The Duty of Conjugal Companionship and Assistance

Marriage as a Sacrament.—The third benefit of marriage is that of the Sacrament. The union of man and wife is not merely a physical union, but also a social one, and it should be modelled on the union of Christ and the Church: “This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and the Church” (Eph., v. 32).

(a) Christ abides with the Church, and so the husband should dwell with his wife (Matt., xix. 5). The cohabitation of the parties is demanded by the very nature of the promises made in marriage, and hence it is wrong for the husband to be absent from the home for notable periods of time, or, what is worse, to drive his wife from home—or vice versa. Grave reasons and mutual consent justify long absences, as when the husband is called away on distant business; but, if he goes away for a considerable part of the year, he should, if possible, take his wife with him, or visit or write to her frequently. Very grave reasons suffice for obtaining a separation, either permanent, on account of adultery, or during the continuance of the reason, as when there is serious unhappiness (Canons 1128 sqq.).

(b) Christ is the head of the Church, and so also the husband is superior to the wife in authority (Eph., v. 23). Ordinarily man excels in the qualities suited for rule of the home (such as physical strength, decision, courage), and hence as every society, no matter how small, must have a head, the husband is the natural head of the home. But obedience is due a husband in domestic matters in which he is head of the house—for example, the choice of the place of residence, the management of the family income, the discipline of the children, but not in the wife’s personal affairs (e.g., her conscience, her politics, her property)—and only in commands that do not exceed his authority, for he has no power to command if he is irrational, and he has no claim to obedience if he orders something sinful or foolish. Moreover, since the wife is a partner and not a servant, and since she usually excels as sympathetic and wise adviser and careful household manager and is naturally more virtuous, the husband should consult with her on important family questions and decide them as far as possible by mutual consent, and should gladly leave to her sole control and direction the many things in which she is more competent than himself.

(c) Christ gave Himself for the Church (Eph., v. 25), and so also the husband has the duty of providing for his wife, spiritually and temporally. Usually the man should attend to the external affairs of the family (such as its support and protection), while the wife should take care of the internal affairs (such as the housekeeping and the training of the children). It is to be regretted that the smallness of the husband’s salary often compels the wife to work outside her home. Women should not be compelled to take up occupations unsuited to their sex, much less those that interfere with the supreme duty of motherhood. Injury done the common personal goods of husband and wife by one of them is unjust, if due to illegal action; it is at least uncharitable, if due to carelessness. The family goods are usually under the control of the head of the family. The wife has no right to use the earnings of her husband without his consent, unless he fails to provide suitably for his family, or uses his money extravagantly.

100. In those things which pertain to the mutual help of life, man and wife are of equal right, since marriage is entered for the sake of mutual help. Hence they mutually owe to each other love, fidelity, assistance, aid, according to Eph. 5:25; Tit. 2:4; Matt. 19:5; 1 Cor. 7:3 seqq.; C. I. 130; C. G. 212; C. H. 56; C. A. 90; C. L. 1184; and if anything adverse happens to one, the other ought to be a participant. Wherefore a woman must follow the man migrating elsewhere for the sake of health, or as a punishment, and the man must follow the woman, L. 353, l. 6, n. 957, 977; and to the other who is in need, even driven into exile by his own fault, or enclosed in prison, indeed even separated from him, provided it was not by his own fault, if the other has means, he must furnish support; and the man must feed the wife, even if he married her without a dowry, or the dowry perished by chance. C. I. 132, 133, 142; C. G. 214; C. B. 1360, 1361; Sanchez, de Matr. l. 9, d. 4, n. 20; d. 5, n. 8, 14.

It is lawful for neither, against the will of the other, to enter religion, C. un. Extr. de Voto; and one who passes, against the spouse's will, to religion can be recalled, C. 3, 12, de Conv. coni.; nor is it lawful for the man, against the wife's will, to receive orders, indeed not even tonsure, C. 4, de Temp. ord. in 6, except if he has justly and by law departed from her as regards habitation. L. l. 6, n. 969.

378. • I. Spouses are bound:

1. To mutual love. For since they are one flesh, they must also be one heart. Thus Ephes. 5. 25: Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ also loved the Church. - Tit. 2. 4: (Wives) are to love their husbands.

2. To conjugal society and cohabitation. This is clear from the nature and ends of matrimony, and from the words of Christ, Matt. 19. 5: A man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and the two shall be in one flesh.

3. To food and whatever pertains to the honorable sustaining of their condition, to be furnished to one another: For now they are not two, but one flesh, Matt. 19. 6. - For no one ever hated his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it, Ephes. 5. 29.

4. To rendering the conjugal debt to one another, when it is seriously sought and no legitimate cause of denying it is present; because they bound themselves to this. Hence the Apostle, 1 Cor. 7. 4: The woman does not have power over her own body, but the man; and likewise also the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman (namely in order to generation).

379. • II. The husband is bound in particular:

1. Studiously to manage the family estate, and to administer with due diligence both common goods and the proper goods of the wife.

2. To take care that the wife fulfill the duties of the Christian profession and execute the precepts of both divine and ecclesiastical law. For the man is the head of the woman and the ruler of the whole family; and therefore the right governance both of the wife and of the other members of the family pertains to him.

3. To correct a delinquent wife, where this work is needed for her amendment and for forestalling scandal. But correction must proceed from charity or love of justice or zeal for procuring the right governance of the family, and be much lighter than the fault deserves, because the wife is the companion of the man, not a slave. Care must besides be taken lest peace and love perish between them.

380. • III. The wife, on her part, is bound:

1. To reverence the husband, because he is her Superior, as is clear from what has been said and from the words of Gen. 3. 16: Thou shalt be under the power of the man, and he shall rule over thee.

2. To furnish obedience to him; because obedience is owed to a Superior in those things which pertain to governance; and the Apostle to the Colossians 3. 18 says: Women, be subject to your husbands, as it is fitting in the Lord.

3. To bear care of the house in the family estate, and therefore to perform the offices of the family, such as to prepare foods, sweep the house, wash linens, mend torn clothes, and furnish other things of this sort. Yet a noble wife can fulfill the lower offices through servants or maids, provided she watches over them and takes care that the domestic matter is well managed.

381. Resolves. - 1. A husband can sin gravely if he pursues his wife with insults, for example by calling her an adulteress, a witch, etc.; if without just cause he impedes her from fulfilling divine or ecclesiastical precepts, or from very useful devotions, for example from discreet frequency of the Sacraments; if he treats her in a tyrannical manner like a vile slave; if he does not cohabit with her; if he neglects the governance of the family, etc. - St. Alphonsus, n. 356.

2. A wife likewise can sin gravely if she is accustomed to deride and mock her husband; if by harsh words, contumacious disobedience, or excessive moroseness she provokes him to anger and blasphemies, etc.

3. The husband ordinarily ought to begin correction of the wife by words gentler words, and if these do not profit, to come down to graver correction. Sometimes he must dissemble the defects of the wife, when he can do this without sin, and not be excessive in correcting; but sometimes he should defer correction for a time, lest correction seem to proceed from the heat of anger and lack fruit, while the wife is less disposed to receive it.

4. Let the confessor not immediately believe a spouse complaining against a spouse, especially if the wife inveighs against the husband; because women generally are prone to lying. Wherefore it is better, with the matter dissembled, to commend to them prayer, patience, mildness, and greater solicitude for furnishing services to the husband.

5. Let the wife be silent while the husband is angry or drunk; if an admonition seems likely to profit, let her admonish while the husband is well disposed; if an angry man must be answered, let her answer gently: for a soft answer breaks anger, and a hard one arouses fury. If these obtain nothing, let her take care that the husband be admonished through the Parish Priest or another prudent man.

