The Manner of Fulfilling Obligation

171. Principles. 1. A negative law is satisfied by the omission of the prohibited act without a contrary will: for a negative law prescribes nothing other than the omission of the act.

Therefore he who on a prohibited day does not eat meat because he does not have it fulfills the precept of abstinence, even if he does not even think of the precept, provided there is no contrary intention.

2. For satisfying an affirmative law, different things are required in different cases.

a. If the law prescribes a real performance, only the performance of the thing prescribed is required, which can also be done through another; the intention of performing the thing due is not required.

a. Laws of this kind, e.g. of paying a debt, of paying a tax, by their nature prescribe nothing except the performance of the thing; once this has been exhibited, even ignorantly, indeed even reluctantly, the law is fulfilled and the end of the law obtained, since the law intends nothing other than the external effect, which can be sufficiently obtained through a merely external action. Therefore even a drunk or coerced person satisfies a law of this kind. Nevertheless, in order that these laws be fulfilled formally and meritoriously, the intention of placing the prescribed work is required.¹

b. Through another the thing due can be performed, because a thing can be transferred to another, provided that he to whom it is transferred, or for whom it is performed, consents in some way (tacitly or at least interpretatively), according to the adage: another's thing can become mine.

b. If the law prescribes a personal action, it is required and suffices that the prescribed work be placed in a human manner, i.e. with the intention of doing it, and indeed by the very one who is bound by the law.

a. Laws of this kind, as imposed upon men, require human acts, namely acts placed knowingly and voluntarily. But nothing else is required, because the end intended by the legislator can be obtained sufficiently in this way. These laws cannot be fulfilled through another, because actions cannot be transferred to another: another's action cannot become mine.

b. As regards the observance of law, the axiom must be noted: a little is reckoned as nothing; for laws must be observed in a human manner; but in the moral estimation of men a law is not judged violated which is injured only moderately. Thus he who in reciting the office or in hearing Mass omits some slight thing does not violate the law. Nevertheless those laws must be excepted in which the physical manner of observing them is determined by nature or by law or by human will, as in the natural fast to be observed before communion, or in the age required for religious profession or for sacred orders.

c. The will to place the prescribed work is indeed required when the work itself, and not only the effect of the work, is prescribed; but the intention of satisfying the precept is not required, and much less the intention of obtaining the end intended by the legislator. Wherefore the axiom has prevailed: the end of the precept does not fall under the precept. The intention of satisfying the precept is not required, because laws do not tend to this, that subjects through their observance testify their subjection and obedience toward the law, but that through them the end of the common good may be promoted. But the end intended by the legislator is obtained through the prescribed acts themselves fulfilled by subjects, even if it is not intended by them.

d. Hence he who, sleeping or unwilling and only coerced, assists at Mass does not satisfy the precept of hearing Mass, because he does not act in a human manner; and he who goes to church while Mass is taking place there only in order to wait for a friend likewise does not satisfy the precept, because he does not have the intention of doing the prescribed work; but he who is present at Mass from fear satisfies the precept. - He who, ignorant that it is a feast day, assists at Mass satisfies the precept; and he who pays the work due from a vow or imposed for penance without the intention of fulfilling the obligation satisfies it, provided he does not apply the work to another end which cannot be combined with the end of the precept: for anyone is judged to have the intention of satisfying debts before placing supererogatory works. - He who observes the form of fasting satisfies the precept, even if he eats sumptuously and neither intends (and accidentally) nor obtains mortification of the body, because the end of the precept does not fall under the precept.

3. For satisfying a law it is not required that the law be fulfilled in the state of grace, unless the state of grace pertains to the substance of the work; indeed it can even be fulfilled through an act sinful from the circumstances, provided the sin does not impede the substance of the prescribed act: for the law prescribes only the substance of the act, and in no way its mode, unless it pertains to the substance of the act.

a. If the prescribed work is an external act, it suffices that it be placed in a human manner, e.g. the hearing of Mass with the intention of hearing it; and if the prescribed work is a mixed act, it is required that the whole moral substance of the prescribed act, i.e. the external act with the due internal act, be placed. Therefore through a sacrilegious confession or communion the precept of the Church is not satisfied.² But it is satisfied through an act sinful from the circumstances, as if someone assists at Mass in a determinate church so that there he may have an occasion of stealing. He who abstains from food satisfies the precept of fasting, even if he does it from avarice; likewise he who fasts or confesses from vainglory.

b. He who notices that he did not recite the hours, did not fulfill the penance, did not assist at Mass with that devotion with which he had wished and ought, and therefore proposes to repeat the work in order to satisfy the precept, but afterward does not repeat it, satisfies the precept, even if he does not revoke the will of repeating the work, because he has already placed the prescribed work, although with a defect.

Whether one satisfies the precept who indeed places the prescribed work, but with the intention of not satisfying the precept.

It must be distinguished: if the obligation of the law depends upon the intention of the legislator, he satisfies it; therefore he who hears Mass with the intention of now satisfying devotion and afterward fulfilling the precept is not bound to hear another Mass: for he has already placed the whole of that which the legislator prescribed. But if the obligation depends upon the intention of the agent, as in a vow or promise, he does not satisfy it: for just as it depends upon the intention of the agent that the obligation exist, so it depends upon the same intention of the agent that it be extinguished or remain.

4. He who cannot fulfill the whole law is bound to nothing if the prescribed matter is indivisible, as a pious pilgrimage; but he is bound to a part if the matter is divisible and the reason of the precept is preserved in the part which can be fulfilled. The reason of the precept is judged to be preserved if the part which can be performed contributes something to the end of the precept.

a. He who cannot make the whole way for a pilgrimage to be undertaken from a vow is bound to nothing, because the prescribed matter is indivisible. - He who cannot recite the whole office, but can recite one or another hour, is bound to these parts; but in a few verses or even in one psalm the reason of the precept is not preserved, and therefore he is not bound to their recitation. - He who cannot fast in Lent is bound to abstain from meat, if he can.

b. If someone cannot fulfill the whole law, but doubts whether he can fulfill a part, he is generally excused also from fulfilling the part, as, e.g., a sick person who doubts whether he can recite part of the office: for otherwise occasion would be given to many scruples and anxieties.

¹ Cf. Struggl, Theologia moral. tract. 3. q. 2. n. 14. Schindler I. p. 226.

² "He who makes a voluntarily null confession satisfies the precept of the Church." Prop. 14 of Alexander VII. "He satisfies the precept of annual communion through a sacrilegious eating of the Lord." Prop. 55 of Innocent XI.

172. 1. By the same act several precepts can be satisfied, unless it is established that the mind of the legislator was different: for by one act the whole work can be placed which is prescribed by diverse laws. But that the mind of the legislator is not contrary is rightly conjectured if the precepts which refer to the same matter are enjoined from the same motive.

He who must recite the office by reason of order and by reason of benefice satisfies by one recitation; he who receives viaticum in paschal time satisfies both precepts, of communicating at Easter and of communicating at death. But one to whom the giving of alms for pious causes was enjoined as penance does not satisfy if he gives it for alms due from a vow; and if hearing Mass was imposed on someone as penance, he cannot fulfill it on a feast day by at the same time hearing the Mass due from the precept of the Church, unless the confessor has expressly permitted it, because the motive of each precept is different.

