Chapter IV — A compendium of the Book Against Lying, which St. Augustine wrote to Consentius

I. In addition to the compendious narration of the Book on Lying, I have resolved to add a few observations of a similar kind, no diverting digression interposed, but to sketch, as it were, an image of each Book, so that readers may explore, with a single glance, St. Augustine's mind. Then I shall add a few observations to each Book. And, before I come to the matter, it is worth inquiring why St. Augustine entitled the Book which we treated in the preceding chapter "On Lying," while he entitled this one, which I now undertake to transcribe in compendium, "Against Lying." The reason for the different inscription Augustine himself sets forth (Bk. I, Retractations, last chapter): "The title of the latter is 'Against Lying,' but of the former, 'On Lying' — because through the latter the whole attack against lying is open; the former, however, is occupied for the most part in the disputation of inquiry." For, so that he might exhaust the controversy to its depths, in the former Book he disputed, as it were, problematically on lying: he brought forward the adversaries' reasons, not incidentally, but professedly, into the open, and set them in full light; he also gave responses, and showed whatever lies to be unlawful. In the present Book, however, Against Lying, he attacked the matter at close quarters, and undertook to rout all lies with a united hand. Occasion for publishing this Book was furnished to Augustine by the Priscillianists, whose more pernicious error was that it is lawful for a man, by lies, indeed even by perjuries, to conceal the profession of his own religion. Hence, feigning the religion of Catholics externally, they entered into commerce with Catholics, and, more securely under such a mask, waged war against evangelical truth. And since it was most difficult to drive these wolves, clothed in sheep's skins, from Christ's fold, certain Catholics, less prudent, so as to drive out one nail with another, feigned themselves Priscillianists, so that they might more easily detect the impious dogmas of these same men. To rout these errors, Augustine published his Book Against Lying.

II. And first he established (ch. 1) that neither are lies to be exterminated by lies, nor thefts by thefts, nor adulteries by adulteries. This is the impious opinion of the Priscillianists (ch. 2), which dishonors the holy Martyrs; indeed it takes away entirely their altogether holy martyrdoms. There are many kinds of lies (ch. 3), all of which we ought universally to hate, since none can be found which is not opposed to truth, just as darkness is opposed to light, iniquity to piety, and sickness to health. This opinion of lying once admitted, all human society is removed from the midst. For if the Priscillianists should suspect that we speak Catholic dogmas deceitfully, in order that we might catch them at something — I know not what — this I did then for this reason, that I might see whether even now he does so, lest I tolerate it. But what will he answer to one saying: whence, then, do I know that Priscillianists do not lie (ch. 5) in comparison with us? For the Priscillianist speaks thus, because he so believes, so that he does not lie; but the Catholic does not so believe, though he speak thus. Never, therefore, let us conceal what we think is true; certainly he would say such things to one so suspecting him: although one blasphemes unknowingly, the other knowingly. One must not lie, then (ch. 6). For if lies were lawful in a matter of religion, with the intention of enlightening heretics, adulteries too, committed with the same intention, could be considered chaste. It matters much, indeed (ch. 7), for what cause, for what end, with what intention someone acts; but those things which are agreed to be sins are to be done for no good end, under no pretext, however good the cause, as it were, nor with any good intention. A good intention can indeed sometimes diminish the malice of a sin (ch. 8), but it can in no way bring it about that a sin which by its own nature is a sin should not be one.

III. But, it must be confessed, human minds are so disturbed by a certain compensatory reckoning of sins, that some things are even thought (ch. 9) to deserve praise, and are rather called well done. For who would doubt that fornication is a great sin! And yet if there existed a cause for which Lot thought he ought to prostitute his own daughters to the fornications of the impious! What shall we say here? If we open this path, and commit lesser evils, lest others perpetrate greater ones, by a wide, indeed by no, boundary, all crimes will reign. But this error prevails chiefly then (ch. 10), when the discussion is of lies. For they reckon that those are not lies which are uttered for another's benefit, and they contend to demonstrate this by examples of Scripture. Which, however (ch. 11), are either not lies, or are mysteries; or, if they are lies, are in no way worthy of imitation. For if the sayings and deeds of the Prophets and Patriarchs are referred to those things which they were meant to signify (ch. 12), even certain sayings, or deeds, of the Savior himself in the Gospel, since he too deigned to become a Prophet of the Prophets, are found to have truthful significations. Very many of his sayings (ch. 13) have a figurative signification. But whoever says (ch. 14) that some lies are just must equally assert that some sins are just. What could be said more absurd than this (ch. 15)? For those things which are against the law cannot be just. But it is said, "Thy law is truth." That, then, which is against truth cannot be just. But who would doubt that every lie is against truth? Nor does the example of the Egyptian midwives, or of Rahab, help the defenders of lying (ch. 16). Since it was not the iniquity of the lying tongue, but the disposition of a merciful mind, that merited a temporal compensation.

