Chapter III. On the Obligation of a Vow

I. The existence of the obligation is clear from Sacred Scripture: "If you have vowed anything to God, do not delay to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeases Him; but whatever you have vowed, pay."¹ And indeed the reverence due to God requires that we fulfill the things which we have promised Him.

¹ Eccl. 5:3.

II. The subject of the obligation is only the one vowing, so that no one can be bound directly by force of a vow emitted by another (can. 1310, § 1). I said directly, because the obligation of a real vow, and of a mixed vow insofar as it is real, passes to heirs through inheritance, as we shall explain shortly. I said by force of a vow emitted by another, because if a community has emitted a vow, successors are not bound by force of the vow, but can be bound by reason of a pact, statute, or custom (St. Alphonsus, III, 213, 214, 216, 217).

III. The object of the obligation, or the matter to which the obligation extends, depends on the intention of the one vowing; this is especially to be deduced from the words pronounced or comprehended in the mind, with attention also to common estimation and the norm for interpreting ecclesiastical law in similar matter (St. Alphonsus, III, 222, 180).

Corollary. One who has vowed to recite the Rosary satisfies by reciting a third part, unless something else is clear from the mind of the one vowing. For so the word Rosary is commonly taken. One who has vowed to fast for a month is not bound on Sundays. One who has vowed to fast on each Friday or Saturday, if on such a day, for example, the Nativity of the Lord falls (cf. can. 1252, § 4), is not bound to fast. One who has vowed to hear Mass for a month is not bound on Sundays and feast days to two Masses. Except, as to individual cases, if a contrary mind is evident (St. Alphonsus, III, 224). One who has emitted an indeterminate vow: if it is indeterminate as to time - as if someone has vowed to recite the Rosary daily - is bound perpetually, unless another mind is clear; if it is indeterminate as to the quality or quantity of the thing, he can define it at will, provided the thing defined is not such that it should be judged rather to mock God than to satisfy the vow (St. Alphonsus, III, 221).

IV. The quality of the obligation. The obligation of a vow, that is, of a promise made to God, is an obligation of religion as to genus (can. 1307, § 1), and of fidelity toward God as to species. Namely, the reverence due to God, as we noted under I, requires that we perform the things promised to Him. But here note the difference between fidelity due to men and that by which we are bound toward God. Fidelity is owed to men lest they be deceived; but to God, lest there be derogation from the reverence due to Him. Moreover, all violations of vows are of the same species; hence if another malice is added, for example, "if someone having a vow of chastity fornicated, he can confess separately the violation of the vow" (St. Alphonsus, III, 224).

V. The quantity of the obligation. The obligation of a vow generally is grave from its genus, that is, grave or light according as it concerns grave or light matter. I said generally, because the one vowing can emit a vow, which is like a law, under light obligation,¹ just as a legislator can impose a grave thing under light obligation (n. 149); nevertheless, the one vowing is presumed not to have done this. A matter light in every respect cannot be vowed under grave obligation (n. 149; St. Alphonsus, III, 211, 213). Moreover:

1. Matter is judged grave which, considering the thing and the circumstances, would be prescribed by the Church under grave obligation. If it is a question of a thing to be given, that matter is held grave which, if a reason of justice intervened, would have to be given under grave obligation. Yet the said norms should be understood so that greater matter is required if someone were to vow a series of objects or a great quantity to be bestowed. Hence, for example, one who promises to hear 20 Masses does not seem to sin gravely by neglecting one or another.

2. If someone has vowed something to be repeated often, which is not grave (as if someone vows that he will bestow a franc on the poor every week), there cannot be grave matter unless several matters coalesce. But several matters coalesce if the one vowing intended them after the manner of one thing, as in the example set forth; otherwise if he intended them separately. But if the intention of the one vowing is doubtful, several matters are presumed to have been intended after the manner of one thing if it is a question of a real vow; otherwise if it is a question of a personal vow.

¹ Except if it is a question of public vows, which, when emitted under light obligation, are rejected by the Church and therefore are not accepted by God.

VI. Fulfillment of the obligation; concerning this it must be seen when and how a vow ought to be fulfilled.

1. The time for fulfilling a vow. a) If the time is determined, this must be observed. If a vow has not been fulfilled at the determined time, the obligation ceases or does not cease according as the time was attached for ending the obligation, or for urging its execution. Moreover, the time is judged attached for ending the obligation if it has been determined by reason of the time itself, as if someone emits a vow of fasting on the Vigil of some Saint. Nor then, if an impediment is foreseen, is there an obligation of anticipating it (St. Alphonsus, III, 220). It is judged attached for urging the execution of the obligation if it has been determined by reason of the vow to be fulfilled, as if someone emits a vow of fasting next Thursday, without regard to any special character of that day. In that case the vow must afterward be fulfilled if it was not fulfilled at the appointed time; indeed, generally there is an obligation of anticipating it if it is foreseen that the vow can be fulfilled neither at the appointed time nor afterward.¹ In doubt whether the time has been determined for ending the obligation or for urging its execution, the former is presumed in personal vows, the latter in real vows (St. Alphonsus, III, cited place); nevertheless the circumstances should be attended to. One who emitted a vow of doing this or that within a determined time, for example of receiving Communion within this month, if after the time has begun he foresees an impediment, certainly is bound to fulfill the vow now.

