Simple Cessation of a Vow

227. By simple cessation the obligation of a vow ceases:

1. If its principal end or motive cause ceases: for when the end ceases, the reason of the obligation ceases, because the one vowing did not will to obligate himself except for obtaining the end which determined him to vow. Therefore he who vowed a pilgrimage for obtaining the health of his son is not obligated by the vow once the son has died. But a vow does not cease when the secondary end or impulsive cause ceases, because the vow does not depend upon it. Thus he who, for honoring a saint, vowed to give alms to Peter, whom he thought poor, is held to give it to another needy person.

2. If the matter becomes physically or morally impossible, even by fault of the one vowing.

Thus he who vowed to build a chapel is not held by the vow if unexpectedly he falls into poverty; and he who, after making a vow of receiving the Eucharist on that day, deliberately breaks the fast, is no longer held by the vow, from the general principle: transgression of a vow does not obligate to compensation, but only to penance.¹

3. If the matter becomes illicit, useless, or impeding a greater good.

Thus he is not held by the vow who promised to give alms to someone, if this would serve only for drunkenness; nor he who promised to relieve a necessity if this afterward ceases; nor he who vowed a pilgrimage on that day, if for this reason he cannot serve those infected with a disease which in the meantime has begun to rage.

4. If the circumstances of the one vowing or of the matter are notably changed, namely in such a way that, if the one vowing had foreseen the change, he would not have made the vow: for a vow does not obligate beyond the intention of the one vowing.

Therefore as often as the intention of the one vowing cannot be presumed in determinate supervening circumstances, the vow does not obligate; but it does obligate if the change could in some way have been foreseen. Hence a vow of chastity is valid, even if vehement temptations supervene: for he who vows chastity promises to overcome all difficulties rising up against it. In like manner a vow of ministering to the sick is valid, even if danger of death from a contagious disease supervenes. On the contrary, he who after making a vow of a Roman pilgrimage falls into poverty, so that he cannot pay the expenses of the railway, is not held to go to Rome on foot.

¹ Cf. Suarez, l. c., l. 4, c. 15, n. 17 ff.

The causes of simple cessation are: 1. lapse of time attached for ending the obligation; 2. substantial change of the matter promised; 3. defect of the condition on which the vow depends; 4. defect of the final cause (can. 1311).

I. Lapse of time, namely time attached for ending the obligation. When time ought to be judged attached in this way, see n. 649.

II. Substantial change of the matter promised. This has place if the matter becomes evil, indifferent, or less good than its omission. Likewise if the matter is notably changed because of a supervening and unforeseen circumstance. The reason is that the intention of the one vowing is judged to be interpreted in this way; indeed, not without foundation is notable change said to constitute a morally diverse object (St. Alphonsus, III, 226). Hence one who has vowed, for example, to build a church, is not bound by the vow if and as long as, because of damage following in the state of his fortune, the execution of the vow is rendered difficult. Except from the rule stated: 1. if it is a question of public vows, which are: religious vows, solemn as well as simple, perpetual as well as temporary, substantial as well as those which are annexed to them; likewise a vow annexed to Sacred Order; 2. if the discussion concerns a supervening difficulty which the matter of the vow carries with it by its nature, or which follows from the changed disposition or will of the one vowing. The reason is that in the former case, since the common good demands it, every supervening circumstance is judged to have been comprehended in the vow; in the latter case, the circumstance of grave supervening difficulty, since the very nature of the thing carries it with it, is judged to be contained in the vow. Hence, for example, a vow of chastity, even one emitted in the world, does not cease because of a difficulty afterward arising, even if it was unforeseen (St. Alphonsus, IV, 50). Besides, note:

1. If the matter of the vow has become unsuitable or impossible in part, the obligation also ceases as to the other part if the matter of the vow is either indivisible by nature, or was intended undividedly by the one vowing; but it persists if the matter of the vow both is divisible by its nature and was intended dividedly by the one vowing. Hence one who vowed 100 Masses and can offer only 50 is bound to these. If in the matter of the vow principal and accessory can be distinguished, when the principal falls, the accessory falls, but not conversely.