I. The principal duties of the married in the natural order are cohabitation and the debitum coniugale.

1. The duty of living together (communio mensae sive cohabitatio) is imposed by the common life to which both parties are vowed.⁴ By the law of nature the husband is the head of the family and determines its place and manner of living. If for some good reason he decides to change his domicile, the wife is bound to follow him, unless she is physically or morally unable to do so. If he is temporarily forced to live apart from his wife, he should obtain her consent, without which he should not act except in case of necessity, and even then only provided the separation does not bring in its wake the periculum incontinentiae. For a short absence the husband does not need the consent of his wife, but it would undoubtedly be an injustice to her if he remained away even for a brief while without informing her of the reason.⁵

⁴ Matth. XIX, 5; 1 Cor. VII, 5.—Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theologia Mor., l. VI, n. 977.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 388.

⁵ St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. VI, n. 939: “It is certain that spouses are bound by an obligation of justice to cohabit in the same house, at the same table and bed. Hence it is inferred that neither spouse can depart elsewhere for a long time against the will of the other unless just causes are present, namely for the public good, to support or protect the family, or to avoid harm from enemies. But Bossius, with Toletus and Sayrus, said that if the husband had to remain elsewhere for a long time, he would be bound, if he conveniently can, to bring his wife there so that she may cohabit with him. . . . The husband can undertake a brief pilgrimage for the sake of devotion even against his wife’s will; the wife, however, cannot do this without the husband’s consent, since she is subject to his will and it does not become the state of women to travel. From mutual consent, however, spouses can rightly separate from each other, provided the danger of incontinence and harm to the education of the offspring are absent, from the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. VII, 5): ‘Defraud not one another, except perhaps by consent for a time, that you may devote yourselves to prayer, and return together again, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence.’”—Cfr. Reuter-Lehmkuhl, Neoconfessarius, P. II, c. 4, n. p. 151.

If the matrimonial contract stipulates that the husband shall not change his domicile without the wife’s consent, or if he becomes a vagabond after marriage, and the wife was unaware of this propensity before she married him, she is not bound to accompany him. The fact that the wife’s dowry has not yet been paid, does not justify the husband in refusing to cohabit with her, for the duty of cohabitation flows from the marriage contract. Arbitrary separation, secret escape, or malicious abandonment of one party by the other, is a grievous injustice.

If married people live apart, it is usually an indication that their spiritual union is not very close. The wife’s place is in her husband’s house, and she inflicts an injury upon him if she goes away to live with her parents or other relatives.

If a man wishes to emigrate to a foreign country, he should not do so against the wishes of his wife. Even though she can give no other reason for opposing the plan than a strong love of home, this sentiment should be respected. The man who without important reasons disregards such a noble sentiment in his wife, cannot expect her to become more closely attached to him if he disregards her wishes. Only when the motives inspiring the husband are very weighty, can the wife be expected to acquiesce, even at the sacrifice of her natural sentiments.⁶

⁶ Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, p. 629.

Neither party may leave the other except on account of notorious adultery or if further cohabitation has become impossible without serious danger to faith, morals, or honor. In that event the facts should be reported to the ecclesiastical authorities and permission obtained for a separatio a mensa et toro.

If one party has committed adultery, and the fact is established beyond doubt, the innocent partner is justified in denying to the guilty the debitum coniugale and other signs of matrimonial affection, and if he or she intends to apply for an ecclesiastical decree of separation, the debitum must be denied, because otherwise the right to a separation would be forfeited.

Even when there are good reasons for demanding a separation the innocent party should consider well whether it would not be better, for the sake of the temporal and eternal welfare of himself or herself and of the children, to condone the crime and continue to cohabit with the guilty partner rather than get a separation.

For a husband or wife to live apart from the other without sufficient canonical reasons is a mortal sin and renders the party per se unworthy of absolution. Under present conditions, however, the Church is no longer able to prevent such unauthorized separations and therefore tolerates them. Hence if married persons living apart are convinced that they are right, if their separation does not give scandal, and if admonitions and warnings are likely to prove ineffective, they may be left unmolested.⁷

⁷ J. E. Pruner, Kath. Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 3rd ed., p. 335; cfr. Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, n. 934 sqq.

The great positive duty is that of mutual love inspired by charity. The marriage bond sets up between the spouses an intimacy which no other surpasses or even equals; the marriage would never have been entered upon without the mutual affection which was necessary for the parties to give themselves to each other. Conjugal love has in Christian marriage a sort of noble primacy. For matrimonial faith demands that husband and wife be joined in an especially holy and pure love, not as adulterers love each other, but as Christ loved the Church. This precept the Apostle laid down when he said: “Husbands, love your wives as Christ also loved the Church,” which of a truth He embraced with a boundless love, not for the sake of His own advantage, but seeking only the good of His spouse.¹

¹ P. 28.

Charity is a love which is forgetful of self: “Charity seeketh not her own” (I Cor. xiii, 5). It is a love which is not content with words: “Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth” (I John iii, 18). It is a love which has its source in God, ends in Him, and tends to lead to Him those that He loves. Charity should, therefore, manifest itself by mutual benevolence, readiness to help in every necessity or difficulty; also by activity of mutual upbuilding, and reciprocal

influence for good according to the qualities allotted to each party, an office which is called in Christian tradition the work of edification according to the Gospel.

It excludes any abasement of one of the spouses, any degrading subjection or servitude; but, far from excluding all subordination, it rather requires it for the sake of order and harmony; only it must see to it that this subordination is suave and gentle.

Because if nature had not established a hierarchical order domestic society would begin with anarchy, and authority which did not rest on a natural title would make submission more painful and less welcome. Nature herself designates the husband as the superior by giving him strength of body and a fatherhood which does not interfere with his duties in the maintenance and government of the family. Besides having a natural ability which is usually greater, the man has by nature a taste for government and leadership; whereas the woman, physically less robust, naturally leans upon him, and is besides normally impeded by the inconvenient consequences of motherhood. By supernatural revelation, the Apostle derives this hierarchy from the mysterious origin of woman: “For the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man” (I Cor. xi, 8).

Not at all. It is limited to the exterior acts of family life which may be reasonably demanded. The wife keeps the independence of a human person; she remains free in her personal conduct, in her practises of piety, in her goings and comings, with due consideration for the conjugal pact and the order of the house and family; she preserves the right to demand of the husband whatever her quality as wife and mother entitles her to, for she, too, has charge of the education of the children. Finally, as the husband and wife were equal in giving themselves each to the other, so they remain equal in regard to the right which flows from

this mutual self-surrender. Besides, the subordination of the wife admits of a certain variation according to circumstances of time, place, and persons. Incapacity on the part of the husband confers upon the wife by a natural devolution the right to replace him in the government of the house. State laws, and the ante-nuptial agreement, if any, may modify the property rights of the wife. There will, therefore, be,even as a regular thing, cases of independence and cases of equality; besides there are exceptional cases.

It may be somewhat diminished or intensified; but, since it is founded in the natural order it can never be entirely abolished nor go beyond certain limits. It is intended to last as long as the family itself.

The Encyclical reminds us that if the husband is the head of the family, the wife is the heart.¹ As the former has the primacy of government, the latter may and should claim for herself the primacy of love. As Leo XIII observes (Encyclical “Arcanum”): “Divine charity should never cease to be the norm of their respective rights.”

¹ See the beautiful reflections of Dermine, work cited, pp. 41-43 on these reciprocal parts of the husband and wife.

Marriage may also be defined as a “total community of life.”

Certainly not, since it began and sprang from that mutual giving of self, and at the same time is its crown and glory.

First, because the spouses can in their union make this their chief purpose. Secondly, because the community of life between the spouses—our second definition of marriage—is providentially directed by God to this last end, which, being the supreme end of man, occupies the first place in the Divine Will.

Absolutely not, because such relations are intrinsically vicious, wrong, and the circumstances mentioned, being merely accidental and extrinsic, cannot alter this. Besides, such a moral disorder could never conduce to perfection nor even serve the purposes of true love, for true love is partly founded on mutual respect, which moral disorder must necessarily weaken. This truth is confirmed by the experience of anthropologists and public officials. Improper relations break up homes.

