Chapter I — The errors of Plato, Origen, Hilary, John Chrysostom, Cassian, John Climacus, and Martin of Braga, concerning the licit use of a lie in extreme necessity, are reviewed

I. So manifest from God is the depravity, and perniciousness, of lies, that not one of the wise can be found who has not proscribed liars as enemies of human society. The dispute has only been, both among the ancient Philosophers and among the Fathers, whether, to conceal a truth of the highest moment, whose manifestation would redound to the harm of the public good, lies are to be lawfully employed. Plato, easily the prince of all Philosophers, in his ten books On the Republic, or in the Dialogues On the Just, teaches in many places that, an exceedingly grave cause pressing, truth is lawfully to be concealed by a lie. I will here transcribe a few things out of many, following the version of Jean de Serres. In Book, or Dialogue, II, near the end, he writes this: "And so a true lie, which consists in this — that the mind is in error, thinking wrongly of some matter — is held in hatred not only by the gods, but also by men; but that lie which is expressed in words is useful only in this case, and does not seem worthy of hatred, if we use it against enemies, or even with those who are called friends, when, seized by madness, or some other kind of derangement, they attempt to do some evil — so that we may divert them from the deed, taking it up as a useful remedy." In Book III, a little after the beginning, he takes away the use of lying from private citizens, but grants it to magistrates, and to physicians: "For if it was rightly said a little before, that among the gods there is no place for lying, but that among men it is, as a kind of remedy, to be employed as useful — it is clear that this matter is to be granted to physicians, but taken away from the rest who do not profess that art; so that, furthermore, it may be lawful for Princes, if for any, to lie, whether for the sake of enemies, or of citizens, for the advantage of the state; but all others must abstain entirely from lying." He has similar things in Book V, and in other places. Plato is said to have drawn this error from Timaeus of Locri, and from Sophocles. He had very many followers, not only among the pagans, but even among worshippers of the true God, who upheld the licit use of lies.

II. The first among Catholic Doctors who wrote less cautiously concerning lying was Clement of Alexandria, who, in Bk. VII of the Stromata, has certain things which seem to favor lying.

III. Clement of Alexandria had as his disciple Origen, who did not obscurely, but openly, patronized lying, as his own Master had done. St. Jerome (Bk. I, Against Rufinus) reports his words, transcribed from Bk. VI of the Stromata, where he has this: "We ought not to say whatever comes into our mind to our neighbor... A Philosopher would cautiously say that a lie is sometimes useful to men, as a kind of medicine. But consider how God himself is sometimes to be thought, when it profits the hearer, to speak in ambiguous words, and to declare what he wishes through enigmas; so that both the dignity of truth may be preserved with him, and, if something harmful might result, were it to be brought forth naked before the common people, it may be covered with some veil, lest it be brought forth. But man, upon whom the necessity of lying rests, should diligently take care so to use a lie at times, in the manner of a condiment, or a medicine, that he keep its measure, lest, by using it too often, he lose the credit of his own honesty. Judith, too, made use of this against Holofernes, having long concealed the truth of her people, correcting it; and, above all, the Patriarch Jacob — of whom we read the blessings which he obtained from his father by a cunning device — unless we have lied in such a way that some great good may be sought thereby for ourselves, we are to be judged, as it were, enemies of him who says, 'I am the truth.'"

IV. Origen was followed by Hilary, in his commentaries on Psalm 14. "For a lie," he says, "is often necessary, and sometimes falsehood is useful — as when we lie about a hidden matter to a persecutor, or defraud one who threatens, of testimony against one in peril, or deceive concerning the difficulty of a sick man's cure; and it behooves us, according to the Apostle's teaching, to season our speech with salt, and to do our neighbor no harm, so that the crime of lying be reckoned by another's inconvenience." His Commentary on this Psalm, however, along with various considerations which the most learned Benedictine Editors prefix to this Psalm in their annotations, is defended, after much dispute, as being truly St. Hilary's. The occasion of St. Hilary's error was Origen, whose commentaries on the Psalms he translated from Greek into Latin.

