The Notion, Object, Division, and Specific Distinction of Virtues

258. The specific distinction of moral virtues is taken from their formal object. For every moral virtue turns about an honorable good; therefore as many virtues specifically diverse will have to be distinguished as there are special reasons of the honorable good about which virtue turns; but the special honesty which any virtue pursues is its formal object.

The diverse reasons of honesty or of the honorable good are found either in operations which are toward another, or in moderating the passions; therefore there are two great genera of moral virtues: virtues which turn about operations toward another, as justice and those which are annexed to it, and virtues which turn about the passions, as fortitude and temperance and those which are annexed to these.

259. Among moral virtues there are four which are called cardinal or principal: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, to which all other virtues are reduced as parts annexed to them.

a. They are called cardinal because among the virtues they are chief and in the moral life of man very necessary and very commonly used, just as in a door the hinge is the chief thing, on which the door turns and on which its use depends.

St. Ambrose is said to be the author of this name (l. 5. in Luc. 6, 20). Sacred Scripture commemorates them where concerning divine wisdom it says: It teaches sobriety (temperance) and prudence, and justice and virtue (fortitude), than which nothing is more useful in life to men;¹ but wisdom (God) teaches these virtues by infusing them.

b. Their number is taken both from the fourfold object (honesty, honorable good) about which they turn, and from the fourfold subject in which they are principally present.

a. Object. In order that man may act in all things according to virtue or according to right reason, first he must judge rightly concerning the things which are to be done, which happens through prudence; then he must preserve the order of reason toward others, which happens through justice; then he must preserve the order of reason toward himself, both by overcoming difficulties which draw back from right reason, which happens through fortitude, and by moderating the passions which in the use of created things incite one to acting against the order of reason, which happens through temperance.²

Briefly, St. Thomas sets forth the object of the moral virtues in this way: prudence, which bears the light before the others, is in things to be chosen; justice in things to be distributed; fortitude in things to be endured; temperance in things to be used.³

b. Subject. Prudence is in the intellect, justice in the will, fortitude in the irascible sensitive appetite, temperance in the concupiscible sensitive appetite.

Nevertheless all moral virtues are also in the will as in a subject, because their acts are either elicited or commanded by the will. Hence some virtues (such as prudence, fortitude, temperance) are in a twofold power, and consequently a complete virtue consists of two habits, of which one is in the will, the other in the intellect or in the sensitive appetite; but each constitutes morally one virtue because of the relation by which one habit is ordered to the other.

¹ Wis. 8, 7.

² Summa I. II. q. 61. a. 2.

³ Summa I. II. q. 61. a. 4.

260. Annexed parts of the cardinal virtues. According to St. Thomas, to each cardinal virtue there pertain three classes of moral virtues which are its annexed parts, as a whole has annexed parts: for some virtues are subjective parts of the cardinal virtues, others integral parts, others potential parts.

a. Subjective parts of a virtue are called those which are referred to it as species to a genus;

b. integral parts are called those which are required so that virtue may be integral, or so that it can operate more easily and more perfectly;

c. potential parts are called those which indeed are akin to the cardinal virtue, but in some respect fall short of the perfect nature of that virtue. They are called potential parts as if not having the whole power of the principal virtue.

261. Diverse perfection of virtues. Virtues are not all of the same dignity and perfection; nevertheless their greater or lesser perfection cannot be determined absolutely: for under one respect this virtue, under another respect another, is of greater perfection.

a. If the object is regarded, theological virtues are more perfect than moral virtues, because the immediate object of the former, both material and formal, is God himself, the ultimate end; but the immediate object of the latter is not God, but a created good, not the ultimate end, but a means to the end.

b. Among the cardinal virtues, under some respect prudence is most perfect, both because it directs all the other virtues and is the leader of all, in that it assigns to each the mean which they must hold, and because it perfects the intellect, not the will; but according to St. Thomas the intellect is more perfect than the will.

Under another respect, however, justice occupies the first place among the cardinal virtues, both because its works fulfill obligations which are owed to God and neighbor, and because it perfects the will, since its subject is the will; on the contrary, fortitude and temperance perfect the lower appetite, since their subject is the sensitive appetite; besides, their works render what man owes to himself.

Under another respect finally, among moral virtues obedience stands out: for if that virtue is called more perfect which offers a greater good to God, obedience must be called the most perfect moral virtue, because through it man offers the noblest good which he possesses, his will.

c. Finally, among the virtues of justice those are more excellent whose remote and mediate object (the object to whom) is God, namely those which fulfill an obligation owed to God, of which kind are religion, which exhibits due worship to God; penance, which satisfies for an offense and injury inflicted upon God; obedience, which executes the will of God.¹

¹ Cf. St. Thomas I. II. q. 66. II. II. q. 141. a. 8. II. II. q. 161.

I. Notion of Virtue. With respect to the etymology of the word, virtue seems to be derived from the word force. Now, as Aquinas teaches: "Force is said according as some thing, through the complete power which it has, can follow its impulse or motion" (De virtutibus in communi, a. 1); whence "virtue, according to the meaning of its name, designates the complement of a power," or "a certain perfection of a power" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 55, a. 1).

"But the perfection of each thing is considered chiefly in order to its end; and the end of a power is act" (St. Thomas, cited place). Hence "the complement of a power is attended to according to this, that it receives complete operation" (St. Thomas, De virtutibus in communi, a. 1), or is best disposed for acting rightly and perfectly.

Although the word virtue, understood in this way, can be applied to every power of every creature, whether rational or irrational, by long usage it has been sanctioned that by the name virtue there is no longer designated that which perfectly disposes the power of an irrational creature to its operation, but only that which in such a way disposes the powers of man, insofar as he is a rational creature, or those powers of man by which he can elicit the best operation consonant with human nature as such, namely an honorable or morally good action. Therefore this human virtue, with which alone we must now deal, is defined: An operative habit disposing one to act honorably. It is said:

1. Habit, i.e., a stable disposition, not a passing inclination.

2. Operative, i.e., a stable disposition which perfects man not according to being, but in order to his operation.

3. Disposing one to act honorably, i.e., to act well in the moral order. For virtue is perfect when it renders not only the work good, but also the one working.

Note. Habits which perfect the intellect of man only in order to truth, and are called intellectual virtues, are not virtues simply, but only in a qualified sense, since they do not regard a morally good act. Such are wisdom, understanding or the habit of first principles, science, and art, or right reason about things to be made; but not prudence, which, although it is in the intellect, nevertheless does not perfect it in order to truth alone, but in order to the good to be pursued by the will, and therefore is virtue simply. Intellectual virtues do not pertain to the object of this treatise; hence we shall scarcely speak further of them.

II. Object of Virtue. The object is distinguished as twofold, material and formal. The material is called that about which the virtue is occupied; and it is twofold, remote and proximate, according as the virtue regards it remotely or proximately. The formal object is the reason under which the proximate material object is considered, or the motive on account of which the said object is chosen. Thus, for example, the remote material object of justice is a thing owed to another according to equality; the proximate material object is the actions which are prescribed by reason of the thing owed to another according to equality; the formal object is the very notion of debt.

III. Division of Virtues. Virtues are distinguished:

1. By reason of origin, into infused and acquired. Infused virtue is that which is infused by God Himself, without us effecting it; it can be either per se or per accidens infused. It is called per se infused when as to its essence it is supernatural, since it can have its origin only from God. It is called per accidens infused when as to its essence it is natural, and therefore could be acquired by natural acts, but in fact has been infused by God. Acquired virtue is a virtue which arises from the repetition of acts.

2. By reason of principle, into natural and supernatural. Natural virtue is a virtue which proceeds from a natural principle and tends toward a natural end. Supernatural virtue is a virtue which proceeds from a supernatural principle and tends toward a supernatural end.

3. By reason of perfection, into formed and unformed. Formed is said of that virtue which is joined to charity and informed by it. Unformed is said of a virtue which is in a subject lacking charity, and which therefore is not informed by it.

