What scandal is

SCANDAL in its theological sense is any word or action which has at least the appearance of evil and is the occasion of sin to another. This is the received definition of active scandal. Passive scandal is the sin which another is led to commit through active scandal. It is quite immaterial whether passive scandal be a sin of the same species as the scandal which caused it or not; a priest who gets drunk may cause scandal by inducing others to follow his example, or by causing others to speak ill of priests or of the Catholic Church.

Scandal is direct when it is foreseen and intended. If it is intended precisely in order that another may fall into sin, it is called diabolic; if it is intended on account of the advantage it will bring to him who gives it, it is simply direct scandal.

Indirect scandal is foreseen by him who gives it, but it is not intended.

Scandal of the weak is caused by the ignorance or frailty of him who suffers it; pharisaic scandal is caused by his malice, as was the case with the Pharisees taking scandal at the words and actions of our Lord and his Apostles.

Giving scandal is of itself gravely sinful, as it is against charity; and it is a special sin against the precept of fraternal correction which obliges us to do what we can to rescue a fallen brother, whereas one who scandalizes his brother causes him to fall.¹ Although of itself scandal is a grave sin, it is frequently only venial in the concrete. The gravity of the sin is not measured by the malice of the sin which causes scandal, but by the malice of the sin which he who gives scandal foresees will certainly or at least probably be caused in another. Thus a gravely sinful word or act may be a venial sin of scandal, and a venially sinful word or act may be a grave sin of scandal. It is plain, too, that not every sin committed in the sight of others is a sin of scandal, but then only when it is forese n that at least probably it will cause others to commit sin.

¹ Cf. Matt. xviii 7.

There is a twofold malice in sins of direct scandal; such sins are against charity and also against that special virtue which he who suffers scandal violates. So that when A incites B to drink to excess, A sins against charity and against temperance, which not only prescribes moderation in one’s own actions, but forbids one to be the cause of its violation by another.

The question whether indirect scandal in the same manner also contains a twofold malice is disputed among theologians, The negative opinion is probable, for although the virtue of temperance, for example, forbids me to induce another to sin against it, and I violate temperance if I do so, yet temperance does not require of me that I should prevent others from sinning against it; I may sin against charity if I do not try to prevent a sin of intemperance in another, but I do not sin against temperance. And so when indirect scandal is given, thereby causing another to drink to excess, there is a sin against charity; but the sin of scandal does not contain in addition the malice of a sin against temperance.

When A solicits B to commit sin with him and B consents, both sin against charity and also against the virtue which is specially violated; so that although solicitation causes A’s sin to be greater, it does not constitute a specific difference, and need not be confessed.

What is scandal? - Scandal is defined: a word or deed less right, offering to someone an occasion of spiritual ruin. Word or deed, under which name omission also is understood. Less right, i.e., what either is evil in itself, as if you speak shameful things before a youth, or has the appearance of evil, as if, from a just cause, you eat flesh-meat on a forbidden day before others ignorant of that cause. Less right; for those things which are and appear right are expedient and edify. Offering occasion; although, metaphysically speaking, occasion is not the same as cause, nevertheless here that occasion is a true moral cause; for since the neighbor is really enticed by it and induced to sin, it exercises a true moral influence. Therefore a fortiori induction or solicitation and provocation to sin participates in the malice of scandal, which consequently contains the malice of direct scandal. Of spiritual ruin, namely mortal or only venial sin. Therefore spiritual ruin is not rumor, or the wonder of others, and a fortiori horror concerning the deed committed; but grave suspicions and rash judgments of others, detractions, calumnies, etc. Yet scandal is still had if occasion is given to another of sinning only materially, e.g., if another does the same, believing it to be licit, for instance if a priest offers an unconsecrated host to be adored. - Suarez, de Carit., d. 10, s. 1; de Cens., d. 6, s. 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 1; L. 43.

How many kinds of scandal are there? - Scandal is one kind direct, another indirect, according as the ruin of neighbor, or sin, either is intended, or, although it is not intended, nevertheless is foreseen, at least in confusion. And if the spiritual ruin of neighbor is intended, or the offense of God, it is called diabolical, against charity toward neighbor and God; but otherwise, if only the sin is intended, e.g., of fornication, but not as the spiritual ruin of another or as offense of God. - Likewise scandal is one kind active, another passive. Active is scandal given, and this is that to which the given definition belongs. Passive is scandal received, and is the spiritual ruin itself of the neighbor, which is improperly called scandal, since it should better be called the effect of scandal.

But scandal can be active, or given, without being passive or received, because an action apt per se for scandal can be posited without the effect following. And conversely it can be received without being given; but then scandal is not properly to be attributed to the action of neighbor, but rather to the ignorance, imagination, or even malice of him who suffers scandal, or admits it without foundation. But this is called scandal of the little ones if it flows from the infirmity or ignorance of neighbor; but it is called pharisaical if it comes from the mere malice of the subject. L. 43; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 1 ad 4; a. 3; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 127.

Resolves: It is not always scandal if you sin before others, but only when, attention being paid to circumstances both of the person acting and of those before whom the act is done, it can probably be feared that by this act those who otherwise would not sin may be drawn to sin. Hence blasphemy uttered before religious and pious men does not have the account of scandal, but of horror and abomination. Likewise it is not scandal to sin before vile and infamous persons who already for another reason are about to sin, as if someone fornicates before others who are already prepared to do the same and are not moved by his example. - L. 43, 44; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, a. 5; Struggl, q. 5, n. 29.

What kind of sin is scandal? Scandal is a grave sin from its genus, having a special specific malice, whether it is direct or indirect. Proof of the first part. Christ the Lord exclaims: Woe to the world because of scandals...! Woe to that man by whom scandal comes! Matt. 18:7. Therefore scandal from its genus, unless namely smallness of matter excuses, is a grave sin. Proof of the second part. Scandal is directly opposed to fraternal correction, in which the removal of the sins of our neighbor is intended. Therefore it has a special specific malice against charity toward neighbor. Proof of the third part. "For if charity obliges one to correct neighbor and to impede him, when we can, lest he fall into sin, how much more does it oblige one not to impel him to sin by counsel or example?" L. 45; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, aa. 1, 4; E. M. 422.

Resolves: He sins only venially by reason of scandal who offers to another occasion of only venial ruin. This is true even if he directly intends that ruin, and indeed through a mortal act. For charity is not then gravely injured. On the contrary, he sins gravely by reason of scandal who offers to another occasion of mortal ruin, although he does this through an indifferent work, or only a venial one, e.g., if a religious utters joking and slightly shameful words before women, or before those who can take from them occasion of mortal sin. L. 44; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 43, aa. 4, 6; Ithur., Cas. 35.

Scandal given, as it is against charity, so from the same charity must be repaired. For if charity obliges us to correct a sinning neighbor, lest he sin, much more is he bound to draw neighbor back from sin who brought him into sin by scandal. It is regularly repaired by ceasing from scandal, by giving good example, by frequenting church and the sacraments, by detesting delicts and crimes. And if someone has spread false doctrines, by revoking and publicly retracting them.

What is the special malice of scandal? In direct scandal there is given sin not only against charity, but also against the virtue to whose violation the neighbor is induced. But in indirect scandal, both the opinion affirming and the opinion denying this other special malice are probable. Proof of the first part: 1. from the common opinion of theologians. 2.