256. - 1. The obligation of cohabiting follows upon the obligation of rendering the conjugal debt. Moreover, cohabitation is consonant with the nature of marriage, since, from the very definition of law, marriage is "the union of a man and a woman, containing an undivided manner of life" (Institutes, book 1, title 9, De patria potestate, § 1).

The new Code of Canon Law sanctions the same in these words canon 1128: "Spouses must preserve the communion of conjugal life, unless a just cause excuses them."

Therefore, when the other is unwilling, one spouse cannot be absent for a longer time without necessity. Except the case of adultery, as was stated in no. 249.

2. Nevertheless, this obligation is to be understood in a human manner. Wherefore, with a burden plainly extraordinary and unforeseen, the wife will not be bound to follow her husband into a distant region; and a more excellent good, or certainly one more due and more necessary, can excuse spouses from cohabitation. It must be left to the judgment of prudent persons to determine when, in proportion to the gravity of the cause, a husband or wife is judged to be absent longer than the obligation of cohabitation permits. But if it is necessary for the husband to be absent for a long time, he must take his wife with him, if he conveniently can. Cf. St. Alphonsus, book 6, no. 939.

3. When the other spouse is unwilling, to be absent without a sufficient cause will be mortal:

1. Whenever it includes a mortal denial of the debt;

2. If it is not for a short time: this will have to be weighed both in itself and from the harm or sadness of the other.

4. Just causes can be: honorable recreation, care for health; the necessity either of avoiding one's own harm, of supporting the family, or of administering the family property; the demand of the public good.

Thus, for the sake of religion, they permit a man a brief pilgrimage, while the wife, since the man is her head, has need of the husband's permission.

5. But neither, "when the other consents, is it therefore at once lawful, without another just cause, to depart for a fixed time, unless provision is made against the probable danger of incontinence in either party, no harm comes to the family, and scandal is absent" (Palmieri, vol. 6, treatise 10, no. 388).

In this matter, it will be necessary that the richer assist the poorer or more humble who, seeking richer wages outside their homeland, can easily be exposed there to many sins against religion and morals. Cf. the institutions in Belgium for assisting those who, each year, are accustomed to go to France for several months for the sake of work; and what Kolping devised to protect those who learn a trade even in a foreign region (apprentices).

Formerly writers permitted that, in order to obtain payment of the promised dowry, the man refuse cohabitation for some time, if this seemed to be an efficacious means. And they dispensed the man from providing support to a wife whose promised dowry had not yet been paid. Cf. St. Alphonsus, book 6, no. 939; Palmieri, vol. 6, treatise 10, nos. 390, 391. These things now have little practical use.

6. It is also to be desired, and care is to be taken insofar as possible, that spouses use not only a common roof but also a common bedroom. For the separation of bedrooms, besides providing an easy occasion for sins and suspicions, is shown to be not slightly harmful to mutual love and, as experience testifies, is a frequent cause of unhappy marriages and divorces. Cf. nos. 208, 3, and 215, 1, and Forel himself.

Noldin, II, n. 281; Rosler, C.SS.R., Die Frauenfrage; Vermeersch, Quaest. de Just., n. 512; Godts, C.SS.R., Le feminisme condamne; Cathrein, Frauenfrage; Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, where there are many things (cf. Gen. Index, v. Frauenemanzipation, etc.); Ami du Cl., 1903, p. 36, 745; Schindler, Moraltheol., II, 747.

703. Principles. I. Spouses mutually owe to themselves society, love, and faith. Thus namely from the nature of marriage, and from positive law, both divine and human⁶ (cf. treatise on Matrimony, c. VII).

1. Society; for they are held to live together, as to table and bed, unless a legitimate cause excuses, as is established from the words of the Lord: A man shall leave father and mother, and shall cling to his wife, and the two shall be in one flesh (Matth., 19, 5). But the choice of domicile pertains to the husband (cf. n. 2120 seq.).

2. Special love, namely conjugal love; for since they are one flesh, they ought also to be, through a more intimate love, one heart. Thus Ephes., 5, 15: Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church; and (Tit., 2, 4) it is commanded to wives that they love their husbands.

Whence a spouse sins against charity and conjugal love if he or she has hatred for the other, or wishes a grave evil; if by injurious words or signs he or she saddens the other, etc. Likewise, because they are held, from love, to furnish food mutually to one another, either husband or wife sins gravely if, either by harshness, idleness, or sumptuousness, he or she deprives the other part of those things which are necessary to life or condition (III, 356).

3. Faith, that is, conjugal fidelity, according to that (1 Cor., 7, 4): The woman does not have power over her own body, but the man. And similarly also the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman, namely in order to generation.

Hence: a) They are held to render to each other the conjugal debt, when it is sought seriously, and there is not a legitimate cause of denying. b) Every venereal act, whether internal or external, with or concerning an alien person, in married persons has the malice of adultery (cf. n. 781).

704. • II. Certain duties are proper to each spouse. This follows from the proper condition of each. For although there is some equality between spouses, nevertheless the ends of marriage and the native character itself of the spouses require that the man be the head of the woman (1 Cor., 11, 3), and that the woman be subject to the man.

1. The HUSBAND must care for his wife's soul, by directing her rightly, watching over her morals, and correcting her where there is need; - body, namely by retaining his wife with him, and feeding her according to his status; - goods, by diligently conducting the family affair.

Hence, the husband sins, and at times gravely: a) If he affects his wife with blows or insults, without just cause. "Nevertheless he can sometimes chastise her moderately by words, or even from a grave cause by moderate blows, having regard to condition" (III, l. c.; H. Ap., VII, 12). See n. 732. b) If he impedes her from fulfilling the precepts of God or of the Church. But if he impedes her, without cause, concerning those things which are of counsel, such as confession, communion, etc., he sins only venially, unless it is established that she perceives great utility from the sacraments. c) If he denies or neglects to procure food for her. Yet he could justly deny these things if the wife had committed adultery, or had departed from him without cause. d) If he treats her in a tyrannical manner, like a vile slave. e) If he neglects the governance of the family, etc.

2. The WIFE is held to exhibit reverence and obedience to the husband in all licit things: Women, be subject to your husbands, as is fitting, in the Lord (Coloss., 3, 18).

Whence she sins gravely if by quarrels or harsh words she provokes the husband to grave anger, or blasphemy; if, the husband being spurned, she claims authority for herself; if without sufficient indication she judges badly concerning his continence; if she spends something notable from common goods, against his will and the custom of women of her condition; if she arrogates to herself the administration of the house without just cause; if she is unwilling to follow the man changing domicile, provided she can follow without danger of life and salvation, and he, after the nuptials, has not become wandering. It also belongs to the wife to devote work to the offspring to be educated, and in domestic business to bear care of the family, applying effort to cleanliness, not to luxury or talkativeness. If nevertheless she is of conspicuous condition, she can fulfill the lower offices through male servants or maids, provided she watches over them and takes care that the domestic affair is well conducted. Consult St. Alphonsus, III, n. 351-356; H. Ap., tr. VII, n. 12-13. See the rest in the treatise on Charity (n. 484 seqq.) and in the treatise on Justice (n. 863 seqq.).

The doctrine just set forth does not please many moderns, especially those who are opposed to positive religion. They demand equality in every way between man and woman, and they say that it is a crime that woman must be subject to man. This modern theory can be considered under a threefold respect: for it touches the domestic order, the economic or social order, and finally the political order.

1. As regards the domestic order. Whatever those say who vindicate complete emancipation, this can in no way be conceded; for nature has so prepared and ordered the whole matter that the man preside, be the head of the family, the mind which directs all things, the will which by labor and endeavor conquers all things. But let the woman become and remain the heart of the family, and let her work by loving, praying, and bearing, and always lead morals to better things. Head and heart, the mind directing and the heart loving, fortitude and loveliness, the strength of the body and the tender constitution of the members, must be one; yet so that what by nature has been made weaker subjects itself to the stronger.

