Section I. On the Notion, Object, Division, and Specific Distinction of Virtues

I. Notion of Virtue. With respect to the etymology of the word, virtue seems to be derived from the word force. Now, as Aquinas teaches: "Force is said according as some thing, through the complete power which it has, can follow its impulse or motion" (De virtutibus in communi, a. 1); whence "virtue, according to the meaning of its name, designates the complement of a power," or "a certain perfection of a power" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 55, a. 1).

"But the perfection of each thing is considered chiefly in order to its end; and the end of a power is act" (St. Thomas, cited place). Hence "the complement of a power is attended to according to this, that it receives complete operation" (St. Thomas, De virtutibus in communi, a. 1), or is best disposed for acting rightly and perfectly.

Although the word virtue, understood in this way, can be applied to every power of every creature, whether rational or irrational, by long usage it has been sanctioned that by the name virtue there is no longer designated that which perfectly disposes the power of an irrational creature to its operation, but only that which in such a way disposes the powers of man, insofar as he is a rational creature, or those powers of man by which he can elicit the best operation consonant with human nature as such, namely an honorable or morally good action. Therefore this human virtue, with which alone we must now deal, is defined: An operative habit disposing one to act honorably. It is said:

1. Habit, i.e., a stable disposition, not a passing inclination.

2. Operative, i.e., a stable disposition which perfects man not according to being, but in order to his operation.

3. Disposing one to act honorably, i.e., to act well in the moral order. For virtue is perfect when it renders not only the work good, but also the one working.

Note. Habits which perfect the intellect of man only in order to truth, and are called intellectual virtues, are not virtues simply, but only in a qualified sense, since they do not regard a morally good act. Such are wisdom, understanding or the habit of first principles, science, and art, or right reason about things to be made; but not prudence, which, although it is in the intellect, nevertheless does not perfect it in order to truth alone, but in order to the good to be pursued by the will, and therefore is virtue simply. Intellectual virtues do not pertain to the object of this treatise; hence we shall scarcely speak further of them.

II. Object of Virtue. The object is distinguished as twofold, material and formal. The material is called that about which the virtue is occupied; and it is twofold, remote and proximate, according as the virtue regards it remotely or proximately. The formal object is the reason under which the proximate material object is considered, or the motive on account of which the said object is chosen. Thus, for example, the remote material object of justice is a thing owed to another according to equality; the proximate material object is the actions which are prescribed by reason of the thing owed to another according to equality; the formal object is the very notion of debt.

III. Division of Virtues. Virtues are distinguished:

1. By reason of origin, into infused and acquired. Infused virtue is that which is infused by God Himself, without us effecting it; it can be either per se or per accidens infused. It is called per se infused when as to its essence it is supernatural, since it can have its origin only from God. It is called per accidens infused when as to its essence it is natural, and therefore could be acquired by natural acts, but in fact has been infused by God. Acquired virtue is a virtue which arises from the repetition of acts.

2. By reason of principle, into natural and supernatural. Natural virtue is a virtue which proceeds from a natural principle and tends toward a natural end. Supernatural virtue is a virtue which proceeds from a supernatural principle and tends toward a supernatural end.

3. By reason of perfection, into formed and unformed. Formed is said of that virtue which is joined to charity and informed by it. Unformed is said of a virtue which is in a subject lacking charity, and which therefore is not informed by it.

4. By reason of object, into theological and moral. Theological virtue is an infused and supernatural virtue whose immediate material object, at least principal, is God Himself, as He is the author and end of the supernatural order, and whose formal object is God Himself or His attributes. Moral virtue is that whose material object regards the honorable good of an intermediate end, and whose formal object is the conformity of this honorable good with the rule of right reason. If the honorable good regards a natural intermediate end, and its conformity is regulated according to natural principles, it is a natural moral virtue; on the contrary, if it regards a supernatural intermediate end, and its conformity is regulated according to supernatural principles, it is a supernatural moral virtue.

5. By reason of degree, into common and heroic virtues. They are called common when they follow the ordinary mode of acting; heroic, when they surpass the ordinary mode of acting.

Note. Certain persons, extolling natural virtues beyond measure,¹ divide virtues into active and passive. They call, for example, zeal for souls, liberality, etc., active virtues; and, for example, obedience, patience, etc., passive virtues. They add that the former are more fitting to the present age, while the latter were better suited to past ages. Now the division into active and passive virtues is contrary to the very notion of virtue; for a virtue which is truly passive neither is nor can be, since the end of every virtue is act (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 55, a. 1). But what they add, that active virtues are more fitting to the present age and passive virtues to a past age, is contrary to the Evangelical Spirit: "Christ is the teacher and exemplar of all holiness; to His rule it is necessary that all should be conformed, as many as desire to be inserted into the seats of the blessed. Now Christ has not changed as the ages have progressed, but is the same yesterday and today and forever. Therefore to men of all ages belongs that saying: Learn from Me, for I am meek and humble of heart²... and in every age the Apostle's saying is valid: those who are Christ's have crucified their flesh with its vices and concupiscences."³

¹ This is the principal error of the system which by some is indicated, less happily, by the general name Americanism; it rests on the false supposition that supernatural virtue would stand in the way of virtue which perfects the natural powers of man, whether in order to himself or in order to society. But grace does not destroy nature; it perfects it. Cf. Letter of Leo XIII to the Archbishop of Baltimore, 22 January 1899 (Acta Leonis XIII, XIX, p. 13).

² Matt. 11:29.

³ Gal. 5:24; cited Letter of Leo XIII.

IV. Specific Distinction of Virtues. This is to be taken from the specific distinction of formal objects. For specific distinction must be drawn from the specific distinction of the honorable good which virtue is apt to attain. But the specific distinction of the honorable good depends on the formal object, or on the reason under which the material object is attained. Thus, for example, the three theological virtues, whose material object is God, are specifically distinguished because their formal objects, or the reasons under which they regard God, are specifically distinct.

Note. Acts of virtues are distinguished into elicited and commanded acts. An act is called elicited if it is immediately elicited by a certain virtue. But it is called commanded when it is not immediately elicited by that virtue to which, as commanded, it is ascribed, but by another, by force of the one commanding. Thus, for example, if someone, moved by charity toward God, elicits an act of abstinence, this act is an elicited act of the virtue of abstinence, and a commanded act of the virtue of charity.¹

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, In III Sent., dist. 23, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 3; Salmanticenses, De virtutibus, disp. 2, dub. 1, n. 8 (tract. 6, p. 241).