67 ss.; Genicot, Casus conscient., I, p. 154 s.; Viva, Theses damnatae, in prop. 30 condemned by Innocent XI, n. IX.

² It is licit for an honorable man to kill an aggressor who tries to bring calumny, if otherwise this ignominy cannot be avoided; the same also must be said if someone strikes a slap or strikes with a staff and after the inflicted slap or blow of the staff flees.

335. On the moderation of blameless defense. The moderation of blameless defense, which must be observed in defense of oneself, requires that nothing be done against the life of the aggressor unless it is necessary for protecting one's own life; for what necessity does not excuse is against justice. Therefore it requires three things: a. that life not be attacked unless the aggression is actually, morally, at hand; b. that the life of the aggressor not be attacked if the danger can be avoided in another way, such as by crying out or fleeing; c. that the aggressor not be killed if his wounding suffices for defense.

a. He is not bound to flee who cannot flee without great detriment, because, for example, he would incur the disgrace of a timid and cowardly man; for the moderation of blameless defense does not require that the danger of the aggressor be avoided with the greatest detriment to oneself. Therefore the following are bound to flee if they can do so safely enough: alpha. common men, because they suffer no loss of honor; beta. clerics and religious, because for them, who ought to furnish an example of meekness, flight is not disgraceful; gamma. all, even noble and military men, if the aggressor is drunk or insane, because in this case flight is disgraceful to no one.

b. Practically, judgment concerning the means necessary for the defense of oneself must be committed to the judgment of him whose life is in danger. But if someone in sudden danger, where time is lacking for weighing all circumstances, seizes a means which would not have been plainly necessary, he is not to be blamed.

IN defence of my own life from unjust attack I may use whatever violence is necessary and even go to the length of killing the aggressor, if I cannot otherwise save my life. This right of self-defence all laws, human and divine, concede, as Innocent III declared. Nature herself teaches us that an act which is necessary for self-defence is lawful, and even if it lead to the taking of the life of the unjust aggressor it does not cease to be lawful. A higher value must be set on the life of the innocent than on that of the guilty, especially when the guilty one is the cause of his life being put in jeopardy. No one is justified in using greater violence than is necessary for the purpose of self-defence,so that if by striking or wounding an assailant of my life I can effectually defend myself, I am not justified in killing him. On the same principle no private person can take vengeance for violence which has already been done, by offering violence in return; vindictive justice is reserved for public authority, at any rate in more serious matters. Nor may one whose life is threatened anticipate the attack; defence is only lawful when the attack is practically being made or is at any rate imminent. Unless the attack is practically imminent it is always possible to resort to other means than homicide for the defence of one’s own life; one may invoke the protection of the law or at least fly the intending assailant.

Is it lawful to kill an aggressor against one's life? - Anyone can kill an unjust aggressor against his life, with the moderation of blameless defense. Thus S. Thomas, and he confirms his thesis from the fact that in Exod. 22:2 it is lawful to kill a nocturnal thief. Therefore much more, he says, is it lawful to defend one's own life. Then, all laws and all rights proclaim that force may be repelled by force. Finally, nature itself teaches that there is in man a true right of defending his own life if it is unjustly attacked, and of preferring it to the life of the unjust aggressor, who from his own malice has cast himself into such danger. And this holds not only for secular persons, but also for clerics themselves and religious; for the right of defense is implanted in each one by nature. If it were otherwise, weapons would be supplied to injustice, to the slaughter of the good, and to the overthrow of commonwealths. Hence the Roman Catechism, n. 8, attributes this right to all without distinction. C. Significasti 18 de Homic. vol.; C. Si vero de Sent. exc.; C. L. 2367; S. Th. 1. 2, q. 64, a. 7; L. 380.

Note: Can; for no one is bound to kill an aggressor. It is a dreadful means for conserving one's own life; but lawfully and praiseworthily someone can permit his own killing, lest another be deprived of temporal and eternal life. Make exception: 1. When the life of the one attacked would be necessary and very useful to the common good. 2. When he himself would be in mortal sin, because then he would be altogether bound to defend himself. L. 380.

With the moderation of blameless defense, which is situated in these three conditions: 1. That the killing of the aggressor not be done for vengeance, since this does not belong to private persons; nor from hatred, since this would be opposed to charity; but only for repelling injury and force, or for defense of oneself. 2. That one who suffers aggression not use greater violence than is necessary for avoiding death; and therefore, if he can free himself from the unjust aggressor by fleeing or only by wounding, he cannot kill; otherwise he would kill unjustly, and would be bound to restitution proportionate to the excess, since he would exceed the right granted by nature. By fleeing; otherwise charity is injured, though not justice. For is there any right in the unjust invader that the other should flee? By fleeing; provided this can be done without danger, and, if the matter concerns a noble man or a soldier, perhaps also without grave harm. 3. That the unjust aggression actually, morally speaking, be brought, that is, be so impending that one cannot repel it except by using force. For if by striking or killing he forestalls an aggression scarcely probable, he himself becomes the aggressor of another's life, not the defender of his own. Impending: yet it is not to be awaited until the other already begins to harm. Otherwise defense would already be ineffectual. C. Significasti 18 de Homic. vol.; C. L. 2367, 2370; Struggl 17, 20, 30; Ithur. Cas. 40, nn. 9-10; Lugo d. 10, n. 161; L. 380, 381, 387, 388.

395. Principles. - I. It is lawful for each one to defend his own life even with the killing of an unjust aggressor; for each one has the right of preserving life unjustly attacked. Therefore he can defend it through necessary means, and consequently even by mutilation or killing of the aggressor, if he cannot otherwise snatch himself from death; for by natural law it is lawful to repel force by force. It is also clear from canon law, especially c. Si vero 3, de sent. excomm., where it is said: All laws and all rights permit force to be repelled by force. - See St. Alphonsus, n. 380.

II. In just defense against an unjust aggressor the moderation of blameless defense must be observed, or nothing must be done except that which is absolutely necessary for protecting oneself; because what necessity does not excuse is against justice.

396. Questions. - Q. 1. Whether it is lawful to kill a drunken or insane aggressor ¹?

¹ This question pertains rather to the following article, where the killing of the innocent indirectly intended is treated. For here anyone is called innocent who attacks you or in any way tries to harm you without crime.

Resp. It is affirmed more probably, unless it is clear to you that he is in a state of mortal sin. The reason is that although a drunken or insane man is not your formally unjust aggressor, nevertheless he is materially unjust, and you preserve your right of repelling force by force. But if you certainly know that he is in a state of mortal sin ², since he is in extreme necessity, charity requires that you prefer his eternal salvation to the preservation of your temporal life. But otherwise, if he were in possession of himself; for his own evil would have to be imputed to him.

² Yet Lugo notes (De Iust. et Iur., disp. 10, n. 145) that the case in which this is certainly clear will be very rare. Besides, some prudent hope ought to shine forth that the aggressor, for example one demented, if spared, will obtain salvation. Finally, unless by flight it is lawful to withdraw oneself from the invader, for it is unbecoming to no one to avoid by fleeing the attack even of a drunk or insane man, it is not forbidden to injure the aggressor by striking or wounding him in such a way that both life is preserved for him and at the same time he is then rendered unable to harm.

Q. 2. Whether it is lawful to defend an innocent neighbor by the killing of the aggressor?

Resp. It is affirmed in every case in which it is lawful to defend one's own life; and this by reason of charity. - St. Alphonsus, n. 389. Yet a private person rarely seems to be bound to this ³. - Thus commonly. - St. Alphonsus, n. 390.

³ Namely the precept of charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience; but in the killing of another great inconvenience can scarcely ever be avoided on account of fear of enmities, of public justice, etc. - Thus St. Alphonsus.

Moreover, St. Ambrose also is authority that this obligation is sometimes present; from him St. Thomas (2. 2, q. 60, art. 6, ad 2) writes out these words: "He who does not repel an injury from his companion, when he can, is as much in fault as he who does it." To this bear also the words of Innocent IV reported in c. Dilecto 6, De Sent. Excomm., in VI: "Since it is lawful for anyone to impart his help to his neighbor or proximate for repelling the latter's injury; indeed if he can and neglects, he seems to favor the one inflicting injury, and to be participant in the same fault," etc.

397. • Q. 3. Whether it is lawful to kill an unjust aggressor also for defense of the members?

Resp. It is affirmed, with the common opinion, against a few. The reason is that each one has the right of preserving a good most necessary to himself for life, even with danger of the life of another, provided another means is lacking and the death of the aggressor is not intended. - St. Alphonsus, n. 380.

Q. 4. Whether it is lawful to defend goods of fortune of great moment by killing the thief, if otherwise they cannot be retained?

Resp. It is affirmed, at least more probably. The reason is drawn from what was said in the preceding question; for each one has the right of preserving goods of great moment according to his condition, and by that very fact of applying means absolutely necessary for this. On the other hand, the precept of charity does not oblige one to prefer the goods of the neighbor, although of a higher order, unless the neighbor is in extreme necessity; but otherwise when he spontaneously exposes himself to danger of death. - St. Alphonsus, n. 382.

398. • Q. 5. Whether it is lawful for a woman to kill an invader of chastity?

Resp. It is affirmed more probably. The reason is that chastity is a good more excellent than riches; therefore if it is lawful to kill an unjust aggressor of goods of fortune, this will be lawful a fortiori for preserving chastity. - St. Alphonsus, n. 386, and others commonly ⁴.

⁴ Add: 1. that neither striking, nor mutilation, nor killing for defending chastity induces irregularity or the penalty of excommunication, even if the invader is a cleric.

Add: 2. that it is right to kill an invader of another's chastity, just as it is lawful for the one herself suffering force. Thus St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 391), who nevertheless limits this: unless the woman consents, or at least if she positively does not resist. These latter words of St. Alphonsus are plainly to be understood of a woman who does not resist when she can, and therefore by conducting herself negatively is reckoned to consent interpretatively, as in fact the Salamancans understand them (De Praec. V., cap. 1, n. 97), from whom St. Alphonsus took these things. For if the woman in reality suffers force, and according to what was said above (note to q. 3, n. 390) conducts herself only passively so that she may avoid a greater evil, this limitation has no place.

Q. 6. Whether it is lawful to kill another for the preservation of honor?

Resp. No, at least speaking practically; because honor can generally be preserved by other means, and therefore an assault upon honor cannot be compared with an assault upon life and other goods. Besides, otherwise an approach would be opened to innumerable slaughters ⁵.

⁵ St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 381 and 391) aptly distinguishes whether the assault upon honor is made by words only, or also by deeds. For if there is question of words, and, for example, it is said contumeliously to an honorable man, "you lie," the injury can, ought, and is accustomed to be repelled otherwise; and striking or wounding would have the character not of defense but of vengeance.

But if honor is attacked by deeds, the matter is to be judged differently after the deed than before the deed. For an injury to the aggressor after the deed, unless there is question of correction to be applied with boys and others of this sort, would be vengeance, not defense; and to this pertains the second part of proposition 50 proscribed by Innocent XI. But if the matter concerns him who is going to try to injure honor by deeds, then the things which the Author adds in the fifth resolution are valid. For an obligation of conducting himself passively cannot be imposed on anyone while another in contempt tries, for example, to pluck his beard, or to strike him with a slap, or to soil his clothes, etc.; but surely it will be lawful for him, with the moderation of blameless defense observed, to repel the injury; and if indeed the obstinate aggressor applies force to inflict the predetermined injury, and when repelled also seizes arms, it will certainly be right for the other to repel force by force, and to oppose arms with arms. See Croix, lib. 3, p. 1, n. 803.

For this reason Alexander VII rightly condemned the following proposition, number 18: It is lawful to kill a false accuser, false witnesses, and even the judge from whom an unjust sentence threatens, if by another way an innocent person cannot avoid damage ⁶. Attend besides to proposition 30 condemned by Innocent XI: It is right for an honorable man to kill an assailant who strives to bring in calumny, if this calumny cannot otherwise be avoided: the same also must be said if someone strikes a slap or beats with a stick, and after the inflicted slap or stroke of the stick flees. - See St. Alphonsus, n. 381.

