Article I. On the notion of virtue

On The Notion Of Virtue.²⁷

²⁷ St. Thomas, l. c. q. 55-70; Billuart, Dissert. de virtutibus; E. Muller, Theol. mor. I, § 104-123; Billot, De virtutibus infusis; Chr. Pesch, Prael. dogm. VIII de virtutibus; Gopfert, Moraltheol. I, § 423 sqq.; Marc, Instit. mor. I, n. 379 sqq.

443. Diverse acceptations. The name of virtue is not taken in one sense by different authors. Among those multiple acceptations the following seem more notable; namely, virtue is named:

1. Strength and power (ἰσχύς, δύναμις), in which sense we speak of attractive, executive, material virtue, etc., and in Sacred Scripture it is said: "A giant shall not be saved in the multitude of his strength."²⁸

2. Some species of Angels, who are as it were personified virtues. Hence it is said: God "set" Christ "on his right hand in the heavenly places, above all principality, and power, and virtue, and dominion."²⁹

3. Potency by opposition to act and form. Thus it is customary to say: the intellective soul contains virtually that which the sensitive soul has formally.

4. Goodness and perfection, or something praiseworthy. Wherefore St. Thomas³⁰ says: "Virtue names a certain perfection," and: "Commonly, however, every thing that is good and praiseworthy in human acts and passions is called virtue."³¹

5. Miracle. Hence the operation of virtues is the same as the operation of miracles.³²

6. A good operative habit. In this last sense alone we now speak of virtues. Socrates, Plato, and others taught that "all virtues are prudences," and therefore that man cannot sin as long as true knowledge exists in him, and consequently that every sin arises from ignorance. St. Thomas refutes this opinion,³³ because it is manifestly clear that certain sins are committed not because of ignorance, but from certain knowledge and after serious deliberation. According to the same St. Thomas,³⁴ "it belongs to the account [that is, to the essence] of human virtue that it be an operative habit," and "human virtue, which is an operative habit, is a good habit and operative of good."

²⁸ Ps. 32, 16.

²⁹ Eph. 1, 20 sq.

³⁰ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 55, a. 1.

³¹ Cf. ib. 2, 2, q. 144, a. 1.

³² Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 111, a. 4, and 2, 2, q. 178, a. 1 ad 1.

³³ Ib. 1, 2, q. 58, a. 2.

³⁴ Ib. q. 55, a. 2 and 3.

444. Definition. Several definitions are assigned for virtue taken in this last sense. The principal ones are three Aristotelian and one Augustinian.³⁵

1. Virtue is the disposition of what is perfect toward the best. Thus Aristotle,³⁶ signifying that virtue is a certain habitual disposition of some perfect, that is complete, nature or power toward its best, that is, toward operation. For nature and power are given by the Creator for performing operations, and they are then best when they can exercise their operations promptly, easily, and delightfully. But this happens if they are adorned with fitting virtues.³⁷

2. Virtue is that which makes the one having it good and renders his work good. This definition, often used by Aristotle³⁸ and after him by St. Thomas,³⁹ is excellent if it is understood of moral virtue; but it cannot without limitation be used of intellectual virtue, as will be said below, n. 457. For moral virtue produces a twofold goodness, that is, on the part of the subject which it perfects, and on the part of the work which it makes good. But that moral virtue renders morally good the man who has it arises from this, that he who perfectly has one moral virtue also possesses all the others, because moral virtues are connected, as will be said below, n. 464. Moreover, he who possesses all the virtues is a morally good man. But that a work performed from virtue is good is clear of itself.⁴⁰

3. Virtue (moral) is an elective habit consisting in the mean of reason, as the wise man will have determined. Thus Aristotle⁴¹ and several times St. Thomas.⁴² For moral virtue must in acts avoid defect as much as excess. And therefore the common adage says: "In the middle is virtue." For example, the virtue of liberality is then and only then present when a man, with all circumstances considered, gives money or other goods neither too abundantly, for this would be prodigality, nor too sparingly, which indeed would be avarice. But in particular cases to determine precisely in what the mean consists is not easy; rather, a sufficiently great wisdom is required for this. Hence in the definition there is added: "as the wise man will have determined." Often also it is said by the Scholastics that moral virtues require the mean of reason, which signifies: by right reason it must be determined in what the due mode and measure of actions consist.

4. Virtue is a good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us.

This definition, composed from diverse places of St. Augustine,⁴³ is proposed as best by St. Thomas⁴⁴ and other theologians.