Because any virtue prohibits not only that someone injure it, but also that he will and cause it to be injured by others. Proof of the second part: 1. because for each opinion there are grave theologians. 2. Because, as the indirect voluntary suffices for sinning, so also it suffices for sinning against such a virtue with respect to which it is indirectly voluntary; whence it is that in morals the direct and indirect voluntary pertain to the same species. Therefore probably in indirect scandal there is given sin not only against charity, but also against the virtue which is injured by the neighbor. But against this is that virtues do not oblige us to impede in others opposed vices, even if foreseen, but only that we not intend and procure that others injure them. It is proper only to charity alone to forbid giving another an occasion of injuring it. Therefore probably in indirect scandal there is not given sin against the virtue which the neighbor violates. "For just as in natural things that which is per accidens does not constitute species, so neither in moral things, in which that which is intended is per se, but what follows beside intention is as it were per accidens." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 39, a. 1. - Lugo, de Poen., d. 16, nn. 159, 168; Struggl, q. 5, n. 21 seqq.; L. 44, 45, 46, 47; l. 3, n. 537.

Resolves: It suffices in Confession to express generally the sin of scandal, nor is it necessary to indicate the species of sin to which others were indirectly induced. Much less is it necessary that circumstances be expressed which perhaps add species to the sins of others, e.g., whether those who could be induced to lust by a shameful speech or picture are married or bound by vow, etc. The circumstance of soliciting and inducing another to sin, e.g., to fornication, is only an aggravating circumstance, and therefore it suffices to confess the fornication alone. For the same malice of induction or scandal is had, although less, when someone does not solicit but only consents; for by consenting he still participates with the other in his sin, and is a cooperating cause toward his ruin. Therefore this malice is only more aggravated within the same species if someone positively solicits another. And the same must be said about shameful conversation and similar things. Thus Lugo, whose opinion seems sufficiently probable to St. Alphonsus, "since even in cooperation toward fornication there is present a sin against charity, well distinct from the sin of cooperation toward fornication, by cooperating toward the ruin of the other party." L. 46.

840. 1. Notion and species. (A) Scandal, from the word skandalon, literally designates any obstacle placed in the way, at which, if someone strikes, he must stumble or fall; metaphorically it is someone or something by which a man is induced to err or to sin.² It is defined by St. Thomas as "a saying or deed less right, furnishing occasion of (spiritual) ruin."

¹ Besides the authors cited above, cf. Vieux Moraliste, apud Ami du Clerge, t. XXIII, 1901, p. 1195.

² Grimm, Lexicon graeco-latinum, 4th ed., 1903, p. 401.

Therefore three things are required for scandal: (a) an external act, or the omission of the same; for a merely internal act, since it is unknown to others, cannot induce them into sin. This act can consist in words, deeds, manner of conducting oneself, etc.; or in the omission of some external act, when from this the neighbor can be induced to the omission of some duty. (b) An act less right, whether in itself, or by reason of the person or circumstances; for an act good in every respect does not allure others to evil; yet it suffices that the act have the appearance of evil; thus one who eats meat in the presence of others on a prohibited day can scandalize those who do not know that this is done for a legitimate cause. (c) An act furnishing to another an occasion of ruin, or at least of some spiritual harm. It is not required that the neighbor actually suffer some spiritual harm, but it suffices that, all things considered, an occasion is probably furnished to him for sinning, whether gravely or lightly. It matters little whether the sin to which the neighbor is induced is of the same or of a different species; scandal is truly given whenever it is probably foreseen that, by the less right action which is performed before him, the neighbor will commit some sin which otherwise he would not have committed. Wherefore, if it is morally certain that those before whom the evil action is performed are so confirmed in virtue, or already so determined to sin, that this action has no influence upon them, there is not truly a sin of scandal. Yet it is not licit to ask from the neighbor an evil thing, even if he is habitually disposed to doing it; for it is more grave actually to sin than to be disposed to sin.

Theologians commonly say that scandal properly is not committed by one who draws others back from perfection, without inducing them to sin. Whatever may be the case, by acting thus he sins against charity, which demands that we furnish others a good example: "So let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father who is in heaven."³

³ Matt. 5:16.

841. (B) Scandal, on the part of the intention, is direct, when the sin of another is truly intended; indirect, when it is only foreseen, without being intended in itself (above, n. 168). (a) Direct scandal is called diabolical when the sin of the neighbor is intended insofar as it is an offense of God, or the ruin of another, for example, when someone has conversations against the faith directly in order to tear faith out of hearts; it is called simply direct when the sin of the neighbor is intended for another end, for example, for one's own utility or pleasure, as often happens in filthy speech. - To direct scandal can be referred in practice the sin of inducement, by which someone, by command, prayers, counsel, and other modes of this kind, solicits or provokes another to sin: then he is not only the occasion, but also a partial cause of the sin. (b) Indirect scandal happens in many ways, for example, when someone sins before others, foreseeing that they will fall from this into the same sin; when he does those things which, although not evil in themselves, are morally dangerous and probably allure others to sin; when something less right is accomplished, from which it is foreseen that certain persons will abandon the faith or despise religion; when something legitimate in itself is required, from which, however, it is foreseen that others will fall into sins of hatred or blasphemy.

2. We sin indirectly against the spiritual welfare of our fellowmen by giving scandal.

Scandal (scandalum) is defined by St. Thomas, following St. Jerome, as "something less rightly done or said that occasions another's spiritual downfall."¹⁰

¹⁰ St. Jerome, In Matth., l. II, c. 15 (Migne, P. L., XXVI, 107); St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, 43, art. 1.

If the "thing less rightly said or done" is immoral, either in itself or at least according to outward appearance, the scandal is called active or objective (scandalum activum). If the act or utterance in question is apt to give scandal merely in an accidental way, and the offense to others, therefore, arises from their own intellectual or moral condition, the scandal is called passive or subjective (scandalum passivum). Subjective or passive scandal, consequently, is identical with the sin caused by the act by which scandal is given (ruina spiritualis).¹¹

¹¹ See Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 214: “A distinction is made between direct or indirect scandal, accordingly as the neighbor’s sin is intended by the agent or only foreseen, at least in general. Direct scandal is also called diabolical when the spiritual ruin of the neighbor is precisely intended. But if the sin of another is intended for one’s own advantage, it is called simply direct. Theologians commonly distinguish active and passive scandal. Active scandal is that to which the given definition applies. Passive scandal is the spiritual ruin of the neighbor itself and therefore is improperly called scandal, and should better be called the effect of scandal.”

It follows from what we have said that not every active scandal entails passive scandal, while, conversely, passive scandal may exist where no active scandal has been given. The reason for this is the spiritual and moral disposition of men.

If one takes scandal because of his own ignorance or indecision, this is called scandalum pusillorum vel infirmorum; if malice is the cause of the scandal taken, we speak of scandalum pharisaicum.¹²

¹² Matth. XV, 11–20; XVIII, 6 sqq.; John VI, 62; Gal. V, 11; 1 John II, 10.—Cfr. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 214: “Scandal can be active or given without being passive or accepted, because an action may be posited which is of itself apt to give scandal without the effect following. And conversely, scandal may be accepted without being given; but then the accepted scandal is not properly to be attributed to any action of one’s neighbor, but rather to the ignorance, imagination, or even malice of him who suffers the scandal—or rather admits it without foundation. This is called the scandal of the little ones if it is taken from the weakness or ignorance of one’s neighbor; but it is called pharisaical if it proceeds from the mere malice of the subject.”

606. Divisions. Scandal is divided in many ways. Besides the division into active and passive scandal, of which mention has already been made, the following subdivisions are to be noted:

1. Active scandal is subdivided into direct scandal and indirect scandal. The former is had if the intention of the agent is borne toward the sin of another, e.g. by command, counsel, seduction, etc. The latter is had when the sin of another is not indeed intended, but is foreseen, and notwithstanding the foresight, the act which furnishes the cause of another's sin is not omitted; e.g. if someone publicly commits a sin, foreseeing that others will thereby be induced to some evil. Therefore indirect scandal is like an indirectly voluntary evil or even like the voluntary in a qualified sense, concerning which see above n. 53 sq.

