Lying always unlawful

According to the common Catholic teaching, lying of every kind is intrinsically wrong; so that, inasmuch as we may not do evil that good may come of it, we are never justified in telling a lie, not even if the life of another or the safety of the world depended on it. St Augustine, St Thomas, and other Catholic Doctors and theologians gather this doctrine from the teaching of Holy Scripture which in many places seems to forbid all lying as absolutely as it forbids theft or homicide. Pope Innocent III gives expression to this teaching when he says in the Decretals, “‘ Since Holy Scripture prohibits lying even to save the life of another.”¹ Reason teaches us the same doctrine. For a lie is something inordinate in itself. It is a perversion of the moral order which the law of nature prescribes should be observed between the mind and the expression of it in our intercourse with others, We are endowed with the faculty of making known our thoughts and feelings to others; right order requires that the external expression should agree with the internal thought, that the machinery should be correctly regulated, that there should be no contradiction between the parts of the same agent, as there is when a lie is told. The moral turpitude which there is in such a contradiction between the mind and its external expression is well seen in the vice of hypocrisy. When a man pretends to be other than he is, there is the same perversion of right order that there is in lying. in nature; It is like a monstrosity the parts of one whole do not fit harmoniously together; they are out of gear and offensive to the view. There is, then, a special virtue of veracity which prescribes that when we have to make known our thoughts and feelings we should do it truthfully, or, in other words, we should make the outward expression agree with the thought. This virtue of veracity exists and is of obligation apart from any right to the truth that there may be in others. Veracity is something which we owe to ourselves as well as to our neighbour. It is true indeed that society is very much interested in sincerity and veracity. Social intercourse is very much hindered by lying and the mistrust which lying generates.² But although this is true, yet lying must be avoided primarily because it is unworthy of the dignity of man; it is a perversion of right order; it is intrinsically, in itself, wrong.

Some of the Greek Fathers held a different view from the above, and thought that lying was not wrong under all circumstances, but that it was occasionally allowable, like medicine, on account of inevitable necessity. English moralists have very commonly held a similar opinion, that a lie is only told when what is false is said to one who has a right to the truth. Some modern Catholic theologians have also adopted this opinion, which places the malice of lying in the denial of the truth to one who has a right to it. They do not, however, sufficiently explain the nature of that right, whether it is a strict right of justice, or a right in a vague sense demanded by the good of society, and so due out of legal justice, or charity, or piety, or obedience. Moreover, it is as difficult to determine when that right exists as it is to determine what is a lie according to the common opinion, and the door seems to be opened to promiscuous lying provided that no injury be done to our neighbour. The only lie which the theory acknowledges seems to be the hurtful lie. Nor does it sufficiently answer the arguments on which the common opinion is based.

¹ C. Super eo, De usuris.

² Eph. iv 25.

Lying.—A lie is a word spoken with the purpose of stating what is not true.

(a) It is said to be a word, by which is meant any external sign consisting in speech or its equivalent. A lie may be expressed by language, oral or written, by signs, by gestures, by insinuation, by expressive silence, by actions or conduct (see 2012, 2028).

(b) A lie is spoken, that is, expressed externally. But the guilt is found in the will, and hence those who plan lies are guilty of mendacity, even though they do not carry out their plans.

(c) A lie is told with purpose; that is, there is a comparison by the intellect of the sign with the thing signified and a voluntary choice of the insufficient sign to be used. An infant or an unconscious person, therefore, may tell an untruth, but he cannot tell a lie. Moreover, a person who has no good command of language or no clear understanding of a subject is not guilty of lying when in spite of his efforts to the contrary he gives misleading impressions. But those who do not think before they speak, or who use language carelessly or inaccurately, may be guilty of injustice and deception, or even of indirect lying.

(d) The purpose of a lie is the statement of what is not true, or the pretense that what is not in one’s mind is in one’s mind. Just as truth is the agreement of the word with the thought, so a lie is the disagreement of word with thought. But a lie need not be entirely false, and indeed one of the most dangerous of lies is what is known as a half-truth, in which some real facts are told in order to give support to pretended facts, or in which valid arguments are adduced to throw dust in the eyes as regards other arguments that are sophistical.

Statements Liable to Misunderstanding or Misinterpretation.—A word that sufficiently expresses one’s idea is not a lie or a deception, even though another idea will be taken from it by a listener or is conveyed by its mere letter.

(a) Thus, misunderstanding due to defect, not of the speaker, but of the listener, does not make one’s words untruthful, any more than it makes them scandalous (see 1462), as when the listener has not given attention to what was said (John, xxi. 23). Even a speech worded obscurely because the matter is obscure, or because the listener would be harmed by plainer speech (see 1001), is not mendacious but prudent.

(b) Misinterpretation to which a statement is open on account of its wording does not make the statement untruthful, if the context or circumstances sufficiently disclose the true meaning of the words. Examples: hyperbolical, ironical or other metaphorical speech; words spoken in jest or in terms of customary politeness, such as “your most obedient servant”, statements made inquiringly or hypothetically (e.g., when a judge or prosecutor accuses a defendant of crime in order to discover the truth; cfr. Gen., xiii. 9), or by way of mere quotation or of fictitious narrative (e.g., fairy tales, stories, reveries), or of disputation as in school debates exercised for the sake of practice in argumentation. It is not a lie to write under a pen-name, to speak according to the personality one represents (Gen., xxxi. 13; Tob., v. 18), to answer according to the mind of a questioner, as when A says to B: “Have you seen your father?” meaning, “Do you know where he is?” and B replies: “I have not seen him,” meaning “I do not know where he is.” Lying contests, in which fishermen, sportsmen, etc., vie with one another to see who can tell the most incredible yarn or tall tale, are not in themselves sinful, but there may be circumstances (for example, scandal, deception, danger) that make them reprehensible.

Divisions of Lies.—(a) Intrinsically, or in respect to its nature as a departure from the speaker’s mind, every lie is either an exaggeration, which tells more than the truth, or a suppression, which tells less than the whole truth. He who affirms what he does not believe, or who states as certain what he thinks is uncertain, exaggerates; he who denies what he believes, or who states as doubtful what he holds as certain, is guilty of suppression.

(b) Extrinsically, or in respect to purpose, mode, and result, lies are of many kinds. As to mode, a lie is either spoken or acted, the former being a falsehood and the latter a simulation or hypocrisy. As to its immediate purpose, a lie is meant either to express falsehood only or to deceive, the former being misrepresentation and the latter deceit (e.g., if Claudius knows that he calumniated and that Sempronius heard the calumny, and yet brazenly denies the calumny to Sempronius, there is misrepresentation); if Claudius tries to mislead others who only suspect him and gives false alibis, there is deceit. As to its ulterior purpose, a lie is meant for good (an officious or jocose lie) or for evil (a pernicious lie), or is directed to both good and evil. As to its result, a lie sometimes produces and sometimes does not produce a statement at variance with fact; it sometimes deceives and sometimes does not deceive the auditors.

Classification of Lies.—Every lie is harmful from its nature, since it tends to deceive others and so to disturb the good order of society. But the reason that moves persons to lie is not always evil, and hence we have the following classes of lies.

(a) Some lies are told for a good purpose, as when one lies in order to please (jocose lie) or to serve another (officious lie). Jocose lies include all kinds of humorous and interesting narrations and descriptions meant only to afford pleasure, but given out as facts by one who does not believe them to be facts. Untruths told in such a way (e.g., with a laugh or in a playful tone, especially if the auditors have a sense of humor) that it is clear they are not meant to be taken seriously, are not jocose lies or lies of any kind. Officious lies are told with a view to assisting or accommodating a neighbor, that he may receive some good (e.g., to hold out false promises as an inducement to good conduct) or escape some evil (e.g., to fill the ears of a despondent man with false reports of good news in order to revive his spirits). It seems that we should regard as officious lies various statements made by Jacob (Gen., xxvii. 35), David (I Kings, xx. 6, xxi. 2, xxvii. 10), and Judith (X. xi. xii).

(b) Some lies are told for an evil purpose, as when one lies merely to indulge a propensity for falsehood or for the sheer pleasure of lying (lies of inclination), or when one lies to injure another person (pernicious lies).

Motives for Lying.—The motives for lying are not always simple, and it may happen that in one and the same lie there are several motives of different character.

(a) Thus, an officious lie is not always dictated by pure benevolence. It may be selfish (e.g., when one lies to conceal the delinquency of another in which one was involved), as well as altruistic (e.g., when the liar derives no benefit from the lie), or self-sacrificing (e.g., when the liar is put to expense, trouble or loss through his lie).

(b) An officious lie may also be pernicious and jocose, for it may affect different persons in different ways. Thus, if Claudius calumniates Julius in order to shield Balbus from the bad opinion of Caius, who does not know Balbus, and to amuse Sempronius who knows the truth, the lie is pernicious as regards Julius, officious as regards Balbus, and jocose as regards Sempronius.

Comparison of the Gravity of Various Lies.—(a) Lies of exaggeration are not worse as lies than lies of suppression, for in both cases the truth is departed from. But it is more imprudent to overstate than to understate, and in this sense the lie of exaggeration is worse.

(b) Lies are aggravated by the purpose to harm, and the greater the harm, the greater the sin. Thus, the worst of all pernicious lies is that which is directed against God, as in false religious doctrine; and the lie that harms a man in spiritual goods is worse than a lie that harms in temporal things only.

(c) Lies are mitigated by the purpose to help, and the greater the good intended the less the sin. In other words, lies that are not pernicious are not so bad as pernicious lies, officious lies are less sinful than jocose lies, officious lies told for the sake of some great good are not so grave as those told for the sake of a lesser good. Thus, it is a less evil to lie in order to save a man’s life than to lie in order to take his life; it is less sinful to lie in order to spare another the shock of bad news than to lie for the sake of embellishing a tale; it is a less offense to lie in order to ward off a bodily harm than to lie in order to prevent a financial loss.

Sinfulness of All Lies.—But though lies are unequal in sinfulness, it remains that no lie, even the smallest (such as are called fibs or white lies), is ever justified, even by the greatest good (Job, xiii. 7), for a lie is intrinsically evil, and the end does not justify the means.

(a) A lie is a sin, because it is an abuse of speech and other signs given by God for the manifestation of truth; because it is an unfriendly and unsocial act, tending to the disruption of kindly relations between men; because it is directly opposed to truth, the proper and distinctive good of the human mind. Even the pagans have regarded liars with contempt and considered lies as disgraceful, and even those who lay no claim to virtue feel gravely insulted if called liars. In many places the Scriptures forbid lying (Exod., xxiii. 7; Levit., Xix. 11; Prov., xii. 22; Ecclus., xx. 26; Col., iii. 9), and St. Paul especially (Eph., iv. 25) is very clear on this point: “Putting away lying, speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor, for we are members one of another.” The Fathers and the theologians are generally agreed that no necessity, not even the danger of death, excuses a lie, any more than it excuses theft or adultery. If God could approve of even one lie, would not that approval undermine our faith in His own veracity? Surely we have no implicit confidence in one who helps to deceive us even in a small matter.

(b) A lie, considered precisely as a lie, seems from its nature to be only a venial sin, for the disorder of using signs against one’s mind is not serious, and the harm done society by mere denial of truth is not necessarily grave (the case would be otherwise if truth could be denied on principle as a lawful thing). Even pious persons do not regard harmless lies as very sinful (see 2143, 2386). Hence, as jocose and officious lies have no other malice than that of untruthfulness and as the malice is lessened by the intention, they are generally venial; but some extrinsic circumstance (such as scandal, the fact that one lies habitually and without scruple, or disastrous results) may render them mortal. Pernicious lies have another malice besides that of untruthfulness, and accordingly the case with them is different.

When Lying Entails No Formal Sin.—Lies are sometimes free from all formal sin on account of ignorance (as in the case of children or uninstructed persons, who think they may use lies in case of great difficulty) or on account of irresponsibility (as in the case of certain defectives who seem to be born liars).

Pernicious Lies.—Pernicious lies are mortal sins from their nature, but may become venial from the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter. For a pernicious lie sins not against truth only, but also against justice or charity. Hence, it is said that the liar destroys his own soul (Wis., i. 11), that a lie is abominated and hated by the Lord (Prov., vi. 17, xii. 22), that it has the devil for its father (John, viii. 44), that it brings down divine vengeance (Ps. v. 7) and will receive its portion in the pool of fire and brimstone (Apoc., xxi. 8). This sin is committed in two ways, as follows:

(a) a lie is pernicious when its matter is harmful, as being contrary to sound doctrine, good morals or true science. Hence, a preacher sins gravely if the substance of his pulpit teaching is mendacious (e.g., if in a sermon he enunciates or defends erroneous principles of conduct), venially if he lies about accidentals (e.g., if he gives the wrong chapter or verse for a text); a scientist, a physician, a jurist, or the like is similarly guilty of a pernicious lie when he misleads the public by unreliable information. A penitent in the confessional and a witness in court lie perniciously if their statements about relevant matters are untrue, for the one injures the Sacrament and the other injures public justice; but if the lie is about some matter of slight importance, the sin is venial, unless there is no other matter in the confession, or the testimony is under oath;

(b) a lie is also pernicious when the intention of the liar is to injure God or his neighbor, even though the matter itself is not opposed to true doctrine or is not official testimony. Examples are found in those who lie in a humorous way in order to injure or sadden others.

439. Principles. - I. A lie properly so called is always intrinsically evil. The reason is, 1. because it is repugnant to right reason to use words against their natural end and institution; 2. because if it were lawful to deceive others in speaking, the order of society, which rests on the mutual commerce of men, would be altogether subverted. Hence, Coloss. 2. 9: "Do not lie to one another." - St. Thom., 2. 2, q. 110, art. 3. - St. Aug., book On Lying and Against Lying.

II. A harmful lie is grave according to the measure of the damage which is brought upon the neighbor; therefore the obligation of repairing the damage follows from it. - Thus all. - St. Thom., ibid., art. 4.

III. An officious lie is per se a venial sin, because grave disorder is not apprehended in it. - Thus all. - A fortiori a jocose lie per se does not exceed venial sin. Indeed, sometimes that which is called a jocose lie is free from altogether every fault; because it is not a lie properly so called, but a joke used for the sake of recreation without any intention of deceiving another, and therefore our definition does not fit it. But this can be admitted only when the adjuncts of things are such that hearers can easily understand that the speaker wishes only to joke. - Thus commonly.

405. (A) Doctrine of St. Augustine. Before Augustine, the Fathers in a general way reproved lying as contrary to Christian truthfulness;² yet a few, such as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, St. Chrysostom, and St. Hilary, had taught that in a case of necessity, for averting the greatest damage, it is licit to use a lie just as a medicine; and in this sense they understood certain deeds related in each Testament.¹ Being questioned concerning this matter, St. Augustine set forth his doctrine in two works, De Mendacio (around the year 365), and Contra Mendacium (around the year 420); in both he openly teaches, - not indeed as Catholic doctrine, but as an opinion to which he firmly adheres, - that every lie is a sin, and that one must never lie: (a) not for the temporal salvation of anyone whatever, since the life of the soul is more powerful than bodily life;² (b) nor for preserving purity or avoiding defilement, since purity of the soul excels the integrity of the body;³ (c) nor for the eternal salvation of another: for just as, in danger of eternal salvation, it is not licit to aid a man through defilement, so neither through a lie, which truly is a sin;⁴ therefore it is not licit to deceive the guards of a prison in order to baptize a man; nor can Catholics falsely say that they are Priscillianists, in order that they may know the secrets of these.⁵

² Thomassin, op. cit., p. 75-107; 129-189, sets forth their doctrine excellently.

¹ See the testimonies in Thomassin, l. c., and T. Raynaudus, op. cit., p. 143-149.

² In Migne, XL, 494, 541-545.

³ Ibid., 496-497.

⁴ Ibid., 546-547.

⁵ The book Contra Mendacium was directly written so that Catholics might be deterred from using a lie to uncover hidden Priscillianists. - Migne, l. c., p. 517.

406. But since not a few texts of the Scriptures were opposed by adversaries for defending lying, he handed down that these are to be explained in a threefold way: (a) let it be shown that the deeds alleged, if rightly understood, are not lies: thus the manner of acting of Jacob, who seems to deceive his father, is not a lie, but a mystery;⁶ (b) but if they are lies, they are not to be imitated; (c) or at least concerning those matters which pertain to the doctrine of religion, one must in no way lie.⁷

⁶ Ibid., 533.

⁷ Ibid., 535.

Concerning equivocation and mental restriction he is entirely silent, and he seems by the whole mode of arguing to exclude them.

But the reasons why, according to Augustine, lies are utterly and always illicit are: (a) the authority of the Scriptures, especially of the Apostle saying:⁸ "Putting away lying, speak truth each one with his neighbor, because we are members one of another"; where the word neighbor designates all, even heretics;⁹ (b) the intrinsic malice of lying, which is no less an evil than adultery;¹⁰ (c) the depraved consequences to follow from this; since indeed faith is not had in other matters toward one who lies in one.¹¹

⁸ Ephes., IV, 25.

