Morals of the Church
Library › Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology › Volume II. On the Precepts of God and of the Church › Part Second. On the Precepts of the Decalogue › Question Third. On Vow › Article Third. On the Obligation of Vow

Section — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology

Section 1. On Simple Cessation

227.

227. By simple cessation the obligation of a vow ceases:

  1. If its principal end or motive cause ceases: for when the end ceases, the reason of the obligation ceases, because the one vowing did not will to obligate himself except for obtaining the end which determined him to vow. Therefore he who vowed a pilgrimage for obtaining the health of his son is not obligated by the vow once the son has died. But a vow does not cease when the secondary end or impulsive cause ceases, because the vow does not depend upon it. Thus he who, for honoring a saint, vowed to give alms to Peter, whom he thought poor, is held to give it to another needy person.

  2. If the matter becomes physically or morally impossible, even by fault of the one vowing.

Thus he who vowed to build a chapel is not held by the vow if unexpectedly he falls into poverty; and he who, after making a vow of receiving the Eucharist on that day, deliberately breaks the fast, is no longer held by the vow, from the general principle: transgression of a vow does not obligate to compensation, but only to penance.1

  1. If the matter becomes illicit, useless, or impeding a greater good.

Thus he is not held by the vow who promised to give alms to someone, if this would serve only for drunkenness; nor he who promised to relieve a necessity if this afterward ceases; nor he who vowed a pilgrimage on that day, if for this reason he cannot serve those infected with a disease which in the meantime has begun to rage.

  1. If the circumstances of the one vowing or of the matter are notably changed, namely in such a way that, if the one vowing had foreseen the change, he would not have made the vow: for a vow does not obligate beyond the intention of the one vowing.

Therefore as often as the intention of the one vowing cannot be presumed in determinate supervening circumstances, the vow does not obligate; but it does obligate if the change could in some way have been foreseen. Hence a vow of chastity is valid, even if vehement temptations supervene: for he who vows chastity promises to overcome all difficulties rising up against it. In like manner a vow of ministering to the sick is valid, even if danger of death from a contagious disease supervenes. On the contrary, he who after making a vow of a Roman pilgrimage falls into poverty, so that he cannot pay the expenses of the railway, is not held to go to Rome on foot.

1 Cf. Suarez, l. c., l. 4, c. 15, n. 17 ff.

Simple Cessation of a Vow

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