2. As regards the economic and political order, nothing prevents women also from being admitted almost equally as men to many businesses and to many arts, provided, and let this be well noted, that all things are proportioned to their powers, and never harm the office which they must pursue as wives and mothers. Therefore a moderate and tempered emancipation is not to be rejected a priori; but let there be rejected whatever could destroy the family as it was founded by the Creator: in the middle you will go most safely. Cf. the authors cited at the beginning of this chapter.

Spouses, on account of the undivided manner of life by which they are bound to each other in turn, and on account of the mutual help which one ought to furnish to the other, are held to cohabit together, unless a legitimate cause of separation has freed them from this obligation. - Whence there is a new argument, the treatment of which we shall dispatch in few words.

2120. Principles. I. "It is certain that spouses ARE HELD, from an obligation of justice, TO COHABIT in the same house, at table and bed."¹ - This is clear both from reason, namely from the nature of marriage, and from the words of the Lord: "A man shall leave father and mother, and shall cling to his wife" (Matt. 19:5).

Hence it is inferred: 1. "Neither spouse can depart elsewhere, against the will of the other, for a long time, unless just causes are present, namely on account of the public good, or for nourishing or protecting the family, or for avoiding harm from enemies."

2. "If the husband had to remain elsewhere for a long time, he would be bound, if he conveniently can, to bring his wife there, so that she may cohabit with him."

3. The wife is held, more probably, to follow the husband into exile; because she is held to suffer his misfortune. Similarly the husband is held to accompany the wife, if necessity compels her to change domicile.²

2121. II. "Regularly the WIFE is held TO FOLLOW THE HUSBAND changing domicile, even if he changes without just cause, provided the cause is not foul. And this, even if somewhere there is a contrary custom, which cannot derogate from divine law, which constituted the man the head of the wife. Likewise also, if the husband departs far away and will remain there for a long time. But otherwise, if he is going to return from there shortly; for then neither is the wife held to follow the husband, nor the husband to lead the wife with him, just as neither is the husband held to lead her with him, even if he departs far away, if great expenses would be required to transport her there."³

We said regularly; for "the wife is not held to follow the husband if he wishes to drag her into sin, or if the wife by departure would be exposed to grave danger of life, or to danger of grave detriment. Thus likewise the wife is not held to follow a wandering husband, unless before matrimony she knew his errant life."⁴

IT IS ASKED. Whether it is licit for a husband not to cohabit with his wife, and to expel her from the house, ON ACCOUNT OF A DOWRY promised and not paid?

Resp. Panormitanus with others affirms; but others with Sanchez more commonly and more probably deny. - "The reason is that the obligation of cohabiting does not arise from the payment of dowry, but from the natural and divine law itself, by which the husband is held to render the debt to the wife, and therefore to live with her. - Whence authors say that even if the husband has not yet led the wife into his house, he is held to lead her there, notwithstanding that the dowry was not paid."⁵

2122. Principles. I. DIVORCE, or separation from bed or habitation, can be made for just causes, while the bond of marriage remains. - This is clear from Trent (sess. 24, can. 8): "If anyone shall say that the Church errs when she decrees that, on account of many causes, separation between spouses, as regards bed or as regards cohabitation, can be made for a certain or uncertain time: let him be anathema."⁶

2123. II. There are very many CAUSES OF DIVORCE, or of the separation of spouses as regards bed and habitation. This is clear from different places of canon law, against some Protestants, who acknowledged adultery as the only cause of this separation. - But the CAUSES enumerated by canonists can be reduced to THREE:

1. The first and principal cause, on account of which it is licit to make divorce, and indeed perpetual divorce, is the adultery of a spouse. - This is clear both from divine law, the Lord saying (Matt. 19:9): "Whoever shall dismiss his wife, except on account of fornication, and shall marry another, commits adultery"; and from canon law, cap. Significasti and cap. Gaudemus, de divortiis. - But it is REQUIRED that the adultery be: 1) morally certain; - 2) voluntary, and not perpetrated from violence brought upon one; - 3) not condoned, whether expressly or implicitly, e.g. by the conjugal act, or by other signs, exhibited by the innocent party conscious and mindful of the adultery, with the mind, for the internal forum, of condoning; - 4) not mutual, because then compensation would exist; - 5) consummated by intercourse, as is more probable to St. Alphonsus; - 6) committed without the consent of the coparty. - And here it must be noted that, from the more common and at least extrinsically more probable opinion of authors, under the name of adultery there is also understood every division of flesh, such as sodomy and bestiality.¹ Long-lasting and injurious desertion is also customarily equated with adultery.²

We said that it is licit to make divorce; for the innocent party is not held to dismiss the guilty party, unless this is necessary for correction and amendment, or for removing scandal; and in these cases also he is excused whenever he would prudently fear grave inconvenience from it.³ Nor indeed is some adultery admitted before nuptials and afterward disclosed a sufficient cause of divorce, unless injury is inflicted on the husband from it, as would be if the wife, when she married, had already been pregnant by another; for then, as one deceived and injured, he can remove from himself, by the authority of the Church, her who contrived fraud and dishonor for him. And this same thing seems to be said if the wife had given herself to prostitution.

Authors note besides the following: 1. A juridical separation having been made, the innocent spouse is not held to receive the adulterous coparty, although amended; for "on the one hand Christ has perpetually freed him from the obligation of cohabiting with an adulterer, and on the other hand charity does not seem, of itself, to oblige to so great a burden."⁴ - 2. Yet he can recall the adulterous spouse to himself, although juridically separated, because he can renounce his right; but it is scarcely to be counseled or prescribed to an adulterous woman that she return to the husband, on account of the frequent danger of bad treatment.⁵ - 3. If after the sentence of divorce it happens that the other spouse also commits adultery, it is more probable that neither is held to return to the coparty recalling; because by the sentence of the judge each was freed from servitude. Nevertheless, the judge ought to take care that they return to each other, so that they may better provide for the salvation of their souls and remove the scandal of others.⁶

2. The second cause of divorce is some grave danger of soul or body; by reason of which danger: 1) If one of the spouses slips into heresy or apostasy from the faith, which is spiritual adultery, it is conceded to the other to institute divorce, even perpetual, after the sentence of the judge.⁷ 2) If a spouse draws the coparty into sin, e.g. if he solicits that one to heresy, sodomy, adultery, etc., the innocent party can depart, indeed is bound if the danger is grave.⁸ 3) Finally, if from cohabitation there threatens grave danger of life or health, or if cohabitation becomes so burdensome that it is rendered morally impossible; for instance, if a spouse were compelled to suffer cruelties grave and frequent for his condition, or if the wife were expelled without cause.⁹

3. The third cause is mutual consent. From this consent spouses separate themselves licitly from bed, or even from habitation, whether for a time or in perpetuity. - Moreover, separation from habitation in perpetuity is not customarily permitted unless each enters Religion; or at least unless, when one professes Religion or receives sacred Orders, the coparty vows chastity. But this ought not to be done inconsiderately; rather, it is required that, all things having been well weighed, every danger of incontinence be absent, and offspring not need the care of parents, etc.; for the evangelical counsels do not free human beings from the duties by which they are bound by the law of nature.¹⁰

2124. Questions. QUESTION 1. By what AUTHORITY ought the separation of spouses to be made?

Resp. It is to be made, regularly speaking, by the authority of the judge, i.e. of the Bishop, whenever there is question of separation from the roof; because such separation is public and pertains to external governance; and although it remained hidden, nevertheless the authority of the Bishop would be required.

We said 1. regularly; for by private authority divorce can be made by an innocent spouse in the case of cruelty or danger of perversion, if there is danger in delay, and the judge cannot be approached, or perhaps the fact cannot juridically be proved. Likewise, it can be made by the husband, more probably, in the case of the wife's adultery, whether the adultery is public or hidden, provided it is certain and provided the separation does not bring public scandal with it. For it is said in law: "Wherever there is fornication, or suspicion of fornication, the wife is freely dismissed."¹¹ But in the case in which he were compelled by the judge to cohabit with the adulteress, he would indeed be held to obey, but by no means to render the debt.¹²

We said 2. whenever there is question of separation from the roof; for spouses, from their own authority and mutual consent, can be separated from each other as regards bed, provided danger of incontinence is absent, as is clear from the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:5): "Do not defraud one another, except perhaps by consent for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer; and return again to the same, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence." Recall the things said in n. 2103.

