Necessity of Faith

7. Assertion. Actual faith is necessary for all adults by necessity of means: for those not yet justified, unto justification; for those justified, unto salvation.

a. In order to salvation there is distinguished a twofold necessity, one of means, the other of precept. That is called necessary by necessity of means without which the end cannot be obtained, even if it is inculpably not employed; and that is called necessary by necessity of precept without which the end cannot be obtained only then, if it is culpably not employed. Of this kind is everything which obliges under grave precept.

If that which is necessary by necessity of means is not in our power, it is called necessary by necessity of means only; but if it is in our power, it is called necessary by necessity of means and of precept: for by the same obligation by which we are bound to the end, we are also bound to employ the means necessary for it, if they are in our power.

If that which is necessary by necessity of means is required in itself and cannot be supplied by another means, as sanctifying grace at the end of life, it is called necessary by a strict, absolute necessity of means and in reality; but if it can be supplied by another means, as the sacrament of baptism, it is called necessary by a broad, hypothetical necessity of means and at least in desire.

b. Habitual faith also is necessary for salvation by necessity of means: for from faith it is certain that no one is saved unless he is adorned with sanctifying grace; but together with sanctifying grace, which is infused in justification, habitual faith also is at the same time infused. But since moral theology treats not of habits, but chiefly of the acts of virtues, the discussion in this place is concerning the necessity of the act of faith. From this it is clear that this necessity regards adults alone; but in moral theology those are called adults who have attained the use of reason.

c. There are among recent theologians some who, in order to render easier the eternal salvation of unbelievers, teach that for obtaining justification there is not always required faith properly so called, by which a revealed truth is believed on account of the authority of God revealing, but that sometimes faith improperly so called suffices, by which the mind embraces a truth known by the light of reason under the actual influence of grace. The assertion is understood concerning faith properly so called.¹

d. Where here the necessity of the act of faith is treated, it is only affirmed that some act of theological faith is necessary, prescinding from its object or from the truths to be believed, concerning which there will be discussion below.

¹ Fr. Schmid, Die ausserordentlichen Heilswege, Brixen: Pressverein, 1899, second section, Die Notwendigkeit des Glaubens, p. 79. W. Liese, Der heilsnotwendige Glaube, Freiburg: Charitas-Druckerei, 1902. Martin, De necessitate credendi et credendorum seu de fide salutari, Paderborn: Schoeningh, 1906.

8. Necessity of means. 1. Actual faith is necessary for adults not yet justified by necessity of means unto obtaining first justification, whether ex opere operato through the sacrament or ex opere operantis through an act of charity or of perfect contrition: a. But without faith it is impossible to please God: for he who approaches God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder to those who seek Him;¹ but these words of the apostle must be understood concerning actual faith, and that properly so called.² b. And indeed an adult man cannot arrive at justification unless by his own acts he disposes himself for it; but he cannot dispose himself for it unless he knows that God is and that the same God will be propitious to him; and he cannot know this except through faith.³ c. The Council of Trent, speaking of faith, and that properly so called, adds, "without which justification has never happened to anyone."⁴

Explicit and formal actual faith is necessary only for the first justification of an adult; but for second justification, which the sinner obtains either in the sacrament of penance or through perfect contrition, virtual faith suffices, unless he has lost the habit of faith. For although the Council of Trent⁵ enumerates faith and hope among the dispositions of the adult for obtaining justification, nevertheless the acts which the council enumerates do not always have to be formally elicited, as in first justification, but it suffices that they be virtually present.

2. Actual faith is necessary for adults already justified by necessity of means unto salvation: for the adult man ought to order himself and all his things to God, the ultimate end, or to tend by his acts to the supernatural end of eternal life and merit it for himself by good works; but this cannot happen unless he believes that God is, and that He is the rewarder of the good and the avenger of evils.

There are some who say that actual faith is necessary by necessity of means for absolutely all men using reason, even baptized children, as soon as they have arrived at the use of reason;⁶ others, on the contrary, say that actual faith is necessary for children of this kind by necessity of precept.⁷ Now nothing prevents it from being called necessary by necessity of means, provided it is held that adults of this kind are to be equated with infants until they have been instructed in faith and attend to the obligation of eliciting an act of faith, and therefore can be saved even without an act of faith.

3. This faith in adults not yet justified ought to be explicit and formal, by which some truths are believed explicitly in themselves; nevertheless in adults already justified virtual faith suffices, provided they explicitly know the things which must be believed by necessity of means and acknowledge the authority of God revealing: for a more perfect faith is not required for obtaining the end on account of which faith is necessary. Furthermore, faith is necessary in reality, nor does its desire suffice, which is contained in the act of charity of God.

¹ Heb. 11:6. Cf. Gal. 2:16.

² Cf. Schmid, loc. cit., n. 103.

³ Cf. Schmid, loc. cit., who in n. 94 ff. develops the arguments with equal acuteness and learning.

⁴ Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7. Cf. Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3.

⁵ Sess. 6, c. 6.

⁶ Lacroix, bk. 2, n. 11 ff.

⁷ Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 10.

FAITH is here understood in the sense in which it is used by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews¹ and elsewhere in Holy Scripture. It is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth of a proposition, not because it is evident to reason, but because its truth is vouched for by someone who knows and whom we can trust. The word has this sense among others in English. We say: ‘I should not like to pin my faith to such a proposition on that writer’s authority.” Here there is question of human faith resting on human authority. God can manifest the truth to us, and we believe that he has done so. ‘‘ God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days hath spoken to us by his Son.” Whatever God makes known to us mediately or immediately we are justified in believing on his authority. He can neither deceive us nor be himself deceived; and we are bound to believe all that we know God to have spoken or revealed, otherwise we implicitly accuse God of lying or of ignorance. An act of divine faith, then, is an act by which we believe whatever God has revealed on the authority of God himself. God has taken care that we should know for certain what he has revealed in times past for man’s benefit and guidance by founding the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church is the pillar and the ground of truth, whose chief function it is to bear witness to God’s revelation, and to teach it to all men even to the consummation of the world. God’s Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Truth, ever abides with the Church, to enable her faithfully and infallibly to perform her task. Faith, then, considered as a habit, is a theological virtue by which we believe all that God has revealed and the Church proposes to our belief on the authority of God himself. An act of faith is an act of this virtue.

¹ Heb. xi.

God has destined us for a supernatural end of eternal happiness, consisting essentially of the beatific vision of himself, as we know from revelation; he wishes that we should, as rational and free beings, work consciously for the attainment of that end. We cannot do this without believing in God and without believing that he is a rewarder of those who do well and a punisher of those who do ill; faith, then, is the necessary foundation of the Christian life. ‘‘ Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder of them that seek him.”

Faith is, then, necessary for salvation, not merely because it is of precept like the Commandments, but because it is a necessary means to attain the supernatural end to which we are destined by God. Without taking the necessary means the end cannot be attained. Those, then, who have come to the use of reason, so that they can know God and know what he has revealed, are bound to make an act of faith; otherwise they cannot be saved. The habit of faith is infused into the soul together with sanctifying grace at the reception of baptism, and this habitual faith is sufficient for such as have not the use of reason, like children or those who have always been insane.

Our act of faith must implicitly extend to everything that God has revealed; we cannot accept some articles on his authority and reject others which are vouched for by the same authority. But it is not sufficient to make an act of implicit faith comprising all that God has revealed. We are bound to know and believe certain revealed truths explicitly. Some of these truths must be believed explicitly as a necessary means to salvation; explicit belief in others is only of precept, and the want of it, if inculpable, will not be a bar to salvation. Explicit belief in the existence of God, the rewarder of them that seek him, is necessary for salvation, and probably also belief in the mysteries of the Blessed Trinity and the Incarna‘tion. Explicit belief in these mysteries is certainly of precept.¹ A Christian is bound also to know and believe the substance of what is contained in the Creed, the sacraments which are of obligation, the precepts of God and of the Church, and the Lord’s Prayer. It is sufficient to have implicit faith in other truths of revelation.

¹ Props. 22, 64, condemned by Innocent XI.

It is not sufficient to have believed the necessary articles of the faith once in a lifetime. Our acts of faith must be frequently renewed; we must lead lives of faith, according to the divine precept.¹ This divine precept is sometimes of obligation per se, as when the truths of revelation first become known to a man and he becomes conscious of his obligation; sometimes it is of obligation per accidens, as after a sin against the faith has been committed, or when a duty has to be fulfilled which requires an act of faith. However, for such as have once made their act of faith, it will be sufficient in order to fulfil the divine precept if the act of faith is renewed implicitly, as is done whenever we pray, assist at Mass, or receive any of the sacraments. It is well, however, especially in these days of unbelief, to renew frequently explicit acts of faith according to the wish and practice of the Church. They are acts of very great merit with God.

¹ Props. 16, 17, condemned by Innocent XI.

The act of faith (actual faith), as is clear, cannot be necessary except for adults. But a distinction must be made between adults not yet justified and adults justified. Now:

I. The act of faith is necessary for salvation by necessity of means for adults not yet justified. And indeed, the act of faith is necessary for obtaining justification. But justification itself is necessary for salvation by necessity of means. Therefore the same must be affirmed of the act of faith.

The major is proved: 1. From Sacred Scripture. "But without faith it is impossible to please God. For he who comes to God must believe."² That St. Paul here speaks of actual faith is clear both from the word believe and from the whole context. That the Apostle speaks of supernatural faith is clear from verse 1, where he calls it "the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things that appear not." But that the words must be understood of all men of all times is clearer than the sun from the context from chapter 10:38-39 through chapter 11:1-40 inclusive, where he is wholly concerned to prove, by examples adduced, that all the saints from the beginning of the world were justified by faith, and likewise that all still must be justified by it. 2. From Councils. The Council of Trent says thus: "Without it [faith] justification has never happened to anyone."³ That actual faith is to be understood you may deduce from the fact that the Council speaks of faith which, "conceiving from hearing, they are freely moved toward God, believing that the things divinely revealed and promised are true."⁴ The Vatican Council teaches the same.⁵ 3. It is confirmed by reason. For it is altogether fitting that, for the justification of an adult, it be required by necessity of means that he tend toward God as his supernatural ultimate end. But this cannot happen unless God is apprehended as the supernatural ultimate end; and this happens through faith.

Corollary. To the question how an adult not yet justified, who lacks a preacher, can elicit an act of faith, St. Thomas responds: "For if someone nourished in such a way⁶ followed the guidance of natural reason in seeking good and fleeing evil, it must most certainly be held that God would either reveal to him by internal inspiration those things which are necessary to be believed, or would direct some preacher of the faith to him, as Peter to Cornelius" (De veritate, q. 14, a. 11, ad 1).

II. The act of faith is also in some way necessary for justified adults by necessity of means, namely to the extent that salvation cannot be obtained without supernatural prayer by which the grace necessary for fulfilling the precepts is obtained. Now for prayer of this sort an act of faith is necessarily required. Hence the act of faith is also necessary for justified adults in this sense by necessity of means, so that they may arrive at salvation.

Corollary I. For justification, the desire of faith does not suffice, but a formal act of faith is required, as is deduced from the obvious sense of the documents which we have alleged.

Corollary II. For justification an act of faith strictly so called is required; but faith broadly so called does not suffice, that is, as those few explain who think this faith to suffice,⁷ faith which does not rest on the authority of God revealing, but on knowledge acquired from creatures, yet with supernatural help. The arguments adduced prove that true faith is required, of which sort faith broadly so called is not. There is added that the attacked opinion almost falls into proposition 23 condemned by Innocent XI: "Faith broadly so called from the testimony of creatures or a similar motive suffices for justification."⁸

III. The act of faith, necessary by necessity of means, must be explicit as regards certain dogmas; namely:

1. Explicit faith in God existing and rewarding is certainly required. This is clear from Sacred Scripture: "For he who comes to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to those who seek Him."⁹ Hence Innocent XI condemned proposition 22: "Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in a rewarder."¹⁰

In addition, explicit faith in God as rewarder in the supernatural order is more probably required; and according to many, also in God existing as author of the supernatural order. On this account the dogmatic theologians should be consulted.

2. It is disputed whether after the Gospel has been promulgated, explicit faith in the Most Holy Trinity and Christ the Redeemer is necessary by necessity of means. I said after the Gospel has been promulgated; for before that, that explicit faith in the aforesaid mysteries was not necessary is drawn from these passages of Sacred Scripture: "The mystery which had been hidden from ages and generations, but now is manifested to His saints";¹¹ "But before the faith came, we were kept enclosed under the law, unto that faith which was to be revealed."¹²

That after the Gospel has been promulgated explicit faith in those mysteries is necessary by necessity of means is taught by St. Thomas, as it seems (II-II, q. 2, aa. 7 and 8), and others. They rest first on these passages of Sacred Scripture: "But the justice of God, that is, our justification, by the faith of Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all who believe in Him; for there is no distinction."¹³ "Now this is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent."¹⁴ Add the responses of the Holy Office.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the contrary opinion also is probable, because the aforesaid doctrine is not necessarily deduced either from the nature of the thing, or from Sacred Scripture, or from the testimonies of the Fathers, or from the responses of the Sacred Congregations. Not from the nature of the thing, because in order that man tend toward God as his supernatural end, explicit faith in God existing and rewarding in the supernatural order suffices. But the texts of Sacred Scripture, the testimonies of the Holy Fathers, and the contrary responses are understood by the favorers of this opinion of implicit faith, or of necessity of precept, or of necessity considered according to common and ordinary providence (St. Alphonsus, II, 2).¹⁶

Corollary I. An adult (not perpetually insane) who certainly does not know God existing or rewarding, of himself cannot be baptized even in danger of death, because he certainly lacks faith, which in an adult is required for obtaining justification (under III). Thus theoretically; since practically either ignorance can be driven out or it will not be certain.

Corollary II. An adult (not perpetually insane) who does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of Christ the Redeemer, of himself cannot be baptized or absolved, not even in extremis, unless he is first instructed.¹⁷ But if, with extreme necessity pressing, instruction cannot be undertaken, Baptism and absolution should be conferred, provided the required intention is certainly, or at least with some probability, present.¹⁸ In the former case Baptism should be administered absolutely, in the latter conditionally; but absolution should not be granted except conditionally, because even if the required intention were certainly present, nevertheless supernatural contrition probably is lacking, when knowledge of the mysteries which probably must be believed by necessity of means is lacking.¹⁹

¹ Cf. Waffelaert, Annotationes in tractatum de virtutibus theologicis; Bouquillon, De virtutibus theologicis; Van der Moeren, Tractatus de virtutibus theologicis.

² Heb. 11:6. The same is taught at Heb. 10:38; Gal. 2:16; Mark 16:15 sq.

³ Session 6, chapter 7.

⁴ Session 6, chapter 6.

⁵ Session 3, chapter 3.

⁶ That is, in forests.

⁷ Thus Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theologie, VIII, 493 sq.

⁸ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1173.

⁹ Heb. 11:6.

¹⁰ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1172.

¹¹ Col. 1:26.

¹² Gal. 3:23.

¹³ Rom. 3:22.

¹⁴ John 17:3.

¹⁵ The response of the Holy Office, May 3, 1703 (Collectanea de Propaganda Fide, n. 254, ad 2, and n. 256, ad 2), causes the greatest difficulty. Asked whether an adult in the article of death could be baptized under a promise of learning the truths of Faith if he recovered, it responded: "That the promise does not suffice; but that the missionary is bound to explain to an adult, even one dying, who is not altogether incapable, the mysteries of Faith which are necessary by necessity of means, such as the principal mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation." This response Benedict XIV also reports in the Constitution Postremo mense, February 28, 1747, n. 41; finally the Holy Office, March 30, 1898 (Collectanea de Propaganda Fide, n. 1993), again appealed to it.

¹⁶ Cf. note [16].

¹⁷ Cf. the responses of the Holy Office cited in note [16].

¹⁸ This doctrine is not opposed to the cited responses of the Holy Office, namely those of May 3, 1703, and March 30, 1898. These establish what generally must be done; this does not prevent an exception being admitted in an urgent case of necessity.

¹⁹ Nor is proposition 64 condemned by Innocent XI an obstacle to our doctrine: "A man is capable of absolution however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of faith, and even if through negligence, even culpable negligence, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ" (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1214). For here the speech concerns culpable ignorance, which certainly excludes valid absolution until the penitent grieves over it (St. Alphonsus, II, 2).

I. The internal act of faith, that is, the act of believing God revealing, is necessary by necessity of precept. This is clear first from the fact that it is necessary by necessity of means, as we explained above (n. 488). Then, one who does not admit revelation sufficiently proposed does supreme injury to the authority of God. Add these texts of Sacred Scripture: "He who does not believe shall be condemned."¹ - "And this is His commandment: that we believe in the name of His Son Jesus Christ."²

II. The internal act of faith, considered according to necessity of precept, must be explicit, not only as regards things to be believed by necessity of means, but also as regards other things which must be known either for thinking rightly, or for living rightly, or for duly using the helps to salvation.³ Hence, by explicit faith there must be believed, besides those things to be believed by necessity of means: 1. the things contained in the Apostles' Creed; 2. the things contained in the Decalogue; 3. the most necessary Sacraments, namely Baptism, Penance, the Eucharist, and, according to many, Confirmation; the others, when someone is about to receive them soon; 4. probably the things contained in the Lord's Prayer, since it involves all the things which Christ taught us to ask for (St. Alphonsus, II, 3). Besides this, note:

1. Besides things to be believed, many other things must be known, such as the precepts of the Church and the duties of each one's proper state. Likewise, at least, it is altogether fitting to know the sign of the Cross, and to retain in memory the Lord's Prayer, the Angelic Salutation, and the Creed (cf. St. Alphonsus, II, 3).

2. As regards the mode of knowing those things which must be believed or known, generally knowledge as to substance suffices, or that which is contained in some concept, however confused and rough. I said generally, because some, considering their state and condition, must possess a more perfect knowledge.

3. One who certainly or probably is ignorant of things to be believed by necessity of means should, before he is absolved, be instructed in the manner in which this can conveniently be done here and now; nevertheless he should be warned that afterward he must try to acquire a more perfect and broader knowledge. One who is ignorant of things to be believed or known only by necessity of precept can be absolved, with the obligation imposed of afterward obtaining the required knowledge (St. Alphonsus, II, 3; Praxis Confessarii, n. 22).

III. The internal act of faith obliges sometimes by reason of the precept of faith itself, sometimes by reason of the precept of another virtue. Therefore note proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VII: "At no time in his life is a man bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity, by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues";⁴ proposition 16 condemned by Innocent XI: "Faith is not considered to fall under a special precept and according to itself";⁵ and proposition 17 condemned by the same: "It is enough to elicit an act of faith once in life."⁶ Now the internal act of faith obliges:

1. By reason of the precept of faith itself:

a) When someone first has knowledge of revelation made. Hence the following are bound to elicit an act of faith: a) children educated among the faithful, who, having attained the use of reason, apprehend the truths of faith as revealed by God; b) non-Catholic adults to whom the true faith is proposed and becomes known as true (St. Alphonsus, II, 5).

b) Several times in life. Thus St. Alphonsus and many others against some. And indeed, the homage to be rendered to God seems to require that acts of the virtues which immediately regard God be elicited more often in life. Then it is gathered from proposition 17, condemned by Innocent XI and cited above. Finally, it seems to have to be deduced from the fact that, according to what will be said in n. 519, an act of charity must be elicited several times in life. For since faith and charity have almost the same necessity, almost the same thing seems to have to be said of the obligation of each (St. Alphonsus, II, 5, 6, 7).

Objection. The precept of faith obliges indirectly, that is, by reason of another virtue, so often in life that Christ is not considered to have imposed it directly.

Response. That the precept of faith obliges indirectly so often does not prevent the homage to be rendered to God revealing also from requiring that an act of faith be elicited several times in life. Hence Christ is considered to have imposed an act of faith also on account of that motive, that is, directly.

c) In the article of death. Thus many, on account of the reasons adduced under b), which they judge must also be applied to the article of death.

d) When a new definition of faith is proposed, insofar as one who in this case did not elicit an act of faith would at least practically either deny an article of faith, or call it into doubt, or expose himself to the danger of doing so.

e) When someone has fallen into heresy or apostasy; in which case the injury done to the authority of God seems to carry with it the obligation of repairing it by an act of faith at least not long delayed.

f) When a temptation against faith presses, whether against faith in common or against a particular mystery, which someone judges he cannot conquer except by an elicited act of faith. Yet this will rarely have place; rather, ordinarily, it is preferable to fight temptations of this sort by turning away to other things (St. Alphonsus, II, 5; Praxis Confessarii, n. 238).

g) When an external profession of faith must be made (St. Alphonsus, cited place, n. 490).

2. By reason of the precept of another virtue:

a) When someone is bound to place an act of another virtue which cannot be placed without an act of faith (St. Alphonsus, II, 5).

b) When a temptation against another virtue presses, which someone seems to himself unable to overcome without an act of faith (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

c) When an act of virtue is freely placed which cannot be placed in the due manner without an act of faith, such as sacramental confession or the reception of the Holy Eucharist.

Corollary I. One who neglects an act of faith imposed by reason of another virtue sins against that other virtue, but not against faith.

Corollary II. A man living Christianly should not doubt that he has fulfilled the obligation of eliciting an act of faith from time to time, since so often, both by reason of faith itself and by reason of another virtue or good work, he elicits an act of faith, now in an act signified, now in an act exercised (St. Alphonsus, II, 7).

¹ Mark 16:16.

² 1 John 3:23.

³ Waffelaert, Annotationes in tractatum de virtutibus theologicis, n. 178.

⁴ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1101.

⁵ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1166.

⁶ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1167.

The Object of Faith.—There is a twofold object of faith, viz., material and formal.

(a) The material object, or the truth that is believed, includes all that is contained in the Word of God, whether written or handed down by tradition. The principal material object is God Himself as the Deity, or Supreme Truth in Being (prima veritas in essendo); the secondary material object embraces all other revealed truths.

(b) The formal object of faith, or the motive that prompts one to give assent to the material object, is the authority of God, who is Supreme Truth in Knowing and Speaking (prima veritas in cognoscendo et dicendo), and hence He can neither be deceived nor deceive.