IV. But someone will say: would not the midwives, and Rahab, have done better (ch. 17) by refusing to lie, showing no mercy at all? On the contrary, if those Hebrew women, that is, had shown no mercy, they would have obtained thereby, you say, an eternal reward, incomparably ampler than those houses which they made for themselves. And, you will say, even had they themselves died, they would have obtained the eternal Kingdom. But what is to be said of the woman of Jericho? Could she not have said to those asking: I know where they are, but I fear God, and will not betray them? Could she have said this to the Israelites, so that there was no deceit in it, since it would have been true, insofar as by God's mercy she was passing over to the city of God? But, you will say, they, having heard this, would have killed her, and searched her house, and would have found the hidden guests, whom she had carefully concealed. Would she not, by lying, have betrayed the guests hidden within, just as she would have by telling the truth? But would it necessarily have followed that, by telling the truth... , they would also have found those whom she had so carefully hidden? For that most cautious woman had foreseen, and had made provision, that they should freely refuse to entrust the little ones to the men of Jerusalem, nor did she lie by this. But see what would have happened, had she, without lying, said where they could hide, even though she would herself have been killed by her own fellow-citizens: her life would have had to end for the sake of a merciful deed, precious in the sight of the Lord, and his benefit toward them would not have been in vain. But you will say: what if, having come to that place where she had hidden them, they, by searching everything, had reached them — not only through the lie, but even through the perjury, of the most vile and shameful woman, of those who sought them? It can be said, in like manner: what, if they had refused to believe her when she lied out of fear? They would surely have obtained by that lie what she feared. And where, then, do we place the will, and power, of God? For by whom could they have been guarded, after the woman's lie, if, had she not lied, they could not have been guarded by him? Unless perhaps we have forgotten that this same thing happened at Sodom, where the males, inflamed with unspeakable lust toward males, could not even find the door of the house in which those they sought were hiding — since the just man, in a case altogether similar, refused to lie for the sake of his guests, whom he did not know to be Angels. And certainly that woman of Jericho could have given such an answer to those questioning her, as the just man gave in Sodom. But the just man refused to stain his soul with a lie for the bodies of his guests, for whose sake he was willing that the bodies of his daughters should suffer violence from an alien iniquity of lust.

V. The holy Doctor, however, warns that Lot is not to be imitated in that he offered his daughters to be ravished by the Sodomites. Whence it is established that not everything which we read to have been done by the Saints ought we to transfer into our own morals, or hold as just, ch. 9 of this Book. Let man do, then (Augustine continues, ch. 17), what he can, even for the temporal safety of men, so long as he does not sin — and when he comes to this point, where he cannot look after such safety without sinning, let him already reckon that he has nothing left to do, when he perceives that what remains to him is not to do rightly.