b) If the time is not determined, the vow ordinarily must be fulfilled as soon as it can be fulfilled morally. This is clear from Sacred Scripture,² and from the fact that a vow has the character of a debt. I said ordinarily, because sometimes one might rightly say that the obligation of fulfilling the vow as soon as morally possible is not undertaken by the one vowing, but that the matter can be taken more broadly. Moreover, delay, unless there is a just cause, is a grave sin: 1. when it is done with grave danger of omission or of inability to fulfill the vow; 2. when the delay is notable, and it concerns a vow in which delay involves diminution of the proximate matter, as happens, for example, in a vow of entering Religion; in this vow a delay beyond half a year is held by St. Alphonsus (III, 221) to be mortal. It is disputed whether one sins gravely if the delay is notable, say for two or three years, and it concerns a vow in which the delay does not involve diminution of the matter promised, as happens, for example, in a vow of making a pilgrimage, etc. But with St. Alphonsus (Homo Apostolicus, tr. 5, n. 33) it seems it must be affirmed, because so great a delay of execution against the will of the creditor, that is, God, seems to contain grave disorder. Deuteronomy seems to favor this.³

2. The manner of fulfilling a vow. a) A personal vow must be fulfilled by the one vowing himself. Hence it cannot be fulfilled through another; nor, if the one vowing cannot fulfill it, must another be substituted by him (St. Alphonsus, III, 217).

b) "Real vows are to be discharged from one's own property; hence one who cannot do so from his own property is not bound to beg from another. But if he can do so from his own property, and yet another, whether asked or spontaneously, wishes to discharge it for him, this is valid.... Indeed, he sufficiently satisfies a vow or oath of alms who, after learning of it, ratifies alms given by another for that purpose while he himself was unaware of it; because then the vow is already fulfilled with the consent of the one vowing" (St. Alphonsus, III, 217). The obligation of a real vow passes to heirs, and likewise the obligation of a mixed vow for the part by which it is real (can. 1310, § 2). It is disputed, however, of what nature the obligation of the heir is. But the real obligations of the testator seem indirectly to affect his goods themselves, so that the said obligations, whether of justice, or of fidelity, or of religion, or of a manifold title, pass to the heirs by the same title by which the testator was bound by them.

c) A mixed vow, as to the personal and real part respectively, must be fulfilled as was said under a and b. But if the obligation of the vow ceases insofar as it is personal, for that reason its obligation does not cease insofar as it is real, unless the real part was promised only accessorily.

¹ Sometimes, however, from the circumstances the intention of the one vowing not to bind himself before the attached time can be gathered.

² Deut. 23:21.

³ Deut. 23:21.

VII. The obligation of certain vows in particular. 1. A vow under a suspensive condition - for example, "I vow entrance into Religion, if my father consents" - obliges in this way: the one vowing is bound:

a) Once the condition has been fulfilled, to execute the vow. Nevertheless he is not bound until the condition has been fulfilled specifically, not merely equivalently. For example, "you vowed Religion if your sister married; it does not suffice if she dies" (St. Alphonsus, III, 219); except if another intention of the one vowing is sufficiently clear.

b) Not to render himself unable to execute the vow.

c) Not maliciously to impede the condition from being fulfilled. But one who impedes that does not act maliciously if it is a question of a condition which depends on the will of the one vowing. Hence if someone vowed to enter religion if within a year he had not entered marriage, he can enter marriage, and thus impede the condition from being fulfilled. "Likewise, you vowed chastity; if you fall from frailty, you do not sin with respect to the vow; otherwise, if you sin deliberately in order to be freed from the vow" (St. Alphonsus, III, 218). One who impedes the condition from being fulfilled is bound to remove the malicious influence if the condition still can be fulfilled; if it can no longer be fulfilled, he is not bound to execute the vow, unless it is evident that the intention of the one vowing extended more broadly (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

2. A penal vow - for example, "I vow Religion if I shall have perpetrated such a sin again" - after the sin has been committed does not oblige if fully deliberated consent was lacking.

3. A vow concerning the deed of another is understood thus: that the one vowing ought prudently to take care that the other perform it (St. Alphonsus, III, 216).

Corollary I. In strict doubt whether someone has vowed, or has taken up a mere proposal, he is not bound by the obligation of a vow (n. 228). In doubt whether a prepubescent person, otherwise normal, could omit a vow with sufficient deliberation, the faculty is presumed if he has completed the seventh year; otherwise, if he has not completed the seventh year (cf. can. 88, § 3).

Corollary II. One who has performed the thing promised while unmindful of the vow more probably has satisfied the vow, because everyone is judged to have the habitual will of satisfying a debt before what is not a debt. Otherwise one must speak of him who, mindful of the vow, intends not to satisfy it (St. Alphonsus, III, 224, at the end).

Corollary III. In strict doubt whether the act by which the vow is fulfilled has been placed, there is an obligation of observing it; otherwise if it is doubted whether the act placed suffices for fulfilling the vow (n. 231).