2. One who has emitted a disjunctive vow - for example, "I vow that I will undertake a pilgrimage or cause 10 Masses to be celebrated" - in the case in which one part has become unsuitable or impossible, is bound in this way:

a) If before election one part becomes unsuitable or impossible, the one vowing is per se immune from every obligation. For the circumstance that the one vowing now cannot choose is not judged to have been comprehended in the vow. Except: 1. if with sufficient certainty he intended one or the other part absolutely, that is, whatever might happen; 2. if the other part became unsuitable or impossible through the fault of the one vowing (St. Alphonsus, III, 224).

b) If after election the part not elected becomes unsuitable or impossible, the one vowing is bound to perform the part elected, because in that case the election seems to have to be regarded as validly determinative of the prior vow (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

c) If the part elected, not yet put into execution, becomes unsuitable or impossible, the one vowing per se is bound to nothing, according to what was said under a).

Corollary. One who has chosen one part can sufficiently probably commute it with the other part, because the election is not judged to have been intended in such a way that the one vowing deprived himself of the faculty of choosing the other part (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

III. Defect of the condition, namely the condition on which the vow depends; for example, if someone vows a pilgrimage if this or that should succeed: when the thing does not succeed, the vow collapses.

IV. Defect or cessation of the final cause, that is, of the cause for which the vow was emitted uniquely or principally, and without which it would not have been emitted; as if someone vowed a pilgrimage for obtaining his father's health, and the father dies before the vow is fulfilled.

Cessation of Vows.—Since a vow is a private law, it may cease, just as a law ceases in certain cases (see 500 sqq.). There are, therefore, two ways in which a vow ceases or ceases to oblige.

(a) The vow ceases from within, or from internal causes, when the matter of the vow has so changed as to be detrimental or useless, or the purpose of the vow is no longer served by the vow. For the nature of a vow is that it promotes a better good to the greater glory of God. It is clear also that a temporary vow ceases when the time limit fixed to it has expired, and that a conditional vow ceases if the condition is not fulfilled (e.g., one vows an alms of thanksgiving if one’s mother recovers from sickness, but she dies).

(b) The vow ceases from without, or from external causes, when it is removed or suspended by the authority of God to whom it was made (dispensation) or by the authority of one who has power over the will of the vower or over the matter of the vow (annulment), or even by the authority of the vower himself in so far as belongs to him the right to substitute some equal or better work for the work vowed (commutation).

Public vows do not cease from intrinsic causes, for this would be productive of many disadvantages to religious communities and to those who take vows in them. The chief cases in which private vows cease for internal reasons are as follows:

(a) They cease on a substantial change in the thing promised, for then the subject-matter has become morally different. There is a substantial change if the matter of the vow has become illicit (e.g., Titus vowed an alms to a beggar, but he learns that the beggar will use the alms to become drunk), or if it has become useless (e.g., Claudius vowed not to visit a certain house on account of the bad language used there, but the guilty parties have now moved away), or if it has become an obstacle to a greater good (e.g., Balbus vowed to go on a pilgrimage, but an epidemic has broken out and it is better for him to remain home and care for the sick), or if it has become impossible (e.g., Sempronius vowed to give an alms, but lost his money and cannot afford to keep the promise). Some also think there is a substantial change when circumstances are so different that, had the vower been able to foresee them, he would not have taken the vow.

(b) They cease on the disappearance of the principal reason that induced the vower to make his promise. Thus, if Caius vows a sum of money to an institution solely because it is poor and it becomes wealthy before he has fulfilled his vow, his obligation is at an end (see Canon 1311).

329. The obligation of a vow can cease:

1. Because of intrinsic causes, namely by cessation of the end or motive cause, substantial change of matter, and impossibility, whether physical or moral, as was said above concerning laws, n. 121.

2. Because of extrinsic causes, namely by irritation, dispensation, and commutation, concerning which we must speak individually.

990. A vow, like a law, can cease from the nature of the thing itself, namely from a notable change of matter or circumstances, or from the cessation of the principal end.

1. From a notable change of matter or circumstances, namely if the thing promised becomes illicit, useless, or impeding a greater good: for the thing ceases to be apt matter of a vow.