Direct scandal is again subdivided into direct formal or diabolical scandal and into direct scandal simply. The former is when someone from hatred of God or neighbor by his action principally intends the perversion of neighbor. It is deservedly called diabolical, because such a man truly acts like the devil, "who as a roaring lion goes about, seeking whom he may devour."¹⁰⁷ The latter is when a man by his action does not indeed directly intend the formal sin of another, but something else with which sin is joined, e.g. his own pleasure, vengeance, etc. But since he cannot attain that end without the sin of another, he also indirectly intends this sin.¹⁰⁸

2. Passive scandal is subdivided into scandal given and into scandal accepted or taken. The former is that which is produced from the truly evil action of another, e.g. a girl is seduced from wanton speeches which someone publicly utters. The latter is that which does not arise from the evil action of another, but from an action right and good in itself, which nevertheless is taken by another, either from ignorance and weakness or from malice, as an occasion of sinning. If passive scandal arises from ignorance or imperfection, it is called scandal of the little ones, e.g. if someone should take scandal on seeing a priest on a two-wheeled machine (commonly Velociped), thinking this to be prohibited to priests of itself. But if passive scandal is taken from malice, it is called pharisaic, because the Pharisees, seeing the best works of Christ and His miracles, nevertheless were scandalized from their own malice and ill will.

From the explanations given it follows that sometimes active and passive scandal are simultaneous, e.g. if someone commits sin precisely because another has given a true occasion. In this case there is had on one side active scandal and on the other side passive scandal given. But sometimes there is active scandal on one side, namely, when someone does a work inductive to the sin of another; but on the other side there is no passive scandal, because that man strongly resists the temptation arising. Finally, sometimes there is passive scandal without active scandal, namely, if someone from his own weakness or malice takes an occasion of sinning on account of a truly good work apprehended. In this case passive scandal accepted is had.¹⁰⁹

In order that the divisions of scandal may more easily be furnished at one glance, we place the following schema:

1. active
   direct (per se)
      formally direct or diabolical
      materially or simply direct
   indirect (per accidens)

2. passive
   given
   accepted
      of the little ones
      pharisaic

Malice of scandal.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. 1 Petr. 5, 8.

¹⁰⁸ This is the common division of scandal given by moderns, e.g. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I 628; Noldin, De praec. n. 103; Gopfert, Schindler. Another is the division given by St. Thomas (S. theol. l. c. a. 1 ad 4), namely, active scandal is subdivided into scandal per se and scandal per accidens. Scandal per se is present "when someone by his evil word or deed intends to induce another to sin, or even if he does not intend this, the deed itself is such that of its own nature it has that it is inductive to sinning." If the agent intends the sin of neighbor precisely as it is sin (namely, led by hatred of God or neighbor), it is called diabolical scandal; but if he intends only the action of another, with which sin is necessarily connected, it is scandal simply direct. To this scandal per se there corresponds, in him who falls into sin on account of scandal, scandal given. - Scandal per accidens is a word or deed which, beyond the intention of the one operating and beyond the condition of the work itself, is an occasion of sin for another on account of his weakness or malice. Passive scandal arising from scandal per accidens is either pharisaic or of the little ones.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 43, a. 1 ad 4.

607. Principle 1. Direct scandal is a mortal sin from its genus, and indeed both against charity and against that virtue to the violation of which neighbor is induced.

Proof 1. From Sacred Scripture. Christ says: "But he who shall scandalize one of these little ones who believe in Me, it is expedient for him that an ass's millstone be hung on his neck, and that he be drowned in the depth of the sea. Woe to the world because of scandals! For it is necessary that scandals come; nevertheless, woe to that man through whom scandal comes."¹¹⁰ From these entirely grave words it is manifestly established that scandal from its genus is a mortal sin.

Proof 2. Scandal is against charity, which gravely prohibits injuring the spiritual good of neighbor. Hence St. Thomas teaches: "Active scandal is always sin in him who scandalizes: because either the very work which he does is sin; or even if it has the appearance of sin, it is always to be laid aside on account of charity toward neighbor, by which each one is bound to provide for the salvation of neighbor; and thus he who does not lay it aside acts against charity."¹¹¹ But since all sins which are directly against charity are mortal sins from their genus, hence the sin of direct scandal is mortal from its genus. - Not only charity, however, but also that virtue is injured which the scandalizing person or the scandalized person violates. Hence active direct scandal commonly includes three sins; e.g. he who acts immodestly before a girl in order to seduce her commits three grave sins, namely, a double sin against chastity (namely his own sin and the girl's sin, which is also imputed to him), and a sin against charity, insofar as he harms the girl.¹¹² - Direct scandal, although from its genus it is a mortal sin, nevertheless can become a venial sin; and indeed not only from imperfection of the act, insofar as the one scandalizing acted with half-full advertence or imperfect consent, but also from smallness of matter.

The gravity of scandal depends on many circumstances. It is always a mortal sin if the one scandalizing by his action, which perhaps from its object is not gravely sinful, intends the grave sin of neighbor. For such a depraved intention gravely injures charity, although perhaps the neighbor in reality did not consent to the seduction furnished to him.

The following general rules can be had for judging the gravity of scandal:

The guilt of scandal is the graver, according as a) the sin of neighbor is more willed; b) the action more influences the sin of neighbor; c) the sin committed by neighbor is graver.

The guilt of scandal is the lighter, according as a) the defect of sufficient deliberation is greater; b) the action itself influences neighbor more lightly; c) the sinful matter to which neighbor is induced is lighter, e.g. if someone is induced to a small officious lie.

Note. The malice of scandal becomes greater if the scandalized neighbor truly falls into sin. But even if the one scandalizing (directly) foresees that his solicitation will probably be fruitless, nevertheless he commits the sin of scandal. Wherefore prostitutes soliciting men to sin cause scandal as often as they solicit, although often they foresee that they themselves will suffer rejection.

¹¹⁰ Matth. 18, 6 sq.

¹¹¹ S. theol. l. c. a. 4.

¹¹² Cf. nevertheless below n. 611 concerning a girl freely consenting to fornication.

608. Principle 2. Indirect scandal is indeed a sin against charity, but not against that virtue which is injured by the scandalized person.

Thus St. Thomas and very many of his Commentators,¹¹³ such as Cajetan, Banez, Ioannes a S. Thoma.¹¹⁴ The same opinion is held by several modern authors, such as Ballerini,¹¹⁵ Lehmkuhl,¹¹⁶ Noldin.¹¹⁷ The mind of St. Thomas, concerning which authors dispute much, nevertheless seems to be sufficiently clear; for the Angelic Doctor writes: "Active scandal can be taken in two ways: namely per se and per accidens; per accidens indeed, when it is beyond the intention of the agent; as when someone by his deed or disordered word does not intend to give to another an occasion of ruin, but only to satisfy his own will: and thus also active scandal is not a special sin; because that which is per accidens does not constitute a species."¹¹⁸ - St. Alphonsus holds the opposite opinion, saying: "He who directly or indirectly induces neighbor to sin, sins in two ways, namely, both against charity and against the virtue to the violation of which he induces neighbor."¹¹⁹ The holy Doctor cites for this opinion of his many authors, some of whom nevertheless are not rightly alleged. - The first opinion seems to be better, because in indirect scandal there is not properly a willing and approval of another's sin, but rather its permission, which is not necessarily imputed to the one giving indirect scandal. Besides, in practice there is not such great difference between the two opinions, as Concina himself,¹²⁰ patron of the second opinion, admits. - The following things are to be attended to in practice:

¹¹³ On S. theol. 2, 2, q. 43, a. 1-4.

¹¹⁴ On 1, 2, q. 18, disp. 10, a. 1.

¹¹⁵ In notes to Gury, Comp. Theol. mor. I, n. 236.

