Section — Koch–Preuss
Section 6: Cessation of Vows
A vow ceases to bind when the time for which it was taken expires, or if a substantial change occurs in the object promised, or if a condition upon which the vow depends is not complied with, or its final cause fails, or, lastly, by irritation, dispensation, or commutation.1
1 C. I. C., can. 1311.
- A vow ceases to oblige per cessationem if the circumstances under which, or the principal motive or purpose for which the vow was made (motivum principale), cease or change. An effect stops with its cause. Thus, if a person for whose recovery I vowed a pilgrimage, should die, or if I can not keep my promise because of changed conditions, or if circumstances supervene which at the outset would have prevented the vow from being taken, the obligation ceases.
In case of a conditional vow no obligation arises if the condition is not complied with. If it is complied with only in part, the obligation becomes modified accordingly.
Substantial error concerning the matter in- volved invalidates a vow, for a substantial mistake hinders consent of the will: consent is given to something which is not there, and hence there is no real consent.2
2 Slater, A Manual of Moral Theol., Vol. I, p. 247.
- Cessatio per irritationem or annulment is a declaration of nullity or suspension made by some one who has authority over the will of the vovens or the object of the vow.
An annulment is direct if the person who has made the vow is subject to the annulling authority, as a child to his parents, a religious to his superior, etc. “Those who are placed in such a state of dependency on their superiors cannot undertake any absolute obligation; they can only bind themselves conditionally, supposing that their superior consents. If he does not consent, the obligation falls to the ground.”3
3 IDEM, ibid., I, 251; cfr. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., II, pp. 241 sqq.
By indirect annulment the obligation can be suspended by any one who has authority over the matter of the vow; for, as the same author says, “it is not just that an obligation should be undertaken which interferes with the rights of some one else.”4
4 Slater, ibid., I, 252.
The vows of minor children, therefore, and those of religious, can be directly annulled, i. e., declared to be perpetually null and void, by their parents or superiors. The only exception is the vow whereby a religious has promised to enter a stricter order.
The vows of children who have attained majority but remain under the tutelage of their parents; the vows of spouses with regard to their marital rights and duties; the vows of ecclesiastical subjects in so far as they affect the personal or “real” rights of their superiors,—all these can be annulled indirectly, i. e., temporarily suspended.5 As soon as the person who has made a vow is able to dispose freely of the matter of the promise, the obligation takes effect.6
5 Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, 324: “The obligation of a vow can cease: 1. From intrinsic causes, namely, by the cessation of the motivating cause, by a substantial change of the matter, and by physical or moral impossibility; 2. From extrinsic causes, namely, by annulment, dispensation, and commutation. . . . Annulment of a vow is its cancellation or suspension made by the one to whose power the will of the vower or the matter of the vow is subject. It is: 1. direct, if it falls directly upon the person of the vower; 2. indirect, if it falls only upon the matter of the vow.” Cfr. n. 325–327; also Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 243.
6 H. Busembaum, S.J., Medulla Theol. Mor., l. III, tr. 2, c. 3, dub. 6, a. 2, n. 8: “Vows annulled only indirectly revive and oblige when they cease to prejudice another.”
To annul a vow arbitrarily, without sufficient reason, is valid but illicit.7
7 Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 328: “Question: Can annulment be made without a cause? Answer: Yes as regards validity, because a master validly disposes of his own thing; but no as regards liceity, because spiritual progress is thus unreasonably impeded, etc.”
- Cessatio per commutationem takes place when some other good work is substituted, under the same obligation, for a good work promised.8 To commute a vow validly and lawfully requires a just cause. The substituted good work may be better than the one originally promised, or of equal or less merit. The person who is under vow may commute it by his own authority into some good work which is evidently better than the one originally promised. This is called commutatio in melius. When there is doubt as to the quality of the good work substituted for the one promised, or when the latter turns out to be a work of merely equal (bonum aequale) or of less merit (minus bonum), the commutation must be made by the competent superior.9 But the self-chosen commutation of a vow into something which is of equal merit is morally permissible, and even in regard to the commutation of a vow into something relatively easier or of less value, the confessor should not decide adversely, since the value of the deed depends not so much upon the external good work actually performed, as upon the intention with which it is done and the intrinsic value of the work itself.10
8 Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 332: “Commutation of a vow is the substitution of some work in place of the work promised. It can be made in three ways, namely: into a better good, into an equal good, or into a lesser good.” Cfr. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 251 sqq.
9 Gury, op. cit., I, n. 333: “Except vows reserved to the Pope, unless the change is made into the religious state.”—Ibid., n. 334: “One who has made a vow cannot commute it into a lesser good by his own authority, for he ought to give God whatever he promised. . . . Indeed, he cannot even change his vow into an equal good, because once the promise has been made, it is rightly deemed more pleasing to God that he perform the very thing promised out of fidelity than substitute another equal thing in its place according to his own judgment.”