QUESTION 2. After juridical divorce has been made on account of adultery, can the spouses enter RELIGION, or the man receive SACRED ORDERS?

Resp. 1. The innocent spouse can, even against the will of the adulterous party, enter Religion or receive sacred Orders.

2. The adulterous spouse cannot enter Religion, nor be initiated into sacred Orders, unless the innocent one consents, or has already himself undertaken an irrevocable state; otherwise, if he received the priesthood or entered Religion, he could be recalled by the innocent party, even after profession. Nevertheless, the tacit consent of the innocent party suffices, e.g. if the innocent one, knowing that the adulterer wishes to change state, does not impede him, though he conveniently could; or if, when asked by the adulterer, he did not wish to admit reconciliation.¹³

QUESTION 3. After juridical divorce has been made, with which spouse are the CHILDREN to be educated, and at whose expense?

Resp. 1. Natural law being considered, all children are to be educated with the innocent spouse. Except if this one is an infidel or heretic, because then they are to be educated with the faithful spouse.¹⁴ But from civil law, children are generally handed over to the one who obtained the separation, unless, on account of the greater advantage of the children, the judge has established otherwise.¹⁵

2. The expenses of the whole education are regularly to be paid by the spouse who is in fault. Yet always in these matters the sentence of the judge is required, by which one must stand.

2125. PRACTICAL RULES. As regards spouses who, legitimate separation not having been sought, live separated, let the parish priest or confessor attend to the following: - 1) A woman whom it is publicly clear to have been unjustly driven away by her husband is not to be barred from the Sacraments; and the husband is not to be absolved unless he restores the consortium of life with the wife. - 2) He who withdrew from the coparty by reason of notorious adultery is not to be disturbed; but the guilty party is not to be admitted to the Sacraments unless he has repaired the crime and scandal. - 3) They are to be held unworthy of absolution who, on account of a matrimony unhappily begun, e.g. mutual aversion, have separated themselves by private counsel. But, scandal having been removed, if they are in good faith and do not wish to acquiesce when admonished, they are not to be admonished concerning this.¹⁶

2126. FROM CIVIL LAW, in force in many places, there can be had a judicial sentence of divorce or of separation from bed and from habitation, on account of various CAUSES, which are commonly enumerated as THREE, namely: 1. Adultery of the woman, and also of the man, if he kept a concubine in the house common to the spouses. 2. Cruelties or grave injuries brought by one spouse against the other. 3. Condemnation of one of the spouses to an infamous penalty.¹ - And here it must be NOTED that separation of bodies always imports separation of goods, but not vice versa.

Indeed, in several places, civil law permits not only that imperfect separation, or separation of habitation and goods, but also DIVORCE PROPERLY SO CALLED, namely as regards the civil bond, so that it becomes free for spouses to pass to other nuptials. And in that case, to the three causes of separation already numbered, in certain places there is added a fourth, namely mutual consent.

Wherefore it helps to report the following Documents of the HOLY OFFICE.

1. Response to the Bishop of St. Gallen: "The law of the Swiss Confederation enacted concerning status and civil matrimony sanctioned that all and singular matrimonial causes, ecclesiastical jurisdiction being suppressed from now and thereafter, are to be treated in lay tribunals according to the norm which is established in civil causes; and that sentences are to be pronounced in them according to the prescriptions of common law and of the most recent enacted law, by which even marriages of Catholics can, under certain very light reasons, be perpetually severed and dissolved as regards the bond, so that litigating spouses of this kind, after the sentence of divorce of secular judges has been passed, can pass to contracting other marriages if they wish. Therefore it is asked: Whether Catholic JUDGES and ADVOCATES in lay tribunals of this kind can with safe conscience take up and defend, or know and judge, matrimonial causes? - Likewise, whether the same Catholic judges and advocates, according to the recent law of Switzerland, can with safe conscience propose the bond of matrimony as to be dissolved, or declare it as dissolved, and also declare that spouses of this kind can pass to contracting another marriage, just as civil law in this case expressly commands and urges judges to judge and declare?"

In discussing this question, it must not be forgotten that the secular tribunals, whose office it is to judge concerning civil causes, are the same tribunals to which by the new law it belongs to know and judge matrimonial causes. But if, therefore, Catholic judges were forbidden to sit in tribunals of this kind, we would experience, to the great harm of citizens, that those tribunals are deprived of those judges who, filled with the fear of God, judge piously and justly.

But the Sacred Congregation, on Wednesday, 3 April 1878, responded: "As regards Judges, let him recur in particular cases. - As regards advocates, let the responses already given to the Bishop of Southwark be given, namely Tuesday, place IV, on 22 May 1860, to the DOUBT: whether a Catholic advocate can defend the causes of the party brought to trial, against an actor seeking dissolution of the bond? The Response was: 'Provided that it is established to the Bishop concerning the probity of the advocate, and provided that the advocate does nothing which deflects from the principles of natural and ecclesiastical law, it can be tolerated.' And to the other DOUBT: whether it is licit to act the parts of advocate and actor, when the end of the lawsuit is simple separation, without any sentence drawing with itself the nullity of matrimony? The Response was: 'Provision has been made in the preceding'; and on Wednesday, 19 December of the same year: 'provided the Catholic party can approach no other tribunal from which he may obtain a sentence of separation as regards bed and table, and provided the sentence of this tribunal has no other effect than the aforesaid separation, it can be tolerated that Catholics, in that forum, act the parts of actor and advocate, and provided just causes of separation are present, in the judgment of the Bishop; and if besides he has anything of doubt, let him recur, setting forth all the circumstances and dispositions of the law.' J. Velamie, Notary of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition."²

2. Letter to all Ordinaries in French territory: "After the recently restored laws of divorce among the French in the year 1884, several doubts were proposed by some Bishops of France to this Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition: namely whether it would be lawful for lay judges in causes concerning the separation of spouses to declare law, whether concerning the bond or concerning habitation only; whether for advocates and procurators to conduct causes of this kind before lay judges; whether for those to whom by law it pertains to appoint the official defenders, as they call them; finally, whether for syndics, commonly maires, to pronounce divorce.

"The Most Eminent Fathers, General Inquisitors together with me, after the matter had been maturely weighed, on Thursday, place IV, on 25 June 1885, judged that it should be decreed thus:

"Considering the most grave adjuncts of things, times, and places, it can be tolerated that those who hold magistracies and advocates conduct matrimonial causes in France without being held to resign their office, provided they openly profess Catholic doctrine concerning matrimony and concerning matrimonial causes as pertaining to ecclesiastical judges alone, and provided they are so disposed in mind, both concerning the value and nullity of marriage and concerning the separation of bodies, about which causes they are compelled to judge, that they never pronounce a sentence, nor defend one to be pronounced, nor provoke or excite one contrary to divine or ecclesiastical law; and in doubtful or more difficult cases, let each approach his Ordinary, direct himself by his judgment, and, insofar as there is need, recur through his mediation to the Apostolic Penitentiary."

"The Most Holy Father held this decree ratified; and therefore it is made known to all Archbishops and Bishops in France for their norm, by these letters which otherwise are not to be published. R. Card. Monaco."