Note. In these things there is contained a certain norm for rightly conjecturing concerning the mind of the legislator, unless something else is established from the circumstances. Thus the matter of justice is always to be excepted: for he who from several obligations owes another a hundred does not satisfy if he once gives a hundred, because in debts of justice the equality of thing to thing is attended to; but by one payment of a hundred the debt of several hundreds cannot be equalled; therefore in these matters the intention of the legislator is different. - Likewise he who has emitted a vow of communicating once in honor of some saint cannot by one communion satisfy the obligation of the vow and of annual communion, although the motive of each is the same, because the intention of the one vowing is judged to have been different, apart from the fact that he had intended to oblige himself to paschal communion by a new bond of religion. - On the contrary, Mass on 2 November, which is to be said for the departed from the precept of the Church (from the motive of religion and mercy), can also be said for an accepted stipend (from justice), because it is established that the legislator permits this.

173. 2. At the same time several precepts can be satisfied: a. unless the prescribed works impede one another; b. unless the legislator intended the works to be placed at a different time.

a. Hence at the same time someone can hear the prescribed Mass and recite the hours or fulfill an enjoined penance.

b. One to whom two or three Masses have been imposed as penance can absolutely hear them at the same time, while they are celebrated simultaneously at several altars, because he can attend to several at once; nevertheless ordinarily the mind of the confessor will be that the penitent hear the Masses successively, not at the same time.

174. When it must be fulfilled. 1. If a determinate time has been set for a law to be fulfilled, it must certainly be observed; but if the law has not been observed at the prescribed time, the obligation ceases if the time was determined for ending the obligation, but it does not cease if it was determined for urging the obligation. Whether the time was determined for ending the obligation or rather for urging it depends upon the intention of the legislator, which is drawn from the end or from the words of the law or from custom.

He who did not fast on the day of the vigil is not bound to fast on another day; he who did not hear Mass on Sunday is not bound to hear it on the following day, because the determination of time was added for ending the obligation. But he who in paschal time did not receive holy communion is bound to receive it afterward; he who did not pay a debt on the appointed day is bound to pay it afterward, because the determination of time was not added for ending the obligation.

2. At the time when the precept urges, a. it can be observed at any time, e.g. holy communion can be received throughout the whole paschal time; b. but he who, when the law is already urging, foresees an impediment to fulfilling it afterward, must satisfy the law earlier, unless he foresees that while the obligation is still enduring he will be exempt from the law; c. finally, he who, when the law is not yet urging, foresees an impediment to fulfilling it, is not bound to anticipate the time of the law, even if he can fulfill it.

Therefore he who in paschal time cannot receive holy communion later is bound to do so earlier; but he who cannot during paschal time is not bound to communicate before paschal time. - He who cannot recite the hours later is bound to do so earlier; but he is not bound to anticipate, even if he foresees that on the following day he cannot recite the office. - He who on a feast day after the sixth hour cannot be present at Mass is bound to hear it before the sixth hour, provided occasion is offered. - He who on the day on which a particular feast is celebrated has come, before the time suitable for hearing Mass, into a place where the feast is not celebrated, is not bound to hear Mass beforehand.

3. A precept cannot be fulfilled at the time when it itself does not urge, unless the precept is of such a kind that a little before the obligation the whole prescribed work can be placed.

He who hears Mass on Saturday cannot fulfill the Sunday precept, because Mass is prescribed to be heard on Sunday. - He who in the morning before ordination recites the office to which he is bound only after ordination satisfies the obligation, because the office is prescribed to be recited on that day. Likewise he who hears Mass in a place where no feast is celebrated and afterward goes to a place in which a universal feast of precept is celebrated is not bound there to hear Mass again, because he has already satisfied the obligation of hearing Mass on that day.¹

¹ Cf. Lugo, De euchar. disp. 16. sect. 2. n. 39 s. Tamburini, De communione c. 5. § 2. n. 4 ss.

An affirmative law is one which imposes an act; a negative law, one which prohibits an act. Furthermore a negative law obliges always, insofar as it is never licit to do what is absolutely prohibited. An affirmative law does not always oblige, but only at the time at which the act must be placed according to the law. Hence the saying: an affirmative law obliges always, but not to always; a negative law obliges always and to always.

We inquire what things are required in order that the obligation of law be fulfilled, not what things are necessary in order that the act by which the obligation is fulfilled be good and meritorious in every respect.

Furthermore, in order that satisfaction be made to the obligation of law, this one thing is required: that what is commanded by the law be placed, or that what is prohibited by it be omitted. Hence:

I. To fulfill a negative law, even the involuntary omission of the prohibited work suffices. Hence, for example, one who is sleeping fulfills the precept of not stealing. Nevertheless one who abstained from the prohibited work only from inability, fear, or coercion would sin because of a wicked affection.

II. To fulfill an affirmative law which prescribes a real debt, even the involuntary payment of the debt suffices. The reason is that the law commands only the placing of the effect. Hence he is immune from the obligation of restitution who makes restitution while drunk.

III. To fulfill an affirmative law which prescribes a personal act, the voluntary placing of the prescribed work is required and suffices. It is said:

1. The voluntary placing of the prescribed work is required. That the placing of the work is required is clear; that a voluntary or free placing is required follows from the fact that in the case the legislator intends and imposes an act placed in a human manner, that is, voluntarily or freely. Therefore in this sense the intention or will of doing what the law prescribes is required. Hence one who, being wholly drunk, assists at Mass does not fulfill the precept. Otherwise it must be said about one who, compelled by fear, hears Mass, because fear does not remove liberty (St. Alphonsus, I, 165).

2. The voluntary placing of the prescribed work suffices. The reason is that the legislator commands only these things. Therefore it is not required:

a) That the prescribed act be placed from the motive of charity, in the state of grace, unless these pertain to the substance of the prescribed work, as in a law which commands an act of the virtue of charity or Paschal communion (St. Alphonsus, I, 162). Hence proposition 16 among the Baian propositions was condemned: "There is no true obedience to the law which is done without charity."

b) That the act be placed without concomitant sin. Except if the sin destroys the substance of the prescribed work. Hence he fulfills the precept who, for example, fasts from avarice or assists at Mass from vanity; but not he who confesses or communicates sacrilegiously. Therefore proposition 14 was rightly condemned by Alexander VII: "He who makes a confession voluntarily null satisfies the precept of the Church" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

c) That the act be placed with the intention of satisfying the law. For this intention is not commanded. Indeed even the very intention of not satisfying the law does not prevent satisfaction from being made to the law, since the subject cannot bring it about that the obligation of law, that is, an obligation which depends on the will of the legislator alone, persists after satisfaction has been made to the will of the legislator. Otherwise it must be said if there is question of the obligation of a vow or promise; this obligation, just as from the beginning it depends on the will, so also, if the will thus wishes, continues to persist (St. Alphonsus, I, 163, 164; IV, 176).

d) That the end of the law be intended, or that the act be referred to the end of the legislator. This intention or relation is not commanded, according to that saying: the end does not fall under the precept. Hence satisfaction is made to the law of fasting, even if the mortification of the flesh and its subjection to the spirit are not intended. Observe, however: that the end of the law does not fall under the precept does not prevent one who acts against the end of the law from sinning venially, "because to act contrary to the end of the law is a certain disorder, which does not seem to be excused from every fault" (St. Alphonsus, III, 1030, qu. 1); suppose if someone, after breaking the fast, ate two or three times (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary I. Someone can satisfy diverse precepts at the same time, provided the diverse prescribed acts do not impede one another and the intention of the one commanding does not stand in the way. Hence one can at the same time satisfy the precepts of hearing Mass and reciting the Breviary, or of fulfilling sacramental satisfaction. But a penitent to whom the confessor imposed two Masses to be heard would not satisfy by assisting at two Masses at the same time. For the intention of the confessor would stand in the way (St. Alphonsus, III, 309; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 2, n. 30, and tr. 16, n. 57).

