Doubt III: Whether every lie is intrinsically a sin

MANY of the ancients asserted that it is lawful to lie in grave necessity for the sake of a great good. St. Augustine reports them, book against lying, and refutes them.

Into this opinion the following seem to have inclined: St. Jerome, on the Epistle to the Galatians, and Epistle 89, which is the eleventh among the Epistles of St. Augustine. Chrysostom, homily 53 on Genesis. Cassian, conference 17, cap. 17 and 20. Dorotheus, sermon 9 on lying.

The MOST TRUE opinion nevertheless is, that every lie, whether by deed or by word, is so evil that it is never lawful; and that it is never dispensable, not even by God himself. So the Holy Doctors, whom all Theologians and Canon Jurists have followed.

I ASSERT with this opinion that it is never lawful by any right whatsoever to lie.

IT IS PROVED first from the Holy Doctor against the arguments, from the consensus of the Scriptures, where every lie is excluded, Lev. 19: You shall not lie, nor shall anyone deceive his neighbor. Sap. 1: The mouth that lieth, killeth the soul. See the Holy Doctor there in his commentary. Eccl. 7: Be not willing to lie, Ephes. 4: Putting away lying, Coloss. 3: Lie not. Where, since a lie is prohibited by a negative precept, it binds always, and it is forbidden.

THE SAME opinion seems defined by Innocent III, cap. super eo, de usuris, where it is said, By the precept of the divine word it is forbidden that anyone lie, even to save the life of another, as Vasquez also notes, prim. 2. d. 182. cap. 4. n. 30. Tanner, d. 6, question 2, d. 1. Fagundez, in 8. praecept. c. 5. n. 3. where he refers to this also Aristotle, 4. Eth.

IT IS PROVED second from the Holy Doctor, Phar. lib. 3. c. 3. §. De mendacio, and the Holy Fathers.

From Augustine in the Enchiridion, cap. 22. and against lying, cap. 1, 2. and de vera Relig. cap. 33. and lib. 1. de Doctrina Christiana, cap. 36.

HE ALSO ADDUCES St. Gregory, l. 11. moral. cap. 13. and lib. 26. cap. 3. Isidore, in the Synonyms, lib. 11. and de bono, lib. 3. cap. 59. The same is the mind of St. Basil, reg. 76. from the briefer ones.

IT IS PROVED also by illustrious reasons taken from St. Bonaventure out of the Holy Fathers.

THE FIRST reason is. That which is intrinsically evil cannot be rectified; such is a lie: Therefore. The minor is proved. That which in its formal element includes malice is altogether intrinsically evil; but a lie is such according to St. Augustine above; for it has its falsity in the perverse intention of deceiving, or of not speaking the truth, but the false; without which it would not be a lie: Therefore, this evil will standing, which gives form to the lie, there can be no dispensation.

THE SECOND reason is taken from St. Augustine, in the places lately first cited, especially in the Enchiridion. That which destroys nature is intrinsically perverse; such is a lie: Therefore. The major is certain, because the first and principal law is the law of nature, which is always right in itself, since it is from God, nor can it be perverse, as nature. The minor is proved, because words are signs instituted by nature for human communication and society, and while we abuse the signs instituted to express the mind, we destroy society; for no one would wish to contract with others by whom he knows he is deceived. But this is to destroy the nature of man, which is a sociable animal.

THE THIRD reason is taken from St. Augustine, lately cited from the De Doctrina Christiana. To violate faith is intrinsically evil; but a liar violates the faith, and the tacit pact between himself and the hearer, which is that, because he speaks the truth, he is to be believed.

THE FIRST reason is CONFIRMED, in the body, because the essence of a lie, since it stands formally in the perverse intention, can never be rectified, and thus, although it may not be mortal in its genus, it nevertheless has a malice more inseparable than theft and homicide, which were dispensed in the Israelites for carrying off the treasures of the Egyptians, for killing the Chanaanites, and are dispensed even now in Judges for putting the guilty to death; in those unjustly invaded, for defense, and in the wretched suffering famine at the last extremity. From this you have the solution to the argument which is urged, that if these are dispensed, a lie also can be dispensed, which is a lesser sin.

YOU OBJECT first, Genesis 22. Abraham told his servants that he would return with his son, when nevertheless he intended to kill him on the mountain and sacrifice him to God.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that Abraham, even if he intended to sacrifice his son, nevertheless believed that his son was to be raised by God; for he firmly held that God stands by his promise: In Isaac shall thy seed be called to thee, as we have in Heb. 11.

YOU OBJECT second, Genesis 26. Isaac called Rebecca his sister; whereas she was his wife, not his sister.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that Rebecca was his cousin-sister, and therefore he spoke the truth, although he concealed that she was his wife.