The material object of faith includes all truths revealed by God; but, since it belongs to the Church to teach those truths, there is a distinction of truths that are revealed by God but not defined by the Church, and truths that are revealed by God and defined by the Church as revealed. Thus: (a) divine faith is belief in revealed truth that has not been declared by the Church as revealed; (b) divine and Catholic faith is belief in a revealed truth that has been proposed as such by the Church, either solemnly or ordinarily. Example: Dogmas contained in creeds, definitions of Popes or general councils. The Vatican Council has determined the object of this faith: By divine and Catholic faith all those things must be believed which are contained in the written word of God and in tradition, and which are proposed by the Church, either by a solemn pronouncement or by her ordinary and universal magisterium, to be believed as divinely revealed (Ibid., Denz. 1792).

The formal object of faith extends to all truths that have been revealed and to no others. Theologians discuss the status of certain truths connected with revelation concerning which the Church is guaranteed infallibility on account of her teaching office. Special difficulties arise in relation to: a) dogmatic facts, that is, definitions concerning particular facts closely related to dogma (e.g., that Anglican orders are invalid; that a particular book contains a sense contrary to revelation; that this Supreme Pontiff, legitimately elected, is the successor of St. Peter in the primacy and consequently infallible); b) theological conclusions, that is, deductions drawn from revealed truth.

Many theologians teach that both dogmatic facts and theological conclusions when defined by the Church constitute a special object of faith distinct from divine and Catholic faith, namely, ecclesiastical faith. Accordingly, for them, ecclesiastical faith is the internal assent given to truths connected with revelation and defined by the Church as true, the motive of assent being the infallibility of the Church in her teaching office.

Others deny the existence of such faith and insist a) that dogmatic facts are contained in revealed doctrine implicitly as singulars in universals and hence are believed before definition by divine faith implicitly, and after definition by divine and Catholic faith, b) that theological conclusions before definition are held by theological assent, afterwards by divine and Catholic faith. Some also have maintained that before definition such conclusions belong to divine faith. (For a summary of the various teachings on this problem see Reginaldo-Maria Schultes, O.P., Introductio in Historiam Dogmatum, pp. 46 ff.; Marin-Sola, O.P., L’Evolution homogene du Dogme Catholique).

Private revelations, even when approved by the Church, are not an object of divine and Catholic faith, for they form no part of the revelation given to the whole human race that was closed with the death of the Apostles and committed to the Church. Hence: (a) if they are negatively approved by the Church, the approval means only that such revelations contain nothing contrary to faith and morals, and are useful and edifying; (b) if they are approved positively (as is the case with the revelations of St. Hildegarde, St. Brigit, and St. Catherine of Siena), the approval means that they appear to be true divine revelations and may be prudently accepted as such.

The assent to be given to private revelations, therefore, is as follows:

(a) Such revelations should receive the assent of divine faith, if it is certain that they are genuine. This applies to those to whom and for whom they were given, and probably to others also. It rarely happens, however, that the genuineness of a private revelation can be critically established, and the Church does not require that such revelations be accepted by all the faithful. To refuse assent, therefore, to a private revelation is not generally an offense against divine faith.

(b) Private revelations cannot receive the assent of Catholic faith, since, even when approved by the Church, they are not proposed as a part of the Christian revelation committed to her care. To dissent from them, therefore, is not a sin against Catholic faith, unless in rejecting them one would also reject defined dogma (e.g., by denying the possibility of revelation).

(c) Private revelations are not offered for the assent of ecclesiastical faith, since in approving them the Church does not propose them as necessarily connected with the exercise of her teaching office or under guarantee of infallibility. To dissent from them, therefore, is not a sin against ecclesiastical faith, unless other errors (e.g., against the authority of the Church in matters connected with revelation) are also involved.

(d) Private revelations are offered for the assent of human faith, since the Church proposes them to the faithful, if approved, as matters of pious opinion, which are according to the rules of prudence truly probable on account of traditions in their favor, supported by suitable testimony and documents (Benedict XIV, De Canonizatione Sanctorum, lib. II, cap. 23; III, cap. ult.; Sacred Cong. Rites, May 12, 1877, n. 3419, ad 2). The Church permits, but does not exact belief in these revelations. One would not be excused, however, who rejected them through pride or contempt, or without sufficient reason.

Similarly, although the Church offers for human faith alone certain particular facts of history, one who rejects them may easily be guilty of contempt or temerity. Such particular facts are: (a) apparitions of heavenly beings in post-Biblical times, such as the appearance of the Archangel Michael in Monte Gargano about 525 and the appearance of the Blessed Virgin at Lourdes in 1858, for which the Church has instituted feasts; (b) deeds related in the legends of the Saints, such as the victory of St. Catherine of Alexandria over the pagan philosophers and the carrying of her body to Mt. Sinai by Angels, which the Church inserts in the Breviary lessons; (c) the authenticity of relics. In granting certificates of genuineness, the Church guarantees only that there is sufficient historical evidence or probability for the belief that particular bones or other objects belonged to a particular Saint.

Many tenets of the Church, indeed, have not the prerogative of infallibility—for example, decrees of the Popes not given ex cathedra, decisions of Congregations made with Papal approval, teachings of Bishops to particular members of the Church, doctrines commonly held by Catholics as theological truths or certain conclusions. These decrees, decisions, etc., receive not the assent of Catholic faith, but what is called religious assent, which includes two things, viz., external and internal assent.

(a) External assent should be given such teachings—that is, the homage of respectful silence due to public authority. This does not forbid the submission of difficulties to the teaching authority, or the scientific examination of objections that seem very strong.

(b) Internal assent should be given such teaching—that is, the submission of the judgment of the individual to the judgment of the teacher who has the authority from Christ and assistance from the Holy Spirit. This internal assent differs, however, from the assent of faith, inasmuch as it excludes fear of error, but not of the possibility of error, and it may later on be suspended, called into doubt, or even revoked. Pope Pius X in his Motu proprio, “Praestantia scripturae Sacrae” (Nov. 18, 1907), indicated the binding force of the decrees both of the Pontifical Biblical Commission and of all doctrinal decrees: All are bound in conscience to submit to the decisions of the Biblical Commission which have been given in the past and which shall be given in the future, in the same way as to the decrees which appertain to doctrine, issued by the Sacred Congregations and approved by the Supreme Pontiff; nor can they escape the stigma both of disobedience and temerity, nor be free from grave guilt as often as they impugn their decisions either in word or writing; and this over and above the scandal which they give and the sins of which they may be the cause before God by making other statements on these matters which are very frequently both rash and false. (Reaffirmed by the Biblical Commission on Feb. 27, 1934.)

The objects, therefore, which formally or reductively pertain to the virtue of faith, are as follows:

(a) Divine faith has for its object all the truths revealed by God as contained in the Canonical scriptures approved by the Church, and in the teachings received by the Apostles from Christ or the Holy Spirit and handed down to the Church as Tradition. Private revelations in exceptional cases may also be the object of divine faith.

(b) Catholic faith has for its object all the truths formally revealed in scripture and Tradition that have been defined as such by the Church. The definitions of the Church are either solemn (e.g., those given in the Creeds, ex cathedra definitions of the Popes, decisions of Ecumenical Councils) or ordinary (e.g., those contained in the universal preaching, practice or belief of the Church, encyclical letters [see Humani Generis, n.20]). Equivalent to definitions are the condemnations of error opposed to revealed truths.

(c) According to some theologians ecclesiastical faith has for its object all infallible decisions of the Church about matters not revealed, but connected with revelation, or necessary for the exercise of the teaching office of the Church. Such are: (i) definitions, that is, definitive declarations of theological conclusions or of dogmatic facts, disciplinary laws made for the entire Church, canonization of the saints, solemn approbation of religious Orders, express or special recognition of Doctors of the Church, declaration of the relation of private revelations to the public revelation; and (ii) censures, that is, condemnations of teachings, on account of falsity, as heretical, near to heresy, savoring of heresy, erroneous, rash, etc.; on account of their expression, as equivocal, ambiguous, presumptuous, captious, suspected, ill-sounding, offensive to pious ears, etc.; on account of their tendency, as scandalous, schismatical, seditious, unsafe, etc. Examples: The definitions concerning the sense of the book Augustinus, the suitability of the terms “consubstantial” and “transubstantiation,” the agreement of the Vulgate with the original scriptures, the lawfulness of the insertion of the Filioque.

(d) Religious assent has for its object all doctrinal pronouncements of the Church that are not infallible, but are yet official and authoritative. Examples are ordinary instructions and condemnations given by Pontifical Congregations and Commissions. The Syllabus of Modern Errors issued by Pius IX was most likely not an infallible or definitive document, although many of the errors it rejects are contrary to dogma, and hence, even apart from the Syllabus, they are to be rejected as opposed to Catholic faith. Likewise, many of its tenets are drawn from encyclical letters. Papal allocutions, radio addresses, and the doctrinal parts of Apostolic Constitutions, in themselves, are in this class.

(e) Respect is due to the judgment of the Church even in non-doctrinal matters and where no obligation is imposed by her, on account of her position and the careful examination given before decision. Example: It would be disrespectful to reject without good reason a pious belief which the Church after mature deliberation has permitted to be held.

Though the truths of faiths are many, the duty of believing imposes no great burden on the believer. Thus: (a) it is not required that explicit belief be given to all the teachings of faith; (b) it is not required that one distinguish the particular kind of assent in case of uncertainty, but it suffices to yield assent according to the mind and intention of the Church. Example: When a group of propositions is condemned under various censures, no indication being made of the censure that applies to particular propositions, it suffices to hold that all of them are false, and that to each of them applies one or more of the censures listed.

Faith is divided into explicit and implicit, according as the object believed is unfolded or not to the mind.

(a) Faith is explicit regarding any truth, when assent is given to that truth as known in itself and expressed in terms proper to itself. Example: He has explicit faith in the Eucharist who has been instructed concerning the meaning of the mystery, and who assents to it according to that distinct knowledge.

(b) Faith is implicit regarding any truth, when that truth is not known or not accepted in itself, but is accepted in another truth. Example: He has implicit faith in the Eucharist who has not yet heard of it, but who accepts all the teachings of the Church, even those he does not know.

Faith is implicit as follows:

(a) Improperly, faith is implicit, if one does not give assent, but is prepared to give it, if necessary, or wishes to give it. These pious dispositions are not the act of faith itself, but they are its beginnings, or preparations leading up to it; they are good, but not sufficient. Example: A pagan who says he would accept the Christian creed, if he thought it were true, or who wishes that he could believe it.

(b) Properly, faith is implicit, if one gives assent to a truth by accepting another in which it is contained, as a particular is contained in a universal (e.g., he who explicitly accepts all the truths of Christianity, implicitly accepts the Eucharist, even when in good faith he thinks it is not revealed), or as an instrument is involved in its principal cause (e.g., he who explicitly believes in the Redemption implicity believes in Baptism, which is the instrument by which Redemption is applied), or as means are contained in their end (e.g., he who explicitly believes that eternal life is a reward, implicitly believes that good works must be performed as a means to that end), or as the reality is expressed in the figure (e.g., those in the Old Testament who explicitly believed in the Paschal Lamb, implicitly believed in the sacrifice of Christ of which the Paschal Lamb was the figure), or as the assent of the disciple is bound up with the assent of the teacher (e.g., the child who explicitly accepts as true the doctrines of faith taught by his pastor, implicitly believes the sense and implications contained in the latter’s instructions).

The points about which explicit faith is required can be reduced to four heads (see Catechism of the Council of Trent). These heads are:

(a) The things to be believed: “Preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth shall be saved” (Mark, xvi. 15). The Gospel doctrine is summarized in the Apostles’ Creed;

(b) The things to be done: “Teach them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you” (Matt., xxviii. 20). The Ten Commandments (see Vol. II) are called the epitome of the whole law;

(c) The ordinances to be observed; “Baptize them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost” (Matt, xxviii. 19). The Seven Sacraments are the sacred instruments through which the merits of the Passion of Christ are applied to the soul;

(d) The petitions to be made to God: “Thus shall you pray: Our Father, etc.” (Matt., vi. 9). The prayer (see Vol. II) given us by Christ teaches us both the manner of prayer and the requests that should be offered.

Faith in the revelation given by God is necessary for salvation (Heb., xi. 6), but in the usual providence of God faith cannot be had or safeguarded without short formulas of its principal doctrines.

(a) Faith cannot be received without such formulas, because, its doctrines being many and frequently difficult and the study of all scripture and Tradition being impossible for most persons, a list of short and clear propositions of revealed truths (Creed) is needed that the faith may be proposed and accepted.

(b) Faith cannot be retained without such formulas, because, being unchanging in itself and yet for all times and places, its doctrines would be easily corrupted if there were not an official standard (Symbol) by which both truth and error could be at once recognized (I Cor., i. 10; II Tim., i. 13).

The formulas of Christian teaching as summarized in the Creeds, since they must be brief and orderly, are divided into short and connected propositions, which are therefore known as articles. Brevity being the character of Creeds, not all revealed truths are expressed in them as articles, but only those that have the following characteristics:

(a) An article of the Creed deals with one of the two main objects of belief, namely, the end of man, which is eternal life (Heb., xi. 1), and the means thereto, which is Jesus Christ (John, xvii. 3). Other things, which are proposed for faith, not for their own sake, but only on account of their relation to these two main objects (e.g., the wandering of the Israelites in the desert, the details of the journeys of St. Paul, etc.), are not mentioned in the Creeds.

(b) An article of the Creed deals only with those doctrines concerning eternal life and Christ which are in a special manner unseen or difficult, for faith is “the evidence of things that appear not” (Heb., xi. 1). Other doctrines which have no special difficulty of their own are considered as implicit in those that express the general mysteries, and hence they are not mentioned. Thus, the three Persons of the Trinity are given distinct articles, because the mysteriousness of the Triune God cannot be reduced to any more general mystery, whereas the Eucharist is not mentioned, as having no mystery that is not implied in the articles on the divine omnipotence and the sanctification of man through Christ.

Has there been an increase in the articles of faith?

(a) If by increase is meant the addition through new revelation of main beliefs not contained in the primitive revelation, there has never been an increase in the articles of faith; for from the beginning God made known His own being, which includes the eternal things of God and the end or happiness of man, and His providence, which includes the temporal dispensations of God and the means for the salvation of man (Heb., xi. 6).

(b) If by increase is meant the addition of new revelations that brought out more clearly and definitely things contained in previous revelation, there was an increase in the articles of faith from the beginning of revelations down to the end of the Apostolic age. Thus, the nature of God and His purpose as regards the redemption of humanity were brought out ever more distinctly by new revelations in Old Testament times (Exod., vi. 2), and were given in final and complete form by the revelation of Christ (Heb., i. 1; Eph., iii. 5; Heb., xii. 27, 28; II Tim., i. 13).

(c) If by increase is meant a clearer and fuller explanation of the revelation once delivered to the Saints, there has been and always can be an increase of articles of faith. Thus, in the Council of Nicaea the Apostles’ Creed was amplified; in the Council of Constantinople the Creed of Nicaea was added to, and similarly today or tomorrow the Pope could add new explanations or developments to the Creed, if new heresies or necessities required that the true sense of revelation already given should be brought out more clearly or fully.

There are three principal Creeds used by the Church:

(a) the Apostles’ Creed, which according to an early tradition was composed by the Apostles themselves before they separated to preach the Gospel. It was in use from the first centuries in the Roman Church, which required that the catechumens learn and recite it before receiving Baptism. It is divided into twelve articles;

(b) the Nicene Creed, which is used in the Mass and was drawn up at the Council of Nicaea (325) against the Arian denial of the divinity of Christ, and was revised by the Council of Constantinople (381) against the Macedonians, who refused to acknowledge the divinity of the Holy Ghost;

(c) the Athanasian Creed, which is used in the Office of Prime and is a resume of the teaching of St. Athanasius on the Trinity and Incarnation. It was composed in the West some time after the beginning of the fifth century.

Summary of the teaching of the First Article of the Creed: “I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth.”—(a) “I believe,” i.e., I give unhesitating assent to God revealing His mysterious truths; (b) “in God,” i.e., the Supreme Being, one in nature and three in persons; (c) “the Father,” i.e., our Maker and Provider, from whom also we receive the spirit of adoption of sons; (d) “almighty,” i.e., all-powerful, and therefore all-wise and endowed with every other perfection in the highest degree; (e) “Creator,” i.e., who freely produced the world out of nothing, without external model or effort of any sort, and who preserves, rules and moves all creatures; (f) “of heaven and earth,” i.e., of the world of pure spirits, of matter, and of man, who is at the confines of matter and spirit—in other words, of all finite things, visible and invisible.

Summary of the Second Article: “And in Jesus Christ, His only Son, our Lord.”—(a) “Jesus,” a name given by command of God and meaning “Saviour”; (b) “Christ,” i.e., “the anointed,” because He was King, Priest, and Prophet; (c) “His only Son,” i.e., born of the Father before all ages, God of God, Light of Light, true God of true God, begotten not made, consubstantial with the Father, by whom all things were made; (d) “our Lord,” for as God He shares all the perfections of the divine nature, as man He has redeemed us and thus deservedly acquired the title of Lord over us, while as the God-man He is the Lord of all created things. It should be noted that there is nothing imperfect or carnal in the generation of the Son, or in the procession of the Holy Ghost, for God is a spirit and all-perfect.

Summary of the Third Article: “Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary.”—(a) “Who was conceived.” The Only-begotten Son, the second Person of the Trinity, for us men and for our salvation, became incarnate and was made man. Thus, the same Divine Person is in both the divine and human natures, and the union preserves the properties and the actions of both natures. (b) “By the Holy Ghost.” At the moment when Mary consented to the announcement of the angel, the body of Christ was formed in her womb from her flesh, the rational soul was infused, and the divine and human natures were united in the Person of the Word. Thus, Mary is truly the Mother of God. This conception was miraculous, accomplished without the aid of man, through the sole operation of the three Persons of the Trinity. Being an external work of God in which love towards us is especially manifested, the Incarnation is attributed to the Holy Ghost, who in the internal life of the Deity proceeds as the mutual love of Father and Son. (c) “Born of the Virgin Mary.” Mary was ever a virgin, before, during, and after childbirth; immaculate and holy in soul; the spiritual Mother of whom Christians are born in holiness.

Summary of the Fourth Article: “Suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried.”—(a) The effect of that which is contained in this article is expressed in the words of the Nicene Creed, “for us.” The passion and death of Christ, willed by Himself, accomplished our salvation, as satisfaction, sacrifice and redemption; (b) The manner in which this was brought about is declared in the words above quoted. In His human nature Christ suffered agony and pain of body; He was sentenced to death by the Roman governor and nailed to the cross. His soul and body were separated in death, although the Divinity never departed from either, and His dead body was laid in the tomb.

Summary of the Fifth Article: “He descended into hell; the third day He rose again from the dead.”—(a) “He descended.” After His death the soul of Christ went to the abode of the departed, to liberate those who were there. (b) “Into hell.” The name hell is applied in a wide sense to all those secret abodes in which are detained the souls of those who have not obtained the happiness of heaven—viz., the hell of the damned, in which the impenitent suffer eternal pain of loss and sense; purgatory, in which the souls of just men are cleansed by temporary punishments; limbo, where the fathers of the Old Testament awaited in peaceful repose the coming of Christ. It was this last abode into which the soul of Christ entered. (c) “The third day”—i.e., on Sunday morning, the third day after His burial. (d) “He rose again.” As He had laid down His life by His own power, so He took it up again by His own power. (e) “From the dead.” Christ not only returned to life, He also conquered death; He rose to die no more, and thus He is first in the final resurrection. (f) “According to the scriptures.” These words are added in the Creed of Constantinople, to call attention to the fact that the resurrection is the attestation of the truth of our Lord’s claims and doctrine (I Cor., xv. 14, 17; Matt., xii. 39, 40).

Summary of the Sixth Article: “He ascended into heaven, sitteth at the right hand of God, the Father almighty.”—(a) “He ascended.” By His own power as God and man Christ ascended into heaven. (b) “Into heaven.” As God, He never forsook heaven, the Divinity being omnipresent; but as man, body and soul, He ascended to the abode of glory forty days after the resurrection. (c) “Sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty.” Christ is said to stand at the right hand of God, inasmuch as He is our Mediator with the Father (Acts, vii. 55; Heb., vii. 25; John, xiv. 2); He is said to sit at the right hand of the Father to express the permanent possession of royal and supreme power and glory (Eph., i. 20-22; Heb., i. 13).

Summary of the Seventh Article: “From thence He shall come to judge the living and the dead.”—There is a particular judgment at death; at the end of the World, of which the time is uncertain, there will be a general judgment, both of the living and the dead. Christ will come a second time, and as Judge will pass sentence either of eternal loss and pain or of eternal happiness.

Summary of the Eighth Article: “I believe in the Holy Ghost.”—The Third Person of the Trinity is equal to the Father and the Son, proceeds from them both as their mutual love, and is spoken of, therefore, by appropriation, as the Author of works of grace and sanctification, in which especially the charity of God is manifested: “The Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceedeth from the Father and the Son, who together with the Father and the Son is adored and glorified, who spoke by the prophets” (Creed of Constantinople).

Summary of the Ninth Article: “I believe the Holy Catholic Church; the Communion of Saints.”—(a) The Church pertains to the material, not the formal object of divine faith (see 754), and hence it is not said: “I believe in the Church.” We believe of the Church that she is the visible society made up of the faithful scattered throughout the world, called also the house of God (I Tim., iii. 15), the flock of Christ, the spouse of Christ (II Cor., xi. 2), the body of Christ (Eph., i. 23; Col., i. 24); that besides the Church militant on earth, composed of both the good and the bad, and outside of which are unbelievers and the excommunicated, there is the Church triumphant in heaven and the Church suffering in purgatory; that there are four marks by which the true Church may be recognized—viz., that she is one, holy, Catholic, and Apostolic; that she is divine in her origin and possesses divinely given powers. (b) “The Communion of Saints.” The members of the Church have different offices, but there is among them a community of spiritual goods, the Sacraments being a bond of union, and each one profiting according to his condition in the good works done by others, The Church suffering is assisted by our suffrages, while we in turn are helped by the intercessions of the Church triumphant.

Summary of the Tenth Article: “The forgiveness of sins.”—God forgives all sins, when they are truly repented of, either through Baptism (in case of sins before Baptism) or through the due exercise of the power of the keys given the Church (in case of sins after Baptism). Venial sins may be forgiven by private repentance.

Summary of the Eleventh Article: “The resurrection of the body.”—The soul is immortal, the body mortal. But at the end of the world the bodies of all the dead, even though corrupted, shall be restored and reunited with their principle of life—i.e., the soul to which they belonged. Substantially, the risen body will be identical with the mortal body, but it will have certain new qualities corresponding to its new state.

