Question One: On the Essence of Virtue

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 55; 56, a. 3; 57, a. 1; 65, a. 2; De Virt. q. 1, a. 1 and 2.

576. Virtue according to the name (ischys, dynamis, deugd) is derived from force, and therefore designates the perfection of an operative power or a completed power.¹ Hence:

¹ "Virtue according to the account of its name designates the complement of a power; whence also force is so called according as some thing, through the complete power which it has, can follow its impulse or motion; for virtue, according to its name, designates the perfection of power." Q. D. de Virt. q. 1, a. 1.

1. natural powers, since they are wholly determined to one thing, are from themselves perfectly disposed to operation, and therefore are called virtues of nature (a. 1). But

2. powers indifferent to many and diverse things, such as rational powers, can from themselves be disposed better through habit, and therefore in them the power is distinguished from its perfection; and virtue in them is a habit (a. 1). But since

3. true perfection does not consist except in good, it follows that virtue is a good operative habit (a. 3). Whence Aristotle: Virtue is that which makes the one having it good and renders his work good (II Eth., c. 6; VII Phys., c. 3);

4. we are treating of human virtue, which is proper to man, and which therefore is a good rational operative habit (a. 2).

577. Virtue is defined in words gathered from St. Augustine: A good quality of mind by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us.² There is indicated:

² Cf. c. Iul. IV, 3; de Lib. Arb. II, 19; ep. 105; and sermon XXVI on Ps. 118.

1. the genus: quality, because it is of the genus of habits; nevertheless it would be better to say habit, which is the proximate genus;

2. the specific difference: good, by which it is specifically distinguished from bad habits;

3. the subject: of mind, because human virtue resides in reason or in a power moved by reason;

4. the end of virtue, namely, operation: a) by which one lives rightly, that is, by which man operates conformably to reason, so that it may be indicated that it is a properly operative habit, and that it may be distinguished from habits which always have themselves toward evil; b) which no one uses badly, by which it is distinguished from habits which are sometimes toward good, sometimes toward evil, such as opinion or human faith. Hence virtue cannot be a principle productive of an evil act, and an act of virtue cannot be evil, for virtue does not flow into an evil act. Namely, no one can make virtue produce an evil act; no one can, by using virtue as a principle, produce an evil work; - nevertheless someone can use virtue badly as an object, as for example when he is proud of it or hates it, but that act does not proceed from virtue as from an operative principle;

5. the efficient cause is added: which God works in us without us, that is, without us as efficient causes, not however without us, as adults, consenting, or disposing ourselves through the help of grace; this is true of infused supernatural virtue, of which Augustine speaks. If these last words are omitted, there is had a definition common to all acquired and infused virtues (a. 4).

That this definition is real, that is, that such virtues are in fact given, will be shown throughout the whole treatise.

578. Virtue renders a power perfect. - Hence:

1. Not every good habit is a virtue, but only that which includes no imperfection; whence opinion, human faith or hope, continence, and constancy³ are not virtues (q. 58, a. 3, ad 2).

³ St. Thomas, using the terminology of Aristotle, says perseverance, but it is better called constancy, so that it may be distinguished from perseverance strictly so called, which is a virtue properly so called (II-II, q. 137, a. 1 and 3). On continence, cf. II-II, q. 155, a. 1.

2. Nor are those good habits virtues which serve the action of the principal power: for until the principal power, which consummates the work, is well disposed to operation, man will not yet be perfectly disposed to it, nor therefore will the operation be perfect. Therefore only the habit which inheres in the principal power, consummative of the good work, is called virtue. Hence it is said by Aristotle: the disposition of the perfect to the best,⁴ that is, a stable disposition of a power perfectly instructed for exercising its operation in the best way.

⁴ "Virtues are certain dispositions of that which is perfect in its nature toward the best, that is, toward the end, which is operation. For, as has been said, virtues of this kind are so called from this, that they make the one having them good and render his work good." St. Thomas, in VII Phys. c. 3, text. 17. Cf. II Eth. c. 6, and I-II, q. 55, a. 4; q. 56, a. 5; q. 58, a. 3, ad 2.

579. The notion of virtue is analogical, and therefore it does not belong equally perfectly to all, nor is it said of all in the same sense. For certain virtues render man perfect under some respect only, and therefore are called virtues in a qualified sense; - certain virtues render man good simply, insofar as he is man, and therefore are called simply and properly so called; to them belongs in the full sense the definition of Aristotle: virtue is that which makes the one having it good and renders his work good. Hence:

A. In the natural order and for philosophers: merely intellectual virtues (arts and sciences), which render man good under some respect only, namely, as to the good of one power, for example, which make a good architect, a good philosopher, etc., are called virtues in a qualified sense; but moral virtues render man simply perfect under the account of the good (namely, the honorable), that is, as to the good of the whole man, and make a good man, and therefore they are called virtues simply so called or simply human virtues. Their difference is twofold:

a) the former, although they give aptitude for operating well, nevertheless do not incline to using their aptitude; whence he who does not use his art is not on that account judged a more imperfect artisan; the latter incline man to use his aptitude rightly; whence he who does not posit just or temperate acts does not have justice or temperance;

b) the former do not render man morally good, nor incline him to living honorably; the latter, on the contrary, do; whence they reside in the will or in a power as moved by the will (q. 57, a. 1; 56, a. 3).