Corollary II. Someone can fulfill several precepts by one single act, unless the one commanding, or those commanding, intended distinct acts. Hence, by one single act of restoring, he satisfies who is held to restitution both from justice and from a vow. He does not satisfy by hearing one Mass who is held to assist at Mass both from the precept of the Church and from the precept of the confessor, unless the latter signifies that he does not intend a distinct Mass. Nevertheless, a penitent to whom the confessor imposed hearing Mass on each day through the week is not held to assist at Mass twice on Sunday; for the confessor is not presumed to intend that (St. Alphonsus, I, 166; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 2, n. 31 sq.).

IV. As regards the time of fulfilling an obligation, take these points: If the legislator has determined the time, this must be observed. If the time was not determined, the obligation must be fulfilled as soon as can morally be done. In the case, delay is grave: first, if there accedes a grave danger of not fulfilling a grave law; second, if the matter from the delay becomes notably worse, as if someone vowed religion and, without just cause, long delayed entrance; these things, however, must be explained and completed more in their own place. Besides, observe:

1. In the private celebration of Mass, in the private recitation of the canonical hours, in receiving Holy Communion, and in observing the law of fasting or abstinence, although there may be another usual reckoning of the place, one can follow the time of the place, whether local, either true or mean, or legal, whether regional or some other extraordinary time (can. 33, § 1). Therefore, in observing the stated laws, it is licit to follow: first, usual time;¹ second, local time,² both true and mean; third, legal time,³ both regional and some other extraordinary time.

2. No one is held to anticipate, that is, to fulfill a law before the useful time of the obligation has begun, even if he foresees that afterward he will be impeded from fulfilling the law; indeed, by anticipating he does not even fulfill the law. But one who, once the useful time of the obligation has begun, foresees that afterward he will not be able to satisfy the law, is held to fulfill it in due time (St. Alphonsus, I, 157; IV, 155; VI, 294, 297, 298).

3. One who did not satisfy the obligation at the time determined by law is not held afterward to supply, if the time was assigned for ending the obligation. Otherwise it must be said if it was assigned for urging the fulfillment of the obligation. Furthermore, the time is considered assigned for ending the obligation if the obligation is affixed to a certain day, as obtains in the laws of fasting, abstinence, hearing Mass, and reciting the Breviary. It is considered assigned for urging the fulfillment of the obligation if something is imposed to be performed within three days, within a year (St. Alphonsus, III, 220). If the time has been determined in some other way, it should be gathered from the nature and end of the law, or from custom, whether the time has been determined for ending or for urging the obligation.⁴

¹ That is, the time which the public and customary clocks of the place in which one is staying are accustomed to use. Commonly, but not always, it coincides with legal time.

² Local time is the time which is measured by the putative daily motion of the sun around the point of earth in which one is staying. It is distinguished into true and mean. True local time is the time which indicates the aforesaid motion of the sun exactly; it is indicated by a sundial. Mean local time is that which indicates the stated motion of the sun according to the mean duration of the day computed through the year.

³ Legal or public time is the time which has been prescribed by law or adopted by common civil usage. Generally the mean local time of some principal city is established as legal time for the whole kingdom. Legal time is called regional when it has been stably established for a whole region; it is called extraordinary when, for a passing cause, it is established in an extraordinary way, as summer time.

⁴ As regards annual communion, the law itself adds the clause: the precept of Paschal communion still urges if someone, for any cause, has not fulfilled it at the prescribed time (can. 859, § 4).

How is law to be observed, and how is satisfaction made for its obligation? To satisfy the obligation of human law it is required and sufficient: 1. To do the commanded work as to its substance, and to have the intention of doing it. 2. Simply to omit the prohibited work, and not to have a contrary will. And thus someone satisfies the precept of abstaining from servile works if in reality he abstains from them, although he thinks nothing about the precept. Proof of the first part. For a commanding law, in itself and generally, commands only the substance of the act, not also the mode; nevertheless it commands not just any act, but a human act. Proof of the second part. For a law prohibiting something intends nothing more than the omission of the work. Therefore it does not also require intention, as a commanding law does, except in the case in which it commands that something be given, e.g., tithes. For you have satisfied, even though you gave while not in possession of your mind, or another gave for you; since the law does not seem to command more than that external and real action. Yet he who, entirely unaware, omits that which is prohibited by law seems rather not to transgress the law than to observe it. And the same must be said if someone, entirely unaware, does that which the law commands to be done; e.g., if there is a precept in a monastery of observing silence through the whole day, and through the whole day you sleep. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 100, a. 9; Cajetan on this place; Struggl, q. 2, n. 13, 14; Suarez, de Leg., l. 2, c. 10, n. 11-14; l. 3, c. 29; La-Croix, l. 1, n. 115.

Not also the mode; for regularly legislators commanding an act do not also command that the end of the law be intended, because even without this intention of the end, and by the commanded act alone, that end is obtained. Yet natural law also obliges to the mode of virtue, namely, that one do good and for an honorable motive, or on account of the honorableness of that same good. And so human law commands that you render the debt; if you render it, although from an evil intention, you have fulfilled the law. But natural law commands that you render the debt by reason of justice to be preserved. A soldier fights in war against enemies and kills them, but from hatred and on account of private vengeance; he observes human law, but not divine and natural law, which commands this or that as something honorable to be done only by reason of its intrinsic honorableness.

The mode of an act according to St. Thomas, following Aristotle, is threefold: first, that someone act, fulfilling the precept from knowledge of the work; second, that someone act from the will and intention of the good on account of the very honorableness of the act; third, that someone operate firmly and immovably. The first and the second mode are commanded by the natural law, which simply commands good; and good is from an integral cause. Therefore it is not enough to will the good materially, but one must will and intend it. But by positive and human law the first mode is commanded; for even positive human law commands only a human act; laws are given only for human acts, not also for acts of man. Moreover the obligation of law is a certain moral necessity, to which consequently satisfaction cannot properly be made except by a moral fulfillment of the precept. By only material fulfillment of the thing commanded someone does not transgress the law; but it cannot properly be said to be fulfilled. For this formal fulfillment of the law, as is clear, knowledge, will, and freedom are altogether required. And that first mode enters into the very substance of the human act. The second mode, that someone act from the will and intention of the honorableness itself, is regularly not commanded by human law. For as St. Thomas says, 1. 2. q. 100, a. 9: "A precept of law has coercive force; therefore that falls directly under the precept of law to which the law coerces. But the coercion of law is through fear of punishment. For that properly falls under the precept of law for which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But with respect to establishing a penalty, divine law and human law stand differently. For the penalty of law is not inflicted except for those things about which the legislator has to judge; because law punishes from judgment. But man, who is the lawgiver of human law, does not have to judge except about exterior acts." But the third mode is commanded neither by divine law nor by human law. For that firmness pertains to habit; thus by neither law is that mode of virtue commanded which is the end of the precept, namely, to make one virtuous.