4. By reason of object, into theological and moral. Theological virtue is an infused and supernatural virtue whose immediate material object, at least principal, is God Himself, as He is the author and end of the supernatural order, and whose formal object is God Himself or His attributes. Moral virtue is that whose material object regards the honorable good of an intermediate end, and whose formal object is the conformity of this honorable good with the rule of right reason. If the honorable good regards a natural intermediate end, and its conformity is regulated according to natural principles, it is a natural moral virtue; on the contrary, if it regards a supernatural intermediate end, and its conformity is regulated according to supernatural principles, it is a supernatural moral virtue.

5. By reason of degree, into common and heroic virtues. They are called common when they follow the ordinary mode of acting; heroic, when they surpass the ordinary mode of acting.

Note. Certain persons, extolling natural virtues beyond measure,¹ divide virtues into active and passive. They call, for example, zeal for souls, liberality, etc., active virtues; and, for example, obedience, patience, etc., passive virtues. They add that the former are more fitting to the present age, while the latter were better suited to past ages. Now the division into active and passive virtues is contrary to the very notion of virtue; for a virtue which is truly passive neither is nor can be, since the end of every virtue is act (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 55, a. 1). But what they add, that active virtues are more fitting to the present age and passive virtues to a past age, is contrary to the Evangelical Spirit: "Christ is the teacher and exemplar of all holiness; to His rule it is necessary that all should be conformed, as many as desire to be inserted into the seats of the blessed. Now Christ has not changed as the ages have progressed, but is the same yesterday and today and forever. Therefore to men of all ages belongs that saying: Learn from Me, for I am meek and humble of heart²... and in every age the Apostle's saying is valid: those who are Christ's have crucified their flesh with its vices and concupiscences."³

¹ This is the principal error of the system which by some is indicated, less happily, by the general name Americanism; it rests on the false supposition that supernatural virtue would stand in the way of virtue which perfects the natural powers of man, whether in order to himself or in order to society. But grace does not destroy nature; it perfects it. Cf. Letter of Leo XIII to the Archbishop of Baltimore, 22 January 1899 (Acta Leonis XIII, XIX, p. 13).

² Matt. 11:29.

³ Gal. 5:24; cited Letter of Leo XIII.

IV. Specific Distinction of Virtues. This is to be taken from the specific distinction of formal objects. For specific distinction must be drawn from the specific distinction of the honorable good which virtue is apt to attain. But the specific distinction of the honorable good depends on the formal object, or on the reason under which the material object is attained. Thus, for example, the three theological virtues, whose material object is God, are specifically distinguished because their formal objects, or the reasons under which they regard God, are specifically distinct.

Note. Acts of virtues are distinguished into elicited and commanded acts. An act is called elicited if it is immediately elicited by a certain virtue. But it is called commanded when it is not immediately elicited by that virtue to which, as commanded, it is ascribed, but by another, by force of the one commanding. Thus, for example, if someone, moved by charity toward God, elicits an act of abstinence, this act is an elicited act of the virtue of abstinence, and a commanded act of the virtue of charity.¹

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, In III Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 3; Salmanticenses, De virtutibus, disp. 2, dub. 1, n. 8 (tract. 6, p. 241).

185. • Virtue is a habit of acting honorably, or according to right order.

Virtues are distinguished into various species, namely:

1º Natural or supernatural, according as they are acquired and preserved by natural powers, or by the aid of supernatural grace.

2º Infused or acquired, according as they are poured into the heart by God himself, or acquired by repeated acts of the agent.

3º Theological or moral, according as they immediately regard God, or have for their immediate object the natural uprightness of an action. Hence it is easily deduced that the theological virtues are more perfect than the moral virtues.

There are four cardinal moral virtues, to which the rest are reduced, namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Since discourse concerning the moral virtues occurs in almost the whole of moral theology, here we shall treat specifically of the theological virtues, namely of Faith, Hope, and Charity.

582. 1. Notion. (A) Three speculative intellectual virtues³ are commonly distinguished: (a) understanding, or the habit perfecting the intellect for knowing first principles intimately; for to understand is the same as to read within. (b) Knowledge is the habit perfecting the intellect for logically deducing conclusions contained in first principles. (c) Wisdom is the habit perfecting the intellect for knowing things not only in themselves, but also in their causes, especially in God, who is the highest and ultimate cause of all; wherefore he is called truly wise who knows God as the first principle and ultimate end of all, and judges concerning all things insofar as they are referred to God. - Thus wisdom contains under itself understanding and knowledge, since it judges both concerning principles and concerning conclusions deduced from the same. - Perhaps therefore it can be said that there is one intellectual virtue, namely wisdom, which ascends from created things to God, and uses the knowledge of principles and conclusions for judging concerning created things according to their relation to God.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57-58; Suarez, in I-II, Tr. IV, disp. 3; John of St. Thomas, op. cit., disp. 16; Billuart, De Passionibus et Virtutibus, diss. II; Lequeux, op. cit., p. 33 and 74-81; Barre, op. cit., p. 143-147 and 165-184.

³ Besides the speculative virtues, two practical ones are enumerated, prudence, concerning which below where moral virtues are treated, and art, or the habit disposing the intellect to making artificial things rightly, concerning which nothing special occurs to be said.

583. (B) But wisdom, like the other intellectual virtues, is not properly a virtue except insofar as it is ordered to acting rightly. For virtue has regard to forming morals honorably; therefore if someone is endowed with knowledge and speculative wisdom, but does not use it for a right institution of life, from this he cannot be said to be endowed with virtue; but wisdom which is ordered to acting honorably is deservedly called a virtue;¹ and all Christians indeed ought to cultivate it, but especially those upon whom the office rests of illuminating and teaching others, and most of all the ministers of Christ, to whom it was said: "Going therefore, teach all nations."²

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 1.

² Matt. 28:19.

584. 2. Excellence. Scripture often commends this wisdom, insofar as it rightly orders us to God, and impels us to fulfilling the divine law. (a) Namely, wisdom ought to be preferred to all riches: "I preferred her before kingdoms and thrones, and I thought riches nothing in comparison with her... But all good things came to me together with her, and innumerable honor by her hands."³ (b) Its endowments are almost innumerable: "For in her is the spirit of intelligence, holy, one, manifold, subtle, eloquent, mobile, undefiled, sure, sweet, loving good, acute, which nothing hinders, beneficent, humane, benign, stable, sure, secure, having every virtue, seeing all things, and who can take in all spirits, intelligible, clean, subtle."⁴ (c) Hence God loves only those who cultivate wisdom: "For God loves no one except him who dwells with wisdom."⁵ (d) It operates strongly and at the same time sweetly: "Therefore she reaches from end to end strongly, and disposes all things sweetly."⁶ (e) It teaches the other virtues: "For she teaches sobriety and prudence, and justice, and virtue, than which nothing is more useful in life to men."⁷ From these and many other things which may be read in the books of Proverbs and Wisdom, the excellence of wisdom can be understood.

³ Wis. 7:8, 11.

⁴ Ibid., 22-23.

⁵ Ibid., 28.

⁶ Wis. 8:1.

⁷ Ibid., 7.

But today not a few, especially positivists, by the name of knowledge understand the cognition of things which can be investigated by experience and induction, and at the same time contend that it is impossible to reach the first cause, and therefore reject not only theological, but also metaphysical knowledge; nevertheless they extol positive knowledge as the only norm of the true and honorable, and the means by which the human race will finally attain perfect happiness.¹ We refuted this error above, n. 43-47. That knowledge of this kind is not a virtue, although it discovers and teaches many useful things, is clear from this, that it turns us away from God, far from directing us to him.

¹ Brunetiere excellently shows the insufficiency of knowledge for the right institution of moral life, and true happiness of heart, in Revue des Deux Mondes, Jan. 1, 1895; cf. M. d'Hulst, L'empoisonnement de la Science, in Melanges oratoires, t. IV, p. 174-189.