¹¹⁶ Theol. mor. I 789.

¹¹⁷ De praecept. n. 104.

¹¹⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 43, a. 3. The same Angelic Doctor teaches the same still more explicitly, 4, dist. 38, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiunc. 2. The mind of St. Thomas is explained excellently by Cajetan in the Commentaries on S. theol. l. c. a. 1.

¹¹⁹ Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 45. - G. J. Waffelaert discusses this controversy at great length and breadth in "L'espece morale du scandale." His general conclusion is: "1. Every scandal contains a species against charity. 2. Indirect scandal is not, generally speaking, a sin of the same nature as that to which it gives occasion" (p. 145).

¹²⁰ Lib. 1 in Decal., diss. de scand. c. 2.

609. Resolves: 1. He who without sufficient cause gives indirect scandal through an action good or indifferent in itself sins against charity only. Hence scandal of the little ones or pharisaic scandal foreseen and culpably not impeded is a sin against charity in him who was the voluntary occasion of those scandals. Wherefore, e.g., a priest legitimately dispensed from the law of fasting and eating meat before laymen, foreseeing that they will be scandalized and perhaps by his example be induced to eating meat on forbidden days, indeed sins against charity, but not against temperance. In confession he is bound to say: Legitimately dispensed, I ate meat before laymen, foreseeing that they would take scandal from it, and I neither warned them concerning my dispensation nor had any sufficient reason for so acting.

2. He who gives indirect scandal through an evil action performed before others commits a double sin to be declared in confession, namely, one through the evil action considered in itself, the other through injury to charity, because he was an occasion of spiritual harm for neighbor; but he does not sin against the virtue which neighbor perhaps violated on account of indirect scandal. Hence, e.g., he who committed theft before others, foreseeing, but in no way intending, that a neighbor, having seen this evil example, would also commit theft, indeed sinned against charity by publicly perpetrating theft, and he is bound to declare this in confession, but he did not sin against justice from the fact that the neighbor also committed theft; and a fortiori he is not bound to restitution on account of the theft committed by neighbor.

Or St. Alphonsus himself¹²¹ and several other authors, thinking that in this case there is a double sin against justice, do not oblige him who gave indirect scandal to restitution. But other favorers of the second opinion, speaking more logically, oblige to restitution in this case. Therefore Billuart,¹²² a favorer of the second opinion, says: "If [someone] by his example efficaciously moves another to damage, he sins equally against justice with respect to the one damaged, as if he moved him by counsel or persuasion." But he who efficaciously counsels unjust damage, beyond all doubt, is bound to restitution. And in truth, as will be taught below in the treatise on unjust damage, with all theologians agreeing, an unjust damager is bound to restitution if his action was truly, formally, and efficaciously unjust. But according to the second opinion the action of him who by his example causes the damage of another is truly, formally, and efficaciously unjust. Hence logically it would have to be inferred that from such indirect scandal there arises an obligation of restitution. This, however, very few authors teach and require in practice. Hence the first opinion, also on account of this reason, namely, because it proceeds more logically, is to be preferred in theory and besides is safe in practice.

3. He who culpably gives indirect scandal before many probably commits as many sins against charity as there are persons truly scandalized. The reason is that charity is injured toward each scandalized person, inasmuch as each scandalized person is a total object. Hence, e.g., he who has uttered filthy words before twenty persons gathered together ought (insofar as he morally can) to declare in confession the number of persons scandalized. But since in practice it is often impossible to indicate the exact number of persons scandalized, and since indirect scandal frequently is not a mortal sin, whether on account of smallness of matter or on account of imperfection of the act, it is often enough to declare in confession in a general way that such a sin was committed before many. - According to the first opinion reviewed above in Principle 2, it is not necessary to confess the special condition of the persons scandalized through indirect scandal. Hence, e.g., it is not necessary to confess that filthy words were uttered before a nun, or a blood relative, or a married person. But sometimes the condition of the one scandalizing is to be explained, as if a superior, father of a family, parish priest, etc. scandalized subjects, because these are bound not only from charity but from office to guard against the ruin of their subjects.¹²³

4. An action gravely sinful from its nature, perpetrated before others, is not scandal if it exercises no causality at all upon the neighbor seeing or hearing; e.g. if those before whom such an evil action is committed are so stable in good that they are in no way moved; or conversely, if they are imbued with such lost morals that they are no longer induced to sin from the evil action of another, but have been accustomed to sin from their own malice or passion.¹²⁴ Thus in theory; but in practice the circumstance that a gravely sinful action was done before others is generally to be accused, because this circumstance not only aggravates the sinful action, but also often produces true scandal, since it is almost impossible to establish whether an action of this kind exercised absolutely no harmful causality upon neighbor or not. Hence, e.g., he who would commit fornication, others even of the most lost morals being present, would have to confess this circumstance of the sin committed. For it is almost impossible that so great a foulness seen should move nothing toward lust. Authors commonly teach that it is a true sin of scandal if someone directly induces another to a thing evil in itself, even if that other had already before been prepared for sin. The reason is that a new actual ruin is caused to the other. Wherefore that man acted illicitly who, doubting whether a woman living in his house was a prostitute, disguised, sought fornication from her in order to expel the doubt. When the woman immediately consented to sin, she was cast out by the man.¹²⁵

¹²¹ L. c.

¹²² De carit. diss. 7, a. 6, § 3.

¹²³ Cf. Billuart, De carit. diss. 7, a. 6, § 3.

¹²⁴ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 45.

¹²⁵ Cf. S. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 47.

S. Th. II-II, q. 43, a. 1-6.

958. Active scandal is defined: A less right word or deed furnishing an occasion of spiritual ruin. It is said:

1. word or deed, but not something desired, because a merely internal sin cannot furnish to another an occasion of sinning. But since affirmation and negation are reduced to the same genus, therefore under the name of word or deed there also comes omission: not said, not done;

2. less right, that is, what according to itself is evil or at least has the appearance of evil; as if someone speaks of shameful things before an adolescent, or for a just cause eats meat on Friday before others who are ignorant, or works on Sunday: for nothing disposes to spiritual ruin except according as it has a defect of rectitude, because that which is properly right rather fortifies man against a fall than induces him to ruin;

3. furnishing an occasion of spiritual ruin, both a) because scandal is not the efficient cause of another's sin, but this cause is his will alone, and b) because for scandal it is not enough that someone sin before others (for scandal does not fall upon the perfect man nor upon the altogether impious),¹ nor is it required that the ruin of neighbor in fact follow, but that an occasion be furnished to him, that is, that the action, either always or in these circumstances, of itself be naturally apt to move him to sin. But if the action does not move in itself, but by accident someone is moved to sin on account of it from his own disposition, the scandal will not be active, but only passive (a. 1, ad 4).

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, q. 43, a. 5; and St. Alphonsus, Th. M., l. 2, n. 47, ad 5: "He is not judged to give scandal who, although he sins publicly, nevertheless does this before those who either are so vile, or infamous or wicked, or who are so upright that no one is moved to sin, for example, if someone fornicates before others who are prepared to do the same and are not moved by his example; or if before the meek someone contends, quarrels, or strikes another."

959. Active scandal is a mortal sin. - It is proved:

a) From the words of Christ, Mt. XVIII, 6-7: "Woe to that man through whom scandal comes" (Rom. XIV, 13, 20; I Cor. VIII, 13).

b) From reason: Charity obliges under grave obligation (by an affirmative precept) to correct neighbor and to impede him from rushing into sin; therefore much more (by a negative precept) it obliges us not to impel him to sin by counsel or example.

It is mortal from its genus; because it can be venial not only on account of imperfection of the act, but also on account of smallness of matter, if the other is induced only to venial sin, even if this is formally intended.