Thus a pastor who vowed a pilgrimage on such a day, if then he must assist the gravely sick; or one who promised to come to the aid of some necessity which has already come to an end; or who vowed a fast on such a day, which would impede a very useful work of charity. The same must be said when circumstances are so notably changed that, if the one vowing had foreseen the change, he would not have emitted the vow: for then he did not intend to oblige himself for such circumstances. Thus he who vowed to give a rich alms, and afterward became poor, is not held to bestow it; he who had promised to relieve a poor man is not held to give him money when he notices that this man uses the same to make himself drunk. On the contrary, however, a vow of chastity is valid, even if vehement temptations afterward arise: for these could have been foreseen from things commonly occurring.

991. 2. From the cessation of the principal end; for since a vow is ordered to obtaining some end, when the principal end for which it is intended ceases, by that very fact the reason of the obligation ceases. Therefore he who vowed a pilgrimage for obtaining the health of a friend is not held to execute the vow after the friend has died. But when the secondary, or impulsive, end ceases, the vow does not by that very fact cease, if the principal end endures; he who vowed to educate a pious young man for the clerical state, and chose Titius on account of a pleasing voice, is not freed from the vow if the voice becomes less pleasing, because this end is altogether secondary.

A vow ceases to bind when the time for which it was taken expires, or if a substantial change occurs in the object promised, or if a condition upon which the vow depends is not complied with, or its final cause fails, or, lastly, by irritation, dispensation, or commutation.¹

¹ C. I. C., can. 1311.

1. A vow ceases to oblige per cessationem if the circumstances under which, or the principal motive or purpose for which the vow was made (motivum principale), cease or change. An effect stops with its cause. Thus, if a person for whose recovery I vowed a pilgrimage, should die, or if I can not keep my promise because of changed conditions, or if circumstances supervene which at the outset would have prevented the vow from being taken, the obligation ceases.

In case of a conditional vow no obligation arises if the condition is not complied with. If it is complied with only in part, the obligation becomes modified accordingly.

Substantial error concerning the matter in- volved invalidates a vow, for a substantial mistake hinders consent of the will: consent is given to something which is not there, and hence there is no real consent.²

² Slater, A Manual of Moral Theol., Vol. I, p. 247.

409. Preliminary note. A vow can cease in two ways: 1. intrinsically, namely, a) from a change of matter or b) from the cessation of the end; 2. extrinsically, namely, through the intervention of legitimate authority; this indeed can occur a) through invalidation, b) through dispensation, and c) through commutation. The cessation of a vow, or at least of its obligation, through extrinsic authority will be treated in the following paragraphs; now the cessation of a vow intrinsically is to be treated briefly.

General rule. A (private) vow ceases intrinsically when so great a change has supervened either on the part of the person vowing or of the matter promised that, had it been present from the beginning, it certainly would have impeded the vow; or, as St. Thomas⁴⁰⁴ briefly says: "That which would impede a vow from being made if it were present also removes the obligation after the vow has been made."

The reason is that a private vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the person vowing. But the person vowing is deservedly presumed not to have wished to bind himself in the case in which a notable change should occur either on his own part or on the part of the matter. For every vow, since it concerns a better good, essentially requires suitable matter, concerning which there was discussion above in n. 399. Therefore, just as a vow is null if the matter was unsuitable from the beginning, so a vow ceases when matter previously suitable afterwards becomes unsuitable. St. Thomas⁴⁰⁵ writes to the point: "He who vows in a certain manner establishes for himself a law binding himself to something which is good in itself and in most cases. It can happen, however, that in some case it is either simply evil, or useless, or an impediment to a greater good; which is contrary to the nature of that which falls under a vow. And therefore it is necessary that in such a case it be determined that the vow is not to be observed."

⁴⁰⁴ IV, dist. 38, q. 1, sol. 1 ad 1.

⁴⁰⁵ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 10.

410. 1. On the part of the person vowing, a notable change causing the obligation of a vow to cease is present, e.g., in the following cases:

a) if a rich man vowed alms but afterwards himself becomes poor, he is now freed from the vow;

b) if someone vowed entrance into a monastery but afterwards falls into a grave and incurable illness, he is no longer bound by his vow;

c) if someone vowed to receive Communion on a stated day, but on this day broke the natural fast, he now neither can nor is bound to receive Communion without fasting;

d) if someone vowed to make a pilgrimage on a fixed day, but on that day he must altogether attend to his sick father, he is no longer bound to the vow.