Wirceburg., c. 1, a. 7.

Resolves: You satisfy the obligation if you fulfill different precepts by different acts, yet at the same time, provided one precept does not impede another; as to hear Mass and to recite the office at the same time. But you do not satisfy the obligation if you fulfill different precepts by one act, since they fall upon different matter; otherwise, however, if they fall upon the same matter. And so, if you owe Caius one hundred from a loan, and one hundred from a purchase, you do not satisfy by rendering only one hundred, because these two obligations fall upon different matter. But if you owe the same Caius one hundred from theft, which you vow to restore, and to the restoration of which the confessor has obligated you, by rendering only one hundred you satisfy these three obligations, namely of justice, of vow, and of precept, since they regard the same matter; thus also a beneficed subdeacon, by one recitation of the canonical hours, satisfies the double burden of order and benefice, for they fall upon the same matter. - L. 100; Struggl, q. 2, n. 15.

You satisfy the obligation, although you do not have the intention of fulfilling the precept, or of acting from the motive of formal obedience; nor do you have the intention of fulfilling the end of the precept; nor do you act from the motive of charity, or in the state of grace, or you lack faith; unless the very end of the precept, or the act of charity, or the state of grace, or faith itself is commanded. The reason for all these is that law regularly commands only the work to be furnished. And, if at times the law also commands its extrinsic end, e.g., to celebrate Mass for the suffrage of the deceased, he who freely furnishes the thing for this reason, because it is commanded, at least implicitly intends that end also.

You satisfy also, although while intending and doing the commanded work you expressly at the same time intend not to satisfy, e.g., if you hear Mass intending not to satisfy the precept; although, if the Mass is the last one, or if it is not the last and you intend not to hear another, you sin against another precept, by which one is bound to be subject to the legislator. - Finally, you satisfy, although in fulfilling the precept you sin from an extrinsic circumstance, e.g., if while hearing Mass you are occupied with thoughts of vainglory or lust. From an extrinsic circumstance; for, since law commands only honorable things, if the very substance of the act is intrinsically evil, you by no means satisfy the law.

He does not satisfy the obligation who, altogether compelled, drunk, sleeping, fulfills the precept, or with the sole intention of doing something else; e.g., if you read the hours with the sole intention of learning, or go to Mass only so that you may wait for a friend, feed your eyes, converse with another. But if you fulfill the precept from fear, you satisfy; though you would not do it if fear were absent, and you then sin from that perverse will. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 89, a. 5; q. 100, a. 9, ad 2, 10; 2. 2. q. 10, a. 4; L. 162-165; Struggl, q. 2, n. 17; E. M.

Note: He does not satisfy who performs the work of a vow or oath while expressly intending not to satisfy; because it depends upon the will of the promiser that such an obligation remain. But the obligation of obeying law proceeds from the will of the legislator, and therefore is not extended beyond his intention, i.e., beyond the substance of the commanded work. While expressly intending; for even in those things which proceed from one's own will, the one acting would satisfy if he merely negatively did not have the intention of satisfying, for example because, forgetful of the obligation undertaken, provided nevertheless that he does not apply what he does to another thing. For each person, from a general prior intention, intends to satisfy a debt before satisfying those things which he has imposed upon himself by free will. And this holds also concerning sacramental satisfaction, namely if he does the work imposed by the confessor, yet not intending to fulfill the penance. L. 30, 163; l. 3, n. 700.

103. Principles. - I. For satisfying any obligation whatever, an intention of doing that which is prescribed is required, if the law is affirmative, for example, the law prescribing hearing Mass on a feast day. The reason is that otherwise the act is not placed in a human mode. - By no means, however, if it is negative, as the law prohibiting servile works on feast days. The reason is that a negative law intends no more than omission of the work. - Thus all.

II. Yet there is not required an intention of fulfilling the precept, or of acting from the motive of formal obedience; because the legislator commands only the placing or omission of the work. - St. Lig., no. 163. - Sanchez, and others commonly.

III. It is not required that the law be fulfilled from a motive of charity, nor in the state of grace, unless the act itself of charity, or the state of grace, is prescribed, as in reception of the Eucharist. The reason is that the work is prescribed, not the motive, unless perhaps this too is expressed. It is also clear from proposition 16 of Baius condemned by Pius V, which has itself thus: That is not true obedience to the law which is done without charity.

IV. An intention of fulfilling the end of the precept is not required, unless that end is precisely commanded per se; because ordinarily the legislator does not command the end, nor intend to command it, but only the placing of the act. Hence the axiom: The end of the precept does not fall under the precept. - St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 100, art. 9, etc., and others.

105. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Whether he who sins in fulfilling the obligation of a law satisfies it?

I answer affirmatively, provided that the act is honest in itself, and evil only from an extrinsic circumstance, so that the substance of the thing prescribed is placed. The reason is that the precept commands only the substance of the act, not however the mode. Hence he satisfies who, while hearing Mass, is occupied with thoughts of vainglory or lust, or who while hearing Mass has the intention of stealing. Yet the precept of confession or communion is not satisfied by sacrilegious confession or communion, because then the very substance of the act is infected by sin. It is also clear from proposition 14 condemned by Alexander VII. - St. Lig., no. 162, and others commonly against a few.

QUESTION 2. Whether diverse precepts can be fulfilled by one act?

I answer affirmatively, if these diverse precepts fall on the same matter and on account of the same motive, as the fast of a vigil falling in the Ember Days; but otherwise, if they fall on diverse matter, or indeed on the same matter but on account of a diverse motive, as a fast owed from penance and from ecclesiastical law. - St. Lig., no. 166.

293. 1. General principle: Law must be fulfilled in the mode determined by the legislator, whether explicitly or implicitly; for that mode, like the act itself, falls under the precept. Hence it must be fulfilled: -

(a) In a human mode, that is, with advertence and liberty.

(b) In an honorable mode, so that the act is not substantially vitiated under that respect under which it is commanded; thus one does not satisfy the obligation of annual confession through a sacrilegious confession, but he satisfies the precept of hearing Mass who is duly present at the sacred rite, even if because of vain glory. Nor is it required that the law be fulfilled in the state of grace, unless the prescribed act by its nature supposes that state.

(c) At the time prefixed, and if no time has been assigned, as soon as morally possible. If the time has elapsed, and at the same time it was determined for urging the obligation, this obligation does not cease (for example, the law of annual confession); but if it was determined for defining the obligation, the obligation is extinguished (for example, the law of fasting affixed to such a day).