⁹ In Migne, l. c., p. 527.

¹⁰ Ibid., 527-528 and passim.

¹¹ Ibid., 523.

Yet since he knows that there are some defenders of lying, he says: "At least in the worship of God let them concede that one must not lie... concerning the other kinds of lies, let him who is pleased that lying is to be done choose for himself what he thinks to be the mildest and most innocent kind of lying."¹

¹ Ibid., 544.

407. (B) Doctrine of St. Thomas. Most Fathers embraced the opinion of St. Augustine, with a few nevertheless excepted, who, with Cassian,² held that lying can be applied as it were as hellebore, in a case of necessity, for averting an imminent evil. St. Thomas polished the Augustinian doctrine, (a) by defining the conditions required for a lie properly so called: "Therefore if these three concur, namely that what is enunciated is false, and that the will to enunciate the false is present, and again the intention of deceiving, then there is falsity materially, because what is false is said, - and formally because of the will of saying what is false, - and effectively because of the will of imprinting falsity."³ (b) Afterward he establishes that every lie is a sin, because it is evil according to itself: for it is against nature that someone by voice signify that which he does not have in mind.⁴ (c) The sin is grave when the lie turns upon divine matters, that is, faith or religion, or inflicts grave damage upon the neighbor; - but it is venial if light harm is inflicted, or if the lie is officious or jocose.⁵

² "And so one must think of a lie, and use it so, as if the nature of hellebore were in it; if it is taken when a deadly disease is imminent, it becomes healthful; otherwise, when taken without necessity of the greatest danger, it belongs to present destruction... Therefore when some grave danger threatens from the confession of truth, then the refuges of lies are to be received, yet in such a way that we are healthfully bitten by the guilt of a humble conscience." (Collat. XVII, cap. 17, in Migne, XLIX, 1062-1063.)

³ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 110, a. 1. Yet he adds that the intention of deceiving does not pertain to the essence of a lie, but to a certain perfection of it.

⁴ Ibid., a. 4.

⁵ Ibid., a. 3.

408. (C) The theory of moralists concerning equivocation and mental restriction. Up to this point nothing had been said concerning equivocation or mental restriction; yet soon theologians understood that in certain circumstances, in order to avoid a greater evil, truth can be hidden under the appearance of equivocation. This, already before implicitly proposed, Lessius and Parsons more directly set forth and defended;⁶ but J. Barnes and Thomassin (op. cit.) attacked their opinion; Th. Raynaudus, op. cit., strove with all strength to vindicate the doctrine of Lessius; and, although some theologians, such as Caramuel,¹ held the same as very dangerous, nevertheless this became common in the schools.

⁶ Lessius, in the book de Antichristo, § 31; de Justitia, lib. II, cap. 11, dub. 20, and cap. 42, dub. 9, and also cap. 47, dub. 6; Parsons, Tr. de Aequivocatione.

¹ Theologia Fundamentalis, Frankfurt, 1652, Fundam. LXII, p. 639.

Yet certain theologians proceeded further in this matter, whose propositions Innocent XI condemned as scandalous and pernicious in practice on March 2, 1679 (n. 24-28):

24. "To call God as witness of a light lie is not such irreverence on account of which He would will or could damn a man.

25. "With cause it is licit to swear without the mind of swearing, whether the matter is light or grave.

26. "If someone, either alone or before others, whether questioned, or of his own accord, or for the sake of recreation, or for any other end whatever, swears that he did not do something which in reality he did, by understanding within himself something which he did not do, or another way from that in which he did it, or any other true addition, in reality he does not lie, nor is he perjured.²

² From this it is clear that this and the following propositions are condemned because in these there is question of purely mental restriction, which cannot be understood even by a prudent man, and indeed confirmed by oath.

27. "A just cause of using these amphibologies is as often as this is necessary or useful for protecting the health of the body, honor, family affairs, or for any other act of virtue, so that the concealment of truth is then judged expedient and studious.

28. "He who by means of recommendation or gift has been promoted to a magistracy or public office will be able with mental restriction to render the oath which by mandate of the king is customarily exacted from similar persons, without respect being had to the intention of the one exacting: because he is not bound to confess a hidden crime."

409. With these excesses set aside, the theory concerning equivocation and mental restriction is proposed today in this way. Equivocation is a word or other sign which, from its nature and the common use of men, is not determined to signify one thing, but can signify several.³ Mental restriction is an act of the mind, by which the words of the speaker, through something which is retained in the mind, are determined to another sense than the natural and obvious one; if the sense of the speaker can in no way be perceived, the restriction is purely or strictly mental;⁴ but if it can be understood from the context or from the circumstances, the restriction is called broadly mental.¹

³ Thus when Christ said: "Lazarus our friend sleeps" (John XI, 11), these words could be understood of sleep or of death.

⁴ Thus if to one asking "whether you have seen Rome," you answer affirmatively, understanding in a picture.

¹ If someone, questioned about a secret which he ought to conceal, responds, I do not know.

Now, for the legitimate use of equivocation or mental restriction, two conditions are required together: (a) that the true sense can be discovered by a prudent man from the context or from the circumstances; (b) that a proportionately grave cause be present; for since deception is a certain evil, it is not licit without reason to give another an occasion of deception; on the other hand, the nearer this occasion is, and the graver the error to which another is exposed, the greater cause is required.

410. Yet this theory concerning mental restriction by no means pleased many recent philosophers, who contended that, with it admitted, no one is now certain in what part the words of another ought to be taken; since, on the other hand, there are not lacking cases in which it is necessary to say what is false in order to avoid a greater evil, they tried to mitigate the rigor of the Augustinian theory and to accommodate it to human weakness. Namely, they say that a lie properly so called is illicit, which is repugnant to the right or good of others; but in a case of necessity a false-saying (faussete) is licit, by which what is false is indeed enunciated, but only when truth is not owed to others, and on the other hand these suffer no damage from the assertion of what is false. Thus especially Grotius and Pufendorf.² Most Protestant theologians,³ not a few Rationalists, and certain Catholics⁴ assented to these. - A lie properly so called indeed is always illicit, they say, because it violates the right which someone has to knowing the truth; but false-saying does not injure the neighbor's right, since by hypothesis truth is not owed to him; nevertheless it cannot be applied without reason, since speech of itself was instituted for saying what is true.

² Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, lib. III, c. 1, § 10-21; Pufendorf, De jure nat., l. IV, c. 1.

³ Thus among others Taylor, Milton, Paley, Johnson, whom Newman cites, Apologia pro vita sua, 5th ed., Appendix, p. 378-384; de Wette, Christl. Sittenlehre, III, 126; Martensen, Die christl. Ethik, 1879, t. II, p. 245 sq.; Dorner, Christian Ethics, New York, 1887, p. 489-492; N. Smyth, New York, 1892, p. 392-400.

⁴ Bolgeni, Il possesso, c. 48; author of the article in Melanges theol., l. c.; Piat, in Appendix IV to Theologia Moralis by Van der Velden, Tournai, 1875, t. I, p. 524-533; Dubois, l. c.; author of the little work Etude sur la malice intrinseque du Mensonge; Fonsegrive, Elements de Philosophie, t. II, p. 475.

411. (A) A lie properly so called, or the denial of owed truth, is intrinsically evil and a sin grave of itself.

(a) For as often as truth is owed to someone, whether from justice, or from obedience, charity, or another virtue, the neighbor through a lie is deprived of truth to which he has a right, and therefore incurs damage grave from its nature; for truth is the essential good of the intellect, just as virtue is the good of the will; and if someone is deceived in a grave matter, by that very fact he suffers grave harm. - Moreover, once the liceity of lying is admitted, the security of social life is now overthrown; for this consists in mutual confidence; now if, when truth is owed to the neighbor, it is licit to say what is false, confidence vanishes and suspicions disturb security on every side.

(b) Deservedly, therefore, Scripture prohibits and rebukes lying: "You shall not lie, nor shall each deceive his neighbor";¹ - "You will destroy all who speak a lie";² - "The just man will detest a lying word";³ - "Do not plow a lie against your brother, nor do likewise against a friend; do not will to lie every lie: for its assiduity is not good";⁴ - "Putting away lying, speak truth each one with his neighbor, because we are members one of another."⁵

¹ Levit., XIX, 11.

² Ps., V, 7.

³ Prov., XIII, 5.

⁴ Eccli., VII, 13-14.

⁵ Ephes., IV, 25.

412. Hence when someone is bound from office to announce the truth, as a preacher of the Gospel; or is legitimately questioned by superiors or judges;⁶ or if there is question of entering into pacts or contracts, - it is never licit to use equivocations or false-saying by which the neighbor can be induced into error.

⁶ In certain regions, one who is accused of a crime can legally declare himself guilty or not (to plead guilty or not guilty); in this case he is not bound to confess the crime committed by himself, but can wait until he is judicially proved guilty; but if as a witness he wishes to appear in his own cause (in the witness-box, as they say) he is bound to manifest the truth.

413. (B) Even when truth is not owed to the neighbor, lying is illicit outside the case of necessity, but only under light sin.

For since error is an evil of the intellect, it is not licit to induce the neighbor into error, unless grave necessity excuses this. - Besides, since speech by its nature is the expression of the mind, he who deliberately and without grave reason asserts something false acts voluntarily against the natural order of things and against his own dignity. - Under light sin, from the common sense of the faithful.

414. (C) But in a case of necessity, when grave damage, whether temporal or spiritual, is foreseen as going to arise from open declaration of the truth, it is licit to use these words or signs which induce the neighbor into error, if the damage cannot otherwise be averted. But this mode of speaking is commonly called mental restriction by theologians, false-saying (faussete) by moderns, or a psychological lie.¹

¹ Therefore those are little consistent with themselves who on the one hand reprove the moderate use of mental restriction, and on the other approve false-saying in many cases; let them deservedly blame the abuse of equivocations, but not condemn the use, unless, with Augustine and Kant, they altogether exclude every assertion of what is false. Nor likewise are theologians consistent with themselves who do not hesitate to assert that, even in a case of necessity, any false-saying whatever is intrinsically illicit, and on the other hand permit the use of certain restrictions which by all upright persons ignorant of theological distinctions are held as lies or false-sayings. Wherefore Genicot says (n. 416): "For it is not an inconvenience if the unlearned call those things licit lies which are more commonly called broadly mental restrictions by Theologians." - Now today not only the unlearned, but many of those who otherwise are learned, do not understand mental restrictions, but abhor them, as is clear both from their writings and from their public speeches; therefore if the word false-saying pleases them more, one must not dispute about the name itself.

(a) For in this case the deception of the neighbor is not directly intended, but the good effect which follows from the deception, namely the legitimate defense of oneself or of others; on the other hand the neighbor in the case does not have a right to knowing the truth, and the accidental error which is caused in his mind is a lesser evil than that which would follow from the manifestation of the truth; besides, the neighbor is deceived for this reason, because he does not attend to all the circumstances. Therefore here there is question of an act good in itself, namely of the temporal or spiritual safety of the neighbor, from which nevertheless an evil effect is foreseen, namely error caused in the mind of another.

415. (b) It is certainly necessary that a practical means be at hand for all, by which secrets, otherwise necessary or very useful, may licitly be protected from an importunate and unjust investigator; now unless in a case of necessity it is licit to use equivocations or false-saying, there will be no means of this kind; for silence will betray the truth, and will bring great damage; for the manifestation of a secret is as pernicious to human intercourse as lying itself, as St. Alphonsus says, n. 152. Now no one ought to be in that condition that, whatever he chooses, he sins; therefore there ought to be a legitimate means for warding off the importunate, by inducing them into error.

Let us explain the matter by examples: if some innocent person is sought by unjust aggressors, who wish to kill him, and cannot be saved in any other way than by deceiving the unjust persecutors, is it not licit to deceive them? In this case, if they were actually attacking the innocent person, it would be licit to repel them by force, even by inflicting death; is it not a lesser evil to induce them into accidental error? - Likewise a physician foresees that some sick person is going to die unless he is deceived; an advocate, judge, confessor, and others bound from office to preserve a secret foresee that the secret committed to them cannot be preserved by silence alone, and therefore they say, "I do not know," or "he about whom you ask by no means committed such a crime"; in this case do they not deserve better of society itself than if by keeping silent they had manifested the secret?

416. And indeed, when the use of equivocation or false-saying is circumscribed by these limits, social security is by no means endangered; for the neighbor is not deceived except when he unjustly inquires into the truth, and he ought to attribute to himself the error into which he falls.¹

¹ We have said nothing of those modes of speaking by which the truth is politely covered, e.g., the master is not at home, so that it may be signified that he, although present, does not wish or is not able to receive anyone; these and other similar things are easily understood and cannot be held as lies.

Most theologians indeed admit this as regards mental restriction, but they commonly assert that false-saying is opposed to divine truthfulness, and therefore is intrinsically illicit, even in a case of necessity.

It is answered that false-saying is no more opposed to the truthfulness of God than homicide is to His supreme dominion; now, in a case of necessity, for the defense of oneself or of others, indirectly willed homicide is permitted, without the right of God being violated by such an action; why would the denial of truth (whether it be called mental restriction or false-saying) not likewise be permitted in a case of necessity, in defense of oneself or others? For then divine truthfulness is by no means injured, which remains intact, but only a particular truth is kept silent or denied, knowledge of which would be truly harmful.

417. Points to be noted for practice. (a) Whatever opinion is chosen, love of truth should be carefully and unceasingly inculcated upon all, especially the younger; when it is said that light lies are venial sins, at the same time it should be clearly and explicitly taught that it is shameful to lie and unworthy of an honorable man, and that those are worthy of every praise who speak candidly and openly according to the mind, even if they suffer not a few inconveniences from this. Therefore teachers should receive kindly boys who ingenuously confess their faults, and for the most part grant them pardon, or at least mercifully mitigate the penalty inflicted upon them; on the contrary they should strictly punish those who deliberately use lying and hypocrisy to cover their faults.

(b) If someone, in a case of necessity, is forced to have recourse to equivocations or false-sayings, let him use them only from a proportionately grave cause, and when by no other way can his own or another's damage be averted.¹

¹ Nor should someone easily persuade himself that the threatening evil cannot be averted in another way. To the point is Bentzon, Causeries de Morale pratique, Paris, 1899, p. 134: "There are in life those distressing situations where one asks oneself whether concealing the truth is not a duty of mercy. There again, let us take good care. No doubt pain wants to be spared, weakness also. But with tact, kindness, a lively sympathy, there are scarcely any things that one cannot gradually say as they are." - Cf. Montaigne, Essais, liv. II, XVII.

3. THE SINFULNESS OF LYING.—a) No statement or act that deserves the name of a “lie” in the formal and proper sense, can be justified by the end for which it is uttered or performed, be that end ever so noble or innocent. Consequently, all kinds of lies, including those told in jest, are strictly forbidden. This is the plain teaching of both the Old and the New Testament. Even if the eighth commandment: “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor,” referred only to false testimony in the narrower sense of the word, it is more widely applied in Lev. XIX, 11: “You shall not lie, neither shall any man deceive his neighbor.”¹² Again and again Holy Scripture warns men not to lie¹³ and threatens divine vengeance upon those who commit this sin.¹⁴ Among the “six things which the Lord hateth,” the Book of Proverbs mentions “a lying tongue.”¹⁵ The same book declares that “lying lips are an abomination to the Lord.”¹⁶

¹² St. Augustine, Enchir., c. 22: “Nor is any lie therefore to be thought not a sin, because we can sometimes benefit someone by lying.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 242).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 3: “Every lie is a sin.”—Ibid., ad 4: “A lie has the character of sin not only from the harm inflicted upon one’s neighbor, but from its own disorder. It is not lawful, however, to use any illicit disorder to prevent the harms and deficiencies of others. . . . And therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order that someone may free another from any danger whatsoever.”

¹³ Ex. XX, 16; cfr. Matth. XXVI, 59 sqq.

¹⁴ Ps. V, 7.

¹⁵ Prov. VI, 17 sq.

¹⁶ Prov. XII, 22; cfr. Ecclus. VII, 14; XX, 26–28; XXV, 3 sq.

Jesus Christ condemns lying, attributes it to the devil as the “father of lies,”¹⁷ and challenges His enemies to convict Him of any sin against the truth.¹⁸ St. Paul admonishes the Ephesians to “put away lying and to speak the truth.”¹⁹ St. James says: “Be not liars against the truth.”²⁰ St. John says that liars shall have their portion with whoremongers, sorcerers, and idolaters “in the pool burning with fire and brimstone, which is the second death.”²¹ The story of Ananias and Saphira, who brazenly lied to St. Peter and were struck dead on the spot, is too well known to require repetition.²² b) The sinfulness (malitia) of lying arises principally from the fact that a lie, being a contradiction between thought and speech, constitutes an abuse of language, which is the principal means of intellectual intercourse and was divinely bestowed upon men to enable them to communicate their thoughts to one another.

