Chapter II — On the cessation of vows on account of the cessation of the final cause, and the change of circumstances

I. Question I. Does a vow, or an oath, cease, the moving cause ceasing? Response: A twofold cause is customarily distinguished, in view of which the one vowing makes his vow: one is called the moving cause, the other the impelling cause. We speak now of the moving cause.

II. We say, then, that, the proximate moving cause ceasing entirely, the vow, or the oath, likewise ceases. This is the common opinion. The reason is manifest: for, the final cause failing altogether, the matter of the vow ceases; since the thing which is the matter of the vow is not promised absolutely, but as it leads toward the end which the one vowing set before himself. If, then, the end fails, the means too must necessarily fail, insofar as it conduces toward such an end — namely, the matter of the vow. This reasoning rests on that principle: that a vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the one vowing. Now everyone makes his vow for some end. Therefore, the whole final cause failing, the intention of the one vowing fails; and consequently the vow itself fails. Wherefore, in the book on laws, we have said that a law ceases, the end ceasing entirely in common, or with respect to the multitude — not so, the end ceasing with respect to some private subject: since laws do not look to private individuals, but the multitude and the community. Private vows, however, are, in that many instances, like peculiar laws which each one imposes on himself, being, as it were, his own peculiar legislator. Wherefore, the end ceasing with respect to such a one vowing, the vow ceases. The matter will appear clearer by examples. You vowed alms to be disbursed to a poor person: this poor person becomes rich; the bond of the vow is dissolved, since the end of the vow was the relief of the poor person's want; therefore, that want ceasing, the vow ceases. You vowed a pilgrimage, so that you might obtain your father's health; here he either recovered, or died; the end of the vow falls with the vow. You vowed to abstain from entering such a house, so as to avoid the occasion of a harlot; she either has died, or has gone elsewhere; entrance into such a house remains free to you. This opinion, which is common, is defended by Suárez (Bk. IV, ch. 9), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 9, n. 291), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 3, §2, n. 10), Martínez de Prado (ch. 31, q. 13, n. 12), Tamburini (on the Decalogue, Bk. III, ch. 13, §2), Castropalao (tract. 15, disp. 9, punct. 10, n. 1), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 12, q. 1), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 3, punct. 2, n. 16).

III. For a clearer understanding of the preceding opinion, this must be observed: that the moving final cause is twofold — one proximate, which immediately excites the agent toward the effect to be produced; the other remote and universal, to which the acts of anyone of this kind are referred. When you vow alms to be disbursed to such a poor person, the relief of the poor person is the proximate final cause; the worship of God, toward which you direct the alms, is called the remote final cause. This remote final cause never ceases so as to excite the one vowing to make the vow; although the one vowing orders both his vows, and his other acts of virtue, toward the glory of God. The proximate final cause is likewise twofold. One is called the moving, or motive, cause, which really induces, and inclines, the mind toward such an act — say, toward almsgiving; and this must cease, in order for the obligation of the vow to cease. The other is called the impelling, or impulsive, cause, which, like spurs, is added to one already running; this ceasing, however, the vow does not cease — since, just as it did not incline the mind to vow, so it cannot invalidate a vow already made. Finally, for the cessation of a vow it is required that the proximate cause, if it consists of several parts, cease fully and entirely. For if there are several proximate ends intended, and one should fail, the vow will not entirely cease; but only in that part which corresponds to the failing end — as to the other part, however, in which, though one end fails, another end subsists, it will remain whole and firm. Likewise, if the end ceases only for some interval of time, for that same time, and no longer, the obligation of the vow is suspended; but the end reviving, the obligation of the vow arises again as well. When doubt arises whether the impelling cause has ceased, or the moving cause in whole or in part, judgment must always be made in favor of the vow, so that the safer part be chosen.