585. 1. Notion. (A) Moral virtues are acquired habits perfecting the will and appetite for acting rightly. - Insofar as they are natural, they rest upon a natural motive, namely honorableness, which comes from conformity with right reason. The end toward which they of themselves tend is the natural perfection of man and his happiness. - Nevertheless, since in fact man is destined to a supernatural end, virtues of this kind, although of themselves natural, can be referred to a supernatural end, and be exercised under the influence of supernatural grace; indeed they can even be supernaturally infused, as will be said below, n. 598.

586. (B) It has been doubted whether the aforementioned virtues are virtues of the true name. Now it is certain that they truly have the nature of virtue, when through charity they are referred to the ultimate supernatural end. It is likewise certain that the same, as long as they remain within the natural order, cannot merit or attain eternal salvation, since there is lacking proportion between the supernatural end and the acts of natural virtues.

Nevertheless it can be said that these are true and perfect virtues in their own genus; for, as Benedict XIV rightly says, "if unbelievers can do honorable works, and frequently exercise themselves in them, they can also acquire for themselves and procure habits of such works, and thus consequently have true and perfect moral virtues in their own genus."²

² Benedict XIV, De servorum Dei beatific., lib. III, c. 21, n. 6.

587. 2. Division. Among moral virtues, there are four principal ones, which are called cardinal, because on these, as on hinges, the other virtues lean: namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.³

³ Vacant-Mangenot, Dict. de Theol., t. II, 1714.

The Fathers and theologians often gather this division from these words of Wisdom:¹ "For she teaches sobriety (that is, temperance), and prudence, and justice, and virtue (fortitude), than which nothing is more useful in life to men." There indeed is not handed down a scientific division of virtues, but an enumeration of certain principal ones. - Pagan philosophers likewise numbered four principal virtues consonant with the aforementioned ones.² But this division already from the time of St. Ambrose became common in the Church.

¹ Wis. 8:7.

² Cicero, Tuscul., c. 14; De officiis, lib. I, c. 20.

588. (A) He seems to have been the first who called the four praised virtues cardinal: "And indeed we know that there are four cardinal virtues, temperance, justice, prudence, fortitude."³ But afterward he hands down their notion thus:⁴ "In the first place they established prudence, which is concerned with the investigation of truth, and infuses the desire of fuller knowledge; secondly justice, which gives to each his own, does not claim another's, neglects its own utility in order to guard common equity; thirdly fortitude, which both in military matters is eminent by the greatness of an exalted soul, and at home, and excels in the powers of the body; fourthly temperance, which preserves the measure and order of all things which we judge either must be done or must be said."

³ Ambrose, Exposit. in Luc., lib. V, n. 62, P. L., XV, 1653.

⁴ De officiis ministrorum, lib. I, c. 24, P. L., XVI, 57.

589. (B) This theory, generally accepted by the other Fathers, St. Thomas refined, namely by explaining why there are four cardinal virtues, and in what way they are distinguished from one another. He observes first that the cardinal virtues can be considered in two ways: (a) insofar as they signify certain general conditions of the human soul, which are found in all virtues; thus prudence is a certain rectitude of practical judgment, by which discretion is preserved in individual acts; justice is a rectitude of soul by which man bears himself rightly in all things to be done; fortitude is a certain firmness against any impulses of the passions or labors of operations; temperance is understood as a certain moderation in all things. In this sense, these virtues are not distinguished from one another, but are called cardinal, because they are the general conditions or properties of any virtue, which must be at the same time prudent, just, moderate, and strong. (b) But the aforementioned virtues can be considered in another way, according as they are concerned with formally diverse objects, and are subjected in various powers. Thus prudence resides in the practical intellect, and perceives and suggests the means to be used for attaining the honorable end in individual acts; justice inclines the will to bearing itself rightly concerning actions due to another, or to rendering to each his own; fortitude perfects the irascible appetite, so that it may stand firmly against all dangers; temperance is in the concupiscible appetite for restraining sensual delectations, especially those which arise from touch. According to this acceptance, the aforementioned virtues are truly and really distinguished, although they are in some way connected.

590. Moreover in the cardinal virtues there can be distinguished integral, subjective, and potential parts. Integral parts are certain conditions or dispositions which, although they do not constitute the virtue essentially, are required for its integral perfection; thus for the perfection of prudence memory, understanding, providence, etc., are desired. - Subjective parts are called the various species of some virtue; thus justice is divided into commutative and distributive. - Potential or annexed parts are called certain less principal virtues which are joined to another more principal one, although they do not perfectly attain its nature; thus religion and piety toward parents are potential parts of justice, because they incline us to rendering to God and parents whatever is due to them, yet in such a way that we cannot render to equality what is due to them.

That this division is sufficiently intricate is clear from the mere consideration of the tree of virtues which certain Scholastics delineated. And indeed, for the perfection of Christian life, it is not necessary to hand down an accurate notion of all virtues with all their parts; but it is enough to set forth and cultivate the principal ones; for since many are connected, he who strives to acquire the principal ones, by that very fact makes progress in the others.

591. 3. Concerning the properties of moral virtues. Here we will explain two things, namely in what sense moral virtues are connected, and what is understood by the axiom: virtue stands in the middle.

(A) Concerning the connection of virtues. Already in his time Augustine thought that the four cardinal virtues are so connected among themselves that one cannot truly and properly be cultivated without the others:¹ "Certainly from this they persuade, that whoever has had one virtue has all, and all are lacking to him to whom one has been lacking, because prudence cannot be cowardly, nor unjust, nor intemperate: for if it were any of these, it would not be prudence. Furthermore if there will then be prudence, if it also is strong, and just, and temperate, certainly where it will be, it has the others with itself. So also fortitude cannot be imprudent, or intemperate, or unjust; so it is necessary that temperance be prudent, strong, and just; so justice is not, unless it is prudent, strong, and temperate. Thus where some one of them is true, the others likewise are; but where the others are lacking, that one is not true, even if in some way it seems to be similar."

¹ St. Augustine, epist. 167 (al. 29) ad Hieronymum, P. L., XXXIII, 735.

The Scholastics embraced this theory, in the sense that perfect moral virtues are so connected among themselves that, when one is lost, the others lose their perfection. But virtues are called perfect when they are not mere inclinations, but firm inclinations to following reason, and have all things required for their integrity. Then it can truly be said that these virtues are connected, because we cannot persevere long in one unless we are also adorned with the others; thus no one can be just for a long time unless he is prudent, temperate, and endowed with fortitude. Hence he who perfectly and stably cultivates one of these, by that very fact makes progress in the others, as we were saying just now.

592. (B) Concerning the mean of moral virtues. Virtues of this kind consist in the middle: (a) insofar as they avoid opposed excesses;¹ for example, fortitude stands in the middle between cowardice and rashness. For they are moral because they are conformed to the rule of morals; now they can deflect from the rule in a twofold way, either by exceeding the measure, or by falling short of it; therefore, to avoid this twofold excess, they ought to consist in the middle. (b) Moreover, when there is a collision of rights or duties, the mean of virtues consists in this, that one virtue is tempered by another: thus, if justice inclines to punishing the guilty strictly, sometimes clemency counsels that, all circumstances attended to, the penalty be mitigated. - But it belongs to prudence, insofar as it is the charioteer of the virtues, to suggest this mean.

¹ This was the doctrine of the Stoics, with Horace as witness, Ep. 18, 9:

"Virtue is the middle of vices, and drawn back from each side."

593. 4. Concerning the increase, diminution, and loss of acquired moral virtues, the principles handed down above concerning acquired habits are valid, n. 573-577.

We divide this chapter into three articles: 1. on the notion of virtue; 2. on the relation between virtues and the gifts and fruits of the Holy Spirit and the beatitudes; 3. on the distinction of virtues.