Summary of the Twelfth Article: “Life everlasting.”—Those who die in the friendship of God will be received into unending happiness, in which they will be exempted from all evil and enjoy the beatific vision and other divine gifts.

“97. Faith is necessary for rustic, ignorant, servile men and those not having an elevated intellect, who do not know how to know through reason and delight to know through faith; but a subtle man is more easily drawn to Christian truth through reason than through faith.” Proposition of Raymond Llull condemned by Gregory XI, on the seventh day before the Kalends of February 1376. Cf. nn. 345, 349, 350.

“22. Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in Him as rewarder.” Proposition condemned by Innocent XI. Cf. n. 345.

“1. At no time whatever in his life is a man bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VII.

“16. Faith is not judged to fall under a special precept in itself. — 17. It suffices to elicit an act of faith once in life. — 18. If someone is questioned by public authority, I counsel him candidly to confess the faith as glorious to God and to the faith; I do not condemn silence as sinful in itself.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI. Cf. n. 350.

187. • I. The internal act of Faith is necessary for all adults for justification by necessity of means. This is clear from the Epistle to the Hebrews 11.6, where the Apostle says: Without Faith it is impossible to please God. For he who approaches God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those who seek him. - And from the Council of Trent, sess. 6. c. 6.

II. It is also necessary by necessity of precept at some time in life. This is clear from Sacred Scripture. For it is said in Epist. 1. John 3.23: This is his commandment, that we believe in the name of his Son Jesus Christ. Likewise from various propositions condemned by Alexander VIII and Innocent XI.

188. Questions. - Q. 1º When does the precept of eliciting Faith bind?

Resp. 1º It binds per se 1º after the complete use of reason, for beginning the Christian life; 2º likewise when the truth of our Faith has been sufficiently proposed to an adult infidel; 3º in the article of death, according to some, for tending more proximately to God; 4º more often in life, according to many at least once a year, and according to some each month. Moreover this precept is sufficiently fulfilled by exercising other acts of Religion. - St. Lig. n. 7, Hom. apost. n. 13.

Resp. 2º It binds per accidens 1º when a grave temptation presses, which cannot otherwise be conquered; 2º when a precept is to be fulfilled which requires Faith, for example, that of confession ¹; 3º after a fall into heresy, or after Faith has been denied. - Thus all.

¹ Faith concerning the article which directs the fulfillment of the precept is understood, for example, concerning the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, if you approach Communion, etc.; and indeed a formal act is not required, but an implicit one suffices. Hence some are wholly beside the point when they require from those approaching the Sacrament of Penance acts of the theological virtues, and indeed the customary formula of faith, in which moreover there is nothing that pertains to that sacrament.

Q. 2º Are explicit acts required for fulfilling the precept of Faith?

Resp. In those who have already learned and believed the truths to be held by faith, generally implicit acts suffice. Hence he satisfies the precept who devoutly hears Mass, adores the Crucified, prays, makes the sign of the cross, receives the Sacraments, etc. Thus commonly. - St. Lig. ibid.

189. • I. There is a negative precept prohibiting the denial of the true Faith, or the profession of a false one. For to deny the Faith is to deny God himself. Hence Christ says, Matt. 10.33: He who shall deny me before men, I also will deny him before my Father, who is in heaven.

II. There is also an affirmative precept, obliging at times to confess the Faith even with danger of life. For the honor of Christ sometimes requires that the faithful, in order to confess him, should despise even life. This is clear from the words of Christ himself, Matt. 10.32: Everyone who shall confess me before men, I also will confess him before my Father who is in heaven. And Luke 9.26: He who shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man will be ashamed when he shall come in his majesty. Likewise the Apostle, Rom. 10.10: With the heart one believes unto justice; but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation.

III. But the external precept of confessing the Faith by natural right binds then, when otherwise the honor due to God, or the spiritual utility of the neighbor, would be withdrawn in a notable way: for instance, if God would be affected with great injury, and the neighbor with great spiritual evil; or if from the omission of confession there would follow contempt of Religion, scandal, the perversion of others; or even if a great honor toward God, or great utility toward the neighbor, would cease. The reason is that charity, which we owe to God or to the neighbor, requires this. - St. Thom. 2. 2. qu. 3. art. 1. - St. Lig. n. 11.

190. Questions. - Q. 1º Is it ever lawful to dissemble Faith?

Resp. 1º It is never lawful to simulate a false one, because this would be the same as denying the true one externally, which is intrinsically evil. And this is openly clear from the words of Christ just related.

Resp. 2º It is lawful for a grave cause to dissemble or conceal the true Faith, when danger of scandal has been excluded. The reason is that the precept of confessing the Faith does not always bind. - St. Lig. n. 10. 12. - Others commonly.

Q. 2º Can one questioned about Faith use ambiguous words?

Resp. 1º Neg., when evasion or silence is equivalent to denial, or to shame or fear, which in those circumstances necessarily detract from the honor of God, or the utility of the neighbor. For then the conditions explained in Principle III have place. This is confirmed from the constant practice of the Church and the common doctrine of the Fathers. - Moreover, with regard to public power questioning, it is clear from the proposition condemned by Innocent XI, under n. 18, which is of this sort: If anyone is questioned by public power, to confess the Faith frankly, as glorious to God and to the Faith, I counsel; to be silent, as sinful per se, I do not condemn. - St. Lig. n. 13.

Resp. 2º Affirm., when no scandal is created for those present, and no denial of Faith, or fear, or shame appears; because then no obligation to confess the Faith is present. - St. Lig. ibid.

191. • Q. 3º Is it lawful to use the signs or garments of infidels?

Resp. 1º Affirm., if they are garments or signs proper to some region, although that whole region may be infidel; because these of themselves are not referred to Religion.

Resp. 2º But if they are garments and signs of Religion, one must subdistinguish: I still more probably affirm, if it is done for a grave cause, and the garments are not solely distinctive of sect from sect, because then their primary use is for covering the body, and only secondarily for distinguishing a sect. - But otherwise, if the garments or signs have been instituted solely or primarily for professing a sect, as are the garments and ornaments which priests use in the exercise of their functions. - Salm., Tract. 21. c. 2. n. 1. 10.

192. Resolves. - 1º Someone sins gravely against Faith, even if only externally he bends the knees before an idol, or exhibits other signs of a false Religion, for example, by frequenting the heretical Supper, etc.

2º He does not sin against Faith who visits the temples of heretics or infidels out of mere curiosity, provided nevertheless scandal, danger of perversion, or a law forbidding these things is excluded. - Likewise he who is present at a wedding banquet or burial of heretics; because these do not properly pertain to Faith, and are regarded as merely civil assemblies. - St. Lig. n. 16.

But one must say otherwise if you assist at the Baptism and Supper of non-Catholics; because these pertain to a religious ceremony. This is also clear from the Letters of Pius VI, in which it is declared that to assist at baptism conferred by intruded ministers is illicit on account of cooperation.

3º He does not sin against Faith who, passing through places of heretics, from fear of grave danger, eats meats on a day of abstinence, lest he be recognized as a Catholic; because this of itself is not a sign of heresy; but otherwise, if he were to eat meats, even from fear of death, impelled to this in hatred of the Faith.

4º Nor does he sin against Faith who flees in time of persecution; indeed flight is generally in some way commanded, as is plain from the words of Christ, Matt. 10.23: But when they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another. But this especially holds if the safety of someone is necessary for the utility of the faithful, or someone fears a fall. - See Cases, n. 192 and following.

194. • It is certain that two things are to be known and believed by necessity of means: 1º that God is: He who approaches God must believe that he is. Hebr. 11. - 2º That he is a rewarder: He must... believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those who seek him. Ibid. - But whether other things must be believed explicitly by necessity of means for salvation is controverted: hence concerning them:

195. Questions. - Q. 1º Is explicit Faith in the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation required by necessity of means?

Resp. A twofold probable opinion is given.

I. The OPINION altogether affirms. The reason is:

1º With regard to the Incarnation, because salvation is not given except through Christ; therefore that means must necessarily be explicitly known and believed.

2º With regard to the Most Holy Trinity, because Faith in this mystery is the foundation of our salvation; for Baptism, which is the Sacrament of Faith, must be conferred in the name of the Father, etc. Now that which is the foundation of salvation must be the primary object of Faith, and therefore believed according to itself and explicitly. - Thus Collet, Decal. c. 1. art. 1. - Antoine, c. 1. - St. Lig. says this opinion is more probable, n. 2. ¹.

¹ ** St. Alphonsus does not call this opinion absolutely more probable, but says that it seems more probable.

II. The OPINION which seems more probable denies. The reason is that before Christ implicit Faith in these mysteries sufficed; therefore even after his advent it ought to suffice. For Christ did not change the means. - Thus Suarez, disp. 12. sect. 4. - Lugo, De Fid. disp. 12. n. 91. ². Nor is there an obstacle in the proposition condemned by Innocent XI, under n. 64, which has itself thus: A man is capable of absolution however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ; it is not an obstacle, I say; for it could deservedly be condemned by reason of the first part, in which it is asserted that a man is capable of absolution, however much he generally labors under ignorance of the mysteries of Faith.

² Cardinal De Lugo (l. c.) calls this opinion the more probable, the common one of the more recent doctors, and, as it seems, also of St. Thomas, P. 3. q. 69. art. 4. ad 2.

** VV. (Pag. 914. n. 23.) produce the response of the Congregation of the Holy Office, 28 Febr. 1703, in which it is said that a Missionary is bound, even to a dying adult who is wholly incapable, to explain the mysteries of faith which are necessary by necessity of means, as are ESPECIALLY the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation.

Resp. Let that word Especially be noted: for it is inferred that there are therefore other mysteries of faith necessary by necessity of means, which nevertheless it is not necessary to propose to that dying person. Therefore in a certain broader sense mysteries of faith are here called necessary by necessity of means.

Q. 2º Can he be absolved who is ignorant of those things which are certainly of necessity of means?

Resp. Neg. Neither licitly nor validly. Thus all. The reason is that he, on account of the defect of a simply necessary means, is incapable of justification; therefore also incapable of absolution. Besides, no one can have hope of salvation unless he believes God to be a rewarder.

196. • Q. 3º Can one who is ignorant of the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation be absolved?

Resp. 1º He cannot licitly, outside a case of necessity, for example, danger of death; the reason is that a Confessor absolving such a one exposes the Sacrament to the danger of nullity, as is plain from the preceding Question 1. - Hence the Confessor must either first instruct the penitent ³, or dismiss him until he has been sufficiently instructed. - St. Lig. n. 3.

³ Before absolving a penitent, it would be enough that this one, while the Confessor proposes those mysteries, elicit an act of faith, although he cannot learn them here and now. St. Alphonsus (In Prax. Confess.) reports these words of Bl. Leonard: It is not good counsel to dismiss such ignorant persons, that these things may be taught by others, because no other fruit will be hoped for, except that in this way the ignorant remain ignorant; and therefore it is expedient briefly to teach them the aforesaid principal mysteries, likewise bringing it about that they elicit with him acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition, yet obliging them that hereafter they have themselves instructed perfectly concerning the other mysteries necessary to be known by necessity of precept.

Resp. 2º More probably he can be absolved validly, if he is in invincible ignorance. The reason is drawn from what was said in the II Opinion of the first Question ⁴.

⁴ St. Alphonsus observes (Lib. 2. n. 2.) after Tanner, that even if you hold that explicit faith in these mysteries is now necessary by necessity of means, nevertheless if there are any of such rude intellect that they can in no way conceive those mysteries under some proper notion, these with regard to this are to be compared with infants and the foolish. And indeed if they have already been baptized, and are not instructed, shall we say that sanctifying grace flies away from them because they do not do what they cannot do?

Moreover, if it is more probable that those ignorant of these mysteries are validly absolved, therefore previous confessions made in that state of ignorance are not necessarily to be repeated. It must be carefully noted (says St. Alphonsus Lib. 6. n. 505.) that penitents are not to be compelled to repeat confessions, unless it is morally certain that they were invalid. Now confessions which more probably are valid cannot be said to be morally certainly invalid.

631. 1. It is certain that it is necessary by necessity of means explicitly to believe in God existing and rewarding.

(A) This is declared. Indeed we are bound in a general way to believe all those things which God has revealed; and he who would deliberately deny one truth which he knows to have been divinely revealed would by that very fact be a heretic, as will be explained below. But besides this certain truths must be believed explicitly, or in themselves, in their own proper concept; nor is it enough to believe them implicitly, that is, insofar as they are contained in other truths explicitly believed.

(B) It is proved. (a) The existence of God and His providence with regard to the remuneration of the good and the evil must be explicitly believed, according to that saying of the Apostle:¹² "For he who comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder to those who seek Him." - Moreover, by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679, this proposition (22) was condemned: "Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in the Rewarder."¹³ Therefore explicit faith in both truths is necessary.

¹² Heb. 11:6.

¹³ Denzing., n. 1039; Viva, on this proposition.

(b) This indeed is consonant with right reason. For since God is our ultimate end both in the natural and in the supernatural order, we cannot attain Him unless we know His existence. - Some indeed say that this is sufficient; for, as soon as we know that God is the highest good, we can proceed to an act of perfect charity and contrition, and thus be justified. But, given man's nature and imperfection, he in fact does not arrive at perfect contrition except through fear and hope, namely by considering God as the supreme rewarder, who justly renders punishments to the evil and rewards to the good, according to the laws of equity.

632. (C) But it is asked in what sense we must believe in God the rewarder.

(a) With regard to the existence of God, many Thomists say that there is required faith in God as He is the author of the supernatural order, but not faith in God as He is the author of the natural order; for we know this truth by reason, and moreover what is certainly and evidently known cannot be believed.¹⁴ Yet many others, such as Suarez, Lugo,¹⁵ etc., hold that faith in God as He is the author of the natural order is necessary, or insofar as He is endowed with those perfections which can be known by the natural light: for we can believe by faith what we already know by reason, and moreover St. Paul requires this faith.

¹⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, aa. 4-5; Gonet, Clypeus, De fide, disp. I, art. 5-6; Salmanticenses, De Fide, disp. III, dub. 2; Berthier, De locis theolog., n. 504.

¹⁵ Suarez, De Fide, disp. III, sect. 8, and disp. XII, sect. 3, n. 4; Lugo, disp. XII, sect. 5, n. 123; Pesch, n. 445. - Cf. Synop. Theol. Dogmat., De Fide, nn. 129-132.

In truth the Apostle makes no distinction, but teaches only that God must first be believed as existing, afterward as rewarding. Moreover he is treating of supernatural faith, namely of that which is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing,¹⁶ and therefore of that which rests not upon human reasoning, but upon divine testimony. But for this faith it is not required that there be a distinct concept of supernaturality, which cannot be demanded from the common people; rather, it is enough that the believer understand that these truths are in some way divinely proposed, whether through external revelation or through an internal manifestation made to conscience.

¹⁶ Heb. 11:1. - Which M. d'Hulst thus explains, Confer. 1892, pp. 113-114: "The second domain of faith is the natural truths which serve as a basis for revelation. Man first discovers them by the effort of his reason, if he is capable of this effort. But, when faith has supervened, it shows him these same truths under a new light, as forming part of divine teaching; and what was matter for reasoning becomes an object of belief. Such are the teachings relating to the existence of God, to His perfections, to the immortality of the human soul... For the cultivated mind, these truths are therefore illumined by a double light, one which comes from nature, the other which is kindled at the hearth of grace."

633. Therefore that faith in the broad sense, resting upon natural discourse, which takes its origin from the testimony and knowledge of creatures, insofar as they manifest the invisible attributes of God, is not sufficient. For this proposition (23) was condemned by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: "Faith in the broad sense from the testimony of creatures, or from a similar motive, suffices for justification."¹⁷ For faith arising from the knowledge of creatures alone cannot rise up to the supernatural end, nor beget supernatural charity, which is especially necessary for salvation.

¹⁷ Denzing., n. 1040; Viva, on this proposition.

634. Corollary. From this it is understood how God provides for the salvation of those who live among pagans, where they have heard nothing of evangelical faith. According to St. Thomas and theologians commonly, if some pagan "were to follow the guidance of natural reason in the pursuit of good and the flight from evil, it must most certainly be held that God would either reveal to him by internal inspiration those things which are necessary to be believed, or would direct some preacher of the faith to him, as He sent Peter to Cornelius."¹ And indeed God, who once spoke to the patriarchs and to others outside the Jewish people, can without difficulty speak inwardly to those who are rightly disposed, so that they understand themselves to be instructed by the supreme Deity.

¹ St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 14, a. 11, ad 1.

635. 4. It is controverted whether explicit faith in the Most Holy Trinity and in Christ the Redeemer is necessary by necessity of means.

(A) It is commonly held that, before the coming of Christ, it was not necessary by necessity of means explicitly to believe the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and of the incarnate Word; for these had not yet been sufficiently revealed to men, as is clear from what was said in the Treatise on the Triune God, nn. 29-36.

(B) But some, supported by the authority of St. Augustine and St. Thomas,² think that, after the fall of Adam, it was necessary for justification by necessity of means explicitly to believe in some mediator, by whose merits salvation could be obtained. They allege the words of Scripture: "For there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved";³ and from this they infer that no one can be saved without faith in Christ, or in some mediator.

² St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, lib. XVIII, cap. 47, P. L., XLI, 610; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 7; Bouquillon, n. 169. - You may see the whole controversy set forth apud Perrone, De virtutibus fidei, spei et carit., Ratisbon, 1865, nn. 344-379.

³ Acts 4:12; cf. 1 Cor. 11:11.

636. (C) Nevertheless today, as more probable, many theologians teach that explicit faith in the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation, or even of Christ the mediator, is not necessary by necessity of means.⁴ For (a) so grave a necessity ought not to be established without a compelling reason; but this reason is lacking. For when the Apostle speaks of the necessity of faith, in the place cited above, he speaks only of faith in God the rewarder; moreover the acts of faith, hope, charity, and penance required for justification can be elicited without faith in the Trinity and Incarnation; as soon as we believe that God is, and indeed that He is supremely good and perfect, rendering to each according to his works, there is now nothing to prevent the acts necessary for justification from being elicited. Therefore, from the nature of the thing, even after the supernatural end has been posited, faith in the Trinity and the Incarnation is not absolutely required; if it is necessary, this is only by the positive will of God; but this will has not been clearly manifested. (b) Moreover, if this faith is required, the salvation of those who have heard nothing of the Gospel becomes morally impossible, that is, of more than half of the human race; for an extraordinary light would be necessary for pagans to be instructed concerning this twofold mystery, the existence of which most do not suspect.

⁴ Suarez, disp. XII, sect. 4.

Therefore we think it more probable that this explicit faith is not required. But the texts of Scripture concerning the necessity of faith in Christ can be understood of necessity of precept, or of implicit necessity of means, or even in this sense, that no one is saved except through the merits and satisfactions of Christ.

637. Corollary. In practice, since here the question is of a thing necessary for salvation, the safer part must be followed. Therefore: (a) all those who have the care of souls must diligently teach the faithful committed to them not only God existing and rewarding, but also God triune and the Word incarnate and Redeemer. Yet it is not required that a scientific knowledge of these mysteries be handed on to the simple, of which they are incapable; it is enough that it be taught that there are three persons in God, distinct and equal, namely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and that these three are one God, - and that the second person of the Trinity, or the Son of God, made man, redeemed us by His death.

638. (b) Regularly those who labor under ignorance of these mysteries, even invincible ignorance, are neither to be baptized nor absolved;⁵ but, in a case of extreme necessity, if time for instructing the catechumens is lacking, they are to be baptized absolutely, because, where there is question of requisites not for the valid but only for the fruitful reception of baptism, no condition should be placed; if they survive, they should be diligently instructed. But penitents are to be absolved under condition if they are capable, and, if they survive, they must be instructed and absolved again. For on the one hand, where there is question of means necessary for salvation, the safer part must be chosen, and on the other hand, in a case of necessity, where certain remedies are lacking, probable remedies must be used (above, nn. 388-389).

⁵ Hence the Holy Office, Jan. 25, 1703, declared that "a missionary is bound to explain to an adult, even one dying, who is not altogether incapable, the mysteries of Faith which are necessary by necessity of means, as are especially the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation" (Collect. P. F. n. 549). This was declared concerning an adult in relation to baptism; but the same reason applies with regard to absolution. - It is established besides from the condemnation by Innocent XI of this proposition 64: "A man is capable of absolution, however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of faith, and even if through negligence, even culpable negligence, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ." (Denzing., n. 1081; Viva, on this proposition.)

(c) When there is question of the semi-foolish or the very ignorant, an act of faith in God one and triune, and in Christ the Redeemer, should be suggested to them before they are absolved, so that the validity of the absolution may become safer.

What things are to be believed; when they are actually to be believed: these two matters come to be explained in order.

Notions. A twofold necessity of faith is distinguished: the necessity of habitual faith or of the virtue of faith, and the necessity of actual faith or of the act of faith. Each must be treated separately. Faith, both habitual and actual, can be necessary either by necessity of means or by necessity of precept. Necessity of means, which sometimes is better called necessity for obtaining the end, is an absolute condition without which some end cannot be obtained. Therefore if such a means is lacking (whether culpably or inculpably), the end is in no way obtained. Thus the eye is necessary for seeing, the soul is necessary for human life, grace for eternal life, etc. - Necessity of precept follows from the special precept of a legitimate superior and is indeed a condition attached to some means for obtaining the end, but not so absolutely that without such a means the end can in no way be obtained. Thus, e.g., the reception of the Eucharist is necessary for having eternal life by necessity of precept laid down by Christ, but eternal life can sometimes be obtained even without the real reception of the Eucharist, e.g. by infants. Ignorance or moral impossibility usually excuses from those means which are necessary by necessity of precept.

We divide the present chapter into two articles: 1. on faith necessary by necessity of means; 2. on faith necessary by necessity of precept.

We treat 1. of habitual and actual necessary faith itself, 2. of truths necessarily to be believed.

495. Proposition 1. Habitual faith is necessary for all men by necessity of means, so that without it no one can be saved. It is of faith.

Proof 1. From Sacred Scripture. St. Paul says simply and without any restriction: "But without faith it is impossible to please God";¹ and at the beginning of the same chapter he defined faith: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." But substance signifies the beginning or foundation, and the things to be hoped for are eternal salvation. Therefore if faith is lacking, the foundation of salvation must be lacking, and therefore salvation itself.