294. 2. Concerning a prohibiting law. This commands nothing other than the negation of the act, without any intention of fulfilling the law. Wherefore he does not transgress the law of fasting who, sleeping the whole day, does not eat, nor the law of abstinence who on a forbidden day abstains from meat because he lacks it.

295. 3. Concerning a commanding law: (a) There is required at least the implicit will of placing the prescribed work; otherwise the law is not fulfilled in a human mode. But there is not required the intention of satisfying the precept, nor a fortiori of attaining the end intended by the legislator; for the end of the precept does not fall under the precept. - Yet it is better to propose this intention to oneself, so that the merit of obedience may be had.

Thus he who, for the sake of devotion, hears Mass, not knowing that it is a feast day, satisfies the precept, because he implicitly wills the prescribed work; but he who, sleeping or coerced, assists at the sacred rite, does not satisfy the precept. He fulfills the law of fasting who observes the form of the fast, even if he eats sumptuously and does not intend mortification of the body.

(b) He who cannot fulfill the whole law is held to nothing if the thing commanded is indivisible, as a pious pilgrimage; but if it is divisible, he is held to the part which he can fulfill; thus he who cannot recite the entire office, but only vespers and compline, is held to that.

(c) It is licit by the same act to satisfy several precepts, unless it is established that the legislator's mind was otherwise; and this is known from the circumstances and the judgment of prudent men. - Thus he who receives viaticum at Easter time satisfies the twofold precept of communicating at Easter time and in danger of death. But if alms are prescribed for the jubilee, and another alms is owed from a vow, one does not suffice for fulfilling both obligations.

(d) It is licit at the same time to satisfy several precepts, provided that the various works commanded do not exclude one another, or unless it is established that the mind of the legislator was otherwise. Thus someone can hear a prescribed Mass and at the same time recite the hours.

After it has been said concerning the very obligation of diverse laws, certain things remain to be said concerning the mode of fulfilling obligating laws. But we bring forward only general principles, reserving a fuller discussion for when there will be question of individual laws and precepts. The Angelic Doctor treats this matter in two articles, asking: 1. Whether the mode of virtue falls under the precept of law? 2. Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept?¹ Following the footsteps of St. Thomas, we set down these principles:

¹ S. theol. I-II, q. 100, a. 9 and 10.

221. Principle 1. More is required for the fulfillment of a law than for non-transgression.

The reason is that for non-transgression it suffices to do nothing against the law, while for the fulfillment of the law a true human act is required. For law is essentially a moral obligation. But a moral obligation cannot be satisfied by a physical, or amoral, or non-human act, but by a moral and human act. Thus, for example, an insane man does not fulfill the law, because he is incapable of a truly human act; but nevertheless he does not transgress human law, as is plain. Likewise, he who by compulsion eats nothing on a fast day, namely because he has no foods, although he very greatly desires to eat, does not indeed effectively transgress the law of fasting, because he really eats nothing; nevertheless he does not fulfill the law of fasting, because by compulsion he abstains from foods against his will. Indeed, affectively he has transgressed the law of fasting.

222. Principle 2. For the fulfillment of a law it is not required that the prescribed work be done from a habit of virtue or from charity,² or in other words: the substance of the act suffices, but the virtuous mode is not required.

Although a good legislator greatly desires that subjects be led to virtues and to sanctity, nevertheless he commands only the external work, which can be fulfilled even without virtue and charity; or in other words: virtue and charity are indeed the end of the precept, but not the precept itself. "The end of a precept does not fall under the precept," as the common adage bears. Wherefore Baius's proposition 16 was condemned by St. Pius V: "That is not true obedience to the law which is done without charity."³ There are only two precepts which must be done with virtue, namely the precept of annual confession and of paschal communion, since they are determinations of divine law and otherwise grave sacrilege would be committed. Wherefore Alexander VII proscribed the following proposition (prop. 14): "He who makes a confession voluntarily null satisfies the precept of the Church."⁴ Innocent XI condemned the proposition (55): "The precept of annual communion is satisfied by a sacrilegious eating of the Lord."⁵ - But other laws are fulfilled, even if the act of fulfillment is vitiated by a sinful circumstance. Thus, he who fasts from vain glory, he who assists at Mass in order to lust after a woman, satisfies the precept of human law, although he sins because of the evil motive joined to it.

² Thus Billuart, De leg. diss. 4, a. 2 after St. Thomas, S. theol. I-II, q. 100, a. 9 and 10.

³ Denz. n. 1016.

⁴ Denz. n. 1114.

⁵ Denz. n. 1205.

223. Principle 3. For the fulfillment of a law the intention of satisfying the precept is not required, provided there is at least the implicit intention of performing the prescribed work itself, or more briefly: For the fulfillment of a law formal obedience is not required, but material obedience suffices.

The reason for the first part is that the intention of satisfying the precept is a merely internal act, which the human legislator perhaps cannot and certainly does not will to command. For the external prescribed work, which is principally intended by the legislator, can be duly done without this intention. Hence the subject must indeed will the external work itself, but it is not strictly required that he will this work reduplicatively as prescribed. (Wherefore authors commonly teach that even he satisfies the precept who has the explicit intention of not satisfying the precept, provided, however, that he has knowingly and voluntarily performed the work itself. The reason is that the obligation of the law depends on the will of the legislator and not on the will of the subject. Therefore, since the legislator prescribes nothing other than the work itself, once this work has been performed the law is fulfilled, whatever at length the subject intends. Thus the opinion which St. Alphonsus calls the more probable and most common: "The reason," says the holy Doctor,⁶ "is that he who spontaneously fulfills the prescribed work truly executes that which is commanded by the superior; for to fulfill a precept it is not required that one have the mind of fulfilling, but it suffices that he place the prescribed act.") Therefore the intention of satisfying the precept is not required for the fulfillment of the law, but there is necessary at least the implicit intention of performing the prescribed work itself, or, as St. Thomas says, the prescribed work itself must be done knowingly and voluntarily.⁷ The reason is that without this knowledge and will the work done is not a truly human act, which nevertheless is required for the fulfillment of the law, as was said above in the first principle. - This doctrine, however, cannot be extended to an obligation which arises from the will of the agent alone, as for example in the fulfillment of a vow or promise. For just as it depends upon the free will of the agent to make a vow or promise, so also it depends upon the same will to determine the mode of satisfying the obligation undertaken. Wherefore, if someone, for example, vowed to hear Mass, and now while hearing Mass expressly establishes that he is going to satisfy the obligation of the vow not by this Mass but by another, he really does not satisfy by hearing the first Mass.

Resolves. 1. If someone, hearing Mass in the morning on Sunday, expressly establishes that he wishes to fulfill the Sunday precept not by this Mass, but by another Mass to be heard afterward, nevertheless he has satisfied this precept, even if in reality he will not hear another Mass. The reason is that he has knowingly and voluntarily performed the prescribed work, namely he really heard Mass on Sunday.

2. He who slept during the whole Mass did not satisfy the precept. The reason is that he did not perform the prescribed work, nor did he really hear Mass. On the contrary, he who, being ignorant that it is a feast of precept, assists at Mass, has satisfied the precept; for he really performed the prescribed work.

