Article Third. On the Manner of Fulfilling Obligation.

171. Principles. 1. A negative law is satisfied by the omission of the prohibited act without a contrary will: for a negative law prescribes nothing other than the omission of the act.

Therefore he who on a prohibited day does not eat meat because he does not have it fulfills the precept of abstinence, even if he does not even think of the precept, provided there is no contrary intention.

2. For satisfying an affirmative law, different things are required in different cases.

a. If the law prescribes a real performance, only the performance of the thing prescribed is required, which can also be done through another; the intention of performing the thing due is not required.

a. Laws of this kind, e.g. of paying a debt, of paying a tax, by their nature prescribe nothing except the performance of the thing; once this has been exhibited, even ignorantly, indeed even reluctantly, the law is fulfilled and the end of the law obtained, since the law intends nothing other than the external effect, which can be sufficiently obtained through a merely external action. Therefore even a drunk or coerced person satisfies a law of this kind. Nevertheless, in order that these laws be fulfilled formally and meritoriously, the intention of placing the prescribed work is required.¹

b. Through another the thing due can be performed, because a thing can be transferred to another, provided that he to whom it is transferred, or for whom it is performed, consents in some way (tacitly or at least interpretatively), according to the adage: another's thing can become mine.

b. If the law prescribes a personal action, it is required and suffices that the prescribed work be placed in a human manner, i.e. with the intention of doing it, and indeed by the very one who is bound by the law.

a. Laws of this kind, as imposed upon men, require human acts, namely acts placed knowingly and voluntarily. But nothing else is required, because the end intended by the legislator can be obtained sufficiently in this way. These laws cannot be fulfilled through another, because actions cannot be transferred to another: another's action cannot become mine.

b. As regards the observance of law, the axiom must be noted: a little is reckoned as nothing; for laws must be observed in a human manner; but in the moral estimation of men a law is not judged violated which is injured only moderately. Thus he who in reciting the office or in hearing Mass omits some slight thing does not violate the law. Nevertheless those laws must be excepted in which the physical manner of observing them is determined by nature or by law or by human will, as in the natural fast to be observed before communion, or in the age required for religious profession or for sacred orders.

c. The will to place the prescribed work is indeed required when the work itself, and not only the effect of the work, is prescribed; but the intention of satisfying the precept is not required, and much less the intention of obtaining the end intended by the legislator. Wherefore the axiom has prevailed: the end of the precept does not fall under the precept. The intention of satisfying the precept is not required, because laws do not tend to this, that subjects through their observance testify their subjection and obedience toward the law, but that through them the end of the common good may be promoted. But the end intended by the legislator is obtained through the prescribed acts themselves fulfilled by subjects, even if it is not intended by them.

d. Hence he who, sleeping or unwilling and only coerced, assists at Mass does not satisfy the precept of hearing Mass, because he does not act in a human manner; and he who goes to church while Mass is taking place there only in order to wait for a friend likewise does not satisfy the precept, because he does not have the intention of doing the prescribed work; but he who is present at Mass from fear satisfies the precept. - He who, ignorant that it is a feast day, assists at Mass satisfies the precept; and he who pays the work due from a vow or imposed for penance without the intention of fulfilling the obligation satisfies it, provided he does not apply the work to another end which cannot be combined with the end of the precept: for anyone is judged to have the intention of satisfying debts before placing supererogatory works. - He who observes the form of fasting satisfies the precept, even if he eats sumptuously and neither intends (and accidentally) nor obtains mortification of the body, because the end of the precept does not fall under the precept.

3. For satisfying a law it is not required that the law be fulfilled in the state of grace, unless the state of grace pertains to the substance of the work; indeed it can even be fulfilled through an act sinful from the circumstances, provided the sin does not impede the substance of the prescribed act: for the law prescribes only the substance of the act, and in no way its mode, unless it pertains to the substance of the act.

a. If the prescribed work is an external act, it suffices that it be placed in a human manner, e.g. the hearing of Mass with the intention of hearing it; and if the prescribed work is a mixed act, it is required that the whole moral substance of the prescribed act, i.e. the external act with the due internal act, be placed. Therefore through a sacrilegious confession or communion the precept of the Church is not satisfied.² But it is satisfied through an act sinful from the circumstances, as if someone assists at Mass in a determinate church so that there he may have an occasion of stealing. He who abstains from food satisfies the precept of fasting, even if he does it from avarice; likewise he who fasts or confesses from vainglory.

b. He who notices that he did not recite the hours, did not fulfill the penance, did not assist at Mass with that devotion with which he had wished and ought, and therefore proposes to repeat the work in order to satisfy the precept, but afterward does not repeat it, satisfies the precept, even if he does not revoke the will of repeating the work, because he has already placed the prescribed work, although with a defect.

Whether one satisfies the precept who indeed places the prescribed work, but with the intention of not satisfying the precept.

It must be distinguished: if the obligation of the law depends upon the intention of the legislator, he satisfies it; therefore he who hears Mass with the intention of now satisfying devotion and afterward fulfilling the precept is not bound to hear another Mass: for he has already placed the whole of that which the legislator prescribed. But if the obligation depends upon the intention of the agent, as in a vow or promise, he does not satisfy it: for just as it depends upon the intention of the agent that the obligation exist, so it depends upon the same intention of the agent that it be extinguished or remain.

