Article — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)
Article II. On the Killing of an Unjust Aggressor
- Principles. - I. It is lawful for each one to defend his own life even with the killing of an unjust aggressor; for each one has the right of preserving life unjustly attacked. Therefore he can defend it through necessary means, and consequently even by mutilation or killing of the aggressor, if he cannot otherwise snatch himself from death; for by natural law it is lawful to repel force by force. It is also clear from canon law, especially c. Si vero 3, de sent. excomm., where it is said: All laws and all rights permit force to be repelled by force. - See St. Alphonsus, n. 380.
II. In just defense against an unjust aggressor the moderation of blameless defense must be observed, or nothing must be done except that which is absolutely necessary for protecting oneself; because what necessity does not excuse is against justice.
- Questions. - Q. 1. Whether it is lawful to kill a drunken or insane aggressor 1?
1 This question pertains rather to the following article, where the killing of the innocent indirectly intended is treated. For here anyone is called innocent who attacks you or in any way tries to harm you without crime.
Resp. It is affirmed more probably, unless it is clear to you that he is in a state of mortal sin. The reason is that although a drunken or insane man is not your formally unjust aggressor, nevertheless he is materially unjust, and you preserve your right of repelling force by force. But if you certainly know that he is in a state of mortal sin 2, since he is in extreme necessity, charity requires that you prefer his eternal salvation to the preservation of your temporal life. But otherwise, if he were in possession of himself; for his own evil would have to be imputed to him.
2 Yet Lugo notes (De Iust. et Iur., disp. 10, n. 145) that the case in which this is certainly clear will be very rare. Besides, some prudent hope ought to shine forth that the aggressor, for example one demented, if spared, will obtain salvation. Finally, unless by flight it is lawful to withdraw oneself from the invader, for it is unbecoming to no one to avoid by fleeing the attack even of a drunk or insane man, it is not forbidden to injure the aggressor by striking or wounding him in such a way that both life is preserved for him and at the same time he is then rendered unable to harm.
Q. 2. Whether it is lawful to defend an innocent neighbor by the killing of the aggressor?
Resp. It is affirmed in every case in which it is lawful to defend one's own life; and this by reason of charity. - St. Alphonsus, n. 389. Yet a private person rarely seems to be bound to this 3. - Thus commonly. - St. Alphonsus, n. 390.
3 Namely the precept of charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience; but in the killing of another great inconvenience can scarcely ever be avoided on account of fear of enmities, of public justice, etc. - Thus St. Alphonsus.
Moreover, St. Ambrose also is authority that this obligation is sometimes present; from him St. Thomas (2. 2, q. 60, art. 6, ad 2) writes out these words: "He who does not repel an injury from his companion, when he can, is as much in fault as he who does it." To this bear also the words of Innocent IV reported in c. Dilecto 6, De Sent. Excomm., in VI: "Since it is lawful for anyone to impart his help to his neighbor or proximate for repelling the latter's injury; indeed if he can and neglects, he seems to favor the one inflicting injury, and to be participant in the same fault," etc.
- Q. 3. Whether it is lawful to kill an unjust aggressor also for defense of the members?
Resp. It is affirmed, with the common opinion, against a few. The reason is that each one has the right of preserving a good most necessary to himself for life, even with danger of the life of another, provided another means is lacking and the death of the aggressor is not intended. - St. Alphonsus, n. 380.
Q. 4. Whether it is lawful to defend goods of fortune of great moment by killing the thief, if otherwise they cannot be retained?
Resp. It is affirmed, at least more probably. The reason is drawn from what was said in the preceding question; for each one has the right of preserving goods of great moment according to his condition, and by that very fact of applying means absolutely necessary for this. On the other hand, the precept of charity does not oblige one to prefer the goods of the neighbor, although of a higher order, unless the neighbor is in extreme necessity; but otherwise when he spontaneously exposes himself to danger of death. - St. Alphonsus, n. 382.
- Q. 5. Whether it is lawful for a woman to kill an invader of chastity?
Resp. It is affirmed more probably. The reason is that chastity is a good more excellent than riches; therefore if it is lawful to kill an unjust aggressor of goods of fortune, this will be lawful a fortiori for preserving chastity. - St. Alphonsus, n. 386, and others commonly 4.
4 Add: 1. that neither striking, nor mutilation, nor killing for defending chastity induces irregularity or the penalty of excommunication, even if the invader is a cleric.
Add: 2. that it is right to kill an invader of another's chastity, just as it is lawful for the one herself suffering force. Thus St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 391), who nevertheless limits this: unless the woman consents, or at least if she positively does not resist. These latter words of St. Alphonsus are plainly to be understood of a woman who does not resist when she can, and therefore by conducting herself negatively is reckoned to consent interpretatively, as in fact the Salamancans understand them (De Praec. V., cap. 1, n. 97), from whom St. Alphonsus took these things. For if the woman in reality suffers force, and according to what was said above (note to q. 3, n. 390) conducts herself only passively so that she may avoid a greater evil, this limitation has no place.