Proof 2. From the Councils. The Council of Trent, session VI, c. 7, asserts: "The sacrament of baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, without which justification has ever happened to no one." The Vatican Council² defined: "Since without faith it is impossible to please God and to come to the fellowship of his sons, therefore justification has never happened to anyone without it; nor will anyone obtain eternal life unless he has persevered in it unto the end."³

Proof 3. By reason of fittingness. Indeed intrinsic natural reasons of this complete necessity cannot be assigned, since it arises from the free ordination of God, who certainly could save man even without previous faith; but this necessity is very fitting. For our life is the way to blessed union with God in the other life. But it is very fitting that this union already be begun in earthly life; this indeed happens through faith.

For infants and all others lacking the actual use of reason (such as baptized insane persons who never had the use of reason), this habitual faith, which is infused together with sanctifying grace in baptism, suffices for justification and for eternal salvation; for adults, i.e. those enjoying the use of reason, actual faith is necessary in addition. Hence there is posited:

¹ Hebr. 11, 6.

² Sess. 3, Const. de fide cath. c. 3 (Denz. n. 1793).

³ Cf. also Conc. Trid. sess. 6, c. 7 de iustif. (Denz. n. 799 sq.).

496. Proposition 2. For all adults (capable of reason), actual and explicit faith is necessary in addition by necessity of means.

It is certain. Andrew Vega alone (+ 1560) taught that in a case of necessity man is justified without supernatural faith, but by natural cognition of God alone.⁴ There does not seem to be a great difference between Andrew Vega and those authors who think that faith broadly so called sometimes suffices for salvation.⁵

Proof 1. From Sacred Scripture. "But the justice of God through the faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all who believe in him; for there is no distinction."⁶ Christ commands the Apostles: "Preach the Gospel to every creature. He who believes and is baptized shall be saved; but he who does not believe shall be condemned."⁷ Explaining this text, St. Bernard says that "faith alone sometimes suffices for salvation, and without it nothing suffices."⁸ St. Paul says: "We judge that man is justified by faith without the works of the law";⁹ and: "But knowing that man is not justified by the works of the law, except through the faith of Jesus Christ."¹⁰ In these and other texts of Sacred Scripture, not only habitual faith, but also actual faith is clearly prescribed. For the discussion is about the act of faith, namely to believe.

Proof 2. From the Council of Trent, which, explaining the words of St. Paul, says: "But when the Apostle says that man is justified by faith and freely, those words are to be understood in that sense which the perpetual consensus of the Church has held and expressed; namely, that we are therefore said to be justified by faith because faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God and to come to the fellowship of his sons."¹¹

Proof 3. By reason of fittingness. The beatitude of man consists in the vision of the divine essence, and an adult man is bound to attain that beatitude by his own acts. But no one can tend toward some end unless he knows it. Therefore an adult man must know his supernatural end; moreover, this is impossible by natural reason alone. Therefore a supernatural illumination of the intellect, which is faith, is required.¹²

⁴ De iustif. l. 6, c. 10 sq.

⁵ Cf. below n. 498.

⁶ Rom. 3, 22.

⁷ Mark 16, 15 sq.

⁸ Tract. de baptismo c. 2, n. 8 (Migne, Patr. lat. 182, 1036).

⁹ Rom. 3, 28.

¹⁰ Gal. 2, 16.

¹¹ Sess. 6, c. 8 de iustif. (Denz. n. 801).

¹² Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 2, a. 3.

497. Certain less correct opinions on the necessity of faith. a) The opinion of Lugo. Actual faith is indeed necessary for all adults for justification, but not always for eternal salvation. Hence Lugo¹³ writes: "The question proceeds only concerning an adult sinner who must be justified in order to be saved." Elbel¹⁴ asserts the same: "If a baptized infant should die shortly after having attained the use of reason, or if one baptized already as an elderly man, blind, deaf, and mute from birth, should invincibly be ignorant of the existence of God and depart from this life without mortal sin committed, without doubt as a friend and adoptive son of God, on account of the grace of baptism, he will obtain eternal beatitude as owed to him by hereditary right, even if it is supposed that he never elicited an act of faith." We deny that this can be admitted, because every adult capable of reason (and not only an adult sinner who wishes to be justified) is bound to obtain beatitude as a reward for good works. But no salutary work can be done without actual faith, at least implicit.¹⁵

The possibility of eternal salvation granted by God to all men seems to fight against the absolute necessity of faith. For since by far the greater part of men do not receive the sacrament of baptism, and since very many men never hear the preaching of true faith and therefore can elicit the act of faith only with such difficulty, it seems to follow that this whole crowd of men perishes and falls as a mass of damnation into hell. To avoid this very harsh consequence, some theologians devised diverse modes for establishing the possibility of salvation for all men.

b) The opinion of Ripalda. The desire of faith suffices, and an act of faith explicitly elicited is not required. For just as baptism received in reality or in desire suffices for salvation, so it seems that faith had or desired in desire also suffices.¹⁶ Few theologians admitted this doctrine, but very many rejected it, requiring explicit faith and not faith in desire alone. For nowhere, neither in Sacred Scripture nor in Tradition, is there a foundation for this opinion; hence it cannot be admitted. Moreover, when it is said: He who comes to God must believe, those words must be taken as they sound, for explicit faith and not only for wishing to believe, unless an authentic interpretation admits another sense; and this indeed has not been made.

497. c) The opinion of Gutberlet. Faith broadly so called suffices. What faith broadly so called is has already been said above, n. 491, where the divisions of faith were enumerated. The chief modern defender of this faith broadly so called was the illustrious Gutberlet,¹⁷ professor at Fulda. - But this opinion cannot be admitted, and seems openly to be opposed to the doctrine of St. Thomas,¹⁸ who says: "Faith adheres to all the articles of faith on account of one medium, namely on account of the first truth proposed to us in the Scriptures according to the teaching of the Church understanding rightly. And therefore he who falls away from this medium totally lacks faith." Therefore St. Thomas recognizes only one medium or intrinsic motive of faith, namely the first truth revealing, or divine revelation, and therefore rejects the light of reason as a sufficient motive for believing. But the reason why the light of reason is an insufficient motive of salvific faith is taken from this, that the act of salvific faith must be altogether supernatural; which certainly it would not be if the intrinsic motive were natural reason, even under the influence of actual grace. - Moreover, this opinion seems to be little safe, since Innocent XI condemned the proposition: "Faith broadly so called, from the testimony of creatures or a similar motive, suffices for justification,"¹⁹ and the Vatican Council²⁰ defined: "If anyone says that divine faith is not distinguished from natural knowledge about God and moral things, and therefore that for divine faith it is not required that revealed truth be believed on account of the authority of God revealing, let him be anathema."²¹

¹³ De fide disp. 12, sect. 1, n. 3. Thomas Bouquillon teaches the same (De virt. theol. n. 165), who also adds: "it can happen that some adult is saved who never actually loved God with a love of friendship, but only had habitual charity annexed to grace." This opinion indeed seems to be improbable.

¹⁴ De fide n. 13.

¹⁵ Cf. St. Thomas, De verit. q. 14, a. 11.

¹⁶ Ripalda, however, speaks not by assenting but by doubting (De ente supern. lib. 1, disp. 20, n. 123); cf. Schiffini, De virt. infus. n. 168.

¹⁷ Dogmat. Theologie VIII 403 sqq.: "In general faith must be proper faith; it is necessary necessitate medii; but in particular only the two truths: God is, and God is a rewarder, are certainly necessary necessitate medii; these two truths must be believed explicitly, but not always in the proper sense. Thus it would be conceivable that the pagan, to whom the motives of faith are unknown, could also come to a true faith through motives of reason." - This author proposed this opinion with the best intention; for he adds: "Precisely from apologetic interest, in order to reject the often-heard reproach that the Catholic Church condemns all unbelievers and pagans to hell, we have occupied ourselves so thoroughly with this question. But if indeed we have now shown the sufficiency of improper faith for salvation as very probable, it would be wrong, on the basis of this probability, in practice to be content with improper faith" (l. c. p. 503).

¹⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 5, a. 3 ad 2.

¹⁹ Denz. n. 1173.

²⁰ Sess. 3, c. de fide cath. 3, 2 (Denz. n. 1811).

²¹ Martin, O.P., wrote at length on this matter, De necessitate credendi et credendorum (1906), p. 56 sqq. Likewise F. Schmid, Die ausserordentlichen Heilswege für die gefallene Menschheit (1906), and Wilh. Liese, Der heilsnotwendige Glaube (1902), rejected the opinion defended by Gutberlet.

498. The opinion of St. Thomas on the salvation of unbelievers. St. Thomas, and after him almost all theologians, explain the proposed difficulty concerning the salvation of unbelievers in this way: "Do those to whom [the Gospel] has not come, as being brought up in the woods, have an excuse for the sin of infidelity? - To this it must be said that according to the opinion of the Lord, which is had in John 15:22, those who have not heard the Lord speaking through himself or his disciples have an excuse for the sin of infidelity, yet they will not obtain the benefit of God, namely that they be justified from other sins which they either contracted by being born or added by living badly; and for these they are deservedly damned. If, however, any of them had done what is in himself, the Lord according to his mercy would have provided."²² Indeed he says: "For if one so brought up followed the guidance of natural reason in desiring good and fleeing evil, it must most certainly be held that God would reveal to him, either through internal inspiration, those things which are necessary to be believed, or would direct some preacher of the faith to him, as he sent Peter to Cornelius."²³ But the reason is that God sincerely wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, and because he enlightens every man coming into this world.

Scholion. On the salvation of infants dying without baptism. Since, with all theologians agreeing, faith at least habitual is necessary for salvation, a most difficult question arises: How do infants dying without baptism have sufficient grace for that habitual faith? No certain response can be given to this question, nor has the Church determined anything on this matter. See the diverse opinions of theologians concerning this question, which pertains rather to dogmatic theology, in Billuart.²⁴

²² In Rom. c. 10, lect. 3.

²³ De verit. q. 14, a. 11 ad 1.

²⁴ De voluntate Dei diss. 2, a. 1.

Concerning faith two things are prescribed: the internal act of faith and the external manifestation or profession of faith; concerning these one must treat separately.

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 2, a. 3-8; St. Alphonsus, II, 2; VI, 505; H. Ap., IV, n. 3; Billuart, de Fid., disp. 3; Pesch, n. 426-465; Lahousse, de Virt. theol., disp. II, c. V, a. 4; Viva, Thes. damn., P. I, prop. I.

424. Things to be noted beforehand. 1. A twofold necessity as regards salvation is distinguished, one of means, the other of precept: a) That is necessary by necessity of precept which, if omitted inculpably, does not harm salvation, as the real reception of the Eucharist. b) That is necessary by necessity of means without which, even if it is omitted inculpably, in the present order of Providence salvation cannot be obtained.

This necessity of means again is twofold: strict, if it can be supplied by no other means; thus sanctifying grace in the last moment of life is strictly necessary for salvation; broad, however, if another means of supplying is present. Thus, for example, charity can succeed into the place of baptism. Cf. n. 1451.

2. It is certain that HABITUAL FAITH is strictly necessary, by necessity of means, for eternal life. For no one can be saved without infused habitual justice. But the habit of faith is either a part or the foundation of this justice. Therefore. But this faith, in baptized infants and the perpetually insane, suffices for salvation, since it is equally certain that all dying with the grace of baptism become partakers of eternal life (Suarez, disp. 12, s. 1, n. 4).

Therefore the whole question concerns ACTUAL FAITH, and indeed the act of faith both internal and external, with respect to adults who enjoy the use of reason.

The internal act of faith can be either explicit or implicit. It is called explicit when one adheres to a revealed Truth apprehended in its own terms: for example, I believe that Christ is the Incarnate Word. It is called implicit when one adheres to a revealed Truth contained in another Truth apprehended in its proper terms: for example, I believe all things which are proposed by the Church as revealed.

425. PRINCIPLES. I. The internal act of faith is necessary for all adults for justification by necessity of means. It is established from Scripture (Epistle to the Hebrews 11:6): Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those seeking him. And from Trent (Sess. 6, c. 6): "Without faith justification never happens to anyone." God does not justify adults unless through their own acts they tend into him.

Nor does faith in desire, or faith improperly or broadly so called, suffice;¹ for faith properly so called (according to Trent, Sess. 6, c. 8) "is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification," and consequently it presupposes nothing in which its desire would be included. Suarez judges this conclusion so certain (disp. 12, s. 2, n. 101) that he denies it can be rejected without error in faith. Yet from this it cannot be inferred that there are men who are in an impossibility, properly so called, of obtaining salvation. For "to him doing what is in him, God does not deny grace."

Whence St. Thomas (de Verit., XIV, a. 11, ad 1): "If someone," he says, "nurtured in forests or among brute animals..., should follow the guidance of natural reason in desiring good and fleeing evil, it must most certainly be held that God would either reveal to him by internal inspiration the things which are necessary to be believed, or would direct some preacher of the faith to him, as he sent Peter to Cornelius." Cf. St. Alph., Gran mezzo della pregh., P. II, c. 4.

426. II. The act of faith is necessary for all by necessity of precept. It is established from Scripture (Mark 16:16): He that believes not shall be condemned. Likewise from the twofold proposition condemned by Innocent XI, namely the 16th: "Faith is not considered to fall under a special precept, and according to itself"; and the 17th: "It is enough to elicit the act of faith once in life."

This obligation of eliciting the act of faith can be either on account of faith itself or on account of another obligation. Concerning the former St. Alphonsus speaks thus: "It is certain," he says, "that man is bound by the natural law to turn himself to God through faith, hope, and charity, and therefore to elicit acts of those virtues, since each virtue lives by its acts" (II, 6).

Hence the PRECEPT OF FAITH urges: 1. Per se, that is, independently from every other circumstance: a) at the beginning of spiritual life, that is, when someone, for example a boy or a non-Catholic, shall have known both those things which must be believed and the obligation of believing (cf. n. 436); likewise when some truth to be believed is proposed by the Church; b) more often in life, at least once in the year, as Doctors admit with sufficient probability (II, 7); c) in the article or danger of death, as is more commonly taught, because then we are especially bound to tend into God as our ultimate end (II, 5; H. Ap., IV, 13; Conf. dir., IV, 6).

2. Per accidens, that is, from a peculiar circumstance: a) when a grave temptation against faith is pressing, which cannot otherwise be conquered; b) when a precept must be fulfilled which requires faith, for example of penance, of profession of faith, of communion, etc.; c) after a lapse into heresy or faith denied; because the injury inflicted upon the First Truth must be repaired. Thus all (II, 5).

Take note: 1. We are never strictly bound to recite the customary formulas of the act of faith. A man who lives Christianly (at least by fulfilling the paschal precept) sufficiently satisfies the precept of faith (and of hope), because in him who has already learned and believed generally the truths to be held by faith, implicit or exercised acts suffice, such as to pray, to adore the crucifix, to sign oneself with the sign of the cross (II, 7). Cf. Ferreres, I, 188.

2. A heretic, so long as he judges his own sect to be more credible, or equally credible, and Catholics to reject and persecute the word of God, is not bound to believe, because the faith is not yet sufficiently proposed to him, and he would act imprudently. Cf. n. 441.

3. "If a doubt about his sect should arise for someone, he is bound to inquire further and to ask light from God: but if he neglects this, he sins against faith. But if afterwards our faith is sufficiently proposed to him, he is bound to embrace it" (II, 9).

427. Questions. QUAER. 1. What things are to be known and explicitly believed BY NECESSITY OF MEANS?

Resp. 1. They are two: a) that God is; b) that he is the rewarder of good, and avenger of evil. For the Apostle (Heb. 11:6) says: He that comes to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those seeking him. It is established also from the 22nd proposition condemned by Innocent XI, which said: "Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in him as rewarder" (II, 2; Exam. Ord., n. 131).

2. As regards the mysteries of the Most Holy TRINITY and of the INCARNATION and DEATH OF JESUS CHRIST, there is controversy. The first opinion, sufficiently probable, denies that these must be explicitly believed, supported by this reason: that, after the promulgation of the Gospel had been made, the condition of those who have heard nothing of Christ was not changed for the worse; whence now, as formerly, those can be saved who believe with explicit faith in God as rewarder, and with implicit faith in the Redeemer. Thus very many more recent authors with Lugo, Sylvius, etc. - But the second opinion, which seems more probable to St. Alphonsus, affirms; because many texts of Sacred Scripture and of the Holy Fathers seem to require faith in Christ, so that man may be united to his Redeemer and be justified through this union. Thus more commonly the ancient theologians.

This opinion is favored (especially for practice) by the response of the Congregation of the Holy Office, which, having been asked whether an adult who was in the article of death and who promised that, after health was recovered, he would learn the truths of faith, could be baptized, wrote back, on January 25, 1703: "the promise does not suffice; but the missionary is bound to explain to the adult, even dying, who is not altogether incapable, the mysteries of faith which are necessary by necessity of means, as are chiefly the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation." This decree was renewed on March 30, 1898 (Mon. eccl., X, P. II, p. 30).

Finally, for practice, the 64th proposition condemned by Innocent XI urges: "A man is capable of absolution, however much he may labor under ignorance of the mysteries of faith; and even if, through negligence even culpable, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ."

From these things conclude: 1. The CONFESSARIUS sins by absolving (outside the case of necessity) one who is ignorant of the aforesaid mysteries, since he exposes the sacrament to danger of nullity. Therefore he ought either first to instruct a penitent of this kind, or to dismiss him until he shall have been instructed. But it is better briefly to teach him, and to elicit with him acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition (Prax., n. 22). 2. A PENITENT who notices that his confession, on account of such ignorance, was probably valid, but also probably null, is bound, after having been taught those mysteries, to repeat the confession. The reason is that "with respect to him who has certainly gravely sinned, the obligation of fulfilling confession not only probably, but certainly valid, always urges and possesses antecedently" (cf. n. 83). Thus St. Alphonsus (II, n. 2, at the end), reforming his former opinion. See ed. G., I, p. 298.

Note. Invincible ignorance concerning the aforesaid mysteries can scarcely be found among us. If someone exists so dull that he cannot grasp them, he is rather to be assimilated to an infant (Aertnys, II, tr. 1, n. 4; Tanquerey, II, n. 438).

QUAER. 2. What things are to be believed or known BY NECESSITY OF PRECEPT?

Resp. "Explicitly, by necessity of precept, there ought to be known and believed, at least in substance, as St. Charles Borromeo teaches (Instr. ad Conf.): the Apostles' Creed; the Lord's prayer and the angelic salutation; the precepts of the Decalogue and of the Church; the sacraments which are necessary to anyone, such as baptism, Eucharist, and penance; for concerning the others it suffices to have implicit faith, since explicit faith is necessary only for those who receive them" (H. Ap., IV, 3; Conf. dir., IV, 2).

Hence: 1. They sin (mortally or venially, according to the gravity of the matter) who neglect to learn the aforesaid things;² likewise pastors who do not teach these things to their sheep, as also parents and other Superiors who do not teach them to their children or subjects, either by themselves or through others. 2. He who is ignorant of the aforesaid things even inculpably can indeed be absolved the first time, provided that, after being admonished, he firmly proposes to learn them. But if afterwards he has altogether neglected to fulfill the obligation, he must be treated as a recidivist (cf. n. 1829). 3. He who neglects to learn the same by memory sins venially. But this light obligation chiefly urges the uneducated, because otherwise they can scarcely have sufficient knowledge of them (II, 3; Prax., n. 22).

We ought also to profess faith externally, according to the words of Christ the Lord (Luke 9:26): He that shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty; and of Paul (Rom. 10:10): With the heart one believes unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation. There is added the reason that the Church ought to know its faithful.

This precept is at once affirmative and negative.

428. PRINCIPLES. I. The precept of professing faith, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges, in certain circumstances, either by divine right or by ecclesiastical right.

1. By divine (or natural) right there is given an obligation of professing faith externally in a twofold case, "namely, when, through omission of profession, either the honor owed to God or usefulness to be bestowed upon neighbor would be taken away privatively or contrariwise."

We said: a) privatively, as if a great honor toward God or usefulness redounding to one's neighbor would therefore cease; b) contrariwise, as if otherwise God would be affected with injury, or one's neighbor with a grave evil, for example, if the conversion or perversion of others, contempt of religion, scandal, etc., depended upon it. For then the act of virtue seems prescribed when it is necessary for the end of the precept; and this occurs here, because the end of the precept is charity (II, 10).

Hence, "if heretics trample images and afflict the faith with other injuries, a Catholic is bound to protect it by his confession, if indeed he prudently hopes for profit from this." But otherwise, if the honor of God and the usefulness of neighbor counsel prudent dissimulation (II, 11).

2. By ecclesiastical right some are bound to emit the profession of faith alone, others the profession of faith together with the oath against modernism.

To THE PROFESSION OF FAITH ALONE are bound, besides those to be baptized (who namely are bound through sponsors, if they are infants), and more probably personally, not through a proxy: a) Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops, in the first provincial synod at which they are present (Trent, Sess. 25, de Ref.);³ b) all beneficed clerics who by right are present at the diocesan synod, the first time (ibid.); c) all prelates of religious institutes; likewise all to be promoted as doctors, masters, regents, and professors, where the decree of Pius IV on this matter is in force;⁴ d) heretics returning to the Church, who are bound both to abjure heresy and to emit an express profession of faith before witnesses, as is commonly done, and reason counsels, and right confirms. Cf. n. 1833.

To THE PROFESSION OF FAITH TOGETHER WITH THE OATH AGAINST MODERNISM are bound: a) those to be ordained to major orders, at least before the Subdiaconate; b) priests, before they are given the faculty of hearing confessions or preaching (especially solemnly during Lent), but not as often as the faculty is prolonged; c) pastors (also succursalists), canons, beneficed clerics, without delay before entering into possession of the benefice (the profession of faith is to be renewed when they are transferred to another benefice); d) all officials of episcopal Curias, tribunals, Roman Congregations; e) readers of theology and philosophy in Seminaries of secular clerics and in Colleges of religious, annually before beginning lectures; f) moderators of religious before they enter upon office. Cf. the Motu proprio Sacrorum Antistitum, September 1, 1910; declaration of the S. C. Consist., September 25, October 25, December 17, 1910; February 10, 1911; Vermeersch, Period., V, p. 197, 229, 252, 271; Hilling, die Reform. des Papst. Pius X, I, p. 184.