¹⁷ John VIII, 44; cfr. J. E. Belser, Das Evangelium des hl. Johannes, pp. 291 sqq.

¹⁸ John VIII, 46.

¹⁹ Eph. IV, 25; cfr. Col. III, 9.

²⁰ Jas. III, 14.

²¹ Apoc. XXI, 8; cfr. XXII, 15.

²² Acts V, 1 sqq.

Untruthfulness counterfeits this spiritual medium of exchange and, by making it impossible for men to live together in mutual trust and confidence, violates the divinely established order of things and the law of nature. Therefore the Apostle exhorts the Ephesians to “put away lying and to speak the truth,” because “we are members one of another.”²³

²³ Eph. IV, 25. Cfr. St. Augustine, Enchir., c. 22: “And indeed words were instituted for this purpose, not that through them men might deceive one another, but that through them each might convey his thoughts to the knowledge of another. Therefore to use words for deception, not for that for which they were instituted, is a sin.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 243).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 3: “A lie is evil by its kind; for it is an act falling upon undue matter. For since words are naturally signs of thoughts, it is unnatural and undue for someone to signify that which he does not have in mind.”

Lying is sinful also for the reason that it violates or destroys the true dignity of man, which consists in his being an image of God. God is “the God of truth,”²⁴ and if we lie, we become dissimilar to Him, or rather like to the devil, who is a liar from the beginning and has not the truth.²⁵

²⁴ Ps. XXX, 6.

²⁵ John VIII, 44; cfr. John XIV, 6; XVII, 17; Apoc. III, 7, 14.

Finally, lying is sinful because it is opposed to charity or love of neighbor. It robs men of a good to which they have a just claim,—viz.: the truth,—and substitutes for that good an evil, i. e., error. Even if in some cases the truth is not esteemed as a real good, and error is not regarded as an evil, but rather as a service rendered to another, this does not change the nature of truth or of its contrary. Lying always embodies a violation of charity and involves contempt of others.

“You ask what costs you more dearly, falsehood or the truth? I answer: falsehood, because falsehood costs you your very ego, whereas the truth can at most rob you of happiness,” says the poet Hebbel. The well-known anecdote told of St. Thomas is purely legendary, but it conveys an important lesson. “Do you see that ox flying up there?” cried one of his fellow students. When St. Thomas strained his eyes to espy the strange phenomenon, his companion scoffed at his simplicity. The Saint censured him and said: “I would rather believe that an ox could fly, than that a Catholic would tell a lie.”²⁶ But St. Thomas might have known that it was a hoax. To test another’s wit is not deception. c) Though every lie is a sin, not every lie is a mortal sin.²⁷ The gravity or guilt of a lie is to be gauged by the general criteria of mortal and venial sin, by its subject-matter, by the objective and subjective importance of the truth involved, by the end or object aimed at, and by the circumstances of the case.

²⁶ A. Scherer and J. B. Lampert, Exempellerikon, Vol. III, 2nd ed., Freiburg i. B. 1908, p. 191.

²⁷ St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 4. Cfr. Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 167 sqq.

As regards the subject-matter, the denial of a revealed truth of great importance for the eternal or temporal welfare of man is always a mortal sin because it involves serious dishonor to God and a grave violation of charity and justice.

The end or purpose for which a lie is told may be serious or trivial. A jocose lie, or one told to get out of a scrape, may generally be classed as a venial sin.²⁸ But there are cases in which the objective and particularly the subjective momenta weigh heavily in the scale. A lie may be inspired by a totally corrupt motive and, aside from the scandal given, may have incalculable consequences. There are jocose lies that hurt keenly and others which partake of blasphemy, and though not every joking prevarication is a lie, yet every jocose lie, no matter how harmless it appears to be, is incompatible with the dignity of a Christian and the respect he owes the truth. It must also be taken into consideration that many of the “little white lies” of social intercourse are apt to cause grave temporal and spiritual damage to others. The motive of charity by which these lies are often inspired, may diminish their guilt, yet pious frauds can never promote the cause of truth or justice, the welfare of Church or State, or the true ends of scholarship or science.²⁹

²⁸ St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., V, n. 7: “There are altogether two kinds of lies in which the fault is not great, but which nevertheless are not without fault: when we either joke or lie in order to benefit someone. The former, in joking, is therefore not most harmful, because it does not deceive. For the one to whom it is said knows that it was said for the sake of a joke. The latter, however, is milder because it retains some benevolence.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 86).

²⁹ Cicero, De Orat., II, 15: “Who does not know that the first law of history is that it dare say nothing false, and then that it not dare leave anything true unsaid? that there be no suspicion of favor in writing, no simulation?” These words were quoted by Leo XIII in his letter of Aug. 18, 1883, to Cardinal Hergenröther et al., as a norm for all Catholic writers of history.

Luther excused “fat lies” if the cause of the Gospel could be promoted thereby. Who invented the maxim: The end justifies the means?

Let us always remember the query of St. Paul: “Shall we do evil that there may come good?”³⁰ and the pious exclamation of holy Job: “Hath God any need of your lie, that you should speak deceitfully for him.”³¹ A Catholic must ever be firmly convinced that no lie can be of real advantage and that God will turn the damage which one fears from the truth into an advantage. “We know that to them that love God, all things work together unto good.”³²

³⁰ Rom. III, 8.

³¹ Job XIII, 7.

³² Cfr. Rom. VIII, 28.

When a conflict arises between duty and truth on the one side and various other interests on the other, the injury done to the soul by a lie cannot be compared to any temporary disadvantage. In a conflict between truth and charity, e. g., in the case of a sick person or a lunatic, a conscientious man will always, if necessary, find a way to disguise the truth so that it will not bear the character of a lie. In such cases it should be considered that, on the one hand, by lying to the sick we are apt to undermine their confidence in the physician and those who have them in charge, hinder a correct treatment, and run the danger that the patient may die unprepared, while, on the other hand, persons who have not the full use of reason are rendered suspicious and distrustful if those in whom they have confidence lie to them, and are thus often impeded in their progress towards recovery.

There is a well-known story told by the younger Pliny of the Roman matron Arria, who, having lost her son by sickness, and all but lost her husband, used to tell the latter in his convalescence, when he enquired about the boy: “Oh, he has slept well; he has had quite an appetite.” Then she would rush out of the room to hide her tears. Father Rickaby, commenting on this story, says: “I will not vouch for the objective morality of these replies: they may or may not be justified as broad mental reservations. But they are much more easily justified, if the whole harm of lying consists in the hearer’s unwillingness to suffer a deception rendered necessary by the state of his health. The same doctrine would justify other speeches of a much more objectionable character. It would, in fact, contain the reaffirmation of the old Greek position, that deceit is a medicine and a drug, and may be administered ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει, especially by persons in authority, wherever they judge that it will work a wholesome effect, and wherever the person deceived is not unwilling, or at least ought not to be surprised or complain, considering the circumstances. But this would be to throw the door open wide to the whole crowd of official, officious, and jocose lies. Untruths told for a purpose to enemies, to children, to subjects, to servants; pleasant fictions to gratify a friend; hoaxes unlimited, where we think the victim ought not much to mind,—these will be withdrawn from the category of lying, or will be registered as white lies and lawful. Worst of all, if the whole harm of lying is in the unpleasant effect wrought upon the deceived hearer, or in the scandal and bad consequences to society at large, it is not clear that lying is impossible to God; and our faith, based on the divine veracity, is shaken to the foundation. God, as Master, might bid the deceived listener bear the mortification and shame of being duped. He might by His providence prevent any scandal or general bad consequences to society; or, as Sovereign, He might impose or permit such consequences, as He sends or permits a pestilence. The Lord of life and death, who commanded Isaac to be slain, and who daily ‘taketh away the spirit of princes,’ is not to be restrained from being a deceiver by the mere reluctance of His creatures, unless there be some element in the divine nature itself which makes it utterly impossible for God to deceive and speak false. Undoubtedly there is such an element. It lies even at the root of the sanctity of God. God is holy in that, being by essence the fullness of all Being and all Goodness, He is ever true to Himself in every act of His understanding, of His will, and of His power. By His understanding He abidingly covers, grasps, and comprehends His whole Being. With His will He loves Himself supremely. His power is exercised entirely for His glory—entirely, but not exclusively, for God’s last and best external glory is in the consummated happiness of His creatures. Whatever God makes, He makes in His own likeness, more or less so according to the degree of being which He imparts to the creature. And as whatever God does is like Him, and whatever God makes is like Him, so whatever God says is like Him. His spoken word answers to His inward word and thought. It holds of God, as of every being who has a thought to think and a word to utter:— “‘To thine own self be true, And it must follow, as the night the day, Thou canst not then be false to any man.’”³³

³³ Rickaby, Political and Moral Essays, pp. 227 sqq.

Lies told for the purpose of injuring others are, as a rule, grievous sins, though subject to parvitas materiae. The guilt in such cases is not to be measured by the damage calculated or foreseen, but primarily and above all by the malice or lack of charity which inspired them. Even a slight injury may be done with great malice.

The principal circumstances to be considered in weighing the guilt of a lie are the scandal given and the importance of veracity as a pillar of social intercourse.

d) By frequent lying a man forms the habit of mendacity, which consists in the inclination and a certain aptitude to tell lies. This vice gradually entails not only absolute indifference to truth, but a real love of lying for its own sake, which sometimes results in a sort of obsession of the soul by the evil spirit. “Why dost thou glory in malice, thou that art mighty in iniquity? All the day long thy tongue hath devised injustice, as a sharp razor thou hast wrought deceit. Thou hast loved malice more than goodness, and iniquity rather than to speak righteousness. Thou hast loved all the words of ruin, O deceitful tongue.”³⁴

³⁴ Ps. LI, 3–6.

St. Augustine calls the controversy that was waged in his time concerning the ethics of lying “magna quaestio, latebrosa nimis,” and treats it as a problem for the solution of which the most learned men have labored in vain.³⁵ It follows that at the time when the Saint wrote, this part of Catholic moral teaching had not yet been fully developed. In practice, however, lying had been condemned absolutely and unreservedly by Clement of Rome, the Shepherd of Hermas, Justin Martyr, Lactantius, and St. Basil.³⁶

³⁵ De Mendac., c. I, n. 1; c. XVIII, n. 38.—IDEM, Contra Mendac., c. XV, n. 33 (Migne, P. L., XL, 487, 513, 541).—V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 82 sqq.—Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 174 sqq.

³⁶ On the veracity of God, cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 236 sqq.; Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 186 sqq.

169. Principle 1. Every true lie is intrinsically evil, so that it can be made honorable by absolutely no reason.

Thus, after St. Augustine and St. Thomas, is the most common opinion, with few Catholic theologians contradicting it. Clement of Alexandria,³¹² Origen,³¹³ St. Chrysostom,³¹⁴ St. Hilary,³¹⁵ and especially Cassian³¹⁶ seem to have taught that in a case of necessity, for averting the greatest damage, it is lawful to use a lie as a medicine. Here are the words of Cassian: "Therefore one must think about lying in such a way and use it in such a way as if the nature of hellebore [Nieswurz] were in it; if it is taken when a deadly disease threatens, it becomes healthful; but if it is received without the necessity of supreme danger, it is of present destruction.... Therefore when some grave danger threatens from the confession of truth, then refuges of lies are to be received, yet in such a way that we are healthfully bitten by the guilt of a humble conscience."³¹⁷ There are, however, several Catholic theologians³¹⁸ who explain the Fathers and older ecclesiastical writers as if they spoke concerning the liceity of mental restriction, not of lying properly so called.³¹⁹ Hence there would only be a dispute about words. Certain modern Catholic theologians distinguish between a moral lie, which is never lawful, and a psychological lie, or false-speaking, which in a case of necessity is lawful according to Bolgeni,³²⁰ Piat, O. Cap.,³²¹ Tanquerey,³²² and several Protestants, such as Luther, Grotius, Pufendorf, Martensen.³²³ Again there seems to be a dispute about words; because that which they call a psychological lie or false-speaking (fausseté), others call mental restriction. Nevertheless it would be much better if the expressions "psychological lie" or "false-speaking" were avoided. For in practice it is not so easy to distinguish between a psychological and a moral lie, and it sounds very bad if a Catholic theologian says that some lie is sometimes lawful. - These things having been premised, it is proved that lying properly so called is intrinsically evil:

1. From Sacred Scripture, which indiscriminately prohibits every lie. You shall flee a lie;³²⁴ Do not lie, nor let each one deceive his neighbor;³²⁵ Do not lie to one another.³²⁶

2. From the Holy Fathers. St. Cyprian,³²⁷ citing Prov. 12, 22, says that one must not lie, because lying lips are an abomination to the Lord. - But especially St. Augustine strenuously proved in his diverse writings³²⁸ that a lie is never lawful, neither for anyone's temporal safety, nor for preserving chastity, nor for the safety of the neighbor. But since lies seem to be approved in not a few places of Sacred Scripture, e.g., Jacob, who deceived his father Isaac; the midwives, who concealed the children of the Jews by a lie; Judith, who deceived Holofernes by a lie, etc., St. Augustine shows that the alleged deeds either are not lies properly so called, or are not to be imitated. St. Thomas assumed the doctrine of St. Augustine, and simply asserts: "Every lie is a sin";³²⁹ and, "We concede that lying is always a sin."³³⁰

3. From reason. a) Lying is repugnant to the natural end of speech: "For since words are naturally signs of understandings, it is unnatural and undue that someone should signify by the voice that which he does not have in the mind. Hence the Philosopher says³³¹ that 'lying is of itself depraved and to be fled; but the true is good and praiseworthy.'"³³² Therefore lying is an abuse of the voice.

b) Lying is repugnant to the natural commerce of men. For without truthfulness human society cannot stand in peace.

c) Lying is repugnant to the good of the neighbor hearing. As was said above, any true lie by its nature induces the hearer into error. Now to induce another into error is to harm him. If sometimes a lie does not induce into error, this is by accident, and therefore does not change its absolute culpability.

d) Lying is repugnant to the good of the speaker himself. For although an (officious) lie sometimes seems to be useful to the speaker himself, nevertheless in reality it harms, since it excites to many evils. Hence it is evident from experience that a lying man loses nobility of soul and often sins especially from cowardice or even from a cauterized conscience.

³¹² Strom. l. 7, c. 9 (Migne, Patr. graec. 9, 474).

³¹³ Strom. l. 6 (Migne, l.c. 11, 102).

³¹⁴ Hom. 3, n. 3 in 2 Cor. 1, 17 (Migne, l.c. 61, 408).

³¹⁵ Comm. in Ps. 14, n. 10 (Migne, Patr. lat. 9, 305).

³¹⁶ Collat. 17, c. 17.

³¹⁷ L.c., in Migne, Patr. lat. 49, 1062. This doctrine of Cassian seems taken from Plato, who taught that lying is sometimes salutary: ψεῦδος δὴ ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει (De republ. l. 3 [ed. Didot n. 389]). Socrates and the Stoics spoke in the same way. On the contrary Aristotle calls lying from its very nature something evil: καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν (Ethic. l. 4, c. [13] 7, 6).

³¹⁸ Waffelaert, Diss. mor. sur la malice du mensonge p. 41 sqq.

³¹⁹ Especially it is not so clear what St. Jerome thought in this question. In his Commentaries on the Epistle to the Galatians c. 2, 11-12 he had written that St. Paul did that very thing concerning which he rebuked St. Peter, and therefore did not speak so according to truth. St. Augustine, vehemently moved by this, invites St. Jerome to sing a palinode in this matter (Ep. 67 among the works of St. Jerome; in Migne, Patr. lat. 22, 650), but he took this very badly and wrote rather vehement letters to defend his opinion; yet he expressly asserts that he does not wish to defend an "officious lie," as Augustine imputed to him, but that the holy Apostles committed simulation from a certain "honest dispensation" (Ep. 113; ib. 923). St. Augustine was unwilling to admit even this, and strenuously defended St. Paul (Ep. 116; ib. 936 sqq.). Therefore between St. Augustine and St. Jerome there exists rather a controversy about St. Paul's manner of acting than about the liceity of lying. Nevertheless it must be confessed that St. Augustine extended the words of St. Jerome to an officious lie. - Concina treats this whole matter excellently, both historically and theologically (In Decal. l. 5, diss. 3, c. 20 and l. 10, c. 5), and also clearly shows that St. Raymond of Pennafort is falsely cited as permitting an officious lie in grave necessity.

³²⁰ Mélanges théologiques de Liége, 4th series (1850-1851), p. 409-413.

³²¹ Appendix 4 to Theol. mor. by Van der Velden I, 524 sq.

³²² Theol. mor. De iust., n. 4105 sqq.

³²³ Die christl. Ethik II (1879), 245 sqq.

³²⁴ Ex. 23, 7.

³²⁵ Lev. 19, 11.

³²⁶ Col. 3, 9; cf. also Prov. 12, 22; Eccli. 20, 26.

³²⁷ Lib. 3 testim. ad Quirin. c. 104 (Migne, Patr. lat. 4, 807).