3. He who goes to church for the sole motive of hearing the music, or seeing his lover, or avoiding penalties of his father or some other superior to be inflicted otherwise, does not satisfy the precept. The reason is that he does not will to hear Mass.

4. Soldiers who are led in a body to hear Mass satisfy the Sunday precept, although, if there were no compulsion, they would have omitted hearing Mass, provided, however, that now they will to hear Mass. The reason is that it is not asked what would have been done, but what has been done.

Note. The work prescribed by law, if it is personal, must be fulfilled by the subject himself; but if it is a primarily real work, it can also be performed by a deputy. Thus, for example, fasting is a personal work and therefore fasting prescribed by law must be fulfilled by the subject himself and not by his deputy; on the contrary, a tax to be paid is a primarily real work, and therefore someone can satisfy the law of taxes not only by himself, but also by a deputy.

⁶ Theol. mor. l. 4, n. 176. The holy Doctor indeed speaks there of the law of reciting the canonical hours, but his doctrine is general and is valid for every human law. Cf. l. 1, n. 164.

⁷ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 100, a. 9.

224. Principle 4. By the same act one can satisfy several precepts concerning the same matter which are diverse not formally but only materially.

Precepts are judged formally diverse if they have been given on account of motives wholly special and diverse, or from wholly particular and complete titles; otherwise precepts are held only materially diverse. To discern formally and materially diverse precepts one must attend to the mind of the legislator, which indeed becomes known either by his express manifestation or by doctrinal or usual interpretation. - Hence he who must recite the canonical hours by reason both of sacred order and of ecclesiastical benefice satisfies two precepts by one recitation; he who in paschal time receives Viaticum satisfies by this one communion both the divine precept of receiving Viaticum and the ecclesiastical precept of receiving paschal communion. The reason is that these precepts are only materially diverse, as having been given from the same motive, namely in the first case the Office is to be recited and in the other case communion is to be received. - On the contrary, in the following cases diverse precepts cannot be satisfied by a single act: If someone must fast a) because of ecclesiastical law; b) because of imposed sacramental penance; c) because of a vow emitted, he cannot by one fast satisfy the threefold precept. If someone owes Peter one hundred francs because of damage unjustly caused and in addition because of a contract entered into, he cannot by one payment satisfy two obligations, as is plain of itself. The reason is that obligations of this kind are formally diverse, because they arise from titles or motives wholly particular and independent of one another.

225. Principle 5. At the same time several precepts concerning diverse matters can be satisfied, a) if the prescribed works are compossible; b) if the legislator has not prohibited it.

Which works are really compossible must be discerned from prudent judgment and common estimation. Thus hearing Mass, reciting the Breviary, or fulfilling a sacramental penance which consists in some prayers are compossible works. Whether, on the contrary, hearing Mass and, during it, making a sacramental confession are compossible works is not so established.⁸ - If the legislator has expressly prohibited performing two prescribed works at the same time, as is wont to happen in works prescribed for gaining indulgences, surely such a prohibition must be observed.

⁸ Cf. below in the treatise on satisfaction of the Sunday precept II, n. 481.

226. Scholion. On the time of fulfilling an obligation. Laws are wont to determine not only the work itself to be performed, but also some circumstances of the work. Among these circumstances is found the time of fulfilling the obligation. If the law has not been fulfilled at the appointed time, a distinction is needed: 1. If the time has been determined for ending the obligation, outside this time (that is, neither before nor after) the law neither must nor can be fulfilled. Hence, for example, he who does not assist at Mass on Sunday neither must nor can satisfy the Sunday precept either on Saturday or on Monday. 2. If the time has been determined for urging the obligation, the law must be fulfilled not only during this time, but also afterward. Therefore, when the appointed time has elapsed, the obligation of the law not only does not cease, but it urges more and is to be fulfilled as soon as possible. Hence, for example, he who has not received communion in paschal time (whether culpably or inculpably) must afterward do this as soon as possible. - Whether the time has been determined for ending, or rather for urging, the obligation depends on the intention of the legislator, which indeed is known from the right interpretation of the law.

If the time of the obligation of the law has already begun, and if then someone foresees that he will afterward be impeded, he is held to fulfill the law before the impediment is going to arrive. For example, if a priest in the morning foresees that he cannot recite the Office after midday, he must recite the whole Office in the morning. On the contrary, if a priest foresees that tomorrow he cannot recite the Office, today after midday he is not held to anticipate Matins and Lauds. For today the obligation has not yet begun, and no one is held to use the privilege of anticipating Matins and Lauds.

360. A prohibiting law is satisfied either knowingly and voluntarily, by a human act even meritorious, or unknowingly, e.g., by one sleeping, because it suffices to omit that which the law prohibits; but for omission there is not necessarily required a positive will of omitting or abstaining from the work. Hence one who fasts satisfies the law, whether he does it in order to spare money, or by reason of health, or because food is not given to him, or because he is asleep or does not think about food: for it is a negative precept. Yet one who omits unknowingly should rather be said not to transgress the law than to fulfill it.

Nevertheless, the one omitting cannot have a contrary will: for that which the law prohibits is evil, and therefore by that very fact the affection or will of this evil is prohibited; thus he from whom meats are violently taken away against his will, although effectively he does not transgress the law, nevertheless sins affectively against it and is guilty in will of violating it.

361. A preceptive law must be fulfilled by a human act, that is, knowingly and voluntarily: for law is given to men; whence if it prescribes a personal act, it requires that it be done in a human mode. Hence one drunk, or sleeping, or altogether compelled at the sacred rite does not satisfy; but if the law is real, imposing a thing to be furnished, it suffices that it be furnished by another, but by mandate of him who is obligated, or with his ratification.

In order that law be fulfilled in a human mode, intention is required, which the substance of the act demands so that it may be placed in its moral species; whence:

1. on the part of the subject, the intention should be at least virtual, that is, formerly had and here and now influencing the act (e.g., continuing to pray while distracted from the intention had at the beginning), and implicit, contained in another (e.g., the intention of praying in the act of taking up the breviary);

2. on the part of the object, there should be the intention of placing the act prescribed, because without that the act prescribed by law would not be placed.

Nevertheless, there is not required: a) the intention of the extrinsic end intended by the legislator (unless it is specially imposed): for the end intended by the legislator is one thing, the act which he prescribes as a means to this end is another. Hence the axiom: the (extrinsic) end of a precept does not fall under the precept, and the end of the one acting can be opposed to the end of the legislator; e.g., one who eats fish from gluttony observes the precept of abstinence; therefore the law is not deprived of common utility;

b) nor an explicit intention of satisfying or of fulfilling the law as such, because laws generally do not obligate to formal obedience, that is, to doing something because it is prescribed, but only to doing that which is prescribed; hence one who is ignorant that it is a feast day, or who intends to hear another Mass, nevertheless satisfies the precept;

c) indeed, probably one effectively satisfies the law with a contrary intention of not satisfying (provided the will of doing the prescribed work is predominant), because the legislator ordinarily prescribes only the substance of the work; hence one who wills to pray and not to satisfy the law, although he can sin affectively against the law, nevertheless effectively satisfies. For although it depends on the intention of the agent that an obligation be fulfilled which depends on his will, such as a vow, oath, sacramental penance, nevertheless it depends not on his will but on the will of the legislator that the law obligates to such a work and is fulfilled by such a work; for once the prescribed work is placed, the subject cannot impede that by this work the law is fulfilled. Therefore, once the substance of the work is placed, the law is necessarily fulfilled. Exception is made if someone is bound by several precepts, e.g., law, vow, sacramental penance, to several similar acts: for then it depends on his intention to which one he satisfies.