On The Notion Of Virtue.²⁷

²⁷ St. Thomas, l. c. q. 55-70; Billuart, Dissert. de virtutibus; E. Muller, Theol. mor. I, § 104-123; Billot, De virtutibus infusis; Chr. Pesch, Prael. dogm. VIII de virtutibus; Gopfert, Moraltheol. I, § 423 sqq.; Marc, Instit. mor. I, n. 379 sqq.

443. Diverse acceptations. The name of virtue is not taken in one sense by different authors. Among those multiple acceptations the following seem more notable; namely, virtue is named:

1. Strength and power (ἰσχύς, δύναμις), in which sense we speak of attractive, executive, material virtue, etc., and in Sacred Scripture it is said: "A giant shall not be saved in the multitude of his strength."²⁸

2. Some species of Angels, who are as it were personified virtues. Hence it is said: God "set" Christ "on his right hand in the heavenly places, above all principality, and power, and virtue, and dominion."²⁹

3. Potency by opposition to act and form. Thus it is customary to say: the intellective soul contains virtually that which the sensitive soul has formally.

4. Goodness and perfection, or something praiseworthy. Wherefore St. Thomas³⁰ says: "Virtue names a certain perfection," and: "Commonly, however, every thing that is good and praiseworthy in human acts and passions is called virtue."³¹

5. Miracle. Hence the operation of virtues is the same as the operation of miracles.³²

6. A good operative habit. In this last sense alone we now speak of virtues. Socrates, Plato, and others taught that "all virtues are prudences," and therefore that man cannot sin as long as true knowledge exists in him, and consequently that every sin arises from ignorance. St. Thomas refutes this opinion,³³ because it is manifestly clear that certain sins are committed not because of ignorance, but from certain knowledge and after serious deliberation. According to the same St. Thomas,³⁴ "it belongs to the account [that is, to the essence] of human virtue that it be an operative habit," and "human virtue, which is an operative habit, is a good habit and operative of good."

²⁸ Ps. 32, 16.

²⁹ Eph. 1, 20 sq.

³⁰ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 55, a. 1.

³¹ Cf. ib. 2, 2, q. 144, a. 1.

³² Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 111, a. 4, and 2, 2, q. 178, a. 1 ad 1.

³³ Ib. 1, 2, q. 58, a. 2.

³⁴ Ib. q. 55, a. 2 and 3.

444. Definition. Several definitions are assigned for virtue taken in this last sense. The principal ones are three Aristotelian and one Augustinian.³⁵

1. Virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best. Thus Aristotle,³⁶ signifying that virtue is a certain habitual disposition of some perfect, that is complete, nature or power toward its best, that is, toward operation. For nature and power are given by the Creator for performing operations, and they are then best when they can exercise their operations promptly, easily, and delightfully. But this happens if they are adorned with fitting virtues.³⁷

2. Virtue is that which makes the one having it good and renders his work good. This definition, often used by Aristotle³⁸ and after him by St. Thomas,³⁹ is excellent if it is understood of moral virtue; but it cannot without limitation be used of intellectual virtue, as will be said below, n. 457. For moral virtue produces a twofold goodness, that is, on the part of the subject which it perfects, and on the part of the work which it makes good. But that moral virtue renders morally good the man who has it arises from this, that he who perfectly has one moral virtue also possesses all the others, because moral virtues are connected, as will be said below, n. 464. Moreover, he who possesses all the virtues is a morally good man. But that a work performed from virtue is good is clear of itself.⁴⁰

3. Virtue (moral) is an elective habit consisting in the mean of reason, as the wise man will have determined. Thus Aristotle⁴¹ and several times St. Thomas.⁴² For moral virtue must in acts avoid defect as much as excess. And therefore the common adage says: "In the middle is virtue." For example, the virtue of liberality is then and only then present when a man, with all circumstances considered, gives money or other goods neither too abundantly, for this would be prodigality, nor too sparingly, which indeed would be avarice. But in particular cases to determine precisely in what the mean consists is not easy; rather, a sufficiently great wisdom is required for this. Hence in the definition there is added: "as the wise man will have determined." Often also it is said by the Scholastics that moral virtues require the mean of reason, which signifies: by right reason it must be determined in what the due mode and measure of actions consist.

4. Virtue is a good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us.

This definition, composed from diverse places of St. Augustine,⁴³ is proposed as best by St. Thomas⁴⁴ and other theologians.

It is said 1. good quality, by which words the genus and difference of the thing defined are indicated. For the genus of virtue is quality; but the difference is good. "Yet the definition would be more fitting if habit were put in place of quality, which is the proximate genus."⁴⁵ For since quality is something generic, under which four species are contained: a) habit and disposition, b) potency and impotence, c) passion and passible quality, d) form and figure,⁴⁶ habit is a special quality, namely one difficult to move, by which one operates easily, promptly, and delightfully. But in reality every perfect virtue is a quality difficult to move. For just as virtue is not acquired except by repeated acts, so neither is it usually lost by one act. Concerning the loss of virtues, a more explicit discussion will return below, n. 465 and 476. Through the mediation of virtue man performs good works easily, promptly, and delightfully. These words indeed do not signify that the virtuous man suffers no difficulties at all in the exercise of works, but only that he acts more easily, promptly, and delightfully than if he did not have the virtues. But the reason why facility, promptitude, and delight in acting arise from virtue possessed is that virtue is a habit. But a perfect habit is as it were a second nature. And those things which happen according to nature are done easily, promptly, and with delight.

It is said 2. of mind, that is, of a power essentially, or at least participatively, rational, whether it be the mind or intellect, or the will, or the sensitive appetite, yet insofar as this is moved by the will. For every human virtue is in these powers as in its proper subject. The reason is that virtue is given for doing free good operations. Hence those powers of man which do not participate, at least in some way, in liberty are not the subject of virtues, as for example the eyes, ears, members of the body, and internal senses. In which faculty the virtues are subjected will be said when there is special discussion of the individual virtues.

It is said 3. by which one lives rightly,⁴⁷ by which words the office and necessity of virtues are designated briefly indeed but forcefully. Therefore virtues consist neither in pure knowledge of the good, as several Stoics wished, nor in sterile affections, as Michael de Molinos and the Quietists taught, but in a right and operative life according to the eternal law and the other norms of morality. - Since a right life is wholly necessary for every man, it is necessary that virtue also be necessary for him. For for a right life it is required that man, notwithstanding diabolical, worldly, and carnal attacks, follow right reason perfectly, promptly, and constantly. This indeed certainly cannot be done without the help of virtues. - Yet to live rightly in this definition cannot be taken for moral rectitude alone, but for the rectitude of that power in which there is virtue. Therefore with respect to intellectual virtue, to live rightly is to attain truth. But since to attain truth is not simply a right life, this part of the definition belongs to intellectual virtues not so perfectly as to moral and theological virtues. Or more briefly: Intellectual virtues cause an expeditious faculty of acting well; but moral virtues besides this induce one to the right use of this faculty.⁴⁸

It is said 4. which no one uses badly, to distinguish virtue from other habits which man can abuse for evil, for example science, art, etc. But the Angelic Doctor rightly observes⁴⁹ that man can indeed abuse virtue as an object. Thus, for example, someone can hate virtue or be proud about it. But it is by no means possible that an act elicited by true virtue should be evil considered in itself. Thus, for example, an act of true liberality is always in itself good, as being conformed to right reason. Indeed, if that act were done for an evil end, for example to seduce a poor girl, it would be totally evil; but then neither would it be an act of the virtue of liberality, since liberality is the virtue moderating love of riches and rendering a man easy and prompt to spend them when right reason dictates. It would indeed be an act materially similar to acts of liberality, but the virtue of liberality would in no way flow into it. For it often happens that one and the same act, considered materially, is elicited or commanded by diverse habits.