⁶ Proposition XVII, condemned by Alexander VII, bears rather on this, which has thus: It is lawful for a Religious and Cleric to kill a calumniator threatening to scatter grave crimes concerning himself or his Religion, when another manner of defending is not available, as it does not seem to be available if the calumniator is prepared to fasten the aforesaid things either upon the religious himself or upon his religion publicly and before most grave men, unless he is killed. For proposition XVIII treats not only of loss of honor, but of other damages.

Moreover some seem to have brought Religious and clerics into the middle because in these the loss which can be feared from calumny was more evident. And hence others had taken occasion to affirm that this indeed was forbidden to Religious and clerics, but not to laymen (see Croix, lib. 3, p. 1, n. 800); to this evasion an opening was afterward closed through proposition XXX condemned by Innocent XI.

Moreover, the reason for the condemnation is hardly obscure, namely the danger of abuses threatening from this doctrine; since this is intrinsic to the doctrine itself, this is enough that it be judged to be reproved. For as Lugo observes concerning a similar case (De Iust. et Iur., disp. 10, n. 189): "If these inconveniences per se follow from that opinion, certainly it will not be probable even speculatively; for for the speculative probability of a moral matter it is necessary that the matter be such that in human circumstances it does not bring inconveniences which render it illicit; but if of itself it brings such inconveniences, by that very fact it is intrinsically illicit even speaking speculatively." But thus the matter stands in the present material. For: 1. it will never be evident that grave infamy cannot be declined otherwise than through the killing of the calumniator, or judge, etc. (see Viva on proposition XVII of Alex. VII, n. 4). 2. Since men easily hallucinate through passion, slaughters would be multiplied without cause from mere suspicions. And so a remedy of this sort against calumnies, to which such grave inconveniences are necessarily connected, had to be forbidden by the very law of nature.

399. Resolves. - 1. It is not lawful to kill a thief carrying away a thing of lesser moment, even with the resistance of the owner; because although such taking happens with a special injury to him on account of violence, nevertheless an injury of this sort is not judged grave according to the estimation of men. - St. Alphonsus, n. 383 ⁷. Yet the owner is not bound to let the thing go, and, with the moderation of blameless defense observed, can defend himself if the other brings force against his person for taking it away.

⁷ So that this question may be turned over more clearly and exactly, a threefold case must be distinguished.

The first is when not so much the value of the thing is attended to as the injury inflicted on the owner of the thing, because with him present, and in vain forbidding, shouting, threatening, and retaining the thing, the thief withdraws it. And to this pertains the opinion of St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 383) that by reason of such contempt and dishonoring it is not lawful to kill the thief.

The second is when rather the damage is considered which the owner suffers by the thing taken. And then another doctrine of the same St. Alphonsus (l.c.) is valid: "It is certain that two things are required for killing a thief: first, that the thing cannot be recovered by another way; second, that the thing be of great moment." Where he wisely notes with other Doctors that the gravity of the damage is to be understood relatively, and generally that loss suffices which would bring notable damage to the owner according to the quality of the person; although neither is it to be denied that, as in the quantity of theft, so also in the present matter, some absolute gravity of damage must be admitted, which, namely, with respect to all can and ought to be judged and called of great moment. Yet that this is not to be restricted to the value of one gold coin or scudo is clear from this proposition 31, condemned by Innocent XI: "Regularly I can kill a thief for the preservation of one gold coin"; although even the value of one gold coin can sometimes be held of great moment in a very poor person.

Finally, the third case is when there is question neither of honor, as in the first case, nor of gravity of damage, as in the second, but the force brought upon the owner guarding his own thing is considered. And then the question returns which was raised above at Q. 6 concerning him who tries by deeds to injure the honor of another. For when a thief brings force so that he may enter, for example, a house or henhouse, or snatch a watch or stick from your hands, surely you are not bound to conduct yourself passively and permit the thing to him, but you can lawfully resist the unjust aggressor and repel force by force; although the moderation of blameless defense requires that you not apply greater force than that which suffices to repel force. The reason is, as Molina says (tom. 4, tr. 3, disp. 16, n. 4), that when someone thus defends his own things, regularly he also defends his own person, which he exposes to danger for the defense of his things. Laymann brings another reason (lib. 3, tr. 3, cap. 3, part. 3, n. 4), namely of the public good. For otherwise impunity of crimes would render the wicked more daring to harm.

** The defect of these distinctions makes St. Alphonsus' resolution (l.c.) become very obscure. For to the question whether it is lawful to kill a thief carrying off a thing of moderate value with the resistance of the owner or of its guardian, after bringing forward the affirmative opinion, which he attributes to Molina, Bonacina, Lugo, Sporer, Viva, and Roncaglia, he adds: "But the contrary opinion pleases me much more, which the Salamancans hold (tr. 25, c. 1, n. 85) after Diana, not admitting this. The reason is that although such taking happens with special injury of the owner by reason of violence, nevertheless since not every injury brings dishonoring, here it seems to me that through that taking honor is not properly or gravely injured according to the estimation of men. For who will be judged gravely dishonored because a thief violently snatched some thing from him?" In these things Molina is wrongly attacked with others, who, as is clear from what has been said and from the following note, treats another hypothesis; nor is the cause of defending honor distinguished from the right of resisting a thief trying to snatch a thing. But it is no wonder if sometimes the Salamancans are taken as guides in handling grave questions.

2. Generally it is not lawful to kill him who merely threatens an assault; because there can be a great and frequent danger of hallucination in this. But otherwise if it is certainly clear concerning the depraved will of the aggressor, and the danger cannot be met in another way.

3. It is not lawful to kill an aggressor after the deed, because it would be vengeance, not defense. Exception is made ⁸ when, as they say, the aggression would endure effectively in the flight of the aggressor carrying away the stolen thing. - Thus commonly.

⁸ In this case there is question not of honor or of person, but only of damage. In this hypothesis Molina (tom. 4, tr. 5, disp. 16, n. 6) denies that the thief is lawfully killed when the thing would not be of great value, as if it were only three, four, or five ducats; which things indeed are to be taken of the absolute quantity of damage, not of the relative, as we observed in the preceding note. And from these things it is clear that some have attributed by mere calumny to Molina the doctrine contained in proposition 31 proscribed by Innocent XI. For Molina did not bring forward the value of one gold coin in the present matter as the absolute measure of damage, but while handling the question (see l.c., n. 7) proposed by us in the third case of the preceding note, namely when there is question not so much of the defense of things as of the defense of person against an unjust aggressor.

4. It is not lawful for a girl to kill the aggressor of her honor after oppression; yet she can strike him and treat him badly and most harshly, especially because unless in such a manner she shows her constancy and displeasure, the wicked man will not easily depart, or he will easily be able to return to solicitation. - St. Alphonsus, n. 386.

5. It is not lawful, at least speaking practically, even for an honorable man to anticipate by killing an aggressor wishing to strike a slap; for he can always consult for his own honor by flight or another way. Yet it is lawful to ward off the aggressor even with drawn sword, and to show himself ready for his own defense. - St. Alphonsus, n. 381. - See Cases, n. 390 and following.

325. Principle: It is licit for each one to defend his own life or that of others, or even the integrity of members, even with the killing of an unjust aggressor, provided nevertheless that the moderation of blameless defense is observed.

It is proved. (A) For he who defends himself, by wounding or killing the aggressor, does not directly intend the killing, but his own defense or that of others, repelling force by force; and therefore he performs an act good of itself, foreseeing the evil effect that will follow from it, namely the wounding or death of the aggressor. Now in the case he has a proportionately grave reason for permitting that effect, namely the legitimate defense of himself or others, and in addition the public good, which demands that the boldness of the wicked be broken. Nor can it be said that the invader is thus exposed to the danger of eternal damnation: for he ought to impute this evil to himself, and otherwise before he dies he is able to elicit an act of contrition. Therefore he acts licitly who defends himself, even with the killing of an unjust aggressor.

326. (B) Positive laws, ecclesiastical or civil, confirm this indeed. Thus Innocent III says: "Although all laws and all rights permit force to be repelled by force, yet because this must be done with the moderation of blameless defense, not for taking vengeance, but for repelling injury...."¹

¹ Decret. Greg. IX, l. V, t. 12 de Homicidio, c. 18, p. 801, ed. Richter-Friedberg. - Thus also in the French Penal Code, a. 328: "There is neither crime nor offense when homicide, wounds, and blows were commanded by the actual necessity of legitimate defense of oneself or of another." Cf. for Germany, Cod. p. a. 53; for England and the United States, Bouvier, Dict. of Law, word Self defence.

327. The principle is explained. (a) It was said: it is licit; because generally no one is bound to defend himself in this way; for someone can, from charity, permit his own killing, lest the aggressor be deprived of temporal and eternal life, unless, however, the life of the one attacked is very useful to the common good or to the family.²

² Others add with St. Alphonsus (n. 380): unless the one attacked were himself in mortal sin, because then he would be entirely bound to defend himself. - Yet this argument does not seem to be valid; for he who acts thus performs a heroic act of charity, by which he is cleansed from his sins and justified.

(b) Of an unjust aggressor; for if there is question of a guard or minister of justice who tries to capture a guilty man or to kill one juridically condemned, the latter certainly cannot be repelled by force and killed, because he uses his own right, indeed he performs an office; now the public good demands that violence not be inflicted upon ministers of justice legitimately exercising their office. But it suffices that the aggressor be materially unjust; hence a madman or a drunkard can be killed, if otherwise we cannot defend life.

It is moreover required that the aggressor actually bring force to bear, or at least exhibit signs of imminent aggression, e.g., by drawing a sword, seizing a gun, etc.; hence it is not licit to kill an aggressor before he has in some way begun the act of invasion; otherwise homicides would frequently be perpetrated under the pretext of legitimate defense, not without great detriment to the commonwealth. Deservedly, therefore, this eighteenth proposition was condemned, at least as scandalous, by Alexander VII, September 24, 1665: "It is licit to kill a false accuser, false witnesses, and also the judge from whom an unjust sentence certainly threatens, if by another way the innocent person cannot avoid the damage."¹ - Nor is it licit to kill an invader who has already ceased from aggression and flees, because he is no longer an aggressor, and it belongs to public authority alone to punish the guilty who are not actually attacking others.

¹ In Denzinger, n. 989.

328. (c) With the moderation of blameless defense, that is, by doing only that which is required for one's own defense; and therefore if another way of escaping the danger is at hand, e.g., by fleeing, crying out, it is not licit to kill or wound the invader; likewise if it suffices to inflict a wound, it is not licit to kill him. - Nevertheless, if someone, disturbed by a sudden attack, has not observed moderation, because time was lacking for maturely weighing all the circumstances, as often happens, he is not to be reproved for grave sin; for in practice it cannot easily be discerned what is necessary for defending oneself. Likewise if the one attacked cannot flee without great detriment, without, e.g., being regarded by others as cowardly, he can resist the aggressor even with the danger of killing him. Therefore, in a particular case, attention must be paid to the psychological dispositions of him who defends himself.

329. 2. Corollaries. It is licit to defend not only life and bodily integrity, but other goods, with the killing of an unjust aggressor: namely goods of the greatest moment, whose loss is morally irreparable.

(A) It is licit for a woman to repel by force an invader of chastity, even with the killing of the aggressor, if another means of efficaciously defending chastity is not at hand. Thus commonly. For here there is question of a good of the greatest moment, which, once lost, cannot be repaired; for a woman, by permitting herself to be oppressed, exposes herself to the danger of inwardly consenting to lust, of conceiving illegitimate offspring, and of losing reputation; if she is a virgin, she will with difficulty be married; if already married, she will introduce adulterine offspring into the family of the husband, with disgrace and detriment to the whole family; and these evils indeed are a proportionately grave reason. - But if she has already been oppressed, it is not licit to kill the aggressor, from what has been said above.

Hence it is not licit for a husband by his own authority to kill a wife detected in adultery; for the contradictory proposition was reproved by Alexander VII at least as scandalous.¹ - But whether a husband or father can kill him who attacks the chastity of his wife or daughter, when otherwise the aggressor cannot be repelled, is controverted. In practice, however, those who, moved by indignation, kill the invader are for the most part excused: for they do not think they act badly; and generally they are not condemned by a civil tribunal.