Moreover the sin of scandal is so much graver as the ruin of neighbor is greater, and as it is more intended, and as it follows more from our action (for example, given before an adolescent or by a priest), and as the persons who are moved to sin are more numerous.

960. Active scandal is divided by reason of efficacy: into direct, when someone is the true moral cause of the sin of neighbor, which is done by command, counsel, seduction, praise, request to commit sin, etc.; - and indirect, when someone places a less right action which is only a probable occasion of sinning for neighbor, as an evil example is.

Direct scandal is a sin not only against charity but also against the virtue to the violating of which it induces neighbor; indirect scandal is a sin, but probably against charity alone. Hence if someone by command, counsel, etc., has led someone to sin mortally, for example, to commit adultery, the species of sin to which he led him, in the case adultery, must be declared in confession; on the contrary, if someone has scandalized by evil example alone, it suffices to confess: I gave grave scandal. The reason is because any virtue obliges not only that we not violate it, but also that we not be a cause and positively procure that it be violated by others; but it is not proved also to oblige that we not furnish to another the mere occasion of violating it, nor that we impede its violation. And indeed the sin of another cannot be imputed to us (directly and in itself) unless we are its cause. Whence he who only gave to another the occasion of stealing (by example or intemperance) is not bound solidarily to restitution, and this is a sign that he did not sin against justice. And similarly concerning other virtues.²

² Do not say that it is indirectly imputed to us, insofar as we are bound to impede it, while direct and indirect voluntary are of the same species; - for we are bound to impede the sin of another insofar as it is his evil and is against charity, not insofar as it is such an evil and of such a species, and is against such a virtue.

961. Active scandal is divided by reason of intention: into directly or explicitly intended, whether it is formally and in itself intended (as an end), if someone explicitly intends the sin of neighbor insofar as it is sin (which is called diabolical scandal), or is simply intended (as a means), if someone explicitly intends the sin of neighbor on account of his own utility or pleasure; - and implicit or interpretative, if someone does not intend the sin of another but only places a less right action from which it can probably be feared that another will be drawn to sin.³

³ That scandal which is formally intended is called by St. Thomas active in itself, that is, from the intention of the agent or on the part of the one operating, "when someone by his inordinate word or deed intends to draw another to sinning," and it is called a special sin, because "the end gives species in morals"; - any other active scandal whatever, even direct, is only scandal by accident, or "besides the intention of the agent, as when someone by his inordinate deed or word does not intend to give another an occasion of ruin, but only to satisfy his own will, and thus even active scandal is not a special sin, because what is by accident does not constitute a species." Thus in article 3; elsewhere St. Thomas uses similar terminology but in an entirely diverse sense, which must be carefully noted. For example, in article 1, ad 4, every active scandal is called a cause of sinning in itself, on the part of the work, "when someone by his evil word or deed intends to induce another to sinning, or even if he does not intend this, the very deed is such that by its character it has that it is inductive to sinning"; - but in merely passive scandal, the deed of one is a cause of sinning for another by accident, "when both besides the intention of the one operating and besides the condition of the work someone badly disposed takes occasion" of sin.

But just as someone can sin by a merely internal act, not indeed by the sin of scandal, but by a desire or affection for scandal, so also by an internal act someone can desire the sin of another more than he procures it externally by scandal. Hence if someone directly and explicitly intends to procure the sin of another by merely indirect scandal, as if by evil example alone he explicitly intends to lead another to lust, he indeed sins by desire or affection against the virtue (for example, of chastity) which he intends to be violated, which must be declared in confession; but the external sin of scandal, as being indirect, is against charity alone.

But if someone formally, with a diabolical intention, intends the sin of neighbor, he commits a special (that is, a distinct species) and most grave sin against charity toward neighbor, directly opposed to fraternal correction, by which he explicitly intends as an end the special and most grave harm of neighbor, which is spiritual ruin. But the end gives species to human acts. Otherwise the character of scandal is as it were a circumstance changing the species of another sin.

962. There is an obligation of repairing active scandal, as much as can be done: for if anyone from charity is bound to forestall the fall of another and to procure the amendment of one sinning (or erring), a fortiori he who through scandal was the occasion why another sinned is bound. The obligation arises from charity alone, because no injury is done to one knowing and willing; not, however, from justice or office, unless someone used unjust means, for example, deceit, force, fear, or unless a superior gave scandal to subjects for whose spiritual good, by force of his office, he ought to provide.

As regards the mode of reparation: 1. It suffices to repair implicitly indirect scandal given by example alone, namely, by cessation from scandal, good example, public reception of the sacraments, prayer for the one scandalized, etc.

2. Direct scandal, given by depraved counsel, false doctrine, depraved books, machination against the Church, etc., must be repaired explicitly, so that first its further influence is removed, and then the evil caused is compensated, so that he who suffered scandal may be recalled to good. Thus wicked counsel and false doctrine are to be recalled, machination against the Church is to be publicly detested, the diffusion of depraved books is to be impeded as much as can be done, and good books are to be written or spread.

3. Hence public scandal must also be repaired publicly, both so that its further influence may be removed, and so that the reparation, by which they are warned concerning the evil, may become known to all and profit them.

The mode of public reparation can be diverse: either a retraction drawn up in writing is published through public newspapers, or it is done before witnesses (two) who will afterwards publish the matter, or before the parish priest who will afterwards publish that the sinner has satisfied his obligations, provided it suffices for removing the scandal. But since the sacraments cannot be ministered to the unworthy, it is clear that he who has not removed public scandal cannot be publicly admitted to the sacraments; indeed, the minister would commit scandal, because he would furnish an occasion of judging that the sacraments are ministered to the unworthy and that scandalous actions are tacitly approved. Thus a public concubinary is bound first to leave the shameful commerce and its occasion before he publicly receives the sacraments. - In practice it belongs to confessors, parish priests, and bishops to determine the congruent mode of reparation.

963. Observations. - 1. It can happen that a sin grave according to itself is venial scandal, for example, if your grave theft is an occasion for another to commit light theft. Conversely, a sin light according to itself can be grave scandal of disobedience or irreverence or injury or immodesty, for example, if a religious utters a less honorable word before women or those who from it can take occasion of sinning mortally, or a priest keeps a suspect person at home.

2. Scandal can contain several other malices acceding to it, either on account of the quality of the person scandalizing, for example, if a father scandalizes children, a superior subjects, a teacher disciples: for these are bound not only from charity but also from office to forestall the ruin of subjects; or on account of the quality of the person scandalized, as if someone directly induces a married person, or one bound by a vow of chastity, to shameful things; or on account of the mode in which it is committed, if unjust means such as force or threats are employed.

3. "Some deed is not therefore scandal because another begins to suspect or think evil concerning such a man, because this latter does not sin if he suspects on account of sufficient indications. Nevertheless it is otherwise if he begins to think evil concerning the Catholic faith, the clergy, a religious order, or to be less disposed toward piety" (St. Alphonsus, l. II, n. 44, 6). For it makes no difference whether the sin by which scandal is given furnishes an occasion for sins of the same species or for sins of a diverse species. Hence those give scandal more easily who are of greater authority, or piety, or esteem.

But two things are to be noted here:

1st. Direct scandal is also called diabolical when the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor is formally intended. But if the spiritual ruin of another is not intended, but only one's own utility or pleasure, it is called simply direct.

2nd. Any scandal whatsoever can be active or given, without being passive or accepted; because an action apt of itself for scandal can be posited, without one's neighbor taking from it an occasion of spiritual ruin. And vice versa there can be accepted scandal, without its being given; but in that case scandal is not properly to be attributed to the action of another, but rather to the ignorance, imagination, or even malice of him who suffers scandal or admits it without foundation. If it is taken up from weakness or ignorance, it is called scandal of the little ones; but if it arises from the mere malice of the subject, it is called pharisaical. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 43.