It is said 5. which God works in us without us. This particle holds only for infused virtues; but if it is removed, the rest of the definition will be common to all virtues, and especially to moral virtues.

³⁵ For several other definitions of virtue, see St. Bonaventure (2, dist. 27, dub. 3) and Lactantius (Div. instit. l. 6, c. 5 [Migne, Patr. lat. 6, 649 sqq.]). Very worthy of note, because of its brevity and perfection, is that definition which St. Augustine gives, saying: "It seems to me that the true and brief definition of virtue is: order is of love" (De civ. Dei l. 15, c. 22; Migne, Patr. lat. 41, 467). Cf. also St. Thomas, S. theol. 1, 2, q. 62, a. 2 ad 3.

³⁶ Phys. l. 7, c. 3.

³⁷ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 123, a. 2 ad 1.

³⁸ Cf. e.g. Ethic. l. 2, c. 5 and 6.

³⁹ Cf. e.g. Quodl. 4, q. 2, a. 2.

⁴⁰ For a good explanation of this Aristotelian definition, see St. Thomas, Quaest. disp. de virtut. q. 1, a. 1.

⁴¹ Ethic. l. 2, c. 6: "Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ - ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν" - Virtue is a habit which deliberately consists in that mean which has been determined by reason, and indeed as the wise man will have determined.

⁴² For example, Quaest. disp. de virtut. q. 1, a. 13; S. theol. 1, 2, q. 64, a. 1.

⁴³ In various places and especially De libero arbitrio l. 2, c. 19; Contra Iulian. l. 4, c. 3.

⁴⁴ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 55, a. 4; Quaest. disp. de virt. q. 1, a. 2.

⁴⁵ Thus S. theol. l. c.

⁴⁶ Concerning all these, see S. theol. 1, 2, q. 49, a. 2.

⁴⁷ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 61, a. 1.

⁴⁸ This part of the definition, like the following part, does not belong necessarily to intellectual virtues.

⁴⁹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 55, a. 4 ad 3.

They are principally distinguished:

456. 1. Acquired and infused virtues. Acquired virtues are called those which man obtains for himself by his own acts. Indeed, there have been implanted in man certain principles as if naturally inborn, both of things knowable and of things to be done. Thus in the will there is a certain natural appetite for the good, and in the intellect there are certain practical truths so obvious and so clear that anyone imbibes them as it were with his mother's milk. Hence certain virtues are inchoatively from rational nature.¹¹² Add that certain men from their natural constitution, commonly called their "temperament," are inclined to certain virtues, for example to fortitude, to meekness, etc. But no perfect virtue belongs to man by nature; it must be acquired either by exercise of acts or by supernatural infusion.¹¹³ - Infused virtues are those which, in a supernatural manner, are mercifully infused into man by God together with sanctifying grace, for example faith, hope, charity. - As long as charity, which is the form of all virtues (cf. below, 559), exists in man, his virtues are called formed; but once charity has been lost, the other virtues, and notably faith and hope, are called unformed.

2. Intellectual, moral, theological virtues.

¹¹² Cf. St. Chrysostom, Hom. 13 de statuis.

¹¹³ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 63, a. 1, and below n. 473.

457. Intellectual virtues¹¹⁴ are called those which perfect man with respect to the knowledge of truth, whether practical or speculative.¹¹⁵ Five are enumerated by Aristotle and St. Thomas, namely understanding, science, wisdom, prudence, art.

The virtue of understanding¹¹⁶ is a habit perfecting the faculty of intellect for knowing first principles perfectly. For the intellective faculty of man from birth is as it were a blank tablet. By means of sensitive perception, ideas gradually come into the intellective faculty. But if that faculty shall have attained the habit of clearly and intimately knowing first practical principles, then it has acquired the so-called virtue of understanding, which is called synteresis.

The virtue of science¹¹⁷ is a habit perfecting man's rational faculty for logically deducing conclusions from known principles, for example the science of Moral Theology.

The virtue of wisdom¹¹⁸ is a habit perfecting the intellective faculty for considering all things, whether principles or conclusions, insofar as they have relation to the highest cause. "Therefore the virtue of wisdom contains under itself both the virtue of understanding and the virtue of science."¹¹⁹ Truly and perfectly wise is called that man who not only knows that God is the principle and end of all things and actions, but also directs all his actions according to this knowledge; which St. Bernard¹²⁰ briefly states in these words: "It belongs to the wise man, in those things which have been created, to look upon God as the end for which they have been created."

The virtue of prudence¹²¹ is commonly defined: "right reason of things to be done,"¹²² or an intellective habit directive of human actions according to right reason in every event. Prudence is called the charioteer of all the virtues; for it directs all moral virtues; hence no moral virtue can exist without prudence, but neither can the virtue of prudence exist without the moral virtues.¹²³ Prudence according to its essence is an intellectual virtue, for it perfects man's practical intellect, in which it also resides; but according to matter it is a moral virtue, because it directs human or moral acts to the ultimate end.¹²⁴ Below there will be a special tract on prudence.

The virtue of art¹²⁵ is right reason of things to be made.¹²⁶ Things to be made are distinguished from things to be done. For things to be made are actions physically considered and especially external works, for example to paint, to sing; but things to be done are human actions morally considered, insofar as they conduce to the ultimate end and receive their norm from the eternal law.

Intellectual virtues, with the single exception of prudence, are not perfect virtues. For it belongs to perfect virtue to render man morally good, as is clear from the second Aristotelian definition given above, n. 444. But intellectual virtues indeed produce works good in themselves and make the power of the intellect good or right,¹²⁷ yet they do not necessarily render the man himself good. Thus, for example, someone can paint from a perfect habit of art and nevertheless be a man without good morals. - Intellectual virtues are to be esteemed at their just price, that is, neither with the exaggeration of many men of our age, who think that the whole perfection of man consists in the so-called culture of the spirit, nor with the undervaluing of Wyclif and certain Lutherans. Hence the Council of Constance¹²⁸ condemned the error (29) of Wyclif saying: "Universities, studies, colleges, graduations, and masterships in them were introduced by vain paganism; they profit the Church just as much as the devil."

¹¹⁴ Spiritual virtues, διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί; cf. Aristotle, Ethic. Nicom. 1, c. 13, 1103.

¹¹⁵ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 58, a. 3.

¹¹⁶ νοῦς.

¹¹⁷ ἐπιστήμη.

¹¹⁸ σοφία.

¹¹⁹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 57, a. 2 ad 2.

¹²⁰ Sermo 3 de Pentec. n. 4.

¹²¹ φρόνησις.

¹²² Aristotle, Ethic. l. 6, c. 5; S. theol. 2, 2, q. 47, a. 2, arg. Sed contra.

¹²³ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 58, a. 4 and 5.

¹²⁴ Cf. ib. a. 3 ad 1; 2, 2, q. 181, a. 2 ad 3.

¹²⁵ τέχνη.

¹²⁶ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 57, a. 4.

¹²⁷ Ib. a. 1.

¹²⁸ Sess. 8 (Denz. n. 609).

458. Moral virtues are habits, whether acquired by good acts or infused together with sanctifying grace, which perfect the powers of man for acting rightly concerning those things which are means to the ultimate end. Already from the most ancient times¹²⁹ all moral virtues were commonly reduced to four principal ones, namely to prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. But St. Ambrose¹³⁰ seems to have been the first among the Holy Fathers who called the four above-praised virtues cardinal: "And indeed we know that the cardinal virtues are four: temperance, justice, prudence, fortitude." St. Thomas¹³¹ teaches that these virtues can be called cardinal or principal under a twofold respect, namely either because they are certain general conditions necessary for any virtue whatsoever, or because they concern the more principal moral matters.

As to the first, in every virtue there are required a) prudent discretion, so that man neither exceeds nor falls short; b) rectitude of soul, or justice; c) fortitude, lest man be drawn back from the exercise of virtue by dangers or difficulties; d) temperance, lest man be carried away by passions.