³²⁸ De mendacio, Contra mendacium, Sermons 81, 133, and 166 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 494-497 and 541-547).

³²⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 3.

³³⁰ Quodl. 8, a. 14.

³³¹ Ethic. l. 4, c. 7.

³³² S. theol., l.c.

170. Principle 2. Lying, insofar as it is chiefly opposed to truthfulness, is a venial sin; but insofar as it is opposed to justice, religion, and other virtues, it is from its genus a mortal sin.

The reason of the first part is that the abuse of speech and the other disorders found in a pure lie do not seem to be so grave that they constitute a mortal sin. Thus also bears the common sense of the faithful, even those who fear God, who do not think that they have sinned mortally if they have told a purely jocose or officious lie. And truly it seems too harsh to condemn someone to the penalty of Gehenna who departed from this life with a jocose or officious lie. Concerning these lies St. Augustine says:³³³ "There are altogether two kinds of lies in which there is no great fault, but nevertheless they are not without fault, when either we joke, or lie in order that we may help. That first, in joking, is therefore not most pernicious, because it does not deceive. For he to whom it is said knows that it was said for the sake of a joke. But the second is milder, because it retains some benevolence."

The reason of the other part of the principle is that these virtues (charity, justice, faith, religion) of themselves oblige under grave matter. Hence without any doubt he commits mortal sin who by lying causes grave scandal and thus wounds charity, e.g., if a bishop should tell a pure and foul lie; or if someone by lying causes grave damage, because it is a grave wounding of justice; or if someone tells a lie with an oath, because he wounds the virtue of religion; or if someone speaks against the true faith, because he wounds the virtue of faith. - Therefore lies which, besides truthfulness, also wound other virtues, are from their genus mortal sins; but they become venial sins either from lightness of matter or from imperfection of the act.³³⁴ But when in Sacred Scripture it is said: You will destroy all who speak a lie,³³⁵ and: The mouth that lies kills the soul,³³⁶ such and similar places are to be understood of the pernicious lie.³³⁷

³³³ Enarr. in Ps. 5, n. 2 (Migne, Patr. lat. 36, 86).

³³⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 4. - The opinion proposed by Tanquerey seems too harsh: "Lying properly so called ... is of itself a grave sin" (Theol. mor., De iust. n. 411). But if under lying properly so called only a damaging lie is understood, the proposition is indeed true, but then that manner of speaking is not pleasing, because it is repugnant to the common usage of theologians. Mausbach also speaks less rightly in this matter (Kathol. Moraltheol. III, 59).

³³⁵ Ps. 5, 7.

³³⁶ Wis. 1, 11.

³³⁷ Cf. S. theol., l.c. ad 1.

S. Th. II-II, q. 110.

857. A lie (mensonge; leugen) is directly opposed to truth by defect and therefore is speech against the mind. It is called:

1. Speech, and indeed external speech, which can be made by any external sign whatever, whether by word, writing, gesture, or deed; hence on the part of the act a lie is divided into a lie strictly so called, which is made by words or equivalent signs, and simulation, which is made by deeds, of which hypocrisy is a species, which chiefly is the simulation of holiness.

2. Against the mind, namely, that which proceeds from the intention of enunciating what is false; hence if someone enunciates what is false, erroneously thinking it to be true, falsity is not present except materially, nor is there a lie; in other words, he errs but does not lie. On the contrary, if someone enunciates what is true, erroneously thinking it to be false, he does not err but lies, because falsity is present formally, and accordingly a lie.

In this intention there is implicitly included the intention of deceiving, because the proper effect of a false enunciation is that another be deceived; but that someone explicitly intends to establish falsity in the opinion of another does not pertain to the species or essence of a lie, but to a certain perfection of it (a. 1).

858. Principle I. Every lie is a sin. - It is proved:

1. From the Scriptures (Ecclus. VII, 14; Prov. XIII, 5 and Col. III, 9; John VIII, 44; I John II, 21).

2. From the authority of St. Augustine and St. Thomas.

3. By reason, because a) it is essentially evil, as an act which falls upon undue matter. Namely, it is repugnant to the end of speech and of the faculty of speaking, which were established by the author of nature so that man might manifest his thoughts to man: for since voices by their nature are signs of concepts, it is unnatural and undue that someone signify by voice that which he does not have in his mind; from which disorder follows b) another, that a lie of itself by its nature induces the deception of the neighbor, and accordingly, once universal suspicion has arisen, brings harm to trust and security in social life and to the public good (a. 3).

859. A threefold lie: officious, jocose, pernicious. - On the part of the end (motive) or effect and fault, a lie is distinguished as officious, jocose, and pernicious, according as it is made for the sake of one's own or another's utility, of delight, or of inflicting special harm: the first is lighter than the second, and the second than the third; but the gravest of all is a lie which harms God in the matter of religion (a. 2 and 4).

An officious and jocose lie is venial from its genus, and is not mortal except accidentally, for example by reason of scandal, for a deception of small moment does not overthrow social life, but inconveniences it: for from deception of the neighbor about something of small moment concerning which it does not matter whether it be known, the neighbor is not harmed; but a pernicious lie is mortal from its genus on account of the evil joined to it, whether on the part of the matter, if it is made in doctrine of religion or of good morals or of some science, or in a contract, or on the part of the end, if it is said to the injury of God or to the notable detriment of the neighbor.

860. Principle II. Although it is never licit to lie, "nevertheless it is sometimes licit prudently to hide the truth under some dissimulation" (q. 110, a. 3, ad 4). - This is customarily done in a twofold way:

1. By amphibology or equivocation (dubbelzinnige uitdrukking), which is a speech having of itself a twofold sense: one, ordinarily more obvious and common, which the speaker foresees is to be perceived by the hearer; the other, less common, yet perceptible by the hearer from the circumstances, which the speaker intends to express, for example, I say no, I will, Peter is at home, this book belongs to Peter, etc.

2. By restriction (voorbehoud), which is a limitation made in the mind of some absolute affirmation or negation, or an act of the mind by which someone restricts or turns words in his mind to a sense other than the natural and obvious one. It is twofold: a) purely mental, when the limitation cannot appear externally, but the whole sense lies hidden in the mind and the truth can in no way be perceived, as if someone says that he has seen Rome, understanding in a picture, I did not break the vow, understanding in the previous year, I did not take your thing, thinking with the left hand, I did not do this, namely, that which I am now thinking, etc.; b) broadly mental or real, when the limitation can be gathered from the circumstances of things, persons, places, and received common usage, for example, if a priest or physician says: I know nothing about these things, understanding, which I can reveal; then by reason of the circumstances the speech is now made equivocal, and rather there is restriction of the utterance than of the mind. Now then:

I. It is never licit to use a purely mental restriction, because it is simply a lie, for the words neither of themselves nor from the adjoining circumstances in any way outwardly manifest the internal concept of the mind. This is clear from the condemnation of propositions 26 and 27 by Innocent XI.¹

¹ "If anyone, either alone or before others, whether interrogated, or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation, or for any other end whatever, swears that he did not do something which in reality he did, understanding within himself something else which he did not do, or another way from that in which he did it, or any other true addition whatever, he does not really lie nor is he perjured." - "A just cause for using these amphibologies is present whenever it is necessary or useful for safeguarding bodily health, honor, family goods, or for any other act of virtue, so that the hiding of truth is then judged expedient and studious."

II. It is licit to use real restriction and amphibology, provided that a just cause is present for hiding the truth, and another honest means is lacking, and deception of the neighbor is not intended.

It is proved: a) by the example of Christ. "But of that day no one knoweth... nor the Son," understanding: so as to manifest it (Mk. XIII, 32; Mt. XXIV, 36; cf. John XI, 11; VII, 8);

b) by reason: on the one hand, it is not a lie, because the words which are uttered, taken together with the circumstances of the speaker, the hearer, etc., which according to common estimation co-signify, signify the true sense which the speaker has in mind, although not clearly and distinctly; on the other hand, deception of the neighbor is not necessarily intended: for that speech has a twofold effect, one good, the hiding of truth which the speaker intends, the other evil, the deception of the neighbor which he only permits from a just cause. Hence the neighbor is not directly and necessarily deceived, but his deception is only permitted, which for a just cause is licit. For we are not bound to speak according to the mind of others if a just cause is present. But if this were not licit, there would not exist a way of licitly keeping secrets, which would be pernicious to human commerce, no less than lying, says St. Alphonsus, l. III, n. 152.²

² Real restriction is not something new, although the name is new. In ancient times it was known, although not so expressly; even by St. Thomas, as is clear from what he has concerning various sayings by Christ, and concerning the sacramental seal.

We said: from a just cause; for such utterances ordinarily are not licit, otherwise social life itself, which is founded upon mutual trust and mutual manifestation of truth, would totter. A just cause is an honorable end for preserving goods useful to the spirit or body; and this cause is required to be proportionate, that is, greater 1) the more the words furnish occasion of erring; 2) the graver the matter of error is; 3) the more numerous and greater are those to be deceived. A greater cause, for example, is required that someone use them publicly, or not interrogated, or asked by authority, than that he use them privately, or interrogated, especially if not by authority. But for swearing with real restriction or amphibology a greater and grave cause is required, out of reverence for the name of God.

861. Principle III. It is not always licit to hide the truth. - It is not licit to use any restriction or equivocation when some other special precept of faith, charity, justice, etc., demands the open confession of truth; in which case one who nevertheless used it would sin in two ways, both against truth and against the other virtue: a) when the precept of externally confessing the faith presses; b) when by reason of office we are bound to instruct someone and teach him true things lest he err, especially if for a price or stipend; c) when a judge legitimately interrogates, having the right of knowing the truth (to this right of knowing some truth there corresponds in another the obligation of confessing it, and in such a way that the truth be known by the hearer), or a superior concerning those things which pertain to the governance of subjects, or a confessor concerning those things which he must know in order rightly to judge the penitent; d) in onerous and mutual contracts, on account of a similar motive: for justice requires that no injury be brought upon another.

One who uses amphibology without sufficient cause violates the affirmative precept of truth, by which, on account of the good of society, we are obliged not to hide the truth without cause, or at least not to furnish occasion for the deception of the neighbor: for if this were always done and without reason, no one could any longer believe another without suspicion of ambiguity, which would tend to the manifest detriment of society. Yet such a person does not make a lie, because the utterance in some signification is conformed to the internal judgment of the speaker, provided that it remains equivocal when all the circumstances are considered. Hence if he confirms it by oath, he makes an unjust assertory oath, which of itself is venial; yet it can be mortal, if another virtue is gravely injured, for example commutative or legal justice, as in contracts and judgments.

But one who uses restriction without sufficient cause, besides this, makes a lie, because if sufficient cause is lacking, the circumstances do not sufficiently indicate the restriction added in judgment by the mind; hence one who in this case confirms it by oath makes perjury strictly so called.

862. Remarks. - 1. Let proposition 28 be noted among those condemned by Innocent XI,³ by which we know that all restrictions are illicit when an oath is required on account of the public good, whether by the Republic or by the Church, lest the unworthy be promoted, for example, in those to be promoted to sacred order (concerning birth, censures, irregularity), in those wishing to contract marriage (concerning a diriment impediment), in conditions for teaching in schools for an academic degree, etc.

³ "One who by means of recommendation or a gift has been promoted to a magistracy or public office will be able, with mental restriction, to furnish the oath which by mandate of the king is customarily required from such persons, no regard being had to the intention of the one requiring it; because he is not bound to confess a hidden crime."

2. We note that Catholics commonly admit broadly mental restriction as a necessary means of hiding the truth. Nor is it to be admitted what certain moderns have said for this end: that false-speaking is licit, or a psychological lie which harms no one but benefits the speaker or another, distinguishing it from a moral lie, which denies truth when it ought to be affirmed, and thus perverting the definition of a lie.⁴ Although practically in most cases broadly mental restriction and false-speaking return to the same thing as to the matter, nevertheless the doctrine must be held which says that every lie and false-speaking is illicit, both because it more easily excludes abuse, and because every false-speaking is against the essence of speech, and because broadly mental restriction, as being speech true in itself, can also be confirmed by oath, which is sometimes necessary. But false-speaking, even if it were said to be licit, cannot be confirmed by oath, because it is falsity.

⁴ Thus not only Grotius and Pufendorf, Protestants, but also certain Catholics, such as Bolgeni, Il possesso, c. 48; Dubois, Une théorie du mensonge; and the author of the little work: Étude sur la malice intrinsèque du mensonge par un professeur de théologie. Against these especially Waffelaert, Dissertation morale sur la malice du mensonge; and Vermeersch, in the periodical Gregorianum, I, wrote very well.

3. The comparison cannot be admitted which some, such as Fr. Vermeersch, institute between homicide licit from just defense on account of a good effect, and false speech or a restriction which is not sufficiently indicated by the circumstances, licit from just defense of a secret which otherwise could not be defended. For homicide is not always and essentially evil, because it is not against the essence of things but only against their natural condition, and therefore it is not always an illicit means but only the homicide of an innocent person; on the contrary, lying is essentially and always evil against the very essence of speech (in the same way as lust against nature, because it is against the very essential order of the generative organs); and therefore it is always illicit even for just defense, because evil things, even the least, are not to be done for the sake of good things.

4. It must be noted that penitents sometimes affirm that they had to lie in order to keep a secret. Then the confessor would try in vain to explain to the simpler the distinction between a lie and broadly mental restriction, which in the case is licit. Therefore, having asked what utterance they had used, let him simply tell them that such things are not lies, but licit responses which can be given on account of necessity, and whose sense in those circumstances does not deceive an upright and prudent man (for example, in a merchant).

863. Corollary. - False testimony is of itself a grave sin, as being a pernicious lie. It is directly prohibited by the eighth precept of the decalogue (Ex. XX, 16), and is hateful to God (Prov. VI, 16, 19) and very harmful to the neighbor (Prov. XXV, 18).

It has a threefold deformity: a) against legal justice, because it does not obey the command of a judge or superior legitimately interrogating, and for that reason it is apt to harm the good of the community; b) against commutative justice, if besides it causes unjust harm to the neighbor; c) against religion, if, as is customary, it is done under oath, because then it is perjury strictly so called. From this last head it is always a mortal sin, even in a slight matter; from the first and the other it is mortal from its genus. Hence in law it is said (Decr. l. V, tit. 20, c. 1): "A false-speaking witness is liable to three persons: first to God, whose presence he contemns; then to the judge, whom he deceives by lying; lastly to the innocent person, whom he harms by false testimony."

From these things it is understood that this is accidentally venial: a) from some inadvertence or insufficient deliberation; b) also from lightness of matter, if it is not done under oath and brings only slight harm.

A false witness is bound:

1. to revoke the testimony, and indeed if he said it only materially or from error, he is bound when revocation is useful to another and does not bring grave harm to himself; but if he said it formally and knowingly, he is bound, when revocation is useful to another, even with equal or greater inconvenience to himself, therefore even with danger of life if he has thrown an innocent person into the same danger, for in equal harm favor is rather to be shown to the innocent;

2. to restitution of the harm already following, he is bound; and indeed if he knowingly said false testimony and thus effectively brought harm upon another, he is bound simply. But when in good faith he gave false testimony, he is bound to restore if afterward he did not revoke it, although he could conveniently have done so and reparation would have been useful to another: for then he indirectly wills to be an efficacious cause.

I say 1st. A lie properly so called is certainly something intrinsically evil, but does not exceed venial sin if it is jocose, or even officious; but if it is harmful, it will be a light or grave sin according to the quantity of harm inflicted. The reason for the first is both because it is repugnant to right reason to use signs of speech against their natural end and institution, and to wish, as it were, to destroy the unity of man; and because, the liceity of lying having been admitted, the order of society, which rests upon mutual commerce and trust, would be altogether subverted. But the reason for the second is taken from the common consent of theologians, from the persuasion of the faithful, and from the very nature of that repugnance with right reason, which certainly does not appear grave. Finally, the reason for the third is that in a harmful lie, besides the virtue of truthfulness, justice is injured, which obliges under grave or light matter according to the harm that is inflicted. - Cf. St. Augustine, books On Lying and Against Lying. - St. Thomas, loc. cit., art. 3 and 4.

I say 2nd. It is never licit to use purely or properly mental restriction, because, as is clear from its definition, this would be simply to lie. But sometimes it is licit from a just cause to use restriction broadly, that is improperly mental, when the sense intended by the speaker can be understood. The reason is that this is not evil in itself, since the neighbor is not properly deceived, but his deception is only permitted from a just cause; besides, for the good of society it is required that there be a licit means of hiding a secret; but sometimes no other means is available besides broad or improperly mental restriction. I said, from a just cause; because if the use of such restrictions were permitted without a proportionate cause, no one could or would wish to believe another; and this would redound to the greatest harm of human society. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de secund. praec. Decal., nn. 151 and 152. - Lacroix, lib. 3, n. 287.