I Say 1st. Scandal, even indirect, is a grave sin from its genus, because from its genus it is opposed by commission to charity, since it is directly opposed to fraternal correction: for this draws one's neighbor away from sin, but that on the contrary draws him to sinning. Wherefore besides the proper malice of the action, which is called scandalous, there is had the specific malice of scandal, by which charity is injured. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 43, art. 3.

I Say 2nd. Scandal of the little ones or of the weak is to be avoided whenever it can be done without grave inconvenience, by omission both of an indifferent work and also of a good work not prescribed. The reason is that by charity we are bound to impede the ruin of our neighbor who needs our help, when we easily can, for example, by abstaining from an action not very useful, or by deferring it, or by explaining our manner of acting, etc.; but the little ones need help, since because of ignorance or weakness they are placed in a certain spiritual necessity. Therefore. - But St. Thomas well observes that scandal of the little ones after admonition for the most part becomes pharisaical. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. cited, art. 7.

I Say 3rd. Pharisaical or malicious scandal, at least ordinarily, is not necessarily to be avoided either by omission of a good work or by omission even of an indifferent work not having the appearance of evil. The reason is that those suffering scandal from their malice alone are not in a necessity from which they cannot easily free themselves without the help of another, and otherwise a place would be given to the wicked for impeding good works whenever they wished.

Question 1. In scandal is there had not only a sin against charity, but also against the virtue to violating which one's neighbor is induced?

Response. Affirmatively, as to direct scandal; for any virtue specially forbids not only that it be violated, but also that someone directly induce another to violate it. But as to indirect scandal there is much dispute, but the negative opinion which Lugo defends with others seems probable. The reason is both that virtues do not oblige us to impede the opposite vices in others, but only not to induce our neighbor positively and directly to violate them; and that otherwise he who by his example moves another to steal would be bound to restitution, which the Doctors most commonly deny. In this opinion it is enough that the penitent express generally the sin of scandal, without being bound to add the species of sin to which others were indirectly induced. Much less is it necessary to express circumstances which perhaps add a species to the sins of others, for example, whether those who are induced to lust by foul speech are married or bound by vow, etc. Cf. Lugo, de Paenit., disp. 16, n. 159. - Baller., note (b), p. 207.

Question 2. Are precepts sometimes to be omitted on account of scandal of the little ones?

Response. Negatively, as to negative precepts of natural law, because these oblige always and for always, and works contrary to them are intrinsically evil. But affirmative precepts, because these do not oblige for always, it is sometimes licit and indeed necessary to omit, for example, the precept of correcting sinners, if graver ruin is to be feared from it; or rather it must be said that then the law itself ceases. As to positive human precepts, there is controversy. The more probable opinion affirms, excluding grave inconvenience, because the precept of avoiding scandal to one's neighbor, as being natural, is to be preferred to positive precepts. Hence a woman knowing that she will be shamefully desired by someone, if she goes to the prescribed Mass, is bound to omit it once or twice, if there is hope that afterward the scandal will cease; but not several times, on account of the grave inconvenience which would result from it. But because the negative opinion is also probable, a burden concerning which there is no certainty must not be imposed. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 51. - Baller., note (a) and (b), p. 206.

Question 3. Are you bound to give up temporal goods in order to avoid scandal?

Response. Negatively, ordinarily speaking, because charity toward neighbor does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Hence you are not bound to pay more than is fair to a workman or coachman, although you foresee that otherwise he will blaspheme; for that inconvenience, although light in itself, can occur rather often, and thus easily becomes grave; nay, it could rather often be an incitement to blaspheming. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 52.

Question 4. Must one sinning with an accomplice declare in confession the circumstance of solicitation?

Response. Negatively, more probably, provided either from the nature of the sin, or from the mode in which the sin is accused, the confessor sufficiently understands that some accomplice was present. The reason is that by the simple communion of crime it is effected that there was mutual scandal, and indeed active on each side, between the one soliciting and the one consenting, and therefore, once that has been declared, the sin of scandal also is declared. But that one of the accomplices placed the cause of scandal before the other is a merely aggravating circumstance, which does not change the species of sin. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 46.

Question 5. Is it licit to persuade someone determined upon a greater evil to a lesser evil?

Response. Affirmatively, more probably with St. Alphonsus. Yet some limit this if the lesser evil is contained in some way in the greater, as beating in homicide, etc.; which limitation, however, does not seem necessary to the Holy Doctor. Certain other theologians, as, for example, Cardinal de Lugo, posit another limitation, namely provided that to one willing to inflict greater harm on one person, you do not persuade lesser harm to be inflicted on another. But others deny that this limitation also is required. - But the reason of the solution is that this kind of counsel tends formally to this, that a greater sin not be committed; from which it happens that he from whom a robber steals what is less is not reasonably unwilling concerning him who gave the counsel. - Cf. Vasquez, Opuscul. de scand., art. 1, dub. 2, n. 14. - Baller., note (b), p. 208.

Thence you conclude that if someone persuades another to inflict a lesser harm so that a greater evil may be avoided, he is not bound to restitution: not by reason of a thing received, because he has received nothing; not by reason of unjust damaging, because by his counsel he rather usefully managed the matter of another. Nor is the one giving counsel bound to restitution who has brought help to another, for example, to a robber, because he manages the master's matter usefully. And this conclusion is of very grave moment, namely lest an obligation of restitution be imposed where there truly is none. Sanchez, de Matr., l. 7, disp. 11, nn. 17, 18; De Lugo, De Just. et Jure, disp. 19, n. 44.

Question 6. Is it licit to permit an occasion of sinning so that the guilty person may be corrected?

Response. Affirmatively, because to permit is not to induce, and often there is a sufficient reason for permitting sin. Hence parents and masters are of themselves to be excused from sin who allow sons or servants to sin, in order that they may find an opportune place of correcting them. Indeed it is licit also, at least probably, to place an occasion of sin, provided the act is indifferent, and a just cause is present for placing it. Hence a master ought to be excused from sin who, deliberately, leaves the key attached to the chest in which money is stored, in order to test the doubtful fidelity of a servant; but in no way can a father be excused who keeps a prostitute at home, in order that he may take an experiment of his son's chastity. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 58.

Note. - From the doctrine handed down thus far, all cases concerning scandal could already be solved, but because of special difficulties it will be useful to say something in particular concerning luxury, bad books, dances, and spectacles.

II. Scandal is twofold, active and passive. Active is that which I have described, and which can be committed in three ways. 1. Directly and formally, when someone expressly intends the spiritual ruin of his neighbor; and this is called the scandal of demons. 2. Directly but not formally, when someone induces another to sin, not because he intends the malice, but because he wishes to satisfy his own appetite. 3. Indirectly, when it is foreseen, or can be foreseen, that from such an occasion the neighbor will take occasion of spiritual ruin.

III. Passive scandal is the very spiritual ruin of him who suffers the scandal, an occasion having been accepted from another's word or deed. Passive scandal is often joined with active, as when one gives, and another accepts, the occasion of sinning. Sometimes there is active scandal without passive, as when someone furnishes an occasion of sinning, but the other, scorning such an occasion, remains constant in virtue. Passive scandal without active occurs when someone, from an innocent occasion, seizes a handle for sinning — either from ignorance and infirmity, and this is called the scandal of the little ones; or from malice, and is called pharisaical scandal.