IV. Question II. Does a vow cease, the proximate moving final cause ceasing through the fault of the one vowing? Response: Leander denies that the vow ceases (tract. 1, disp. 12, q. 6), on the grounds that no one ought to reap advantage from his own iniquity. For this opinion he cites Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 3, §1, n. 16), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 4); and even Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 9, n. 13, and n. 45), where he teaches the opposite. The matter must be explained by examples, so that the truth may appear of itself. You vowed alms to be paid to a poor person within a month; you vowed to redeem a captive from captivity within two months. Through your own fault you do not fulfill the vow at the prefixed time. Before the elapsed time, the poor person dies, the captive dies. To whom ought you to pay the price of the alms? Certainly it does not seem possible to designate anyone in the case where the thing promised by the vow is rendered impossible, the end ceasing. The same we would now say, that we said in the preceding dissertation, ch. 9, §4, n. 6 — that a conditional vow does not cease at all, when the one vowing freely impedes the condition proximate to that same vow, even though this happens through the one vowing's fault. We said that no one ought to draw advantage from iniquity to whom such a payment of the vow would befall. Wherefore it seems, as it were, that it must be said that the vow ceases, the end of the vow ceasing, even if this occurs through the fault of the one vowing. What, then, if the poor person did not die, but became rich; if the captive obtained his liberty? Then the payment of the vow would be possible; the case would not then be so evident. In the case, then, in which the vow would have to be fulfilled, should the one vowing owe the price of the vow to the poor person now made rich, and to the captive now restored to liberty? I, indeed, do not see why alms should be given to a rich man, though he was once poor. In similar cases I would rather advise the one vowing to disburse to other poor people the alms promised to the aforesaid poor person, both in penance for his culpable delay, and so that, in whatever way he can, he may satisfy his vow. If the captive, having become free, is poor, the price destined by the vow for his liberty will have to be converted to that same man's sustenance. The same could be said, if the poor man had died — namely, that the alms ought to be disbursed to other poor people, since it seems safer, and lawful, to hold that alms once consecrated by vow can be lawfully and justly retained for such a purpose, especially given some fault of the one vowing on account of delay in paying the vow. Whenever, then, the fault... lies in the grave fault of the one vowing himself, when the end of his vow ceases, I would always oblige him to compensate for such a notable vow.

V. Question III. Does a change of circumstances, which renders the promised matter, either in itself, or according to common estimation, different, suffice to invalidate a vow? Response: The most common opinion affirms this, with St. Thomas (II-II, q. 110, art. 3): "One who promises something, if he has the intention of doing what he promises, does not lie, because he does not speak against what he holds in his mind... He can, however, be excused for two reasons. In one way, if he promised what is manifestly unlawful... In another way, if the conditions of persons, and of affairs, have changed. For as Seneca says in his book On Benefits, for a man to be bound to do what he has promised, it is required that all things remain unchanged; otherwise, he was not lying in promising, since he promised what he had in mind, the due conditions being understood; nor is he unfaithful in not doing what he promised, since the same conditions no longer exist."

VI. Question IV. What change of matter is to be called notable, such that it can dissolve the bond of a vow? Response: Any change of matter whatsoever is by no means sufficient to invalidate a vow; otherwise all vows would be null, since all human affairs are subject to change. It is required, then, that the change be notable, that is, most grave, in order for the bond of the vow to be dissolved, and the obligation of the vow removed. What change, however, is to be called notable, and most grave, can scarcely be clearly defined. That change is commonly called notable which places the promised matter in a different state, according to the common estimation of men, such that customs, or laws, do not usually bind matter under such circumstances or difficulties. This change, moreover, must be evident and manifest; for if it is merely doubtful, it does not invalidate the vow. Therefore, if, the vow having been made, there occurs in its execution a danger to life, or to honor, or a detriment to some other matter of grave moment, then the vow ceases, all commonly hold. For it cannot be prudently presumed that the one vowing willed to bind himself in similar cases, unless he really foresaw such dangers when he made the vow — just as, if, the plague raging, someone made a vow to serve the plague-stricken, the vow would not oblige, having contracted the infection.

VII. Question V. Does a change in the matter promised, which, had the one vowing known of it at the time he made the vow, would have kept him from the vow, invalidate the vow? Response: The first opinion affirms this — since in a general grant those events are not included which, if the one promising had known them, he would have excepted from the promise itself; all the more since a promise never obliges beyond the intention of the promiser. Now the intention of the one vowing is that he did not wish to bind himself in such a difficult event. Besides which, in any law whatsoever there is room for equity, by which those events are excepted which the legislator, had he foreseen them, would have excepted. Now everyone vowing is a private legislator. Finally, St. Thomas himself seems to concede this opinion (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 1, ad 1), where he has this: that one is freed from the obligation of a vow or oath if, had it occurred from the beginning, or been known, it would have impeded the vow from being made. The same opinion is defended by Navarrus (in the Manual, ch. 18, n. 3), Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 5, q. 17, near the end), Caramuel (Fundamental Theology, fund. 4, n. 1799), Molina (Vol. II, on justice, disp. 271, concl. 2 and 7, notable 51). St. Antoninus too is customarily cited (Part II, tit. 10, ch. 6, §5), but undeservedly: for the holy Archbishop has nothing there that favors this opinion.

