Article III. On The Distinction Of Virtues

They are principally distinguished:

456. 1. Acquired and infused virtues. Acquired virtues are called those which man obtains for himself by his own acts. Indeed, there have been implanted in man certain principles as if naturally inborn, both of things knowable and of things to be done. Thus in the will there is a certain natural appetite for the good, and in the intellect there are certain practical truths so obvious and so clear that anyone imbibes them as it were with his mother's milk. Hence certain virtues are inchoatively from rational nature.¹¹² Add that certain men from their natural constitution, commonly called their "temperament," are inclined to certain virtues, for example to fortitude, to meekness, etc. But no perfect virtue belongs to man by nature; it must be acquired either by exercise of acts or by supernatural infusion.¹¹³ - Infused virtues are those which, in a supernatural manner, are mercifully infused into man by God together with sanctifying grace, for example faith, hope, charity. - As long as charity, which is the form of all virtues (cf. below, 559), exists in man, his virtues are called formed; but once charity has been lost, the other virtues, and notably faith and hope, are called unformed.

2. Intellectual, moral, theological virtues.

¹¹² Cf. St. Chrysostom, Hom. 13 de statuis.

¹¹³ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 63, a. 1, and below n. 473.

457. Intellectual virtues¹¹⁴ are called those which perfect man with respect to the knowledge of truth, whether practical or speculative.¹¹⁵ Five are enumerated by Aristotle and St. Thomas, namely understanding, science, wisdom, prudence, art.

The virtue of understanding¹¹⁶ is a habit perfecting the faculty of intellect for knowing first principles perfectly. For the intellective faculty of man from birth is as it were a blank tablet. By means of sensitive perception, ideas gradually come into the intellective faculty. But if that faculty shall have attained the habit of clearly and intimately knowing first practical principles, then it has acquired the so-called virtue of understanding, which is called synteresis.

The virtue of science¹¹⁷ is a habit perfecting man's rational faculty for logically deducing conclusions from known principles, for example the science of Moral Theology.

The virtue of wisdom¹¹⁸ is a habit perfecting the intellective faculty for considering all things, whether principles or conclusions, insofar as they have relation to the highest cause. "Therefore the virtue of wisdom contains under itself both the virtue of understanding and the virtue of science."¹¹⁹ Truly and perfectly wise is called that man who not only knows that God is the principle and end of all things and actions, but also directs all his actions according to this knowledge; which St. Bernard¹²⁰ briefly states in these words: "It belongs to the wise man, in those things which have been created, to look upon God as the end for which they have been created."

The virtue of prudence¹²¹ is commonly defined: "right reason of things to be done,"¹²² or an intellective habit directive of human actions according to right reason in every event. Prudence is called the charioteer of all the virtues; for it directs all moral virtues; hence no moral virtue can exist without prudence, but neither can the virtue of prudence exist without the moral virtues.¹²³ Prudence according to its essence is an intellectual virtue, for it perfects man's practical intellect, in which it also resides; but according to matter it is a moral virtue, because it directs human or moral acts to the ultimate end.¹²⁴ Below there will be a special tract on prudence.

The virtue of art¹²⁵ is right reason of things to be made.¹²⁶ Things to be made are distinguished from things to be done. For things to be made are actions physically considered and especially external works, for example to paint, to sing; but things to be done are human actions morally considered, insofar as they conduce to the ultimate end and receive their norm from the eternal law.

Intellectual virtues, with the single exception of prudence, are not perfect virtues. For it belongs to perfect virtue to render man morally good, as is clear from the second Aristotelian definition given above, n. 444. But intellectual virtues indeed produce works good in themselves and make the power of the intellect good or right,¹²⁷ yet they do not necessarily render the man himself good. Thus, for example, someone can paint from a perfect habit of art and nevertheless be a man without good morals. - Intellectual virtues are to be esteemed at their just price, that is, neither with the exaggeration of many men of our age, who think that the whole perfection of man consists in the so-called culture of the spirit, nor with the undervaluing of Wyclif and certain Lutherans. Hence the Council of Constance¹²⁸ condemned the error (29) of Wyclif saying: "Universities, studies, colleges, graduations, and masterships in them were introduced by vain paganism; they profit the Church just as much as the devil."