It is said 1. good quality, by which words the genus and difference of the thing defined are indicated. For the genus of virtue is quality; but the difference is good. "Yet the definition would be more fitting if habit were put in place of quality, which is the proximate genus."⁴⁵ For since quality is something generic, under which four species are contained: a) habit and disposition, b) potency and impotence, c) passion and passible quality, d) form and figure,⁴⁶ habit is a special quality, namely one difficult to move, by which one operates easily, promptly, and delightfully. But in reality every perfect virtue is a quality difficult to move. For just as virtue is not acquired except by repeated acts, so neither is it usually lost by one act. Concerning the loss of virtues, a more explicit discussion will return below, n. 465 and 476. Through the mediation of virtue man performs good works easily, promptly, and delightfully. These words indeed do not signify that the virtuous man suffers no difficulties at all in the exercise of works, but only that he acts more easily, promptly, and delightfully than if he did not have the virtues. But the reason why facility, promptitude, and delight in acting arise from virtue possessed is that virtue is a habit. But a perfect habit is as it were a second nature. And those things which happen according to nature are done easily, promptly, and with delight.

It is said 2. of mind, that is, of a power essentially, or at least participatively, rational, whether it be the mind or intellect, or the will, or the sensitive appetite, yet insofar as this is moved by the will. For every human virtue is in these powers as in its proper subject. The reason is that virtue is given for doing free good operations. Hence those powers of man which do not participate, at least in some way, in liberty are not the subject of virtues, as for example the eyes, ears, members of the body, and internal senses. In which faculty the virtues are subjected will be said when there is special discussion of the individual virtues.

It is said 3. by which one lives rightly,⁴⁷ by which words the office and necessity of virtues are designated briefly indeed but forcefully. Therefore virtues consist neither in pure knowledge of the good, as several Stoics wished, nor in sterile affections, as Michael de Molinos and the Quietists taught, but in a right and operative life according to the eternal law and the other norms of morality. - Since a right life is wholly necessary for every man, it is necessary that virtue also be necessary for him. For for a right life it is required that man, notwithstanding diabolical, worldly, and carnal attacks, follow right reason perfectly, promptly, and constantly. This indeed certainly cannot be done without the help of virtues. - Yet to live rightly in this definition cannot be taken for moral rectitude alone, but for the rectitude of that power in which there is virtue. Therefore with respect to intellectual virtue, to live rightly is to attain truth. But since to attain truth is not simply a right life, this part of the definition belongs to intellectual virtues not so perfectly as to moral and theological virtues. Or more briefly: Intellectual virtues cause an expeditious faculty of acting well; but moral virtues besides this induce one to the right use of this faculty.⁴⁸

It is said 4. which no one uses badly, to distinguish virtue from other habits which man can abuse for evil, for example science, art, etc. But the Angelic Doctor rightly observes⁴⁹ that man can indeed abuse virtue as an object. Thus, for example, someone can hate virtue or be proud about it. But it is by no means possible that an act elicited by true virtue should be evil considered in itself. Thus, for example, an act of true liberality is always in itself good, as being conformed to right reason. Indeed, if that act were done for an evil end, for example to seduce a poor girl, it would be totally evil; but then neither would it be an act of the virtue of liberality, since liberality is the virtue moderating love of riches and rendering a man easy and prompt to spend them when right reason dictates. It would indeed be an act materially similar to acts of liberality, but the virtue of liberality would in no way flow into it. For it often happens that one and the same act, considered materially, is elicited or commanded by diverse habits.

It is said 5. which God works in us without us. This particle holds only for infused virtues; but if it is removed, the rest of the definition will be common to all virtues, and especially to moral virtues.

³⁵ For several other definitions of virtue, see St. Bonaventure (2, dist. 27, dub. 3) and Lactantius (Div. instit. l. 6, c. 5 [Migne, Patr. lat. 6, 649 sqq.]). Very worthy of note, because of its brevity and perfection, is that definition which St. Augustine gives, saying: "It seems to me that the true and brief definition of virtue is: order is of love" (De civ. Dei l. 15, c. 22; Migne, Patr. lat. 41, 467). Cf. also St. Thomas, S. theol. 1, 2, q. 62, a. 2 ad 3.

³⁶ Phys. l. 7, c. 3.

³⁷ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 123, a. 2 ad 1.

³⁸ Cf. e.g. Ethic. l. 2, c. 5 and 6.

³⁹ Cf. e.g. Quodl. 4, q. 2, a. 2.

⁴⁰ For a good explanation of this Aristotelian definition, see St. Thomas, Quaest. disp. de virtut. q. 1, a. 1.

⁴¹ Ethic. l. 2, c. 6: "Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ - ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν" - Virtue is a habit which deliberately consists in that mean which has been determined by reason, and indeed as the wise man will have determined.

⁴² For example, Quaest. disp. de virtut. q. 1, a. 13; S. theol. 1, 2, q. 64, a. 1.

⁴³ In various places and especially De libero arbitrio l. 2, c. 19; Contra Iulian. l. 4, c. 3.

⁴⁴ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 55, a. 4; Quaest. disp. de virt. q. 1, a. 2.

⁴⁵ Thus S. theol. l. c.

⁴⁶ Concerning all these, see S. theol. 1, 2, q. 49, a. 2.

⁴⁷ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 61, a. 1.

⁴⁸ This part of the definition, like the following part, does not belong necessarily to intellectual virtues.

⁴⁹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 55, a. 4 ad 3.