¹ In Denzinger, n. 990: "The husband does not sin who by his own authority kills his wife detected in adultery."

330. (B) As regards goods of fortune, let us separate certain things from uncertain:

(a) It is not licit to kill him who impedes us from the attainment of goods which we do not yet possess, but to which we have a right. This is clear from the condemnation of this proposition (32) by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "It is licit not only to defend by deadly defense the things which we actually possess, but also those to which we have an inchoate right and which we hope to possess."² - And deservedly, for here there is question of an evil which can be repaired by having recourse to judges.

² Ibid., n. 1049; it was condemned as at least scandalous and pernicious in practice.

(b) If there is question of goods actually possessed, but of lesser moment, the same must be said, from the condemnation of proposition (31) by Innocent XI: "Regularly I can kill a thief for the preservation of one gold coin."³ For the reason is not proportionately grave.

³ Ibid., n. 1048; this proposition was condemned at least as scandalous and pernicious in practice.

331. (c) When there is question of goods of great moment already possessed, more probably it is licit to defend them, even with the killing of an unjust aggressor, if otherwise they cannot be preserved or recovered. - For here there is question of the irreparable loss of goods which are very useful and sometimes morally necessary for the support of life; now the public good demands that thieves who seize goods of this kind and do not wish to abandon them be intercepted in flight, even by a lethal wound, if there is need; otherwise not a few would be incited to theft. - On the other hand, charity does not oblige someone to prefer the neighbor's good, even of a higher order, to his own good, unless the neighbor is in extreme necessity; now the unjust aggressor in the case is not in extreme necessity, since, by leaving the goods which he has invaded, he can escape unharmed. Thus St. Alphonsus, n. 383, with many others.¹

¹ Some attack this doctrine of theologians as contrary to natural equity. Nevertheless it is approved by most jurists, not only in France, but in other regions. Let Garraud be heard, op. cit., p. 213: "Suppose a thief, stealing from the safe of a merchant the titles which constitute the greater part of his fortune, fleeing with these titles, without the darkness permitting him to be recognized: the evil will be irreparable if the owner does not succeed in wounding or killing the thief: he fires and kills him; if Art. 328 (of the Penal Code) does not give him the right to do this, no tribunal will hesitate to declare that this act is not imputable to its author, whether one considers it as justified by legitimate defense, or rather as imposed by a force which the agent could not resist." - He alleges, as regards the laws of other nations: Berge, Revue generale du droit, 1879, t. III, p. 277; Alimena, I limiti e i modificatori dell' imputabilita, t. III, p. 97 seq.

This indeed is admitted by almost all when there is question of a nocturnal aggressor; for, besides the reasons already brought forward, it can be feared that the invader also wishes to take the life of the owner.

In either case, according to all, the owner can rescue his own things from the robber; and if the latter resists and threatens death, it is licit for the owner to defend himself, even by killing the invader.²

² Cod. paen. gall., a. 329.

332. (C) If honor or reputation is attacked, regularly it is not licit to kill the unjust aggressor. - The reason is that loss of honor and reputation generally is not irreparable, since it can be preserved or recovered by other means; on the other hand the common good demands that reputation not be repaired by the killing of the aggressor; for an approach would lie widely open to innumerable slaughters, if it were licit for each person to vindicate his own reputation by violent means, especially because each person would be judge in his own cause, concerning a matter of whose gravity it is difficult to judge. - Deservedly, therefore, this proposition (30) was condemned by Innocent XI as at least scandalous and pernicious in practice: "It is lawful for an honorable man to kill an invader who strives to bring calumny upon him, if otherwise this disgrace cannot be avoided: the same also must be said if someone strikes a slap or strikes with a club, and after the inflicted slap or blow of the club flees."³

³ Denzinger, n. 1047.

333. I said regularly; for if someone is attacked not only by words, but by deeds, e.g., by a slap or club, he can repel injury with the moderation of blameless defense; and if the aggressor continues to inflict injury, and brings force to bear and threatens death, the one attacked can repel force by force, even with the killing of the aggressor.

Likewise he who is struck by a slap, and, inflamed with anger, immediately strikes the aggressor and wounds and kills him, is often excused from grave sin, because he did this without mature deliberation. - But when injury has already been inflicted, whether by words or by deeds, it is not licit to take vengeance for it, but recourse must be had to judges.

1. DEFINITION.—By self-defense (defensio naturalis sive necessaria) we mean protecting one's person or property against unjust aggression. It implies the application of physical force to the extent of slaying the aggressor, if necessary, for necessity knows no law.¹

¹ Regula Iuris in VIto Decr. Gregorii IX, n. 4: “Quod non est licitum in lege, necessitas facit licitum.”—C. 11 de Consecr.: “Necessitas non habet legem.”—Cicero, Pro Milone, c. 4: “Silent leges inter arma.”

2. The conditions under which this right may be exercised can easily be deduced from the definition given above.

a) We are allowed to employ physical force in self-defense only when we are actually attacked and have no other means (such as flight, calling for help, etc.) to protect our person or property from serious harm.² It is not necessary, how- ever, to wait until the damage begins to be inflicted, but one may forestall a threatened attack.

² Among the Propositions condemned by Alexander VII are these:—No. 17: “It is permissible for a religious or cleric to kill a calumniator who threatens to spread accusations of crimes about himself or his religious order, when no other means of defense is available: as none seems to be available if the calumniator is prepared to cast the aforesaid charges publicly and before very grave men against the religious himself or his religious order, unless he is killed.”—No. 18: “It is permissible to kill a false accuser, false witnesses, and even a judge from whom an unjust sentence certainly threatens, if the innocent person cannot avoid the harm by another way.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1117 sq.)

b) The attack must be wrongful and unjust, that is to say, the aggressor must not be justified in his conduct by his office or some real obligation. For there is no right of self-defense against a merited punishment.

c) The right of applying physical force in self-defense extends no farther than is necessary to repel an immediate and unjust attack upon oneself or another (moderamen inculpatae tutelae). Accordingly, manslaughter is not justified if inflicting a wound is sufficient to repel the aggressor; nor is wounding justified if disarming will do. In thus qualifying the right of self-defense it is, of course, supposed that one has the time and opportunity to choose the milder in preference to the severer method. Exceeding the moderamen inculpatae tutelae is a grievous sin only when done with full knowledge and of set purpose.

d) The use of physical force is permitted not only in defending one's life against direct attacks, but also in defending or safeguarding one's possessions, e. g., health, integrity of the body, chastity, property. If this were not the case, the right of self-defense would be illusory. Note, however, that killing or wounding another in an attack upon one's honor or good name is not allowed because reparation is possible in other ways, e. g., by court proceedings, etc. Nor is a husband allowed to kill his wife if he catches her in the act of adultery.³

³ Prop. damn. ab Innoc. XI, n. 30: “It is lawful for a man of honor to kill an assailant who attempts to inflict a calumny, if this disgrace cannot otherwise be avoided; the same must also be said if someone strikes him with a slap or beats him with a stick and, after inflicting the slap or blow of the stick, flees.” Ibid., n. 31: “As a rule I may kill a thief to preserve a single gold coin.” Ibid., n. 32: “It is permissible to defend by lethal defense not only those things which we actually possess, but also those to which we have an inchoate right and which we hope to possess.” Ibid., n. 33: “It is permissible both for an heir and for a legatee to defend himself in this way against one who unjustly prevents either an inheritance from being entered upon or legacies from being paid, just as it is for one having a right to a chair or benefice against one who unjustly prevents possession of them.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1180 sqq.)

e) The use of physical force is permitted not only in defending one's own person or property, but also in defending the person or property of one's neighbors. But we are under no strict obligation to defend others at the risk of life, unless they happen to be very near and dear to us, as parents, children, husband or wife, brother or sister.

f) In exercising the right of self-defense one must be guided by no other intention than that of warding off harm and injustice. It would be wrong, therefore, to harbor a feeling of hatred or revenge against the aggressor.⁴

⁴ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 411: “It is not permissible to kill an aggressor after the deed, because that would be vengeance, not defense. An exception is the case in which the aggression effectively, as they say, continues in the flight of the aggressor carrying away the stolen thing. It is not permissible for a girl to kill the assailant of her honor after the violation. She may, however, strike him, provided she does not gravely injure him, because unless she shows her steadfastness and displeasure in this way, the wicked man will not readily leave or may readily be able to return to solicitation.”

The civil law in some countries does not pun- ish excesses in the exercise of the right of self-defense if they are committed under the influence of fear or fright; but from the moral point of view such excesses are not always blameless.

3. The right of self-defense is based on social ethics. Man, as a member of society, has a claim to be protected in the exercise of his rights against illegitimate interference by others, and since public authority cannot always be promptly invoked, this right in such cases passes to the individual, who, representing as it were, the whole community in his person, acts in its name. Thus he at the same time safeguards an important social interest, namely, public safety and the protection of life and property against unjust aggression and violence. In this consideration lies the reason why the use of physical force in self-defense may be carried to the extreme of manslaughter, if necessary, even in the protection of goods which are in themselves inferior to human life, because these goods in case of necessity have attached to them the bonum commune, i. e., the great and general boon of public security and the protection of law and order. To forbid the use of force in such cases would endanger the safety of all and encourage criminals to rob and murder their fellowmen. The right of self-defense is confirmed by an instinct, deeply implanted in hu- man nature, which moves every man to resist attacks upon himself and his own.⁵

⁵ Cicero, Pro Milone, c. 4: “This law is not written but born with us; we have not learned, received, or read it, but have seized, drawn, and expressed it from nature itself; for it we have not been taught but made, not instructed but imbued: so that if our life should fall into any ambush, into violence, or into the weapons of robbers or enemies, every honorable means of securing safety would be available.”—Cfr. J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, pp. 267 sq.

Against the doctrine here set forth the opponents of Catholic moral teaching raise many objections. Space permits us to consider only a few of them.

a) The first is based on Matt. V, 38, where our Lord says: “You have heard that it hath been said, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth; but I say to you not to resist evil [i. e., evil men who would injure you]; but if one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other, and if a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him.”

But this command does not refer to the right of self-defense, but to retribution inspired by hatred and revenge. The most that can be concluded from our Lord's utterance is that men should refrain from exercising the right of self-defense when the good imperilled is merely an individual and not a social good. Christ Himself, who gave us the most beautiful example of patient suffering, keenly resented injustice on the part of those who were commissioned to dispense justice,⁶ and St. Paul censured the magistrates who had thrust him into prison.

⁶ John XVIII, 23; Acts XVI, 37; XXIII, 3.

b) From the standpoint of ethics and jurisprudence it is asserted that homicide committed in self-defense is a grievous wrong for two reasons. First, because none of the things one means to defend ranks as high as the life of the aggressor, and, secondly, because by killing a man we rob him not only of his physical, but likewise of eternal life, because we send him to the tribunal of the heavenly Judge in a state of mortal sin. Hence, it is argued further, it is a duty of justice as well as of charity, at least for him who is in the state of sanctifying grace, to sacrifice his own life rather than to endanger or destroy the life of an unjust aggressor. To this argument we reply: It is true that the things threatened or endangered by an unjust aggressor are of less worth than the life of the aggressor. But higher even than the life of the aggressor stand the social order and public security, and, secondly, if the aggressor loses his life and forfeits eternal salvation, this is not the fault of him who makes use of the right of self-defense when attacked, but the effect of the aggressor's own sin, as he has it entirely in his power to save himself by omitting the attack or desisting from it. Finally, the one who thus defends himself can cite in his behalf the juridical axiom: “Scienti et volenti non fit iniuria.” He who simply makes use of his rights injures nobody. It would not even be advisable to sacrifice one's own life for that of an unjust aggressor, because a man's duty of preserving his life for his own sake and that of his dependents may be more binding than any consideration for the life of a scoundrel, who probably would commit other crimes if he were spared.