I. So manifest from God is the depravity, and perniciousness, of lies, that not one of the wise can be found who has not proscribed liars as enemies of human society. The dispute has only been, both among the ancient Philosophers and among the Fathers, whether, to conceal a truth of the highest moment, whose manifestation would redound to the harm of the public good, lies are to be lawfully employed. Plato, easily the prince of all Philosophers, in his ten books On the Republic, or in the Dialogues On the Just, teaches in many places that, an exceedingly grave cause pressing, truth is lawfully to be concealed by a lie. I will here transcribe a few things out of many, following the version of Jean de Serres. In Book, or Dialogue, II, near the end, he writes this: "And so a true lie, which consists in this — that the mind is in error, thinking wrongly of some matter — is held in hatred not only by the gods, but also by men; but that lie which is expressed in words is useful only in this case, and does not seem worthy of hatred, if we use it against enemies, or even with those who are called friends, when, seized by madness, or some other kind of derangement, they attempt to do some evil — so that we may divert them from the deed, taking it up as a useful remedy." In Book III, a little after the beginning, he takes away the use of lying from private citizens, but grants it to magistrates, and to physicians: "For if it was rightly said a little before, that among the gods there is no place for lying, but that among men it is, as a kind of remedy, to be employed as useful — it is clear that this matter is to be granted to physicians, but taken away from the rest who do not profess that art; so that, furthermore, it may be lawful for Princes, if for any, to lie, whether for the sake of enemies, or of citizens, for the advantage of the state; but all others must abstain entirely from lying." He has similar things in Book V, and in other places. Plato is said to have drawn this error from Timaeus of Locri, and from Sophocles. He had very many followers, not only among the pagans, but even among worshippers of the true God, who upheld the licit use of lies.

II. The first among Catholic Doctors who wrote less cautiously concerning lying was Clement of Alexandria, who, in Bk. VII of the Stromata, has certain things which seem to favor lying.

III. Clement of Alexandria had as his disciple Origen, who did not obscurely, but openly, patronized lying, as his own Master had done. St. Jerome (Bk. I, Against Rufinus) reports his words, transcribed from Bk. VI of the Stromata, where he has this: "We ought not to say whatever comes into our mind to our neighbor... A Philosopher would cautiously say that a lie is sometimes useful to men, as a kind of medicine. But consider how God himself is sometimes to be thought, when it profits the hearer, to speak in ambiguous words, and to declare what he wishes through enigmas; so that both the dignity of truth may be preserved with him, and, if something harmful might result, were it to be brought forth naked before the common people, it may be covered with some veil, lest it be brought forth. But man, upon whom the necessity of lying rests, should diligently take care so to use a lie at times, in the manner of a condiment, or a medicine, that he keep its measure, lest, by using it too often, he lose the credit of his own honesty. Judith, too, made use of this against Holofernes, having long concealed the truth of her people, correcting it; and, above all, the Patriarch Jacob — of whom we read the blessings which he obtained from his father by a cunning device — unless we have lied in such a way that some great good may be sought thereby for ourselves, we are to be judged, as it were, enemies of him who says, 'I am the truth.'"

IV. Origen was followed by Hilary, in his commentaries on Psalm 14. "For a lie," he says, "is often necessary, and sometimes falsehood is useful — as when we lie about a hidden matter to a persecutor, or defraud one who threatens, of testimony against one in peril, or deceive concerning the difficulty of a sick man's cure; and it behooves us, according to the Apostle's teaching, to season our speech with salt, and to do our neighbor no harm, so that the crime of lying be reckoned by another's inconvenience." His Commentary on this Psalm, however, along with various considerations which the most learned Benedictine Editors prefix to this Psalm in their annotations, is defended, after much dispute, as being truly St. Hilary's. The occasion of St. Hilary's error was Origen, whose commentaries on the Psalms he translated from Greek into Latin.

V. St. John Chrysostom, no less than Hilary, seems to have embraced Origen's opinion not obscurely, Vol. II, Homily 7 on Penance, where he commends the lie by which Rahab withdrew the spies from the fury of their pursuers, in these words: "Worthy of all praise, then, is Rahab, an image of the Church. For when messengers were sent by the King to seek out the spies, if there were any who had entered her house, she said to them: If men have entered in to thee, respond..." 'No.' For if they had at first said 'no,' she would have provoked those who had come to a search. But she said, 'They have entered in to thee, and they have gone out this way: pursue, and you will overtake them.' O beautiful lie! O beautiful deceit — not betraying, but guarding, piety!"* I could adduce many other things, but I pass over them. Nor let anyone hold it against me that I assert a most celebrated holy Doctor of the Church not to be free of this blemish. Since, to establish this, no other path lies open to my own feebleness than that I flatter myself I can prevail over the applause and acumen of those who strive to defend Chrysostom's teaching as untainted by this light stain. Let them note, however, this much: that they gather water in a sieve, while they strive to show that Chrysostom does not patronize lying, on the grounds that in several other places he condemns lying by design, and expressly disowns it. For all writers, to a man, absolutely detest lying, and prove its malice by every kind of argument. The question turns on this: whether, urgent necessity of avoiding some most grave evil pressing — such as the death of men — a lie is lawful. Chrysostom affirms this, as I indeed judge. Whoever shall demonstrate the opposite will be, to me, a great Apollo.

VI. A disciple of St. John Chrysostom was John Cassian, who, whether he drank in this error from his own teacher, or from Origen, defended it more ardently than all his predecessors. Not incidentally, but with a deliberate pen, he treats this controversy in Collation XVII, ch. 17 and following, through fifteen chapters. From these many chapters I will glean a few things. What, he says, is to be thought of lying, and how it is to be used, is such that it has in its nature something of hellebore, which, if taken when death impends from disease, is salutary, but otherwise, without the utmost peril, is deadly. Thus we read that even holy men, and men of God, made use of a lie, as Rahab did, and others. When, then, some grave danger concerning the confession of truth is imminent, then recourse to lies is to be taken up. Ch. 20 speaks of a distinction, forgivable, in a confession of truth. From the examples of principal Princes, chief among God's own, he seems to give a commendation of lies. And ch. 19: this is nearly the perception of imminent death. He draws forth many authorities and examples, both from the Old and from the New Testament, from most approved men, adducing the necessity of it. By these, he says, the learned Apostle Paul is exhorted to descend, out of necessity, to feigned pretenses of the weak, and forgivably to acquiesce. For then a detriment of lying is to be undertaken, when, as we have said, a greater loss of confessing the truth is imminent, and the utility which is conferred by truth does not prevail to compensate for the harm which such things generate for us. Ch. 21 brings forth several testimonies from the Gospel itself, by which he contends that the use of lying is not only lawful, but even necessary. Ch. 22, 23, and 24 allege examples of several most holy Monks and Abbots, who lied because they judged it to belong to a more sublime virtue, to conceal their own continence by a humble lie, than to reveal it to superb human judgment. Ch. 25 again reviews, from several books of Scripture, countless examples of most holy Patriarchs and Saints collected, so as to confirm more strongly his opinion concerning the licit and necessary use of lies, as a kind of remedy. "It is impossible for us," he says, "to enumerate all — for who would suffice to run briefly through the whole? — how the Patriarchs, and innumerable Saints of God, some for the desire of a blessing, some for the safeguarding of life, some for the concealment of some mystery, some out of zeal for God, some for the examination of truth, took up, so to speak, the patronage of lying?"

These few arguments, which more recent theologians thrust upon us in favor of the licit use of equivocations, I have adduced to show that Cassian, in many instances, has touched upon and drawn out all of these, so as to show that lies are necessarily and honorably to be employed.

VII. Two other authors I recount, lest I be too prolix, who have patronized lying in this manner. John Climacus, on the twelfth rung of his Ladder, writes this: "When we have felt ourselves free from every vanity of lying, both in place and in habitual use, then at last, though not without fear, we may sometimes, cautiously, allow a lie to enter in." Martin of Braga (Bk. On the Four Cardinal Virtues, ch. 4) says: "Do not use lying, but where an honorable cause exists, you may be redeemed by a lie. Let the just man guard the secrets of fidelity, not by uttering falsehood, but by keeping guard over truth; and if perchance you are compelled, you will rather be excused than convicted of lying, since he who speaks does not betray what should be kept silent; but what should be spoken, he speaks."

VIII. More authors favoring lying I could recount, but, lest excessive prolixity beget disgust in the reader, I will close this chapter with the words of Augustine, who attests that in his own time it was the common opinion which held that it was lawful to lie for the salvation of men. He has this (q. 68, on Leviticus): "This is to be held, that no one's authority, wherever a thing is decreed in Scripture, is of any account. But the ancient Fathers, while they lied, will be no occasion for the ignorant and heterodox to seize an opportunity for lying — for such audacious imposture has already many times been refuted. For that some of the holy Fathers, at times, in some most difficult controversy which in their time had not yet been discussed with due dignity, fell into some slip, no one denies; but the Fathers, while no one is harmed, are to be excused, as they pass by in passing."

IX. Hence it must not be inferred, that they are to be held of little account, or to be calumniated, and to be deceived, because with unanimous consent they defend some doctrine. But of this, elsewhere a fuller discourse.

I. Aristotle, Plato's disciple, rejected his master's error concerning lying (Bk. IV, Ethics, ch. 7), where he writes that a lie, by its own nature, is depraved, and detestable; truth, good, and worthy of praise. But, setting aside the pagans, I will bring forward Christian Doctors of our own profession.

II. First of the whole chorus will be Lactantius, who, in Bk. VI of the Divine Institutes, openly attacks lying, in these words: "The other things which a worshipper of God ought to observe are easy, being comprehended in these virtues: that he never deceive anyone, nor lie, for the sake of harming. For it is a wicked thing for one zealous for truth to depart, in any matter, from the truth he follows, whether to deceive, or to harm. In this path of justice, and of all the virtues, there is no place for lying." Wherefore that wayfarer, both true and just, will judge that Lucilius's saying — 'It is not mine to lie to a friend' — does not befit him, but rather he will hold it to be his own not to lie to an enemy either, familiar, or unknown, and will never allow that the tongue, the interpreter of the mind, should discord from the sense and thought within.

I do not deny that Lactantius does not speak absolutely of the controversy chiefly... concerning whether, to preserve human life, or to conceal secrets of the highest moment, it is lawful to lie. For the rest, I assert at the same time that Lactantius lays down principles which proscribe the use of any officious lie whatsoever, and condemn it — since he holds that one must lie neither to a friend nor to an enemy, and that it must never be permitted that the tongue, the interpreter of the mind, should discord from the thought within; and, finally, on this path of justice, that there is never room for a lie: he certainly excludes every case in which a lie could be lawful.

III. Similar things are taught by Eusebius of Caesarea, St. Basil, in his Shorter Rules, St. Prosper, in his book Against Cassian, where, ch. 9, he says: "You deceive us with two, and twin, depravities, mixing justices, as you understand them, by dividing them. By this rule you will be able to preach that they err equally who say that one must always deceive, and who determine that one must never deceive. But, that in neither should there be sin, as an evil cannot be made a good by dividing it between two — this is altogether an error of yours: falsity is not always to be shunned, nor truth always to be followed." St. Prosper here refutes two errors of Cassian: one, that he attributed the beginnings of grace sometimes to good works, sometimes to nature; the other, that he taught that one must sometimes use falsehood, sometimes truth.

IV. Ferrandus, Deacon of the Church of Carthage, in his letter to Count Reginus, has this: "Let your speech be, at least, 'yea, yea; no, no' — with an oath either intervening, or absent, let us strive to remain most certain in truth. For as we recall concerning charity that John said, 'He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him' — thus, likewise, if we wish to speak concerning truth, we shall find it stated similarly: for divine truth says, 'I am the truth.' Whence very truly it may be said: he who abides in truth, abides in God, and God in him. We do not lie, then, who abides in truth, and God in him abides. Let us, therefore, prefer truth to all temporal advantages, and we shall be found rightly to have preferred divine things to human ones."

V. St. Gregory the Great (Bk. XVIII, Morals, ch. 3): "Every lie is iniquity... for every iniquity is a lie, because assuredly whatever departs from truth departs from equity... Every lie is to be shunned with the utmost care; although sometimes some kind of lie is of lighter fault, if someone, by lying, tries to procure for another some advantage of life or of body — since it is written, 'The mouth that lieth killeth the soul'; 'Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie.' This kind of lie, too, perfect men avoid with the utmost care, so that no one's life is defended by their deceit, lest they harm their own soul while they strive to render another's life secure. Some, indeed, by the deceit of midwives, attempt to affirm this kind of lie not to be sin — for it is written, 'because the Lord built them houses'; that in this recompense it may the better be recognized what the fault of lying deserves. For that reward of theirs, which could have been repaid to them in eternal life for their kindness, was, on account of the admixed fault of lying, diverted to an earthly recompense — so that, in this life, which they wished to preserve by lying, they might receive the good things they had done, and might not further have the reward of their merit to expect. Indeed, if carefully weighed, they lied out of love of the present life, not out of intention of reward. For, by sparing the life of the infants, they contrived to cover their own by lying."

I will point out three others, since all subsequent writers have detested all lies. Ambertus, Bk. IX on the Apocalypse, explaining those words, "And to all liars their portion shall be in the pool burning with fire," having cited the authorities of Gregory and Augustine against lying, thus concludes: "One thing we must firmly hold: that no kind of lie remains unpunished, which is not here atoned for by penance, or by some work of piety." St. Gregory VII (Bk. IX, Epistle 21, to Alfonso, King of the Spains) says: "You are not ignorant, in your prudence, that lying is a sin, of which an account must be rendered even for an idle word in the strict examination. But not even a lie which is told for peace, with a pious intention, can be proven altogether free of fault." This I have touched upon beforehand, so that, since in the rest, without doubt, you may not hesitate to hold that to be a sin. Alexander III, in the chapter "Super eo," Extra, on abuses, prohibits, as it were a sacrilege, that among priests one should lie for another's life.

I. We have already indicated, in the preceding chapter, that, before Augustine's time, several authors defended as licit the use of lying in extreme necessity, for the preservation of human life, or the warding off of some other grave harm. Cassian, above all others, left no stone unturned to fortify this opinion with the authority of Scripture. St. Augustine, on the contrary, snatched the palm from all the impugners of lying. He proposes to himself all the arguments, or cases, of his adversaries, and, with the utmost acuteness of his own genius, discusses and turns them over, so that nothing is left untouched, nothing unresolved. Indeed, he himself devised all those objections, all those events, paradoxes, and sophisms, which more recent theologians treat, so as to show that lying can be favored, and all those same difficulties, lest he pass over anything. And, since I have judged it worth the effort to set before the eyes of readers the disputation of so great a Father, so that they may gather from this how far Augustine's teaching differs from more recent inventions — Augustine wrote this Book on Lying around the year 395, as the Benedictine Fathers observe. All, then, that is contained in this Book I will transcribe here, reduced to a compendium with such brevity as I am able. The proem of this Book begins with these words:

II. "Great is the question concerning lying, which often disturbs us in our own daily actions — lest we either rashly accuse of lying what is not a lie, or judge that one must sometimes lie for some honorable, officious, and merciful reason." Then (ch. 1), the state of the controversy having been set forth, and jesting words, whose signification is plain to all, being excluded (ch. 2) from the present question, he observes (ch. 3) that neither does one who asserts something false always lie, nor is one who states something true always free of a lie. For one is not guilty of lying who, uttering a falsehood, reckons it to be true. On the contrary, he is held a liar who speaks the truth, thinking it false. Wherefore he lies who, having something else in his mind, states, in words, or by whatever signification, what he reckons false. Ch. 4 inquires what act it behooves the whole Book to treat: namely, whether he who lies ought always to have the intention of deceiving; he there discusses other difficulties as well. Ch. 5 asks whether one may sometimes lie. Those who defend this oppose the examples of Sarah, of Jacob, and of the Egyptian midwives. They add the most grave inconveniences which sometimes follow upon the manifestation of some truth — such as death, and the affliction of the sick, who cannot be freed except by a lie — relying on which words, and on those examples adduced from the Old Testament, they answer that it is unlawful for anyone who thinks well [of a matter] to be manifested. On the contrary, those who hold that the ancient Fathers did not lie argue more forcibly from divine examples, that in every event to lie...

[several lines here in the source are too faint to reliably transcribe; the discussion continues concerning whether examples like Abraham's servant provide precedent for lying]

...examples are found which provoke to the imitation of lying. But the dissimulation of Peter, and of Barnabas, was not only not commended, but even censured, and corrected. From the guilt of this dissimulation he shows Paul to be immune, when he circumcised Timothy — where he brings forward much in Paul's defense.