V. St. John Chrysostom, no less than Hilary, seems to have embraced Origen's opinion not obscurely, Vol. II, Homily 7 on Penance, where he commends the lie by which Rahab withdrew the spies from the fury of their pursuers, in these words: "Worthy of all praise, then, is Rahab, an image of the Church. For when messengers were sent by the King to seek out the spies, if there were any who had entered her house, she said to them: If men have entered in to thee, respond..." 'No.' For if they had at first said 'no,' she would have provoked those who had come to a search. But she said, 'They have entered in to thee, and they have gone out this way: pursue, and you will overtake them.' O beautiful lie! O beautiful deceit — not betraying, but guarding, piety!"* I could adduce many other things, but I pass over them. Nor let anyone hold it against me that I assert a most celebrated holy Doctor of the Church not to be free of this blemish. Since, to establish this, no other path lies open to my own feebleness than that I flatter myself I can prevail over the applause and acumen of those who strive to defend Chrysostom's teaching as untainted by this light stain. Let them note, however, this much: that they gather water in a sieve, while they strive to show that Chrysostom does not patronize lying, on the grounds that in several other places he condemns lying by design, and expressly disowns it. For all writers, to a man, absolutely detest lying, and prove its malice by every kind of argument. The question turns on this: whether, urgent necessity of avoiding some most grave evil pressing — such as the death of men — a lie is lawful. Chrysostom affirms this, as I indeed judge. Whoever shall demonstrate the opposite will be, to me, a great Apollo.

VI. A disciple of St. John Chrysostom was John Cassian, who, whether he drank in this error from his own teacher, or from Origen, defended it more ardently than all his predecessors. Not incidentally, but with a deliberate pen, he treats this controversy in Collation XVII, ch. 17 and following, through fifteen chapters. From these many chapters I will glean a few things. What, he says, is to be thought of lying, and how it is to be used, is such that it has in its nature something of hellebore, which, if taken when death impends from disease, is salutary, but otherwise, without the utmost peril, is deadly. Thus we read that even holy men, and men of God, made use of a lie, as Rahab did, and others. When, then, some grave danger concerning the confession of truth is imminent, then recourse to lies is to be taken up. Ch. 20 speaks of a distinction, forgivable, in a confession of truth. From the examples of principal Princes, chief among God's own, he seems to give a commendation of lies. And ch. 19: this is nearly the perception of imminent death. He draws forth many authorities and examples, both from the Old and from the New Testament, from most approved men, adducing the necessity of it. By these, he says, the learned Apostle Paul is exhorted to descend, out of necessity, to feigned pretenses of the weak, and forgivably to acquiesce. For then a detriment of lying is to be undertaken, when, as we have said, a greater loss of confessing the truth is imminent, and the utility which is conferred by truth does not prevail to compensate for the harm which such things generate for us. Ch. 21 brings forth several testimonies from the Gospel itself, by which he contends that the use of lying is not only lawful, but even necessary. Ch. 22, 23, and 24 allege examples of several most holy Monks and Abbots, who lied because they judged it to belong to a more sublime virtue, to conceal their own continence by a humble lie, than to reveal it to superb human judgment. Ch. 25 again reviews, from several books of Scripture, countless examples of most holy Patriarchs and Saints collected, so as to confirm more strongly his opinion concerning the licit and necessary use of lies, as a kind of remedy. "It is impossible for us," he says, "to enumerate all — for who would suffice to run briefly through the whole? — how the Patriarchs, and innumerable Saints of God, some for the desire of a blessing, some for the safeguarding of life, some for the concealment of some mystery, some out of zeal for God, some for the examination of truth, took up, so to speak, the patronage of lying?"

These few arguments, which more recent theologians thrust upon us in favor of the licit use of equivocations, I have adduced to show that Cassian, in many instances, has touched upon and drawn out all of these, so as to show that lies are necessarily and honorably to be employed.

VII. Two other authors I recount, lest I be too prolix, who have patronized lying in this manner. John Climacus, on the twelfth rung of his Ladder, writes this: "When we have felt ourselves free from every vanity of lying, both in place and in habitual use, then at last, though not without fear, we may sometimes, cautiously, allow a lie to enter in." Martin of Braga (Bk. On the Four Cardinal Virtues, ch. 4) says: "Do not use lying, but where an honorable cause exists, you may be redeemed by a lie. Let the just man guard the secrets of fidelity, not by uttering falsehood, but by keeping guard over truth; and if perchance you are compelled, you will rather be excused than convicted of lying, since he who speaks does not betray what should be kept silent; but what should be spoken, he speaks."

VIII. More authors favoring lying I could recount, but, lest excessive prolixity beget disgust in the reader, I will close this chapter with the words of Augustine, who attests that in his own time it was the common opinion which held that it was lawful to lie for the salvation of men. He has this (q. 68, on Leviticus): "This is to be held, that no one's authority, wherever a thing is decreed in Scripture, is of any account. But the ancient Fathers, while they lied, will be no occasion for the ignorant and heterodox to seize an opportunity for lying — for such audacious imposture has already many times been refuted. For that some of the holy Fathers, at times, in some most difficult controversy which in their time had not yet been discussed with due dignity, fell into some slip, no one denies; but the Fathers, while no one is harmed, are to be excused, as they pass by in passing."

IX. Hence it must not be inferred, that they are to be held of little account, or to be calumniated, and to be deceived, because with unanimous consent they defend some doctrine. But of this, elsewhere a fuller discourse.