VIII. The contrary opinion is more probable; indeed, absolutely considered, and more seriously weighed, it seems the sole true one. For if supervening difficulties were sufficient to alter vows, on the grounds that, had they been foreseen by the one vowing at the time of the vow, he would not have made it, then no promise, no contract, would stand at all, and human society would be disturbed. Since there are few contracts in which grave difficulties do not afterward occur, which, had the contracting party foreseen them, he would doubtless not have entered into the contract; and this occurs everywhere in any promises whatsoever; nor are the contracting parties, or promisers, for that reason freed from their promises or contracts. The obligation of a promise, then, or of a vow, is not to be measured by whether the one vowing would not have promised, had he foreseen it, but by what he promised, and foresaw — this is wicked. You promised alms to a poor person, and did not foresee that you would find him such as you would least wish to have promised; nonetheless you are bound to stand by your promises, as all commonly teach. This opinion is defended by Cajetan (II-II, q. 88, art. 3), Sotus (on justice and law, Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1, ad 3), Valentia (disp. 6, punct. 1), Suárez (Bk. IV, on vows, ch. 19), Navarrus (in the Manual, ch. 12, n. 39), Prado (ch. 31, q. 13, n. 5), Fagundez (Bk. II, ch. 31, n. 8), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 9, n. 21), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 13, q. 3), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 2, punct. 1). The solution to the arguments of the contrary opinion is easy. The rule of law is understood not of any difficulty whatsoever affecting the one vowing, but of a notable change of circumstances, of which we spoke above.

Wherefore a distinction must be drawn between those things which induce a notable change of the promised matter, and those which affect the one vowing himself. Often, the one vowing, when he makes the vow, foresees no difficulty, or only a slight one, concerning its execution and observance; and afterward, in the course of time, the thing promised by the vow remaining unchanged, he suffers grave difficulties, such that, had he foreseen them when he elicited the vow, he would, with few exceptions, have abstained from the vow. Is it to be said that he is therefore exempt from the vow? Far from it. No one, whose business it is to relax the rules of morals, would say this. Those changes which touch the matter subject to the promise, if they induce a notable and most grave change in it — a change which, had the one vowing foreseen, he would not have made the vow — render the one vowing free from the bond of the vow: and it is in this sense that the authority of St. Thomas must be understood — namely, whenever some impediment supervenes which, had it preceded the vow or oath, would have constituted matter unfit to induce the obligation, or would have rendered it unlawful, or useless, or impossible, this same thing invalidates the vow or oath already made. Three things, then, must always be kept before one's eyes in these cases: a difficulty arising from the condition of the one vowing, which, unless it renders him morally incapable, does not free him from the vow; a change not grave on the part of the matter, which likewise does not break the bond of the vow; and finally, a change which places the matter in a state morally quite different, and notable, which alone exempts the one vowing from the obligation of the vow. Equity has a place in rarely occurring events, or those that cannot commonly be foreseen. Future difficulties in the execution of vows are obvious to everyone, nor do they prevent vows from being made.

IX. Question VI. A Religious, profession having been made, acquires a right to the royal throne — does he escape free of the bond of the vow? Response: Certain Casuists have doubted this; indeed, Prado (ch. 31, q. 5, §17, in the appendix, ch. 33) reports that Caramuel teaches that this Religious becomes altogether free of the vow, and can enter marriage. But Prado is mistaken, since Caramuel expressly maintains the opposite (Part II, Fundamental Theology, fund. 89 of the second printing). What he taught in the first printing, which I do not have to hand, I do not know. The common opinion, then, is that the aforesaid Religious remains bound by his vows, since no change occurs on the part of the promised matter. Certainly, if he had foreseen that the right to royal dignity would come to him, he would not have made his solemn vows; nevertheless he does not thereby escape free of the vow. Very many who enter marriage, if they foresaw all the inconveniences that follow from it, would not contract marriage. Will marriages therefore be dissolved for this reason? But enough has already been said above on this matter.