One who before lacked temptations but now is agitated by most vehement temptations against chastity is not, however, freed from a vow of chastity made. For he could and ought to have foreseen this change.

2. On the part of the matter promised, a notable change is present, e.g., in the following cases:

a) if the matter becomes illicit, e.g., if someone promised by vow to give alms to a determined poor man whom he knows will now abuse the alms received in order to become drunk;

b) if the matter becomes impossible (physically or morally), e.g., if someone vowed the construction of a chapel in some place and the civil government strictly prohibits this construction;⁴⁰⁶

c) if the matter becomes useless relative to the principal end intended by the person vowing; e.g., if someone vowed a pilgrimage in order to recover the health of his father, he is no longer bound to the vow if the father has died in the meantime; or one who vowed not to enter some house because of a seductive girl dwelling there is now freed from the vow if that girl has died or dwells elsewhere. But if the matter has become useless relative to the secondary end intended by the person vowing, the vow does not cease. Hence, e.g., if someone vowed to give certain alms each week, and he who until now received those alms has died, the vow does not thereby cease, since the determined person of the poor man was not the principal but the secondary end of the vow.

Note. No public vow ceases because of intrinsic causes. Hence essential vows made in approved religious institutes and the vow of chastity in the reception of the subdiaconate do not cease because of a notable change on the part of the person vowing or on the part of the matter. The reason is that otherwise many inconveniences would arise both for the person vowing himself and for religious institutes. Moreover, if there is an urgent reason for obtaining a relaxation of vows of this kind, a legitimate dispensation can be obtained. It is evident of itself that temporary vows, whether private or public, cease when the time of the vows has elapsed.

⁴⁰⁶ Cf. the things said above in n. 399(b) concerning matter partly possible and partly impossible.

S. Th. II-II, q. 88, a. 8-12.

732. The obligation of a vow ceases: 1. from within, that is, by a substantial change in the matter or in a circumstance of the vow or of the one vowing; 2. from without, or by the legitimate intervention of authority through irritation, dispensation, and commutation. Hence canon 1311:

"A vow ceases by the lapse of time added for ending the obligation, by a substantial change of the matter promised, by the failure of the condition upon which the vow depends or of its final cause, by irritation, dispensation, and commutation."

733. Cessation of a vow from within. - A vow can cease or be suspended partially or totally:

a) When the better good promised to God is no longer better, or is prohibited and thus is impeditive of a greater good, or becomes indifferent, useless, or impossible.

b) When in the matter promised to God or in the state of the one vowing comparatively to it, so grave a change occurs that morally it is believed that the one vowing did not intend to oblige himself for such a case or state: a vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the one vowing. Thus illness excuses from a votive fast, a great diminution of status from a notable alms; but a change in the disposition of the will alone of the one vowing neither removes nor suspends a vow.

c) When the final cause of the vow ceases, which the one vowing intended to attain through the execution of the vow. Thus a vow of giving alms to a poor man ceases when his poverty ceases; a vow of undertaking a pilgrimage for obtaining the health of a friend ceases when that end ceases through his death; a vow of not entering a house on account of an occasion of sin ceases when the occasion ceases; but it does not cease when its merely impulsive cause ceases.

d) By the failure of the condition upon which the vow depends, for example, while I am rich, I will give alms; or conversely, by the fulfillment of a resolutory condition.

In doubt of fact whether a sufficient change of matter is present and the vow has ceased from within: either dispensation or commutation is to be sought, or the vow must be fulfilled.

I. Question I. Does a vow, or an oath, cease, the moving cause ceasing? Response: A twofold cause is customarily distinguished, in view of which the one vowing makes his vow: one is called the moving cause, the other the impelling cause. We speak now of the moving cause.