3. Decree for excluding false interpretations of the preceding Letter:

"By some Bishops of France the following doubts were proposed to the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition: 'In the Letter of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition of 25 June 1885 to all Ordinaries in French Territory concerning the law of civil divorce, it is decreed thus: Considering the most grave adjuncts of things, times, and places, it can be tolerated that those who hold magistracies and advocates conduct matrimonial causes in France without being held to resign their office'; it added conditions, of which the second is this: 'Provided they are so disposed in mind, both concerning the value and nullity of marriage, and concerning the separation of bodies, about which causes they are compelled to judge, that they never pronounce a sentence, nor defend one to be pronounced, nor provoke or excite one contrary to divine or ecclesiastical law.' It is asked:

I. 'Whether the interpretation diffused throughout France and also printed is correct, according to which the judge satisfies the aforesaid condition who, although some matrimony is valid before the Church, entirely abstracts from that true and constant matrimony, and by applying civil law pronounces that there is place for divorce, provided he intends in mind to break only the civil effects and only the civil contract, and the terms of the pronounced sentence regard only those things? In other terms, can the sentence thus passed be said not to be contrary to divine or ecclesiastical law?

II. 'After the judge has pronounced that there is place for divorce, can the Syndic, in French, le maire, also himself intending only the civil effects and only the civil contract, as is set forth above, pronounce divorce, although the matrimony is valid before the Church?

III. 'After divorce has been pronounced, can the same Syndic civilly join with another the spouse attempting to pass to other nuptials, although the prior matrimony is valid before the Church and the other party is living?'

"Thursday, place IV, on 27 May 1886. In the General Congregation of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition held before the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lords, Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, General Inquisitors, the above-written doubts having been proposed, and the Vote of the Lord Consultors having been had beforehand, the same Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lords ordered that response be made: To the first, second, and third doubt, Negatively.

"On the same weekday and day, report having been made concerning these things to Our Most Holy Lord Pope Leo XIII, His Holiness approved and confirmed the resolutions of the Most Eminent Fathers. Jos. Mancini, Notary of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition."

It seems useful also to add these decisions of the S. PENITENTIARY:

1. Response to a certain Bishop of Italy: "Most Reverend Lord. I have reported to the Eminent Major Penitentiary what you write concerning a certain Syndic of your diocese, who by force of his office would have to assist at the civil matrimony of someone already bound by another matrimony celebrated in the face of the Church; and I must, at the command of the aforesaid Eminent Penitentiary, signify to you that the aforesaid syndic can by no pact furnish his work to an act which is so greatly opposed to the sanctity of matrimony. Therefore, whatever the circumstances of the case may be, he ought altogether to deny his assistance, even though it would happen that for this reason he would be compelled to resign his office.

"From the S. Penitentiary, 28 Nov. 1883. Luigi Martini, Substitute of the S. P."

2. Instruction to the Bishops of Italy, of 29 March 1885.

Q. Whether a CIVIL OFFICIAL can both assist at matrimony which they call CIVIL, and prepare and draw up the legal instrument of the same matrimony, although true matrimony did not precede, indeed although there is suspicion or even certainty that it will by no means be celebrated before the Church?

"R. It can be tolerated, provided civil officials in drawing up acts of this kind intend to exercise a merely civil ceremony, and perform or advise nothing against the sanctity of matrimony and the necessity of contracting it before the Church; indeed let them exhort to contracting it before the Church herself, having before their eyes the most holy laws of our religion and the letters of Benedict XIV, Redditae sunt Nobis, concerning which, for removing scandal, let them admonish the contracting parties. - But as regards the cases in which it appears that the faithful, approaching the civil ceremony, are badly disposed, and are not going to celebrate matrimony, which regularly ought to have been premised, before the Church, but are going to persist in concubinage under the pretext of a civil contract, the officials themselves are to be directed according to the rules handed down by approved authors, and especially by ST. ALPHONSUS DE LIGUORI (Lib. 2, tr. 3, cap. 2, dub. 5, art. 3), concerning cooperators."³

From these things you will resolve: - 1. Matrimonial causes look only to the ecclesiastical forum, and therefore cannot, unless the Church permits this, be brought to the civil forum; thus from the constant doctrine of the Church.

2. The Church indeed permits, in various regions, that causes of this kind be treated in the civil forum, but always under the condition that nothing be done which is contrary either to divine or to ecclesiastical law.

3. Where legitimate and canonical causes of divorce are had (cf. n. 2123), spouses can seek separation of habitation and goods, advocates can promote it, and judges can pronounce it. Nor indeed is it licit for spouses to bring the cause to the civil forum before it has been defined by the ecclesiastical judge, since it looks to this judge alone to judge whether sufficient motives of separation are present. Nevertheless, if the spouses, the ecclesiastical judge having been passed over, present themselves to the civil judge, this judge can, on account of grave reasons, know their cause, and, the motives being just, pass a sentence of separation.

4. Divorce as regards the bond of matrimony contracted only civilly can be both sought and pronounced in the civil forum, as is clear. The same must be said concerning matrimony indeed before the Church, but invalidly contracted, provided that the sentence of the ecclesiastical forum concerning the invalidity of the matrimony has preceded.

5. The sentence of divorce by which the bond of a validly contracted matrimony is declared dissolved can neither be sought by spouses nor promoted by advocates. For actors in such a cause seek a thing manifestly unjust and impious. - Nor is it licit for the judge to pronounce a sentence of divorce, even if, while he pronounces it, he intends to abstract from true matrimony and to break only the civil contract, nor do the terms of the pronounced sentence regard anything else.

But whether this is licit if he openly manifests this mind of his and professes the true doctrine of the Church concerning matrimony, there are not lacking those who still move controversy. But to us it seems that it must altogether be denied. The reason is that the sentence of the judge, as regards its being and as regards its effects, depends in no way on his intention or on the declaration of intention, but on the law which he applies. Whence a sentence of divorce, whether the judge wishes it or not, is of itself, not otherwise than the law of divorce itself, evil and iniquitous, and it furnishes help and support to iniquity.

6. Whether a civil official can join by civil rite persons if one of them or each is already bound by the bond of true matrimony, there is not yet one opinion of all; nevertheless, from the above-cited document of the S. Penitentiary, it seems to be denied. But he can, on account of most grave reasons, assist at the civil matrimony of those who are held to be badly disposed, even if he foresees that matrimony will not be celebrated before the Church.⁴

441. • I. Spouses are bound:

1° To mutual love. For since they are one flesh, they ought also to be one heart. Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church. - Let them (wives) love their husbands.²

2° To conjugal society and cohabitation. This is plain from the nature and ends of matrimony, and from the words of Christ: A man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh.³

3° To furnishing mutually to one another food, and whatever pertains to the honorable sustenance of their condition: For (now) they are not two, but one flesh.⁴ But no one ever hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it.⁵

4° To rendering the conjugal debt mutually to one another, concerning which matter in the Treatise on Matrimony.

442. • II. The husband is bound in particular:

1° To conduct the family property studiously.

2° To take care that the wife fulfill the duties of a Christian profession, and execute the precepts of the law both divine and ecclesiastical. For the man is the head of the woman and the rector of the whole family; and therefore to him belongs the right governance both of the wife and of the other members of the family.

3° To correct a delinquent wife where this is necessary for her amendment and for preventing scandal. But correction ought to proceed from charity, or love of justice, or zeal for procuring the right governance of the family, and in manner to be such that it is plain the wife is the partner of the man, not a servant. Care must also be taken lest peace and love perish between them.

443. • III. The wife for her part is bound:

1° To reverence her husband, because he is her Superior, as is established from what was said, and from the words: Thou shalt be under the power of the husband, and he shall rule over thee.¹

2° To furnish obedience to him; because obedience is owed to a Superior in those things which pertain to governance; and the Apostle says to the Colossians:² Women, be subject to your husbands, as it behooveth in the Lord.

3° To carry care of the house in the family property, and therefore to undertake the offices of the family, as to prepare food, sweep the house, wash linens, repair torn garments, and furnish other things of this kind. Yet in families sufficiently wealthy the wife can fulfill the lower offices through male servants or maidservants, provided she watches over them and takes care that the domestic matter be well conducted.