Some writers have carried the principles underlying the doctrine just explained so far as to justify the assassination of tyrants. They argue that it is possible for a whole nation to be in a similar predicament towards an unjust usurper (tyrannus tituli s. usurpationis) or towards a le- gitimate ruler who shamefully abuses his power (tyrannus regiminis s. potestatis abusu), as an individual citizen is towards an unjust aggressor and that, as the individual in time of need represents the right of the entire community and is entitled to exercise that right in the name of all, so, too, an individual may be allowed to kill an unjust ruler in order to safeguard the life and property of the whole people. But the assumptions underlying this contention are untenable. In the first place, the right of using physical force in self-defense embraces only those cases in which the personal and private right of the individual is threatened, though that right may, of course, coincide with the interests of society; secondly, no individual citizen is allowed to pose as the delegate or mandatory of the people against the ruler when the latter acts in his official and public capacity. The case would be different if the ruler privately assaulted the life or property of a citizen; then the latter could claim and exercise the right of self-defense. Thus a woman criminally assaulted by a ruler would be allowed to kill him in order to preserve her chastity.

The doctrine of the lawfulness of killing tyrants is often ascribed to the Jesuits, but unjustly. “The Jesuit moralists, even in the 16th century, before the assassination of the French King, Henri III, and the work of Mariana evoked a deluge of pamphlets on the subject, never did teach the doctrine of the lawfulness of tyrannicide, permitting, that is, the assassination by a private individual of a monarch who, though a usurper and a tyrant, was actually in possession of the throne. As Duhr and others have shown by copious citations, Salmeron, Lessius, Gregory de Valentia, Becan, Gretser, Sat, Azor, Escobar, etc., in a word all the great Jesuit casuists of that period, maintained precisely the contrary.”⁷

⁷ Herbert Thurston, S.J., in the Catholic Times, London and Liverpool, Sept. 16, 1922, p. 8: “A single exception there was, the Spanish Father Mariana, who in his book, De Rege et Regis Institutione, owing to strong political sympathies which also brought him into conflict with the General of the Society, expressed enthusiastic approval of the murder of Henri III by Jacques Clément. The censor who gave his nihil obstat to the book admitted he had not read it, the General of the Jesuits, when it was brought to his notice, condemned it in the strongest terms, and the non-Catholic historian, von Ranke, fully allows that ‘Mariana’s doctrine cannot be regarded as the teaching of his Order or of the Catholic Church.’” (Werke, xxiv, 236). No Jesuit writer in subsequent times has ever identified himself with the views of Mariana, though in the following century such great names in the world of Protestant thought as Hugo Grotius, John Milton, and Leibnitz went quite as far as he did.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 64 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, II, 39 sqq.).—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 380–391 (ed. Gaudé, I, 631).—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 407–411.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 465 sqq.—V. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 4th ed., pp. 99 sqq.—O. von Alberti, Das Notwehrrecht, Stuttgart 1901.—M. Lossen, Die Lehre vom Tyrannenmord, Munich 1894.—R. Böhme, Der Tyrannenmord, Munich 1905.—F. Heiner, Die Jesuiten und ihre Gegner, Munich 1906, pp. 79 sqq.—H. G. Schmidt, Die Lehre vom Tyrannenmord, Tübingen 1901.—V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 694 sqq.—B. Duhr, S.J., Jesuitenfabeln, 4th ed., pp. 694 sqq.—T. Parkinson in The Month, March 1873.

120. Principle. It is lawful to defend oneself, even by the killing of an unjust aggressor, if this is necessary a) for preserving one's own life; b) for preserving the life of the neighbor, and especially of a connected person; c) for protecting the integrity of members and other goods of great value.

The ancient authors briefly announced this principle: It is lawful to kill an unjust aggressor with the moderation of blameless defense.¹¹¹

Proof. The reason is that everyone by natural right itself can defend himself and his own; and in these cases the killing of the aggressor is not directly intended, but the preservation of a very great good, which the aggressor unjustly attacks. Therefore all the conditions are had which are required for placing a cause from which a double effect follows, the one good, the other bad, namely preservation of one's own life and destruction of another's life. For 1. the intention is good, 2. a proportionately grave cause is had, 3. the action placed is not evil in itself, since it is defensive of one's own life. Therefore he acts licitly who defends himself, even with the killing of the unjust aggressor. Thus positive laws establish;¹¹² thus almost all theologians teach, with a few contradicting, e.g., Gerson, Noris, Henry of St. Ignatius. Let St. Thomas alone be heard:¹¹³ "According to the laws it is lawful to repel force with the moderation of blameless defense. Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit an act of moderate defense in order to avoid the killing of another, because a man is more bound to provide for his own life than for another's life."

The principle is explained. It is said 1. to everyone it is lawful; therefore such defense is a morally licit act and not only not punishable, as some jurists wish; nevertheless (at least generally) no one is bound to choose this mode of defense. For to kill another man is something very harsh and horrible. Moreover, generally no private man is bound to employ so harsh a means for conserving his own life, unless nevertheless he himself is very necessary to the common good. Thus, e.g., there can exist an obligation of killing an aggressor if the one attacked is a father, wife, or bishop. For then the obligation of piety and charity comes in. Certainly those who are held to the defense of others by office, as soldiers and the public police, are also bound under grave sin to kill unjust aggressors if otherwise the life of others cannot be preserved.

It is said 2. an unjust aggressor; because if the aggressor acts justly, it is not licit to kill him; as if a guard or minister of justice, from legitimate authority, draws one juridically condemned to the punishment of death, it is not lawful to repel force with force and to kill that guard or minister. This is plain of itself. Likewise, he who is justly detained in prison cannot kill the prison guard in order to acquire his own liberty. But it is not required that the aggressor be formally unjust, or that he act from theological fault; it is enough that he is trying actually to inflict a grave material injury upon me. Hence even one drunk, mad, furious, etc., threatening death to me can be killed, if otherwise his action cannot be impeded. But whether the aggressor is formally or materially unjust, he can be killed, even if perhaps he exists in the state of mortal sin and therefore is going to Gehenna; for 1. the state of mortal sin is not certain in a materially unjust aggressor; 2. the formally unjust aggressor must impute such danger to himself and indeed to himself alone. An aggressor is understood only as one who actually inflicts force, not as one who is in a power more or less remote of inflicting damage. Hence, e.g., an unjust aggressor can be killed who is already drawing a sword, who is already directing a gun at someone; but not he who is foreseen as going to attack after some days or who is going to accuse falsely. Therefore proposition 18 was deservedly condemned by Alexander VII as scandalous: "It is lawful to kill a false accuser, false witnesses, and even a judge from whom an unjust sentence certainly threatens, if in another way the innocent person cannot avoid damage."¹¹⁴

It is said 3. for preserving either one's own life, or the life of the neighbor, or the integrity of members and other goods of great value. Therefore it is not lawful to kill an unjust aggressor for the defense of any good whatever; and for this reason proposition 30 was condemned by Innocent XI: "It is right for an honorable man to kill an attacker who strives to inflict calumny, if otherwise this disgrace cannot be avoided; the same also must be said if someone strikes with a slap or strikes with a staff and after the slap or blow of the staff has been inflicted flees";¹¹⁵ and proposition 31: "Regularly I can kill a thief for the preservation of one gold coin."¹¹⁶

The reason of all these things is that on the one side charity and justice would be injured if a neighbor, although unjustly attacking, were deprived of the greatest good, namely his life, on account of small damage inflicted upon me; but on the other side everyone has a strict right to preserve for himself goods of great value, as are one's own life, the life of the neighbor, the integrity of members, pudicity, etc. But if another unjustly wishes to take these goods away, he can be beaten back with all strength; but if this cannot be done otherwise, even by the killing of him. But I have deliberately said, "if this cannot be done otherwise"; for in defense the moderation of blameless defense must always be observed. Hence if these goods of great value can be preserved in another way, e.g., by beating or mutilation of the unjust aggressor, this certainly must be done, and in that case killing would be gravely sinful.

The goods which, with the moderation of blameless defense thus preserved, it is lawful to defend are therefore, besides life and members, also goods of fortune and pudicity, but not honor and reputation, as will be said below.

¹¹¹ Das Recht der Notwehr, la défense légitime.

¹¹² c. 3, 18, X 5, 12; c. 3, X 5, 39; German Penal Code § 53 sqq.; German Civil Code § 227 sqq.; French Penal Code a. 328.

¹¹³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64, a. 7. But the Angelic Doctor adds: "It is illicit that a man intend to kill a man in order to defend himself." Several teach the contrary, e.g., Lugo (De iust. et iure disp. X, n. 149), saying: "You will be able to intend the death of him, not only as the striking, but as it is death, because not otherwise except as death is it useful for your protection." They give this reason for that opinion, why it is lawful also to intend the death of an unjust aggressor. For the defender in his defense acts as the mandatary of the republic, which permits the killing of the aggressor. But the opinion of St. Thomas seems better.

¹¹⁴ Denz. n. 1118. This proposition was defended by Thomas Sanchez, Decalog. l. 2, c. 39, n. 7; cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 388.

¹¹⁵ Denz. n. 1180.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. n. 1181.

121. a) Goods of fortune of great value, provided nevertheless that those goods are truly possessed. For it is not lawful to kill him who impedes us from the obtaining of goods concerning which we have only a right to the thing, as is plain from proposition 32 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is lawful to defend by killing defense not only those things which we actually possess, but also those to which we have an inchoate right and which we hope that we are going to possess."¹¹⁷ St. Alphonsus¹¹⁸ asks whether it is lawful to kill a thief of a thing of great moment, and calls the affirmative opinion most probable and common, which St. Antoninus, Sylvius, Dominic Soto, St. Raymund, Cajetan, and Lugo hold; and St. Thomas¹¹⁹ clearly adheres to it. For after the Angelic Doctor brought forward the text of Sacred Scripture: "If a thief breaking into a house or digging under it has been found, and, having received a wound, has died, the striker will not be guilty of blood,"¹²⁰ he infers: "But it is much more lawful to defend one's own life than one's own house." Therefore he supposes as certain that that text permits the killing of an invader of goods. Nor do the words which are afterward read in the same place of Exodus stand in the way: "But if when the sun has risen he has done this, he has perpetrated homicide, and he himself shall die." For when the sun has risen, the thief can be more easily recognized and the goods taken away can be recovered through the sentence of a judge. Therefore then the killing of the thief would be illicit, because it would exceed the moderation of blameless defense. Billuart¹²¹ holds the contrary opinion, teaching that it is not lawful to defend goods of fortune with the killing of the invader; but the reasons brought forward by him do not seem to be probative.

What is a good of great value is not so certainly established. The value of one gold coin is not enough, as is plain from proposition 31 just cited, condemned by the same Innocent XI; but theologians judge that a thing of great value is one whose price is equivalent to about the sum of 1000 francs. Indeed D'Annibale,¹²² Bucceroni¹²³ think that a thing of great value is already 400 or 500 lire.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. n. 1182.

¹¹⁸ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 383.

¹¹⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64, a. 7, arg. Sed contra.

¹²⁰ Ex. 22, 2.

¹²¹ De iure et iust. diss. 10, a. 6, § 1.

¹²² Summula Theol. mor. II, n. 283.

¹²³ Inst. theol. mor. I, n. 732.