362. Can law be fulfilled with sin? - Law generally can be fulfilled: 1) without the state of grace or a good habit, joy, delight, etc., because it prescribes the substance of the act, not the mode (prop. 16 of Baius condemned); unless the mode or state of grace is positively and intrinsically required for the substance of the act, e.g., for confession (can. 907; prop. 14 of Alexander VII) or for communion (can. 861; prop. 55 of Innocent XI); indeed 2) law, not indeed universally taken or the law of charity, to which every sin is repugnant, but another law prescribing a particular act, can be fulfilled while sinning, provided that the act of fulfillment as to substance and according to object and species remains good, and its goodness is not totally corrupted (as in a null confession); namely: a) by an act which at the same time is done on account of an extrinsic evil end which is not the sole reason for acting, e.g., to hear Mass also in order to see a woman (n. 156, 4); b) by a good act which is merely accompanied by an evil extrinsic circumstance which does not pass into the object and does not influence the act, e.g., to hear Mass with depraved thoughts or with the intention of stealing (the law is not satisfied by sinning, but the sinner satisfies; n. 154): for law does not prescribe the (extrinsic) mode, but only the substance of the act; unless the mode is of the intrinsic reason of the act according to itself or as it falls under law. Hence the axiom: the (extrinsic) mode of a precept does not fall under the precept.

363. When law must be fulfilled. - A preceptive law, if it does not determine the time of fulfillment, must be fulfilled as soon as, morally speaking, it conveniently can be done (e.g., within three days, if it must be fulfilled at once), for otherwise someone could elude the law by always deferring. But if it determines the time, it must be fulfilled at that time; but if the time has elapsed, if it had been prefixed for ending the obligation, the obligation ceases, e.g., of Mass, of fasting; but if for urging the obligation, it obligates as soon as possible, e.g., one who has not confessed within the year, or has not made the Paschal communion (can. 859, § 4), or who did not fulfill sacramental penance on a certain day.

Concerning the time of obligation, canons 31-35 are to be noted, especially canon 33, in which it is said: "In computing the hours of the day one must stand by common usage; but in private celebration of Mass, in private recitation of the canonical hours, in receiving holy communion, and in observing the law of fast or abstinence, although the usual computation of the place is different, one can follow the time of the place, whether local, true or mean, or legal, whether of the region or some other extraordinary time."

The canon is to be understood according to the Response of the C.I.C., May 29, 1947, in which it is declared that "once one mode of computing time has been chosen here, by force of can. 33, § 1, it can be changed in formally diverse actions."

Formally diverse actions are those which, even perhaps in one materially single action, regard diverse obligations or diverse precepts, which are not intrinsically connected or do not have intrinsic affinity.

Thus:

1. Someone can on the same Friday eat meat because according to the earlier hour it is already midnight and the law of abstinence no longer urges, and also satisfy the obligation of reciting the divine office of Friday, because according to the later hour it is not yet midnight and the term for ending the obligation has not yet expired.

2. Indeed someone can on Friday eat meat because according to the earlier hour the day of abstinence has already elapsed, and nevertheless on Saturday celebrate Mass or approach the Sacred [rite/Communion], because according to the later hour Saturday has not yet begun. For that action, materially one, is formally manifold, since it is the fulfillment of two obligations which do not have an intrinsic connection or affinity.

3. But he who on the night of the Nativity, in the first Mass, by mistake has taken the ablutions with wine so that he is now no longer fasting, cannot celebrate the second and third Masses by now choosing the later hour for determining the midnight from which he must be fasting. For here there is question of one action formally, corresponding to one and the same precept.

364. To what law obligates. - Law 1) directly and explicitly obligates to its own observance, which is the essential and chief obligation of law, in which the others are contained implicitly and virtually;

2. indirectly and implicitly it obligates to all ordinary means proximately necessary for observance: for he who is bound to the end, by that very fact is bound to the means which are proximately necessary for obtaining the end; namely:

a) to knowledge of the law, which is a prior and immediately necessary means without which it could not be observed, and consequently to applying ordinary means which conduce to knowledge of the law;

b) to other internal and external means without which the law will not be able to be fulfilled, provided they are ordinary and the law is proximately imminent, e.g., to acquiring a breviary for reciting the office;

c) and therefore to avoiding or removing or forestalling impediments which render its observance proximately impossible;

d) to avoiding proximate occasions which frequently expose one to the danger of transgression or are morally conjoined with it.

365. Can several precepts be fulfilled at the same time? - Response: 1) Several laws or precepts can be satisfied by one act if all prescribe a matter or act the same in species and number: thus a canonical or religious priest satisfies by one recitation of the breviary; nevertheless satisfaction is not made if diverse or distinct actions are required, e.g., fasting prescribed and imposed by a confessor or by a superior, unless the same one imposed it; by paying 100 francs once if someone owed it twice. When diverse laws are judged to fall upon the same or diverse actions, we have from the intention of the one commanding, the words, custom, and other circumstances.

2. Satisfaction is also made by several acts placed at the same time, provided they are compossible and diversity of times has not been prescribed, e.g., hearing Mass (or a pilgrimage) and recitation of the hours; satisfaction is not made if they are incompossible, e.g., to hear confession and to read the breviary.

366. Observation.

When several precepts occur at the same time which cannot be fulfilled together:

1. by right, if they are equally urgent, the greater must be observed before the lesser: hence, other things being equal, a negative precept is to be preferred to an affirmative one, a natural precept to a positive one, a divine precept to a human one, an ecclesiastical precept to a civil one, a precept of a primary superior or of a stricter virtue or looking to a common or spiritual good to a precept of a secondary superior, of a less strict virtue, looking to a particular or bodily good;

2. in fact, the agent satisfies that to which he intends to satisfy: for it depends on the intention of the agent to which one he satisfies. But if he has thought determinately of no obligation, he is judged to satisfy the more urgent; if they are equally urgent and the matter is divisible, he satisfies each in part; if indivisible, the greater obligation, as was said under 1).

Question 4. If you doubt whether you have already satisfied some obligation, are you still bound to satisfy it?

Response. It is greatly controverted, and a twofold sentence is given.

