Article — Konings, Theologia Moralis
ARTICLE II: ON THE KILLING OF AN UNJUST AGGRESSOR
- Principles. - I. It is licit for each one to defend his own life even with the killing of an unjust aggressor; for each one has a right of conserving life unjustly attacked: therefore he can defend it by necessary means, and consequently even by mutilation or killing of the aggressor, if in no other way he is able to snatch himself from death; for the order of right and of charity permits that we prefer our own life to another's: and in Canon Law it is said: "All laws and all rights permit force to be repelled by force." - I said: it is licit, but not commanded, unless the life of him who suffers the aggression is very useful to the common good, or the one attacked would die in mortal sin. - St. Alphonsus.3
II. In just defense against an unjust aggressor the moderation of blameless defense must be observed, or nothing ought to be done except that which is absolutely necessary for protecting oneself; because what necessity does not excuse is against justice. - Likewise one must take care lest the killing, etc., be done from hatred, revenge, etc.
Notes to n. 467. (3) L. IV. 380.
- Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it licit to kill a drunken or insane aggressor?
Resp. In the affirmative, more probably, unless it is clear to you that he is in the state of mortal sin. The reason is that although the drunken or insane man is not formally your unjust aggressor, nevertheless he inflicts a true injustice, and there remains for you the right of defending your own life. But if you know certainly that he is in the state of lethal sin, since he is in extreme necessity, charity requires that you prefer his eternal salvation to the conservation of your temporal life. But otherwise if he were master of himself (for his own evil would be imputed to him), or if no prudent hope of his salvation shines forth, as almost in the insane. L. IV. 390 at the end. (T) p. 479.
Quaer. 2° Is it licit to defend an innocent neighbor by the killing of the aggressor?
Resp. In the affirmative, in every case in which it is licit to defend one's own life; and this by reason of charity.1 Yet a private person rarely seems to be bound to this. - I said: 1° rarely; for an exception must be made if the one attacked is necessary to the public good, or if he is father, son, wife, or brother, whom piety obligates one to protect, or if he is drunk and in mortal sin, because then he is in extreme necessity. I said: 2° a private person; because by themselves those are bound upon whom the special duty is incumbent of defending citizens, yet not with danger of their own life, unless there is question of averting a public evil,2 or they have specially obligated themselves also to this.
Appendix annotation (T), to n. 468. q. 19. p. 208. col. 2. The obligation of abstaining from the killing of a materially unjust aggressor, who is known certainly to be in mortal sin, supposes that the person attacked prudently judges himself to be in the state of grace. Therefore if either this prudent judgment or that certain knowledge is lacking (and both will rarely be present together), the one attacked cannot be deprived by this uncertain obligation of his certain right of defending himself. Nor is he deprived of it if there shines no prudent hope that the aggressor, if spared, will obtain salvation. Cf. Marres, p. 368. n. 238 under 2°. Haine, T. I. p. 280. q. 132.
- Quaer. 3° Is it licit to kill an unjust aggressor also for the defense of members?
Resp. In the affirmative with the common sentence, against a few. The reason is that each one has a right of preserving a good most necessary to himself for life. Besides, in such risk the life of the one attacked is also practically endangered.3
Quaer. 4° Is it licit to defend goods of fortune of great moment with the killing of the thief, if otherwise they cannot be defended or recovered?
Resp. In the affirmative, at least more probably. The reason is deduced from what was said in the preceding question; for each one has the right of conserving goods of great moment in proportion to his condition, and therefore, by that very fact, of using means absolutely necessary for this. On the other hand, the precept of charity does not obligate one to prefer the goods of a neighbor, although of a superior order, except when the neighbor is in extreme necessity; but otherwise, when he of his own accord exposes himself to this danger of death.2 (Y) p. 460.
Notes to n. 469 - note sequence 1. (1) L. IV. 389. (2) L. IV. 390. (3) L. IV. 390. Notes to n. 469 - note sequence 2. (2) L. IV. 382. § 3. Appendix annotation (Υ), to n. 469. q. 4°. p. 209. col. 1. What in regions where the civil law permits the killing of an unjust aggressor only for legitimate defense of oneself or of others? There are those who pronounce a law of this kind just and therefore to be observed (Marres, p. 369. n. 240 under II). Yet even those who contend for the justice of such a law admit that it is lawful to protect one's goods even by force and arms, and if a thief either of his own accord or induced by this defense uses force also, and now no longer attacks the goods but the very body of the owner, it is lawful, as is clear from the things set forth in n. 469. q. 3°, to provide for one's own safety even with the death of the thief; likewise that it is lawful in the nighttime to slay by a weapon, even sent from a distance, thieves violently breaking doors, since from aggression of this kind not only loss of goods but also danger of death is to be feared.
- Quaer. 5° Is it licit for a woman to kill an invader of chastity?
Resp. In the affirmative, more probably. The reason is that chastity is a good more excellent than riches; therefore, if it is licit to kill an unjust aggressor of goods of fortune, it will be licit a fortiori for preserving chastity. - St. Alphonsus2 and others commonly. From what was said in n. 468, Quaer. 2°, it is also clear that it is lawful to kill an invader of another's chastity, just as it is licit for the one suffering force herself; unless, however, the woman consents, or at least does not positively resist; indeed even if she consents, provided she is very closely related to the defender. - Yet this is never licit after the fact.3 Cf. n. 471. 3°.
Quaer. 6° Is it licit to kill another for the conservation of honor?
Resp. In the negative, at least speaking practically; because honor for the most part can be preserved by other means: besides, by today's morals, flight in such a case is not held shameful either for a noble or for a military man. Otherwise, moreover, a way would lie open to innumerable slaughters. This is also clear from propositions 17 and 18 among those condemned by Alexander VII, p. XIII, and 30 by Innocent XI, p. XVI.
- You will resolve. - 1° It is not licit to kill a thief carrying off a thing of lesser moment, even with resistance of the owner; because although such taking away is done with a special injury against him on account of violence, nevertheless an injury of this sort is not judged grave according to the estimation of men.4 Yet the owner is not bound to let go of the thing, and, the moderation of blameless defense being observed, he can defend himself, if the other inflicts force upon his person for carrying it away.
2° It is not licit to kill him whom you merely suspect of aggression.5 But otherwise, speaking speculatively, if it is morally certain concerning the depraved will of the aggressor, and the danger cannot be met in another way. - I said: speaking speculatively; for in practice, on account of the danger of hallucination, and because that certainty is obtained with greatest difficulty, it will scarcely be licit.2
3° It is not licit to kill an aggressor after the fact, because it would be revenge, not defense. An exception is made when the aggression, effectively, as they say, was continuing in the flight of an aggressor carrying off a stolen thing. - Thus commonly.
4° It is not licit for a girl to kill the aggressor of her honor after oppression; yet she can strike him and treat him badly and most bitterly, especially because, unless in such a way she shows her constancy and displeasure, the wicked man will not easily depart, or will be able easily to return to solicitation.3
5° It is not licit, at least practically speaking, even for an honorable man to anticipate by killing an aggressor wishing to strike him with a slap; for he can always consult his own honor by flight or another way.2 Yet it is licit to ward off the one attacking, even with weapons made ready, and to show oneself ready for one's own defense.
Notes to n. 471. (1) L. IV. 387 and H. A. Tr. VIII. 19. (2) L. IV. 386. (3) L. IV. 391. (4) L. IV. 388. (5) L. IV. 383.