Q. 6. Whether it is lawful to kill another for the preservation of honor?
Resp. No, at least speaking practically; because honor can generally be preserved by other means, and therefore an assault upon honor cannot be compared with an assault upon life and other goods. Besides, otherwise an approach would be opened to innumerable slaughters 5.
5 St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 381 and 391) aptly distinguishes whether the assault upon honor is made by words only, or also by deeds. For if there is question of words, and, for example, it is said contumeliously to an honorable man, "you lie," the injury can, ought, and is accustomed to be repelled otherwise; and striking or wounding would have the character not of defense but of vengeance.
But if honor is attacked by deeds, the matter is to be judged differently after the deed than before the deed. For an injury to the aggressor after the deed, unless there is question of correction to be applied with boys and others of this sort, would be vengeance, not defense; and to this pertains the second part of proposition 50 proscribed by Innocent XI. But if the matter concerns him who is going to try to injure honor by deeds, then the things which the Author adds in the fifth resolution are valid. For an obligation of conducting himself passively cannot be imposed on anyone while another in contempt tries, for example, to pluck his beard, or to strike him with a slap, or to soil his clothes, etc.; but surely it will be lawful for him, with the moderation of blameless defense observed, to repel the injury; and if indeed the obstinate aggressor applies force to inflict the predetermined injury, and when repelled also seizes arms, it will certainly be right for the other to repel force by force, and to oppose arms with arms. See Croix, lib. 3, p. 1, n. 803.
For this reason Alexander VII rightly condemned the following proposition, number 18: It is lawful to kill a false accuser, false witnesses, and even the judge from whom an unjust sentence threatens, if by another way an innocent person cannot avoid damage 6. Attend besides to proposition 30 condemned by Innocent XI: It is right for an honorable man to kill an assailant who strives to bring in calumny, if this calumny cannot otherwise be avoided: the same also must be said if someone strikes a slap or beats with a stick, and after the inflicted slap or stroke of the stick flees. - See St. Alphonsus, n. 381.
6 Proposition XVII, condemned by Alexander VII, bears rather on this, which has thus: It is lawful for a Religious and Cleric to kill a calumniator threatening to scatter grave crimes concerning himself or his Religion, when another manner of defending is not available, as it does not seem to be available if the calumniator is prepared to fasten the aforesaid things either upon the religious himself or upon his religion publicly and before most grave men, unless he is killed. For proposition XVIII treats not only of loss of honor, but of other damages.
Moreover some seem to have brought Religious and clerics into the middle because in these the loss which can be feared from calumny was more evident. And hence others had taken occasion to affirm that this indeed was forbidden to Religious and clerics, but not to laymen (see Croix, lib. 3, p. 1, n. 800); to this evasion an opening was afterward closed through proposition XXX condemned by Innocent XI.
Moreover, the reason for the condemnation is hardly obscure, namely the danger of abuses threatening from this doctrine; since this is intrinsic to the doctrine itself, this is enough that it be judged to be reproved. For as Lugo observes concerning a similar case (De Iust. et Iur., disp. 10, n. 189): "If these inconveniences per se follow from that opinion, certainly it will not be probable even speculatively; for for the speculative probability of a moral matter it is necessary that the matter be such that in human circumstances it does not bring inconveniences which render it illicit; but if of itself it brings such inconveniences, by that very fact it is intrinsically illicit even speaking speculatively." But thus the matter stands in the present material. For: 1. it will never be evident that grave infamy cannot be declined otherwise than through the killing of the calumniator, or judge, etc. (see Viva on proposition XVII of Alex. VII, n. 4). 2. Since men easily hallucinate through passion, slaughters would be multiplied without cause from mere suspicions. And so a remedy of this sort against calumnies, to which such grave inconveniences are necessarily connected, had to be forbidden by the very law of nature.
- Resolves. - 1. It is not lawful to kill a thief carrying away a thing of lesser moment, even with the resistance of the owner; because although such taking happens with a special injury to him on account of violence, nevertheless an injury of this sort is not judged grave according to the estimation of men. - St. Alphonsus, n. 383 7. Yet the owner is not bound to let the thing go, and, with the moderation of blameless defense observed, can defend himself if the other brings force against his person for taking it away.
7 So that this question may be turned over more clearly and exactly, a threefold case must be distinguished.
The first is when not so much the value of the thing is attended to as the injury inflicted on the owner of the thing, because with him present, and in vain forbidding, shouting, threatening, and retaining the thing, the thief withdraws it. And to this pertains the opinion of St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 383) that by reason of such contempt and dishonoring it is not lawful to kill the thief.