122. b) Pudicity. It is lawful for a woman to repel by force an invader of pudicity, and if an unjust aggressor wishes to extort carnal intercourse, the woman, when other means are lacking, can kill him. Thus the common opinion. For if it is lawful to defend goods of fortune of great value by the killing of the invader, a fortiori it is lawful in this way to save the good of pudicity, which is much more excellent. For in that case the woman is exposed not only to some danger of consenting to a sinful act, but also of becoming pregnant and of bearing the greatest burdens of childbirth and education of offspring.¹²⁴

Cuniliati, O.P.,¹²⁵ writes concerning this matter: "The invader of another's pudicity, wishing by force to oppress an honorable woman, a girl, or a male, granted that no other way of escaping lies open (which otherwise seems difficult; nevertheless, this being supposed), is justly killed, not by intending the killing but the defense of oneself. Thus many others after St. Antoninus." St. Augustine¹²⁶ is sometimes alleged as contrary to this opinion, because he seems to approve the opinion of Evodius: "Wherefore I indeed do not censure the [civil] law which permits such men to be killed; but in what way I may defend those who kill them, I do not find." Nevertheless from the context it does not appear whether that is truly the sense of St. Augustine. Billuart¹²⁷ vigorously asserts that a virgin cannot licitly defend pudicity with the killing of the invader. Although the intrinsic reasons brought forward by St. Antoninus, whom St. Alphonsus,¹²⁸ Lugo, Molina, Lessius, Reiffenstuel, Elbel, Sporer, etc.¹²⁹ follow, do not seem to be so convincing (because the danger of consenting to sin is not so grave; the physical violation of virginity does not seem equivalent to the life of the aggressor; and finally the danger of conceiving offspring is almost none in such circumstances), nevertheless their opinion seems safe in practice, because such deflowerers are accustomed by intercourse to infect the woman with venereal disease, by which they themselves are not rarely infected; then, after the crime extorted by force, they are often carried off into such rage that they immediately kill the deflowered virgin (Lustmord). Therefore the virgin is then also placed in danger of death, and thus she can licitly kill the unjust aggressor. But if it is a question not of carnal intercourse itself, but of other immodest acts which do not cause so great a damage or shame, e.g., of kisses or touches, it is indeed lawful to beat but not to kill the unjust aggressor. But after deflowering or adultery has been extorted by force, it is no longer lawful to kill the deflowerer or adulterer, because then the killing would not be defense but illicit revenge.¹³⁰

¹²⁴ Cf. St. Antoninus, S. theol. P. 2, tit. 5, c. 6.

¹²⁵ Theol. mor. tr. 8, c. 2, § 2, n. 3.

¹²⁶ De lib. arb. l. 1, c. 5 (Migne, Patr. lat. 32, 1228).

¹²⁷ De iure et iust. diss. 10, a. 6, § 2.

¹²⁸ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 382.

¹²⁹ Cited by St. Alphonsus, l. c.

¹³⁰ Cf. ibid. n. 386.

123. c) Reputation or honor cannot be defended with the killing of an unjust aggressor. This is plain from proposition 30 condemned by Innocent XI, cited above.¹³¹ The reason is that then the moderation of blameless defense would be exceeded; for honor or reputation is not saved from the fact that someone kills his calumniator. Hence already from this head it appears how illicit and inept dueling is.¹³²

¹³¹ Cf. above n. 120.

¹³² The things which have been said thus far concerning bloody defense are also accustomed to be admitted by diverse criminal codes. Thus, e.g., it is had in the German Criminal Code § 53: "A punishable act is not present when the act was commanded by necessary defense. Necessary defense is that defense which is required to avert a present unlawful attack from oneself or another."

733. Things to be noted beforehand. An aggressor can be just or unjust. - There is no treatment of a just aggressor; since it is not licit to kill, mutilate, or strike him, because it is repugnant that rights opposed to rights be given. Whence one justly condemned to punishment cannot defend himself against the ministers of justice, such as lictors, witnesses, judges, executioners, by striking, mutilating, etc. (cf. n. 2311; see German Code, 226-231). An unjust aggressor is called one who, right resisting, actually invades life, fortune, modesty, or honor.

734. Principles. I. For protecting one's own life, or members of the body, it is licit to kill an unjust aggressor, with the moderation of blameless defense nevertheless observed.¹ That such defense of oneself is licit by both human and divine law, all doctors with St. Thomas and the Roman Catechism affirm, and the same is expressly declared in c. Si vero 3, de sent. excom., where it is said: "All laws and all rights permit force to be repelled by force" (III, 380; H. Ap., VIII, 11).

Indeed, if someone were morally certain concerning an aggression prepared for him, and could not otherwise avoid the ambushes laid and the dangers of death, it would be licit for him to anticipate the aggressor, lest later his own defense be rendered impossible or ineffective. Yet St. Alphonsus admonishes (III, n. 387) that this opinion, although more probable, can scarcely be held in practice because of the danger of hallucination.²

We have said: 1. It is licit to kill, but no one is held to this; because it is an extraordinary means of conserving one's own life.

Indeed, it is an act of perfection to permit one's own killing, lest the aggressor be deprived of temporal life together with eternal life; provided that: a) the life of the one invaded is not necessary or very useful to the common good, or to the family; b) the one invaded is not in the state of mortal sin: because then he is altogether held to defend himself (III, 380; H. Ap., VIII, 12, where there are more things). See what was said n. 482, 483.

2. An unjust aggressor, even if he is mad or drunk. For drunkenness and madness indeed exempt the aggressor, of themselves, from sin, but they do not deprive the one invaded of the right of protecting his own life. - In practice defense becomes easier if the aggressor is mad or drunk.

3. With moderation observed, etc.; that is, there must be in defense such moderation that nothing is done beyond that which is absolutely necessary for warding off injury. Whence, if the one invaded had another way of freeing himself from the invader, for example by fleeing, terrifying him with cries, disarming him, wounding him, he would not be in the extreme necessity which alone furnishes a just cause of killing.

But this, that they flee, etc., cannot be imposed on those who, because of omission of positive defense, even with lethal outcome, would receive a mark of cowardice or timidity. Yet this does not run for clerics, religious, and common people, for whom flight is not ignominious. - For the rest, the killing or mutilation of the aggressor must never be done from hatred, etc. Yet if it were done from hatred, the sin of injustice would not be present. Finally it must be noted that there is no moderation in defense if someone attacks, pursues, and kills the aggressor who flees.

735. • II. For protecting temporal goods of great value, it is licit to kill an unjust aggressor, provided they cannot otherwise be defended. Thus commonly.³ It is proved from Exodus (22, 2): If a thief breaking into a house, or digging under it, should be found, and having received a wound should die: the striker is not guilty of blood. The stronger reason is because the precept of charity does not oblige one to prefer the goods of neighbor of a higher order, unless neighbor is in extreme necessity. But he is not in extreme necessity when he of his own accord exposes himself to danger of death (III, 382). Besides, the killing of such an aggressor is not against justice, which of itself rather favors the rights of the actual possessor, and shows it to be necessary that such repression be done, so that the goods which are necessary for life may be preserved.

We have said: 1. Goods of great value, whose loss namely would bring notable harm, which must be judged from the circumstances, with both the wealth or need of the person and the necessity or superfluity of the things themselves being inspected.

For it is certain that it is not licit to kill an aggressor if it is a question of goods of small moment; or of goods which we do not yet actually possess. Hence this 31st proposition was condemned by Innocent XI: "Regularly I can kill a thief for the conservation of one gold coin." And the 32nd: "Not only is it licit to defend by killing defense the things which we actually possess, but also those things to which we have an inchoate right, and which we hope that we shall possess" (III, 383, q. 2; H. Ap., VIII, 15).

2. Provided they cannot otherwise be defended: for otherwise it must be said if, through the laws and police of the State, sufficient provision is made for public security and the reparation of injuries (Marres, de Just., l. 2, n. 240).

From these things it is deduced: a) It is licit for each person to defend his goods with arms, even through servants. - b) If a thief has already placed in safety your thing of great value which was taken away, and you have no other way of recovering it, you can more probably, if the thief resists you demanding back the thing, strike him, and, if necessary, kill him; because he is still an invader of the thing and a true aggressor. - c) Since the right of defense is natural, it belongs also to clerics and religious, who then do not incur irregularity. Yet such defense is not to be advised to them, if it is a question of goods of fortune alone (III, n. 383-385). d) Of itself it would not be illicit to arrange certain machines for defending a house against malefactors. For what the owner can do through himself, in the act of aggression, he can do through others or through other things. - Ordinarily, however, these will not be licit, because for the most part moderation in defense will be lacking. But if they become necessary, let citizens be warned that danger is not lacking. Ami du Cl., 1905, p. 1146; cf. Lehmkuhl, Cas. consc., n. 670.

736. III. For protecting modesty, it is licit to kill an unjust invader, if force cannot otherwise be repelled. Thus commonly against a few. The reason is both because for the most part there is danger of consenting to an act of sin, and because modesty is a good to be esteemed most greatly, and to be preferred to all riches, indeed even to life (III, 386; H. Ap., VIII, 16).

Hence: 1. A man can kill him who wishes to commit adultery with his wife, if he cannot otherwise avoid infamy (l. El. qq. ref., n. 22; III, 391).

2. It will be licit for a girl, not only while she is actually violently touched, but immediately after, to strike the invader with slaps, fists, a staff, and even with non-dangerous blows. The reason is that unless in such a mode she shows her displeasure, he will not easily depart. Hence, this is to be advised to a woman, so that the other at least may come to his senses and not solicit her another time (III, 386).

737. IV. For protecting the goods of reputation or honor, it is not licit, at least practically speaking, to kill an unjust aggressor. This is established from proposition 30 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is right for an honored man to kill an invader who strives to inflict calumny, if otherwise this calumny cannot be avoided; the same also must be said if someone strikes with a slap or beats with a staff, and after the slap struck or the blow of the staff flees." For the one invaded can always provide for his own honor by another way, for example by flight, by action before a tribunal. Besides, this being admitted, the way would be open to innumerable slayings (III, 381; 2. El. qq. ref., n. 9).

Although it is not licit to kill the invader of honor, nevertheless by no right is it prohibited that the one invaded immediately by words or deeds make an attack against those who by words or deeds detracted from his honor. Certainly there are counsels and the example of the Lord which indicate another way; but here the question is only of licit or illicit (Noldin, II, n. 334).

Let it be noted: 1. What is licit for anyone for the defense of his own life, modesty, fortune, this also generally is LICIT for the defense of similar goods against an unjust invader of neighbor, as is gathered from the precept of loving neighbor as oneself. Except, as regards modesty, the case in which the person invaded herself consents: unless she is very near to the defender, and he cannot otherwise avoid his own infamy. - But if it is a question of life, it is licit to defend neighbor, even if this person has yielded the right of legitimate defense; because the right to defense is diverse from the right to life: for neighbor cannot abdicate the right to life, since he is not the lord of his own life.

2. No one is HELD to such defense of neighbor, unless he owes it from office, as soldiers hired for the security of citizens; or from piety toward more nearly related blood relatives, namely parents, children, brothers, sisters. The reason is that from the precept of charity alone we are not held to stain our hands with human blood, nor to undergo grave inconveniences which usually arise from homicide otherwise licit. - Yet except "if the one to be killed by the invader is drunk and in the state of mortal sin, because he is truly in extreme necessity of soul" (III, n. 389-391; H. Ap., VIII, 17).

3. Civil laws do not protect the goods enumerated above in an equal way. Let each person consult the codes. Nevertheless tribunals ordinarily do not condemn those who kill an aggressor of goods of the greatest moment. Cf. Tanquerey, II, p. 144; Noldin, II, n. 334; Olshausen, Strafgesetzbuch, § 53.

467. Principles. - I. It is licit for each one to defend his own life even with the killing of an unjust aggressor; for each one has a right of conserving life unjustly attacked: therefore he can defend it by necessary means, and consequently even by mutilation or killing of the aggressor, if in no other way he is able to snatch himself from death; for the order of right and of charity permits that we prefer our own life to another's: and in Canon Law it is said: "All laws and all rights permit force to be repelled by force." - I said: it is licit, but not commanded, unless the life of him who suffers the aggression is very useful to the common good, or the one attacked would die in mortal sin. - St. Alphonsus.³

II. In just defense against an unjust aggressor the moderation of blameless defense must be observed, or nothing ought to be done except that which is absolutely necessary for protecting oneself; because what necessity does not excuse is against justice. - Likewise one must take care lest the killing, etc., be done from hatred, revenge, etc.

468. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it licit to kill a drunken or insane aggressor?

Resp. In the affirmative, more probably, unless it is clear to you that he is in the state of mortal sin. The reason is that although the drunken or insane man is not formally your unjust aggressor, nevertheless he inflicts a true injustice, and there remains for you the right of defending your own life. But if you know certainly that he is in the state of lethal sin, since he is in extreme necessity, charity requires that you prefer his eternal salvation to the conservation of your temporal life. But otherwise if he were master of himself (for his own evil would be imputed to him), or if no prudent hope of his salvation shines forth, as almost in the insane. L. IV. 390 at the end. (T) p. 479.

