Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
§ 5. On the Cessation of a Vow Intrinsically
409. Preliminary note. A vow can cease in two ways: 1. intrinsically, namely, a) from a change of matter or b) from the cessation of the end; 2. extrinsically, namely, through the intervention of legitimate authority; this indeed can occur a) through invalidation, b) through dispensation, and c) through commutation. The cessation of a vow, or at least of its obligation, through extrinsic authority will be treated in the following paragraphs; now the cessation of a vow intrinsically is to be treated briefly.
General rule. A (private) vow ceases intrinsically when so great a change has supervened either on the part of the person vowing or of the matter promised that, had it been present from the beginning, it certainly would have impeded the vow; or, as St. Thomas404 briefly says: "That which would impede a vow from being made if it were present also removes the obligation after the vow has been made."
The reason is that a private vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the person vowing. But the person vowing is deservedly presumed not to have wished to bind himself in the case in which a notable change should occur either on his own part or on the part of the matter. For every vow, since it concerns a better good, essentially requires suitable matter, concerning which there was discussion above in n. 399. Therefore, just as a vow is null if the matter was unsuitable from the beginning, so a vow ceases when matter previously suitable afterwards becomes unsuitable. St. Thomas405 writes to the point: "He who vows in a certain manner establishes for himself a law binding himself to something which is good in itself and in most cases. It can happen, however, that in some case it is either simply evil, or useless, or an impediment to a greater good; which is contrary to the nature of that which falls under a vow. And therefore it is necessary that in such a case it be determined that the vow is not to be observed."
404 IV, dist. 38, q. 1, sol. 1 ad 1.
405 Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 88, a. 10.
410. 1. On the part of the person vowing, a notable change causing the obligation of a vow to cease is present, e.g., in the following cases:
a) if a rich man vowed alms but afterwards himself becomes poor, he is now freed from the vow;
b) if someone vowed entrance into a monastery but afterwards falls into a grave and incurable illness, he is no longer bound by his vow;
c) if someone vowed to receive Communion on a stated day, but on this day broke the natural fast, he now neither can nor is bound to receive Communion without fasting;
d) if someone vowed to make a pilgrimage on a fixed day, but on that day he must altogether attend to his sick father, he is no longer bound to the vow.
One who before lacked temptations but now is agitated by most vehement temptations against chastity is not, however, freed from a vow of chastity made. For he could and ought to have foreseen this change.
- On the part of the matter promised, a notable change is present, e.g., in the following cases:
a) if the matter becomes illicit, e.g., if someone promised by vow to give alms to a determined poor man whom he knows will now abuse the alms received in order to become drunk;
b) if the matter becomes impossible (physically or morally), e.g., if someone vowed the construction of a chapel in some place and the civil government strictly prohibits this construction;406
c) if the matter becomes useless relative to the principal end intended by the person vowing; e.g., if someone vowed a pilgrimage in order to recover the health of his father, he is no longer bound to the vow if the father has died in the meantime; or one who vowed not to enter some house because of a seductive girl dwelling there is now freed from the vow if that girl has died or dwells elsewhere. But if the matter has become useless relative to the secondary end intended by the person vowing, the vow does not cease. Hence, e.g., if someone vowed to give certain alms each week, and he who until now received those alms has died, the vow does not thereby cease, since the determined person of the poor man was not the principal but the secondary end of the vow.
Note. No public vow ceases because of intrinsic causes. Hence essential vows made in approved religious institutes and the vow of chastity in the reception of the subdiaconate do not cease because of a notable change on the part of the person vowing or on the part of the matter. The reason is that otherwise many inconveniences would arise both for the person vowing himself and for religious institutes. Moreover, if there is an urgent reason for obtaining a relaxation of vows of this kind, a legitimate dispensation can be obtained. It is evident of itself that temporary vows, whether private or public, cease when the time of the vows has elapsed.
406 Cf. the things said above in n. 399(b) concerning matter partly possible and partly impossible.