But as to the second sense, there are four more principal moral matters, namely the command itself of reason, concerning which prudence is occupied; external operations, concerning which justice is occupied; the passions of the irascible part, concerning which fortitude is occupied; and finally the passions of the concupiscible part, concerning which temperance is occupied.

A third respect can also be assigned: the four cardinal virtues, whether infused or acquired, greatly serve for healing the four wounds inflicted on us from original sin; for prudence drives away ignorance in the intellect; justice represses malice in the will; fortitude removes or at least diminishes weakness in the irascible part; and finally temperance restrains concupiscence in the concupiscible part.

¹²⁹ The quaternary number of moral virtues was already established by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (cf. Ziegler, Die Ethik der Griechen und Romer, 88). But Cicero enumerates the four moral virtues in explicit words: "It [simple honesty] therefore has four parts: prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance" (De invent. 2, c. 53; cf. also De officiis 1, c. 5). Sacred Scripture indicates the same moral virtues not obscurely (Wis. 8, 7): "And if anyone loves justice, her labors have great virtues; for she teaches sobriety (σωφροσύνη, that is, temperance), and prudence (φρόνησις), and justice (δικαιοσύνη), and virtue (ἀνδρεία, that is, fortitude), than which nothing is more useful to men in life." In the tract De sacramentis (l. 3, c. 2 [Migne, Patr. lat. 16, 453]), which is falsely ascribed to St. Ambrose, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are called cardinal virtues.

¹³⁰ Expos. in Luc. l. 5, n. 49 and 62 (Migne, Patr. lat. 15, 1738).

¹³¹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 61, a. 4.

459. Theological virtues are those which a) have God as their direct object, formal and final, and which b) are infused into us and revealed by God alone.¹³² Moral virtues are occupied with the means to the supernatural end; but theological virtues directly attain God himself, our ultimate end. There are three theological virtues, namely faith, hope, charity. For first it is required that we know God supernaturally, which is done through faith; second, that we tend efficaciously into the same God, which is done through hope; third, that we be intimately joined with him by affection already on this earth, which is done through charity.

¹³² Ib. q. 62, a. 1.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 54 and 56, a. 2.

573. There are several rules according to which habits are distinguished in species (a. 2):

1. As forms are distinguished by reason of cause: habits whose proper and per se causes are diverse are distinguished in species, for every agent acts so as to produce something similar to itself according to species. Thus habits are distinguished which are acquired by diverse acts; likewise acquired habits, which we acquire by our acts, and infused habits per se, which God alone can give us.

2. As habits are distinguished by reason of nature: habits which state a diverse order to nature (and consequently to the end) are distinguished in species, as good and bad habits; or habits which state an order to a diverse nature, as ordinary human virtue and divine or heroic virtue, which is suitable to a superior nature.

3. As operative habits are distinguished by reason of the object: habits which have diverse formal objects are distinguished in species; for habits are dispositions to acts; therefore if acts are distinguished in species according to objects, habits also are. - This is the chief rule, because it indicates the ultimate species.

The three aforesaid rules are fundamental; but from the last there follows a derived rule, namely:

4. That habits consequently are distinguished by reason of the subject: habits which inhere in diverse powers operating principally are distinguished in species. For the powers themselves are distinguished from objects generically distinct. Whence where the powers are diverse, the objects also are diverse.¹

¹ Hence the distinctive principle is the object, because powers are distinguished from the object. The disposition of the subject is not the principle of distinction by reason of itself but by reason of the object. Whence here, in truth, a new rule distinct from the third is not handed down.

574. Corollaries. - 1. From the third rule it follows that habits of diverse species can inhere in one and the same power, because a power can be ordered to diverse objects.

2. The fourth rule of specific distinction by reason of the subject or power is to be understood of powers which operate principally. For those which operate secondarily, by serving the principal act or by disposing to it, tend toward the object of the principal operation, and therefore the secondary habits which inhere in them have their species from this object: thus the operation of art in the hand takes its species from the object of the art which is in the intellect.

3. Hence one habit or one virtue cannot be equally and according to essence in several powers; nevertheless it can pertain to several powers in a certain order, so that it is in one principally and secondarily extends itself to others: either by way of diffusion, according as one power moves another which serves it, for example, justice commands frugality or temperance; or by way of disposition, according as one receives from another, for example, prudence rectifying the choice of means supposes rectitude of the appetite concerning the end (q. 66, a. 2).

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 55; 56, a. 3; 57, a. 1; 65, a. 2; De Virt. q. 1, a. 1 and 2.

576. Virtue according to the name (ischys, dynamis, deugd) is derived from force, and therefore designates the perfection of an operative power or a completed power.¹ Hence:

¹ "Virtue according to the account of its name designates the complement of a power; whence also force is so called according as some thing, through the complete power which it has, can follow its impulse or motion; for virtue, according to its name, designates the perfection of power." Q. D. de Virt. q. 1, a. 1.

1. natural powers, since they are wholly determined to one thing, are from themselves perfectly disposed to operation, and therefore are called virtues of nature (a. 1). But

2. powers indifferent to many and diverse things, such as rational powers, can from themselves be disposed better through habit, and therefore in them the power is distinguished from its perfection; and virtue in them is a habit (a. 1). But since

3. true perfection does not consist except in good, it follows that virtue is a good operative habit (a. 3). Whence Aristotle: Virtue is that which makes the one having it good and renders his work good (II Eth., c. 6; VII Phys., c. 3);

4. we are treating of human virtue, which is proper to man, and which therefore is a good rational operative habit (a. 2).

577. Virtue is defined in words gathered from St. Augustine: A good quality of mind by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us.² There is indicated:

² Cf. c. Iul. IV, 3; de Lib. Arb. II, 19; ep. 105; and sermon XXVI on Ps. 118.

1. the genus: quality, because it is of the genus of habits; nevertheless it would be better to say habit, which is the proximate genus;

2. the specific difference: good, by which it is specifically distinguished from bad habits;

3. the subject: of mind, because human virtue resides in reason or in a power moved by reason;

4. the end of virtue, namely, operation: a) by which one lives rightly, that is, by which man operates conformably to reason, so that it may be indicated that it is a properly operative habit, and that it may be distinguished from habits which always have themselves toward evil; b) which no one uses badly, by which it is distinguished from habits which are sometimes toward good, sometimes toward evil, such as opinion or human faith. Hence virtue cannot be a principle productive of an evil act, and an act of virtue cannot be evil, for virtue does not flow into an evil act. Namely, no one can make virtue produce an evil act; no one can, by using virtue as a principle, produce an evil work; - nevertheless someone can use virtue badly as an object, as for example when he is proud of it or hates it, but that act does not proceed from virtue as from an operative principle;

5. the efficient cause is added: which God works in us without us, that is, without us as efficient causes, not however without us, as adults, consenting, or disposing ourselves through the help of grace; this is true of infused supernatural virtue, of which Augustine speaks. If these last words are omitted, there is had a definition common to all acquired and infused virtues (a. 4).

That this definition is real, that is, that such virtues are in fact given, will be shown throughout the whole treatise.

578. Virtue renders a power perfect. - Hence:

1. Not every good habit is a virtue, but only that which includes no imperfection; whence opinion, human faith or hope, continence, and constancy³ are not virtues (q. 58, a. 3, ad 2).

³ St. Thomas, using the terminology of Aristotle, says perseverance, but it is better called constancy, so that it may be distinguished from perseverance strictly so called, which is a virtue properly so called (II-II, q. 137, a. 1 and 3). On continence, cf. II-II, q. 155, a. 1.

2. Nor are those good habits virtues which serve the action of the principal power: for until the principal power, which consummates the work, is well disposed to operation, man will not yet be perfectly disposed to it, nor therefore will the operation be perfect. Therefore only the habit which inheres in the principal power, consummative of the good work, is called virtue. Hence it is said by Aristotle: the disposition of the perfect to the best,⁴ that is, a stable disposition of a power perfectly instructed for exercising its operation in the best way.

