Chapter II — The authors who, before, or around, Augustine's time, declared war on lying, are recounted. After Augustine, none of the Catholics favored lying

I. Aristotle, Plato's disciple, rejected his master's error concerning lying (Bk. IV, Ethics, ch. 7), where he writes that a lie, by its own nature, is depraved, and detestable; truth, good, and worthy of praise. But, setting aside the pagans, I will bring forward Christian Doctors of our own profession.

II. First of the whole chorus will be Lactantius, who, in Bk. VI of the Divine Institutes, openly attacks lying, in these words: "The other things which a worshipper of God ought to observe are easy, being comprehended in these virtues: that he never deceive anyone, nor lie, for the sake of harming. For it is a wicked thing for one zealous for truth to depart, in any matter, from the truth he follows, whether to deceive, or to harm. In this path of justice, and of all the virtues, there is no place for lying." Wherefore that wayfarer, both true and just, will judge that Lucilius's saying — 'It is not mine to lie to a friend' — does not befit him, but rather he will hold it to be his own not to lie to an enemy either, familiar, or unknown, and will never allow that the tongue, the interpreter of the mind, should discord from the sense and thought within.

I do not deny that Lactantius does not speak absolutely of the controversy chiefly... concerning whether, to preserve human life, or to conceal secrets of the highest moment, it is lawful to lie. For the rest, I assert at the same time that Lactantius lays down principles which proscribe the use of any officious lie whatsoever, and condemn it — since he holds that one must lie neither to a friend nor to an enemy, and that it must never be permitted that the tongue, the interpreter of the mind, should discord from the thought within; and, finally, on this path of justice, that there is never room for a lie: he certainly excludes every case in which a lie could be lawful.

III. Similar things are taught by Eusebius of Caesarea, St. Basil, in his Shorter Rules, St. Prosper, in his book Against Cassian, where, ch. 9, he says: "You deceive us with two, and twin, depravities, mixing justices, as you understand them, by dividing them. By this rule you will be able to preach that they err equally who say that one must always deceive, and who determine that one must never deceive. But, that in neither should there be sin, as an evil cannot be made a good by dividing it between two — this is altogether an error of yours: falsity is not always to be shunned, nor truth always to be followed." St. Prosper here refutes two errors of Cassian: one, that he attributed the beginnings of grace sometimes to good works, sometimes to nature; the other, that he taught that one must sometimes use falsehood, sometimes truth.

IV. Ferrandus, Deacon of the Church of Carthage, in his letter to Count Reginus, has this: "Let your speech be, at least, 'yea, yea; no, no' — with an oath either intervening, or absent, let us strive to remain most certain in truth. For as we recall concerning charity that John said, 'He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him' — thus, likewise, if we wish to speak concerning truth, we shall find it stated similarly: for divine truth says, 'I am the truth.' Whence very truly it may be said: he who abides in truth, abides in God, and God in him. We do not lie, then, who abides in truth, and God in him abides. Let us, therefore, prefer truth to all temporal advantages, and we shall be found rightly to have preferred divine things to human ones."

V. St. Gregory the Great (Bk. XVIII, Morals, ch. 3): "Every lie is iniquity... for every iniquity is a lie, because assuredly whatever departs from truth departs from equity... Every lie is to be shunned with the utmost care; although sometimes some kind of lie is of lighter fault, if someone, by lying, tries to procure for another some advantage of life or of body — since it is written, 'The mouth that lieth killeth the soul'; 'Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie.' This kind of lie, too, perfect men avoid with the utmost care, so that no one's life is defended by their deceit, lest they harm their own soul while they strive to render another's life secure. Some, indeed, by the deceit of midwives, attempt to affirm this kind of lie not to be sin — for it is written, 'because the Lord built them houses'; that in this recompense it may the better be recognized what the fault of lying deserves. For that reward of theirs, which could have been repaid to them in eternal life for their kindness, was, on account of the admixed fault of lying, diverted to an earthly recompense — so that, in this life, which they wished to preserve by lying, they might receive the good things they had done, and might not further have the reward of their merit to expect. Indeed, if carefully weighed, they lied out of love of the present life, not out of intention of reward. For, by sparing the life of the infants, they contrived to cover their own by lying."

I will point out three others, since all subsequent writers have detested all lies. Ambertus, Bk. IX on the Apocalypse, explaining those words, "And to all liars their portion shall be in the pool burning with fire," having cited the authorities of Gregory and Augustine against lying, thus concludes: "One thing we must firmly hold: that no kind of lie remains unpunished, which is not here atoned for by penance, or by some work of piety." St. Gregory VII (Bk. IX, Epistle 21, to Alfonso, King of the Spains) says: "You are not ignorant, in your prudence, that lying is a sin, of which an account must be rendered even for an idle word in the strict examination. But not even a lie which is told for peace, with a pious intention, can be proven altogether free of fault." This I have touched upon beforehand, so that, since in the rest, without doubt, you may not hesitate to hold that to be a sin. Alexander III, in the chapter "Super eo," Extra, on abuses, prohibits, as it were a sacrilege, that among priests one should lie for another's life.