XX. The scandal of the little ones must nevertheless be distinguished from pharisaical scandal. To avoid the former, a woman, when she foresees that she will be shamefully loved by this determinate man, must for some one occasion either omit Mass, or go to another Church, or defer hearing Mass: since the precept of avoiding scandal prevails over the precept of hearing Mass. But in practice this rarely happens, because the scandal of the little ones — of those who sin either from ignorance or from mere weakness — rarely occurs. For men commonly sin from malice, and so the scandal is pharisaical, which, according to all, must be despised when it cannot be avoided without a disturbance of order. A girl, or a beautiful woman, foresees that she will be shamefully loved by certain men at such a banquet, because she knows that certain immodest men, burning with lust, will attend there: if she can abstain from such a banquet without grave inconvenience, she is bound to restrain herself, because the precept of charity presses, that the danger of a mortal sin being perpetrated by the Neighbor be avoided, when this can be secured without notable detriment. Read more in Tome II on the Decalogue, dissertation 9, chapter 10.

Scandal signifies the striking of the foot against some stumbling block, as D. Jerome says in cap. 15. Matth. and D. Bonaventure p. p. Compil. sect. 31.

It is from the Greek Scandalon, which signifies an obstacle, a stumbling block; Σκάνδαλον, which among the Greeks signifies that little wooden trigger in the trap, which when the mouse touches it, to gnaw the bait, the fall of the little board follows.

THEREFORE Scandal among Theologians is that which is the occasion of spiritual ruin given to one's neighbor. Hence they define it: Scandalum est dictum, vel factum minus rectum, praebens proximo occasionem spiritualis ruinae, Thus D. Thom. here, Alensis part. 2. quaest. 189. memb. 1. Richard 4. dist. 38. art. ult. quaest. 1. Durandus there, quaest. 3. Maior quaest. ult. art. 1. Adrian quodl. 1. art. 1. Sylvester and other Summists under the word Scandalum. Couar. R. l. CL. in cap. Peccatum, de reg. iuris, part. 1. num. 5. and D. Bonaventure in speculo animae, cap. 1. et parte prima Centiloquii, sect. 31.

It is said dictum, vel factum (a word or deed), because it must be something external. It is said minus rectum (less right), because it is not necessary that it be absolutely evil; but it suffices that it be less right, deficient in one circumstance of those integral ones whereby the good is constituted, according to D. Dionysius, cap. 4. de divin. nominibus. The omission of a duty is also included.

Scandal is DIVIDED first into Active and Passive. Active is that which we have just defined; Passive is the spiritual ruin itself of another. See S. Bonaventure in the place cited of the Centiloquium.

SECOND, active Scandal is divided into Scandal per se, and Scandal per accidens. Scandal per se we call in this place, when from a certain and express intention the occasion of ruin is given, promoting it, soliciting it, persuading to it, exhorting to it. Per accidens is twofold: one with respect to the agent, not with respect to the work, as when one sins in the face of others with such a crime, as induces of itself to sin, even if he does not intend this; with such Scandal one sins in maintaining a concubine in the face of his sons, and it is called general. The other is per accidens, both with respect to the agent, who does not intend to induce others to sin; and on the part of the work, which is not of its own nature an incentive to sin, even if it abound with a defect (naevus).

They DIVIDE the Active per se further into that whereby the spiritual ruin of one's neighbor is formally intended; and into another, whereby only the pleasure or utility of the sinner is intended, but not formal ruin. And each of these is called special by many.

Passive SCANDAL is subdivided into Given (Datum) and Taken (Acceptum). Scandal Given is that which arises from the Active Scandal of another; and it is called the Scandal of the little ones, which is to be guarded against, according to the saying of Christ, Matth. 18. Qui autem Scandalizaverit unum de pusillis istis, expedit ei ut suspendatur mola asinaria in collo eius, et demergatur in profundum maris; this also arises from the weakness of the beholders. Scandal Taken is that which arises not from the occasion given, but taken, from one's own malice, and it is also called Pharisaical. Of this Christ says Matth. 15. Sinite illos: caeci sunt. For of this one must not be concerned.

It is CERTAIN first, that every Scandal, even per accidens given, not by direct will, but from the work, is mortal of its own nature.

It is PROVED first from D. Bonaventure p. p. Centil. sect. 31. et ad 17. Lucae from that passage Matth. 18. Vae homini illi, per quem Scandalum venit. Expedit ei ut suspendatur mola asinaria in collo eius, et demergatur in profundum maris, which the B. Lucas likewise testifies, where from Bede in the Gloss he observes, that a most grave punishment is imposed to be rather endured than eternal; and that the former will be useful to him.

It is PROVED secondly from D. Bonaventure there. Because it fights against Charity, leading souls down to hell. It is also against justice, snatching from Christ souls created, and redeemed by his blood; of which it is said Sap. 11. Tua sunt omnia Domine, qui amas animas. Hence the Apostle gravely, prima Corinth. cap. 8. says: Peribit infirmus in tua scientia frater, propter quem Christus mortuus est? Sic autem peccantes in fratres, et in Christum peccatis. Wherefore Apoc. 2. he declares: Habes tenentes doctrinam Balaam, qui docebat Balac mittere Scandalum, etc. Poenitentiam age: si quo minus, etc.

It is PROVED thirdly from S. Doctor, because as for one who builds up by good example a great reward is prepared, so for one who destroys the work of God, a great punishment. Wherefore Rom. 14. Noli propter escam destruere opus Dei.

It is PROVED fourthly from S. Doctor, because it is a great cruelty to seduce the simple, as it is said Levit. 19. Nec coram caeco pones offendiculum.

It is PROVED fifthly, because one who scandalizes is held to that penalty: Animam pro anima.

But this is a greater sin in public persons, as Prelates and religious, of whom Malach. 2. Legem requirent ex ore eius. Vos autem recessistis de via, et scandalizastis plurimos in lege: Propter quod et ego dedi vos contemptibiles.

You will OBJECT that in Matth. 18. it is said: Necesse est ut veniant Scandala. But what is necessary is not a fault.

S. Doctor ANSWERS, in the place cited that it speaks by supposition, that they are evil, and most truly of Passive Scandal by supposition of the active; nay, by supposition of malice, which is scandalized even at holy works, as the world was scandalized at Christ John 7. Matth. 13. Mark 11. prima Petri 2. and Paul says Christ was a Scandal to the Jews, and in Luke 2. it is said: Positus in ruinam multorum. Thus Valencia also answers puncto 2. and others.

It is CERTAIN also, that passive Scandal per se is a mortal or venial sin, according as the sin itself will be.

It is CERTAIN also, that Scandal from the intention of drawing into the ruin of souls, or into some crime, as such, is a special Scandal; for it is opposed to beneficent Charity.

The QUESTION is now: whether he who induced another by command, counsel, etc., even if he did not directly intend his ruin, is guilty of the special crime of Scandal. Moreover, whether also not only he who intends merely to draw others to that pleasure for himself, but also he who kindled by the sole wickedness of the work gives evil example, is guilty of a special Scandal against Charity.