III. The inconveniences, moreover, which they object would follow from the revelation of truth (ch. 6), the impugners of lying count as nothing. For, directing their mind to the divine Scripture, which threatens, "The mouth that lieth killeth the soul," they reckon it a perversion of order, to destroy one's own soul, so that another may live bodily. Nor does charity urge this, which bids us to love our neighbor as ourselves, not more than ourselves. For if he departs from the right order who seeks temporal death for another's bodily life, how much more does he exceed the rule of sound doctrine, who loses his own eternal life for another's temporal one? Those, however, who rage and are indignant, if someone is unwilling to destroy his own soul by a lie, so that another may live longer in the flesh — what if it be by our own theft, what if by adultery, that another might be freed from death? Is anyone bound to corrupt his own soul by a lie, so that another may live in the body? It is absurd. Therefore neither theft nor adultery is to be committed, however much it might free someone from death. What, if a man bears a noose, that another may be strangled, unless it is granted to him what he seeks — must one assent to it? What, if a ravisher demands debauchery, affirming that he will kill a man, unless it is conceded to him — will he then be a nefarious murderer? Therefore, in this question, nothing is to be attended to, except whether lying is, by its own nature, iniquitous. Since this has already been shown above, it will be the same as to ask whether, for another's salvation, one ought to be unjust, as if one were to ask whether, for another's soul's health, which cannot be preserved except by equity, one ought oneself to be unjust. But if he rejects this, so that not only another's, but even our own, temporal welfare we must prefer to it — who could call it into doubt that one must never lie at all?

IV. Since, however (ch. 7), chastity of body is itself more precious than life, it can be asked whether a man may rightly use a lie, by which he might avoid the loss of chastity — as if a ravisher should rush in, who might be avoided by a lie. It is easily answered that there is no chastity of body, unless it depends on integrity of mind; which being disrupted, the former must necessarily fall, even if it seems untouched. In no way, then, does the mind corrupt itself by a lie for the sake of its body, which it knows remains incorrupt, if incorruption does not depart from the mind itself. For what the body suffers by violence, without preceding lust, is to be called vexation rather than corruption. Not every corruption is shameful; but there is corruption there, if lust has consented. But, however excellent the mind is above the body, so much the more wickedly is it corrupted. Chastity, then, can be preserved wherever no voluntary corruption of the mind can occur, unless someone has procured it, or consented to it. For certainly, if a ravisher has assailed a body which can be resisted neither by force, nor avoided by any counsel, or lie, it must be confessed that chastity is not violated by another's lust. Wherefore, since no one doubts that the soul is better than the body, integrity of mind is to be preferred to integrity of body, which can be preserved in eternity. But who would say that the mind of a liar is integral? For lust itself is rightly defined as an appetite of the mind by which temporal goods are preferred to eternal ones. No one, then, can prove that one must ever lie, unless he can show that some eternal good can be obtained by a lie. But since each one departs from eternity as much as he departs from truth, and it is most absurd to say that one who lies, departing from truth, can, by so departing, arrive at some good — or, if there is such a good, whatever was not fulfilled will not be true, and therefore not good either, since it is false. Just as, then, mind is to be preferred to body, so too is truth to mind, since the mind ought to desire it not only more than the body, but even more than itself. If, however, Lot, being so just that he deserved even to receive Angels as guests, offered his daughters to be ravished by the Sodomites, so that the bodies of women rather than of men might be corrupted by them — how much more diligently, and constantly, ought chastity of mind be preserved in truth, since the male body is truly to be preferred to the female body?

V. Hence anyone may gather that one ought not to lie even with the intention of attaining eternal salvation; indeed he adds (ch. 8) that the door of eternal salvation is closed, if an entrance is opened by a lie. For the first foundation of salvation is faith. This surely wavers, if it is once granted that it is lawful for good men to lie. For how is one to be believed who thinks that one must sometimes lie? For he can lie even then, when he bids himself to be believed. For how can it be known whether he then also has some cause, as he himself thinks, for a false narration by way of officious lying — and this in such a way that even a man terrified could be restrained from lust by this means, or must be believed even in spiritual matters, judging that he consults his own interest by lying? Wherefore, either it is not to be believed that good men lie sometimes, or it is not to be believed that they are good, of whom we believe that they must sometimes lie. Of these three, the first is pernicious, the second foolish. It remains, then, that good men never lie.

VI. Thus this question (ch. 9), considered and treated from both sides, is nonetheless not a judgment easily to be rendered; but those are still to be diligently heard who say that nothing is so ill done that it must not be done in avoidance of something worse. Now it pertains to the deeds of men not only whatever they do, but also whatever, with consent, they suffer. Whence, if a case arose that a Christian man should choose to burn incense to idols, rather than consent to debauchery, which the persecutor threatened him with unless he did so — they seem rightly to ask why he should not likewise avoid the latter turpitude. That consent, by which he preferred to suffer debauchery rather than burn incense to idols, they say is not a passion but a deed: for, that he might not do this, he chose to burn incense. He answers, that if such consent is to be reckoned a deed, then those too are murderers who preferred to be killed rather than to bear false witness. Consent, therefore, is not to be called such, whenever we do not approve what is done to us; indeed, so far as it is in us, we forbid it to be done. He, then, erred, who, to prevent others from sinning against his body, burned incense to idols. But they reply: How is it not done with them, if, had they not done this, you would have done that? Augustine answers, that in this way we would be said to break down the door along with the housebreakers, if, by not shutting it, we did not prevent them from breaking it down. He proposes the question more precisely: ought he, then, to have suffered debauchery rather than burn incense? If you ask what he ought to have done, he ought to have done neither. For if I say he ought to have done one of these, I would approve one of them, whereas I condemn both. But if it is asked which of these he ought rather to have avoided, since he could not avoid both, but could avoid one or the other, I will answer: his own sin, rather [than to avoid another's]. Indeed, his own lighter sin is to be avoided rather than another's grave one. Finally, he concludes that the knot of the question turns on this: namely, whether a lie ceases to be a sin, when someone uses it to guard bodily chastity.

VII. If the discourse concerns pernicious lies, which injure another's reputation, Augustine answers (ch. 10) that it is never lawful for us to obscure another's good name, so as to prevent, whether of our own or of another's body, a rape, or other such evils, or graver ones, to be avoided — just as it is likewise never lawful to lie in a matter of religion. Indeed, one must not lie even in the doctrine of religion, so that someone might be more easily led to it. For, once the authority of truth is broken, or even lightly diminished, all things will remain in doubt — which, unless believed true, cannot be held as certain.

VIII. This being firmly established, the discussion concerning other lies proceeds more safely (ch. 11). And so all lies which unjustly harm someone are to be removed, just as also those which, although they do not harm another, nonetheless profit no one, not even the liars themselves. Finally, those lies too are to be avoided which are called jesting, which liars therefore employ, so that they may please men, and render human conversation more pleasant.

IX. These kinds having been condemned without any doubt, the discourse (ch. 12) returns to officious lies, which harm no one, but profit someone. Concerning this kind of lie the whole controversy turns on this: namely, whether these lies harm him who utters them, so that they may profit another; and whether the harm which the liar suffers is compensated by the good which the lie obtains. He answers that a lie is never lawful, even if it harms no one, and profits someone: otherwise it would be lawful to steal a measure of wheat from a rich man, abounding in superfluous wealth, to give to a poor man, who would experience great advantage, since the rich man would feel no detriment; it would then also be lawful to bear false witness to conceal the poor man's theft. What could be said more perverse than this? But since it could be replied that this lie is therefore unlawful, because by it another's sin is concealed, it is consequently asked whether it is lawful to lie, when the lie harms no one, benefits someone, and conceals no sin. He answers: If, for this reason, we do not sin in lying, because we harm no one, and benefit someone, why do we not, on the same principle, examine the sin of lying itself when we say a false thing to conceal someone's sin, and thereby benefit and harm no one? Is it not lawful to conceal a sin? Where it is written, "Thou shalt not steal," is it not also written there, "Thou shalt not bear false witness"? Is it, then, lawful to conceal a sin, and yet not lawful to commit one? Or perhaps it is not false witness, except when someone lies in such a way as either to fabricate a crime against someone, or to conceal someone's crime, or in some way to oppress someone in judgment? If this is so, what then, if a murderer takes refuge with a Christian, or that Christian sees where he takes refuge, and is questioned about this matter by one who, seeking the man for punishment, is the slain man's avenger — must one lie? Or is it evil to lie to conceal another's sin, but not evil to lie to conceal the sinner? What, if, led before a judge concerning the very place where he is hiding, or where you know he is hiding, you are questioned? Will you say: I do not know, and I did not see what you know, and did see? You will, then, bear false witness, and destroy your own soul, so that the murderer not be destroyed. Should you, then, being led to death, being innocent, where you know a murderer to be hiding, knowingly answer to a judge who, though commanded by a greater power to seize him for death, yet is only the executor of the law, not its author? Will it not be false witness, because you lie for the innocent, since it is not the judge, but the executor of the law, who asks? What, if the lawgiver himself asks, or some other unjust judge, seeking an innocent man for punishment? What will you do? A false witness, or will you be a betrayer? Or will you remain doubtful between the crime of false witness and of betrayal? How much more strongly, then, how much more excellently, will you say: I will not betray, nor will I lie. This a certain Bishop of the Church of Tagaste, named Firmus, once did — firmer still in will than in name. Why should not we do the same, both before a judge, and outside judgment, that we may fulfill what is written: "Thou shalt not bear false witness," and avoid that punishment: "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie"? Sometimes, however, we are asked, not where he is, but whether he is, or is not, concealed in that place. Where, if we know he is, by keeping silent we betray him; or even if we testify that we will by no means say whether he is there or not, we equally betray him, as if we pointed to him with a finger. In this article, then, you ought to answer thus: He knows where he is; I will never show it; I will not lie here. This alone is a fitting response to distract the mind of the questioner elsewhere, and to turn it away from the place where the innocent man lies concealed. Then, indeed, whatever you suffer, so as not to betray him, will be shown to be not only blameless, but even praiseworthy.

X. This much has been said, so that (ch. 14) it is plain that seven kinds of lying have thus far been sufficiently discussed. It remains now to speak of the eighth, and last, kind. This lie, he says, is when we lie to protect our chastity of body from another's violence. But before he renders judgment on this kind of lie, he undertakes to unfold, with a more severe examination, the testimonies of Scripture which condemn such lies. This is mature, and severe. He begins this discussion at ch. 15, and carries it on to ch. 19. He weighs the various interpretations by which the defenders of each opinion accommodated the texts of the divine Scriptures to their own opinion. From all these, weighed with the utmost diligence, he gathers this: that no one can show, from the divine Scriptures, that any lie is found which either ought to be loved, or ought not to be held in hatred, but is sometimes to be done, as something which you hate (ch. 18), so that what is more to be detested may be avoided. But men err in this, that they set precious things beneath baser ones. For, when you have granted that some evil is to be admitted, lest another, graver, be committed — not by the rule of truth, but by his own desire and custom, does each one measure the evil, and reckons that graver which he himself more shrinks from, not that which is truly more to be fled. This whole vice is born from a perversity of love. For since there are two lives of ours — one everlasting, which is divinely promised to us; the other temporal, in which we now live — when anyone begins to love this temporal life more than that everlasting one, he thinks no sins graver than those which take away this life, or take away from it some advantage unjustly, or wholly deprive one of life by death. And so men hate thieves, and robbers, more than the lascivious, the drunken, the luxurious, the abusive, and torturers, and murderers, if these inflict no injury upon them. But against all these are set opposite rules, which truth prescribes for us to be kept. This teaches us bravely and prudently to endure those sins which take away from us the goods of the body, and are not impeded from eternal life; for those alone sin who take them away, and those who suffer the loss of them scarcely sin at all. But whatever things are preserved for the sake of sanctity and religion, when those who wish to do injury attempt to violate them, are to be retained even at the cost of lesser sins — not, however, of injuries to others — if a condition is proposed, and the opportunity given. And then those sins already cease to be sins, which are undertaken for the avoidance of graver ones.

XI. Moreover, these are the things (ch. 19) which ought to be preserved by our free consent, for the sake of sanctity: chastity of body, chastity of mind, truth of doctrine. Chastity of body is not violated without our consent. For whatever happens to our body against our will, a greater force prevailing, is no impurity; and there can be some reason for permitting it, but none for consenting to it. Chastity of mind, however, consists in a sincere delight, which is not corrupted, except when we love, and desire, what truth teaches ought not to be loved, and desired. A sincere love of God, and of neighbor, is therefore to be guarded: for in this, chastity of mind is sanctified. But the truth of doctrine, of religion, and of piety, is not violated by a lie. The truth of doctrine, then, is to be guarded with the utmost care from lying, so that, if chastity of mind should be violated, it may have a source from which it can be repaired: since, once the authority of doctrine is corrupted, there can be no course, or recourse, to chastity of mind.

XII. Chastity of mind is guarded by sincerity of speech: which, even if it is less violated, when someone lies to guard chastity of body, is nonetheless violated, and that which is to be preserved in the chastity and sanctity of the mind is also violated. Whence we are compelled to know beforehand, not by the opinion of men, which is generally in error, but by truth itself, which is most invincible, that the sincerity, fidelity, or truthful speech of the mind excels above the chastity of the body, and is united with it. Chastity of mind is an ordered love, not subjecting greater things to lesser ones. For less can be violated in the body than whatever can be violated in the mind. When someone does violence to your body, you see that it is not your own, but another's, lust that breaks in. Beware, nonetheless, lest, by consenting, you become a participant: for bodily chastity is in no way corrupted, unless it is violated in... the mind, which not consenting, in no way is bodily chastity corrupted, whatever has been perpetrated on the body by another's lust. Wherefore, so far as it is in us, both are to be fortified and hedged about with holy morals, and wisdom, lest they be violated from without. But when both cannot be kept, but one or the other is subject to the danger of loss, no one fails to see that, in matters of sin, chastity of mind is to be preferred to chastity of body, and one's own fault is to be avoided rather than another's.

XIII. Let it be asked, then (ch. 21), whether, all the testimonies of Scripture having been discussed, it remains established that one must never, absolutely, lie at all. Since no examples of lies worthy of imitation will be found in the morals and deeds of the Saints, so far as it concerns those Scriptures which are historical narratives referred to no figurative signification, such as are the deeds recorded in the Acts of the Apostles. All the words and deeds of the Lord in the Gospel, which to the less experienced seem to be lies, are figurative significations. Never, then, is one to lie — since, of the eight kinds of lies already recounted, not one is licit. Whoever, however, shall think that some kind of lying is not a sin, will shamefully deceive himself, since he will consider himself an honest deceiver of others.

I. In addition to the compendious narration of the Book on Lying, I have resolved to add a few observations of a similar kind, no diverting digression interposed, but to sketch, as it were, an image of each Book, so that readers may explore, with a single glance, St. Augustine's mind. Then I shall add a few observations to each Book. And, before I come to the matter, it is worth inquiring why St. Augustine entitled the Book which we treated in the preceding chapter "On Lying," while he entitled this one, which I now undertake to transcribe in compendium, "Against Lying." The reason for the different inscription Augustine himself sets forth (Bk. I, Retractations, last chapter): "The title of the latter is 'Against Lying,' but of the former, 'On Lying' — because through the latter the whole attack against lying is open; the former, however, is occupied for the most part in the disputation of inquiry." For, so that he might exhaust the controversy to its depths, in the former Book he disputed, as it were, problematically on lying: he brought forward the adversaries' reasons, not incidentally, but professedly, into the open, and set them in full light; he also gave responses, and showed whatever lies to be unlawful. In the present Book, however, Against Lying, he attacked the matter at close quarters, and undertook to rout all lies with a united hand. Occasion for publishing this Book was furnished to Augustine by the Priscillianists, whose more pernicious error was that it is lawful for a man, by lies, indeed even by perjuries, to conceal the profession of his own religion. Hence, feigning the religion of Catholics externally, they entered into commerce with Catholics, and, more securely under such a mask, waged war against evangelical truth. And since it was most difficult to drive these wolves, clothed in sheep's skins, from Christ's fold, certain Catholics, less prudent, so as to drive out one nail with another, feigned themselves Priscillianists, so that they might more easily detect the impious dogmas of these same men. To rout these errors, Augustine published his Book Against Lying.

II. And first he established (ch. 1) that neither are lies to be exterminated by lies, nor thefts by thefts, nor adulteries by adulteries. This is the impious opinion of the Priscillianists (ch. 2), which dishonors the holy Martyrs; indeed it takes away entirely their altogether holy martyrdoms. There are many kinds of lies (ch. 3), all of which we ought universally to hate, since none can be found which is not opposed to truth, just as darkness is opposed to light, iniquity to piety, and sickness to health. This opinion of lying once admitted, all human society is removed from the midst. For if the Priscillianists should suspect that we speak Catholic dogmas deceitfully, in order that we might catch them at something — I know not what — this I did then for this reason, that I might see whether even now he does so, lest I tolerate it. But what will he answer to one saying: whence, then, do I know that Priscillianists do not lie (ch. 5) in comparison with us? For the Priscillianist speaks thus, because he so believes, so that he does not lie; but the Catholic does not so believe, though he speak thus. Never, therefore, let us conceal what we think is true; certainly he would say such things to one so suspecting him: although one blasphemes unknowingly, the other knowingly. One must not lie, then (ch. 6). For if lies were lawful in a matter of religion, with the intention of enlightening heretics, adulteries too, committed with the same intention, could be considered chaste. It matters much, indeed (ch. 7), for what cause, for what end, with what intention someone acts; but those things which are agreed to be sins are to be done for no good end, under no pretext, however good the cause, as it were, nor with any good intention. A good intention can indeed sometimes diminish the malice of a sin (ch. 8), but it can in no way bring it about that a sin which by its own nature is a sin should not be one.