Quaer. 2° Is it licit to defend an innocent neighbor by the killing of the aggressor?

Resp. In the affirmative, in every case in which it is licit to defend one's own life; and this by reason of charity.¹ Yet a private person rarely seems to be bound to this. - I said: 1° rarely; for an exception must be made if the one attacked is necessary to the public good, or if he is father, son, wife, or brother, whom piety obligates one to protect, or if he is drunk and in mortal sin, because then he is in extreme necessity. I said: 2° a private person; because by themselves those are bound upon whom the special duty is incumbent of defending citizens, yet not with danger of their own life, unless there is question of averting a public evil,² or they have specially obligated themselves also to this.

469. • Quaer. 3° Is it licit to kill an unjust aggressor also for the defense of members?

Resp. In the affirmative with the common sentence, against a few. The reason is that each one has a right of preserving a good most necessary to himself for life. Besides, in such risk the life of the one attacked is also practically endangered.³

Quaer. 4° Is it licit to defend goods of fortune of great moment with the killing of the thief, if otherwise they cannot be defended or recovered?

Resp. In the affirmative, at least more probably. The reason is deduced from what was said in the preceding question; for each one has the right of conserving goods of great moment in proportion to his condition, and therefore, by that very fact, of using means absolutely necessary for this. On the other hand, the precept of charity does not obligate one to prefer the goods of a neighbor, although of a superior order, except when the neighbor is in extreme necessity; but otherwise, when he of his own accord exposes himself to this danger of death.² (Y) p. 460.

470. • Quaer. 5° Is it licit for a woman to kill an invader of chastity?

Resp. In the affirmative, more probably. The reason is that chastity is a good more excellent than riches; therefore, if it is licit to kill an unjust aggressor of goods of fortune, it will be licit a fortiori for preserving chastity. - St. Alphonsus² and others commonly. From what was said in n. 468, Quaer. 2°, it is also clear that it is lawful to kill an invader of another's chastity, just as it is licit for the one suffering force herself; unless, however, the woman consents, or at least does not positively resist; indeed even if she consents, provided she is very closely related to the defender. - Yet this is never licit after the fact.³ Cf. n. 471. 3°.

Quaer. 6° Is it licit to kill another for the conservation of honor?

Resp. In the negative, at least speaking practically; because honor for the most part can be preserved by other means: besides, by today's morals, flight in such a case is not held shameful either for a noble or for a military man. Otherwise, moreover, a way would lie open to innumerable slaughters. This is also clear from propositions 17 and 18 among those condemned by Alexander VII, p. XIII, and 30 by Innocent XI, p. XVI.

471. You will resolve. - 1° It is not licit to kill a thief carrying off a thing of lesser moment, even with resistance of the owner; because although such taking away is done with a special injury against him on account of violence, nevertheless an injury of this sort is not judged grave according to the estimation of men.⁴ Yet the owner is not bound to let go of the thing, and, the moderation of blameless defense being observed, he can defend himself, if the other inflicts force upon his person for carrying it away.

2° It is not licit to kill him whom you merely suspect of aggression.⁵ But otherwise, speaking speculatively, if it is morally certain concerning the depraved will of the aggressor, and the danger cannot be met in another way. - I said: speaking speculatively; for in practice, on account of the danger of hallucination, and because that certainty is obtained with greatest difficulty, it will scarcely be licit.²

3° It is not licit to kill an aggressor after the fact, because it would be revenge, not defense. An exception is made when the aggression, effectively, as they say, was continuing in the flight of an aggressor carrying off a stolen thing. - Thus commonly.

4° It is not licit for a girl to kill the aggressor of her honor after oppression; yet she can strike him and treat him badly and most bitterly, especially because, unless in such a way she shows her constancy and displeasure, the wicked man will not easily depart, or will be able easily to return to solicitation.³

5° It is not licit, at least practically speaking, even for an honorable man to anticipate by killing an aggressor wishing to strike him with a slap; for he can always consult his own honor by flight or another way.² Yet it is licit to ward off the one attacking, even with weapons made ready, and to show oneself ready for one's own defense.

361. Thesis IV. The killing of an unjust aggressor, at least indirect, is licit for defending life or an equivalent good, with the moderation of blameless defense being observed.

It is said 1) licit, and not obligatory, because generally no one is bound to defend himself in this hard way, but he can, from a motive of virtue, permit his own death, unless he is very necessary to his family or to the common good, or unless he distrusts his own state of grace;⁴

⁴ Let it not be said that he who offers his life for his neighbor is always in the state of grace, because he performs an act of heroic charity; for that is true only if he so acts from the motive of perfect love of God.

2. the killing of an aggressor, that is, of one who actually brings force to bear, or at least in some way has begun the work and morally is already invading, as if he displays signs of an imminent aggression (by drawing a sword, seizing a firearm, etc.), or has altogether determined to attack and is now seeking the occasion of aggression and this is established from some present indication; but in doubt there would be place for caution or for interrogation, not for defense.⁵ For to kill before the aggression would be to forestall it, not to defend oneself against it; and when the aggression has ended, it would no longer be defense, but vengeance;

⁵ Hence Alexander VII condemned proposition 18: "It is licit to kill a false accuser, false witnesses, even a judge, from whom an unjust sentence is certainly imminent, if in no other way can an innocent person avoid harm."

3. unjust; therefore it is illicit to defend oneself against the just action of ministers of justice or of officers, but licit against a materially unjust aggression attempted by a drunken man or a madman, unless that man certainly is in the state of sin and the one attacked is certainly in the state of grace;

4. at least indirect: we say this because some, such as Lugo and Waffelaert, think that in the case the direct killing itself is licit, provided that it is not intended as an end but chosen as a means; nevertheless we judge it more conformable to truth, with St. Thomas, that bloody defense is nothing except indirect killing;

5. for defending life or an equivalent good, whether one's own or another's, so that there is present a good effect proportionate to the death of the aggressor; but an equivalent good is the integrity of members to be preserved, or sensation or the use of reason not to be irreparably lost: whether another good can be judged equivalent is left aside for now;

6. with the moderation of blameless defense, that is, so that no more be done than is necessary for defense; whence it is illicit to kill if it suffices to wound, illicit to wound if it suffices to shout, or if it is possible to flee without dishonor, but not if it would be done with great detriment: a soldier or nobleman cannot always flee without dishonor; a cleric, a man of the common people can; indeed a soldier or nobleman can before a madman or a drunken man.

It is proved: It is licit to posit a cause of a double effect, one good, the other evil, when certain conditions are present (n. 352). But this is verified in the case. For a) the indirect killing of an unjust aggressor is an action not evil, since it is nothing except to repel force by force and just defense; b) from it there equally and immediately arises the good effect, namely the preservation of life, just as the evil: the death of the aggressor; c) the good effect is proportionate to the evil, because the life of the innocent one attacked is worth the life of the guilty aggressor, and it is not otherwise to be preserved; d) only the good effect is intended in itself, not thus the evil, since if it could be done otherwise it would not be inflicted. Therefore it is licit.

This was solemnly consecrated by the Law, as Innocent III relates: "Although all laws and rights permit force to be repelled by force, nevertheless, because this must be done with moderation of blameless defense, not for taking vengeance but for driving away injury..."⁶

⁶ Cf. French Penal Code, a. 328; Belgian, a. 416; German, a. 53; likewise English law.

Let St. Thomas be heard, q. 64, a. 7: "Nothing prohibits there being two effects of one act, of which one only is in the intention, while the other is outside the intention... Therefore from the act of someone defending himself a double effect can follow: one indeed, the preservation of his own life; but the other, the killing of the attacker. Therefore an act of this kind, from the fact that the preservation of one's own life is intended, does not have the character of the illicit, since this is natural to anyone, that he preserve himself in being as much as he can. Yet some act proceeding from a good intention can be rendered illicit if it is not proportionate to the end. And therefore if someone, for defending his own life, uses greater violence than is fitting, it will be illicit. But if he repels violence moderately, the defense will be licit, for according to the laws 'it is licit to repel force by force with the moderation of blameless defense.' Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit an act of moderate defense in order to avoid the killing of another, because a man is bound to provide for his own life more than for another's life. But because it is not licit to kill a man except by public authority on account of the common good..., it is illicit that a man intend to kill a man in order to defend himself, unless he is one who has public authority; and he, intending to kill a man for his own defense, refers this to the public good, as is clear in a soldier fighting against enemies, and in a minister of a judge fighting against robbers, although even these sin if they are moved by private passion."

362. For protecting what goods is bloody defense licit? - Theologians have disputed whether such indirect wounding or killing of an aggressor can be licit for defending other lesser goods of oneself or of another: goods of fortune, chastity, reputation and honor. Now:

1. Many have said that it is licit for defending goods of fortune.

But this certainly does not hold a) for goods to be possessed and for a right to the thing, as moreover is established from the condemned proposition 32 by Innocent XI,⁷ but at most for goods actually possessed and for a right in the thing; b) nor for goods of lesser moment, for example, formerly for one or another gold coin,⁸ or now for 500 lire or 1,000 francs, even of gold value, but at most for goods of great value; but a matter of great moment would be to fall from one's state, or to suffer great detriment in it, whence it must be considered not only absolutely but relatively; c) nor for those things which could also be recovered otherwise... For goods of great moment, already possessed, whose loss would probably be irreparable, this can be sustained as probable, because it pertains to public security and to the common good that violent robbers should not be able to snatch goods of this kind with impunity, without incurring danger to life. Yet this is not certain, because, as others say: it is not licit as punishment, because punishment does not belong to private persons; nor as defense, because proportion is lacking between the fortune of the attacked one to be preserved and the very life of the attacker.

⁷ "Not only is it licit to defend by lethal defense the things which we actually possess, but also those to which we have an inchoate right and which we hope that we will possess."

⁸ Proposition 31 condemned by Innocent XI: "Regularly I can kill a thief for the preservation of one gold coin."

2. A fortiori many have held it licit for defending chastity.

But this also is very doubtful. For the integrity of the flesh does not seem of such value that it can be equated with life. But the integrity of the soul can be preserved otherwise, by not consenting to sin.

3. Some also have held it licit for defending reputation and honor, which are esteemed more than goods of fortune, indeed more than life.

But this last is true of the foundation of honor, namely, of virtue, which is worth more than life, not of honor itself, which is a very fragile thing. Moreover reputation and honor cannot be defended by the wounding or killing of one defaming or dishonoring. For after the fact, it would not be defense but vengeance by private authority: for if a nobleman who has unjustly received a slap or an insult strikes back, this certainly does not avail for defending honor thus taken away, but for obtaining from vengeance a new and false honor. But before the fact, it would be prevention, not defense; nor is that necessary, because the loss of honor and reputation is not irreparable, since by other means it can be preserved or at least recovered (for example, by verbal retort, by judicial way, or by goodness of life), and the wounding or killing of the attacker is of itself an inept means for conserving or recovering such a good, since it is rather defamatory. Therefore this was deservedly condemned.⁹ Besides, violent defense of honor or reputation would afford an entrance to countless slaughters and enmities with great detriment to the common good.

⁹ Proposition 30 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is lawful for an honorable man to kill an attacker who endeavors to bring calumny upon him, if otherwise this disgrace cannot be avoided; the same also must be said if someone gives a slap or strikes with a staff, and after the slap has been given or the blow of the staff flees." And proposition 17 condemned by Alexander VII: "It is licit for a religious and a cleric to kill a calumniator threatening to scatter grave crimes about him or about his religion, when another way of defending is not available; as it does not seem to be available if the calumniator is prepared publicly and before very grave men to impute the aforesaid things either to the religious himself or to his religion, unless he is killed."

All the aforesaid things are to be understood of these goods alone; but it would have to be said otherwise if at the same time there were an aggression against the person, especially if bodily integrity came into danger or an aggression against life could deservedly be feared. For someone can defend his own things (or chastity) even by force, and if the aggressor resists and seriously threatens mutilation or death, he can kill him by necessity of defense. And if one attempts to strike with a slap or a staff, the other can impede him by force; and if he who has struck is prepared to continue the injury, the one attacked can repel force by force (if there is no place for flight), even with the killing of the aggressor when he threatens death.