Note. 1. The obligation of itself is grave. Yet it primarily affects Superiors, who ought to call subjects to professing. 2. The internal assent is diverse for diverse points: it is the assent of faith in the profession of faith; it is assent of a diverse grade of certitude, according to the points assigned in the oath, as is established from the various expressions accompanying the several parts, for example I admit, I acknowledge, I hold, with firm faith I believe, I altogether reject, I hold as certain, etc. 3. The mode of emitting it is that the oath, in writings indeed to be preserved, be given to the respective Superior, namely according to the various title by which one ought to profess. Thus, for example, moderators and readers of religious, as such, ought to profess before the moderator either immediate or major; those to be ordained, even exempt religious, before the Bishop or Vicar general, who previously has himself made the profession of faith. In particular cases, for a just cause, some priest, whether secular or regular, constituted in some dignity or office, can be delegated to receive the profession. 4. An exception has been made in Germany only for those who are Doctors in public Universities of the State, so that, from the benign interpretation of the Pontiff, they use their right by not emitting the oath. 5. There must be denounced to the Holy Office not only those who have violated the oath, but also those who have refused to subscribe to it.

429. II. The precept of professing faith, insofar as it is negative, prohibits: denying the true faith, professing a false faith, or simulating it. It prohibits these three things even if they were done externally (II, 12).

1. Denying the true faith. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:12): If we shall deny him, he also will deny us. - Whence the Church always punished with most grave penalties those who had denied the faith in persecutions. For exterior denial of faith is a lie harmful to one's neighbor and most injurious to the truth of God.

2. Professing a false faith. For this is manifestly to renounce the true faith.

Hence, he sins gravely against faith who, even when questioned by a private person about his religion, replies that he is a Turk, or a Jew, or a Gentile; for this is just as if he denied himself to be Christian. But it would not be mortal nor against faith if someone denied that he was a priest, a religious, or that he had been present at the sacrifice of the Mass (Piscetta, II, p. 22).

3. Simulating a false faith; for it matters very little whether someone lies by word or by deed. Hence Benedict XIV, in the year 1742, declared that it was not licit for Chinese Christians to exhibit external signs of adoration to an idol, although the intention were directed to a cross hidden under the garment (Scavini, l. 2, n. 820, 4; Zitelli, App. Jur. eccl., l. II, App.).

430. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether it is licit to HIDE faith, or to dissimulate it?

Resp. 1. When the precept of confessing it externally urges, it is not licit, as we said above (n. 428, 1).

Hence deservedly, as being too general, the 18th proposition was condemned by Innocent XI: "If someone is interrogated by public power, I counsel ingenuously confessing faith as glorious to God and to faith; I do not condemn keeping silent as sinful per se." Cf. Viva, P. II, on this proposition.

2. When the precept does not urge, it is licit, for a just cause, to hide faith, or to cover the truth by words or other signs ambiguous and indifferent.

Hence, one interrogated about faith outside the order of law can keep silence, or respond obscurely. "For generally it is not true that one interrogated (even by public authority) is bound positively to profess faith, except when this is necessary lest he seem to those present to have denied faith" (II, 13, 2). Much more will someone be able to refuse a response to those who ask from curiosity, unless, having been asked about the faith in hatred of religion, he would seem to those present to deny the true religion.

Note. He who flees in time of persecution is not considered to hide his faith. Cf. Matt. 10:23. Yet pastors of souls are bound not to abandon their sheep (II, 14).

QUAER. 2. Whether it is licit to use the SIGNS or GARMENTS of unbelievers?

Resp. 1. If the garments or signs are proper to that region, even if the whole region is unbelieving, it is licit; for these, of themselves, are not referred to religion. - 2. If they are religious garments or signs, one must distinguish: either they are common, and then it is licit to use them, provided a grave cause underlies it; or they are ceremonial and indicate profession of religion, and then it is not licit except from a most grave cause (Piscetta, II, p. 23). - 3. But if these garments or signs, from their own nature or from use, are solely protestative of a false religion (as would be the equipment and garments whose use is in sacrifices, or certain signs of the Masonic sect), it is in no way licit, unless necessity makes every religious signification absent, for example in a fire.

QUAER. 3. Whether Catholics, in the intercourse of COMMON and PUBLIC LIFE, are bound positively to profess faith?

Resp. Affirmatively; because also in the order of earthly things, all things must be directed to the highest good as to the ultimate end. Besides, all human actions, at least in the concrete, either agree or disagree with natural and divine right, and therefore are subject to the judgment and jurisdiction of the Church. Yet it suffices if, through an exercised act, in civil life Catholics profess faith and exercise external acts when they ought to be exercised (Mausbach, Kath. Mor., s. 365).

Hence: 1. Catholics, individually or associated, ought to acknowledge the rights of the Church's authority in controversies and social causes, for example concerning hours of work, the manner of wages, voluntary cessation of labor, etc. 2. Societies which primarily and principally pursue the temporal good of one or another order of civil life (such as associations for cultivating letters and arts, for promoting the temporal lot of workers, for sustaining political parties), on account of mixed questions which cannot fail to occur for Catholics, ought of themselves to be confessional. Yet societies of this kind that are interconfessional are tolerated where a just cause counsels it, as would be a great inconvenience to be avoided, provided that suitable cautions are applied for avoiding the dangers to faith and religion to which Catholic men are necessarily exposed in such groups. - 3. The mode by which confessional Catholic and non-Catholic societies can labor together for the common good is to be preferred here: with distinction remaining and special caution being applied, they should rather be joined to one another by an exterior league. Cf. Letter of Leo XIII, May 1892; Letters Graves de Communi (A. S. S., 33, p. 385); Letter of Pius X to the Sillonists, November 22, 1909 and August 25, 1910; Encyclical Letter Singulari quadam caritate, September 24, 1912. Cf. also Mausbach, die Kath. Moral., p. 2, c. 9 and 10; Ami du Clerge, 1913, Les cath. et les oeuvres non confessionnelles; Hiptmair, in the periodical Linz. Quart. Schr., 1914, article Kirchl. Zeitlaufe.

431. From the things said, you will resolve:

A. CONCERNING THE HIDING OF FAITH:

1. "When you are not asked about faith, often it is better, for the honor of God and the usefulness of neighbor, to cover faith than to confess it: as if, hidden among heretics, you do more good; or if from confession more evil would follow, for example the exasperation of a tyrant, danger of defection if you were tortured."

2. "To redeem with money, lest an inquiry be made concerning your faith, is licit; and often it is a great virtue of discretion to preserve life for the glory of God, and to cover faith by licit modes."

3. "Likewise a licit mode is, when a Catholic passes through heretical places, and grave danger threatens him (of life, for example, or of goods), for dissimulating faith, to eat meats on a prohibited day, because the precept of the Church does not oblige under such danger" (II, 14, 15). Cf. nevertheless n. 154, 3.

432. B. CONCERNING COMMUNICATION WITH NON-CATHOLICS.

Things to be noted beforehand: a) The discussion concerns communication in the exercise of divine worship or in those acts of civil life which are consecrated by religion, as, for example, in the celebration of marriage, in funeral rites.

b) This communication can be active, namely when a Catholic is present at the sacred rites of non-Catholics; or passive, namely when non-Catholics, with Catholics consenting, are present at their sacred rites.

c) Again, it can be public or private. It is public if a Catholic is present at sacred rites which a group of non-Catholics celebrates as a group: for example, at sacred rites which take place in a non-Catholics' temple. It is private if he is participant in a sacred thing which is done by a non-Catholic as a private man, not as a minister of a sect; as if, for example, you recite the Lord's prayer with a non-Catholic.

433. Therefore in particular:

I. CONCERNING ACTIVE COMMUNICATION.

1. To hear sermons of heretics generally is not held as a sign of profession of faith; although from these, if there is scandal, danger, or special prohibition, one must certainly abstain. Thus Paul V (Brief, September 16, 1606) forbade the English to obey a law prescribing this (II, 16, 13).

2. To conduct a funeral as far as the doors of the temple or cemetery is considered a civil courtesy. But regularly it is not licit to be present at the religious ceremonies, because ordinarily it has the character of communication in sacred rites, or presents the appearance of it. Except if, from the circumstances of place, time, etc., something else is signified (II, 16; Gury-Cretoni, I, p. 555).

3. To stand by at the celebration of nuptials, for example as a maid of honor, is for the most part assessed as a testimony of respect toward the spouses, without the heretical rites therefore being approved. Moreover, a Catholic who, with contempt of the laws of the Church, contracts nuptials before a minister of a non-Catholic religion incurs excommunication, and no Catholic can approve this by his presence. Indeed parents and those more closely joined by blood are generally bound positively to disapprove this (Kon., 254, 2). Cf. n. 1314.

4. A servant can, after the example of Naaman the Syrian (4 Kings 19), carry his master by carriage to heretical temples, or accompany this man's daughter or wife to them for the sake of guardianship, yet so that he does not participate in the heretical rites; likewise he can carry infants to be baptized and support them on his arm while they are baptized by a heretical preacher. For all these things pertain to service, and attest no partnership of worship (II, 16, 12).

5. He who receives supper or sacred communion from heretical ministers, or from schismatic priests, even in paschal time or in danger of death; or absolution, except in the article or danger of death; or baptism, unless any other Catholic baptizer whatsoever is lacking; or contracts marriage religiously before them, is guilty of mortal sin against faith (II, 16, 14).

6. Those who, for the sake of a religious rite, sing hymns in the temples of heretics, play organs, respond to the minister, plainly become participants of worship, and therefore in some way betray the faith. - Those who build, restore, or sweep temples do not always seem to enter into partnership of religion; but they provide a certain work, from which one must abstain, especially in a Catholic region, unless a most grave cause urges (Kenrick, tr. 13, n. 37; A. S. S., vol. 11, p. 174). Cf. n. 523, 2.

7. It is not licit for schoolmasters to teach boys Protestant hymns, or a heretical catechism, or to use a Protestant version of Sacred Scripture, although parents or rectors of schools demand it (Kenrick, tr. 13, n. 38).

8. It is not licit to go to musical concerts of heretics, if by occasion of the place the concerts put on the notion of worship, or if the profits from these redound to the usefulness of heresy, or otherwise favor heresy (ibid., n. 39).

9. To bend the knees with heretics praying (whether publicly or privately, but not formally) does not seem to be denial of faith; for it is understood to be done for the sake of civility, provided that it be done only occasionally. - But a custom in these matters is altogether to be disapproved, as favoring heresy and full of danger. Therefore it is in no way to be permitted to servants whom masters are accustomed to urge to this. Resolve the same concerning a servant who would be ordered to read Protestant bibles to a master becoming blind, or ill (Kon., n. 254, 5).

II. CONCERNING PASSIVE COMMUNICATION.

This can take place in a twofold mode: merely passively or negatively, or actively or positively, when non-Catholics positively do or contribute something.

1. Negative communication is permitted; for example, a non-Catholic can be admitted to hearing Catholic sermons, to assisting at the sacrifice of the Holy Mass, to participating by his presence alone in ecclesiastical ceremonies.

2. But positive communication is interdicted according to the things said above, because it easily falls back into illicit communication, and, where it is formal, becomes a sign of the unity of two religious confessions.

3. Thus are understood several decisions of the Sacred Roman Congregations concerning the invitation of non-Catholics into choir, the bestowal of the peace, of ashes, of candles, admission to carrying torches and lights, kissing the instrument of peace, carrying the body at funerals or holding the cloth, and even singing separately and not without scandal in the musical choir.

4. It is licit to invite non-Catholics to play the organ.

5. As regards admitting Protestant or schismatic girls into Catholic houses of education, several decrees exist, especially for houses situated in Italy, and prescriptions are given for the Superioresses of the same Institutes. Cf. Ami du Clerge, 1908, p. 445; Monit. eccl., X, 86; XI, 434.

CERTAIN RESPONSES OF THE SACRED CONGREGATIONS.

1. To the doubt: Whether it is licit for Catholics to go to the temples of heretics, the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, on January 14, 1718, responded: "It is licit, if they go for the sake of mere curiosity, without any communication in sacred rites, in which such going is commonly held for an act protestative of a false religion; since, just as to go to profane buildings, so also to the temples of heretics, is an act indifferent per se, which becomes evil only from a depraved end or from circumstances."

2. The same Sacred CONGREGATION, on May 10, 1770, decreed: "It is regularly not licit for Catholics to be present at sermons, baptisms, and marriages of heretics or schismatics." To undertake also the office of sponsor in the baptism of heretics is strictly prohibited by the same decree (cf. Intr. Card. Vicar, July 7, 1878, apud Gury-Cretoni, I, p. 554; Lehmkuhl, I, 816).

3. The Sacred Congregation DE PROPAGANDA FIDE, having been asked in the year 1674: Whether Catholic missionaries, asked by schismatics, can preach in their churches, responded: "Either they are invited to the effect that Catholic truth be preached there indefinitely, and even against the errors of the same schismatics, and affirmatively; or only that a discourse be made concerning virtues and vices which commonly ought to be exercised and avoided both by Catholics and by schismatics, and negatively." Scavini, II, n. 911, 14).

4. The Congregation of the HOLY OFFICE, having been asked: "Whether it is licit for nuns having care of the sick in a hospice to call a heretical minister, who for the sake of religion would be sought by a sick heretic; likewise, whether this would be licit for a Catholic in whose house a heretic was sick?" responded on March 15, 1848: According to the things set forth, it is not licit; let them have themselves passively.¹ This response was renewed by the same Sacred Congregation on February 5, 1872, and on December 14, 1898 (N. R. Th., 31, p. 402). - Yet otherwise, as is clear, if, when the sick person asks, greater evils would threaten from the denial, for example, desperation, outcries against the Church, blasphemies, scandal of others, etc. Then the little minister could licitly be called, so that he may visit the sick person (Scavini, l. c., 8; Kon., 313, 3; Monit. eccl., IX and X).

N. B. See other things at n. 447 seqq., where concerning dangers of faith, and n. 523, where concerning cooperation, and apud Lehmkuhl, I, n. 809; Villada, Cas. consc., II, 52.

249. • I. The internal act of Faith is necessary for all adults for justification by necessity of means. This is established from the Epistle to the Hebrews,¹ where the Apostle says: Without Faith it is impossible to please God. For he who approaches God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder to those who seek Him. - And from the Council of Trent:² "without faith justification has never happened to anyone."

II. It is also necessary at some time in life by necessity of precept. This is established from Sacred Scripture. For it is said in the First Epistle of John:³ This is His commandment, that we believe in the name of His Son Jesus Christ. Likewise from condemned propositions, namely the 1st by Alexander VII (p. XIII), and the 16th and 17th by Innocent XI (p. XV).

250. Questions. - Quaer. 1° When does the precept of eliciting Faith urge?

Resp. 1° It urges of itself: 1° after the use of reason, once the obligation of the precept has been sufficiently known; 2° likewise when the truth of our Faith has been sufficiently proposed to an adult unbeliever; 3° in the article of death, for tending more proximately to God; 4° several times in life, at least once in a year.⁴

Resp. 2° It urges by accident: 1° when a grave temptation urges which cannot otherwise be overcome; 2° when a precept must be fulfilled which cannot be fulfilled without faith. Thus contrition cannot be elicited unless an act of faith precedes or accompanies it; 3° after a fall into heresy, or after Faith has been denied, because the injury inflicted on the First Truth must be repaired by a contrary act.

Quaer. 2° Are explicit acts required for fulfilling the precept of Faith?

Resp. In those who have already learned and believed the truths to be held by faith, implicit acts generally suffice. Hence he satisfies the precept who devoutly hears Mass, adores the Crucifix, prays, forms the sign of the Cross, receives the Sacraments, etc. - Thus commonly.¹

251. • I. There is a negative precept prohibiting the denial of the true Faith and the profession of a false one. For to deny the Faith is to deny God Himself. Hence Christ² says: He who shall deny me before men, I also will deny him before my Father, who is in heaven.

II. There is also an affirmative precept obliging sometimes to confess the Faith even with danger to life. For the honor of Christ sometimes requires that the faithful despise even life for confessing Him. This is established from the words of Christ Himself:³ Everyone who shall confess me before men, I also will confess him before my Father who is in heaven. And:⁴ He who shall be ashamed of me and of my words, the Son of man will be ashamed of him when He shall come in His majesty. Likewise the Apostle:⁵ With the heart one believes unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation.

The precept of confessing the Faith outwardly obliges by the law of nature as often as otherwise the honor due to God, or the spiritual utility of others, would be withdrawn in a notable way, either contrarily or privatively. Contrarily: as if, by omitting confession of Faith, God would be affected by great injury, or contempt of Religion, or scandal, or the perversion of others would follow. Privatively: if namely a great honor toward God, or a great utility for others, would cease. - The reason is because the charity which we owe to God or to the neighbor demands this. - St. Thomas,⁶ St. Alphonsus.⁷

252. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Is it ever licit to dissemble the Faith?

Resp. 1° It is never licit to simulate a false faith, because this would be the same as outwardly denying the true one, which is intrinsically evil. - But this is openly established from the words of Christ just cited.

Resp. 2° It is licit for a grave cause to dissemble or hide the true Faith, when the danger of scandal is excluded. The reason is because the precept of confessing the Faith does not always urge.¹

Quaer. 2° Can one who is questioned concerning the Faith use ambiguous words?

Resp. 1° Negatively, when evasion or silence is equivalent to denial, or to shame or fear which in those circumstances necessarily detract from the honor of God or the utility of the neighbor. For then the conditions set forth in the preceding number have place. This is confirmed from the constant practice of the Church and the common doctrine of the Fathers.²

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, when no scandal is created for those present, and no denial of Faith, or fear, or shame appears; because then there is no obligation of confessing the Faith.³

253. • Quaer. 3° Is it licit to use the signs or garments of unbelievers?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if they are garments or signs proper to some region, although this whole region be unbelieving; because these of themselves are not referred to Religion.

Resp. 2° But if they are garments and signs of Religion, a subdistinction must be made. More probably still affirmatively, if it is done for a grave cause, and the garments are not solely or primarily distinctive of the sect from the sect, because then their primary use is for covering the body, and only secondary for distinguishing the sect. - But otherwise, if the garments or signs are solely or primarily instituted for professing the sect, as are the garments and ornaments which priests use in the exercise of their functions.⁴

254. Resolves. - A. From principle I.

1° Someone sins gravely against Faith if, even only externally, he bends the knee before an idol, or exhibits other signs of false Religion, for example if he were to receive the heretical supper; - if in this region he contracted marriage before a heretical minister, since this person among us is not a witness civilly necessary, and so cannot be approached except insofar as he is a sacred minister; - if clothed in the garments of the Quakers, or even not clothed in them, for nowadays the Quakers themselves scarcely wear distinctive garments, he were silently to consider in their assembly, like the others, as though meditating; - if he were to go to the places in which those are received who profess the so-called conversion in the assemblies of Presbyterians, Methodists, or others, and among the others were to sit or bend the knees, as though about to pray; - if, asked whether he is a Romanist or Papist, he were to answer that he is not, unless nevertheless from the accompanying circumstances it can easily be gathered that he denies it because of those terms as invidious and full of contumely. The same today, after the Syllabus and the Decrees of the Vatican Council, seems to have to be said if someone should deny that he is an Ultramontane.

2° He does not sin against Faith who visits the temples of heretics or unbelievers from mere curiosity, yet with scandal, danger of perversion, or a law forbidding this excluded. - Likewise he who is present at a wedding banquet, since this does not pertain to Faith, or, without participating in the rite, at the burial of heretics, since this is done for the sake of civil honor. Kenrick¹ with others says the same concerning those standing by the celebration of nuptials contracted before a heretical preacher, since this for the most part is not estimated as approval of a heretical rite, but as an indication of respect toward the spouses. But whether the same can be said of those who on this occasion perform the office of bridesmen, I leave to wiser men to decide; much in this matter must be attributed to the common estimation prevailing among the people; for what, with no participation at all in the rite of heretics, is judged only a civil respect, cannot be held as profession of false religion. But where a Catholic enters nuptials before a minister, it is not fitting, says the same Kenrick,² for Catholics, especially parents and those more closely joined by blood, to approve this by their presence. Yet this resolution of the very celebrated Theologian seems a little milder; indeed we judge that this not only is not fitting, but generally is not licit (see below, n. 308), at least for parents and those who are held from office to disapprove this.

3° It is licit for servants to carry infants to be baptized and to hold them on the arm while they are baptized by a minister; for this is held as pertaining to service, and not as fellowship in worship.³ Say the same of attendance at a baptism of this sort and a fortiori at a baptismal banquet, where that attendance is judged civil respect. For the Declaration of Pius VI, namely that it is illicit to be present at baptism conferred by intruders, that is, Frenchmen, cannot be said certainly to comprehend our case. For the attendance of which Pius VI treats, considering the special circumstances then obtaining, could not fail to be, or at least be judged, an approval of those very intruders; but in our case no approval of the minister is commonly apprehended. A case similar to the case to which the declaration of Pius VI pertains would be if there were a question of attendance at baptism conferred by some German so-called Old Catholic.

"But absolutely it is not licit, neither by oneself nor through others, to perform the office of sponsor in Baptisms which are administered by heretics to the children of heretics," the S. Congregation of the Office responded on Thursday, May 10, 1770,¹ and Kenrick teaches this.²

4° Paul V, by Brief of September 22, 1606,³ declared to the English that it is not licit to obey the law prescribing to Catholics, even under most grave penalties, that they go to the temples of heretics, frequent their assemblies, and be present at their sermons. But now on the ships of our Government, as also in forts and other public places for the most part, in certain workhouses and prisons, all are compelled to attend prayers and a sermon, those who refuse being beaten. Therefore it is asked whether for Catholics in this region, where it is provided by laws that the secular power should usurp no right of involving itself in sacred matters, it is licit to provide attendance of this sort?

Resp. Since this attendance is demanded on account of order rather than favor toward the sect, and no one is compelled actually to furnish worship, the case must be said to be different from that of which the cited Brief speaks; and those are to be excused who, to avoid punishment or from some other sufficiently grave cause, present themselves, provided nevertheless that otherwise they openly profess the Catholic faith and avoid every fellowship in worship.⁴ Yet the matter is by no means free from danger, namely of perversion. Cf. Second Plenary Council of Baltimore.⁵

5° "To bend the knees with heretics praying," says Kenrick,¹ "whether publicly or privately, does not seem to be a denial of faith; for it is understood to be done for the sake of humanity," provided, I would add, that this is done only on some occasions. Moreover Kenrick himself adds: "Besides, the custom must altogether be disapproved; for it favors heresy, and has danger of perversion and bad example. Therefore it is by no means to be permitted to servants whom masters are accustomed to press to this." I resolve the same concerning a servant who would be ordered to read aloud Protestant bibles to a blind or sick master. "But they can," Kenrick continues, "drive their masters to the temples of heretics, or accompany the daughter or wife of their masters to them, for the sake of protection, without taking part in their rites." I would say the same is licit for a Catholic husband with respect to a heretical wife, as is commonly accustomed to be done in rural places, without Catholics being scandalized by it.