II. We say, then, that, the proximate moving cause ceasing entirely, the vow, or the oath, likewise ceases. This is the common opinion. The reason is manifest: for, the final cause failing altogether, the matter of the vow ceases; since the thing which is the matter of the vow is not promised absolutely, but as it leads toward the end which the one vowing set before himself. If, then, the end fails, the means too must necessarily fail, insofar as it conduces toward such an end — namely, the matter of the vow. This reasoning rests on that principle: that a vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the one vowing. Now everyone makes his vow for some end. Therefore, the whole final cause failing, the intention of the one vowing fails; and consequently the vow itself fails. Wherefore, in the book on laws, we have said that a law ceases, the end ceasing entirely in common, or with respect to the multitude — not so, the end ceasing with respect to some private subject: since laws do not look to private individuals, but the multitude and the community. Private vows, however, are, in that many instances, like peculiar laws which each one imposes on himself, being, as it were, his own peculiar legislator. Wherefore, the end ceasing with respect to such a one vowing, the vow ceases. The matter will appear clearer by examples. You vowed alms to be disbursed to a poor person: this poor person becomes rich; the bond of the vow is dissolved, since the end of the vow was the relief of the poor person's want; therefore, that want ceasing, the vow ceases. You vowed a pilgrimage, so that you might obtain your father's health; here he either recovered, or died; the end of the vow falls with the vow. You vowed to abstain from entering such a house, so as to avoid the occasion of a harlot; she either has died, or has gone elsewhere; entrance into such a house remains free to you. This opinion, which is common, is defended by Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 9), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 9, n. 291), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 3, §2, n. 10), Martínez de Prado (ch. 31, q. 13, n. 12), Tamburini (on the Decalogue, Bk. III, ch. 13, §2), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 9, punct. 10, n. 1), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 12, q. 1), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 3, punct. 2, n. 16).

III. For a clearer understanding of the preceding opinion, this must be observed: that the moving final cause is twofold — one proximate, which immediately excites the agent toward the effect to be produced; the other remote and universal, to which the acts of anyone of this kind are referred. When you vow alms to be disbursed to such a poor person, the relief of the poor person is the proximate final cause; the worship of God, toward which you direct the alms, is called the remote final cause. This remote final cause never ceases so as to excite the one vowing to make the vow; although the one vowing orders both his vows, and his other acts of virtue, toward the glory of God. The proximate final cause is likewise twofold. One is called the moving, or motive, cause, which really induces, and inclines, the mind toward such an act — say, toward almsgiving; and this must cease, in order for the obligation of the vow to cease. The other is called the impelling, or impulsive, cause, which, like spurs, is added to one already running; this ceasing, however, the vow does not cease — since, just as it did not incline the mind to vow, so it cannot invalidate a vow already made. Finally, for the cessation of a vow it is required that the proximate cause, if it consists of several parts, cease fully and entirely. For if there are several proximate ends intended, and one should fail, the vow will not entirely cease; but only in that part which corresponds to the failing end — as to the other part, however, in which, though one end fails, another end subsists, it will remain whole and firm. Likewise, if the end ceases only for some interval of time, for that same time, and no longer, the obligation of the vow is suspended; but the end reviving, the obligation of the vow arises again as well. When doubt arises whether the impelling cause has ceased, or the moving cause in whole or in part, judgment must always be made in favor of the vow, so that the safer part be chosen.

IV. Question II. Does a vow cease, the proximate moving final cause ceasing through the fault of the one vowing? Response: Leander denies that the vow ceases (tract. 1, disp. 12, q. 6), on the grounds that no one ought to reap advantage from his own iniquity. For this opinion he cites Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 3, §1, n. 16), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 4); and even Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 9, n. 13, and n. 45), where he teaches the opposite. The matter must be explained by examples, so that the truth may appear of itself. You vowed alms to be paid to a poor person within a month; you vowed to redeem a captive from captivity within two months. Through your own fault you do not fulfill the vow at the prefixed time. Before the elapsed time, the poor person dies, the captive dies. To whom ought you to pay the price of the alms? Certainly it does not seem possible to designate anyone in the case where the thing promised by the vow is rendered impossible, the end ceasing. The same we would now say, that we said in the preceding dissertation, ch. 9, §4, n. 6 — that a conditional vow does not cease at all, when the one vowing freely impedes the condition proximate to that same vow, even though this happens through the one vowing's fault. We said that no one ought to draw advantage from iniquity to whom such a payment of the vow would befall. Wherefore it seems, as it were, that it must be said that the vow ceases, the end of the vow ceasing, even if this occurs through the fault of the one vowing. What, then, if the poor person did not die, but became rich; if the captive obtained his liberty? Then the payment of the vow would be possible; the case would not then be so evident. In the case, then, in which the vow would have to be fulfilled, should the one vowing owe the price of the vow to the poor person now made rich, and to the captive now restored to liberty? I, indeed, do not see why alms should be given to a rich man, though he was once poor. In similar cases I would rather advise the one vowing to disburse to other poor people the alms promised to the aforesaid poor person, both in penance for his culpable delay, and so that, in whatever way he can, he may satisfy his vow. If the captive, having become free, is poor, the price destined by the vow for his liberty will have to be converted to that same man's sustenance. The same could be said, if the poor man had died — namely, that the alms ought to be disbursed to other poor people, since it seems safer, and lawful, to hold that alms once consecrated by vow can be lawfully and justly retained for such a purpose, especially given some fault of the one vowing on account of delay in paying the vow. Whenever, then, the fault... lies in the grave fault of the one vowing himself, when the end of his vow ceases, I would always oblige him to compensate for such a notable vow.