The second is when rather the damage is considered which the owner suffers by the thing taken. And then another doctrine of the same St. Alphonsus (l.c.) is valid: "It is certain that two things are required for killing a thief: first, that the thing cannot be recovered by another way; second, that the thing be of great moment." Where he wisely notes with other Doctors that the gravity of the damage is to be understood relatively, and generally that loss suffices which would bring notable damage to the owner according to the quality of the person; although neither is it to be denied that, as in the quantity of theft, so also in the present matter, some absolute gravity of damage must be admitted, which, namely, with respect to all can and ought to be judged and called of great moment. Yet that this is not to be restricted to the value of one gold coin or scudo is clear from this proposition 31, condemned by Innocent XI: "Regularly I can kill a thief for the preservation of one gold coin"; although even the value of one gold coin can sometimes be held of great moment in a very poor person.
Finally, the third case is when there is question neither of honor, as in the first case, nor of gravity of damage, as in the second, but the force brought upon the owner guarding his own thing is considered. And then the question returns which was raised above at Q. 6 concerning him who tries by deeds to injure the honor of another. For when a thief brings force so that he may enter, for example, a house or henhouse, or snatch a watch or stick from your hands, surely you are not bound to conduct yourself passively and permit the thing to him, but you can lawfully resist the unjust aggressor and repel force by force; although the moderation of blameless defense requires that you not apply greater force than that which suffices to repel force. The reason is, as Molina says (tom. 4, tr. 3, disp. 16, n. 4), that when someone thus defends his own things, regularly he also defends his own person, which he exposes to danger for the defense of his things. Laymann brings another reason (lib. 3, tr. 3, cap. 3, part. 3, n. 4), namely of the public good. For otherwise impunity of crimes would render the wicked more daring to harm.
** The defect of these distinctions makes St. Alphonsus' resolution (l.c.) become very obscure. For to the question whether it is lawful to kill a thief carrying off a thing of moderate value with the resistance of the owner or of its guardian, after bringing forward the affirmative opinion, which he attributes to Molina, Bonacina, Lugo, Sporer, Viva, and Roncaglia, he adds: "But the contrary opinion pleases me much more, which the Salamancans hold (tr. 25, c. 1, n. 85) after Diana, not admitting this. The reason is that although such taking happens with special injury of the owner by reason of violence, nevertheless since not every injury brings dishonoring, here it seems to me that through that taking honor is not properly or gravely injured according to the estimation of men. For who will be judged gravely dishonored because a thief violently snatched some thing from him?" In these things Molina is wrongly attacked with others, who, as is clear from what has been said and from the following note, treats another hypothesis; nor is the cause of defending honor distinguished from the right of resisting a thief trying to snatch a thing. But it is no wonder if sometimes the Salamancans are taken as guides in handling grave questions.
- Generally it is not lawful to kill him who merely threatens an assault; because there can be a great and frequent danger of hallucination in this. But otherwise if it is certainly clear concerning the depraved will of the aggressor, and the danger cannot be met in another way.
- It is not lawful to kill an aggressor after the deed, because it would be vengeance, not defense. Exception is made 8 when, as they say, the aggression would endure effectively in the flight of the aggressor carrying away the stolen thing. - Thus commonly.
8 In this case there is question not of honor or of person, but only of damage. In this hypothesis Molina (tom. 4, tr. 5, disp. 16, n. 6) denies that the thief is lawfully killed when the thing would not be of great value, as if it were only three, four, or five ducats; which things indeed are to be taken of the absolute quantity of damage, not of the relative, as we observed in the preceding note. And from these things it is clear that some have attributed by mere calumny to Molina the doctrine contained in proposition 31 proscribed by Innocent XI. For Molina did not bring forward the value of one gold coin in the present matter as the absolute measure of damage, but while handling the question (see l.c., n. 7) proposed by us in the third case of the preceding note, namely when there is question not so much of the defense of things as of the defense of person against an unjust aggressor.
- It is not lawful for a girl to kill the aggressor of her honor after oppression; yet she can strike him and treat him badly and most harshly, especially because unless in such a manner she shows her constancy and displeasure, the wicked man will not easily depart, or he will easily be able to return to solicitation. - St. Alphonsus, n. 386.
- It is not lawful, at least speaking practically, even for an honorable man to anticipate by killing an aggressor wishing to strike a slap; for he can always consult for his own honor by flight or another way. Yet it is lawful to ward off the aggressor even with drawn sword, and to show himself ready for his own defense. - St. Alphonsus, n. 381. - See Cases, n. 390 and following.