Article — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Article VI. On the Mode of Fulfilling a Law
After it has been said concerning the very obligation of diverse laws, certain things remain to be said concerning the mode of fulfilling obligating laws. But we bring forward only general principles, reserving a fuller discussion for when there will be question of individual laws and precepts. The Angelic Doctor treats this matter in two articles, asking: 1. Whether the mode of virtue falls under the precept of law? 2. Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept?1 Following the footsteps of St. Thomas, we set down these principles:
1 S. theol. I-II, q. 100, a. 9 and 10.
221. Principle 1. More is required for the fulfillment of a law than for non-transgression.
The reason is that for non-transgression it suffices to do nothing against the law, while for the fulfillment of the law a true human act is required. For law is essentially a moral obligation. But a moral obligation cannot be satisfied by a physical, or amoral, or non-human act, but by a moral and human act. Thus, for example, an insane man does not fulfill the law, because he is incapable of a truly human act; but nevertheless he does not transgress human law, as is plain. Likewise, he who by compulsion eats nothing on a fast day, namely because he has no foods, although he very greatly desires to eat, does not indeed effectively transgress the law of fasting, because he really eats nothing; nevertheless he does not fulfill the law of fasting, because by compulsion he abstains from foods against his will. Indeed, affectively he has transgressed the law of fasting.
222. Principle 2. For the fulfillment of a law it is not required that the prescribed work be done from a habit of virtue or from charity,2 or in other words: the substance of the act suffices, but the virtuous mode is not required.
Although a good legislator greatly desires that subjects be led to virtues and to sanctity, nevertheless he commands only the external work, which can be fulfilled even without virtue and charity; or in other words: virtue and charity are indeed the end of the precept, but not the precept itself. "The end of a precept does not fall under the precept," as the common adage bears. Wherefore Baius's proposition 16 was condemned by St. Pius V: "That is not true obedience to the law which is done without charity."3 There are only two precepts which must be done with virtue, namely the precept of annual confession and of paschal communion, since they are determinations of divine law and otherwise grave sacrilege would be committed. Wherefore Alexander VII proscribed the following proposition (prop. 14): "He who makes a confession voluntarily null satisfies the precept of the Church."4 Innocent XI condemned the proposition (55): "The precept of annual communion is satisfied by a sacrilegious eating of the Lord."5 - But other laws are fulfilled, even if the act of fulfillment is vitiated by a sinful circumstance. Thus, he who fasts from vain glory, he who assists at Mass in order to lust after a woman, satisfies the precept of human law, although he sins because of the evil motive joined to it.
2 Thus Billuart, De leg. diss. 4, a. 2 after St. Thomas, S. theol. I-II, q. 100, a. 9 and 10.
3 Denz. n. 1016.
4 Denz. n. 1114.
5 Denz. n. 1205.
223. Principle 3. For the fulfillment of a law the intention of satisfying the precept is not required, provided there is at least the implicit intention of performing the prescribed work itself, or more briefly: For the fulfillment of a law formal obedience is not required, but material obedience suffices.
The reason for the first part is that the intention of satisfying the precept is a merely internal act, which the human legislator perhaps cannot and certainly does not will to command. For the external prescribed work, which is principally intended by the legislator, can be duly done without this intention. Hence the subject must indeed will the external work itself, but it is not strictly required that he will this work reduplicatively as prescribed. (Wherefore authors commonly teach that even he satisfies the precept who has the explicit intention of not satisfying the precept, provided, however, that he has knowingly and voluntarily performed the work itself. The reason is that the obligation of the law depends on the will of the legislator and not on the will of the subject. Therefore, since the legislator prescribes nothing other than the work itself, once this work has been performed the law is fulfilled, whatever at length the subject intends. Thus the opinion which St. Alphonsus calls the more probable and most common: "The reason," says the holy Doctor,6 "is that he who spontaneously fulfills the prescribed work truly executes that which is commanded by the superior; for to fulfill a precept it is not required that one have the mind of fulfilling, but it suffices that he place the prescribed act.") Therefore the intention of satisfying the precept is not required for the fulfillment of the law, but there is necessary at least the implicit intention of performing the prescribed work itself, or, as St. Thomas says, the prescribed work itself must be done knowingly and voluntarily.7 The reason is that without this knowledge and will the work done is not a truly human act, which nevertheless is required for the fulfillment of the law, as was said above in the first principle. - This doctrine, however, cannot be extended to an obligation which arises from the will of the agent alone, as for example in the fulfillment of a vow or promise. For just as it depends upon the free will of the agent to make a vow or promise, so also it depends upon the same will to determine the mode of satisfying the obligation undertaken. Wherefore, if someone, for example, vowed to hear Mass, and now while hearing Mass expressly establishes that he is going to satisfy the obligation of the vow not by this Mass but by another, he really does not satisfy by hearing the first Mass.