V. Question III. Does a change of circumstances, which renders the promised matter, either in itself, or according to common estimation, different, suffice to invalidate a vow? Response: The most common opinion affirms this, with St. Thomas (II-II, q. 110, art. 3): "One who promises something, if he has the intention of doing what he promises, does not lie, because he does not speak against what he holds in his mind... He can, however, be excused for two reasons. In one way, if he promised what is manifestly unlawful... In another way, if the conditions of persons, and of affairs, have changed. For as Seneca says in his book On Benefits, for a man to be bound to do what he has promised, it is required that all things remain unchanged; otherwise, he was not lying in promising, since he promised what he had in mind, the due conditions being understood; nor is he unfaithful in not doing what he promised, since the same conditions no longer exist."

VI. Question IV. What change of matter is to be called notable, such that it can dissolve the bond of a vow? Response: Any change of matter whatsoever is by no means sufficient to invalidate a vow; otherwise all vows would be null, since all human affairs are subject to change. It is required, then, that the change be notable, that is, most grave, in order for the bond of the vow to be dissolved, and the obligation of the vow removed. What change, however, is to be called notable, and most grave, can scarcely be clearly defined. That change is commonly called notable which places the promised matter in a different state, according to the common estimation of men, such that customs, or laws, do not usually bind matter under such circumstances or difficulties. This change, moreover, must be evident and manifest; for if it is merely doubtful, it does not invalidate the vow. Therefore, if, the vow having been made, there occurs in its execution a danger to life, or to honor, or a detriment to some other matter of grave moment, then the vow ceases, all commonly hold. For it cannot be prudently presumed that the one vowing willed to bind himself in similar cases, unless he really foresaw such dangers when he made the vow — just as, if, the plague raging, someone made a vow to serve the plague-stricken, the vow would not oblige, having contracted the infection.

VII. Question V. Does a change in the matter promised, which, had the one vowing known of it at the time he made the vow, would have kept him from the vow, invalidate the vow? Response: The first opinion affirms this — since in a general grant those events are not included which, if the one promising had known them, he would have excepted from the promise itself; all the more since a promise never obliges beyond the intention of the promiser. Now the intention of the one vowing is that he did not wish to bind himself in such a difficult event. Besides which, in any law whatsoever there is room for equity, by which those events are excepted which the legislator, had he foreseen them, would have excepted. Now everyone vowing is a private legislator. Finally, St. Thomas himself seems to concede this opinion (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 1, ad 1), where he has this: that one is freed from the obligation of a vow or oath if, had it occurred from the beginning, or been known, it would have impeded the vow from being made. The same opinion is defended by Navarrus (in the Manual, ch. 18, n. 3), Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 5, q. 17, near the end), Caramuel (Fundamental Theology, fund. 4, n. 1799), Molina (Vol. II, on justice, disp. 271, concl. 2 and 7, notable 51). St. Antoninus too is customarily cited (Part II, tit. 10, ch. 6, §5), but undeservedly: for the holy Archbishop has nothing there that favors this opinion.