VI. "But, since we are men, and live among men, and I confess myself to be among the number of those whom compensatory sins (ch. 18) do not yet trouble, human feeling often prevails over me even in these matters, nor am I able to resist it, when I am told: 'Behold, a sick man is in danger from a grave illness, whose strength can no longer bear it, if the death of his dearest son, most beloved, is announced to him; if he asks whether he lives — whose death you know — what will you answer, when, whatever else you say besides one of three things — namely, that he is dead, or that he lives, or that you do not know — he understands nothing else than that you are unwilling to say that he is dead? It will avail just as much, even if in every way you keep silent. But of those three, two are false: that he lives, and that you do not know; these you can say only by lying. But the one true thing — namely, that he is dead — if you say it, and the death of the troubled man follows, it will be cried out that he was slain by you.' And who could bear that men, exaggerating how great an evil is thereby avoided, prefer a salutary lie, and call truth a murderer? (Or, that truth, which confers life, should be preferred to a murderous lie.) I am moved by these objections vehemently, but it would be a marvel if I were also moved wisely. For when I set before the eyes of my heart, however dim, that intelligible beauty from whose mouth nothing false has proceeded, although the more that truth shines forth radiantly and ever more clearly, the more my own weakness, trembling, is beaten back by it — nonetheless I am so inflamed with love of so great a beauty, that I despise, in comparison, all the human considerations that call me back from it. But it is much for that affection to persevere so far, that its effect does not fail in the moment of temptation. Nor let it delay me, as I contemplate that luminous good, in which there are no shadows of lying, that truth should be called a murderer of men — because, on account of our unwillingness to lie, and their dying upon hearing the truth. For if an impudent woman awaits debauchery, and, with you not consenting, dies, disturbed by a savage passion — will chastity be called a murderer in every place, and everywhere? Or, because we read, 'We are the good odor of Christ in every place, and in them that are saved, and in them that perish; to some indeed the odor of life unto life, but to others the odor of death unto death' — shall we also pronounce the odor of Christ a murderer? But since we are men, and, in such questions and contradictions, human feeling grows weary, therefore it soon..."

Here it is worth adding what follows. There approaches, then, of his own weakness, and gradually, imperceptibly, he insensibly slips into it — as one who admits, for the sake of safety, that a lie could sometimes be said, is led on, little by little, and bit by bit, by such increments, that he can no longer be entirely on guard against so great a pestilence, growing immensely from the smallest additions. Whence it is written: "He that contemneth small things, shall fall by little and little"; "And who is sufficient for these things?" (2 Corinthians 2:16). It is to be lamented, that this evil, by such brief approaches, and by degrees, so often more miserably leads to so great a heap of wicked lies — where, he adds, most providently it is written: "He that despiseth small things shall fall by little and little." What of the fact that such lovers of this life, so as not to doubt to prefer it to truth, wish us, so that man may not die — or rather, so that man, who is one day to die, may die a little later — not only to lie, but even to perjure ourselves, so that, forsooth, the vain safety of man may not pass a little sooner, and we take the name of our God in vain? And there are, among them, learned men, who even fix rules, and set limits, of when one ought, and when one ought not, to perjure oneself. O, where is that saying: 'Whither shall we go, and whither shall we hide ourselves from the wrath of thy face?' And what shall we do — if we not only readily commit such lies, but even dare, besides, to teach perjuries? Let the assertors, and defenders of lying, themselves see what kind, or kinds, of lying delights them to justify. At least let them grant that one must not lie in a matter of God; at least let them keep themselves from perjuries, and blasphemies. At least, where the name of God, where God as witness, where the sacrament of God is interposed, where the discourse is of divine religion, or is conferred — let no one lie, let no one praise it, let no one teach or command it, let no one say that a lie is just. As for the other kinds of lying, let each choose for himself what he thinks the mildest, and most innocent, kind of lying, in which it pleases him to lie. This I know: that even he who teaches that one ought to lie wishes himself to seem to teach the truth. For if what he teaches is false, teaching it he deceives, and deceiving he is deceived, knowing it! But if he wishes to be at pains, when he teaches falsely, so that he may find a pupil, he asserts that he teaches truth, where the discourse concerns doctrine — how, then, will it be a lie, if he teaches that lying is to be done? For if it is false that one must lie, how will any lie be from truth, the Apostle John crying out against it: 'Every lie is not of the truth'?"*