6° As regards those who in Protestant temples give an address, or in mixed assemblies, in which a minister presides or even pours forth prayers, give a speech, or are otherwise present, distinguish in about this way.

Either a) there is a question of a priest about to preach in a temple of the sects, and then the following response of the S. Penitentiary must be attended to; when asked whether Catholic Missionaries and priests, requested by schismatics, could preach in their churches, in the year 1674 it resolved: "Either they are invited to the effect that the Catholic truth be preached there indefinitely and also against the errors of those same schismatics, and then affirmatively; or only that a sermon be made concerning virtues and vices which commonly must be embraced and avoided both by Catholics and by non-Catholics, and negatively."² From this response applied to our regions I conclude that a priest is not to be blamed who, although not invited, indeed even asking this permission, in some place where a Catholic church or another suitable place, for example a courthouse, is lacking, would announce Catholic truth in the temple of sectarians. Outside this case it is better to abstain, so that every appearance of fellowship in matters of religion may be avoided, and lest the faithful go to the churches of sects for any cause whatever.³

Or b) there is a question of a layman who is going to give an address in the same churches of sects concerning temperance, liberty, or other things of this sort, according to the custom of this region. This certainly must be vehemently dissuaded, especially if non-Catholics on that occasion are also going to speak; for in matters of this sort they are scarcely not accustomed to run beyond just limits and to mix in very many things contrary to faith, to which the Catholic speaker either will contradict or will not. - If the former, the matter will have the appearance of a public disputation concerning faith, which is forbidden to a layman.¹ A layman besides will scarcely fail to enter the danger of not rightly answering objections. - If the latter, the silence of the Catholic will easily be held in place of approval, or certainly will harm religion as though it cannot be defended.

Or c) there is a question of an address to be given either in a church of the sects or in a profane place or under the open sky, with a minister presiding, or at least about to pour forth prayers before or after the address. If the former, it will scarcely be licit for a Catholic to give an address, since in circumstances of this sort he would seem in some way to enter into a society of religion; if the latter, it will be licit when, for example, an address is to be given on the occasion of a national feast or of some civil solemnity, as, for example, the dedication of a new municipal courthouse, or the anniversary of some battle at the graves of those slain, although a minister at the request of others pours forth prayers; for in those circumstances he who performs his part by giving an address is not judged to enter into fellowship of religion; otherwise speakers in legislative assemblies would also have to be blamed, for at the beginning of individual sessions a minister is accustomed to pour forth prayers. What has been said concerning those who in this latter case give an address, resolve the same concerning those present, whether they are individuals or, when there is a question of some national feast or civil solemnity, Catholic societies; for those societies, even in the case in which they are present with insignia or banners which exhibit the image of the Saint under whose invocation they exist, are present only civilly.

7° Those who sing publicly outside temples, or at least outside every occasion and appearance of worship, as is accustomed to happen in a concert of many persons, do not seem to sin against faith, even if certain hymns concerning sacred matters have Protestant authors, provided nevertheless that they have nothing adverse to faith; for in those circumstances they are referred only to the delight of the ears. But they would sin if they furnished their work so that money to be collected from it should yield to Protestant uses.¹

8° He does not sin against Faith who, passing through places of heretics, from fear of grave danger, eats meat on a day of abstinence, lest he be recognized as a Catholic; because this of itself is not a sign of heresy. Otherwise, however, if he ate meat, even from fear of death, impelled to this in hatred of the Faith.

9° Nor does he sin against Faith who flees in time of persecution; indeed, generally flight is in some way prescribed, as is clear from the words of Christ:² But when they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another. But this especially holds if someone's safety is necessary for the utility of the faithful, or someone fears a fall.

255. Resolves. - B. From principle II.

1° This proposition (18th) was indeed rightly condemned by Innocent XI: "If someone is questioned by public authority, I counsel him frankly to confess the Faith as glorious to God and the Faith; to be silent I do not condemn as sinful of itself." Yet from this you would not rightly conclude that always and everywhere one must answer public authority questioning concerning faith. For since he who is questioned by a judge contrary to the order of law, although otherwise legitimate, is held by no obligation of answering; and our laws will that no account of the religion or faith of citizens be had, no response is owed of itself to a question of this sort. Much more can someone be unwilling to satisfy the curiosity of private persons.³

It is said: of itself, and to curiosity. For an answer certainly is owed if, according to the principle enunciated above, the honor due to God or the spiritual utility of the neighbor would be notably diminished or even cease by not answering, by evading, or by equivocating; as, for example, if taciturnity, evasion, or equivocation were, or seemed to those present, a denial of faith, or yielded to contempt of faith or to grave scandal.

2° Although faith must sometimes be professed publicly, nevertheless public controversy with heretics concerning matters of faith is prohibited by the Decree of the S. Congregation of the Council dated March 6, 1625, except with the permission of the Supreme Pontiff. But whether this decree is in living observance, as they say, among us, can rightly be doubted. Besides, in a case of necessity and when there is danger in delay, the Ordinary of the place, according to the things said at n. 154, 2°, will be able to concede this license.

Note. - Other resolutions connected with the precept of faith, see n. 313 sqq., where cooperation in the sacred rites of heretics is discussed.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 2, a. 3 and 5-8; De Verit., q. 14, a. 10-12.

706. A twofold necessity: one of means, the other of precept. - It must be noted beforehand that something is said to be necessary for the end either by necessity of means, or by necessity of precept. Necessary by necessity of means is a means which positively flows into obtaining the end, and indeed in such a way that without it, even if omitted involuntarily, the end cannot be obtained. Necessary by necessity of precept is not a means to the end, but that which is imposed by precept in such a way that, when the precept is known, its observance is a condition, just as voluntary transgression is an obstacle to attaining the end; whence it flows in not positively but negatively, by not placing an obstacle. From this definition it follows that invincible ignorance excuses from necessity of precept, because it excuses from sin, which would be an obstacle to attaining the end; but no ignorance or impossibility whatever liberates from necessity of means, for this does not supply the necessary influx of the means for attaining the end.

Necessity of means is one thing from the nature of the thing, another from positive institution; likewise one is necessity of means in reality, when the means itself is always necessary, another is necessity of means in desire, when the defect of the means can be supplied by another thing together with the desire of it. Examples for salvation are sanctifying grace and Baptism.

707. Faith is necessary by necessity of means.

I. By necessity of means for salvation, both for little children and for adults, from the nature of the thing, the habit of faith is necessary, because without it charity cannot be had. Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7.

II. By necessity of means for justification and in this way for salvation,1 for adults, that is, those having the use of reason, from the nature of the thing, in all times altogether, the act of faith properly so called is necessary, by which they explicitly believe, on account of divine revelation, that God, the institutor and end of the supernatural order, exists, and is a rewarder.

It is proved: 1. From Scripture, which rather often declares the absolute necessity of the voluntary reception of faith properly so called (for it recognizes no other as necessary) for attaining justification (Heb. X, 38 sq.; Rom. I, 17; III, 26; IV, 5; Gal. II, 16; Mk. XVI, 16), and professedly teaches at Heb. XI, 6, that "without faith it is impossible to please God. For he who comes to God must believe (the act of faith) that He is, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him."

2. From the perpetual doctrine of the Church, which is established from Trent, sess. 6, c. 6, 7, 8; from the Vatican Council, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 2; and from the condemnation of propositions 22 and 23 by Innocent XI.1

3. From reason: a) No one can order himself and tend to the supernatural end, which nevertheless is required for justification, unless he know that end. But we cannot know the supernatural end by reason, but only by revelation, to which faith responds. Therefore.

b) Likewise no one can hope for salvation and have supernatural contrition concerning sin, unless he know the supernatural end and reward. But hope and supernatural contrition are required for justification (Council of Trent, sess. 6 and 14). Therefore for justification it is required that we believe the supernatural end.

From what has been said it follows a) that some true concept of one God is required, by which namely He is distinguished from creatures, and is known at least as creator, or omnipotent, or a necessary or most perfect being; otherwise we would not tend to the true God;

b) that knowledge of God as natural end and rewarder does not suffice: for although it is not required that we know distinctly and formally as supernatural the end or reward, nevertheless we must believe the reward which in fact is supernatural;

c) that practically there is no difficulty in this: whoever by faith on account of the authority of God revealing believes that God is and rewards, by that very fact believes God revealing Himself in a supernatural mode, that is, communicating with us beyond the exigencies of nature, and believes that God will reward with the reward which He promised by His revelation.

III. Before the Gospel was promulgated, explicit faith in the Incarnation (and at the same time in the passion, death, redemption, resurrection, and glorious reign of Christ in heaven) and in the Most Holy Trinity was not necessary by necessity of means for justification, but implicit faith sufficed; but whether after the Gospel has been promulgated it is required from the positive institution of God is disputed. Although the affirmative opinion of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus is more probable and more conformable to the mode of speaking of Sacred Scripture and the Holy Fathers,¹ nevertheless it is not altogether certain, because the texts which are brought forward to prove it, and which, according to them, proclaim the necessity of faith in Christ, perhaps can also be understood either of the efficacy alone of faith in Christ; - or of the necessity of precept alone; - or of necessity of means, but of the merits and grace of Christ, or of faith by which we are united to Christ, or at least of implicit faith in Christ. Yet because in things necessary for the end, in the case for salvation, it is illicit to choose a merely probable opinion, but the safer course must be taken (cf. n. 215, 3), therefore in practice these two mysteries must be considered as to be believed by necessity of means.

¹ Cf. Martin, De Necessitate credendi et credendorum.

1. It is said thus and not simply for salvation, because if someone was baptized in infancy, and afterwards arrived at the use of reason, and it should happen that faith is not sufficiently proposed to him, and at the same time that he does not sin mortally, he will be saved without an act of faith. Here, nevertheless, for adults it will regularly be a necessary means for preserving justice, namely, for fulfilling Christian duties, so that they may persevere in justice.

1. "Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in a Rewarder." - "Faith broadly so called, from the testimony of creatures or from a similar motive, suffices for justification."

708. Practical corollaries. - 1. Since he who is ignorant of the existence of God as supernatural end and rewarder is incapable of justification and certainly indisposed, the sacraments, even of Baptism or Penance, can never be given to him. Indeed confessions made with ignorance even invincible of these truths are null (from defect of contrition) and therefore must be repeated.

2. Nor can these sacraments be administered to one who is ignorant of the mystery of the Incarnation or of the Trinity; but he must first be instructed concerning these, because it is illicit to expose a sacrament to danger of fruitlessness, or even Penance to danger of nullity (Holy Office, January 25 and May 10, 1703, renewed March 30, 1898; Innocent XI, prop. 64 and 65).² The case of extreme necessity is excepted, when the means or time of instruction is lacking; in which case the sacrament of Penance is administered under condition: if you are capable, provided that the other requisites are present, but with these given, the other sacraments absolutely.

² "A man is capable of absolution, however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of faith and even if through negligence, even culpable, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ." - "It suffices to have believed those mysteries once."

3. Especially let canon 752, § 2 be noted: an adult "in danger of death, if he cannot be instructed more diligently in the chief mysteries of faith, it is sufficient, for conferring Baptism, that he show in some way that he assents to the same and seriously promise that he will observe the commands of the Christian religion."

4. Since confessions made with ignorance not gravely culpable of the Incarnation or of the Most Holy Trinity by one who in good faith thought that he was rightly disposed, are not certainly invalid, although more safely they are repeated, nevertheless the faithful cannot be strictly obliged to this.

5. When it is a question of the half-witted or the very ignorant, an act of faith in God one and three, and in Christ the redeemer, is to be suggested to them before they are absolved; by which the validity of absolution becomes safer.

6. Hence St. Alphonsus notes, Theologia Moralis, l. 2, c. 1, n. 2: if someone were so unlearned that he could in no way perceive the aforesaid mysteries, and therefore did not explicitly believe, as to this he would be assimilated to infants and the insane; but if he cannot retain them, it will suffice that he explicitly believe the individual articles while they are proposed to him. The case, besides, is rare even in barbarous regions.

7. For justification implicit faith on the part of the act does not suffice, or faith in desire or broadly so called, but faith in reality is required, by which we explicitly believe God revealing; yet implicit faith on the part of the object suffices insofar as revealed truths are apprehended confusedly, but explicit faith is required as to truths necessary by necessity of means.

I Say 1st. The internal act of faith is necessary for all adults by necessity of means for justification, and also by necessity of precept sometime in life. The first is clear both from the Apostle saying, Hebr. xi, 6, "Without faith it is impossible to please God," and from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, cap. 6, where the mode of preparation for justification is described, and among other things necessarily required faith is assigned. But the other is clear from proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VII, which holds thus: "Man at no time of his life is bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity, by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues." - Cf. Mazzella, disp. 3, art. 10.

I say 2nd. There exists both a negative precept prohibiting one from denying the true faith, and an affirmative precept sometimes obliging one to confess it, even with danger to life. The reason for the first is that to deny the faith is to deny God himself. But the reason for the second is that the honor of Christ sometimes demands that the faithful despise even life for confessing him. Hence Christ himself says, Luke ix, 26, "He who shall be ashamed of me ... of him the Son of man will be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty." - I said sometimes, for this affirmative precept, precisely because it is affirmative, does not oblige always and for always, but only then when the honor due to God, or the spiritual utility of the neighbor, would be withdrawn in a notable way; for example, if from omission of the confession of the true faith there would follow contempt of religion, or scandal, or the perversion of others; as is clear from Can. 1325, § 1.

§ 1. The faithful of Christ are bound openly to profess the faith as often as their silence, evasion, or manner of acting would bring with it implicit denial of the faith, contempt of religion, injury to God, or scandal of the neighbor (Can. 1325).

§ 1. It is by no means lawful for the faithful in any way actively to assist or take part in the sacred rites of non-Catholics.

§ 2. Passive or merely material presence can be tolerated, for the sake of civil office or honor, for a grave reason to be approved by the Bishop in a case of doubt, at the funerals, weddings, and similar solemnities of non-Catholics, provided danger of perversion and scandal is absent (Can. 1258). - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 3, art. 2. - St. Alphonsus, n. 10.

Question 1. When does the precept of eliciting the internal act of faith press?

Response. It certainly presses of itself not only after the use of reason has been completed, or after the truth of our faith has been sufficiently proposed to an adult infidel, for beginning the Christian life, but also more often in life, as theologians commonly hold, and as is sufficiently clear both from the condemnation of the proposition already cited and from proposition 17, condemned by Innocent XI, which lies thus: "It is enough to elicit an act of faith once in life." - But the particle more often is understood in different ways by different persons, but it can safely be held that it does not include greater frequency than once a year. - But it presses by accident as often as some end is to be obtained for which an act of faith is necessarily required.

Yet note that this precept, as St. Alphonsus holds, is sufficiently fulfilled by those who have already learned and believed the truths to be held by faith, by exercising other acts of religion in which an act of faith is implicitly contained, for example, by devoutly hearing Mass, adoring the crucifix, receiving the sacraments, etc. Hence:

1st. It follows that the faithful who live as Christians, or at least once a year approach the sacraments of Penance and the Eucharist, are not to be disturbed concerning the fulfillment of this precept.

2nd. It follows that the question whether the dying are bound of themselves, namely by force of a special obligation imposed by the virtue of faith itself, to eliciting some act of it, has been resolved, at least practically. For the dying are certainly bound to some acts of religion, especially to receiving the last sacraments; but they cannot perform this without eliciting an act of faith. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 7; and Hom. Ap., n. 13. - Baller., note (a), p. 161, note (b), p. 174, note (c), p. 178, and note (a), p. 180. - Amer. Eccl. Review, Vol. 2, p. 442.

Question 2. When questioned concerning the faith, can you use ambiguous words?

Response. Negatively, when evasion or silence is equivalent to denial, or to shame which from the circumstances is known to yield to contempt of God and scandal of the neighbor. Besides, as regards public power questioning, this is clear from proposition 18, condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: "If someone is questioned by public authority, I counsel him to confess the faith ingenuously, as glorious to God and to the faith; I do not condemn silence as sinful of itself." - But Kenrick says: "Among us, where the laws wish that no account be had of the religion or faith of citizens, one will generally be able to use his own right and reject the interrogation as out of order." - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 13. - Kenrick, n. 30. - Amer. Eccl. Review, Vol. 2, p. 266.

Question 3. Is it lawful to use the signs or garments of infidels?

Response. Affirmatively, if they are garments or signs proper to some region, although this whole region is infidel; because these of themselves are not referred to religion. But if they are garments and signs of religion, a subdistinction must be made, and again it must be affirmed, if it is done for a grave cause and the garments are not only distinctive of sect from sect, because then their primary use is for covering the body, and only secondarily for distinguishing the sect. - But the response must be negative if the garments or signs are instituted either uniquely or primarily for professing the sect, as are the garments and ornaments which priests use in the exercise of their functions. - Cf. Salmant., tract. 21, cap. 2, n. 110.

153. Question 4. Who are bound by canon law to emit the profession of faith?

Response. By ecclesiastical law, as is clear from Canon 1406, § 1:

§ 1. By the obligation of emitting the profession of faith, according to the formula approved by the Apostolic See, there are bound:

1st. Before the president or his delegate, those who attend an Ecumenical or particular Council or diocesan Synod with a vote, whether consultative or deliberative; but the president before the same Council or Synod;

2nd. Before the Dean of the Sacred College, the Cardinals first in the order of priests and deacons, and the Camerarius of the Holy Roman Church, those promoted to the cardinalitial dignity;

3rd. Before a delegate from the Apostolic See, those promoted to an episcopal see, even a non-residential one, or to the rule of an Abbey or Prelature nullius, an Apostolic Vicariate, or an Apostolic Prefecture;

4th. Before the cathedral Chapter, the Capitular Vicar;

5th. Before the local Ordinary or his delegate and before the Chapter, those who have been promoted to a dignity or canonry;

6th. Before the local Ordinary or his delegate and before the other consultors, those assumed to the office of diocesan consultors;

7th. Before the local Ordinary or his delegate, the Vicar General, pastors, and those for whom provision has been made concerning any benefices, even manual ones, having care of souls; the rector and professors of sacred theology, canon law, and philosophy in Seminaries, at the beginning of any scholastic year or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; all who are to be promoted to the order of subdiaconate; censors of books, of whom in can. 1393; priests designated for hearing confessions and sacred preachers, before they are endowed with the faculty of exercising those duties;

8th. Before the Ordinary or his delegate, the Rector of a University or Faculty; but before the Rector of the University or Faculty or his delegate, all professors in a canonically erected University or Faculty, at the beginning of each scholastic year or at least at the beginning of the office undertaken; likewise those who, after examination, are endowed with academic degrees;

9th. Before the Chapter or Superior who nominated them or their delegate, Superiors in clerical religions.¹

§ 2. Those who, the prior office having been dismissed, obtain another office or benefice or dignity even of the same species, must again emit the profession of faith according to the norm of this canon (Can. 1406).

He does not satisfy the obligation of emitting the profession of faith who emits it through a procurator or before a layman (Can. 1407).

The prescriptions concerning Councils of vigilance and the anti-modernist oath remain in their full force until it shall have been otherwise established concerning this matter. - S. Off., 22 Mar., 1918.

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1143, n. 114.

You Will Resolve. 1st. He would deny the faith externally: 1st. who, when asked whether he were a Romanist or Papist, would respond that he is not such, unless nevertheless from the circumstances it were gathered that he had rejected words of this kind as being full of envy and insult; 2nd. who, among Quakers, would sit silent and as if meditating; but not if he used only their garments, for example, a large hat; 3rd. who would approach places where conversions of Presbyterians, Methodists, and others are received, and, praying among them, would bend the knees, as if about to receive the spirit; but not if, standing at a distance, he looked upon their manner of acting from levity or curiosity. - Cf. Kenrick, n. 30.

2nd. He should not be accused of denied faith who on days of abstinence would eat meats in order to avoid troubles from heretics; and much less a girl who does the same, fearing lest her father become violently inflamed when he perceives that she has passed over to the Catholic Church. The reason is that from one side we are not always bound externally to profess the true faith, and from the other the eating of meats of itself does not necessarily import denial of the faith, since often this is done from gluttony or from necessity. Indeed someone can hide conversion to the true faith for avoiding very grave evils, when neither the honor due to God nor the good of the neighbor demands manifestation of the faith. - Cf. Kenrick, ibid. - Il Monitore Ecclesiastico, Sec. Ser., Vol. 1, p. 211.

3rd. He does not sin against faith who flees in time of persecution; indeed flight generally is in some way commanded, as is clear from the words of Christ, Matt. x, 23: "But when they persecute you in this city, flee into another." - But this especially holds if someone's salvation is necessary for the utility of the faithful, or someone fears a fall. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 14. - Kenrick, n. 31.

4th. He does not sin against faith who goes to the temples of heretics or infidels for the sake of mere curiosity, without any communication in sacred rites: indeed he sins in no way, or certainly not gravely, if neither scandal is present, nor danger of perversion, nor a particular law forbidding this approach. The reason is that, as to approach profane buildings, so also to approach the temples of heretics is an act indifferent of itself, which is made evil only by an evil end or from circumstances. Thus S. Congr. S. O., 14 Jan. 1818, Dub. 3 (in Cretoni, vol. 1, p. 544, note C). - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 16.

5th. Yet he will sin against faith if such approach has been commanded by a heretical government as a protestation of heretical faith, or if in any way it is commonly held as a mark of one and the same religion between Catholics and non-Catholics.

6th. Catholics regularly are not permitted to be present at the sermons, baptisms, and marriages of heretics or schismatics. Thus S. Cong. S. O., on 10 May 1770. - It is said regularly, because if the presence is merely material, as can sometimes happen, and from the circumstances it is sufficiently perceived to contain or show no participation with the rites of heretics, it can be excused from sin, especially among us, where this is held as an indication of civil respect. - Cf. Kenrick, n. 33.

7th. To perform the office of sponsor in the baptism of heretics, or to enter marriage before a heretical minister, is always illicit because of cooperation and communication in divine things, as S. Cong. S. O. expressly declared in the cited decree in the year 1770, and S. P. Pius VI, both in the Instruction of 26 Sept. 1791 and in the Responses to the clergy of France of 28 May 1793. - As regards funerals, a distinction must be made: those things which pertain to a merely civil office, such as accompanying the body, can be permitted; other things which have the nature or appearance of communion with heretics are to be prohibited. - Cf. Kenrick, ibid.