444. You will resolve. - 1° A husband can sin gravely if he pursues his wife with insults, for example by calling her an adulteress, etc.; - if without a just cause he impedes her from fulfilling divine or ecclesiastical precepts, or from devotions very useful, for example from discreet frequency of the Sacraments; - if he treats her in a tyrannical manner like a vile slave; - if he does not cohabit with her; - if he neglects the governance of the family, etc.³

2° A wife likewise can sin gravely if she is accustomed to ridicule and mock her husband; - if by harsh words, contumacious disobedience, or excessive peevishness she provokes him to anger and blasphemies, etc.

3° Ordinarily the man ought to begin the correction of the wife by gentler words, and, if these do not profit, to proceed to graver correction. Sometimes he ought to conceal the faults of the wife when he can do this without sin, and not be excessive in correcting; but sometimes to defer correction for a time, lest the correction seem to proceed from the heat of anger and lack fruit, while the wife is less disposed to receive it.

4° Let the confessor not immediately believe a spouse complaining against a spouse, especially if a wife rails against the husband; because women are generally prone to lying or certainly exaggerating. Wherefore it is better, the matter being passed over, to commend to them prayer, patience, meekness, and greater solicitude for furnishing services to the man.

5° Let the wife be silent while the husband is angry or drunk; if admonition seems likely to profit, let her admonish while the husband is well disposed; if a reply must be made to an angry man, let her reply gently: for a soft answer breaketh anger, and a hard word stirreth up fury. If these things obtain nothing, let her take care that the husband be admonished by the Pastor or another prudent man.

445. • Quaer. What are the principal dispositions of our civil laws concerning the obligations of spouses?

Resp. 1° "The husband may ... be bound to keep the peace as against his wife, and for any unreasonable and improper confinement by him, she may be entitled to relief upon habeas corpus. But as the husband is the guardian of the wife, and bound to protect and maintain her, the law has given him a reasonable superiority and control over her person, and he may even put gentle restraints upon her liberty, if her conduct be such as to require it, unless he renounces that control by articles of separation, or it be taken from him by a qualified divorce."¹

2° "If he" (the husband) "shifts his domicile, the wife is bound to follow him wherever he chooses to go."²

3° The husband is bound to provide his wife with necessaries suitable to her situation and his condition in life; and if she contracts debts due for them during cohabitation, he is obliged to pay those debts; but for anything beyond necessaries, namely "elegancies or luxuries,"³ he is not chargeable....

"If the husband abandons his wife, or they separate by consent, without any provision for her maintenance, or if he sends her away, he is liable for her necessaries, and he sends credit with her to that extent." The same says "if she receives such treatment as affords a reasonable cause for her to depart from his house, and refuse to cohabit with him."

"But if the wife elopes, though it be not with an adulterer, he is not chargeable even for necessaries."¹

257. • I. "From valid matrimony there arises between the spouses a bond by its nature perpetual and exclusive." (Can. 1110.)

Cf. the things we said concerning the properties of matrimony, Chapter I, Article II.

258. • II. "Christian matrimony furthermore confers grace upon spouses who do not place an obstacle." (Ibid.)

For matrimony between baptized persons is a true sacrament of the New Law, and therefore it confers grace upon those who receive it worthily. The sacramental grace of matrimony is an increase of grace making one pleasing, together with special help so that spouses can duly fulfill the duties of conjugal life.

259. • III. "To each spouse from the very beginning of the matrimony there belongs an equal right and duty as regards acts proper to conjugal life." (Can. 1111.)

a) "From the very beginning of the matrimony." From these words, as otherwise from the silence of the Code, it is licit to infer that the privilege existing in the law of the Decretals is now abolished, by force of which a period of two months was granted to each spouse for deliberating whether he or she wished to enter a religious institute of solemn vows, without being held during that whole time to render the conjugal debt.

b) Concerning the rights and duties of spouses in the use of matrimony, we shall not treat here. But we remit to the solid, clear, and learned doctrine of the distinguished Father Merkelbach, O.P., in Questions concerning Chastity and Lust; question eight: Concerning spouses in the use of matrimony.

260. • IV. "Unless something else is provided by special law, the wife, concerning canonical effects, becomes a participant in the status of the husband." (Can. 1112.)

Here there is question of domicile, competent forum, rite, and burial, but to linger over these is not our province.

261. • V. "Parents are bound by a most grave obligation to care according to their powers for the education of their offspring, both religious and moral, and physical and civil, and also to provide for their temporal good." (Can. 1113.)

Let the parish priest or confessor take careful care often to exhort parents duly to fulfill the most grave office of educating their children. Both in public sermons and in private conversations let him induce them to send their children to Catholic schools.

S. Th., Suppl., q. 62.

963. Cohabitation, or the partnership of common life, is the other obligation to which spouses of themselves are bound from justice, and without which it is morally impossible to fulfill the offices pertaining to the individual custom of life, of which therefore it is an integral part. Of itself it comprises the partnership of bed, table, and roof.

964. Principle I. Spouses must preserve the communion of conjugal life, unless a just cause excuses them. - So can. 1128.

This is clear from the very nature of marriage, and from the ends of matrimony, which require an individual and inseparable common life. Hence it is read, Gen. II, 24, and Mt. XIX, 5: A man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and I Cor. VII, 10: To those who are joined in matrimony, I command, not I, but the Lord, that the wife depart not from her husband.

Hence: 1° Neither of the spouses can depart, against the will of the other, for a long time, unless just causes are present, namely on account of the public good, or for feeding or protecting the family, or for avoiding damage.

2° If the husband must remain elsewhere for a long time, he is bound, if he conveniently can, to bring the wife there so that she may cohabit with him, or frequently to visit her. Similarly the husband of himself would be bound to accompany the wife, if necessity compelled her to change domicile.

3° Regularly the wife is bound to follow the husband changing domicile, even if he changes without a just cause, provided the cause is not base; indeed even if he departs far away and is going to remain there for a long time; - unless thus the wife would be exposed to grave danger of life or of very grave detriment, whence she would not be bound to follow a husband wandering here and there, unless she herself, before matrimony, knew that the man was a wanderer.

4° Communion of bed is to be understood as that which is required from the very nature of matrimony; whence it is not necessarily to be taken in the stricter sense, although it is generally so in use, but the partnership of the bedroom suffices, a distinct bed being used. Indeed it can subsist if the man and woman have distinct bedrooms joined to one another, although in practice, because of inconveniences easily arising, this use is less to be approved, as harmful to the union of minds.

965. Principle II. Divorce from bed and habitation can be licit for just causes, such as adultery of the spouse, grave danger of soul or body, and mutual consent. - This is certain from the definition of the Council of Trent, sess. 24, can. 8, against the Protestants who, while admitting dissolution of the bond on account of adultery, reject all causes of separation.

The principle is clear both from the words of Christ, who declares that this is sometimes licit (Mt. XIX, 29), and explicitly indicates adultery as a legitimate cause of separation (Mt. V, 31; XIX, 9), and from the Apostle, who supposes that this can be done for a legitimate cause (I Cor. VII, 11 sq.), and from the law (can. 1128-1131), and finally from the fact that cohabitation does not pertain to the essence of matrimony, but only to its integrity.

Separation can be made in perpetuity or for a time, totally or partially.

966. The first cause of separation is adultery of the spouse, according to can. 1129, § 1: "On account of adultery of the spouse, the other spouse, the bond remaining, has the right of dissolving the communion of life, even in perpetuity; unless he has consented to the crime, or given cause for it, or expressly or tacitly condoned it, or himself also has committed the same crime." This Christ himself explicitly declared, Mt. V, 32: Everyone who shall put away his wife, except on account of fornication, causes her to commit adultery (cf. XIX, 9). The reason is that, by breaking the promised fidelity, the adulterer has lost every right toward the other party as to conjugal offices.

But that it may confer the right of separation, adultery must be formal, consummated, morally certain, one to which the other has not consented or given cause, and neither condoned nor mutual.