⁴ "Virtues are certain dispositions of that which is perfect in its nature toward the best, that is, toward the end, which is operation. For, as has been said, virtues of this kind are so called from this, that they make the one having them good and render his work good." St. Thomas, in VII Phys. c. 3, text. 17. Cf. II Eth. c. 6, and I-II, q. 55, a. 4; q. 56, a. 5; q. 58, a. 3, ad 2.

579. The notion of virtue is analogical, and therefore it does not belong equally perfectly to all, nor is it said of all in the same sense. For certain virtues render man perfect under some respect only, and therefore are called virtues in a qualified sense; - certain virtues render man good simply, insofar as he is man, and therefore are called simply and properly so called; to them belongs in the full sense the definition of Aristotle: virtue is that which makes the one having it good and renders his work good. Hence:

A. In the natural order and for philosophers: merely intellectual virtues (arts and sciences), which render man good under some respect only, namely, as to the good of one power, for example, which make a good architect, a good philosopher, etc., are called virtues in a qualified sense; but moral virtues render man simply perfect under the account of the good (namely, the honorable), that is, as to the good of the whole man, and make a good man, and therefore they are called virtues simply so called or simply human virtues. Their difference is twofold:

a) the former, although they give aptitude for operating well, nevertheless do not incline to using their aptitude; whence he who does not use his art is not on that account judged a more imperfect artisan; the latter incline man to use his aptitude rightly; whence he who does not posit just or temperate acts does not have justice or temperance;

b) the former do not render man morally good, nor incline him to living honorably; the latter, on the contrary, do; whence they reside in the will or in a power as moved by the will (q. 57, a. 1; 56, a. 3).

B. In the supernatural order and for theologians: virtues in a qualified sense are those which render man good as to a particular end (or an ultimate end in some genus), for example, temperate, just, believing, etc.; virtues simply and properly so called are those by which man is perfected as to the supernatural ultimate end. Whence natural and philosophical virtues, even those strictly so called, are not in the perfect state of virtue nor are they called by theologians virtues simply so called, unless in fact they are habitually ordered to the ultimate end, which is done through charity: then they are called perfect or formed; but if they inhere in a man turned away from the ultimate end, they are called imperfect virtues or unformed, since there is lacking to them the ultimate or supreme perfection or form of morality. Formed virtues are virtues in the fullest sense (q. 65, a. 2).

580. Observation. - Just as in a good or evil human act (and in passion), so also in a moral habit, virtue and vice, a twofold element can be distinguished:

1. the material and physical, which is only the inclination or physical propensity to acting well or badly;

2. the formal or moral, which is the ordination of reason, namely, a permanent deliberate adhesion to the object as good or evil, which perfects the habit in the moral being of virtue or vice.

Hence when a sinner is converted, that which has the formal account of vice is taken away from the evil habit, but not the material propensity, although it is diminished and impeded; whence the vice remains only as to the material element, in a certain state of destruction. And likewise when a virtuous man sins gravely against the object of the virtue, he loses the formal element of virtue, but the good acquired habit remains as to its material element.⁵

⁵ "Infused and acquired virtue are not of the same species. Whence since a habit generated from the frequency of works of sin is contrary to acquired virtue, it is not directly contrary to infused virtue, which has opposition to sin from that part by which it is an offense of God. Whence it is not necessary that, as soon as the infused virtues have been restored, the habits of vices be totally taken away, although they are impeded and also diminished." St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4. - "And although an acquired habit is not corrupted through a simple act, nevertheless an act of contrition has this, that it corrupts a habit of vice generated, from the power of grace. Whence in him who had a habit of intemperance, when he is contrite, there does not remain with the infused virtue of temperance a habit of intemperance in the account of habit, but on the way to corruption, as a certain disposition. But a disposition is not contrary to a perfect habit." Q. D. de Virt., a. 10, ad 16.

581. Corollary. - The followers of Americanism contradict the proposed doctrine; their ideas are found latent among certain persons even in Germany, France, and England. They are said to have distinguished two genera of virtues, namely, active virtues and passive virtues, or: manly virtues, such as independence of self, cultivation of one's own personality, duties toward neighbor; and womanly virtues, such as humility, patience, meekness, abnegation of self, full confidence in God. Moreover, natural virtues seem rather to have the active virtues, which answer more aptly to the customs and necessities of the present age; but Christian and supernatural virtues seem rather to have passive virtues, which no longer agree with the present time as they did in the Middle Ages.

This doctrine was condemned by Leo XIII, in the letter of January 22, 1899 to Cardinal Gibbons. And deservedly; for it contradicts:

1. Scripture, where Prov. XVI, 32 says: "The patient man is better than the strong"; and Christ, our exemplar, is shown as meek and humble (Matt. XI, 29), and obedient (Phil. II, 5, 8), and crucified for the mortification of the flesh, on which account those who are Christ's have crucified their flesh with its vices and concupiscences (Gal. V, 24).

2. Reason. For a) a virtue cannot be passive, for as Leo XIII says, "virtue is the perfection of a power...; the end of a power is act, and the act of virtue is nothing other than the good use of free will";

b) furthermore, that natural virtues are to be preferred to supernatural ones and are of greater efficacy or fecundity cannot be understood, because nature, with grace acceding, is not made weaker, but is perfected. Whence also the saints, from humility, obedience, and abstinence, were made powerful in work and word.

[I. — The name virtue is derived from the substantive vis, which expresses fortitude, because the habits of the virtues make the soul strong, and each of their acts supposes some fortitude, without which it cannot be exercised. Sometimes virtus is taken for the very effect of an operative power, as Matth., VII, 22 : In thy name we have done many virtues. But here it is taken for a certain quality superadded to rational creature, whereby it comes to act promptly, easily and rightly.

Virtue is defined by Cicero, book II de Inventione : « A habit of mind consonant with nature in its manner and with reason. » True indeed it is that it is such a habit; but, as St. Aug. observes, book IV contra Julian. Pelagian., c. 3, n. 19, those who thus described virtue « knew not what is consonant with the nature of mortals to be freed and beatified. » He himself says, de Morib. Eccles. cathol., c. 6, that virtue is « a habit and as it were a quality of a wise soul, making the soul most good. » Whence came forth the following definition admitted by the Angelic Doctor¹ : « Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses ill, which God works in us without us. » Thus the Holy Doctor defends it there: « That definition perfectly embraces the whole reason of virtue. For the perfect reason of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the aforesaid definition embraces all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, as of any thing whatever, is taken from its genus and difference, when it is called a good quality; for the genus of virtue is quality, but the difference good. Yet a more fitting definition would be if habit were put in place of quality, which is the proximate genus. Virtue however has no matter out of which, like the other accidents, but has matter about which, and matter in which, namely subject. And the matter about which is the object of virtue, which could not be put in the aforesaid definition, because through the object virtue is determined to species, whereas here is assigned the definition of virtue in common: whence the subject is put in place of material cause, when it is said that it is a good quality of the mind. — But the end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation itself. But it must be noted that of operative habits some are always toward evil, as vicious habits, others indeed at one time toward good and at another time toward evil, as opinion stands to truth and falsity. Virtue however is a habit always standing toward good. And therefore, that virtue be distinguished from those things which always stand toward evil, it is said, by which one lives rightly; that however it be distinguished from those which stand at one time toward good, at another time toward evil, it is said, which no one uses ill. — But the efficient cause of infused virtue, of which the definition is given, is God. On which account it is said: Which God works in us without us. Which particle indeed, if it be taken away, the remainder of the definition will be common to all virtues both acquired and infused. » ¹ Here q. 55, a. 4, o.

From what has been said you will gather, 1° that virtue is essentially an operative habit of a good act¹. ¹ Ibid., a. 1, 2 et 3, o.