8th. Servants can carry their masters to the temples of heretics, and accompany their daughters or wives to them for the sake of protection; for this is held as an office of service, but not as participation of worship. By the same reason a maidservant is excused who holds an infant in her arm while he is baptized by a minister. - Cf. Kenrick, ibid.

9th. Among us it seems lawful for Catholics on Government ships, in fortresses, in prisons, and in other public places, to stand by at the prayers of heretics; for from one side this is demanded for the sake of order rather than favor of the sect, and from the other they would incur great inconvenience if any refused it. Nor is it valid to say that Paul V prohibited this to English Catholics, because there at that time the circumstances were entirely different. - Cf. Kenrick, nn. 33 and 34.

10th. It does not seem able to be permitted to Catholics, in this region, that they play organs or sing in the temples or assemblies of heretics, unless perhaps in some very rare case and with the following conditions acceding: 1st. that there be nothing in the hymns and songs which is opposed to the true faith; 2nd. that no scandal or danger of perversion be had; and 3rd. that a very grave necessity press. The reason for this tolerance is that, when all the aforesaid conditions have been verified, the malice does not seem to hold itself on the part of the act, but only on the part of the agents, and therefore the cooperation will be only material, which, when a just cause intervenes, can be permitted. But if anywhere it has been solemnly declared by the local Ordinary that tolerance of this kind must in no way be admitted, in practice one must stand by this declaration. Indeed such tolerance seems to us illicit in itself. For to sing, while religious offices are exercised in temples, is an active part of the worship of that assembly to which the temple belongs, which then worships God by its own religious rites. But actively to participate in heretical worship is intrinsically evil. In the mouth of men commonly such an act is held as protestative of heresy. Besides, singers entice men to these churches of heretics and thus give favor to heresy. Wherefore let it be lawful for us to depart from the milder opinion and to affirm that to sing in the temples of heretics, while heretical worship is exercised there, is intrinsically evil and never to be permitted. He who places some work which by its intrinsic nature and here and now is directly and immediately ordered to an evil action formally cooperates in that action: hence the intention of the one singing does not change the signification of this act placed here and now. - Bucceroni, Cas., v. 2, n. 30.11. - Lehmkuhl, v. 1, n. 813.

11th. Likewise it does not seem able to be permitted to Catholics that they contribute money to the increase or splendor of fairs, bazaars, or suppers (oyster suppers), when it is known that these fairs or suppers are instituted for this purpose, that money may be obtained for building synagogues or temples of heretics. Nevertheless otherwise would have to be said if sometimes from the circumstances it appears that Catholics wish to show not indeed favor of sects, but only a sign of grateful spirit or benevolence.

12th. In danger of death, when a Catholic priest is lacking, it is lawful to seek absolution from a heretical or schismatic priest, provided scandal is not offered to the other faithful, nor is there danger that the faithful person be perverted by the heretic, and it is probably believed that the heretical priest will administer this sacrament according to the rites of the Church. (S. Off., 7 Jul. 1864.) But outside the case of death it is not lawful, as is clear from this response: "In no case, not even of necessity, is it lawful for a Catholic to confess his sins and obtain absolution from a schismatic priest." S. C. de Prop. Fide, 17 Feb. 1761.

13th. "Communication with heretics can be either in a matter of approved doctrine or in rites or other signs protestative of a false sect with scandal of the faithful, for which reason communion with them is forbidden by the Church, lest faith be understood either to be lost or to be placed in danger. Hence St. John the Evangelist commands so severely: 'If anyone comes to you and does not bring this doctrine, do not receive him into the house, nor say "hail" to him; for he who says "hail" to him communicates in his evil works.' II St. John 10. Most evidently from these words it is inferred that whatever expresses a hail of this kind is to be prohibited, as are liturgical actions which were instituted for signifying ecclesiastical unity. Wherefore we read it sanctioned by the Fathers of the Council of Carthage, 'with heretics neither must one pray nor sing psalms,' as Benedict XIV reports, de Syn., c. 5, lib. 6. Therefore it is illicit in sacred functions to invite heretics into the choir, to sing psalms alternately, to give them peace, sacred ashes, and other things of this kind of external worship, which by right and merit are judged signs of an interior bond and agreement, both in the active sense, namely by giving similar things to them, and in the passive, by receiving them from them in their sacred rites." - S. C. S. Off., 22 Jun. 1859.

Besides, the Most Holy Lord Pope Alexander VII, 9 May 1663, proposed the following question to be resolved by the Qualifiers of the Holy Office: What things can with a safe conscience be permitted to be done or omitted for hiding the Catholic religion and what things cannot ...? "All present agreed that those actions which, the circumstances having been considered, are indifferent for signifying worship of a false religion can be permitted; but those which determinately signify, either of themselves or from circumstances, the worship of a false religion are not to be permitted." And when certain special actions which can be permitted had been proposed, it is added: "These things are understood with contempt of the faith, scandal, and danger of perversion excluded." Finally the case of a Baron or petty ruler wishing to embrace the faith but entangled in difficulties is resolved: "All likewise said: since it is certain that no signs protestative of heresy can be permitted to the aforesaid petty ruler ... we judged that first there must be explained what we understand by the name of a sign protestative of heresy. And this indeed we say is that sign, seen or heard which, commonly all conceive that the one using such a sign is a heretic. But we say that sign is indifferent, seen or heard which, commonly, a presumption of heresy is not determinately conceived." Once the questions concerning presence or assistance at heretical worship had been resolved, it is added: "But truly, that ecclesiastical precepts concerning foods, hearing Mass, etc., can be not observed: for this disobedience is not determinately a sign of a false religion, and moreover precepts of this kind do not seem to oblige with so great an inconvenience." - Jur. Pontif. de P. F., Part ii, p. 126 and seq.

It is not permitted for Catholics to be present at dances and other recreations which are accustomed to be held by members of a masonic society, and as such.

§ 7. Praise of a perpetrated delict, participation in its fruits, concealment and reception of the delinquent, or other acts following upon a delict already fully completed, can constitute new delicts, namely if they are punished by a penalty in the law; but, unless there had been agreement with the delinquent concerning those acts before the delict, they do not bring with them imputability of the perpetrated delict (Can. 2209).

14th. 1. Whether the decree by which Catholics are prohibited from being present at the Masses of schismatics and their prayers is understood also for places in which Catholic priests are not found and concerning prayers in which nothing against the faith and Catholic rite is had? S. C. of the Office, 7 Aug. 1704, responded to I: His Holiness judged: Affirmatively.

15th. It is not lawful for Catholics to give alms of Masses to schismatic priests. S. C. de Prop. Fide, 12 Mar. 1789.

16th. That it is not only lawful, but that Catholics are bound to adore the Most Holy Sacrament when they meet a Schismatic Priest carrying it to a sick person, but that they are bound nevertheless to abstain from accompanying him, the S. C. de Prop. Fide responded, 15 Dec. 1764, ad 4.

Concerning many other solutions pertaining here, discourse will be had below, where scandal and cooperation are treated. - For the rest, in all these things attention must be paid to the customs of the region, and to peculiar circumstances, from which it can happen that the same action has a different signification among us than elsewhere. Wherefore not all the responses which are reported in Amer. Eccl. Review, Vol. VI, p. 152, ought to be applied to those who live in this region.¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1143, n. 115.

I Say 1st. It is certain that these two things must necessarily be believed by necessity of means for salvation, namely that God exists, and that he is the Rewarder. The first is clear from the fact that it is impossible to obtain salvation, namely the ultimate end, unless we tend toward him; but we tend through faith, and this cannot be had unless before all things the existence of God is believed. The other is clear from proposition 22 condemned by Innocent XI, which holds thus: "Only faith in one God seems necessary by necessity of means, but not explicit faith in the Rewarder." But both are confirmed from the Apostle, Hebr. xi, 6: "One approaching God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder to those seeking him." - Cf. Mazzella, disp. cited, § 3, nn. 864 and seq.

I say 2nd. By necessity of precept all the faithful are bound explicitly to believe 1st. all those things which are contained in the Apostles' Creed, and 2nd. the divine efficacy of the principal sacraments, namely Baptism, Penance, and the Eucharist, and also of the other sacraments when they are proximately to be received. The reason for the first is that the very nature of Christian profession which is contained in the Creed demands this. It is clear also from the practice of all the faithful. - But the reason for the second is that the sacraments cannot be received worthily unless their divine efficacy is known, and this cannot be known by any other account except through faith, since they are of positive institution.

Question 1. Is explicit faith in the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation required by necessity of means?

Response. It is controverted, but the negative opinion is certainly probable. The reason is that before Christ implicit faith in these mysteries sufficed; therefore also after his advent it ought to suffice; for justification ought not to be said to have been made more difficult. Besides, only that faith is required which is necessary and suffices for justification, or for an act of love of friendship: but implicit faith in these mysteries suffices for this. Therefore. - Nor does the proposition condemned by Innocent XI, under n. 64, stand in the way, which lies thus: "A man is capable of absolution, however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of faith; and even if through negligence, even culpable negligence, he does not know the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ": it does not stand in the way, I say; for deservedly it could be condemned by reason of the first part, in which generally, or in every case, it is asserted that a man is capable of absolution, however much he labors under ignorance of the mysteries of faith. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 2. - Suarez, disp. 12, sect. 4. - Lugo, disp. 12, n. 91. - Mazzella, disp. 3, n. 875.

Question 2. Can a penitent invincibly ignorant of the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and Incarnation be licitly absolved?

Response. Negatively, outside a case of necessity, for example, danger of death. The reason is that the opinion affirming that explicit faith in these mysteries is required by necessity of means is probable, indeed to some, such as St. Alphonsus, it seems more probable; and therefore the confessor absolving a penitent of this kind would expose the sacrament to danger of nullity. Hence the confessor ought either to dismiss him until he has been sufficiently instructed, or, what in many cases would be better, to instruct him, at least as much as is enough for eliciting an act of faith here and now, namely by clearly proposing those two mysteries and seeking assent to them.

But if the penitent were certainly in a state of vincible ignorance of these mysteries and did not wish to learn them, or invincibly ignored those things which are certainly of necessity of means, he could in no way be absolved even in danger of death, because he would be altogether incapable of receiving justification. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 3. - Baller., (a) and (b), p. 165.

Question 3. Is there an obligation of believing explicitly the precepts of the Decalogue?

Response. Many affirm this, because the precepts of the Decalogue were revealed that they might be observed by all; but several rightly contradict it, both because precepts of this kind can be known in another way than through revelation, and because these precepts were given not for believing, but for acting. - Nor should you say that the sacraments also were given for acting rightly; for the response is that they cannot be received worthily unless they are first believed to have been divinely instituted.

For the rest, although these precepts need not necessarily be known through faith, nevertheless they must be known under grave obligation; not indeed in order and as to the individual words, but as to substance. The same must be said concerning the precepts of the Church and concerning the Lord's Prayer, and some add also concerning the Angelic Salutation.

It has been necessary at all times, by necessity of means for salvation, to believe with supernatural faith, determinately and explicitly, these two things: namely, that God is the author of grace and the remunerator of glory.

Proof. from the Apostle, Heb., XI, 6, who says : Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he who comes to God must believe that he is, and is a remunerator to those who seek him. That the Apostle speaks of God and the remunerator in the supernatural order, namely, that he is the author of grace and the remunerator of glory, is evident : 1° because, when he says : he must believe, he speaks of supernatural faith, which he had defined shortly before, ibid., 1 : the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not. For things to be hoped for surpass the grasp of human understanding, and things that appear not cannot be investigated by human reason. 2° Because afterwards, in the same chapter, 14, he says of Abraham that, together with the other holy Fathers, he desired a better country, that is, a heavenly one ; and of Moses, ibid., 26, that, despising the treasures of the Egyptians, he looked to the remunerator, namely the heavenly one.

It is urged by reason. According to the ordinary providence, it is necessary by necessity of means for salvation that man, who is governed by reason, know the ultimate end toward which he tends, and the means by which one arrives at it. The ultimate end toward which man tends is the fellowship of the glory of God ; the means by which one arrives at it are grace and the acts of the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and love, elicited through grace. But man cannot know this end and these means by natural reason, but only by revelation ; for they are supernatural, nor does natural reason dictate that God wills to admit man into the fellowship of his glory, nor does it explain the means by which one arrives at it. Therefore.

I say 2° : After the Gospel has been sufficiently promulgated, explicit faith in the Incarnation and the Trinity is necessary for all, by necessity of means, unto salvation.

This opinion is more probable and more common. Understand, however, the necessity not from the nature of the thing, otherwise it would have been the same at all times, but from a necessity arising from the institution and will of God for this state of the law of grace.

[It is said, « after the Gospel has been sufficiently promulgated, » because it is supposed that before the said promulgation implicit faith in these mysteries was commonly sufficient, from the Apostle, Gal., III, 23 : But before faith came, we were kept under the law shut up, unto that faith which was to be revealed. I said « commonly, » that is, for the lesser and the common people. For it seems that the greater, that is, priests and doctors, who offered the sacrifices prefiguring Christ and expounded the prophecies concerning Christ to come, were bound, at least by necessity of precept, to know in some way the sacred significance of these things.]

Proof of the first part. 1° From Scripture. Christ, John., III, 14 and 15, says : As Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in him may not perish, but may have life everlasting. Now the looking upon the serpent was a means necessary to bodily health. Therefore also faith in Christ unto spiritual health. But that he speaks of explicit faith is clear from what he subjoins there : He that, he says, believeth in him is not judged ; but he that doth not believe is already judged, because he doth not believe in the name of the Only-begotten Son of God. τὸ ὄνομα designates the person ; τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος of the Only-begotten Son of God distinguishes him from the other persons. Therefore he speaks of explicit faith, and indeed of faith absolutely necessary ; because he who does not believe is already judged.

John., XIV, 1, Christ says : You believe in God ; believe also in me. Where he demands equal faith in himself as in God. Now explicit faith concerning God is necessary by necessity of means. Therefore also concerning Christ. Many other similar passages are read in the Gospel and in the Epistles of Paul.

Proof 2° from the Fathers and the Council of Trent. St. Augustine, book de Corrept. et Gratia, c. 7, n. 11 : « From this damnation, he says, they will not deliver themselves who can say they have not heard the Gospel. » Where he speaks of explicit faith, since he speaks of the faith of the Gospel, and asserts a necessity absolute and inexcusable, even from invincible ignorance, which implies necessity of means.

St. Thomas, here art. 7, c, where at the beginning he speaks of what is necessary by necessity of means, concludes thus at the end : « After the time of revealed grace, both the great and the small are held to have explicit faith concerning the mysteries of Christ. » And still more expressly in III Sentent., dist. 25, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiunc. 2 : « After the coming of Christ, he says, all, both great and small, are held to believe explicitly ; and if anyone should lack instruction, God would reveal it to him, unless he remained behind through his own fault. » Therefore he plainly holds that explicit faith is necessary by necessity of means, and not merely of precept ; otherwise, if one lacked instruction, he would be excused from its precept : which the holy Doctor does not admit, but recurs to the extraordinary means of revelation, which then would be owed.

Trent, sess. VI, cap. 6, treating of the disposition to justification and of the things that are to be believed for it, says : « They are disposed unto that justice itself when, roused by divine grace and aided, receiving faith by hearing, they are moved freely toward God, believing to be true what has been divinely revealed and promised ; and this above all, that the impious man is justified by God through his grace, through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus. » Further, if it is necessary « above all » to believe this concerning redemption through Christ, therefore nothing is more necessary. Therefore this explicit faith concerning the redemption of Christ is to be placed among the first things to be believed, and necessary before the others, consequently by necessity of means.

Proof 3° by reason. A more perfect faith of the Incarnation is required in the new law, in which this mystery has been accomplished and revealed, than in the old law, in which it was veiled. Now in the old law implicit faith of the Incarnation was necessary by necessity of means. Therefore in the new law explicit faith is necessary. — Proof of the minor, 1° from the Apostle, Gal., II, 16, who says : A man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ. 2° Just as the redemption of Christ is necessary, so also is faith in him ; for through faith redemption is applied, according to that, Rom., III, 22 : The justice of God, through the faith of Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all who believe in him. Now the redemption of Christ is and was necessary to all, at whatever time, by necessity of means unto salvation, as the Apostle teaches, Rom., V, 18 : As by the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation ; so by the justice of one, unto all men unto the justification of life. Therefore.

The second part follows from the first. Because explicit faith of the Incarnation, namely that the Son of God was incarnate and conceived by the Holy Spirit, cannot be had without explicit faith of the Trinity. Add that the Incarnation is only a secondary object of our faith, while the Trinity is the primary object. Therefore, if in the new law explicit faith of the secondary object is required, with stronger reason that of the primary object.

Both parts are confirmed by the Symbol of St. Athanasius received by the Church, where, after the holy Doctor expounded the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, he concludes : « This is the Catholic faith, which unless each one believe faithfully and firmly, he cannot be saved. »

I said : « After the Gospel has been sufficiently promulgated ; » because, from the advent of Christ until the sufficient promulgation of the Gospel, the same thing must be judged as concerning the time preceding the Incarnation, namely, that implicit faith concerning Christ sufficed ; since what has not been sufficiently promulgated ought not to be considered a means necessary to salvation. For that repugns the goodness of God and his gentle providence, as Bernard argues, epist. 77. Yet those to whom the Gospel had been promulgated in particular were bound by precept to explicit faith. When, however, the Gospel was sufficiently promulgated for all, it is uncertain. It is probable that this happened around the fortieth year after the ascension of Christ, when the temple of Jerusalem and the republic of the Jews were overthrown by the Romans.

[I say 3° : Explicit faith of each mystery is necessary by necessity of means, not only unto the second salvation, namely glorification, but also unto the first, namely justification.

This is against Cano and Bannez.

Proof. 1° from Holy Scripture. John., III, 14 and 15, cited in the proof of the first part of the second conclusion. Mark., XVI, 15 and 16 : Preach the Gospel to every creature. He who believes and is baptized shall be saved ; but he who does not believe shall be condemned. John., III, 36, Christ not only says that he who does not believe the Son shall not see life, but adds that the wrath of God abides upon him, that is, that he remains a sinner and unjust.

Proof 2° from the Tridentine passage cited there, where there is question, not only of glorification, but also and especially of justification. To this accords the response of the Congr. of the Holy Office, which, being asked : « Whether an adult who was in the article of death, and who promised that, after recovering his health, he would learn the truths of the faith, could be baptized, » replied on May 10, 1703 : « The promise does not suffice ; but the missionary is bound to explain to the adult, even though moribund, provided he is not altogether incapable, the mysteries of faith which are necessary by necessity of faith, such as above all the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. »

Proof 3° by reason. The just man is an adoptive son of God and heir of glory. Therefore, if implicit faith suffices for justification, it suffices also for glory ; which the adversaries do not admit.

Several cases are objected in which implicit faith of the Incarnation and the Trinity seems to suffice for salvation. 1° A boy nourished in the woods, or among barbarous nations, if he follows the guidance of right reason in the flight of evil and the pursuit of good, will be saved, according to St. Thomas. 2° If a boy, when he has attained the age of reason, is not instructed concerning the aforementioned mysteries, provided he converts to God, he will be justified. 3° Some are so rude and stupid that they cannot apprehend these mysteries by concept. The same must be said of the deaf and mute from birth. Yet salvation cannot be said to be impossible to them : otherwise God would not provide sufficiently for them.

I answer. to the 1st, with St. Thomas, de Verit., q. 14, a. 11, ad 1 : « If one so nourished followed the guidance of natural reason in the desire of good and the flight of evil, it is most certainly to be held that God would reveal to him, either by internal inspiration, the things necessary to be believed, or would direct to him some preacher of the faith, as he sent Peter to Cornelius, Acts., x. »

I answer. to the 2nd. The age of reason is moral, having some duration, within which the boy can be instructed, whether by God, or by an angel, or by a man. These extraordinary instructions ought not to be called miraculous, because they follow naturally from the will of God to save men.

I answer. to the 3rd. Intelligence is not required for faith, but assent, nor is anyone so stupid that, helped by the aid of grace, he could not apprehend the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Trinity at least confusedly and as to their substance. But if you deny this, those are to be numbered among infants and the insane who, without actual faith, by habitual faith alone received in baptism, are saved.]

From what has been said you will gather that those who are ignorant of the aforesaid mysteries of the Incarnation and the Trinity as to their substance, even if invincibly, are incapable of absolution, and that all confessions made in this ignorance are null and to be repeated, nor does it suffice ever to have believed them, if they are now in fact unknown.

(To this tend the following propositions condemned by Innocent XI on March 2, 1679 : « Man is capable of absolution, however greatly he may labor under ignorance of the mysteries of faith, and even if, through negligence, even culpable negligence, he does not know the mystery of the most holy Trinity and the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, » n. 64. — « It suffices to have believed those mysteries once, » n. 65.]

I. Question I. Is faith necessary to salvation? Answer. Necessity is twofold: one of means, the other of precept. That is necessary with the necessity of means, without which salvation cannot be had, even though its omission were free of fault. Thus infants dying without baptism do not attain eternal glory, even though the omission of baptism be blameless in them. But that is necessary with the necessity of precept, whose blameless omission does not impede the attainment of the end, though a culpable neglect impedes it. What is necessary with the necessity of means is at the same time necessary with the necessity of precept; but not conversely. The necessity of precept binds adults only. The necessity of means is twofold: one always in re, in fact — such as the necessity of habitual grace, of faith, hope, and charity; the other in voto, in desire — such as the necessity of baptism in respect of adults, who, adorned with habitual grace, can attain salvation with the mere desire of baptism.

II. That faith is necessary with the necessity of means, both in little children and in adults, no one calls into dispute. The discourse is now of actual faith.

III. For all adults endowed with reason there is necessary, with the necessity of means, an internal, actual, explicit, and supernatural faith, both for justification and for glory. Wherefore adults having the use of reason, though baptized in infancy, cannot attain eternal salvation without actual faith.

IV. Question II. Which articles are to be believed with the necessity of means? Answer. At every time, explicit faith in God as supernatural author and rewarder has always been necessary to all with the necessity of means, as St. Paul teaches, Hebrews 11: Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him.

V. After the fall of the human race into sin, both under the law of nature and under the law of Moses, actual faith in Christ the Redeemer, at least implicit, was always necessary to all adults with the necessity of means, as the Theologians commonly teach.

