Doubt IV: Whether a lie is mortal of its kind

I assert that a lie, by its genus, is not mortal. So the unanimous consensus of the Theologians.

It is proved first from St. Bonaventure from the Gloss; second from St. Gregory, book 18 of the Morals, chapter 2, where, speaking of the lie of the Egyptian midwives, he says: We easily believe this kind of sin to be relaxed.

Third, because there is no intrinsic lust, or contempt, involved in it.

Fourth, because I knew not sin, but by the law, as the Apostle says; yet no law condemns under mortal sin the jesting lie, by which a falsehood is told in the telling of a fable.

Fifth, because the tongue is far too unsteady, and it seems far too severe to condemn to hell every defect of the tongue, with the removal of which man is perfect, as is said in James 3.

St. Bonaventure adds that it can become mortal by reason of the harm it inflicts on someone through lying, or by reason of contempt, or by reason of a lust ready for every lie, even one pernicious to one's neighbor, etc.

He objects first from Psalm 5: Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie, where the Gloss says: To destroy is more than to hate. But God hates no one except one sinning mortally: Therefore.

St. Bonaventure answers that the Gloss is speaking of all who tell pernicious lies. Hence the universal particle is referred to persons lying perniciously, not to lies. Therefore the argument is fallacious in consequence, according to the figure of speech.

He objects second from Wisdom 1, where it is said: The mouth that lieth killeth the soul. Treating this passage, St. Augustine, in the book on the conflict of virtues and vices, says: Neither by an officious lie, nor by a simple word, ought anyone to be deceived, because in whatever way one lies, he kills his soul.

St. Bonaventure answers that the discourse there is about a pernicious lie: And if you say that it is expounded by St. Augustine of every lie, chapter 5 of On Lying, the holy Doctor answers that he is speaking of every lie pernicious in matters of religion, as is gathered from what immediately follows.

He objects third the Gloss of Augustine on the same Psalm 5: Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie, where he says: If anyone does not wish to betray a man to death, let him keep silent about the truth, but let him not utter a falsehood, lest, for the body of another, he kill his own soul. If, therefore, the soul is killed by an officious lie, which is the least of all, much more by the others.

The holy Doctor answers first, that that saying tends only to the perfect, who lose perfection gradually even through venial sins. He answers second, that it speaks of abstaining from lies advisedly, because they dispose to mortal sins, which are the death of the soul.

He objects fourth. That which is a peremptory act against truth is mortal: Such is a lie, which is repugnant to truth as fornication is to chastity.

The holy Doctor answers that not every lie is contrary to the habit of truth, which is rather a will to speak the truth as expedient than the actual utterance of every truth; and although every lie is repugnant to the act of speaking the truth, it is not therefore repugnant to the habit of truth, which shrinks from the pernicious lie; nor is it the same with fornication, which is opposed to a gravely preceptual virtue and mortally defiles it.

He objects fifth. Whoever acts against conscience builds hell for himself; such is a liar: Therefore.

The holy Doctor answers that the major is true of one acting against a conscience dictating that the thing is grave.

He objects sixth. Where there is full consensus, there the thing is lethal; such is the case in lying: Therefore.

The holy Doctor answers that the major is true where the object is gravely depraved, or in acts simply forbidden, as in the sin of the flesh. From these words I gather that the holy Doctor does not admit parvity of matter in the sin of the flesh, which today is the common opinion, as at Diana, part 5, tract. 5, resol. 5, where it is related that Clement VIII defined it, and Claudius Aquaviva ordered his Society to teach the same. Diana relates the authors at part 3, tract. 5, resol. 1, where he concludes that the opposite opinion is dangerous. He defines the same especially about kisses, part 4, tract. 4, miscell. resol. 136, and tract. 5, resol. 4, where he concludes that a soliciting confessor, even in a light touch, is to be denounced. So Alexander VII defines concerning kisses. But the general rule for knowing when parvity of matter is granted is taken from St. Bonaventure here against the arguments, which Baldellus uses, Tom. 1, lib. 3, disp. 14, num. 13, Diana, part 5, tract. 5, resol. 1. For acts are specified by their objects according to book 2 of the Soul, text. 33; if, therefore, from the very reason of the object in the first order per se there arises a notable opposition to virtue, and the gravity of malice, there cannot be in that object parvity of matter and lightness of fault. But if the notable opposition and gravity of fault arise from the reason of the object in the second order per se, and not from the reason per se first, it will be granted entirely. So, because theft is forbidden by reason of the thing, as another's; therefore unless the damage to another is grave, the fault will not be grave; on the contrary, because infidelity is forbidden as denying the Divine truth, therefore every infidelity is grave. See also Sanchez, sum., tract. 1, lib. 1, cap. 4; Suarez, de leg., lib. 2, cap. 18, num. 68. But Castropalao holds that from the common consensus of the Church the gravity of things is to be determined. And this consensus is indeed founded on the natures of things: for some things are so ordered that they are reckoned most grave, such as any idolatry, Simony, Infidelity, Despair, any perjury, hatred of God and any contempt of him, any mockery of the Sacraments, any pollution, fornication, etc.; these constitute a grave judgment, and do not vary in any matter; on the contrary, however, the holy Doctor infers against the arguments, because a lie in jesting and pernicious matter gravely varies in judgment, therefore it can be light and grave.

Let us grant at last that a lie gravely pernicious is lethal, because it is opposed to Charity; So St. Bonaventure here, and St. Thomas, question 110, article 4.