III. But, it must be confessed, human minds are so disturbed by a certain compensatory reckoning of sins, that some things are even thought (ch. 9) to deserve praise, and are rather called well done. For who would doubt that fornication is a great sin! And yet if there existed a cause for which Lot thought he ought to prostitute his own daughters to the fornications of the impious! What shall we say here? If we open this path, and commit lesser evils, lest others perpetrate greater ones, by a wide, indeed by no, boundary, all crimes will reign. But this error prevails chiefly then (ch. 10), when the discussion is of lies. For they reckon that those are not lies which are uttered for another's benefit, and they contend to demonstrate this by examples of Scripture. Which, however (ch. 11), are either not lies, or are mysteries; or, if they are lies, are in no way worthy of imitation. For if the sayings and deeds of the Prophets and Patriarchs are referred to those things which they were meant to signify (ch. 12), even certain sayings, or deeds, of the Savior himself in the Gospel, since he too deigned to become a Prophet of the Prophets, are found to have truthful significations. Very many of his sayings (ch. 13) have a figurative signification. But whoever says (ch. 14) that some lies are just must equally assert that some sins are just. What could be said more absurd than this (ch. 15)? For those things which are against the law cannot be just. But it is said, "Thy law is truth." That, then, which is against truth cannot be just. But who would doubt that every lie is against truth? Nor does the example of the Egyptian midwives, or of Rahab, help the defenders of lying (ch. 16). Since it was not the iniquity of the lying tongue, but the disposition of a merciful mind, that merited a temporal compensation.

IV. But someone will say: would not the midwives, and Rahab, have done better (ch. 17) by refusing to lie, showing no mercy at all? On the contrary, if those Hebrew women, that is, had shown no mercy, they would have obtained thereby, you say, an eternal reward, incomparably ampler than those houses which they made for themselves. And, you will say, even had they themselves died, they would have obtained the eternal Kingdom. But what is to be said of the woman of Jericho? Could she not have said to those asking: I know where they are, but I fear God, and will not betray them? Could she have said this to the Israelites, so that there was no deceit in it, since it would have been true, insofar as by God's mercy she was passing over to the city of God? But, you will say, they, having heard this, would have killed her, and searched her house, and would have found the hidden guests, whom she had carefully concealed. Would she not, by lying, have betrayed the guests hidden within, just as she would have by telling the truth? But would it necessarily have followed that, by telling the truth... , they would also have found those whom she had so carefully hidden? For that most cautious woman had foreseen, and had made provision, that they should freely refuse to entrust the little ones to the men of Jerusalem, nor did she lie by this. But see what would have happened, had she, without lying, said where they could hide, even though she would herself have been killed by her own fellow-citizens: her life would have had to end for the sake of a merciful deed, precious in the sight of the Lord, and his benefit toward them would not have been in vain. But you will say: what if, having come to that place where she had hidden them, they, by searching everything, had reached them — not only through the lie, but even through the perjury, of the most vile and shameful woman, of those who sought them? It can be said, in like manner: what, if they had refused to believe her when she lied out of fear? They would surely have obtained by that lie what she feared. And where, then, do we place the will, and power, of God? For by whom could they have been guarded, after the woman's lie, if, had she not lied, they could not have been guarded by him? Unless perhaps we have forgotten that this same thing happened at Sodom, where the males, inflamed with unspeakable lust toward males, could not even find the door of the house in which those they sought were hiding — since the just man, in a case altogether similar, refused to lie for the sake of his guests, whom he did not know to be Angels. And certainly that woman of Jericho could have given such an answer to those questioning her, as the just man gave in Sodom. But the just man refused to stain his soul with a lie for the bodies of his guests, for whose sake he was willing that the bodies of his daughters should suffer violence from an alien iniquity of lust.

V. The holy Doctor, however, warns that Lot is not to be imitated in that he offered his daughters to be ravished by the Sodomites. Whence it is established that not everything which we read to have been done by the Saints ought we to transfer into our own morals, or hold as just, ch. 9 of this Book. Let man do, then (Augustine continues, ch. 17), what he can, even for the temporal safety of men, so long as he does not sin — and when he comes to this point, where he cannot look after such safety without sinning, let him already reckon that he has nothing left to do, when he perceives that what remains to him is not to do rightly.

VI. "But, since we are men, and live among men, and I confess myself to be among the number of those whom compensatory sins (ch. 18) do not yet trouble, human feeling often prevails over me even in these matters, nor am I able to resist it, when I am told: 'Behold, a sick man is in danger from a grave illness, whose strength can no longer bear it, if the death of his dearest son, most beloved, is announced to him; if he asks whether he lives — whose death you know — what will you answer, when, whatever else you say besides one of three things — namely, that he is dead, or that he lives, or that you do not know — he understands nothing else than that you are unwilling to say that he is dead? It will avail just as much, even if in every way you keep silent. But of those three, two are false: that he lives, and that you do not know; these you can say only by lying. But the one true thing — namely, that he is dead — if you say it, and the death of the troubled man follows, it will be cried out that he was slain by you.' And who could bear that men, exaggerating how great an evil is thereby avoided, prefer a salutary lie, and call truth a murderer? (Or, that truth, which confers life, should be preferred to a murderous lie.) I am moved by these objections vehemently, but it would be a marvel if I were also moved wisely. For when I set before the eyes of my heart, however dim, that intelligible beauty from whose mouth nothing false has proceeded, although the more that truth shines forth radiantly and ever more clearly, the more my own weakness, trembling, is beaten back by it — nonetheless I am so inflamed with love of so great a beauty, that I despise, in comparison, all the human considerations that call me back from it. But it is much for that affection to persevere so far, that its effect does not fail in the moment of temptation. Nor let it delay me, as I contemplate that luminous good, in which there are no shadows of lying, that truth should be called a murderer of men — because, on account of our unwillingness to lie, and their dying upon hearing the truth. For if an impudent woman awaits debauchery, and, with you not consenting, dies, disturbed by a savage passion — will chastity be called a murderer in every place, and everywhere? Or, because we read, 'We are the good odor of Christ in every place, and in them that are saved, and in them that perish; to some indeed the odor of life unto life, but to others the odor of death unto death' — shall we also pronounce the odor of Christ a murderer? But since we are men, and, in such questions and contradictions, human feeling grows weary, therefore it soon..."

Here it is worth adding what follows. There approaches, then, of his own weakness, and gradually, imperceptibly, he insensibly slips into it — as one who admits, for the sake of safety, that a lie could sometimes be said, is led on, little by little, and bit by bit, by such increments, that he can no longer be entirely on guard against so great a pestilence, growing immensely from the smallest additions. Whence it is written: "He that contemneth small things, shall fall by little and little"; "And who is sufficient for these things?" (2 Corinthians 2:16). It is to be lamented, that this evil, by such brief approaches, and by degrees, so often more miserably leads to so great a heap of wicked lies — where, he adds, most providently it is written: "He that despiseth small things shall fall by little and little." What of the fact that such lovers of this life, so as not to doubt to prefer it to truth, wish us, so that man may not die — or rather, so that man, who is one day to die, may die a little later — not only to lie, but even to perjure ourselves, so that, forsooth, the vain safety of man may not pass a little sooner, and we take the name of our God in vain? And there are, among them, learned men, who even fix rules, and set limits, of when one ought, and when one ought not, to perjure oneself. O, where is that saying: 'Whither shall we go, and whither shall we hide ourselves from the wrath of thy face?' And what shall we do — if we not only readily commit such lies, but even dare, besides, to teach perjuries? Let the assertors, and defenders of lying, themselves see what kind, or kinds, of lying delights them to justify. At least let them grant that one must not lie in a matter of God; at least let them keep themselves from perjuries, and blasphemies. At least, where the name of God, where God as witness, where the sacrament of God is interposed, where the discourse is of divine religion, or is conferred — let no one lie, let no one praise it, let no one teach or command it, let no one say that a lie is just. As for the other kinds of lying, let each choose for himself what he thinks the mildest, and most innocent, kind of lying, in which it pleases him to lie. This I know: that even he who teaches that one ought to lie wishes himself to seem to teach the truth. For if what he teaches is false, teaching it he deceives, and deceiving he is deceived, knowing it! But if he wishes to be at pains, when he teaches falsely, so that he may find a pupil, he asserts that he teaches truth, where the discourse concerns doctrine — how, then, will it be a lie, if he teaches that lying is to be done? For if it is false that one must lie, how will any lie be from truth, the Apostle John crying out against it: 'Every lie is not of the truth'?"*

VII. "It is not true, then (ch. 19), that one must sometimes lie; and what is not true is to be persuaded to no one at all. But infirmity plays its own part, and, where it contradicts, proclaims that it has a case winnable with sympathetic crowds. But how, among men, who without doubt, if they are deceived, are turned aside from ruin, whether another's or their own, doth human feeling, when men are helped in their peril, not incline toward lying? If the crowd of my mortality would patiently hear me, I would respond something on behalf of the cause of truth. Certainly pious, true, holy chastity is only from truth: and whoever acts against it, assuredly acts against truth. Why, then, even if those in peril cannot otherwise be helped, do I not commit debauchery — which is therefore contrary to truth, because contrary to chastity — and, that one in peril may be helped, speak a lie, which is itself most openly contrary to truth? What has earned so great a favor with us, and offense, that chastity of body should so please, and truth offend — when all chastity is from truth?" But someone will say, this is for the perfect; solid food. "For many things are relaxed to weakness by way of pardon, although they do not please; and let chastity be not of the body, but of the mind, and let truth dwell in the mind, just as most sincere chastity." Let him say this, whoever does not fear the consequences that are to be feared, if lies of any kind are in any way admitted. "In no way, however, are they to be permitted to ascend so far that they arrive at perjuries and blasphemies; nor ought any cause whatsoever to be alleged for why one ought to perjure oneself, or, what is more execrable, why God ought to be blasphemed. For it is not the case that, because blasphemy occurs through a lie, therefore it is not blasphemy. For it can likewise be said, in this manner, that one does not perjure oneself, because one perjures oneself through a lie." Whoever, then, says that, for the sake of a man in danger, even..."*

VIII. "But sometimes it is objected (ch. 20) that one ought to lie, even for our own temporal safety, when it is loudly proclaimed that eternal salvation is thereby also endangered by our lie, if it cannot otherwise be repelled — as, if someone, wishing to be baptized, is placed in the power of impious and unbelieving men, to whom access cannot be had, so that he may be washed in the laver of regeneration, unless the guards are deceived by a lie. From this most invidious outcry, by which we are compelled ... to lie for a man's eternal salvation, whither shall I flee? And chastity, too, is set before me by you. For why, if the guards, unless deceived, would admit us to baptize the man, but could be enticed into debauchery — do we not act contrary to chastity? And, if they can be deceived by a lie, do we not act contrary to truth, unless truth does not command it, since no chastity would be lovable to anyone at all, unless truth prescribed it? Accordingly, in order that a man might be baptized, if the guards be deceived by a lie — if truth so commands. But how would truth command that a man be lied for, in order to be baptized, if chastity does not command that a man be committed adultery with, in order to be baptized? But why does chastity not command this, except because truth does not teach it? If, then, we ought to do nothing except what truth teaches; since truth teaches that we ought not to do what is contrary to chastity, even for the sake of a man's baptism — how will it teach us to do, for the sake of a man's baptism, what is itself contrary to truth? But just as eyes too weak to gaze upon the sun nonetheless gladly look upon things illumined by it, so souls, already able to be delighted by the beauty of chastity, are yet not altogether able to consider truth by itself, whence the light of chastity shines — so that, when it comes to doing something contrary to truth, they shrink back and shudder, just as they flee from, and shudder at, doing something contrary to chastity. But the son who obeys the word that proceeds from his mouth will be so far from all falsehood, and there will be such signs, that, in order to help a man, he reckons no path closed to him through a lie, rather than that he should be compelled to pass through debauchery. And the Father hears him praying, that he may be able, without a lie, to snatch a man from ruin, that man whom the Father himself wills to be helped, by inscrutable ... Such a son, then, observes as much abstinence from lying as from sin. For the name of lying is sometimes used in the place of the name of sin."

IX. "Lies, then, are either to be avoided (ch. 21, or 22) by right acting, or to be confessed by repentance; but they are not to be increased by unhappily abounding in them, and by teaching them. But let him who thinks this the way choose it, whence he may help one in danger, of whatever sort of lies, and by whatever perjuries, provided that any kind of salvation for the man may be obtained — nonetheless, even among such men, let no cause lead us to perjury, and, if we shall have obtained this much at least, we shall judge these crimes at least equal to, or certainly not less than, debaucheries. For it must very often be considered that men provoke their wives, of whose adultery they are suspicious, to swear an oath — which assuredly they would not do, unless they believed that even those women who did not fear to commit adultery would fear to commit perjury. For indeed some unchaste women, who did not fear to deceive their husbands by a stealthy union, feared to deceive God, whom they had employed deceitfully as a false witness to the very husbands they had deceived... And if infirmity so far usurps for itself, that something is venially permitted to it which truth disapproves; nonetheless, so that you may inconcussedly maintain, in the divine religion, that one must never, absolutely, lie, hold fast — just as neither are adulterers to be sought out through adulteries, nor murderers through murders, nor sorcerers through sorceries, nor liars through lies, nor blasphemers to be sought through blasphemies — according to those things which we have disputed at such length in this volume, that we have scarcely arrived at that limit which we set for that place."

I. So that anyone may most easily perceive how opportunely I have prefixed Augustine's teaching against lying, before entering upon the most difficult controversy concerning the deceitful oath, it is worth setting forth beforehand certain general propositions, which are gathered, as it were, in summary, from St. Augustine's teaching, so that I may set them before the readers' eyes by a simple narration. Once I have explained these propositions, in comparison with the teaching of more recent authors, the discourse will return to them below.

II. All the difficulties which more recent writers turn over in their Books concerning equivocations and mental restrictions, and all the cases relevant to practice, St. Augustine brings under examination, both in his Book On Lying, and in that Against Lying. For, at the very beginning of the disputation, he attests that he wishes to institute a discourse concerning those expressions which greatly disturb the mind in daily speech; and he indicates the two chief purposes of his treatment: one, lest anyone wrongly condemn as a lie what is not a lie; the other, lest a lie be ever held lawful. "Great is the question concerning lying, which often disturbs us in our own daily actions; lest we either rashly accuse of lying what is not a lie, or judge that one must sometimes lie for some honorable, officious, and merciful reason" (Book on Lying, ch. 1).

III. The hinge of Augustine's disputation, in the two Books cited above chiefly, turns on this: that reasons be given for the concealment of truth in matters of the highest moment, such as for the preservation of life, of chastity, and for the keeping of secrets. And Augustine himself, with his own divine genius, could find no remedies beyond these which follow. The first is silence: "For most often," he says (Book Against Lying, ch. 10), "we conceal true things, not by lying, but by keeping silent." The other is an open and unconcealed signification, by which someone protests that he knows the truth, but is unwilling to reveal it: "I fear God, I do not betray them. I will neither betray, nor will I lie." No other way of concealing truth did Augustine recognize — not internal restrictions, not material locutions, not amphibologies of words, not other inventions of more recent authors, wherever they may be found.

IV. It is evident that Augustine was altogether ignorant of the doctrine of lying held by very many more recent writers, both his predecessors, and later Fathers, and the very defenders of lying themselves. Indeed, they would have disapproved it as false, on the grounds that they had determined that we cannot conceal truth, except either by silence, or by an open signification of our unwillingness to reveal it, or by lying.

MANY of the ancients asserted that it is lawful to lie in grave necessity for the sake of a great good. St. Augustine reports them, book against lying, and refutes them.

Into this opinion the following seem to have inclined: St. Jerome, on the Epistle to the Galatians, and Epistle 89, which is the eleventh among the Epistles of St. Augustine. Chrysostom, homily 53 on Genesis. Cassian, conference 17, cap. 17 and 20. Dorotheus, sermon 9 on lying.

The MOST TRUE opinion nevertheless is, that every lie, whether by deed or by word, is so evil that it is never lawful; and that it is never dispensable, not even by God himself. So the Holy Doctors, whom all Theologians and Canon Jurists have followed.

I ASSERT with this opinion that it is never lawful by any right whatsoever to lie.

IT IS PROVED first from the Holy Doctor against the arguments, from the consensus of the Scriptures, where every lie is excluded, Lev. 19: You shall not lie, nor shall anyone deceive his neighbor. Sap. 1: The mouth that lieth, killeth the soul. See the Holy Doctor there in his commentary. Eccl. 7: Be not willing to lie, Ephes. 4: Putting away lying, Coloss. 3: Lie not. Where, since a lie is prohibited by a negative precept, it binds always, and it is forbidden.