That it is a habit, is clear; because habit in common is divided per se into virtue and vice; for by habits the powers of the rational soul are disposed, which stand indeterminately toward many things: if they be disposed fitly, it is virtue; if unfitly, vice². ² Ibid., a. 1, o.

That it is an operative habit, also is clear; because virtue, from the very reason of the name, and as was said, imports a certain perfection of a power. Perfection added to any power conforms itself to it. Therefore, as rational powers are operative, so too are the virtues superadded to them³. ³ Ibid., a. 2, o.

Finally, that it is an operative habit of a good act, equally is clear; because, since the rational powers are operative of acts, both in the genus of being and in the genus of morals, it must be that virtue, by which they are perfected, should attain both reasons, so as to be conformable to them. For, although a rational power can absolutely and of itself alone attain acts¹ as to substance and morality, yet this it cannot do promptly, easily and readily; but through virtue it becomes prompt and ready toward both². Of itself nevertheless and first it regards the acts' morality or goodness, secondarily their entity; because virtue is essentially in the genus of morals, since it is essentially ordered unto acting morally well. ¹ Ibid., a. 3, o. ² Here q. 58, a. 3, o.

You will gather 2° that power and virtue, in the reason of cause, are not placed in number, nor are several causes, but power is the cause and virtue the complement of the cause, whence together power rises into one complete cause. For, as I said, power can do without virtue what it can do with it (speaking of moral virtues in the natural order); but without virtue it can do this imperfectly only, incompletely and with difficulty, with virtue truly completely, easily and readily.

II. — Human virtue generically is divided into moral and intellectual. For human virtue, as was said, is an operative habit of a good act, or a habit perfecting man unto acting well. In man however the principle of acting is twofold, namely intellect or reason, and appetite. Therefore every human virtue is perfective either of reason or of appetite. If it be perfective of the intellect, whether speculative or practical, toward the good act of man, namely unto judging rightly, it will be intellectual virtue; if however it be perfective of the appetitive part, namely unto choosing rightly, it will be moral virtue³. Hence the Angelic Doctor rightly infers that moral virtue can indeed be without certain intellectual virtues, as without wisdom, knowledge and art, but not without intellect and prudence. For moral virtue is about election. Election however, that it be morally good, must be right, both as to the end convenient to reason, which cannot be without intellect judging rightly; and as to the means ordered to the end, which cannot be without prudence. ³ Ibid., a. 4, o.?

By moral virtue man is ordered unto morally good operation, which is its effect. But the operation itself can be considered as the matter about which moral virtue itself is concerned, and from this head the moral virtues are divided generically into virtues which are about actions and virtues which are about passions. « The reason of which, says St. Thomas, here q. 60, a. 2, o, is that good and evil in certain operations is regarded in themselves, however man be affected toward them, namely inasmuch as good and evil in them is taken according to the reason of commensuration to another. And in such there must be some virtue directive of operations in themselves, as buying and selling, and such-like operations, in which is regarded the reason of due or undue to another. And on this account justice and its parts are properly about operations as about proper matter. But in certain operations good and evil is regarded only according to commensuration to the agent; and therefore in these good and evil must be considered according as man is well or ill affected about suchlike. And on this account it must be that virtues in such are principally about interior affections, which are called passions of the soul: as is clear of temperance, fortitude and other suchlike. It happens however that in operations which are toward another the good of virtue is omitted on account of disordered passion of the soul, and then inasmuch as the commensuration of the exterior operation is corrupted, it is corruption of justice; inasmuch however as the commensuration of interior passions is corrupted, it is corruption of some other virtue: as, when through anger someone strikes another, in the very undue striking justice is corrupted, but in immoderateness of anger meekness is corrupted. And the same is clear in others. »

Thence is clear the nature of those virtues commonly called cardinal, and their number. Indeed, when we speak simply of virtue, human virtue is dealt with. Human virtue however, according to the perfect reason of virtue, is said to be that which requires rectitude of appetite. For such virtue not only makes faculty of acting well, but also causes the very use of the good work. But according to the imperfect reason of virtue, that is called virtue which does not require rectitude of appetite, because it only makes faculty of acting well, but does not cause use of a good work. It is established moreover that the perfect is more principal than the imperfect; and therefore those virtues which contain rectitude of appetite are called principal or cardinal. Suchlike however are the moral virtues, and among the intellectual prudence alone, which also in a certain way is moral, inasmuch as it is right reason of things doable¹. ¹ Here q. 61, a. 1, o.

Four, as all know, are the cardinal virtues : prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude. The reason of this division is assigned by St. Thomas here a. 2, o : « The number, he says, of certain things can be taken either according to formal principles, or according to subjects, and in both ways four cardinal virtues are found. For the formal principle of the virtue of which we now speak is the good of reason. Which indeed can be considered in two ways: In one way according as it consists in the very consideration of reason; and thus there will be one principal virtue, which is called prudence. In another way, according as the order of reason is posited about something: and this either about operations, and thus it is justice; or about passions, and thus there must needs be two virtues. For the order of reason must needs be posited about passions, their repugnance to reason having been considered. Which indeed can be twofold: In one way, according as passion impels toward something contrary to reason; and thus passion must needs be repressed, and from this temperance is named. In another way, according as passion withdraws from that which reason dictates, as fear of dangers or labors ; and thus man must needs be firm in that which is of reason, lest he withdraw, and from this fortitude is named. — And likewise according to subjects the same number is found. Fourfold indeed is found the subject of this virtue of which we now speak, namely the rationale by essence, which prudence perfects, and the rationale by participation. Which is divided into three, that is, into the will, which is the subject of justice, and into the concupiscible, which is the subject of temperance, and into the irascible, which is the subject of fortitude. »

There are besides theological virtues, so called from their immediate object, which is God, as variously attained. But considered in themselves, according as they perfect the powers of human soul, they are reduced to moral and intellectual virtues. Of which there will be treated singly and fully in IIa IIae.]

72. Habits are defined as more or less permanent qualities which dispose a faculty to act readily and with ease. A habit results naturally from frequent repetition of the same act. Thus, by constantly restraining the passion of anger, a person gains facility in doing so; or, in other words, he acquires the virtue of meekness. A habit is said to be "a second nature," because though not constituting nature it greatly facilitates certain operations of the natural faculties. Good habits, or those inclining us to do what is morally right, are called virtues; bad habits, or tendencies to what is wrong, are called vices. Brute animals are incapable of moral acts; hence they cannot form moral habits. Their power of imitation or the influence of peculiar circumstances may, it is true, enable them to acquire ways of acting which are not ordinary, which may indeed seem unnatural; as, when a bird is made to pronounce words. The power to act thus may be termed a habit, but, of course, not a moral habit. Man may also acquire habits that are more or less mechanical; but, besides these, he can form moral habits by the frequent repetition of free acts; and in Moral Philosophy we are concerned with only the latter class of habits.

73. Certain habits may be supernaturally infused into the soul, and in no other way can the supernatural virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity be obtained; so that natural acts, though ever so numerous, cannot of themselves produce a supernatural habit. Even natural virtues may be supernaturally infused or strengthened by Almighty God. Philosophy, however, considers only natural virtues and the natural mode of acquiring and developing them, all of which depend on the repetition of virtuous acts.

74. Virtue and vice necessarily imply freedom of action; no one is truly said to be virtuous for doing what he cannot help doing, nor can any one be called vicious for doing what he cannot possibly avoid. Now, freedom is a power belonging peculiarly to man's will; therefore all vices and virtues must, in some manner, be referred to the will. Besides, the will can influence the intellect considerably, not in regard to such judgments as are immediately evident, but in regard to the less immediate conclusions of reasoning. In this way it can so bend the intellect to consider certain motives for action to the exclusion of other motives that, after repeated acts of the same kind, the intellect finds great ease in certain modes of action rather than in others.