10 Gury, op. cit., n. 334: “A priest delegated to commute vows cannot commute them into a notably lesser work, because otherwise he would dispense in great part and thus exceed the faculty received. Nevertheless, the faculty of commuting vows is not to be interpreted so strictly as to be restricted to a work altogether equal, but is to be accepted in a broad sense; otherwise it would be subject to innumerable difficulties and scruples, since it is most difficult to find equality in things altogether disparate. Moreover, the commutation ought to be made for the relief of the one who has bound himself by the vow.”
The rule, however, is that in all cases of com- mutation, even when the object of the vow is changed into some thing seemingly better than that originally promised, the individual should not follow his own opinion or inclination, but consult with his confessor or spiritual director.
A vow made on behalf of, and accepted by another, can be commuted only with that other’s consent.
One whose vow has been commuted is always free to return to his original promise (materia voti),11 for the original good work is supposed to be better than, or of equal merit as, the one substituted therefor, and the commutation was a favor that may be freely renounced.12
11 H. Busembaum, S.J., Medulla Theol. Mor., l. III, tr. 2, c. 3, dub. 7, n. 5: “If he whose vow has been changed should afterward prefer to fulfil the first work, he can do so, both because it is better or equal and because the change was made in his favor under the tacit condition, if it should please him.”
12 St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 248: “Although the vower has returned to the first work, he can nevertheless return again to the second work substituted. And furthermore, if commutation into different works has been made several times, the vower can choose whichever of them he prefers.” (Ed. Gaudé, I, 532).
When a vow has been commuted by ecclesiastical authority, its obligation is extinguished, or transferred to the new work, and does not revive even if the performance of the substituted good work is found to be impossible or useless. On the contrary, when the substitution has been made by private authority, and the performance of the substituted work is found to be impossible, the original obligation revives.13
13 H. Busembaum, S.J., Medulla, l. III, tr. 2, c. 3, dub. 7, n. 6: “If the matter or work of a vow legitimately commuted by a superior becomes impossible or indifferent, one is not bound to return to the former work, because the obligation has been extinguished.”—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 249: “Once a vow has been commuted, even if the substituted thing becomes impossible through the fault of the vower, or if he has not fulfilled it, he is not bound to the first thing; for example, a fast on a certain day was substituted for alms: if you then could not or would not fast, you sinned, but you are not bound to the alms, because through commutation the first obligation is extinguished. This does not hold, however, if the commutation is made by one’s own authority; for then, if the second work is not fulfilled, the first must be fulfilled, because the first obligation is not then extinguished, but is satisfied through a superabundant or at least equivalent fulfilment.”—Slater, A Manual of Mor. Theol., I, 256.
- A vow ceases per dispensationem if it is condoned in the name of God by one who has spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum.14 Such a dispensation can be granted only by legitimate authority and for a just cause. As examples of a just and sufficient cause theologians give the following: the public good or the private spiritual advantage of him who is dispensed; unusual difficulty in the observance of the vow; the fact that the vow was taken with insufficient deliberation or at an immature age.15
14 Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 328: “Dispensation from a vow is its absolute remission, made in the name of God by a legitimate superior.”—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 10–12.—Slater, A Manual of Mor. Theol., I, 253.
15 Busembaum, Medulla Theol. Mor., l. III, tr. 2, c. 3, dub. 8, resp. 1: “For this [dispensation] to be valid, a just cause is required, such as, for example: 1. The good of the Church or the common good of the republic; 2. Notable difficulty in observing the vow; 3. Imperfection of the act, or the levity and facility from which the vow proceeded.”—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 329: “For the validity of a dispensation a just cause is always required; because, since vows are made to God alone, a man cannot dispense from them except as a delegate; but a delegate cannot validly dispense without a sufficient reason.”—Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 250–253 (ed. Gaudé, I, 533); Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 245 sqq.
Dispensation is a subject that properly belongs to Canon Law. We will only note that the Church claims and possesses the power of dispensing from vows;16 that she exercises this power through the Pope, the bishops, and the superiors of religious orders; and that parish priests and confessors have no jurisdiction in the external forum and, therefore, can dispense from vows by delegated authority only.
16 Wernz, Ius Decretalium, Vol. III, n. 584.
READINGS.—C. Kirchberg, De Voti Natura, pp. 93 sqq.—J. B. Wirthmüller, Die moralische Tugend der Religion, pp. 575 sqq.—F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., pp. 481 sqq.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Compendium Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., pp. 283 sq.—Sabetti-Barrett, Comp. Theol. Mor., 27th ed., pp. 234 sqq.—J. B. Ferreres, S.J., Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 9th ed., pp. 279 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 239 sqq.—J. d’Annibale, Summula Theol. Mor., Vol. III, pp. 186 sqq.—E. Müller, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 183 sqq.—A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 335 sqq.