VI. For all adults, after the promulgation of the Gospel, explicit faith in the Trinity and the Incarnation is necessary with the necessity of means for the attainment of eternal salvation. This truth is expressly handed down in the Gospel. St. Matthew, chapter 28: Teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. St. Mark, chapter 16: Preach the Gospel to every creature: he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned. The contrary opinion, which Fr. Sporer defends — who cites for it Laymann, Tanner, and other more recent writers — is false, and adverse to the luminous testimonies of God.

VII. The Salmanticenses, treatise 21, chapter 2, point 2, number 18, Roncaglia, treatise 6, chapter 2, question 3, and other Casuists defend the position that it can happen per accidens that someone be justified by a merely implicit faith in Christ. For, they say, it can come about that to a Catechumen God is proposed as supernatural author and end, no express mention being made of Christ and of the Trinity. True enough. But it can also happen that no mention be made of God as supernatural author. What then? Arbitrary and utterly fictitious is the distinction given between per se and per accidens in this cause. For the divine Scriptures are plain. The experience which the Salmanticenses adduce is too amusing, since the justification of the ungodly leaps beyond the limits of our experience. St. Thomas is ineptly alleged for this opinion.

VIII. Question III. Is absolution to be denied to one ignorant of the mysteries of the Incarnation and of the Trinity? Answer. The affirming opinion is common, and the contrary utterly false. Wherefore this thesis was deservedly condemned by Innocent XI: A man is capable of absolution, however much he labor under ignorance of the mysteries of the faith, and even if through culpable negligence he know not the mystery of the most holy Trinity and of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. Fr. Viva, in his commentary on this thesis, number 7, distinguishes licit absolution from invalid absolution, and wraps up in that place several things which, in my judgment, are false. Wherefore adults who, wrapped in this ignorance, have frequented the sacraments, must repeat their Confessions, as being null.

IX. Question IV. Which are the heads of faith which adults are bound by force of precept to believe? Answer. All adults endowed with reason are bound to know and believe explicitly all the articles contained in the Creed. For that Creed contains the sum of the Christian profession, says St. Augustine in his book On faith and the Creed, chapter 1: Now the catholic faith is made known to the Faithful in the Creed, and committed to memory, in as brief a form of words as the matter allowed; so that for beginners and sucklings — for those who have been reborn in Christ, but are not yet strengthened by a most diligent and spiritual handling and knowledge of the divine Scriptures — there might be set forth in few words what is to be believed. All adults, therefore, must hold in memory the aforesaid mysteries of the Creed, so that, being questioned about them, they know how to answer. They must therefore believe and know expressly that God is one, omnipotent, creator of the universe, of all things visible and invisible, savior of the human race, giver of all sanctity and of graces, who forgives sins, bestower of glory; and that this one God is threefold in three distinct persons, of which one is not another, and all three are one.

X. Concerning the articles which regard the humanity of Christ, all must know and believe that the second person, namely the Son of God, was made man, who is called Christ, and is God-man. It is not required that they expressly know that the union of the human nature with the divine was made in the person, and the other difficulties, etc. They must also know and believe that Christ was conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost, and born of the Virgin Mary; likewise that he suffered and died — nor is explicit faith in the passion under Pontius Pilate required. They are equally bound to believe that he descended into hell according to his soul; that on the third day he rose again from the dead; and finally that he ascended into heaven, to the right hand of the Father, and will come to judge the living and the dead on the last day of judgment. The communion of Saints, moreover, must be expressly believed, although it does not constitute an article distinct from the ninth, which is: I believe the holy catholic Church. And the express faith of this article is supremely necessary. But they can scarcely believe that the Church is one assembly, one body, gathered in unity of doctrine and of sacraments under one head — invisible, Christ, and visible, the Roman Pontiff, Vicar of that same Christ on earth — unless at the same time they perceive that the Faithful, who are members of this mystical body, mutually aid one another, and that all spiritual goods, of which each partakes, are common.

XI. Implicitly, moreover, the Faithful must believe all the things which God has revealed in the holy Scriptures and in the word handed down, and which the catholic Church proposes to be believed.

D. Thomas says an article is named from ἄρθρον, which signifies the fitting together of the parts for motion: St. Bonaventure acknowledges this too, question 1. article 3. Calepinus, however, took the name from artus, a joint, because it is a particle into which the joints, or the members of the body, are resolved; and it is called articulus from arctando, constraining, a term applied both actively and passively to the mysteries to be believed: passively indeed, because it is a thing constrained, and just as the knots in the body are the parts into which the joints, or members, are resolved; so the articles are, as it were, the first principles into which the parts of the whole habit of FAITH are resolved: actively, however, because they constrain to belief.

HENCE St. Bonaventure gathers that the articles of faith are the first principles in faith, into which all the objects of belief are resolved, in the way that the joints are in the body, into which the members are resolved, even the tiniest of the fingers; and just as in the sciences, and in acts, there are first principles into which the conclusions are resolved, nor are those resolved into others, as Caspens also notes, disp. 1. sect. 12. Likewise they are the first distinguishers of the object of belief, in the way that the articles in Grammar distinguish the genders, and the cases. And in Rhetoric an article is called the distinction that is made in the science, and in the uttering. Since, therefore, the sciences, and the arts are the handmaids of Theology, as St. Bonaventure splendidly demonstrates in his opusc. On the reduction of the arts to Theology, for that reason it received the name of article, to signify the first heads, and principles into which all things believed are resolved, which are called the object of faith. Hence the Seraphic Doctor praises the definition of an article handed down by Richard of St. Victor: An article is an indivisible truth about God, constraining us to believe. It is called an indivisible truth, because things believed are ultimately resolved into the articles, for resolution stops at the indivisible. It is called constraining, etc., for it constrains, as a directive rule, toward all things to be believed. See Caspens, Cardinal de Lugo, Morandus, and others agreeing.

The Seraphic Doctor OBJECTS to himself against this definition, first, because an article is a divisible proposition.

HE ANSWERS that it is indivisible formally, because it is not divided into other articles, as credible things.

He objects second. If an article is an indivisible truth. Therefore it is one article, because truth is one. Then truth is God: Therefore it is not about God.

The Seraphic Doctor answers that an article is a truth as it is compared to something about God to be asserted, as that God is one; that there is a Trinity, etc.; and thus God is the subject of these truths.

He objects third. Among the articles there are some that are not about God, as the Resurrection of the flesh. It is answered that the resurrection of the flesh pertains to the Divine power.

He objects fourth. Because the articles of faith do not convince by reasonings: Therefore they do not constrain to believe. HE ANSWERS that they constrain the faithful who are enlightened, by the authority of the revealer; they constrain indeed not by compelling; but by removing every ambiguity: they constrain also by obliging; and by restricting, and by resolving into distinct principles the object of faith.

Presently the Seraphic Doctor, question 2., hands down another definition of the Article from D. Isidore. An article is a perception of Divine truth, tending to it. And he explains it thus: It is called a perception of Divine truth causally, because it is that by which we perceive the first truths of faith. It is called tending to God himself, whereby he shows that faith directs the will to God, to whom we are roused by the articles of faith. From this the Seraphic Doctor deduces the definition of the article, as it is the object of faith formed.

By this exposition the oppositions that are made against this definition collapse. See St. Bonaventure.

The ORDER of the things to be believed is given in the Symbol. Now the Symbol signifies a judgment, or mark, by which others may be distinguished from one another, and the bringing together of many into one, as D. Bonaventure notes, disp. 25. question 1. For the Symbol is said from Syn, which is together; and bole, which is opinion; hence a Symbol is the opinion of many, constituted out of several articles, by which the faithful are set apart from the unfaithful, like a watchword, as Valencia also notes, disp. 1. question 1. p. 5., from Rufinus in his exposition of the Symbol, and Cassian, book 6. de Incarn. to Leo the Pope. See also Tanner, disp. 8.

Now there is a THREEFOLD Symbol in the Church, as D. Bonaventure notes on the cited 5th question. The first is that of the Apostles, which is recited in the office. That it was composed by the twelve Apostles the old Fathers commonly assert; Clement I. epistle 1. Irenaeus book 1. chapter 2. Tertullian in the praescriptiones, Ambrose epistle 81. Rufinus in the exposition, Jerome epistle to Pammach. and on the errors of John of Jerusalem, Chrysostom homilies 1. and 2. on the Symbol, Augustine sermons 115. and 180. de tempore, Leo sermon 11. on the Passion of the Lord, and epistle 13. to Pulcheria, and with them St. Bonaventure and others.

The Seraphic Doctor adds, with Augustine and Leo above, that each Apostle set forth one article.

The SECOND Symbol is Athanasius's, which, as the Seraphic Doctor says, was drawn up chiefly against Arius. It is the one that is recited at the first Hour of Sunday. So testify Sts. Augustine on Psalm 120. in the enchiridion chapter 36. and book 5. on the Trinity, chapter 8. and epistle 174. and sermon 195. de Tempore. And St. Gregory Nazianzen on the praises of Athanasius; and, which is the chief point, the whole Church receives it. It is kept at Rome, written by him in Latin.

The THIRD Symbol is the Nicene, which is recited in the Mass with certain additions in the first Council of Constantinople: Toledo 8. and Florence; and separately by the Church there was added that clause: proceeding from the Son (Filioque), as we saw p. 2. tract. 1. disp. 10. question 2.

SUITABLY, however, the Seraphic Doctor shows that faith was ordered into articles first, that it might be Catholic, that is, a universal uniformity of faith among all peoples, which Irenaeus taught before, book 1. chapter 3.

SECOND, because Faith had to be handed on to all, even the simple, which would not be explicit enough in general terms, nor could they be instructed by profuse eruditions, as D. Augustine teaches, book on faith, and the Symbol chapter 1., Cyril of Jerusalem catech. 5.

Valencia adds, with D. Bonaventure, that it is useful, indeed most necessary, against heretics, to have a formula of faith, which, therefore, as heresies arose with the passage of the times, was enlarged, as I shall say in the following question.

The Seraphic Doctor shows, with D. Thom. question 1. article 8., that the articles are placed in a fitting order. He takes this order from the heads of things to be believed. First, then, the Divinity is to be believed: then the Trinity of persons: third the Humanity: fourth the Operations of the divinity; and last the works of Christ incarnate. As to the Divine essence, there is one article, just as the essence of God is most simple: I believe in God. As to the most holy Trinity, there are three articles. The first is: I believe in God the Father; the second is: In Jesus Christ, his son, etc.; the third: I believe in the Holy Spirit. As to the Operations of the deity, they are threefold. The first is the creation of nature, and it is noted when it is said: I believe in the Creator of heaven, and earth. The second is the bestowal of grace, and it is noted when it is said: I believe the Holy Catholic Church: the communion of Saints, the remission of sins. The third is the bestowal of glory: the resurrection of the flesh, life everlasting. And so there are seven articles concerning the divinity, looking to the divine essence itself: One looking to the Deity in itself; Three looking to the Trinity of persons, and the other three to the works of the Deity. Likewise concerning the humanity of Christ there are seven articles, according to the seven acts of the Redemption, which are ordered to our salvation. The first is the Incarnation, and on this is the article: Who was conceived of the Holy Spirit. The second is to be Born: Born of the Virgin Mary. The third is Redemption: He suffered under Pontius, and was crucified, dead, and buried. The fourth is the despoiling of hell: He descended into hell. The fifth is the triumph over death: On the third day he rose again from the dead. The sixth is the Ascension into heaven: He ascended into heaven, and sits at the right hand of the Father. The seventh is the Coming to judgment: From thence he shall come to judge, etc. See the Seraphic Doctor, dist. 25. question 1., assigning to each Apostle his own article.

The Seraphic Doctor marvels that these fourteen articles are set forth in Apoc. 1., where Christ was seen among seven golden candlesticks, and he had in his right hand seven stars; now the stars are the heavenly articles of the deity: but the seven golden candlesticks, of earthly substance, yet precious, are the seven articles of the humanity. The same he teaches in Hexaemer. sermon 8. and in the Centilog. sect. 38. and in the Diaeta, chapter 5. title 3.

He notes, however, that the articles are reduced to twelve; for the first contains the Deity; and the first Person, who is the Fount of all the communications of the Deity; and the work of Creation, all of which St. Peter asserts; and so there are twelve articles in a broad sense. See the Seraphic Doctor.

Therefore the Seraphic Doctor proves the sufficiency of the Symbol first from Cassian book 6. de Incarn. to Pope Leo.

SECOND, because faith is concerned with God: Now God is regarded in two ways, either in himself, as One, and Three; or in the Humanity assumed. Again. The Deity is not known on the way, except through the works; now three of these are the chief ones, Creation, Gratification, and Glorification. But the works of the humanity are related in the Symbol, which, since it was composed by the Apostles, full of the Holy Spirit, there is no doubt that it is fitting; for they were the masters of the Catholic Church. And so, although fourteen can also be counted, as St. Bonaventure teaches, loc. cit., Scotus dist. 25. question 1., nevertheless they are reduced to twelve.

Valencia, however, loc. cit., Morand. q. 4., Cardinal Lugo disp. 3. sect. 4., observes that the Symbol is not Canonical Scripture, because it was composed by the Apostles, as a brief formula for professing the faith already possessed. You will wonder, here, that the Mystery of faith, that is, the Eucharist, is omitted. But it is included in the omnipotence. See D. Th. article 8. to 6. It is also enclosed in the Church.

The COMMON opinion of Theologians is that all the articles of faith have always been believed implicitly, though not explicitly: so D. Bonaventure and D. Thomas here, where the Thomists, and all the Sententiarii with the Master, 3. dist. 25., where also Albert. art. 1 to 1. Scotus question 1. Durand. question 1. Richard. art. 3. question 2. Valencia question 1. p. 6. et others in Suarez on Faith disp. 2. sect. 6. Cardinal Lugo disp. 3. sect. 5. Aragon. here. Tanner. disp. 1. q. 1. n. 101.

I ASSERT first, that the articles of Faith, as to implicit belief, have not grown.

It is PROVED by the Seraphic Doctor first, because the Christian Faith is contained wholly in the new law, and the new law was enfolded in the old, as the whole in the wheel, as is said Ezech. 1.

It is PROVED second by the Seraphic Doctor. When the object is changed substantially, the habit is changed: Therefore if faith had a new object, believing what it did not believe before, it would be changed; but Faith, according to the diverse times, has not been changed, from D. Augustine epistle 51., Irenaeus book 4. chapter 13., and other Fathers; and so indeed what we believe, the Fathers believed explicitly as to substance, at least implicitly, so that even the holy Doctors who use this term teach, that it has not been changed as to substance, but according to accident; because what was believed implicitly of old is now believed explicitly, and so these articles were contained in the ancient ones, as more remote and more distinct concepts in the universal ones, as Valencia notes.

It is PROVED third by the Seraphic Doctor. For in ancient times all expected the Redeemer; but that he was to be a God-man, not all knew. So of the remaining articles looking to the passion, resurrection, and Ascension of Christ. The Seraphic Doctor explains this more fully in the body. These are the arguments for the opposite, granted in this sense in the replies.

It is PROVED fourth. As the object of Charity grew, so also of Faith; but all things must now be loved explicitly, even enemies; in ancient times they were to be loved implicitly: Therefore.

I ASSERT second, that not all things that are now believed explicitly were believed in the same way in ancient times.

It is proved first by the Seraphic Doctor from that of Exodus 6. I am the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: and my Name Adonai I did not show them, that is, I did not impart to them a clear knowledge of my Simplicity, and Unity, as D. Thom. expounds, question 174. article 6.

It is proved second by the Seraphic Doctor. As the Evangelical Law is related to the Mosaic as to morals, so also the faith of the new law to the faith of the old as to things to be believed; but the Gospel adds many counsels above the old law: Therefore the new law adds more things to be believed; yet not otherwise than by unfolding the implicit, as is clear from the foregoing. It is almost the argument of D. Irenaeus, book 4. chapter 47.

It is proved third by the Seraphic Doctor. For the Mysteries of the Incarnation, the Sacraments, and other things believed in the Church were not believed explicitly of old.

It is proved fourth by the Seraphic Doctor. The new Church knows many things that lay hidden from the Angels, as is said Ephes. 3. Therefore much more did these things lie hidden from the men of the old law.

A TWOFOLD necessity is assigned by the Theologians, after D. Bonaventure here, and in 4. dist. 12. p. 2. art. 2. quaest. 1. and dist. 3. p. 1. articulo 1. quaest. 3.

ONE is the necessity of means; another of precept. With the necessity of means, or of the end, that thing is necessary which, from the Law of God, by ordinary institution, is necessary for salvation, so much so that neither ignorance supplies for it, nor excuses it. That is necessary from precept which must be carried out necessarily, where the faculty and the occasion are at hand; yet not in such a way that, on account of ignorance or a lack of opportunity, the attainment of salvation is impeded. But some things are necessary in both ways, such as Penance after sin, the vow of Baptism, and faith, as the holy Doctor says at dist. 3. in the place cited.

THAT faith has always been necessary for the justification of adults, and for salvation, I proved in the first part of the Summa, Tract. 5. disput. 3. quaest. 10. And it is established by that passage of Hebr. 11. Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe, etc. And Ioan. 3. He who does not believe is already judged, as the holy Doctor discusses on cap. 3. Ioan. To this also pertains what is said in Sap. 9. Through wisdom they were healed, whosoever pleased thee, O Lord, from the beginning, as the holy Doctor indicates on that passage, for by wisdom he understands Doctrine from revelation. So also D. Ambrose on the First Epistle to Tim. 3. by Wisdom understands Faith.

THIS is the Catholic teaching. So D. Bonaventure in the places alleged, and in the prologue of the Breviloquium, and Lib. 2. of the Pharetra, cap. 23. where he brings forward many holy Fathers, and in the Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 3. and tit. 9. cap. 5. in which places he proves it from the Scriptures testifying that faith is the foundation of salvation, as Matth. 16. Upon this rock I will build my Church, namely upon Peter's confession, and upon faith founded on Christ as base. And in Hebr. 11. it is called Substance, or Foundation. And in the Hexaëmeron, serm. 8. he compares it to the Firmament. He proves it from Rom. 10. With the heart we believe unto justice: but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation. Heb. 11. Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for. Act. 15. Purifying their hearts by faith. And in serm. 9. he pursues the same point, proving the firmness of faith from many headings. And in serm. 10. he compares it to heaven, which is the universal cause of living things.

THERE FOLLOW D. Thomas 2. 2. quaest. 2. art. 3. where the Thomists. The Master 3. dist. 23. where the Sententiarii. Cano relect. de Sacram. in genere, p. 2. quaest. 2. Peter. ad Rom. d. 17. and cap. 2. d. 8. Valentia 2. 2. disp. 1. quaest. 2. p. 2. Sanchez Lib. 2. decal. c. 2. Suarez de fide, disp. 12. sect. 1. and 2. Becan. summae p. 2. cap. 12. and it is a dogma of faith. Nor had even the heretics almost ever denied it, except the Manichaeans, and the Pelagians, as Tannerus says, quaest. 7. num. 28. Scarcely one, Zuinglius, tom. 2. art. 12. says that Socrates, Aristides, Numa, Camillus, the Catos, the Scipios, Seneca, and others, were saved without faith, and Erasmus in the Tusculan Questions says the same of Cicero.

129. Thesis III. All men are obliged to accept Divine Revelation, when it has been made known to them, and to believe the mysteries which it may contain.

Explanation. We know indeed that a supernatural Revelation has been given to mankind. This, however, it is the province, not of Philosophy, but of Theology and kindred sciences to prove and discuss. Prescinding, therefore, from the actual state of things, we examine, from the standpoint of natural reason, what man's duties are in regard to Revelation if the latter should be made.

Part 1. Man is obliged to accept Divine Revelation. Proof. God is the Supreme Lord and Master of all His creatures. He has the right, therefore, to enjoin upon us the acceptance of certain truths which natural reason by itself is incapable of discovering, and to command the performance of certain acts of worship. This right connotes, on our part, the duty of accepting such truths and of performing such acts, when God's will in these matters shall have been made known to us. Now this is to accept Divine Revelation. Consequently, we are obliged to accept Divine Revelation when it has been made known to us.

Part 2. Man is obliged to believe in revealed mysteries. Proof. A mystery is a truth which human reason cannot comprehend. We may understand the meaning of the subject and the predicate of the proposition in which the incomprehensible truth is enunciated; we may know that such a predicate belongs to such a subject, but we cannot perceive how or why they are thus connected. Even in the natural order, many of the physical phenomena are incomprehensible truths, and may, therefore, be called, in a certain sense, natural mysteries. Revealed or supernatural mysteries are those truths which can be learned only by Divine Revelation; for example, that the three Divine Persons are one God. Now, God's infinite knowledge necessarily includes truths which surpass our finite understanding; such truths He is surely able to make known to us, and He has the right to demand our belief in the same as an homage of our understanding. Therefore, we are under obligation to believe the mysteries which God may be pleased to reveal.

130. Objections.

1. It is unworthy of a man to believe what he does not understand. Answer. If such belief were without a sufficient reason, yes; but if it is supported by the best of reasons, namely, the infallible authority of God, belief is truly worthy of man, and the contrary course would be most unreasonable.

2. Dogmatic teaching enslaves the intellect. Answer. An entire reliance upon authority in every science would be detrimental to intellectual development. But to reject the momentous truths of Revelation, because they come from authority, would be more unreasonable than to refuse belief in the existence of the Roman Empire, because we must depend ultimately for our knowledge of this historic fact upon human testimony.

3. The knowledge of mysteries is useless. Answer. On the contrary, it is most useful; besides giving us an occasion to honor God by the homage of our intellect, it wonderfully and consolingly expands our knowledge of God and of our own destinies.

4. Dogmatic teaching begets intolerance. Answer. Truth begets a theoretic intolerance, or a firmness of conviction which is intolerant of error. But we deny that such a state of mind, whether it rests upon authoritative teaching, or upon demonstration, causes practical intolerance, or an unjust interference with civil and religious liberty. The persecution of the Church in recent times, carried on in many lands by the opponents of Revelation, shows what begets intolerance.

131. If God deigns to bestow a Revelation upon us, He must necessarily give us the means of recognizing it as such. Chief among these means are miracles and prophecies. Miracles are effects perceptible by the senses, which transcend the powers and the order of all nature. We have demonstrated (Ment. Phil., Cosmol., Chap. III.) that miracles are possible, and can be known as such with certainty. Prophecies are accurate predictions of such future events as depend upon free causes, and cannot be known in advance with certainty, except by the omniscient God.