THE SAME opinion seems defined by Innocent III, cap. super eo, de usuris, where it is said, By the precept of the divine word it is forbidden that anyone lie, even to save the life of another, as Vasquez also notes, prim. 2. d. 182. cap. 4. n. 30. Tanner, d. 6, question 2, d. 1. Fagundez, in 8. praecept. c. 5. n. 3. where he refers to this also Aristotle, 4. Eth.

IT IS PROVED second from the Holy Doctor, Phar. lib. 3. c. 3. §. De mendacio, and the Holy Fathers.

From Augustine in the Enchiridion, cap. 22. and against lying, cap. 1, 2. and de vera Relig. cap. 33. and lib. 1. de Doctrina Christiana, cap. 36.

HE ALSO ADDUCES St. Gregory, l. 11. moral. cap. 13. and lib. 26. cap. 3. Isidore, in the Synonyms, lib. 11. and de bono, lib. 3. cap. 59. The same is the mind of St. Basil, reg. 76. from the briefer ones.

IT IS PROVED also by illustrious reasons taken from St. Bonaventure out of the Holy Fathers.

THE FIRST reason is. That which is intrinsically evil cannot be rectified; such is a lie: Therefore. The minor is proved. That which in its formal element includes malice is altogether intrinsically evil; but a lie is such according to St. Augustine above; for it has its falsity in the perverse intention of deceiving, or of not speaking the truth, but the false; without which it would not be a lie: Therefore, this evil will standing, which gives form to the lie, there can be no dispensation.

THE SECOND reason is taken from St. Augustine, in the places lately first cited, especially in the Enchiridion. That which destroys nature is intrinsically perverse; such is a lie: Therefore. The major is certain, because the first and principal law is the law of nature, which is always right in itself, since it is from God, nor can it be perverse, as nature. The minor is proved, because words are signs instituted by nature for human communication and society, and while we abuse the signs instituted to express the mind, we destroy society; for no one would wish to contract with others by whom he knows he is deceived. But this is to destroy the nature of man, which is a sociable animal.

THE THIRD reason is taken from St. Augustine, lately cited from the De Doctrina Christiana. To violate faith is intrinsically evil; but a liar violates the faith, and the tacit pact between himself and the hearer, which is that, because he speaks the truth, he is to be believed.

THE FIRST reason is CONFIRMED, in the body, because the essence of a lie, since it stands formally in the perverse intention, can never be rectified, and thus, although it may not be mortal in its genus, it nevertheless has a malice more inseparable than theft and homicide, which were dispensed in the Israelites for carrying off the treasures of the Egyptians, for killing the Chanaanites, and are dispensed even now in Judges for putting the guilty to death; in those unjustly invaded, for defense, and in the wretched suffering famine at the last extremity. From this you have the solution to the argument which is urged, that if these are dispensed, a lie also can be dispensed, which is a lesser sin.

YOU OBJECT first, Genesis 22. Abraham told his servants that he would return with his son, when nevertheless he intended to kill him on the mountain and sacrifice him to God.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that Abraham, even if he intended to sacrifice his son, nevertheless believed that his son was to be raised by God; for he firmly held that God stands by his promise: In Isaac shall thy seed be called to thee, as we have in Heb. 11.

YOU OBJECT second, Genesis 26. Isaac called Rebecca his sister; whereas she was his wife, not his sister.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that Rebecca was his cousin-sister, and therefore he spoke the truth, although he concealed that she was his wife.

YOU OBJECT third. Joseph said, Genesis 42 and 44, that his brothers were spies, knowing this to be false. Likewise he said that he was skilled in auguries, when nevertheless it was not true.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that he spoke those words not by affirming, but by testing. Whence they are rather to be understood interrogatively than assertively. But when he said that he was skilled in the science of auguring, he takes augury for the prediction of things to come. Then too he said it while expressing the hunger of the people.

YOU OBJECT fourth, Jacob, Genesis 27. feigned himself Esau, and to his blind father asserted that he was Esau his firstborn, and this with the intention of deceiving his father.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS, dub. 4. litt. d. 38. that Jacob did not lie; for he feigned himself Esau with respect to the mystery, as St. Ambrose teaches, de Iacob et Esau, and St. Augustine, against lying, cap. 10.

But that he said he was Esau the firstborn, he spoke the truth in the sense intended by God, because such he was with regard to the right of primogeniture from the revelation made by God to his mother. Nor did he wish to deceive, but to express the truth.

YOU OBJECT fifth. In Scripture many things are said, according to the intention of the letter, that are false, as Judges 9: The trees went, to create a king for themselves, and many false things are proposed there by the disputants; but Scripture is to us the rule of morals: Therefore a lie is not intrinsically a sin.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that the things which are expressed transumptively by figures and tropes are to be understood tropically; as is that apologue of the Council of the trees for creating a King, and thus they are true in that sense.

HENCE St. Augustine, against lying, cap. 5 and 10, says that whatever is said or done figuratively is not a lie; otherwise all Metaphors and figures would be banished. But in disputes it is not a lie to propose false things in order to lead out or examine the truth. For in disputes the propositions are more interrogations and dubitations than assertions, unless perhaps in doctrinal disputes, in which the learner must believe, where only true things are proposed or preached, according to Aristotle, primo Elenchorum, c. 2.

YOU OBJECT sixth, the simulations, which are lies; for even actions done to deceive are lies, because they are falsified signs. Thus Joshua, cap. 8. deceived the citizens of Hai. David deceived King Achish, feigning himself mad, 1. Reg. 27. Jehu simulated himself a worshipper of Baal, in order to deceive the worshippers of Baal, 4. Reg. 10. And these did not sin, nay, they are commended. Thus also Christ, at the end of Luke, feigned to go farther.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that the caution of Jehu in deceiving is praised; but not the lie itself uttered by him, as I said in the Tract. de fide, disp. 1. quaest. 16.

But DAVID acted cautiously and rightly, in order to escape death; for he did not say he was mad, for actions are not principally instituted to signify the internal concept, as words are instituted. Thus also Joshua prudently feigned flight, that he might reduce the citizens of Hai to straits and take them out of the midst, for he was fighting at God's command: But Christ feigned to go farther for the sake of doctrine, that he might teach hospitality. These simulations indeed are not evil; but the simulation of hypocrisy and duplicity, which by a sign show themselves to be good, are lies.

YOU OBJECT seventh. Theft and homicide are a greater sin than a lie: But in these a dispensation is granted, as is clear in the Judges, who put the guilty to death, and in the Hebrew people, dispensed in order to kill the Chanaanites and to carry off the treasures of the Egyptians: Therefore.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that these graver things were done with an evil will and an evil end; but because they can be separated from the evil end, therefore they can be well done: not so, however, in a lie, because it intrinsically denotes an evil deceiving will.

YOU OBJECT eighth. A dispensation can be granted in the precepts of the second table, as St. Bernard says, de praecepto, et dispensatione: But a lie is against the second table: Therefore.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that a dispensation cannot be granted in the disordination of the will, which is intrinsic to a lie, even though it could be granted in the acts, the disordination of the will removed, and the matter changed.

YOU OBJECT ninth. It can be that someone lie in order to preserve the chastity of another, as that soldier who, that he might deliver that holy Virgin from violation, exchanged clothes with her and taught her to flee from prison. Therefore it can be done out of Charity, which does not act perversely.

The Holy Doctor answers that Charity does not move to that which is evil, as it is the will of deceiving by words; whence Bernard says of dispensation, For a laudable work truth is required in the election, and Charity in the intention, and because truth is not preserved in the utterance of a lie, hence a lie cannot be said to be done out of Charity. For as out of Charity evil cannot be knowingly chosen so that it remain evil; so neither can the false be chosen. For as the operative power serves the affective; so the interpretative power serves the intellective, and as the end of the affective is the good; so the end of the intellective is the true. Therefore as no work can be done out of Charity unless one intend the good, and that work be ordainable to the good; so also no speech can be uttered out of Charity unless in the utterance of that speech the true be intended. And because a lie is ordered to the false by the intention of the one uttering it, therefore it cannot be done out of Charity.

But that soldier only exchanged clothes as a precaution, nor is it a lie, because clothes are not principally ordained to signify the concept of the mind.

I assert that a lie, by its genus, is not mortal. So the unanimous consensus of the Theologians.

It is proved first from St. Bonaventure from the Gloss; second from St. Gregory, book 18 of the Morals, chapter 2, where, speaking of the lie of the Egyptian midwives, he says: We easily believe this kind of sin to be relaxed.

Third, because there is no intrinsic lust, or contempt, involved in it.

Fourth, because I knew not sin, but by the law, as the Apostle says; yet no law condemns under mortal sin the jesting lie, by which a falsehood is told in the telling of a fable.

1. Human society cannot go on, if men are to be allowed indiscriminately to lie to one another. Thucydides (iii., 83) gives as the reason of the extravagant length to which faction ran in Greece in his time: "For there was no power to reconcile the parties, no plighted word reliable, no oath held in awe." Even in trifles no one likes to be lied to, and we are not to do to our neighbour what we would not have done to ourselves. The laws of good fellowship require that we should "put away lying, and speak the truth every man with his neighbour: for we are members one of another." (Ephesians iv. 25.) This at least in ordinary circumstances. The same good fellowship requires that in ordinary circumstances we should respect the lives and property of our fellow-men.

2. But it is lawful to take life in pursuance of the just judgment of authority: it is lawful to seize upon property in self-preservation. These exceptions stand very harmoniously with the well-being of society, or rather are required by it, as we shall see later on. The law against lying, so far as it is founded on the general prejudice done to society by the shock of social confidence, and on the particular annoyance of the party lied to, may seem to admit of similar exceptions. Whoever has no reasonable objection to having life and property taken from him in certain contingencies, can he reasonably complain of any hurt or inconvenience that he may suffer from a lie being told him at times?

3. I put forward this difficulty, not as though it were without its answer in the principle of General Consequences: still it is a difficulty. Besides, if the whole harm of lying is in the unpleasant effect wrought upon the deceived hearer, and the scandal and bad consequences to society at large, it is a long way to go round to show that lying is impossible to God. He in whose dominion are all the rights and claims of man, is not to be restrained by the mere reluctance of His creatures to be deceived, or by the general bad effects of a lie upon the edifice of human credit. As Master He might impose this annoyance upon the individual, these bad consequences upon society: or by His Providence He might prevent their occurring, whenever He willed in His utterances to swerve from the truth. The only help for the argument for the Divine veracity on these grounds, is to urge with Plato that none of the motives which lead men to lie can ever find place in the mind of God: that a lie is a subterfuge, an economy, a device resorted to under stress of circumstances, such as can never serve the turn of the Supreme Being. But though God be inaccessible to human reasons for departing from the truth, may He not have higher reasons, mysterious, and unsearchable, for such a deviation? It is long arguing out this point. Better bring the discussion sharp round with the question: Is there not some element in the Divine Nature itself, which makes it impossible for God to speak false?

4. Undoubtedly there is such an element, deep down, even at the root of the sanctity of God. God is holy in that, being by essence the fulness of all being and all goodness, He is ever true to Himself in every act of His understanding, of His will, and of His power. By His understanding He abidingly covers, grasps, and comprehends His whole Being. With His will He loves Himself supremely. His power is exercised entirely for His glory—entirely, but not exclusively, for God's last and best external glory is in the consummated happiness of His creatures. Whatever God makes, He makes in His own likeness, more or less so according to the degree of being which He imparts to the creature. And as whatever God does is like Him, and whatever God makes is like Him, so whatever God says is like Him: His spoken word answers to His inward word and thought. It holds of God as of every being who has a thought to think and a word to utter:

To thine own self be true,
And it must follow as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.

5. God's sanctity is in His being true to Himself. His veracity is part of His sanctity. He cannot in His speech, or revelation of Himself, contradict what He really has in His mind, without ceasing to be holy and being no longer God. But the sanctity of intellectual creatures must be, like their every other pure perfection, modelled on the corresponding perfection of their Maker. Holiness must mean truthfulness in man, for it means truthfulness in God. God's words cannot be at variance with His thought, for God is essential holiness. Nor can man speak otherwise than as he thinks without marring the attribute of holiness in himself, that is, without doing wrong.

6. To speak against one's mind is an act falling upon undue matter. Words are naturally signs of thoughts. Not that the words of any given language, as English or German, have any natural connection with the thoughts that they express; but it is natural to men, natural to every intellectual being, to have some mode of expressing his thoughts by outward signs; and once a sign is recognized as the sign of a certain thought, so long as the convention remains unrepealed, whoever uses that sign, not having in his mind at the time the thought which that sign signifies, but the contradictory to it, is doing violence to the natural bond between sign and thing signified, by putting forward the former where the latter is not behind it. And since the due and proper matter for the sign to be put upon is the presence in the mind of the thought signified, to make that sign where the opposite thought is present, is, as St. Thomas says, an act falling upon undue matter. The peculiar spiritual and moral inviolability of the connection between word and thought, appears from the consideration which we have urged of the archetype holiness of God. This then is the real, intrinsic, primary, and inseparable reason, why lying, or speech in contradiction with the thought of the speaker, is everywhere and always wrong.

7. Grotius (De Jure Belli et Pacis, I. iii., c. i., nn. 11, seq.) argues a lie to be wrong solely inasmuch as it is "in conflict with the existing and abiding right of the person spoken to." If right here means something binding in commutative justice (Ethics, c. v., s. ix., n. 6, p. 106), we deny that any such right is violated by what is called a simple lie, that is, an untruth not in the matter of religion, and not affecting the character, property, or personal well-being of our neighbour. For if a simple lie is a violation of commutative justice, it carries the obligation of restitution (Ethics, c. v., s. ix., n. 6, p. 107); that is, we are bound to tell the truth afterwards to the person that we have lied to, even in a matter of no practical consequence,—quite a new burden on the consciences of men. Again, if the bar to lying were the hearer's right, whoever had dominion over another's right might lie to him; the parent might lie to the child, the State to the citizen, and God to man, a doctrine which, away from its application to God, Grotius accepts. Lastly since volenti non fit injuria, the presumed willingness of the listener would license all manner of officious and jocose lies, as the authority of the speaker would sanction official fabrications. Thus, what with official, and what with officious speeches, it would be very hard to believe anybody.

8. By our rejection of Grotius' theory we are enabled to answer Milton's question: "If all killing be not murder, nor all taking from another, stealing why must all untruths be lies?" Because, we say, killing and taking away of goods deal with rights which are not absolute and unlimited, but become in certain situations void; whereas an untruth turns, not on another's right, but on the exigency of the speaker's own rational nature calling for the concord of the word signifying with the thought signified, and this exigency never varies. Untruth and falsehood are but polite names for a lie.

Readings.—St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 110, art. 3, in corp., ad. 4; ib., q. 109, art. 2, 3, in corp.; Ar., Eth., IV., vii.; Plato, Rep., 382, 389 B, C.

156. Thesis VIII. A lie is intrinsically evil.

Proof 1. It is intrinsically evil to use a thing contrary to its natural end. But the natural end of speech is to communicate our thoughts to our fellow-men, and a lie is the contrary of the thoughts of him who utters it. Therefore, a lie is contrary to the natural end of speech and is intrinsically evil.

Proof 2. The universal shame attached to lying is an evident sign that, by the common consent of mankind, it is held to be wrong in itself. This is made clearer by the application of the simple text, "Do not do unto others, etc." Does any person wish to be deceived? Lying, then, is an evil to the intellect which no one wishes to suffer, for no one wishes to be deceived.

Proof 3. Man is by nature a social being; hence it is the will of the Author of Nature that he shall live in society. Therefore, whatever tends to subvert human society is intrinsically wrong. But lying tends to do this, because it weakens mutual confidence, which is essential for human society.

157. Objections.

1. That cannot be wrong which all civilized nations allow in their courts of justice; but they allow the guilty to plead "not guilty." Answer. "Not guilty," pleaded in a criminal court, is an accepted technicality meaning "not proved guilty."

2. That is not wrong which is related by Holy Scripture concerning virtuous men; but it is there related that Jacob said, "I am Esau, thy first-born" (Gen. xxvii. 19). Answer. Jacob regarded himself, after purchasing Esau's right of primogeniture, as legally Esau the first-born. Besides, Holy Scripture does not approve all the deeds which it chronicles of good men.

3. Our Blessed Saviour Himself declared that He was not going up to Jerusalem, and yet eventually He went thither (John vii. 8). Answer. Our Lord did not go up to Jerusalem on that particular festival day of which He was speaking at the time, but He went up on the third or fourth day afterwards.

4. But He denied that He knew when the end of the world should come (Mark xiii. 32). Answer. Our Lord spoke mystically as man and not as God; so He was understood by His disciples, as in other like passages, e. g., "My doctrine is not mine, but His that sent me."