VII. "It is not true, then (ch. 19), that one must sometimes lie; and what is not true is to be persuaded to no one at all. But infirmity plays its own part, and, where it contradicts, proclaims that it has a case winnable with sympathetic crowds. But how, among men, who without doubt, if they are deceived, are turned aside from ruin, whether another's or their own, doth human feeling, when men are helped in their peril, not incline toward lying? If the crowd of my mortality would patiently hear me, I would respond something on behalf of the cause of truth. Certainly pious, true, holy chastity is only from truth: and whoever acts against it, assuredly acts against truth. Why, then, even if those in peril cannot otherwise be helped, do I not commit debauchery — which is therefore contrary to truth, because contrary to chastity — and, that one in peril may be helped, speak a lie, which is itself most openly contrary to truth? What has earned so great a favor with us, and offense, that chastity of body should so please, and truth offend — when all chastity is from truth?" But someone will say, this is for the perfect; solid food. "For many things are relaxed to weakness by way of pardon, although they do not please; and let chastity be not of the body, but of the mind, and let truth dwell in the mind, just as most sincere chastity." Let him say this, whoever does not fear the consequences that are to be feared, if lies of any kind are in any way admitted. "In no way, however, are they to be permitted to ascend so far that they arrive at perjuries and blasphemies; nor ought any cause whatsoever to be alleged for why one ought to perjure oneself, or, what is more execrable, why God ought to be blasphemed. For it is not the case that, because blasphemy occurs through a lie, therefore it is not blasphemy. For it can likewise be said, in this manner, that one does not perjure oneself, because one perjures oneself through a lie." Whoever, then, says that, for the sake of a man in danger, even..."*

VIII. "But sometimes it is objected (ch. 20) that one ought to lie, even for our own temporal safety, when it is loudly proclaimed that eternal salvation is thereby also endangered by our lie, if it cannot otherwise be repelled — as, if someone, wishing to be baptized, is placed in the power of impious and unbelieving men, to whom access cannot be had, so that he may be washed in the laver of regeneration, unless the guards are deceived by a lie. From this most invidious outcry, by which we are compelled ... to lie for a man's eternal salvation, whither shall I flee? And chastity, too, is set before me by you. For why, if the guards, unless deceived, would admit us to baptize the man, but could be enticed into debauchery — do we not act contrary to chastity? And, if they can be deceived by a lie, do we not act contrary to truth, unless truth does not command it, since no chastity would be lovable to anyone at all, unless truth prescribed it? Accordingly, in order that a man might be baptized, if the guards be deceived by a lie — if truth so commands. But how would truth command that a man be lied for, in order to be baptized, if chastity does not command that a man be committed adultery with, in order to be baptized? But why does chastity not command this, except because truth does not teach it? If, then, we ought to do nothing except what truth teaches; since truth teaches that we ought not to do what is contrary to chastity, even for the sake of a man's baptism — how will it teach us to do, for the sake of a man's baptism, what is itself contrary to truth? But just as eyes too weak to gaze upon the sun nonetheless gladly look upon things illumined by it, so souls, already able to be delighted by the beauty of chastity, are yet not altogether able to consider truth by itself, whence the light of chastity shines — so that, when it comes to doing something contrary to truth, they shrink back and shudder, just as they flee from, and shudder at, doing something contrary to chastity. But the son who obeys the word that proceeds from his mouth will be so far from all falsehood, and there will be such signs, that, in order to help a man, he reckons no path closed to him through a lie, rather than that he should be compelled to pass through debauchery. And the Father hears him praying, that he may be able, without a lie, to snatch a man from ruin, that man whom the Father himself wills to be helped, by inscrutable ... Such a son, then, observes as much abstinence from lying as from sin. For the name of lying is sometimes used in the place of the name of sin."

IX. "Lies, then, are either to be avoided (ch. 21, or 22) by right acting, or to be confessed by repentance; but they are not to be increased by unhappily abounding in them, and by teaching them. But let him who thinks this the way choose it, whence he may help one in danger, of whatever sort of lies, and by whatever perjuries, provided that any kind of salvation for the man may be obtained — nonetheless, even among such men, let no cause lead us to perjury, and, if we shall have obtained this much at least, we shall judge these crimes at least equal to, or certainly not less than, debaucheries. For it must very often be considered that men provoke their wives, of whose adultery they are suspicious, to swear an oath — which assuredly they would not do, unless they believed that even those women who did not fear to commit adultery would fear to commit perjury. For indeed some unchaste women, who did not fear to deceive their husbands by a stealthy union, feared to deceive God, whom they had employed deceitfully as a false witness to the very husbands they had deceived... And if infirmity so far usurps for itself, that something is venially permitted to it which truth disapproves; nonetheless, so that you may inconcussedly maintain, in the divine religion, that one must never, absolutely, lie, hold fast — just as neither are adulterers to be sought out through adulteries, nor murderers through murders, nor sorcerers through sorceries, nor liars through lies, nor blasphemers to be sought through blasphemies — according to those things which we have disputed at such length in this volume, that we have scarcely arrived at that limit which we set for that place."