I say. It is licit for each person to defend his own life even with the killing of an unjust aggressor, provided nevertheless that the moderation of inculpable defense is preserved. The reason is taken both from canon law, chap. Si vero 8, de sent. excomm., where it is said: "All laws and all rights permit force to be repelled by force"; and from natural law. For since each person has the right to preserve his own life, he must also have the right of employing the means which are necessary for this end and not otherwise illicit. But to kill an unjust aggressor is sometimes the sole means of saving one's own life, nor through this are any certain rights of anyone violated; since the aggressor, by freely and unjustly bringing into danger the life of another, cannot retain the right to his own life against the certain right of an innocent person. Therefore.

Yet I added that the moderation of inculpable defense is to be preserved, or that nothing ought to be done against the life of the aggressor unless it is absolutely necessary for protecting one's own life, because what necessity does not excuse is contrary to justice. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 64, art. 7. - St. Alphonsus, n. 380.

Question 1. Is it licit to kill a drunken or insane aggressor?

Response. Affirmatively, more probably, unless it is clear to you that he is in the state of mortal sin. The reason is that although a drunken or insane person is not formally your unjust aggressor, nevertheless he is materially unjust, nor is your right to life lost through his drunkenness or insanity. But if you know certainly - which surely will be very rare - that he is in the state of mortal sin, from which after frenzy or drunkenness he will be able to rise again, while on the contrary you morally believe that you are in the state of grace, charity requires that you prefer his eternal salvation to your temporal life. Yet nothing prevents, even in that hypothesis, you from striking or wounding him in such a way that, his life being safe, he becomes unable to do harm. Cf. Lugo, de just. et jur., disp. 10, n. 143.

Question 2. Is it licit to defend goods of fortune of great moment with the killing of the thief, if otherwise they cannot be retained?

Response. Affirmatively, more probably, and the reason is that each person has the right of preserving goods of great moment, and by that very fact of employing the means absolutely necessary for this. Besides, the precept of charity does not oblige one to prefer the goods of a neighbor, though of a higher order, except when the neighbor is in extreme necessity, but not when he spontaneously exposes himself to the danger of death and injures the rights of another. By this same reason it is concluded that an unjust aggressor can be killed for the defense of members. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 383 and following.

Question 3. Is it licit for a woman to kill an assailant of chastity?

Response. Affirmatively, because chastity is a good more excellent than riches; and accordingly if it is licit to kill an unjust aggressor of goods of fortune, this will be licit a fortiori for preserving chastity. But a girl cannot kill an aggressor against her honor after violation, because this would be to take vengeance; nevertheless she can strike him and treat him most harshly, especially because, unless in such a way she shows her constancy and displeasure, the wicked man will not easily depart, or will easily be able to return to soliciting. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 386.

Question 4. Is it licit to kill an unjust aggressor against honor?

Response. Negatively, altogether, if the injury has already been inflicted, in whatever way it has been inflicted, whether by words or by deeds; because this would not be to defend oneself but to take vengeance, which is licit for no one. It is also clear from the second part of prop. 30 proscribed by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: "It is lawful for an honorable man to kill an assailant who attempts to inflict calumny, if otherwise this calumny cannot be avoided: the same also must be said if someone strikes with a slap or with a stick, and after the slap has been struck or the blow of the stick flees." - One must also respond negatively if it concerns preventing or repelling an injury of honor inflicted by words only, both because the injury can then and usually does get repelled by other means, and accordingly killing is not necessary, and because otherwise an entrance would lie open to innumerable slaughters. - Besides, prop. 17 condemned by Alexander VII bears on this point, which sounds thus: "It is licit for a Religious or Cleric to kill a calumniator threatening to spread grave crimes about him or about his Religion, when another mode of defending does not suffice, as it does not seem to suffice if the calumniator is prepared publicly and before most grave men to impute the aforesaid things either to the Religious himself or to his Religion, unless he is killed." - I said by words only, for if an aggressor against honor attempts to pull the beard, soil the clothes, or do something similar, it will certainly be licit, with the moderation of inculpable defense being preserved, to repel the injury, and if indeed the obstinate aggressor, having been repelled, employs force and seizes weapons, it will surely be licit to oppose weapons to weapons. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 381 and 391. - Viva, on the cited propositions. - Lacroix, lib. 3, p. 1, n. 803. - Baller., note (b) and (c), p. 378.

Question 5. Is it also licit to kill an unjust aggressor against one's neighbor?

Response. Affirmatively, in every case in which it is licit to defend one's own life or other goods of great moment: indeed it is not only licit, but it ought also to be done by reason of charity. Yet rarely does a private person seem to be bound to this, on account of the great inconveniences which such killing ordinarily brings with it, excluding the case in which the person attacked is very necessary to society, or joined very nearly to you by blood. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 389 and 390. Baller., note (c), p. 377.

AS a certain truth the Holy Doctor asserts that a man may kill another, necessity compelling the defense of his life, his soul, if it be done with the moderation of blameless defense. Hence it follows that this is lawful to any persons whatsoever, even those in a state of perfection, namely Religious, who are bound to perfection, or Bishops, who are bound to be in a state of perfection. So serm. 6. de decem praeceptis.

BUT that we may know: what is that moderation of blameless defense by which homicide is made unpunishable in the external forum, and lawful in the forum of conscience, and immune from all irregularity, and from excommunication.

FAGUNDEZ l. 5. cap. 5. says it consists in three things: namely, in time, in manner, and in cause.

IN Time: that it be done incontinently, that is, in the very act of the assault of invasion, not after a long interval. For if it be done after a long interval, it will not be to repel force with force in act; but it will be to take vengeance, which is never lawful, as is said in Ezech. 9. Vengeance is mine, and I will repay. And Deuter. 32. Mine is revenge, and I will repay in due time. So teaches D. Bonav. serm. 6. Decal. where he laid down the first condition, that it be not done out of a lust for vengeance, which he finds in almost all the authors above alleged. There follow Sayrus l. 7. cap. 10. num. 28. et patet ex cap. significasti, 2. de homicid. Salomon. in repetit. Legis, ut vim, ff. de iustitia, et iure: Claudius num. 56. Bolognetus num 46. because he says it is done incontinently which is done while the brawl lasts, or while the assailant does not withdraw from it. Cynus l. 1. num. 4. C. Unde vi, Bartol. ibi, num. 9. Baldus num. 8. Hostiens. in cap. significasti, 2. extra de homicid. num. 17. Ananias ibi, num. 18. Butrius in C. olim causam, de restit. spoliat. num. 37. Bellamera ibi, num. 22. Angelus de malef. in verbo, et dictus Titius, se defendendo, num. 18.

Wherefore it is not done incontinently when the one insulted withdraws into his house, seeking weapons, and immediately returns to the assailant, as Cepolla thinks cons. 42. et fere Mascard. de probat. l. 3. concl. 1126. num. 51.

Secondly, the moderation of blameless defense consists in manner, which condition the Holy Doctor expresses as: that it be not done out of cruelty: by which word he shows that the manner is exceeded when the manner of defense is with too many wounds multiplied, with the body savagely pierced through, as with the head struck off, the belly laid open. That moderation of the act, indeed, in the recoil, equal to the blow of the assailant, as in an arm for an arm, but not in the head, is morally impossible, as Fagundez says num. 7. Likewise that one, in the equality of weapons, seems vain, for often the assailant has inferior weapons.

Thirdly an equality of Cause is required, and this S. Bonav. explains, saying there must be a necessity morally inevitable, so much so, that it cannot be done otherwise, nor does any other manner of preserving oneself from death, or danger, occur, and this is to repel force with force. So Iaso in l. Vim vi. Bolognetus num. 89. Bartol. l. 1. C. Unde vi. Ananias loc. cit. Caepol. Consil. 43. num. 7. et in hoc fere solo moderamen hoc posuit Molina Tom. 4. tract. 3. disp. 11. as cited by Diana p. 5. tract. 4. resol. 1. But there Vega reports T. 1. cap. 127. casu 12. another condition laid down: that no greater diligence be employed in the defense than is necessary.

The Holy Doctor says there that he, or another Religious, lest perhaps he incur disgrace, cannot kill, but must take flight; otherwise he is not entirely excused, if he kill. Wherefore he seems to concede, with Molina loc. cit. et Hurtado 1. 2. disp. 170. §. 135. and Diana, alleging the common opinion of the Doctors, that it is lawful to kill the assailant, if it would be gravely disgraceful for the assailant to flee: But of this below.

Therefore I assert that it is lawful to kill the invader with the moderation of blameless defense. This is against Accursius, and Gloss. Leg. vim vi, ff. de Iustitia, et iure, Richard de S. Victore opusc. de Charitate. Ioan. Gerson Tract. de Eucharistia, Augustine of Ancona Tract. de potestate Ecclesiae, quaest. 2. art. 3. Hugo dist. 50. C. de his Clericis. Abulensis in cap. 5. Matth. quaest. 109. So all the Doctors uphold it, as cited by Diana loc. cit. et Fagundez in 5. Praeceptum decal. lib. 5. cap. 3.

This Cicero proves pro Milone; nay, the Supreme Pontiff Alexander III. C si vero, de sent. excom. et D. August. l. 1. de lib. arb. before the middle; because all the Laws permit force to be repelled with force.

It is proved secondly by the Holy Doctor at those words Luke 22. Et nunc qui non habet, vendat tunicam suam, et emat gladium, namely for defense.

The Holy Doctor also observes, at those words: et percussit unus ex illis servum Pontificis sacerdotum, et amputavit auriculam eius dexteram, that Luke did not name him; and that John added the name for the sake of praising zeal, Simon ergo Petrus, etc. on which the Gloss: Simon Peter was zealous with the same ardor of mind, as Phinees, of whom it is said, that he therefore obtained from God an everlasting Priesthood, Numer. 25.

But it must be gravely observed that the Seraphic Doctor does not except state, or rank of person in this case, nor even a sacred place, from which you may draw many conclusions.

First, for you have that even in a consecrated Church this is lawful, and it is not defiled thereby. So, even if a Priest, celebrating at the altar, be assailed, he can kill the invader, and immediately continue the Mass without fear of irregularity, even if the invader killed be a cleric: So Abbas C. Clerici de vita cleric. Socin. in repert. C ad audientiam, num. 40. de homic. Decius in l. ut vim, ff. de Iustitia, et iure. Hippolytus in l. Is qui aggressorem, C. ad legem Cornel. Ioan. de Lignano C. de Iusto bello, cap. 26. D. Antonin. 3. p. tit. 34. §. 1. cap. 4. Lessius T. 1. lib. 2. cap. 9. dub. 8. num. 41. Suarez Tom 5. in 3. p. disp. 46. sect. 3. Iul. Clar. §. Homic. nur 29. Gloss in cap. significasti, de homicid. v. tutelae. Farinacius T. 4. quaest. 125. de homic. num. 14. 22. et 29. Capua l. 1. decis. aur. cap. 65. num. 9. Carrer. in pract. de homicid. et affinio, §. 5. excus. 3. Placa epur. delict. cap. 18. num. 4. et 6. et many others cited by Farinacius, with whom Fagundez subscribes num. 5. et others.

Secondly, as to persons, you have also that persons can kill the invader, their own prelate. So Farinac. loc. cit. num. 34. Decius in l. Ut vim, ff. de Iustitia, et iure, num. 8. Salon. num. 10. Bolognet. ibi, num. 16. Angel. in l. Quoniam multa, C. ad l. Iuliam de vi publ. num. 16. Hostiensis in C. significasti, 2. num. 19. de homic. Butrius num. 19. et commonly, as cited by Fagundez num. 6.

But the question is: Whether you may kill even a Prince, an unjust invader. Many indeed affirm it. So Farinac. T. 4. quaest. 125. de homic. num. 34. fol. 202. Marsil. consil. 1. Petrus Caleph. consil. crim. 103. Carter. de homic. §. quinto excusat. etc. Iulius Clar. §. Homicid. num. 23. Decian. in tract. crim. l. 7. cap. 49. num. 25. Azor. Tom. 3. l. 2. cap. 2. Less. T. 1. l. 2. dub. 8. num. 41. et others.