It must be:

1° formal, that is, committed knowingly and freely;

2° consummated by copula itself with insemination, even if performed onanistically, to which are equated sodomy properly so called and bestiality, in which there is an equal reason of injury inflicted; but impure acts, even grave ones, without copulation do not suffice;

3° morally certain, so that it is truly established concerning it; otherwise the other cannot be deprived of the right of the one possessing, although physical certitude is not required, which in such matter is obtained with difficulty;

4° one to which the other spouse has not consented or given cause, as is explicitly said in can. 1129, § 1: he is considered to give cause who has deserted the wife or has rather often omitted to render the conjugal debt;

5° nor condoned: for if it has been freely condoned by the innocent spouse, the latter by that very fact has renounced his right of departing. But condonation can be made expressly or tacitly; "tacit condonation is had if the innocent spouse, after he has been made certain concerning the crime of adultery, has spontaneously conversed with the other spouse with marital affection; but it is presumed, unless within six months he has expelled or left the adulterous spouse, or has made a legitimate accusation" (can. 1129, § 2);

6° nor mutual: for the crime of one is compensated by the crime of the other; but it makes no difference which of the spouses first or more often has perpetrated adultery.

Let it be noted that the husband is not bound to dismiss an adulterous wife, unless it were the only means for her amendment, or for avoiding scandal lest he be thought a favorer of the offense because he retains her, nor are greater evils to be feared; but the wife probably is never bound to dismiss the husband.

967. The second cause of separation can be grave danger of soul or body, such as arises from the circumstances enumerated in can. 1131, § 1: "if the other spouse has given his name to a non-Catholic sect; if he has educated the offspring non-Catholically; if he leads a criminal and ignominious life; if he creates grave danger either of soul or of body for the other; if by cruelties he renders common life too difficult, these and other things of this kind are so many legitimate causes of departing for the other spouse, by authority of the local Ordinary, and also by one's own authority, if they are certainly established and there is danger in delay."

Concerning these things it must be noted:

1° "In all these cases, when the cause of separation ceases, the custom of life is to be restored. But if separation has been pronounced by the Ordinary for a definite or indefinite time, the innocent spouse is not bound to this except by decree of the Ordinary or when the time has elapsed" (can. 1131, § 2).

2° Rarely, on account of supervening heresy or apostasy, is separation expedient, from which greater damages often are to be feared for the spouses or for society; unless there were grave danger to the faith for the wife or offspring (Tit. III, 10).

3° Danger of soul is incitation or induction to grave sin, with grave danger of consent, especially if otherwise it cannot be removed (Mt. XVIII, 9; Lk. XIV, 26); but the mere occasion of sin does not suffice.

4° Danger of body can arise on account of the fury of the other party or from contagious disease, in which case separation from bed is licit, as was said in n. 961.

5° Cruelties are had if the spouse treats the consort cruelly, as if a husband pursues the wife with mortal hatred, prepares snares against her life, seriously threatens death or mutilation; but beating does not suffice, unless it is very grave and immoderate and repeated several times, or to be repeated in the future.

6° Troublesome cohabitation from continual quarrels and brawls, denial of food, abandonment in sickness, great neglect in administering goods, reduction to the condition of a more vile servant, etc., can also be a cause of separation, because thus the safety of soul and body is endangered.

968. The third cause of legitimate separation can be mutual consent: whether as to bed or as to habitation, whether for a time or in perpetuity.

From the words of Christ it is clear that this is licit unto perfection: Everyone who shall leave house... or wife for my name's sake, shall receive a hundredfold and shall possess eternal life (Mt. XIX, 29).

Hence: 1) If matrimony has not been consummated, each spouse has the right of choosing a more perfect state; indeed by solemn religious profession itself a ratified matrimony is dissolved, as was said n. 818, B.

2. Nevertheless from current law, for entering religion or that the man may be able to receive sacred orders, besides the consent of the other party an apostolic dispensation is required (can. 542 and 987); a fortiori if the matrimony has been consummated.

3. Perpetual separation from roof requires the intervention of the bishop, but not temporary separation, which is licit for a proportionate cause, as was said n. 964.

4. Separation from bed, by mutual consent, can be made by one's own authority, but regularly it is not expedient except for a time, namely because of danger of incontinence, as the Apostle warns, I Cor. VII, 5: Do not defraud one another, except perhaps by consent and for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer (or if another just cause exists); and return again to the same thing, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence.

969. Corollaries. - 1. Separation as to habitation, since it is of the external forum, regularly cannot be made by private authority or by the counsel of a confessor, but requires the intervention of public authority; whence a wife even maliciously deserted is not considered legitimately separated unless she has obtained separation from an ecclesiastical judge (comm. int., July 14, 1922); on the other hand separation as to bed is of itself hidden, and therefore can be instituted by private authority. Particular statutes are especially to be attended to; but from common law:

a) If it is a matter of embracing the religious or clerical state, a dispensation of the Holy See is always required, as was said in the preceding number;

b) If separation is made on account of adultery, a sentence of the Ordinary is required, unless the adultery is certain and notorious, in which case it is licit to depart by one's own authority.

c) If separation is made on account of other motives, it must be made by authority of the Ordinary, and only by one's own authority if they are certainly established and there is danger in delay (can. 1131, § 1); therefore, when the delay has ceased, recourse must be had to the Ordinary. But separation is to be decreed in administrative form, unless the Ordinary establishes otherwise ex officio or at the instance of the parties, and the same form is also to be observed in the second grade (comm. int., June 25, 1932).

2. The innocent party preserves the right of recalling the dismissed party, provided the other party, with the express or tacit consent of the former, has not undertaken a state contrary to matrimony (can. 1130); nevertheless the other party would be excused from returning if he justly feared that grave cruelties would be inflicted upon him.

Caia, a Catholic and the wife of Titius, a Protestant official in a certain colony, comes to her native country to supervise the education of their daughters in a convent of nuns and, led by this purpose, lives near the convent. After some months Titius asks, indeed orders, her to return to him; Caia, however, always excuses herself on the ground that she herself must care for the daughters who are to be educated, and at length Titius publicly takes a concubine for himself. Having heard this, Caia, anxious about the past and the future, asks a confessor whether she is bound to return to her husband. Hence it is asked:

1. What are the obligations of spouses with regard to cohabitation?

2. Is it lawful to institute a partial divorce by public or private authority?

3. Are husband and wife equal in rights with regard to a partial divorce?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What are the obligations of married people with regard to cohabitation?

From the nature of the marriage contract and to secure the ends of marriage those who are married are bound to live together, unless by mutual consent they agree to live apart for a time and there is no danger of scandal or incontinence. This obligation is one of justice and is grave in serious matter.¹

1 Génicot, vol. ii, n. 552 ff.

The second question was answered above, p. 266.

3. Are husband and wife equal in the matter of rights about separation?

In general, husband and wife are equal in the matter of conjugal rights, though the husband as head of the family has authority over her and is her superior. The causes then, such as adultery, on account of which one consort is allowed to separate from the other, favor husband and wife equally. Because the husband has the duty of providing for the family, lawful causes of absence from his wife will more frequently exist in his case than in hers, and because of this and of her inferior position the wife will be called upon in general to follow her husband, and not vice versa.

4. The case. Titius was a colonial official, and his wife Caia went to the mother country to see to the education of her daughters. She put her daughters in a convent and took up her residence in the neighborhood. Her husband sent for her but she refused to go, under the pretext that she had to look after the education of her daughters. She became uneasy in conscience when she heard that her husband was living with another woman.

Caia’s uneasiness was justified. Her husband bade her come out to him and she had no good reason for refusing. The education of her daughters would probably proceed better without her presence than with it. Objectively she committed a grave sin in not obeying her husband and exposing him to the danger of incontinence.

She is bound to do what she can to repair her fault and bring back her husband from his sinful course of life. But now on the supposition that Caia knows for certain that her husband has committed adultery she has the right to separate from him. Although her disobedience was the occasion of his sin, yet we must not presume that she acted as she did with the view of making him commit adultery, and on that supposition she did not lose her right to separate from her husband on account of his adultery.¹

1 Gasparri, De Matrim., vol. ii, n. 1113.