The FIRST opinion is that it is a special sin. Thus Adrian in 4. dist. 38. quaest. ultim. Antoninus 2. part. titul. 7. §. 4. cap. 4. Navarre relect. in cap. Consideret, de Poenit. disp. 5. and in the Manual, cap. 6. number 19. Valencia disp. 3. quaest. 18. puncto 2. where he also cites Alensis part. 2. quaest. 189. memb. 2. The same think Peter Soto Lect. 9. de confess. Suarez de Charitate, disput. 10. sect. 2. Layman Lib. 2. tract. 3. cap. 13. Tannerus disp. 2. quaest. 6. dub. 8. citing also Victoria and the modern Thomists, Sylvius 2. 2. The SECOND opinion is, that this scandal is a mere aggravating circumstance. Thus D. Bonav. in 4. dist. 38. dub. 2. lit. D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 43. art. 3. Caietan there, and in summa, V. scandalum, Couar. relect. in cap. Peccatum, part. 1. num. 5. Bannes quaest. 43. art. 4. Durandus 4. dist. 38. quaest. 3. Palud. there, quaest. 6. Fagundez part. 2. Lib. 4. cap. 4. Ledesma Tom. 2. Tract. 4. cap. 5. concl. 5. Lorca 2. 2. quaest. 43. sect. 3. disp. 56. num. 7. Villalob. summa, Tom. 2. tract. 3. diffic. 8. Becanus 2. 2. cap. 27. quaest. 2. Coninck de act. supernaturalibus, disp. 33. dub. 5. num. 35. Filliucius in Tom. 1. tract. 28. cap 6. num. 216. Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 43. art. 3. Sanchez summa, Tom. 1. lib. 1. cap. 6. Vasquez prima secundae, disp. 102. cap. 4. Azor Lib. 4. cap. 7. quaestio 1. Diana part. 3. tract. 4. resol. 114. and part. 5. Tract. 2. which is entirely on scandal, where resol. 2. he refuses to recount the opinions of the Doctors, because this disputation seems metaphysical; for as to practice it matters little, because according to the common opinion of D. Bonaventure, in whatever way you give the occasion of spiritual ruin, you are bound to confess it. In the same manner speak some of those cited above, especially Layman, and Hurtado 2. 2. disp. 173. sect. 8. §. 61. Fuliensis lib. 2. cap. 12. Bassaeus, and others.

I ASSERT with this opinion, that scandal of this kind is only an aggravating circumstance.

It is PROVED from D. Bonaventure and D. Thom., because sin is not named from the person against whom it is; whence if anyone offended several with one contumely, he would commit one sin; but it is taken from the act about which it is, and about that which is per se intended, not about that which is per accidens. Therefore that which is beyond the formal intention pertains to the species of the act only reductively, as Valencia also acknowledges.

Valencia ANSWERS that the assumption is true of that which is beyond every intention and without all voluntariness; and that it does not look to the moral act, nor has anything whereby it is reckoned among moral acts. But it suffices for the Seraphic Doctor, if the act does not have moral being per se, but needs to be reduced to something else, that it not constitute a distinct species of moral act.

Valencia OBJECTS. In every other matter in which sin is specified by the harm or injury inflicted, the tacit and indirect, or virtual intention, is equivalent to an express intention, at least for the commission of a sin of such a species: Therefore also in the matter of scandal. The antecedent is proved: For he truly commits the sin of detraction who rashly says something, from which follows damage to the reputation of his neighbor. Likewise he truly commits the sin of theft who takes another's property, not with the intention of harming his neighbor, but of benefiting himself; and he who commits fornication in a sacred place commits Sacrilege, although he does not expressly intend to inflict injury on the sacred place: Therefore. Caietan admits the knot of this argument, saying he does not know how to solve it, quaest. 53. art. 2. ad 3.

Yet it is ANSWERED that the cases are different: for all have moral entity per se, nor do they need to lean on another; not so in our case. As to the first; many judge it probable that it is not a sin. As to the second case, there is a direct will, for he necessarily wills to snatch from another to benefit himself. The third case is of a different matter, about which the act per se takes place in the Church, if the fornicator wills certainly to fornicate in that place, even if he does not principally intend this.

You OBJECT secondly. He who scandalizes by a good act truly commits the sin of scandal, as Caietan and Paludanus concede; although he only indirectly wills the ruin of his neighbor: Therefore also he who scandalizes by an evil act. For the latter is not in a better condition than the former; nor does the fact that his act is otherwise evil stand in the way of its being, for another reason, at the same time in another species of sin, as appears from the doctrine of D. Thom. prima secundae, quaest. 18. art. 10. I do not think (says Valencia) this argument can be solved.

It is ANSWERED with D. Bonaventure by denying the Antecedent: For the former sins against prudence, and so that circumstance of the act is not a sin per se; and by this the third objection is answered.

You OBJECT thirdly: If the formal intention is necessary for the special sin of scandal; rarely, or never, will one sin by the sin of scandal. For how rare is the man so imbued with diabolical poison as to will the special and spiritual ruin of others? and yet in Scripture this sin is described as frequent Matth. 18. prima Corinth. 8.

It is ANSWERED easily, that a direct intention is not necessary, namely that you will to lead him directly into spiritual ruin, namely to hell; but it suffices that you will to lead him to sin in such a way, and persuade, solicit, threaten, etc. Alas, how frequent are these acts. In this sense some of the second opinion do not deny that it is a special sin. Thus D. Bonaventure in speculo animae, cap. 1. et lib. 3. Phar. cap. 39. where the SS. Fathers cited seem to think this, and ad 17. Lucae, and in 4. in the place cited he seems to speak the same.

From what has been said you will gather how one who has given scandal ought to behave in confession.

INDEED it seems that this circumstance need not be confessed, according to the doctrine of D. Bonav. de circumstantiis aggravantibus, and I shall say 3. part. Tract. de Paenit. disp. 2. sect. 3. quaest. 5. Thus many affirm on this matter.

However, COMMONLY they teach that it is to be confessed. Thus Lorca, Villalobos, Becanus, Coninck, Fagundez, Ledesma, cited above, to whom Diana almost subscribes Part 3. Tract. 4. resol. 114. with D. Bonaventure. Nay, Sylvius, Filliucius, Sanchez, Layman above, Bonacina de sacrament. disp. 5. quaest. 5. sect. 2. puncto 2. §. 3. diff. 3. num. 21. and Diana point out that the number of persons and their condition must be expressed, to whom the scandal was given, even with a single sin, and in what way, whether in conversations about fornication? about unspeakable things? or about betrothed women (conjunctis)? Wherefore these two last cry out blind confessors who do not ask these things. Diana again subscribes Part 5. Tract. 7. resol. 3. adding Paludanus, Molsheim (Molfesium), Leo, and others.

NOTE truly first, that soliciting a defiled (patatam), or a prepared (paratam) woman,¹ is a probably direct scandal, to be said in confession, according to Sanchez lib. 1. cap. 6. num. 14. Bonacina tract. 1. disp. 5. quaest. 5. puncto 2. §. 3. Vasquez quaest. 91. art. 1. disp. 4. Fill. tract. 28. num. 231. They make an exception, if by an explicit act it were sufficiently perceived, as was said, that you fornicated with a woman, one could gather that you sought this; for a woman, for the most part, is not accustomed to ask. ¹ Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'sollicitare patatum, vel paratam' (djvu layer: 'follicitare pararum, vel paratam'); the first word is a corrupted form; rendered 'patatam' (defiled, feminine, agreeing with foemina), as the English rendering already assumed.

Others, however, admit it is not to be confessed; for it does not induce, since he finds it prepared. Thus Fagundez praecept. 2. lib. 4. cap. 5. Suarez 3. part. tract. 4. disp. 22. sect. 4. num. 18. Henriquez lib. 2. de paen. cap. 6. num. 7. Diana part. 1. tract. 7. res. 34. Azor tract. 2. lib. 12. cap. 16. quaestio 5. Bassaeus §. 1.

To SOLICIT one not yet prepared, however, is called by Diana indirect scandal; but I refuse it, for many do not excuse doing works in the face of the perfect which inflame; for even these fall, as David 2. Reg. 11. seeing Bethsabee in the bath. Solomon 3. Reg. 11. See D. Thom. art. 5. and 6. Perhaps you will excuse yourself, if you opine that the beholders are not to be moved, as many say with Diana, Tract. de scandalo, resol. 3. or if they have been so carried along that they are not moved on that account. See there.

1. What is the sin of scandal and what is the difference between direct and indirect scandal ?

Scandal is any word or action having at least the appearance of evil which is the occasion of sin to another. When another’s sin is intended by him who gives scandal, this scandal is direct; when it is foreseen but not intended, it is indirect.

1. What does scandal mean, and what are its species?

2. What is the malice of direct and indirect scandal?