But this must by no means be admitted so absolutely; for the Law dictates that the common good be preferred to the private; yet from the death of a Prince innumerable evils not rarely arise, as Fagundez cries num. 8. Suarez de censur. disp. 46. sect. 1. et commonly the Doctors cited by Diana p. 5. tract. 4. resol. 2. Baffaeus v. Charitas, num. 20. et v. Homicidium 1. num. 28.

Whatever Bisseldins exaggerates de iniur. cap. 1. q. 5. concl. 5. Angel. v. defensio in Princ. Sylvest. v. bellum 2. quaest. 5. S. Antonin. 3. p. tit. 4. cap. 3. Aurea Armilla v. Defensio, Vasquez l. 1. Illustrium contr. cap. 18. n. 8. Card. Zabarell. in Clem. 1. de paenis.

Yet I would not reject the opinion of these Doctors in one case: that if assailed by a Prince, he should probably fear an imminent damnation of his soul. So Malder. 2. 2. tract. 3. cap. 1. dub. 7. et it seems the opinion of D. Bonav. loc. cit. serm. 6. where he concedes it universally, that he may impede him, lest he lose his life and his soul; and while this condition intervenes, it is extended even to Monks, nor is any person excepted. Whatever Diana says with others.

There arises, moreover, from what has been said the question: Whether it be lawful to kill the invader on account of a grave injury, for instance one inflicted upon a wife, who is being assailed.

Diana resol. 5. with Villalob. T. 1. tract. 22. diffic. 10. Vega in summa, tom. 1. cap. 127. casu 11. Petrus Nauar. de restit. lib. 2. cap. 3. num. 361. Salon. 2. 2. quaest. 64. art. 7. controv. 1. Molina tom. 4. tract. 3. disp. 15. Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 64. art. 7. assert that this can be done with impunity.

He brings forward many frivolous reasons. One reason from D. Bonaventure seems valid to me: If damnation presses upon the adulterer, then one will be able to kill such an assailant, as Bannes says, and Rodriquez Tom. 1. cap. 220. for then the natural law dictates to me that even a greater good may be preferred.

Moreover, as to life, the adulterer is an unjust assailant even of the husband's life, whom he gravely provokes to the dangers of death. See Navar. cap. 15. num. 7. yet it would be an eminent act rather to die, as Bassaeus says loco citato.

From these you have that it is lawful even to anticipate the assailant, if it be necessary inevitably to escape death. So Diana resol. 5. et alii, as Couar. in Clem. si furiosus, p. 3. §. unico. Otherwise it is not lawful to anticipate, as Bass. num 11. et 16. says.

The Seraphic Doctor, in serm. 6. de decem praeceptis, speaks thus. But if he be a homicide from necessity, this is twofold: either from inevitable, or from avoidable necessity: Avoidable necessity is, if I can escape, but I decline to do so on account of shame, or another cause, and in that case he is excused from so much, but not from all: because it would be better that he flee.

Then he adds: But if there be inevitable necessity, that a man kill another man, not out of love of vengeance, but out of love of the conservation of life and soul, so that he do not kill him out of cruelty, but that he impede him, lest he lose his life and his soul, provided this be done with the moderation of blameless defense, this has been granted even to persons in a state of perfection, not only to those in an imperfect state. And this he says August. lib. 1. de libero arbitrio, and he is excused from so much, and from all. So S. Bonav. There S. August. cap. 5. being asked: Whether it were lawful to kill an invader of life, chastity, and goods. He answered, that it is lawful on account of life and chastity; the rest he omits.

From these things, attentively read through, you have that, solely on account of saving life or soul, it is lawful, according to D. Bonavent., to kill another; and further, that no person whatsoever is to be excused, if he weigh flight so highly, or any other disgrace, that to flee these he kills.

This opinion they defend: Sylvius 2. 2. q. 64. art. 7. quaeritur 9. Bisfeldius in com. de iniur. et damno, cap. 1. quaest. 5. concl. 8. Bolognetus in l. Ut vim, num. 42. ff. de Iustitia, et iure, Baldus l. 4. consil. 312. and others. You have very many reasons in Sylvius, of which the eminent one is that of D. Bonav. loc. cit. arguing from the Religious and Episcopal state, that it is not lawful for any Christian whatsoever to defend honor in this way. A Christian man, a Bishop, or Religious is bound to flee, if he can, and it is not lawful to kill the assailant, because the Religion of Christ requires this; but a Christian at last pledges the worship of Christ in Baptism, renouncing all the pomps of Satan. This argument terrifies those saying that it is lawful for a noble Christian; not for a plebeian, or Cleric, or Religious, as Bass. num. 22. holds, excluding plebeians, and num. 26. Clerics, etc., with Diana p. 5. tract. 4. resol. 49. Lessio lib. 2. cap. 9. num. 86. and others; who say that this is lawful to a Christian; Bassaeus indeed so holds num. 2. Less. dub. 12. num. 77. Diana p. 3. tract. 5. miscell. resol. 90. Add Petr. Navar. l. 2. cap. 36. num. 389. and others.

I press upon the man himself. That which is of the law of nature pertains to all indispensably: But to kill the one committing injustice does not pertain to plebeians, Clerics, or Religious according to you: Therefore deservedly Andreas Gail. observat. 100. num. 8. says, of those saying the opposite, that they teach politically rather than Christianly.

This utterance, however, Diana cries out is immodest resol. 9. following the opposite opinion, alleging both Nauarros, Valencia, Bannes, Salonius, Aragon, whom he cites and follows Tanner. T. 3. disp. 4. quaest. 8. dub. 4. num. 7. Turrianum 2. 2. T. 2. disp. 28. dub. 5. Escobar. p. 1. de puritate, et nobilitate probanda, quaest. 1. §. 8. num. 13. Azorium Tom. 3. lib. 2. cap. 1. quaestio 14. Molinam tomo 4. tract. 3. disput. 17. Sotum de iustitia, quaest. 1. num. 8. Nauar. man. cap. 15. Gomez Tom. 3. variarum resol. cap. 3. num. 23. and says it is the common opinion.

The same opinion Fagundez upholds in 5. praeceptum, cap. 3. adducing Lessium Tom. 1. l. 2. dub. 11. num. 66. Farinacius with many others cited by him T. 4. quaest. 125. de homicid. tit. 14. num. 41. Salomonem in repetit. Legis, ut vim, ff. de Iusticia, et iure. Bouër. decis. 168. Toletum l. 5. summa, cap. 6. Ananiam in cap. suscepimus, de homicid. Sylvest. verbo homicid. 1. quaest. 15. Iulium Clarum l. 5. sent. §. Homicid. num. 26. Bartholum l. 1. num. 8. C. Unde vi. Angelum in l. Is qui aggressor, C. de sicaer. where he says this is the common practice of the world; add Petrum Navarrum l. 2. de restit. cap. 3. num. 16.

Hence some of those alleged infer that it is lawful for a noble secular man to kill one who insults him, who wishes to strike him with a cudgel, or a blow of the hand, if he cannot otherwise avoid the ignominious blow; a bloody dogma indeed, and worthy that on its account several Pontiffs have hurled various excommunications.

Diana agglomerates many with these p. 1. Tract. 15. resol. 15. saying it is lawful, after a blow of the hand, a cudgel, or a wound has been dealt, to pursue the fugitive and kill him: Navar. Man. cap. 14. num. 4. Petrum Navar. de restit. l. 2. cap. 3. num. 382. Victoriam de Iure belli, quaest. 2. num. 5. Henriquez sum. lib. 14. cap. 10. num. 3. who adduces others, Fernandez in Exam. p. 1. cap. 9. §. 1. the same Diana upholds p. 5. Tract. 4. resol. 11. adducing moreover Merchantium in summa resol. Pastor. ad decal. cap. 5. quaest. 3. casu 3. Fabrum in 4. dist. 15. disp. 52. cap. 1. num. 29.

Against these, however, they set themselves in a crowded column after D. Bonav. loc. cit. Ioannes de la Cruz in Direct. p. 2. praecept. 5. dub. 6. Tolet. l. 2. cap. 6. man. 16. Rodriquez 41. cap. 135. num. 11. Turrian. 2. 2. quaest. 27. dub. 3. citing Bannes and Sotus. Salon. 2. 2. quaest. 64. art. 7. cont. 2. Malder. 2. 2. tract. 3. cap. 1. dub. 14. and others.

From the adversaria others advance, saying it is lawful to kill the one offering contumely, when that injury cannot otherwise be warded off. So Escobar. p. 1. de puritate, et nobil. quaest. 1. gloss. 4. num. 14. Petr. Navar. de restit. l. 2. cap. 3. num. 376. et Henricus Strouersdorf. de Iustitia, et iure, in 2. 2. quaest. 64. art. 7. Baldell. in Theol. Mor. l. 3. disp. 24. num. 24.

Diana reproves this, however resol. 12. loc. cit. Hurtad. 2. 2. disp. 170. sect. 15. §. 123. Petrus Binfeldius de iniur. cap. 1. quaest. 9. Molfes. tom. 1. tract. 11. cap. 19. num. 74. Lessius l. 2. cap. 9. dub. 13. num. 78. Filliuc. tom. 2. tract 29. cap. 3. num. 49. Azor. t. 3. l. 2. cap. 1. quaestio 17. Bassaeus num 23. but coldly.

Hence the opinion of Strouersdorf is rather refuted, that one can be killed who says to a man of honor: you lie, since Diana carps at it Resol. 13. Bass. num. 23. indeed by killing you do not prove yourself truthful. But when it is lawful for the one insulted to say: you lie. See Hurt. t. 2. t. 2. disp. 70. sect. 14. num. 116. Culpatium in casu 13. militari. Bass. num. 17. adds that by fleeing, not to be admitted in practice, it is lawful to kill one accusing him before a judge; Nay, condemned by Alexandr. VII. 1665. 14. Sept. Bass. num. 17. and 24. brings the authorities.

We must now fight for the true opinion of the Seraphic Doctor. Now the Law of Christ is that which we have professed in baptism, renouncing Satan and all his works and pomps. For the Law of Christ teaches, Matth. 5. Whoever shall strike you on one cheek, turn to him the other also. And therefore Christ, Ioan. 18. received the blow, and did not avenge it. And Ioan. 8. he heard: You have a devil. But he could justly have avenged it. Where Chrysostom, homil. 82. in Ioan.: You shudder at heaven; endure on earth the outrage of the mind. The Creator of the world, the eternal Son of God, received the blow, and a servant gave it, who was worthy of every punishment, namely either to be burned with heavenly fire, or swallowed by the opening earth, or seized by a demon and whirled about. And S. August. adds, tract. 113. And yet he who by his power could command, by whom the world was made, chose rather to teach patience. And asking why he did not offer the other cheek, according to the precept, Matth. 5., he says: By this he rather showed what was to be shown, namely that his great precepts of patience are to be performed not by ostentation of the body, but by preparation of the heart. And the same S. August. epist. 5. ad Marcellinum, says that those precepts about offering the cheek, etc. pertain more to the preparation of the heart than to the work. All this S. Bonaventura pursues on 18. Ioannis.

And on 6. Lucae at those words: Et qui te percusserit in maxillam unam, praebe illi et alteram the Holy Doctor observes that the cheek is put for the nobler part of the body, which, when struck, receives the gravest injury; and he notes that Christ commanded patience by precept, according to that Deuter. 31. Vengeance is mine, and I will repay, saith the Lord. And therefore the Apostle, Rom. 12. Not defending yourselves, most beloved, but give place unto wrath. Therefore Matth. 18. he commands: If thy brother shall sin against thee, go, and rebuke him between thee and him alone. Whence it follows that correction is to be made; therefore S. August. serm. 10. de verbis Domini: If you suffer an injury, and are silent, and do not rebuke your neighbor, you sin more by neglecting than he by afflicting.

The same the Holy Doctor proves on 6. Lucae at those words: Qua mensura mensi fueritis, remetietur vobis, namely by harming, according to that Apoc. 18. As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delights; so much torment and sorrow give ye to her. And Iohel. 3. Speedily and swiftly will I repay your recompense upon your own heads.