4. He who cannot fulfill the whole law is bound to nothing if the prescribed matter is indivisible, as a pious pilgrimage; but he is bound to a part if the matter is divisible and the reason of the precept is preserved in the part which can be fulfilled. The reason of the precept is judged to be preserved if the part which can be performed contributes something to the end of the precept.

a. He who cannot make the whole way for a pilgrimage to be undertaken from a vow is bound to nothing, because the prescribed matter is indivisible. - He who cannot recite the whole office, but can recite one or another hour, is bound to these parts; but in a few verses or even in one psalm the reason of the precept is not preserved, and therefore he is not bound to their recitation. - He who cannot fast in Lent is bound to abstain from meat, if he can.

b. If someone cannot fulfill the whole law, but doubts whether he can fulfill a part, he is generally excused also from fulfilling the part, as, e.g., a sick person who doubts whether he can recite part of the office: for otherwise occasion would be given to many scruples and anxieties.

¹ Cf. Struggl, Theologia moral. tract. 3. q. 2. n. 14. Schindler I. p. 226.

² "He who makes a voluntarily null confession satisfies the precept of the Church." Prop. 14 of Alexander VII. "He satisfies the precept of annual communion through a sacrilegious eating of the Lord." Prop. 55 of Innocent XI.

172. 1. By the same act several precepts can be satisfied, unless it is established that the mind of the legislator was different: for by one act the whole work can be placed which is prescribed by diverse laws. But that the mind of the legislator is not contrary is rightly conjectured if the precepts which refer to the same matter are enjoined from the same motive.

He who must recite the office by reason of order and by reason of benefice satisfies by one recitation; he who receives viaticum in paschal time satisfies both precepts, of communicating at Easter and of communicating at death. But one to whom the giving of alms for pious causes was enjoined as penance does not satisfy if he gives it for alms due from a vow; and if hearing Mass was imposed on someone as penance, he cannot fulfill it on a feast day by at the same time hearing the Mass due from the precept of the Church, unless the confessor has expressly permitted it, because the motive of each precept is different.

Note. In these things there is contained a certain norm for rightly conjecturing concerning the mind of the legislator, unless something else is established from the circumstances. Thus the matter of justice is always to be excepted: for he who from several obligations owes another a hundred does not satisfy if he once gives a hundred, because in debts of justice the equality of thing to thing is attended to; but by one payment of a hundred the debt of several hundreds cannot be equalled; therefore in these matters the intention of the legislator is different. - Likewise he who has emitted a vow of communicating once in honor of some saint cannot by one communion satisfy the obligation of the vow and of annual communion, although the motive of each is the same, because the intention of the one vowing is judged to have been different, apart from the fact that he had intended to oblige himself to paschal communion by a new bond of religion. - On the contrary, Mass on 2 November, which is to be said for the departed from the precept of the Church (from the motive of religion and mercy), can also be said for an accepted stipend (from justice), because it is established that the legislator permits this.

173. 2. At the same time several precepts can be satisfied: a. unless the prescribed works impede one another; b. unless the legislator intended the works to be placed at a different time.

a. Hence at the same time someone can hear the prescribed Mass and recite the hours or fulfill an enjoined penance.

b. One to whom two or three Masses have been imposed as penance can absolutely hear them at the same time, while they are celebrated simultaneously at several altars, because he can attend to several at once; nevertheless ordinarily the mind of the confessor will be that the penitent hear the Masses successively, not at the same time.

174. When it must be fulfilled. 1. If a determinate time has been set for a law to be fulfilled, it must certainly be observed; but if the law has not been observed at the prescribed time, the obligation ceases if the time was determined for ending the obligation, but it does not cease if it was determined for urging the obligation. Whether the time was determined for ending the obligation or rather for urging it depends upon the intention of the legislator, which is drawn from the end or from the words of the law or from custom.

He who did not fast on the day of the vigil is not bound to fast on another day; he who did not hear Mass on Sunday is not bound to hear it on the following day, because the determination of time was added for ending the obligation. But he who in paschal time did not receive holy communion is bound to receive it afterward; he who did not pay a debt on the appointed day is bound to pay it afterward, because the determination of time was not added for ending the obligation.

2. At the time when the precept urges, a. it can be observed at any time, e.g. holy communion can be received throughout the whole paschal time; b. but he who, when the law is already urging, foresees an impediment to fulfilling it afterward, must satisfy the law earlier, unless he foresees that while the obligation is still enduring he will be exempt from the law; c. finally, he who, when the law is not yet urging, foresees an impediment to fulfilling it, is not bound to anticipate the time of the law, even if he can fulfill it.

Therefore he who in paschal time cannot receive holy communion later is bound to do so earlier; but he who cannot during paschal time is not bound to communicate before paschal time. - He who cannot recite the hours later is bound to do so earlier; but he is not bound to anticipate, even if he foresees that on the following day he cannot recite the office. - He who on a feast day after the sixth hour cannot be present at Mass is bound to hear it before the sixth hour, provided occasion is offered. - He who on the day on which a particular feast is celebrated has come, before the time suitable for hearing Mass, into a place where the feast is not celebrated, is not bound to hear Mass beforehand.

3. A precept cannot be fulfilled at the time when it itself does not urge, unless the precept is of such a kind that a little before the obligation the whole prescribed work can be placed.

He who hears Mass on Saturday cannot fulfill the Sunday precept, because Mass is prescribed to be heard on Sunday. - He who in the morning before ordination recites the office to which he is bound only after ordination satisfies the obligation, because the office is prescribed to be recited on that day. Likewise he who hears Mass in a place where no feast is celebrated and afterward goes to a place in which a universal feast of precept is celebrated is not bound there to hear Mass again, because he has already satisfied the obligation of hearing Mass on that day.¹

¹ Cf. Lugo, De euchar. disp. 16. sect. 2. n. 39 s. Tamburini, De communione c. 5. § 2. n. 4 ss.