Article Second. On the Distinction of Moral Virtues.

258. The specific distinction of moral virtues is taken from their formal object. For every moral virtue turns about an honorable good; therefore as many virtues specifically diverse will have to be distinguished as there are special reasons of the honorable good about which virtue turns; but the special honesty which any virtue pursues is its formal object.

The diverse reasons of honesty or of the honorable good are found either in operations which are toward another, or in moderating the passions; therefore there are two great genera of moral virtues: virtues which turn about operations toward another, as justice and those which are annexed to it, and virtues which turn about the passions, as fortitude and temperance and those which are annexed to these.

259. Among moral virtues there are four which are called cardinal or principal: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, to which all other virtues are reduced as parts annexed to them.

a. They are called cardinal because among the virtues they are chief and in the moral life of man very necessary and very commonly used, just as in a door the hinge is the chief thing, on which the door turns and on which its use depends.

St. Ambrose is said to be the author of this name (l. 5. in Luc. 6, 20). Sacred Scripture commemorates them where concerning divine wisdom it says: It teaches sobriety (temperance) and prudence, and justice and virtue (fortitude), than which nothing is more useful in life to men;¹ but wisdom (God) teaches these virtues by infusing them.

b. Their number is taken both from the fourfold object (honesty, honorable good) about which they turn, and from the fourfold subject in which they are principally present.

a. Object. In order that man may act in all things according to virtue or according to right reason, first he must judge rightly concerning the things which are to be done, which happens through prudence; then he must preserve the order of reason toward others, which happens through justice; then he must preserve the order of reason toward himself, both by overcoming difficulties which draw back from right reason, which happens through fortitude, and by moderating the passions which in the use of created things incite one to acting against the order of reason, which happens through temperance.²

Briefly, St. Thomas sets forth the object of the moral virtues in this way: prudence, which bears the light before the others, is in things to be chosen; justice in things to be distributed; fortitude in things to be endured; temperance in things to be used.³

b. Subject. Prudence is in the intellect, justice in the will, fortitude in the irascible sensitive appetite, temperance in the concupiscible sensitive appetite.

Nevertheless all moral virtues are also in the will as in a subject, because their acts are either elicited or commanded by the will. Hence some virtues (such as prudence, fortitude, temperance) are in a twofold power, and consequently a complete virtue consists of two habits, of which one is in the will, the other in the intellect or in the sensitive appetite; but each constitutes morally one virtue because of the relation by which one habit is ordered to the other.

¹ Wis. 8, 7.

² Summa I. II. q. 61. a. 2.

³ Summa I. II. q. 61. a. 4.

260. Annexed parts of the cardinal virtues. According to St. Thomas, to each cardinal virtue there pertain three classes of moral virtues which are its annexed parts, as a whole has annexed parts: for some virtues are subjective parts of the cardinal virtues, others integral parts, others potential parts.

a. Subjective parts of a virtue are called those which are referred to it as species to a genus;

b. integral parts are called those which are required so that virtue may be integral, or so that it can operate more easily and more perfectly;

c. potential parts are called those which indeed are akin to the cardinal virtue, but in some respect fall short of the perfect nature of that virtue. They are called potential parts as if not having the whole power of the principal virtue.

261. Diverse perfection of virtues. Virtues are not all of the same dignity and perfection; nevertheless their greater or lesser perfection cannot be determined absolutely: for under one respect this virtue, under another respect another, is of greater perfection.

a. If the object is regarded, theological virtues are more perfect than moral virtues, because the immediate object of the former, both material and formal, is God himself, the ultimate end; but the immediate object of the latter is not God, but a created good, not the ultimate end, but a means to the end.

b. Among the cardinal virtues, under some respect prudence is most perfect, both because it directs all the other virtues and is the leader of all, in that it assigns to each the mean which they must hold, and because it perfects the intellect, not the will; but according to St. Thomas the intellect is more perfect than the will.

Under another respect, however, justice occupies the first place among the cardinal virtues, both because its works fulfill obligations which are owed to God and neighbor, and because it perfects the will, since its subject is the will; on the contrary, fortitude and temperance perfect the lower appetite, since their subject is the sensitive appetite; besides, their works render what man owes to himself.

Under another respect finally, among moral virtues obedience stands out: for if that virtue is called more perfect which offers a greater good to God, obedience must be called the most perfect moral virtue, because through it man offers the noblest good which he possesses, his will.

c. Finally, among the virtues of justice those are more excellent whose remote and mediate object (the object to whom) is God, namely those which fulfill an obligation owed to God, of which kind are religion, which exhibits due worship to God; penance, which satisfies for an offense and injury inflicted upon God; obedience, which executes the will of God.¹

¹ Cf. St. Thomas I. II. q. 66. II. II. q. 141. a. 8. II. II. q. 161.