B. In the supernatural order and for theologians: virtues in a qualified sense are those which render man good as to a particular end (or an ultimate end in some genus), for example, temperate, just, believing, etc.; virtues simply and properly so called are those by which man is perfected as to the supernatural ultimate end. Whence natural and philosophical virtues, even those strictly so called, are not in the perfect state of virtue nor are they called by theologians virtues simply so called, unless in fact they are habitually ordered to the ultimate end, which is done through charity: then they are called perfect or formed; but if they inhere in a man turned away from the ultimate end, they are called imperfect virtues or unformed, since there is lacking to them the ultimate or supreme perfection or form of morality. Formed virtues are virtues in the fullest sense (q. 65, a. 2).

580. Observation. - Just as in a good or evil human act (and in passion), so also in a moral habit, virtue and vice, a twofold element can be distinguished:

1. the material and physical, which is only the inclination or physical propensity to acting well or badly;

2. the formal or moral, which is the ordination of reason, namely, a permanent deliberate adhesion to the object as good or evil, which perfects the habit in the moral being of virtue or vice.

Hence when a sinner is converted, that which has the formal account of vice is taken away from the evil habit, but not the material propensity, although it is diminished and impeded; whence the vice remains only as to the material element, in a certain state of destruction. And likewise when a virtuous man sins gravely against the object of the virtue, he loses the formal element of virtue, but the good acquired habit remains as to its material element.⁵

⁵ "Infused and acquired virtue are not of the same species. Whence since a habit generated from the frequency of works of sin is contrary to acquired virtue, it is not directly contrary to infused virtue, which has opposition to sin from that part by which it is an offense of God. Whence it is not necessary that, as soon as the infused virtues have been restored, the habits of vices be totally taken away, although they are impeded and also diminished." St. Thomas, IV Sent., d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4. - "And although an acquired habit is not corrupted through a simple act, nevertheless an act of contrition has this, that it corrupts a habit of vice generated, from the power of grace. Whence in him who had a habit of intemperance, when he is contrite, there does not remain with the infused virtue of temperance a habit of intemperance in the account of habit, but on the way to corruption, as a certain disposition. But a disposition is not contrary to a perfect habit." Q. D. de Virt., a. 10, ad 16.

581. Corollary. - The followers of Americanism contradict the proposed doctrine; their ideas are found latent among certain persons even in Germany, France, and England. They are said to have distinguished two genera of virtues, namely, active virtues and passive virtues, or: manly virtues, such as independence of self, cultivation of one's own personality, duties toward neighbor; and womanly virtues, such as humility, patience, meekness, abnegation of self, full confidence in God. Moreover, natural virtues seem rather to have the active virtues, which answer more aptly to the customs and necessities of the present age; but Christian and supernatural virtues seem rather to have passive virtues, which no longer agree with the present time as they did in the Middle Ages.

This doctrine was condemned by Leo XIII, in the letter of January 22, 1899 to Cardinal Gibbons. And deservedly; for it contradicts:

1. Scripture, where Prov. XVI, 32 says: "The patient man is better than the strong"; and Christ, our exemplar, is shown as meek and humble (Matt. XI, 29), and obedient (Phil. II, 5, 8), and crucified for the mortification of the flesh, on which account those who are Christ's have crucified their flesh with its vices and concupiscences (Gal. V, 24).

2. Reason. For a) a virtue cannot be passive, for as Leo XIII says, "virtue is the perfection of a power...; the end of a power is act, and the act of virtue is nothing other than the good use of free will";

b) furthermore, that natural virtues are to be preferred to supernatural ones and are of greater efficacy or fecundity cannot be understood, because nature, with grace acceding, is not made weaker, but is perfected. Whence also the saints, from humility, obedience, and abstinence, were made powerful in work and word.

3. Experience. It is established that to exercise passive virtues is of greater labor than to acquire active virtues; furthermore, it is known that from the exercise of those virtues great fruits have come both to individuals and to society, as Leo XIII shows.

4. Finally, it contradicts the very doctrine on the connection of virtues among themselves, with which it fits badly and can scarcely agree.⁶

⁶ Cf. Analecta S. O. P., vol. IV, p. 68; Weiss, Die Kunst zum Leben, XII, n. 2; Hugon, Vertus actives et vertus passives, in Revue Thomiste, 1908.