¹¹⁴ Spiritual virtues, διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί; cf. Aristotle, Ethic. Nicom. 1, c. 13, 1103.

¹¹⁵ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 58, a. 3.

¹¹⁶ νοῦς.

¹¹⁷ ἐπιστήμη.

¹¹⁸ σοφία.

¹¹⁹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 57, a. 2 ad 2.

¹²⁰ Sermo 3 de Pentec. n. 4.

¹²¹ φρόνησις.

¹²² Aristotle, Ethic. l. 6, c. 5; S. theol. 2, 2, q. 47, a. 2, arg. Sed contra.

¹²³ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 58, a. 4 and 5.

¹²⁴ Cf. ib. a. 3 ad 1; 2, 2, q. 181, a. 2 ad 3.

¹²⁵ τέχνη.

¹²⁶ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 57, a. 4.

¹²⁷ Ib. a. 1.

¹²⁸ Sess. 8 (Denz. n. 609).

458. Moral virtues are habits, whether acquired by good acts or infused together with sanctifying grace, which perfect the powers of man for acting rightly concerning those things which are means to the ultimate end. Already from the most ancient times¹²⁹ all moral virtues were commonly reduced to four principal ones, namely to prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. But St. Ambrose¹³⁰ seems to have been the first among the Holy Fathers who called the four above-praised virtues cardinal: "And indeed we know that the cardinal virtues are four: temperance, justice, prudence, fortitude." St. Thomas¹³¹ teaches that these virtues can be called cardinal or principal under a twofold respect, namely either because they are certain general conditions necessary for any virtue whatsoever, or because they concern the more principal moral matters.

As to the first, in every virtue there are required a) prudent discretion, so that man neither exceeds nor falls short; b) rectitude of soul, or justice; c) fortitude, lest man be drawn back from the exercise of virtue by dangers or difficulties; d) temperance, lest man be carried away by passions.

But as to the second sense, there are four more principal moral matters, namely the command itself of reason, concerning which prudence is occupied; external operations, concerning which justice is occupied; the passions of the irascible part, concerning which fortitude is occupied; and finally the passions of the concupiscible part, concerning which temperance is occupied.

A third respect can also be assigned: the four cardinal virtues, whether infused or acquired, greatly serve for healing the four wounds inflicted on us from original sin; for prudence drives away ignorance in the intellect; justice represses malice in the will; fortitude removes or at least diminishes weakness in the irascible part; and finally temperance restrains concupiscence in the concupiscible part.

¹²⁹ The quaternary number of moral virtues was already established by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle (cf. Ziegler, Die Ethik der Griechen und Romer, 88). But Cicero enumerates the four moral virtues in explicit words: "It [simple honesty] therefore has four parts: prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance" (De invent. 2, c. 53; cf. also De officiis 1, c. 5). Sacred Scripture indicates the same moral virtues not obscurely (Wis. 8, 7): "And if anyone loves justice, her labors have great virtues; for she teaches sobriety (σωφροσύνη, that is, temperance), and prudence (φρόνησις), and justice (δικαιοσύνη), and virtue (ἀνδρεία, that is, fortitude), than which nothing is more useful to men in life." In the tract De sacramentis (l. 3, c. 2 [Migne, Patr. lat. 16, 453]), which is falsely ascribed to St. Ambrose, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit are called cardinal virtues.

¹³⁰ Expos. in Luc. l. 5, n. 49 and 62 (Migne, Patr. lat. 15, 1738).

¹³¹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 61, a. 4.

459. Theological virtues are those which a) have God as their direct object, formal and final, and which b) are infused into us and revealed by God alone.¹³² Moral virtues are occupied with the means to the supernatural end; but theological virtues directly attain God himself, our ultimate end. There are three theological virtues, namely faith, hope, charity. For first it is required that we know God supernaturally, which is done through faith; second, that we tend efficaciously into the same God, which is done through hope; third, that we be intimately joined with him by affection already on this earth, which is done through charity.

¹³² Ib. q. 62, a. 1.