VIII. The contrary opinion is more probable; indeed, absolutely considered, and more seriously weighed, it seems the sole true one. For if supervening difficulties were sufficient to alter vows, on the grounds that, had they been foreseen by the one vowing at the time of the vow, he would not have made it, then no promise, no contract, would stand at all, and human society would be disturbed. Since there are few contracts in which grave difficulties do not afterward occur, which, had the contracting party foreseen them, he would doubtless not have entered into the contract; and this occurs everywhere in any promises whatsoever; nor are the contracting parties, or promisers, for that reason freed from their promises or contracts. The obligation of a promise, then, or of a vow, is not to be measured by whether the one vowing would not have promised, had he foreseen it, but by what he promised, and foresaw — this is wicked. You promised alms to a poor person, and did not foresee that you would find him such as you would least wish to have promised; nonetheless you are bound to stand by your promises, as all commonly teach. This opinion is defended by Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 3), Sotus (on justice and law, Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1, ad 3), Valentia (disp. 6, punct. 1), Suárez (Bk. IV, on vows, ch. 19), Navarrus (in the Manual, ch. 12, n. 39), Prado (ch. 31, q. 13, n. 5), Fagundez (Bk. II, ch. 31, n. 8), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 9, n. 21), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 13, q. 3), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 1). The solution to the arguments of the contrary opinion is easy. The rule of law is understood not of any difficulty whatsoever affecting the one vowing, but of a notable change of circumstances, of which we spoke above.

Wherefore a distinction must be drawn between those things which induce a notable change of the promised matter, and those which affect the one vowing himself. Often, the one vowing, when he makes the vow, foresees no difficulty, or only a slight one, concerning its execution and observance; and afterward, in the course of time, the thing promised by the vow remaining unchanged, he suffers grave difficulties, such that, had he foreseen them when he elicited the vow, he would, with few exceptions, have abstained from the vow. Is it to be said that he is therefore exempt from the vow? Far from it. No one, whose business it is to relax the rules of morals, would say this. Those changes which touch the matter subject to the promise, if they induce a notable and most grave change in it — a change which, had the one vowing foreseen, he would not have made the vow — render the one vowing free from the bond of the vow: and it is in this sense that the authority of St. Thomas must be understood — namely, whenever some impediment supervenes which, had it preceded the vow or oath, would have constituted matter unfit to induce the obligation, or would have rendered it unlawful, or useless, or impossible, this same thing invalidates the vow or oath already made. Three things, then, must always be kept before one's eyes in these cases: a difficulty arising from the condition of the one vowing, which, unless it renders him morally incapable, does not free him from the vow; a change not grave on the part of the matter, which likewise does not break the bond of the vow; and finally, a change which places the matter in a state morally quite different, and notable, which alone exempts the one vowing from the obligation of the vow. Equity has a place in rarely occurring events, or those that cannot commonly be foreseen. Future difficulties in the execution of vows are obvious to everyone, nor do they prevent vows from being made.

IX. Question VI. A Religious, profession having been made, acquires a right to the royal throne — does he escape free of the bond of the vow? Response: Certain Casuists have doubted this; indeed, Prado (ch. 31, q. 5, §17, in the appendix, ch. 33) reports that Caramuel teaches that this Religious becomes altogether free of the vow, and can enter marriage. But Prado is mistaken, since Caramuel expressly maintains the opposite (Part II, Fundamental Theology, fund. 89 of the second printing). What he taught in the first printing, which I do not have to hand, I do not know. The common opinion, then, is that the aforesaid Religious remains bound by his vows, since no change occurs on the part of the promised matter. Certainly, if he had foreseen that the right to royal dignity would come to him, he would not have made his solemn vows; nevertheless he does not thereby escape free of the vow. Very many who enter marriage, if they foresaw all the inconveniences that follow from it, would not contract marriage. Will marriages therefore be dissolved for this reason? But enough has already been said above on this matter.

IV. Question IV. Does a vow cease when the moving cause ceases? Answer. One cause is moving, another impelling. The proximate moving cause ceasing, the vow ceases, as all commonly teach. Because, the final cause altogether ceasing, the matter of the vow ceases. This is plain by an example. You vowed alms to be given to such a poor man: this man has become rich: the end of the alms altogether ceases. The vow, therefore, also ceases. But the impelling cause ceasing, the vow does not cease.