The first sentence affirms. The reason is deduced from this commonly admitted principle: A certain obligation is not satisfied through a doubtful fulfillment. For a law once existing and commanding has the right of exacting rigorous obedience, or the undoubted fulfillment of the obligation. Moreover, when you doubt, or only probably or even more probably judge that you have fulfilled the law, you have by no means rigorously satisfied it. Therefore it still urges and presses you until you have certainly satisfied it. Besides, equity demands that what we grant to liberty we not deny to the law also in an equal condition: but we grant to certain liberty that it cannot be bound by a doubtful law. Therefore it must be granted to certain law that it cannot be loosed by a doubtful fulfillment. Finally, in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; but a law certainly existing possesses against liberty, which it has obligated to itself; therefore in doubt it prevails against liberty. Thus St. Alphonsus, nn. 28 and 29, who in this place, and in several other places, as, for example, lib. 6, n. 477, QQ. ref., ser. 2, nn. 1, 18, etc., seems fully to have retracted whatever he had written to the contrary, lib. 1, n. 99, vers. fin. Almost unanimously the more recent disciples follow the Master: Scavini, n. 87. - Neyraguet, cap. 3, inf. 2. - Gousset, n. 87. - Panzuti, n. 20. - Mueller, § 84, reg. 1, etc.

The second sentence denies, with not a few very distinguished theologians. For, they say, an obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certain concerning it, as was said above concerning probabilism. But it is not certain concerning an obligation to which satisfaction has already more probably or probably been made. Therefore. Besides, just as from that principle: An obligation is not to be imposed, etc., it is drawn that the human will is not obligated by a law whose existence has not yet been proved, so it necessarily follows that the same will is not obligated as soon as the existence of the law becomes uncertain; for just as obligation depends upon certain notice of the law, so also the continuation of obligation depends upon continuation of the same certain notice. But a law to which satisfaction has probably been made probably no longer exists. Therefore.

As to the axiom which is objected: A certain obligation is not satisfied through a doubtful fulfillment, it is answered that it is true as often as there is discussion of practical or negative doubt, but not if true and solid probability favors liberty. Suarez holds this sentence, in 3, St. Thom. ad q. 90, disp. 22, sect. 9, n. 6. - Roncaglia, de Voto, cap. 2, q. 4; and tract. 2, cap. 5, q. 3, de Leg. - Tamburini, Meth. conf., lib. 2, cap. 1, n. 10. - Lugo, de Paenit., disp. 16, nn. 59 and 60. - Bonacina, de Integrit. conf., disp. 5, q. 5, sect. 2, punct. 2, § 3. - Lacroix, lib. 1, nn. 599 and 600. - The Salmanticenses, de Voto, cap. 1, n. 145. - etc., etc. - Add from the camp of the probabiliorists Billuart, de Integrit. conf., § 4, and others who say that it is enough if satisfaction has more probably been made to the law.

It cannot be denied that this sentence, which Cardinal de Lugo in the cited place calls common, enjoys great extrinsic probability. Otherwise, the reasons upon which it rests are efficacious, and make it truly probable. Cf. Baller., notes (a), (b), (c), p. 74.

Although for satisfying a law the intention of fulfilling the precept is not required, and much less the intention of obtaining the end of the precept, nevertheless the intention of doing that which is commanded is required, if the law is affirmative; but not if it is negative, or indeed affirmative, but of such a kind that through it the simple effect of some action is intended, and not the action itself. The reason for the first is that, for satisfying, material obedience suffices, as theologians speak, namely, to place the action which is commanded. The reason for the second is both because, as the axiom taken from the Angelic Doctor has it: The end of the precept does not fall under the precept; and because by the simple fulfillment of the precept the end intended by the legislator is sufficiently obtained. But the reason for the third is that, since law is imposed upon men, its fulfillment ought to be a human action. Finally, the reason for the fourth and fifth is that then the legislator intends nothing except either the omission of a work, or only the material placing of the effect, for example, restitution, which even one who is sleeping is able to make. - Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 100, art. 9. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 162, 163, 164, and 165.

You Will Resolve. 1st. He satisfies who hears Mass, not knowing that it is commanded on this day, or who indeed knows the obligation, but intends only here and now to satisfy devotion, with the intention of hearing another Mass.

2nd. But he does not satisfy who places the work of a vow or oath while expressly intending not to satisfy; for it depends on the will of the one promising that such an obligation remain.

3rd. He does not satisfy who, wholly coerced, is present at Mass; for such an act, on account of the defect of will, is not human. It is otherwise if someone is induced only by fear, as, for example, a servant by fear of his master, a child by fear of his mother, etc.

4th. He satisfies who sins in the very fulfillment of the law, provided the act is honorable in itself and evil only from an extrinsic circumstance, so that the substance of the thing commanded is placed; because the precept commands only the substance of the act, not the mode. Hence he satisfies who, while he hears Mass, is occupied with thoughts of vain glory or lust. Yet satisfaction is not made to the precept of confession or communion by sacrilegious confession or communion, because then the very substance of the commanded act, that is, confession destructive of sins, or communion which spiritually feeds the soul, is not placed. This is also clear from proposition 14 condemned by Alexander VII: "He who makes a confession voluntarily null satisfies the precept of the Church," and from proposition 55 condemned by Innocent XI: "The precept of annual communion is satisfied by a sacrilegious eating of the Lord." - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid. - See Can. 861, 907.

Question 1. Can several precepts be fulfilled by one act?

Response. Affirmatively, if these precepts fall upon the same matter and on account of the same intrinsic motive, as the fast of a vigil falling in the Ember days; but otherwise if they fall upon the same matter indeed, but on account of a diverse motive, as fasting owed from penance and from ecclesiastical law. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 166.

Question 2. Can diverse precepts be fulfilled at the same time by diverse acts?

Response. Affirmatively, if those acts are associable, that is, if they can be placed as they are required, because then the whole is placed which is required. Thus while hearing Mass you can recite the canonical Hours or discharge an imposed penance, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 166.

Question 3. Does the obligation cease for one who has not satisfied at the determined time?

Response. Affirmatively, if the determination of the time was made for ending the obligation. Thus, for example, if you did not fast on the day of a vigil, you indeed sinned, but you are freed from the law, because fasting is a burden affixed to the day itself. But otherwise it must be said if the time was not determined except for soliciting or urging the obligation. Thus he is not freed from the obligation of receiving the Eucharist who did not receive it in paschal time. Cf. St. Alphonsus, de secundo praec. Decal. n. 220; and de Euchar. n. 297. See below n. 342, Q. 1. - Cf. Can. 859, § 4.

Question 4. What must be done in the concurrence of two unassociable precepts?

Response. The greater must be observed before the lesser, which then ceases to oblige. But a natural precept prevails over a merely positive precept; a divine precept prevails over a human one; an ecclesiastical over a civil one, etc.

You Will Resolve. 1st. If you owe 100 coins to Titius, and you vow to restore them, by one act you satisfy two obligations, namely, of justice and of vow. Likewise a beneficed Priest vowing faithfully to recite the Hours satisfies a triple obligation by one recitation.

2nd. If from a vow and from a penance imposed by the confessor you are held to hear Mass, you do not satisfy each obligation if you are present at a single Mass on Sunday. Except unless the confessor imposes a work otherwise commanded.

3rd. Nor can you hear several Masses imposed upon you by a confessor at the same time, while they are being celebrated simultaneously on several altars, because such is not to be presumed to have been the intention of the confessor.

4th. He who is held to hear Mass on individual days from penance for one month satisfies by hearing one on Sunday, because it is reasonably presumed that the confessor did not wish to oblige the penitent to hear two Masses on the same day, unless he expressed this. - St. Alphonsus, Hom. Apost. n. 31.