Resolves. 1. If someone, hearing Mass in the morning on Sunday, expressly establishes that he wishes to fulfill the Sunday precept not by this Mass, but by another Mass to be heard afterward, nevertheless he has satisfied this precept, even if in reality he will not hear another Mass. The reason is that he has knowingly and voluntarily performed the prescribed work, namely he really heard Mass on Sunday.
2. He who slept during the whole Mass did not satisfy the precept. The reason is that he did not perform the prescribed work, nor did he really hear Mass. On the contrary, he who, being ignorant that it is a feast of precept, assists at Mass, has satisfied the precept; for he really performed the prescribed work.
3. He who goes to church for the sole motive of hearing the music, or seeing his lover, or avoiding penalties of his father or some other superior to be inflicted otherwise, does not satisfy the precept. The reason is that he does not will to hear Mass.
4. Soldiers who are led in a body to hear Mass satisfy the Sunday precept, although, if there were no compulsion, they would have omitted hearing Mass, provided, however, that now they will to hear Mass. The reason is that it is not asked what would have been done, but what has been done.
Note. The work prescribed by law, if it is personal, must be fulfilled by the subject himself; but if it is a primarily real work, it can also be performed by a deputy. Thus, for example, fasting is a personal work and therefore fasting prescribed by law must be fulfilled by the subject himself and not by his deputy; on the contrary, a tax to be paid is a primarily real work, and therefore someone can satisfy the law of taxes not only by himself, but also by a deputy.
6 Theol. mor. l. 4, n. 176. The holy Doctor indeed speaks there of the law of reciting the canonical hours, but his doctrine is general and is valid for every human law. Cf. l. 1, n. 164.
7 Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 100, a. 9.
224. Principle 4. By the same act one can satisfy several precepts concerning the same matter which are diverse not formally but only materially.
Precepts are judged formally diverse if they have been given on account of motives wholly special and diverse, or from wholly particular and complete titles; otherwise precepts are held only materially diverse. To discern formally and materially diverse precepts one must attend to the mind of the legislator, which indeed becomes known either by his express manifestation or by doctrinal or usual interpretation. - Hence he who must recite the canonical hours by reason both of sacred order and of ecclesiastical benefice satisfies two precepts by one recitation; he who in paschal time receives Viaticum satisfies by this one communion both the divine precept of receiving Viaticum and the ecclesiastical precept of receiving paschal communion. The reason is that these precepts are only materially diverse, as having been given from the same motive, namely in the first case the Office is to be recited and in the other case communion is to be received. - On the contrary, in the following cases diverse precepts cannot be satisfied by a single act: If someone must fast a) because of ecclesiastical law; b) because of imposed sacramental penance; c) because of a vow emitted, he cannot by one fast satisfy the threefold precept. If someone owes Peter one hundred francs because of damage unjustly caused and in addition because of a contract entered into, he cannot by one payment satisfy two obligations, as is plain of itself. The reason is that obligations of this kind are formally diverse, because they arise from titles or motives wholly particular and independent of one another.
225. Principle 5. At the same time several precepts concerning diverse matters can be satisfied, a) if the prescribed works are compossible; b) if the legislator has not prohibited it.
Which works are really compossible must be discerned from prudent judgment and common estimation. Thus hearing Mass, reciting the Breviary, or fulfilling a sacramental penance which consists in some prayers are compossible works. Whether, on the contrary, hearing Mass and, during it, making a sacramental confession are compossible works is not so established.8 - If the legislator has expressly prohibited performing two prescribed works at the same time, as is wont to happen in works prescribed for gaining indulgences, surely such a prohibition must be observed.
8 Cf. below in the treatise on satisfaction of the Sunday precept II, n. 481.
226. Scholion. On the time of fulfilling an obligation. Laws are wont to determine not only the work itself to be performed, but also some circumstances of the work. Among these circumstances is found the time of fulfilling the obligation. If the law has not been fulfilled at the appointed time, a distinction is needed: 1. If the time has been determined for ending the obligation, outside this time (that is, neither before nor after) the law neither must nor can be fulfilled. Hence, for example, he who does not assist at Mass on Sunday neither must nor can satisfy the Sunday precept either on Saturday or on Monday. 2. If the time has been determined for urging the obligation, the law must be fulfilled not only during this time, but also afterward. Therefore, when the appointed time has elapsed, the obligation of the law not only does not cease, but it urges more and is to be fulfilled as soon as possible. Hence, for example, he who has not received communion in paschal time (whether culpably or inculpably) must afterward do this as soon as possible. - Whether the time has been determined for ending, or rather for urging, the obligation depends on the intention of the legislator, which indeed is known from the right interpretation of the law.
If the time of the obligation of the law has already begun, and if then someone foresees that he will afterward be impeded, he is held to fulfill the law before the impediment is going to arrive. For example, if a priest in the morning foresees that he cannot recite the Office after midday, he must recite the whole Office in the morning. On the contrary, if a priest foresees that tomorrow he cannot recite the Office, today after midday he is not held to anticipate Matins and Lauds. For today the obligation has not yet begun, and no one is held to use the privilege of anticipating Matins and Lauds.