YOU OBJECT third. Joseph said, Genesis 42 and 44, that his brothers were spies, knowing this to be false. Likewise he said that he was skilled in auguries, when nevertheless it was not true.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that he spoke those words not by affirming, but by testing. Whence they are rather to be understood interrogatively than assertively. But when he said that he was skilled in the science of auguring, he takes augury for the prediction of things to come. Then too he said it while expressing the hunger of the people.

YOU OBJECT fourth, Jacob, Genesis 27. feigned himself Esau, and to his blind father asserted that he was Esau his firstborn, and this with the intention of deceiving his father.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS, dub. 4. litt. d. 38. that Jacob did not lie; for he feigned himself Esau with respect to the mystery, as St. Ambrose teaches, de Iacob et Esau, and St. Augustine, against lying, cap. 10.

But that he said he was Esau the firstborn, he spoke the truth in the sense intended by God, because such he was with regard to the right of primogeniture from the revelation made by God to his mother. Nor did he wish to deceive, but to express the truth.

YOU OBJECT fifth. In Scripture many things are said, according to the intention of the letter, that are false, as Judges 9: The trees went, to create a king for themselves, and many false things are proposed there by the disputants; but Scripture is to us the rule of morals: Therefore a lie is not intrinsically a sin.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that the things which are expressed transumptively by figures and tropes are to be understood tropically; as is that apologue of the Council of the trees for creating a King, and thus they are true in that sense.

HENCE St. Augustine, against lying, cap. 5 and 10, says that whatever is said or done figuratively is not a lie; otherwise all Metaphors and figures would be banished. But in disputes it is not a lie to propose false things in order to lead out or examine the truth. For in disputes the propositions are more interrogations and dubitations than assertions, unless perhaps in doctrinal disputes, in which the learner must believe, where only true things are proposed or preached, according to Aristotle, primo Elenchorum, c. 2.

YOU OBJECT sixth, the simulations, which are lies; for even actions done to deceive are lies, because they are falsified signs. Thus Joshua, cap. 8. deceived the citizens of Hai. David deceived King Achish, feigning himself mad, 1. Reg. 27. Jehu simulated himself a worshipper of Baal, in order to deceive the worshippers of Baal, 4. Reg. 10. And these did not sin, nay, they are commended. Thus also Christ, at the end of Luke, feigned to go farther.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that the caution of Jehu in deceiving is praised; but not the lie itself uttered by him, as I said in the Tract. de fide, disp. 1. quaest. 16.

But DAVID acted cautiously and rightly, in order to escape death; for he did not say he was mad, for actions are not principally instituted to signify the internal concept, as words are instituted. Thus also Joshua prudently feigned flight, that he might reduce the citizens of Hai to straits and take them out of the midst, for he was fighting at God's command: But Christ feigned to go farther for the sake of doctrine, that he might teach hospitality. These simulations indeed are not evil; but the simulation of hypocrisy and duplicity, which by a sign show themselves to be good, are lies.

YOU OBJECT seventh. Theft and homicide are a greater sin than a lie: But in these a dispensation is granted, as is clear in the Judges, who put the guilty to death, and in the Hebrew people, dispensed in order to kill the Chanaanites and to carry off the treasures of the Egyptians: Therefore.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that these graver things were done with an evil will and an evil end; but because they can be separated from the evil end, therefore they can be well done: not so, however, in a lie, because it intrinsically denotes an evil deceiving will.

YOU OBJECT eighth. A dispensation can be granted in the precepts of the second table, as St. Bernard says, de praecepto, et dispensatione: But a lie is against the second table: Therefore.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS that a dispensation cannot be granted in the disordination of the will, which is intrinsic to a lie, even though it could be granted in the acts, the disordination of the will removed, and the matter changed.

YOU OBJECT ninth. It can be that someone lie in order to preserve the chastity of another, as that soldier who, that he might deliver that holy Virgin from violation, exchanged clothes with her and taught her to flee from prison. Therefore it can be done out of Charity, which does not act perversely.

The Holy Doctor answers that Charity does not move to that which is evil, as it is the will of deceiving by words; whence Bernard says of dispensation, For a laudable work truth is required in the election, and Charity in the intention, and because truth is not preserved in the utterance of a lie, hence a lie cannot be said to be done out of Charity. For as out of Charity evil cannot be knowingly chosen so that it remain evil; so neither can the false be chosen. For as the operative power serves the affective; so the interpretative power serves the intellective, and as the end of the affective is the good; so the end of the intellective is the true. Therefore as no work can be done out of Charity unless one intend the good, and that work be ordainable to the good; so also no speech can be uttered out of Charity unless in the utterance of that speech the true be intended. And because a lie is ordered to the false by the intention of the one uttering it, therefore it cannot be done out of Charity.

But that soldier only exchanged clothes as a precaution, nor is it a lie, because clothes are not principally ordained to signify the concept of the mind.